CHAPTER II

The Wonsan Landing

_ROK Army Captures Wonsan--Marine Loading and Embarkation--Two Weeks of Mine Sweeping--Operation Yo-Yo--Marine Air First at Objective--MacArthur Orders Advance to Border--Landing of 1st Marine Division_

On 6 OCTOBER 1950, after the arrival of the initial assault shipping at Inchon, General Smith ordered the 1st Marine Division to commence embarkation on the 8th. Similar instructions were issued by X Corps the following day.[44] Thus, the first troops and equipment were to be loaded even before the G-2 Section of the Landing Force could begin evaluating the enemy situation at the objective, since it was not until 8 October that the intelligence planners received X Corps’ OpnO 4, published four days earlier. Summing up the outlook at the time, G-2 later reported:

[44] 1stMarDiv Embarkation Order (_EmbO_) 2-50, 6 Oct 50; Smith, _Notes_, 394.

Inasmuch as subordinate units of the Division were scheduled to embark aboard ship some time prior to 15 October 1950, it was immediately obvious that preliminary intelligence planning, with its attendant problems of collection, processing, and distribution of information, and the procurement and distribution of graphic aids, would be both limited and sketchy.... Fortunately ... the section [G-2] had been previously alerted on the projected operation, and while elements of the Division were yet engaged with the enemy at Uijongbu, had requested reproductions of some 100 copies of pertinent extracts of the JANIS (75) of Korea. Thus it was ... that subordinate units would not be wholly unprepared for the coming operation.[45]

[45] G-2 _SAR_, 2. JANIS is the abbreviation for Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies.

General Smith’s OpnO 16-50, published on 10 October, climaxed the accelerated planning at Inchon. Worked out jointly by the staffs of PhibGruOne and the 1st Marine Division, this directive covered the Wonsan attack in detail and pinpointed subordinate unit responsibilities.

Kalma Peninsula was chosen as the point of assault, with two beaches, YELLOW and BLUE, marked off on the eastern shore. Ten high-ground objectives described the semicircular arc of the beachhead, which focused on Wonsan and fanned out as far as five miles inland. The 1st and 7th Marines were to hit YELLOW and BLUE Beaches, respectively and drive inland to their assigned objectives. The 5th, upon being ordered ashore, would assemble west of Wonsan, prepared for further operations. Two battalions of the 11th Marines were to land on call in direct support of the assault units, and the remainder of the artillery would initially function in general support.

Other subordinate units drew the usual assignments. The Reconnaissance Company, after landing on order, was to screen the Division’s left flank by occupying specified objectives. Attached to the 1st and 7th Regiments respectively, the 5th and 3d Korean Marine Corps (KMC) Battalions would also go ashore on call.[46]

[46] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 16-50_, 10 Oct 50.

_ROK Army Captures Wonsan_

At 0815, 10 October, coincidentally with the publication of 1stMarDiv OpnO 16-50, troops of I ROK Corps, advancing rapidly up the east coast of Korea, entered Wonsan. By evening of the next day, the ROK 3d and Capital Divisions were mopping up minor resistance in the city and guarding the airfield on Kalma Peninsula.[47]

[47] EUSAK _War Diary Summary_ (_WD Sum_), _Oct 50_, 14–16.

Overland seizure of the 1st Marine Division’s amphibious objective did not come as a surprise either at GHQ in Tokyo or at General Smith’s CP aboard the _Mount McKinley_ in Inchon Harbor. General MacArthur had, in fact, prepared for this eventuality by considering an alternate assault landing at Hungnam, another major seaport, about 50 air miles north of Wonsan. On 8 October, therefore, the JSPOG completed a modified version of CinCFE OpnPlan 9-50. Eighth Army’s mission--the capture of Pyongyang--remained unchanged in this draft, but X Corps would now land “... in the vicinity of Hungnam in order to cut the lines of communications north of Wonsan and envelop the North Korean forces in that area.”

