CHAPTER VII

Advance To The Chosin Reservoir

_Attacks on Wonsan-Hungnam MSR--Appraisals of the New Enemy--The Turning Point of 15 November--Changes in X Corps Mission--Marine Preparations for Trouble--Supplies Trucked to Hagaru--Confidence of UN Command--Marine Concentration on MSR_

On 4 November, while RCT-7 was at the height of its fight with the Chinese, the Division CP displaced from Wonsan to Hungnam. General Craig, the ADC, who inspected the area on the 2d, recommended the abandoned Engineering College on the western outskirts as the best location. During his visit he was shown a knoll outside the city where the bodies of some 200 Korean civilians were laid out in a perfect row. All had been victims of the retreating NKPA forces.[304]

[304] LtGen E. A. Craig, ltr, 20 Feb 56.

A location in Hamhung would have been preferred, but available sites were already taken by X Corps. General Smith flew to Hungnam by helicopter and opened the new CP at 1100 on the morning of the 4th. That evening a train carrying 160 officers and men of Headquarters Battalion and the Division staff arrived at 2130 from Wonsan. En route it had been fired on by guerrillas but no casualties resulted.[305]

[305] HqBn _SAR_, 10–11; Smith, _Notes_, 513–514; CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units, 2200 3 Nov 50; MajGen E. W. Snedeker Comments, 4 May 56.

A perimeter defense, consisting of two outposts and eight machine-gun positions, was set up to command all likely approaches to the new CP. Defensive wiring and trip flares were installed, with the gun positions and outposts being connected by telephone.

During these proceedings everyone was blissfully unaware of the existence of 250 tons of NKPA high explosive, stored only 600 yards from the CP in three connecting caves. Undiscovered for a week, this enemy cache was believed capable of demolishing the command post. A 16-man security detachment was placed on guard until the explosive could be removed and detonated.[306]

[306] HqBn _SAR_, 10–11; Smith, _Notes_, 513–514. Some explosive, too unstable to be moved, was left in the caves. Gen O. P. Smith ltr, 15 Apr 56.

_Attacks on Wonsan-Hungnam MSR_

Protection of the Wonsan-Hungnam MSR took on added importance as the 1st Marine Division speeded up its move to the north. This responsibility, it may be recalled, was shared by Division and Corps on 3 November in accordance with a decision by General Almond. The 1st Marines and elements of the 1st Tank Battalion maintained security from Wonsan 15 miles northward to Munchon, while the 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines was responsible from Hamhung southward to Chigyong. This left the 54-mile stretch between Chigyong and Munchon without any protection except the patrols of the Korean CIC agents and the Special Operations Company, USA, both under Corps control.

On 4 November this company reported that large numbers of North Koreans were moving into the area to the west. That same afternoon Corps notified Division that a group of mounted guerrillas had fired on railway police in the yards at Kowon, 15 miles north of Munchon.[307]

[307] Smith, _Notes_, 472–473; G-3 _SAR_, 21. The previous day an A/Tks patrol had killed an estimated 150 NKs in a short fire-fight west of Munchon. 1stTkBn, _SAR_, 12.

On 6 November, immediately after landing at Wonsan, the 65th RCT of the 3d Infantry Division (less one battalion, placed temporarily under 1st Marine Division control for the Majon-ni operation) was ordered by Corps to relieve elements of the 96th Field Artillery Battalion, USA, which had been recently sent to Yonghung. The Army RCT was assigned a mission of protecting the Yonghung-Kowon area and patrolling to the west (see map on Page 122).[308]

[308] CG X Corps msg X12075, 5 Nov 50; Dolcater, _3d Infantry Division in Korea_, 69; Smith, _Notes_, 473.

The Wonsan-Hamhung rail line took on special importance after the announcement that water transportation would be delayed until enemy mines were cleared from the harbor at Hungnam. This made it necessary for the 1st Marine Division to send daily supply trains from Wonsan.[309] The first two completed the run without incident, but after departing Wonsan at dusk on the 6th the third train was halted at Kowon by the destruction of rails ahead. North Korean guerrillas attacked the train, guarded by a lieutenant and 38 men from Company C of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion.[310]

[309] ComNavFE msg to CinCFE, 0010 12 Nov 50.

[310] The account of the guerrilla attack at Kowon is derived from: 1stAmphTracBn _SAR_, 5–6; 1stAmphTracBn _HD_, _Nov 50_, 3; Statement of Pvt Richard J. Foster, n. d.

The detachment was taken by surprise in the darkness by foes firing from both sides of the track. When the Marines attempted to reverse the train, the enemy wounded the engineer and put a hole in the boiler with grenades. In the darkness the guard became separated into two groups, the smaller of which was surrounded in a car. The guerrillas fired through the wooden sides, forcing the Marines to the floor, and threw grenades through the windows until all ten men were killed or wounded, only two of them surviving.

The remaining 29 men of the guard made a stand on an embankment about 200 yards from the track. Six Marines were wounded in the ensuing fire fight. The train guard broke off the action and withdrew to the area of the Army artillery battalion.

An empty train from Hamhung, guarded by a platoon from Company A of the Amtracs, was halted at 1700 on the afternoon of 6 November by railway officials at Yonghung. Reports of guerrilla activity in the area had proved to be only too well founded when elements of the 96th Field Artillery Battalion were attacked early that morning. Their perimeter south of the town was breached with losses to the Army unit of equipment and ammunition.

The 2d Battalion of the 65th RCT, which arrived at Yonghung late that afternoon, had its baptism of fire within a few hours. Guerrillas in estimated strength of 500 to 800 attacked at 0300 on the 7th, inflicting casualties of six killed and 14 wounded. Troops of the 96th Field Artillery Battalion also came under attack, as did elements of the 4th Signal Battalion, USA. Company D of the 1st Tank Battalion sent a Marine tank and “Weasel” (M-29) to evacuate the wounded with the assistance of the Amtrac platoon guarding the empty train at Yonghung.[311]

[311] G-3 _SAR_, 24; 1stTkBn _SAR_, 13.

At 1400 that afternoon the empty train resumed its run to Wonsan. Only two miles had been covered when the locomotive and six cars were derailed by a split rail and wrecked just south of Yonghung. Personnel losses amounted to one man killed and 14 injured.[312]

[312] The description of this fight at Yonghung is based upon: 1stAmphTracBn _SAR_, 5–6; 1stAmphTracBn HD, _Nov 50_, 3; Dolcater _3d Infantry Division in Korea_, 69; G-3 _SAR_, 24; X Corps _POR 42_; and _1stMarURpt (S-3) 9_; D/Tks tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0955 8 Nov 50.

At almost exactly this same hour the fourth supply train was stopped south of Kowon by a blown section of track. The guard proceeded on foot to investigate and encountered the depressing spectacle of the third supply train, abandoned by the enemy after being plundered. One ammunition car was still burning and in another riddled car the bodies of the trapped Marines were found. So extensive was the damage to tracks and switches that rail service could not be resumed until 9 November.[313]

[313] CO I Co [sic] 1stAmphTracBn tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 2215 7 Nov 50; Smith, _Notes_, 475–478.

