d. Again the Air Support Section contacted JOC and was informed

that any air support for the 7th Marines would have to be requested through the 1st Cavalry Division to which the 7th Marines were attached. [In fact, JOC notified DEVASTATE BAKER that any such requests from the 1st Marine Division would not be honored until the Division went back into action.][149]

[149] 1st MAW G-3 Staff Journal, 9 Apr, _op. cit._

During all this time ten Marine planes--six from VMF-311 and four from VMF-214--had reported in and out of the area. They had been sent by MELLOW to work under the control of Mosquito STRATEGY, the tactical air controller (airborne) (TACA) of the 1st Cavalry Division. The flights also supported the 6th ROK Division patrols on the Marines’ left, hit troops in a small settlement 3 miles to the Marines’ front, and aided the 7th and 8th Cavalry regiments which were encountering resistance on the commanding ground to the right. None of the flights supported the Marines.

Meanwhile, the 3/7 Marines employed artillery and tanks on the enemy positions, and late in the day a Mosquito brought in a flight of four Air Force F-80s. Major Hewitt’s report continued:

e. At the end of six (6) hours air support was finally received by the 7th Marines. It was brought in by a Mosquito who would not relinquish control of the aircraft to the Forward Air Controller who could see the target much better than the Mosquito.

f. After having the fighters make a couple of passes the Mosquito took the fighters and went to another target without having completely destroyed the position.

This was the beginning of a deterioration in air support for Marine ground forces that can be charged in large measure to the JOC system of control. Major Hewitt’s report was read with great interest by high-ranking Navy and Marine Corps officers. By now they were devoting a lot of thought to the breakup of the Marine air-ground team.