Although the choice of a new objective seemed logical on the basis of the ROK Army’s accomplishment, certain logistical obstacles at once loomed in the path of the alternate plan. Not unaware of the most imposing of these, JSPOG commented:

The harbor at Wonsan cannot accommodate at docks the large vessels lifting the 7th Division. Since most of the amphibious type boats are carried on ships lifting the 1st Marine Division, the plans for off-loading the 7th Division will have to be revised.[48]

[48] CinCFE _OpnPlan 9-50_ (_Alternate_), 8 Oct 50.

But the plans for off-loading the 7th Division could not be revised. If the Army unit was to land within a reasonable length of time, it would have to go in on the heels of the 1st Marine Division, using the same landing craft. If the ship-to-shore movement took place at Hungnam, the 7th Division would be ill-disposed for beginning its overland drive to Pyongyang as planned; for it would have to backtrack by land almost all the way to Wonsan. On the other hand, if the Army division landed at Wonsan while the Marines assaulted Hungnam, the Navy would be handicapped not only by the lack of landing craft but also by the problem of sweeping mines from both harbors simultaneously.

From the standpoint of Admiral Joy in Japan and Admiral Doyle in Korea, there was insufficient time for planning a new tactical deployment of X Corps at this late date. And the time-space handicap would be compounded by serious shortages of mine sweepers and intelligence information. Joy was unsuccessful on 8 October in his first attempt to dissuade MacArthur from the new idea. On the 9th, unofficial word of the pending change reached General Smith at Inchon, just as his staff wound up work on the draft for the Wonsan assault. ComNavFE persisted in his arguments with the commander in chief, however, with the final result that on 10 October the original plan for landing the whole X Corps at Wonsan was ordered into effect.[49] Coming events were to uphold the Navy viewpoint; for while the Wonsan landing itself was delayed several days by enemy mines, it was 15 November before the first ships safely entered the harbor at Hungnam.[50]

[49] C/S Notes in X Corps _WD_ 10–25 Oct 50; ComPhibGruOne, “Report of ... Operations ... 25 Jun 50 to 1 Jan 51,” 11; Smith, _Chronicle_, 57–59; and Capt Walter Karig, _et al_, _Battle Report_: _The War In Korea_ (New York, 1952), 301–302. According to Gen Wright, MacArthur’s G-3, “Admiral Joy may have ‘discussed’ this often with the Commander-in-Chief, but no one ever ‘argued’ with him.” Wright ltr 16 Feb 56.

[50] ComNavFE msg to CinCFE, 0010 12 Nov 50.

_Marine Loading and Embarkation_

On 11 October, the day after he opened his CP on the _Mount McKinley_, General Smith learned that the Hungnam plan had been dropped. The 1st Marine Division continued loading out in accordance with X Corps OpnO 4, even though its objective had already been captured.[51]

[51] Smith, _Chronicle_, 59.

During the period 4–10 October, Admiral Doyle had assembled at Inchon an assortment of Navy amphibious vessels, ships of the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS), and Japanese-manned LSTs (SCAJAP).[52] With the arrival of Transport Squadron One on 8 October, the total shipping assigned to the landing force consisted of one AGC, eight APAs, two APs, 10 AKAs, five LSDs, 36 LSTs, three LSUs, one LSM, and six commercial cargo vessels (“Victory” and C-2 types).[53]

[52] ComPhibGruOne “Operations Report,” 10. SCAJAP is the abbreviation for Shipping Control Authority, Japan. Under this designation were American ships lent to Japan after World War II, of which many were recalled during the Korean War to serve as cargo vessels.

[53] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex D (hereafter G-4 _SAR_), 2.