The Corps commander summoned General Smith to Wonsan that morning for a conference on measures for the security of the rail line. It was decided that only daytime runs would be made thereafter, with the train guard increased from 38 to 50 men. The 65th RCT, the 26th ROK Regiment and a battery of the 96th Field Artillery Battalion were placed under the temporary control of the 1st Marine Division with a mission of guarding bridges and other key points.[314]

[314] Smith, _Notes_, 475–478; CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_ 7 Nov 50.

General Smith worked out a plan for the ROK regiment to drive the guerrillas southward from the Chigyong area toward the 65th RCT at Yonghung. As it proved, elements of both units were given Corps commitments which prevented this maneuver from being put into effect. They remained only a few days under nominal Division control, being used for a variety of security missions along the Wonsan-Hamhung MSR.[315]

[315] Smith, _Notes_, 475–478; CG X Corps msg X12270, 9 Nov 50.

By 9 November, when the Division supply trains resumed their runs, 95 loaded cars had accumulated at Wonsan. The 1st Combat Service Group continued to route supplies northward from the railhead at the Wonsan airfield. Corps orders required troops to ride in open gondola cars.[316]

[316] 1st CSG _SAR_, 8.

_Appraisals of the New Enemy_

It is understandable that an atmosphere of uncertainty should have enveloped military decisions of this period. With the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the UN command groping their way through a fog of war, division commanders in Korea could not be expected to see very far ahead.

Disconcerting as it had been to have the Chinese appear in the first place, it was even more disturbing to have them break off contact and vanish so inexplicably. Nevertheless, General MacArthur and his staff had a fairly accurate idea of CCF numbers at this time. On 2 November the UN command estimated that 16,500 Chinese Communist soldiers had crossed the Yalu and 450,000 CCF regulars were in Manchuria. Three days later, Major General Charles A. Willoughby’s intelligence summary warned that the Chinese had the potential to start a large-scale counteroffensive.[317]

[317] GHQ/UNC msgs 2977 and 2979, 3 and 5 Nov 50, as cited in Schnabel, _Korean Conflict_.

General MacArthur, reporting to the United Nations for the first half of November, stated that 12 CCF divisions had been identified in Korea, indicating a total of perhaps 100,000 troops. Nine of these units had appeared on the Eighth Army front and three in the X Corps zone north of Hamhung.

“At the same time,” the report continued, “United Nations aerial reconnaissance disclosed heavy troop movements near the border, in Manchuria, and into Korea.”[318]

[318] Ninth Report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea, for the Period 1 to 15 November 1950 in Dept State, _United Nations Action in Korea_ (Washington, 1951), 9.

Quite as important as the new enemy’s numbers was the question of his intentions. Did the CCF divisions consist merely of so-called volunteers making a demonstration to encourage the beaten _NKPA_ remnants? Or were the Chinese contemplating an all-out military intervention?

President Truman asked JCS on 4 November to obtain from General MacArthur an estimate of the situation.[319] The general’s reply stated that it was “impossible to authoritatively appraise the actualities of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea.” He recommended “... that a final appraisement should await a more complete accumulation of military facts.”[320]

[319] C/S USA msg 95790, 3 Nov 50; Truman _Memoirs_ II, 373.

[320] Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 373; CinCFE msg C68285, 4 Nov 50.

During the next three days the issue of bombing bridges across the Yalu posed a question that has remained a controversial subject ever since. General MacArthur was granted permission, after being at first refused, but cautioned “that extreme care be taken to avoid violation [of] Manchurian territory and airspace.”[321]

[321] CinCFE msg C68396, 6 Nov 50; JCS msg 95949, 6 Nov 50; JCS msg 95878, 5 Nov 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 375–376; Whitney, _MacArthur_, 405–411.

In two messages of 7 November, the UN commander confirmed his original appraisal to the effect that the Chinese were not making a full-scale intervention. But he conceded that reinforcements might enable the new enemy to stop the UN advance or even throw it into reverse. He planned a resumption of the initiative, he said, in order to take “accurate measure ... of enemy strength.” And he repeated that the restriction of his bombing operations provided “a complete sanctuary for hostile air immediately upon their crossing of the Manchuria-North Korean border.” This factor, he warned, could “assume decisive proportions....”[322]

[322] CinCFE msgs C68456 and CX68436, 7 Nov 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 377.

On this same date, with the wary phase of UN strategy at its height, General Almond flew to Hungnam to confer with General Smith. The X Corps commander still wore another hat as General MacArthur’s chief of staff; and though he could not function actively in this position, he kept in close touch with strategic aims at Tokyo. Thus the cautious spirit of the UN commander’s messages of 7 November was reflected in Almond’s changed viewpoint. Where he had previously urged haste in the X Corps drive to the border, he was now disposed to put on the brakes and carry out that mission with less scattering of forces.

The prospect of a winter campaign was discussed, and the Marine general recommended that only enough territory be held for the security of Hamhung, Hungnam and Wonsan. Almond believed that Hagaru should also be included, but he agreed that a greater degree of concentration was advisable.[323]

[323] Smith, _Notes_, 552–553.

As day after day passed without further CCF contacts of importance, however, operations again took on the character of an occupation rather than a drive which might end in a collision with a powerful new enemy.

X Corps OpnO 6, issued at 2400 on 11 November, called for an advance to the border by I ROK Corps on the right, the 7th Infantry Division in the center and the 1st Marine Division on the left. The 3d Infantry Division, with the 26th ROK Regiment attached, was to have the responsibility for the Wonsan-Yonghung area after relieving elements of the 1st Marine Division; the Marines were directed to take blocking positions at Huksu-ri and Yudam-ni. In the Corps rear, the 1st KMC Regiment (-) had a zone to the south and west of Kojo.

The Marine zone on the Yalu, about 40 miles in width, was approached and bounded by two roads branching off from the Changjin area. One of them ended at Huchanggangu and the other at Singalpajin. From that point the zone of the 7th Infantry Division extended east to Hyesanjin (where the border turns north at a right angle) and thence again eastward to the Hapsu area. I ROK Corps was to operate from the line Hapsu-Chuchonhujang and drive northward along the coast with Chongjin as an objective.[324]

[324] X Corps _OpnO 6_, 11 Nov 50.

Such a dispersion of forces, depending for supplies on poor secondary roads through wild mountain regions, could hardly have been contemplated if large-scale CCF opposition were expected. As a further indication of renewed confidence, General MacArthur asked informally and indirectly that X Corps do everything possible to assist the Eighth Army in its drive to the Yalu. This request was conveyed in a personal letter of 11 November from General Wright, G-3 of FECOM, to the Corps commander.[325]

[325] _X Corps Special Report on Chosin Reservoir, 27 Nov to 10 Dec 50, 9_; X Corps _WDSum, Nov 50_, 5.

_The Turning Point of 15 November_

The date of General Almond’s reply, the 15th, is worthy of recognition as a turning point. For it was also the occasion of messages from the UN commander-in-chief and the commanding general of the 1st Marine Division which had an effect on strategy. Indeed, the entire course of the Chosin Reservoir campaign was channeled into new directions as a result of the concepts advanced in these three communications of 15 November 1950.