Loading a reinforced division, several thousand Corps troops and thousands of tons of supplies and equipment proved to be an aggravating job under the circumstances. Pressure on the attack and landing forces for an early D-Day only magnified the shortcomings of Inchon as a port. Limited facilities and unusual tide conditions held dock activity to a series of feverish bursts. Moreover, many ships not part of the amphibious force had to be accommodated since they were delivering vital materiel. The assigned shipping itself was inadequate, according to the Division G-4 and “considerable quantities” of vehicles had to be left behind. Much of the trucking that could be taken was temporarily diverted to help transport the 7th Infantry Division to Pusan; and although unavailable for port operations when needed, it returned at the last minute to disrupt outloading of the Shore Party’s heavy beach equipment.[54] Out of conditions and developments such as these grew the necessity for postponing D-Day from 15 October, the date initially set by General Almond, to the 20th.

[54] _Ibid._, 3.

For purposes of expediting embarkation and economizing on shipping space, X Corps directed the 1st Marine Division to out-load with less than the usual amount of supplies carried by a landing force.[55] Resupply shipping would be so scheduled as to deliver adequate stocks of Class I, II, III, and IV consumables “... prior to the time they would be needed,” even though when “they would be needed” was anybody’s guess at this stage of the war.[56]

[55] These totals were authorized: C-Rations for five days; individual assault rations for one day; POL for five days; Class II and IV supplies for 15 days; and five units of fire (U/F). _Ibid._; 1stMarDiv _Administrative Order_ (_AdmO_) 13-50, 8 Oct 50. A unit of fire is a convenient yardstick in describing large quantities of ammunition. It is based on a specific number of rounds per weapon.

[56] G-4 _SAR_, 1.

In anticipation of a rapid advance to the west (which did not materialize), Division G-4 not only assigned 16 pre-loaded trucks and trailers to each RCT, but also earmarked three truck companies and 16 more trailers as a mobile logistical reserve. These supply trains would stay on the heels of the attacking regiments in order to maintain ammunition dumps as far forward as possible in a fast-moving situation.[57]

[57] _Ibid._, 3.

On 8 October, ComNavFE directed Admiral Doyle and General Smith to effect his OpnPlan 113-50.[58] Coincidentally, the first contingents of the 5th Marines boarded the _Bayfield_ (1/5), _George Clymer_ (2/5), and _Bexar_ (3/5). Three days later, on the 11th, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray, commander of the reserve regiment, opened his CP in the _Bayfield_, and his unit completed embarkation.[59]

[58] ComNavFE msg to ComPhibGruOne, CG 1stMarDiv and others, 0200 8 Oct 50.

[59] 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1035 11 Oct 50; 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex QQ, appendix A (hereafter 1/5 _SAR_), 4, appendix B (hereafter 2/5 _SAR_), 6, and appendix C (hereafter 3/5 _SAR_), 4.

Although reserve and administrative elements of the 1st and 7th Marines loaded earlier, the four assault battalions of these regiments could not begin embarkation until 13 October, owing to the fact that the LSTs had been used for shuttle service around Inchon Harbor. General Smith opened his CP in the _Mount McKinley_ at 1200 on the 11th.[60] The last of the landing ships were loaded by high tide on the morning of the 15th, and later that day all of them sailed for the objective. By evening of the 16th, most of the transports were on the way, but the _Mount McKinley_ and _Bayfield_ did not depart until the next day.[61]

[60] CG 1stMarDiv msg to All Units, 0752 11 Oct 50; Smith, _Notes_, 373.

[61] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex RR (hereafter 7thMar _SAR_), 9; Smith, _Notes_, 399, 409; 1stMar _HD Oct 50_, 3.

Broken down into seven embarkation groups, the landing force and X Corps troops leaving Inchon comprised a grand total of 1902 officers and 28,287 men. Of this number, 1461 officers and 23,938 men were on the rolls of the 1st Marine Division, the breakdown being as follows:

Marine officers 1119 Marine enlisted 20,597 Navy officers 153 Navy enlisted 1002 U. S. Army & KMC officers attached 189 U. S. Army & KMC enlisted attached 2339[62]

[62] 1stMarDiv _Embarkation Summary_, 16 Oct 50; and “Special Report 1stMarDiv,” 12.