Obviously the gap of 80 miles separating the Eighth Army from X Corps would have to be reduced before much help could be given by the latter. General Almond replied to General Wright in a letter proposing that X Corps attack to the west of the Chosin Reservoir while also continuing to advance northward in zone to complete its original mission.

That same day, while the letter was en route to Tokyo, General MacArthur came to a far-reaching decision. In a radio message he directed the X Corps commander to develop, as an alternative to OpnO 6, a plan for reorienting his attack to the west on reaching Changjin in order to cut the Chinese MSR, as represented by the Manpojin-Kanggye-Huichon road and rail line.

This was the first indicated change in mission, according to the X Corps command report, since CinCFE’s directive late in October calling for a drive to the border. The amendment “was made necessary,” the report continued, “by the enemy build-up in front of the Eighth Army and the fact that the enemy action had halted the first attempt ... to advance Eighth Army to the border. An estimate of the Eighth Army situation ... fixed the relative combat power as 100,000 UN to 100,000 enemy with UN forces having air superiority and superior artillery support.... The enemy was given an offensive capacity which he could implement with an estimated reserve of 140,000 CCF troops north of the Yalu River. In view of the enemy’s offensive capacity, Eighth Army adopted a conservative plan to make a general advance with the main effort in the center generally parallel to the enemy MSR (Huichon-Kanggye). This course of action was designed to meet any course of action which might be adopted by the enemy. To assist the Eighth Army advance, X Corps was to initiate a main attack to the West from the Chosin Reservoir area, cutting the enemy MSR at Mupyong-ni, and advance in a northwesterly direction to the Yalu River line at Manpojin.”[326]

[326] X Corps _WD Sum, Nov 50_, 4–5.

By a coincidence it was also on Wednesday, 15 November, that General Smith wrote a letter which foreshadowed future military events. Addressed to General Clifton B. Cates, Commandant of the Marine Corps, this communication made it plain that the 1st Marine Division commander and his staff did not share in the renewed optimism as to the course of the UN war effort. Not only did the Marines accept the possibility of imminent and formidable CCF intervention, but they were making preparations to meet it.

So far our MSR north of Hamhung has not been molested, but there is evidence that this situation will not continue....

Someone in high authority will have to make up his mind as to what is our goal. My mission is still to advance to the border. The Eighth Army, 80 miles to the southwest, will not attack until the 20th. Manifestly, we should not push on without regard to the Eighth Army. We would simply get further out on a limb. If the Eighth Army push does not go, then the decision will have to be made as to what to do next. I believe a winter campaign in the mountains of North Korea is too much to ask of the American soldier or marine, and I doubt the feasibility of supplying troops in this area during the winter or providing for the evacuation of sick and wounded.

The letter mentioned such preparations as the work done by Marine engineers to strengthen the Hamhung-Hagaru road for tanks and heavy vehicles. Plans had been approved, added General Smith, for an airstrip at Hagaru capable of landing cargo planes for resupply and casualty evacuation.

He emphasized that he did not mean to be pessimistic. “Our people are doing a creditable job,” he said; “their spirit is fine, and they will continue to do a fine job.” But in conclusion he reiterated his doubts about his “wide open left flank” and his concern over “the prospect of stringing out a Marine division along a single mountain road for 120 air miles from Hamhung to the border.”[327]

[327] MajGen O. P. Smith ltr to Gen C. B. Cates, 15 Nov 50. Gen Almond comments: “I am very mindful of the skepticism of General Smith in all of the supply plans that X Corps conceived and I sympathize with his viewpoint very thoroughly. However, in my mind there was always the assistance to be gained by air supply either drop or landing them and the counterpart of that, the evacuation to be expected by plane from the air field that we were to build.” Almond ltr, 22 Jun 56.

General Smith had no more than finished dictating his letter when two Navy officers called at the CP--Rear Admiral Albert K. Morehouse, chief of staff to Admiral Joy, and Captain Norman W. Sears, chief of staff to Admiral Doyle. Both were old acquaintances of the Marine general, who had led the assault landing force on Peleliu in 1944 while Sears commanded an LST group. Smith felt that he could speak frankly, therefore, and expressed his concern over the aspects of the strategic situation he had discussed in the letter.[328]

[328] Smith, _Chronicle_, 31.

CinCFE had requested in his message of the 1st that the plan for reorienting the X Corps attack be submitted to him as an alternative to OpnO 6. General Almond put his staff to work on the 16th, and that same day Draft No. 1, of OpnO Plan 8 was completed. This was a concept of an attack on Kanggye by means of a drive westward from Changjin.[329]

[329] This section is based on: X Corps _Special Report, Chosin Reservoir_, 9; and X Corps _WDSum, Nov 50_, 5–6, 51–52.

_Changes in X Corps Mission_

Almond disapproved the first draft on the grounds that the MSR of the Corps element making the effort would be too far extended. He requested the preparation of a new plan based on the concept of an advance farther south on the Hagaru-Mupyong-ni axis and west of the zone of the 1st Marine Division. The X Corps commander also directed:

(1) That the Hamhung-Hagaru road be developed as a Corps MSR with intensive effort on the part of Corps troops, including Corps engineers;

(2) That an RCT of the 7th Division be assigned the mission of seizing Changjin in order to protect the right flank of the 1st Marine Division.

The Corps commander considered that Changjin and Mupyong-ni were too widely separated as objectives to be assigned to a single division, not to mention the difficult terrain. His staff worked for four days on Draft No. 2 of OpnO Plan 8 before submitting it to him. He accepted it with several modifications and directed that the third draft be taken to Tokyo by Lieutenant Colonel John H. Chiles, the Corps G-3, for presentation to GHQ.

_Marine Preparations for Trouble_

General Smith, for his part, lost no time in putting into effect his preparations for trouble in the shape of a formidable CCF attack. The completion of mine clearance at Hungnam had opened that port on 15 November, thus easing the transportation situation. That same day the 7th Marines occupied Hagaru, being greeted by a temperature of four degrees below zero which threatened an early and bleak winter.

Only four days previously, X Corps OpnO No. 6 had directed the 1st Marine Division to take up blocking positions to the west, at Huksu-ri and Yudam-ni, while continuing the northward advance to the Yalu. This meant a further dispersion at a time when Smith hoped to reduce the 163 road miles separating his infantry battalions.

In order to carry out the Corps directives, Division OpnO 21-50 of 13 November assigned the following tasks:

RCT-1--to seize Huksu-ri;

RCT-7--to seize Hagaru, and, on order, to seize Yudam-ni;

RCT-5--to protect the MSR from positions at Majon-dong, Chinhung-ni and Koto-ri, while preparing to pass through RCT-7 in the Hagaru area and advance to Changjin (approximately 40 miles northward);

Division Reconnaissance Company--to screen the Division right flank by operating in the Soyang-ni-Sinhung valley to the east Division boundary.[330]

[330] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 21-50_, 13 Nov 50. The orders for the seizure of Hagaru and the 5th Mar’s movement of a battalion to Koto-ri had been issued in CG 1stMarDiv FragO, 2130 12 Nov 50. Hagaru was occupied without a fight at 1300 on the 14th. CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1437 14 Nov 50.

In connection with the mission of RCT-7, the words “on order” deserve special notice. For the commanding officer was directed by Smith’s oral instructions to take up blocking positions at Toktong Pass, about halfway between Hagaru and Yudam-ni, until additional units of the Division could be moved up to the Hagaru area. In other words, the Division commander believed that the possibilities of large-scale CCF intervention were such as to justify caution in the drive to Yudam-ni.[331]

[331] Smith, _Notes_, 592–594.

Not only would the concentration of the Marine units ease General Smith’s concern over the tactical situation; it would also greatly simplify the administrative load. Colonel Bowser has commented, “Division was faced with the problem of handling a division scattered from Wonsan and Majon-ni in the south to the heavy engagement of the 7th Mar in the north. Add to this the problem of guerrilla bandits between Wonsan and Hungnam/Hamhung as well as a completely unknown situation to the West, and you have a task of considerable magnitude for any division staff.”[332]

[332] Bowser Comments.

RCT-1 was delayed several days by lack of railway facilities in its move 70 miles northward to Chigyong after being relieved in the Wonsan area by the 3d Infantry Division.[333] But most of the other Marine units had been pulled up--a battalion or even a company at a time--as far as the Hungnam area. Along the new MSR north of Hamhung, the column of advance on 15 November consisted of these units:

[333] 1stMar _SAR_, 13.

Hagaru--RCT-7;

Koto-ri--2d Battalion, RCT-5;

Chinhung-ni--3d Battalion, RCT-5; Battery K, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines; Detachment 1st Ordnance Battalion; Detachment 1st Service Battalion; 1st and 2nd Platoons, Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion; Company B (less 3d Platoon), 1st Engineer Battalion;

Majon-dong--1st Battalion RCT-5; Company D, 1st Tank Battalion.

The Division command and staff took a dim view of the possibility of completing “the race to the Yalu” before winter. It was already too late, if sub-zero temperatures were any indication; and preparations must now be made for tactical and logistical support of a midwinter campaign in the mountains. Among the most essential provisions were the selection of a forward base, the construction of airstrips along the MSR, and the strengthening of the road to make it fit for tanks and heavy vehicles.

Hagaru, at the foot of the Chosin Reservoir, had been recommended by General Craig as the best location for a forward base when he visited here on the 15th. The commanding generals of the Division and Wing arrived for a tour of inspection the next day. General Harris made the trip at the express request of General Almond, who believed that a strip long enough to land R4Ds was necessary to insure resupply and casualty evacuation in a midwinter emergency. One of the few comparatively flat pieces of real estate in northeast Korea was found just south of the town. The black loam promised to make a hard surface in freezing weather, so that the prevailing arctic temperatures offered at least one consolation.[334]

[334] Smith, _Notes_, 614; LtGen F. Harris ltr, 24 Aug 56.

An OY strip had been completed on 13 November at Koto-ri, but heavier engineer equipment was needed at Hagaru. Before it could be brought forward, the road from Chinhung-ni to Koto-ri required strengthening and widening. This task had already been assigned to Lieutenant Colonel Partridge, commanding the 1st Engineer Battalion. After a survey by jeep, he decided to begin operations at the highest point of the one-way dirt road.

“By working down,” he explained, “we could first of all provide for what we considered to be a dangerous accumulation of snow, and the problem of land slides.... The work on the road involved a good bit of drainage in order to insure that the melting snows from day to day during the sunlight hours would not filter across and destroy the road bed. It involved demolitions and drilling and a good deal of dozer and grader work.”[335]

[335] LtCol J. H. Partridge interv by HistDiv, HQMC, 25 Jun 51, 31–32.

Enough progress had been made by 18 November so that armor could be sent forward to support RCT-7. Only the day before, the 1st Tank Battalion had begun functioning with its Headquarters and Service Companies at Soyang-ni, eight miles northwest of Hamhung. The road between Chinhung-ni and Koto-ri was still impassable for M-26 (Pershing) tanks until the engineers could widen some of the turns. But Lieutenant Colonel Harry T. Milne, the battalion commander, organized a provisional tank platoon consisting of two M4A3 (Sherman) tanks from Headquarters Company and four dozer tanks from Company D at Majon-dong. They proceeded without incident on the 18th to Hagaru, operating as a gun platoon.[336]

[336] 1stTkBn _SAR_, 18. 1stEngrBn had been ordered to prepare the MSR for tank use on 6 Nov. CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stEngrBn, 1530 6 Nov 50.

Opening the mountain road to heavy traffic made it possible on the 18th to begin work on the Hagaru airstrip. Five large dozers with pans of eight cubic yards capacity arrived at the site the next day, and Company D of the 1st Engineer Battalion tackled the job of hacking out a runway from ground frozen as hard as granite. Plans called for a cut of 90,000 cubic yards and a fill of 60,000 for a 3200-foot runway. The rub was that engineering field manuals prescribed a runway of 3600 feet for R4Ds or C-47s at sea level, plus an additional 1000 feet for each 1000 feet of altitude. And since Hagaru was about 4000 feet above sea level, it could only be hoped that pilots were right in estimating that a strip of 3000 to 4500 feet might do in a pinch.[337]

[337] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CG X Corps, 1229 18 Nov 50; Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 39–40.

The 19th also dated the establishment of the Supply Regulating Station at Hagaru for the purpose of building up stockpiles. Prior to this time, the 1st Service and 1st Ordnance Battalions had been in charge of division dumps at Hamhung. Supplies arrived by rail after being unloaded from the ships at Wonsan by the 1st Shore Party Battalion and the 1st Combat Service Group.

The completion of mine clearance made it possible to order the latter organization to Hungnam by sea to operate in-transit depots for X Corps. Practically all Division supplies were soon being received by sea at this port, where the 1st Combat Service Group separated the incoming cargo into proper classifications and forwarded it to the dumps at Hamhung. Port operation was the responsibility of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade, USA. After the project got into full swing, from 2000 to 2500 Korean laborers were employed at Hungnam and as many as 6000 tons of cargo unloaded in 24 hours.[338]

[338] Kenneth W. Condit, “Marine Supply in Korea,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, xxxvii, no. 1 (Jan 53), 53–54.

A limited amount of rolling stock was available for the narrow-gauge railway from Hungnam to Chinhung-ni. But it was up to the Marines to put the line back into operation, for the X Corps Railway Transportation Section already had its hands full with the Wonsan-Hamhung route. The 1st Service Battalion was authorized to make the attempt, and enough Korean crews were rounded up to operate the trains. Chinhung-ni thus became the railhead for supplies tracked the rest of the way to Hagaru.[339]

[339] _Ibid._

Preparations were also made for large-scale casualty evacuation to the Division hospital at Hungnam. H&S, A and B Companies of the 1st Medical Battalion remained there to set up the Division hospital while D, C and E Companies were attached to RCTs 1, 5 and 7 respectively. As the Division center of gravity shifted northward, medical officers foresaw the need of a hospital-type facility at Hagaru in addition to the clearing stations contemplated at Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni. Plans were approved, therefore, for Companies C and E to pool their resources at Hagaru and establish a medical supply dump. Additional surgical teams were to be flown to Hagaru in an emergency by Companies A and B from the hospital at Hungnam.