Even in the last stages of loading and during the actual departure, new orders had continued to flow out of higher headquarters. It will be recalled that General Smith issued his OpnO 16-50 for the Wonsan assault on 10 October. An alternate plan, to be executed on signal, went out to subordinate units the same day, providing for an administrative landing by the Division on RED Beach, north of Wonsan, instead of Kalma Peninsula.[63]

[63] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 17-50_, 10 Oct 50.

As a result of discussions during a X Corps staff conference on 13 October, a party headed by General Almond flew to Wonsan the next day.[64] The purpose of his visit was to reconnoiter the objective and to explain his latest operational directive to the I ROK Corps commander, who would come under his control.[65] This new order, published on the 14th, called for an administrative landing by X Corps and a rapid advance westward along the Wonsan--Pyongyang axis to a juncture with EUSAK. Assigned to the 1st Marine Division was an objective northeast of Pyongyang, the Red capital.[66]

[64] “... Division [1stMarDiv] Advance Parties were flown to Wonsan in accordance with a definite plan which materialized just before we set sail from Inchon. As a matter of fact the personnel for these parties and even some of the jeeps were already loaded out and had to be removed from the shipping prior to our sailing.” Col A. L. Bowser, Comments, n. d.

[65] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50; Smith, _Chronicle_, 59.

[66] X Corps _Operation Instruction_ (_OI_) _11_, 14 Oct 50; Smith, _Notes_, 385.

It was this tactical scheme, then, that prevailed as the Marines departed Inchon from 15 to 17 October and the 7th Infantry Division prepared to embark from Pusan. General Smith, of course, placed into effect his alternate order for a landing on RED Beach.[67] While there may be a note of humor in the fact that on 15 October ComPhibGruOne issued his OpnO 16-50 for the “assault landing” at Wonsan, it must be remembered that the ship-to-shore movement would remain essentially the same from the Navy’s standpoint, regardless of the swift march of events ashore.

[67] According to General Smith, “The reason for issuing 1stMarDiv OpnO 17-50 was to provide for an administrative landing in sheltered waters just north of Wonsan where there would be easy access to the existing road net. The ship-to-shore movement provided for in 1stMarDiv OpnO 16-50 was retained intact. This plan [OpnO 17-50] had to be dropped when it was found that Wonsan Harbor was completely blocked by mines, and that it would be much quicker to clear the approaches to the Kalma Peninsula where we eventually landed ... 1stMarDiv dispatch [1450 24 Oct] cancelled both 1stMarDiv OpnOs 16 and 17 and provided for an administrative landing on the Kalma Peninsula as directed by CTF 90.” Gen O. P. Smith ltr to authors, 3 Feb 56. Hereafter, unless otherwise stated, letters may be assumed to be to the authors.

_Two Weeks of Mine Sweeping_

Mine sweeping for the Wonsan landing commenced on 8 October, when Task Group 95.6, commanded by Captain Spofford, began assembling for the mission of clearing a path ahead of the 250-ship armada bringing the 1st Marine Division and other units of X Corps. It had been known for a month that the waters of the east coast were dangerous for navigation. The first mine was discovered off Chinnampo on the west coast on 7 September, and four days later Admiral Joy ordered the United Nations Blocking and Escort Force to stay on the safe side of the 100-fathom line along the east coast. But it was not until 26 and 28 September that more definite information was acquired the hard way when the U. S. destroyer _Brush_ and the ROK mine sweeper _YMS 905_ were damaged by east coast mines.[68]

[68] CinCPacFlt _Interim Evaluation Report No. 1_, VI, 1090.

On the 28th ComNavFE issued his OpnO 17-50 covering operations of mine sweepers in Korean waters. The herculean task awaiting the 12 available American vessels of this type may be judged by the fact that more than a hundred had been employed off Okinawa in World War II.