Meanwhile the hospital ship _Consolation_, commanded by Captain John W. McElroy, USNR, prepared to move from Wonsan to Hungnam. There the Division hospital had been enlarged to 400 beds, and an additional 100 to 150 were planned for the new annex at Hamhung. In order to speed up casualty evacuation, several heated railway cars were equipped for that purpose on the 35-mile narrow-gauge line from Chinhung-ni.[340]

[340] CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units, 2345 20 Nov 50; 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex HH (hereafter 1stMedBn _SAR_), 4–7.

_Supplies Trucked to Hagaru_

Provisions for the advance of RCT-5 east of the Chosin Reservoir were included in Division OpnO 22-50, issued at 0800 on 17 November. As a preliminary, RCT-7 was given a two-fold mission: (1) to protect the Division left flank between Hagaru and Yudam-ni with a minimum of a battalion; and (2) to relieve elements of RCT-5 and protect the MSR in zone from positions in the vicinity of Hagaru, Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni.

RCT-5 was assigned these missions: (1) to pass a minimum of a battalion through RCT-7 at Hagaru; (2) to move up the east side of the Chosin Reservoir and seize Sinhung-ni, about 7 miles northeast of Hagaru; and (3), on order, to seize the road junction at Kyolmul-ni, some 20 miles north of Hagaru.

Division Reconnaissance Company was to screen the left flank of the MSR in the vicinity of Majon-dong, and the 11th Marines to maintain its 4th Battalion in that area prepared for employment in the north on order.

OpnO 22-50 directed the Supply Regulating Detachment (1) to establish a truckhead at Hagaru after taking over and consolidating the dumps of RCT-7; (2) to control traffic between Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni; and (3) to support RCTs 5 and 7, with priority to RCT-5. The following supply levels were fixed:

Classes I and III, five days;

Class V, 1 Unit of fire;

Classes II and IV, as required for all troops operating to the north and west of Koto-ri.[341]

[341] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 22-50_, 17 Nov 50.

Although the advance westward to Huksu-ri remained the mission of RCT-1, the shortage of rail and motor transport slowed the movement from Wonsan to Chigyong. The last elements had not arrived on the 18th when Corps asked and received the consent of Division to the employment of the 26th ROK Regiment for the attack on Huksu-ri, with the understanding that the objective would be turned over to RCT-1 at a later date. On the morning of the 19th the ROK unit left Chigyong to execute its mission.[342]

[342] 1stMar _SAR_, 12; G-3 X Corps tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1220 18 Nov 50; 26thROK msg to 3dInfDiv, 1030 19 Nov 50.

Two days later RCT-1 was relieved of this responsibility when Corps verbally notified Division that Huksu-ri had been placed within the modified boundary of the 3d Infantry Division. This was confirmed the next day by X Corps OI 17, which also directed the Division to establish blocking positions at Yudam-ni.[343]

[343] Smith, _Notes_, 638–639; X Corps _OI 17_, 22 Nov 50. See also G-3 X Corps tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1850 20 Nov 50, in G-3 Journal, X Corps _WD_, 20 Nov 50.

Up to this time General Smith had not been able to make much progress toward Yudam-ni without dispersing his units to an extent which he regarded as imprudent. But with the availability of RCT-1 to occupy positions on the MSR behind the other two infantry regiments, he could now push ahead.

As an added factor, the 1st Marine Division had just acquired a new unit. Early in November Admiral Joy had inquired if General Smith could use the 41st Independent Commando, Royal Marines. This British unit of 14 officers and 221 enlisted men, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale, and attached to ComNavFE in Japan, had requested service with the U. S. Marines. Smith replied that he would be glad to have these fine troops. Highly trained in reconnaissance, they could operate with the Division Reconnaissance Company in protecting the flank of the Marine advance. The British Marines arrived at Hungnam on the 20th and reported to the 1st Marine Division.[344]

[344] Smith, _Notes_, 638–639; 1stMarDiv _POR 164_.

Division OpnO 23-50, issued at 0800 on the 23d, directed the Commandos to locate and destroy enemy forces on the left flank, ranging as far as 13 miles west of Koto-ri. It was hoped that the British unit and the Division Reconnaissance Company might flush out CCF troops beyond the reach of routine infantry patrols. Other tasks assigned to elements of the Division were as follows:

RCT-7--to seize Yudam-ni and maintain one battalion in that position;

RCT-5--to seize Kyolmul-li (20 miles north of Hagaru) and be prepared to seize Toksil-li (10 miles northwest of Kyolmul-li) and Tuan-di (15 miles northeast of Kyolmul-li) on order;

RCT-1--to relieve elements of RCT-7 in the vicinity of Hagaru and Koto-ri and protect the Division MSR from positions in the vicinity of Hagaru, Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni;

1st Tank Battalion (less detachments)--to protect the MSR from positions in the vicinity of Majon-dong and Soyang-ni;

1st Engineer Battalion--to support Division operations with priority to the maintenance of the MSR and construction of the airfield at Hagaru.

OpnO 23-50 also provided that the Supply Regulating Station Detachment continue operation of the truckhead at Hagaru and stock supplies at the following levels: Classes I and III, 8 days; Classes II and IV, as required; and Class V, one and one-third U/F for all troops operating to the north and west of Chinhung-ni.[345]

[345] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 23-50_, 23 Nov 50.

The trucking facilities of the Division had been strained to the limit ever since the Wonsan landing. Shortly afterwards the bulk of the 7th Motor transport Battalion was taken under the operational control of X Corps, and it became necessary to attach the 1st Motor Transport Battalion to RCT-7. On 19 November, however, the 1st MT (less detachments) had passed to the control of the 1st Supply Regulating Detachment at Hagaru. There the truckers not only built up the stockpile of supplies but rendered the best support that units of the division had known so far along the MSR.[346]

[346] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex II (hereafter 1st MTBn _SAR_), 4, 7; 7th MTBn _SAR_, 2–3.

_Confidence of UN Command_

General MacArthur did not appear to be shaken by EUSAK G-2 reports during the third week of November which called attention to a formidable CCF build-up on both sides of the Yalu. On the contrary, a UN order of the 20th, giving directions for the conduct of troops at the border, indicated that an occupation rather than a fight was expected:

Elements of minimum size only will be advanced to the immediate vicinity of the geographical boundary of Korea. No troops or vehicles will go beyond the boundary between Korea and Manchuria, or between Korea and the USSR, nor will fire be exchanged with, or air strikes be requested on forces north of the northern boundary of Korea. Rigid control of troop movements in vicinity of northern boundary will be exercised. _Damage, destruction or disruption of service of power plants will be avoided._ No personnel, military or civilian, will be permitted to enter or leave Korea via the Manchurian or USSR border. Commanders will insure that the sanctity of the international border is meticulously preserved.[347]

[347] CG X Corps msg X12811, 20 Nov 50. Italics added.

The italicized sentence emphasizes an assumption which had made converts in high State Department as well as Defense circles in Washington. The Chinese, according to this conjecture, were concerned chiefly with defending their Manchurian frontier and guarding the power complexes along the Yalu. As evidence, it was pointed out that early in November the Sinuiju radio described the CCF troops crossing the river as a “volunteer corps” for the protection of the hydro-electric plants along the Yalu serving Mukden, Dairen and Port Arthur. Proceeding from this premise, it was a logical conclusion that if no provocation were given these forces, a large-scale fight might be avoided.[348]

[348] See Memo Chairman JCS to SecDef: “Chinese Communists Intervention in Korea,” 9 Nov 50; and Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 372.

General MacArthur, after receiving a qualified permission to bomb the Yalu bridges, had enjoined UN airmen not to violate territory or air space on the other side of the river. This meant that the bomber crews must take much greater risks, since their restricted axes of approach and flight paths were known to enemy antiaircraft gunners in advance. Moreover, CCF jet fighters could attack and retire to the sanctuary of Manchuria when hard-pressed.[349]

[349] JCS msg 95949, 6 Nov 50; CinCFE msg CX 68411, 7 Nov 50; Schnabel, _Korean Conflict_. See also Karig, _Korea_, 376–378.

Despite these handicaps, Air Force and Navy bombers knocked out four of the twelve international bridges and damaged most of the others. These efforts doubtless imposed delays, but troops and supplies continued to cross throughout November.[350] After arrival in North Korea, they seemed to vanish into that void of mystery which had swallowed up Chinese Communist troops ever since they broke off contact.

[350] Schnabel _Korean Conflict_. Bombing of the bridges ceased 6 December with the freezing of the Yalu. OCMH, _Report from the Secretory of Defense ... on Operations in Korea_, (Draft No. 1), Pt. V, 3–4.

Students of history may have recalled at this time that one of the most significant engagements of modern history was known as the Battle of the Yalu. From a tactical viewpoint, to be sure, the clash of 30 April 1904 was not a great affair. The Japanese army, after disembarking at Chemulpo (Inchon) and marching up the Korean peninsula, numbered five times the Russian force which opposed the crossing of the Yalu at Uiji, just east of Sinuiju. A Japanese victory was doubtless to be expected, yet a new page of history had opened. For the first time in modern chronicles, an Asiatic army had successfully challenged a European army with the weapons and tactics of the Machine Age.

Now, nearly half a century later, history was repeating itself as another Asiatic army crossed the Yalu with unknown capabilities and intentions. If the Chinese Communists were merely sending a force to guard the hydro-electric complexes and frontier, hopes of peace by Christmas might be realized. But if the invaders were secretly massing for an all-out counter-offensive, a great new war might soon be flaming up from the ashes of the old.

Little fault can be found with current G-2 estimates of CCF numbers, which hold up surprisingly well even when viewed with the wisdom of hindsight. Quite as much depended on interpretations of CCF intentions by the UN command, and there can be no doubt that an end-of-the-war atmosphere prevailed on the eve of the Eighth Army offensive of 24 November.

Thanksgiving Day, which fell on the 23d, was celebrated both in Korea and the United States in a spirit of rejoicing over a victorious peace which seemed almost within grasp. It was a tribute to American bounty as well as organizational genius that the troops in Korea were served a dinner which would have done credit to a first-rate Stateside restaurant. The menu, as proposed by X Corps to component units, included shrimp cocktail, stuffed olives, roast young tom turkey with cranberry sauce, candied sweet potatoes, fruit salad, fruit cake, mince pie and coffee.[351]

[351] X Corps ltr to Subordinate Commands, 16 Nov 50.

As an item of good news for this Thanksgiving, it was learned the day before that the 17th Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division had reached the Yalu at Hyesanjin. Not a single Chinese soldier had been encountered by troops who had troubles enough with sub-zero temperatures and mountain roads.[352]

[352] This was the only American unit ever to push as far north as the border. On the Eighth Army front a regiment of the 6th ROK Division reached the Yalu on 26 October, only to be cut off and badly mauled a few days later in the first CCF attacks. EUSAK, _WDSum, Oct 50_, 38, 44.

Since the first week of November, in fact, there had been no clashes of any importance with the invaders from Red China. On the 24th, as usual, the front was quiet everywhere except for minor patrol contacts. Yet this was the D-day of the great Eighth Army offensive, and the stirring communique of the commander-in-chief was read to all troops in Korea. It was a message in the bold spirit of Inchon, and no one could doubt the confidence of the UN command after hearing these words:

The United Nations massive compression envelopment in North Korea against the new Red Armies operating there is now approaching its decisive effort. The isolating component of the pincer, our air forces of all types, have for the past three weeks, in a sustained attack of model coordination and effectiveness, successfully interdicted enemy lines of support from the north so that further reinforcement therefrom has been sharply curtailed and essential supplies markedly limited. The eastern sector of the pincer, with noteworthy and effective naval support, has now reached commanding enveloping position, cutting in two the northern reaches of the enemy’s geographical potential. This morning the western sector of the pincer moves forward in general assault in an effort to complete the compression and close the vise. If successful, this should for all practical purposes end the war, restore peace and unity to Korea, enable the prompt withdrawal of United Nations military forces, and permit the complete assumption by the Korean people and nation of full sovereignty and international equality. It is that for which we fight.[353]

/s/ DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, _General of the Army_, _United States Army_, _Commander-in-Chief_.

[353] CinCUNC Communique 12, 24 Nov 50.

Eighth Army troops found it something of an anticlimax, after this message, to jump off without meeting any large-scale opposition. General MacArthur, who flew to the front for the occasion, watched from his plane as the UN columns moved out unmolested, as if conducting a motor march.

“The Army offensive began, as scheduled, at 1000 hours on 24 November,” said the EUSAK report. “Since for some time there had been little contact with enemy forces the advance of EUSAK elements was in the nature of a meeting engagement, with little or no resistance in the initial stage. Across the Eighth Army front as a whole, advances were made from 4000 to 16,000 yards.”[354]

[354] EUSAK _WD_, 24 Nov 50.

_Marine Concentration on MSR_

On this same day Lieutenant Colonel Chiles presented X Corps OpnPlan 8, Draft 3, at Tokyo. It was approved at UNC Headquarters with only one modification--the shifting of the proposed boundary between X Corps and Eighth Army farther to the south in the zone of the 1st Marine Division.

This plan was the basis of X Corps OpnO 7. Issued on the 25th, it provided for a reorientation of the X Corps attack to provide more assistance for Eighth Army. H-hour was to be 0800 on the 27th, and the principal units of X Corps were assigned these tasks:

1st Marine Division--to seize Mupyong-ni and advance to the Yalu;

7th Infantry Division--(1) to attack from east side of Chosin Reservoir and advance to Yalu in zone; (2) to secure Pungsan area, coordinating with 1 ROK Corps;

1 ROK Corps--to advance from Hapsu and Chongjin areas, destroying enemy in zone to north boundary of Korea;

3rd Infantry Division--(1) to gain and maintain contact with the right flank of Eighth Army in zone; (2) to protect the left flank of X Corps; (3) to support the 1st Marine Division on X Corps order; (4) to protect harbor and airfield at Wonsan; (5) to destroy enemy guerrillas in zone.[355]

[355] X Corps _OpnO 7_, 25 Nov. 50.

A Corps warning order, issued on the evening of the 24th, was supplemented by a briefing session at Corps Headquarters at 1000 the next morning. General Smith learned that his division was to be the northern arm of the pincers in the “massive compression envelopment” while the 7th Infantry Division took over the previous Marine mission of advancing east of the Chosin Reservoir to the Yalu.[356]

[356] CG X Corps msg X 13069, 24 Nov 50; CG’s Diary in X Corps _WD_, 25 Nov 50; Smith, _Notes_, 727.

The new Marine boundary cut across Korea to the north of Eighth Army. From Yudam-ni the Marine route of advance led to Mupyong-ni 55 miles to the west. This objective was about halfway between Huichon in the south and Kanggye in the north (see map, Page 130). From the latter, which was believed to be the assembly area of the NKPA remnants, a good road led about 40 miles north to Manpojin on the Yalu.

In accordance with Corps OpnO 7, the rear boundary of the 1st Marine Division had been moved north to a line just south of Hagaru. The 3d Infantry Division had the responsibility for the area south of Hagaru, but this unit had so many other commitments that it could assign few troops to the task. General Smith was granted permission, therefore, to retain garrisons at Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni. This left the 3d Infantry Division responsible for the protection of the MSR from Sudong southward to Hamhung.[357]

[357] Smith, _Notes_, 727–729.

Corps OpnO 7, in short, provided for a wide envelopment to be spearheaded by the 1st Marine Division on 27 November. The other arm of the pincers, of course, was to be the Eighth Army; but on the evening of the 25th came the disturbing news that its right wing, the II ROK Corps, had been hurled back by a surprise CCF counterstroke. This reverse took place in the vicinity of Tokchon, about 70 air miles southwest of Yudam-ni.[358]

[358] _Ibid._, 728; EUSAK _WD_, 26 Nov 50.

EUSAK intelligence reports, as it proved, were not far off the mark in estimating enemy strength on the Eighth Army front at 149,741 troops at this time.[359] During the past few days, however, estimates of probable enemy courses of action had been so reassuring as to justify the confidence of CinCFE’s communique on D-day. Even the setback of the 25th was not regarded as alarming.

[359] It is interesting to note that this is an increase of 95,741 over EUSAK’s estimate of the day before. EUSAK _PIR 136_, encl. 2, 3, in EUSAK _WD_, 25 Nov 50.

“With the possible exception of the relatively vague situation on the east flank,” said the next day’s G-2 report, “the enemy reaction to the EUSAK attack has been one of active defense with local counterattacks in strength.” The enemy’s probable course of action was believed to be “an active defense in depth along present lines employing strong local counterattacks in conjunction with continued guerrilla activities with bypassed units; limited air activity; and further reinforcement by CCF or USSR forces.”[360]

[360] EUSAK _PIR 137_, 4, and encl 4, 3, in EUSAK _WD_, 26 Nov 50.

On the X Corps front the reorientation of the attack to the west gave General Smith a long-sought opportunity to collect his dispersed units and achieve a relative degree of concentration. The release of RCT-1 from its Huksu-ri mission made it possible to bring that infantry regiment up behind the other two. This move in turn enabled RCT-5 to advance east of the Chosin Reservoir and RCT-7 to push on to Yudam-ni.

Progress might have been more rapid for all units if adequate transportation had been available for RCT-1 in the Chigyong area. Only by using vehicles of the 11th Marines was it possible to move 1/1 to Chinhung-ni, where it relieved the 3d Battalion of the 5th Marines on 23 November. During the next two days the 2d Battalion and RCT-1 Headquarters relieved 2/5 at Koto-ri. After the return of the vehicles, 3/1 (less Company G, left behind for lack of trucks) was lifted to Hagaru on the 26th to relieve the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines.[361]

[361] 1stMar _SAR_, 13, and appendix 6, 4; 1stMar _HD, Nov 50_, 2; 1stMarDiv msg to COs 11th & 1stMars, 1350, 22 Nov 50.

All three battalions of RCT-5 were operating east of the Chosin Reservoir by 24 November. Until supply levels were built up at Hagaru, however, General Smith kept a careful check on the advance in this quarter. The farthest penetration took place on the 25th when a platoon-size patrol of 3/5, reinforced by two tanks, drove nearly to the northern end of the Reservoir. Scattered enemy groups were flushed out and an abandoned 75mm gun destroyed after a pursuit resulting in five Chinese killed and one captured. This was one of the few encounters in an area combed by patrols from all three battalions, and no signs of large-scale enemy activity were reported by Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Taplett, CO of 3/5, after a helicopter reconnaissance.[362]

[362] 5thMar _SAR_ 15–18. Smith, _Notes_, 626.

Meanwhile RCT-7 began its move to Yudam-ni. This objective had first been mentioned as early as 11 November in X Corps OpnO 6. But until RCT-1 could be brought up to the MSR, the Division Commander limited the advance to the vicinity of Toktong Pass. There an estimated 150 to 200 enemy resisted with machine-gun fire but were scattered with the aid of air strikes and artillery support.

On the 23d, in accordance with Division OpnO 23-50, the 1st Battalion led the advance of RCT-7. During the next two days Lieutenant Colonel Davis’s reinforced battalion methodically cleared booby-trapped but undefended road blocks and scattered small groups of enemy along the route. The men of 1/7 belatedly celebrated Thanksgiving on the 24th with a full, hot turkey dinner--their last full meal for 17 days--and seized battered Yudam-ni the next day against negligible resistance.[363] The 3d Battalion, regimental headquarters, and 3/11 (-) followed.

[363] 7thMar _SAR_, 19–20; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56; Col R. G. Davis Comments, n. d.

Marine operations east of the Chosin Reservoir came to an end at 1200 on the 25th with the relief of RCT-5 by the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, 7th Infantry Division. Corps orders called for this unit to remain under operational control of the 1st Marine Division until the assumption of command in the area by the CO, 31st Infantry. All elements of RCT-5 were to be relieved by the following noon for the mission of advancing to Yudam-ni and then passing through RCT-7 to lead the attack toward Mupyong-ni.[364]

[364] 5thMar _SAR_, 18; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 5thMar, 2101, 25 Nov 50.

This was in accordance with Division OpnO 24-50, issued at 0800 on the 26th to implement the provisions of Corps OpnO 7. The jump-off was to be at 0800 on 27 November, with the first objective the road junction at Yongnim-dong (27 road miles west of Yudam-ni), in preparation for further advance on order to the high ground about one mile south of Kogae-gol and 35 miles west of Yudam-ni. Other provisions of OpnO 24-50 were as follows:

RCT-7--to seize and secure Yudam-ni without delay, and when passed through by RCT-5, to protect the Division MSR from Sinhung-ni (7 miles west of Hagaru) to Yudam-ni;

RCT-5--to pass through RCT-7 west of Yudam-ni by 0800, 27 November, advance to the west and seize first objective, prepared for further advance;

RCT-1--in Division reserve, to occupy positions in the vicinity of Chinhung-ni, Koto-ri and Hagaru for the protection of the MSR;

11th Marines--less detachments, to provide general support from positions in the vicinity of Yudam-ni;

41st Commando--reinforced, to move to Yudam-ni prepared for operations to the southwest to protect Division left flank;

Reconnaissance Company--to move to Yudam-ni and reconnoiter to the north in co-ordination with operations of RCT-7.[365]

[365] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 24-50_, 26 Nov 50.

_Wonsan Arrivals--Above, Bob Hope entertaining Marine airmen who were first to reach the seaport; and, below, Marine infantry disembarking from cargo nets of_ Marine Phoenix _into the LCVPs_.

_Administrative Landing--Above, an LCM and a troop-laden amtrac in Wonsan harbor; and, below, LSTs drawn up abreast to land the thousands of tons of supplies required by a division._

_Wonsan Scenes--Above, a camouflaged hangar on Wonsan airfield; below, Marine infantry in railway station awaiting transportation shortly after their debarkation._

_First Action in Northeast Korea--Two views of Marine infantry mopping up guerrillas after surprise counterattack in Kojo area by NKPA troops escaping to join Chinese Reds._

_On the Planning Level--Above, RAdm J. H. Doyle, CTF-90, and BrigGen E. A. Craig, ADC of 1st Marine Division; below, V/Adm A. D. Struble, Cdr JTF-7, and MajGen E. M. Almond, CG X Corps, in the USS_ Missouri.

_Command Conference--Above, left to right, MajGen W. J. Wallace, USMC; LtGen L. C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC; MajGen O. P. Smith, USMC; MajGen E. A. Almond, USA; and MajGen Field Harris, USMC; below, 1st Marine Division CP at Hungnam._

_First Chinese Resistance--Above, infantry of 7th Marines setting up mortar during initial encounter with Chinese in northeast Korea; and, below, enemy tank killed by Marine fire._

_Advance of RCT-7--Above, artillery emplacement of Battery G, 11th Marines, on 3 November 1950; and, below, supplies transported over railroad from Wonsan to Hamhung._

_As Seen from the Air--Above, “Frozen Chosin” and the rugged terrain of the Reservoir area; and, below, an aerial view of the MSR winding its precarious way through Funchilin Pass--“a cliff on one side and a chasm on the other.”_

_As Seen by the Infantry--Here are two views of the sort of terrain encountered by the infantry of the 1st Marine Division; sometimes it was as difficult to complete an approach march as to dislodge the enemy after arrival._

_Air Supply and Evacuation--Above, an air drop of supplies and helicopter evacuation of casualties at Yudam-ni; below, parachute-rigged cases of ammunition in an Air Force C-47._

_Preparations for Yudam-ni Breakout--Above, Marines selecting gear for breakout from Yudam-ni to Hagaru; and, below, the first stages of the three-day fighting advance._

_Chinese Communist POWs--Above, these CCF prisoners don’t seem unhappy about their captivity; below, a Chinese officer being interrogated with the aid of an interpreter._

_Marines on the March--These two pictures give some idea of the exhaustion of Marines, many of them walking wounded, as they huddle by the roadside during halts of the Yudam-ni breakout._

_Covered by Artillery--Above, a 105mm howitzer fires to the rear as the infantry fights its way forward from Yudam-ni; below, a quarter of a mile per hour was considered good progress._

General Smith, flying by helicopter from Hungnam to Yudam-ni on the morning of the 26th, could survey the MSR below him and reflect with satisfaction that it was now easier to count the Marine outfits south of Chinhung-ni than those to the north. These included the 1st Tank Battalion with the exception of the provisional platoon at Hagaru and the 2d Platoon of Company D at Chinhung-ni. Transportation had not yet been provided for the 41st Commando, but the new unit was scheduled to move up in convoy on the 28th with Headquarters Battalion when the Division CP displaced from Hungnam to Hagaru. By that time only service units and a few platoons of tanks and engineers would be left in the rear area.

At Hagaru the C-47 airstrip was taking shape as the dozers hacked away at the frozen earth night and day, working under flood lights in the darkness. Companies C and E of the 1st Medical Battalion had set up clearing stations and built up dumps of medical supplies. Troop units at Hagaru and Yudam-ni had two days’ supplies of rations and fuel, but only a unit of fire was stockpiled at Hagaru in addition to the half unit carried by the troops.

Marine motor columns were winding along the narrow, twisting mountain road from Hagaru to Yudam-ni in preparation for the attack in the morning. Upon arrival at Lieutenant Colonel Davis’s 1/7 CP, General Smith learned to his discomfort that the hovering ability of a rotary-wing aircraft is curtailed at high altitudes. The helicopter dropped like a stone the last ten feet, but fortunately no injury resulted to passenger, pilot or machine.[366]

[366] Smith, _Chronicle_, 89.

On the 26th intelligence arrived at Hamhung from the 7th Marines, reporting capture of three soldiers from the 60th CCF Division. They asserted that the 58th, 59th, and 60th Divisions of the 20th CCF Army had reached the Yudam-ni area on the 20th. According to these enlisted men, Chinese strategy envisioned a move south and southeast from Yudam-ni to cut the MSR after two Marine regiments passed.[367]

[367] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1935, 26 Nov 50.

X Corps had received similar reports of Chinese movement southeast from Yudam-ni as well as air reports of enemy activity north and northeast of the Chosin Reservoir. Six Chinese divisions had now been identified in northeast Korea but both Corps and Division intelligence estimates of probable enemy action continued to be optimistic. Although Chinese attacks on the division’s MSR or along the Huichon-Huksu-ri-Hamhung axis were not ruled out, G-2 officers seemed to consider a continued westward withdrawal more likely.[368]

[368] X Corps, _Special Report, Chosin Reservoir_, 32; 1stMarDiv _PIR 33_.

Division planning went ahead on the assumption of commander and staff that the enemy would be met in strength in the mountainous country west of Yudam-ni. This was the basis for the decision to pass the relatively fresh 5th Marines through the 7th for the attack westward.[369]

[369] Smith ltr, 15 Apr 56. See also Smith, _Chronicle_, 79, 82, 87.

It was a cold, clear Sunday afternoon when General Smith returned to Hungnam. From his helicopter he could see for several miles on either side, and no signs of enemy activity were discerned in the snow-clad hills. After his arrival at the Division CP, however, the Marine general was informed that the situation had gone from bad to worse in west Korea. The II ROK Corps on the right flank had disintegrated on the 26th under a second day’s heavy blows, thus exposing the 2d Infantry Division and Turkish Brigade to flank attack. In short, the Eighth Army offensive had been brought to a standstill before the Marines could jump off in the morning as the other arm of the United Nations envelopment.