Although the exact date remained unknown, it was a safe assumption that North Korean mining activities, beginning in late July or early August, were speeded by the Inchon landing, which aroused the enemy to the peril of further amphibious operations. Russian instructors had trained Korean Reds at Wonsan and Chinnampo in the employment of Soviet-manufactured mines. Sampans, junks, and wooden coastal barges were used to sow a field of about 2000 in the harbor and approaches to Wonsan.[69]

[69] _Ibid._, VI, 1088–1089; Smith, _Notes_, 404; Karig, _Korea_, 301. See also ADVATIS Rpt 1225 in EUSAK _WD_, 24 Oct 50.

Captain Spofford’s TG 95.6 commenced its sweep off Wonsan on 10 October after a sortie from Sasebo. Unfortunately, the three large fleet sweepers, _Pledge_, _Pirate_, and _Incredible_, were not well adapted to the shallow sweeping necessary at Wonsan. More dependence could be placed in the seven small wooden-hulled U. S. motor mine sweepers _Redhead_, _Mocking Bird_, _Osprey_, _Chatterer_, _Merganser_, _Kite_, and _Partridge_, which were rugged even though low-powered. Spofford’s two big high-speed sweepers, _Doyle_ and _Endicott_, had their limitations for this type of operation; and the nine Japanese and three ROK sweepers lacked some of the essential gear.[70]

[70] CinCPacFlt _Interim Evaluation Report No. 1_, VI, 1004; Dept Army, Joint Daily Situation Report (D/A Daily SitRpt) 105; Karig, _Korea_, 311–314.

The U. S. destroyers _Collett_, _Swenson_, _Maddox_, and _Thomas_ were in the Wonsan area as well as the cruiser _Rochester_. On the 9th the _Rochester’s_ helicopter sighted 61 mines in a reconnaissance, and the next day the observer found them too numerous to count. In spite of these grim indications, rapid progress the first day led to predictions of a brief operation. By late afternoon a 3000-yard channel had been cleared from the 100-fathom curve to the 30-fathom line. But hopes were dashed at this point by the discovery of five additional lines of mines.[71]

[71] Minesweep Rpt #1 in X Corps _WD_ 10–25 Oct 50; ComNavFE Intelligence Summary (IntSum) 76; ComNavFE Operations Summary (OpSum) 201; D/A Daily SitRpt 105; Karig, _Korea_, 315.

On 12 and 13 October the naval guns of TG 95.2 bombarded Tanchon and Songjin on the northeast coast. While the USS _Missouri_ treated the marshaling yards of Tanchon to 163 16″ rounds, the cruisers _Helena_, _Worcester_, and _Ceylon_ fired at bridges, shore batteries, and tunnels in the Chongjin area.[72]

[72] ComUNBlockandCortFor, “Evaluation Information,” in CinCPacFlt, _Interim Evaluation Report No. 1_, 13–15; ComSeventhFlt, “Chronological Narrative,” in _Ibid._, 7.

Spofford tried to save time on the morning of the 12th by counter-mining as 39 planes from the carriers _Leyte Gulf_ and _Philippine Sea_ dropped 50 tons of bombs. It was found, however, that even the explosion of a 1000-pound bomb would not set off nearby mines by concussion.[73] According to Admiral Struble, “The results of this operation simply bore out our experience in World War II, but were tried out on the long chance that they might be effective in the current situation.”[74]

[73] CTG 95.6 msg to CTF95, CTF77 11 Oct 50 in G-3 Journal, X Corps _WD_ 10–25 Oct 50; ComNavFE OpSum 215; ComNavFE IntSum 82; Karig, _Korea_, 315.

[74] VAdm A. D. Struble Comments, 14 Mar 56.

The 12th was a black day for the sweeping squadron. For the steel sweepers _Pledge_ and _Pirate_ both were blown up by mines that afternoon and sank with a total of 13 killed and 87 wounded. Rescue of the survivors was handicapped by fire from enemy shore batteries.[75]

[75] ComPatRon 47, “Special Historical Report,” in CinCPacFlt _Interim Evaluation Report No. 1_, H4; ComUNBlockandCortFor, “Evaluation Information,” 5, 15; Karig, _Korea_, 318–322.

While the blast of a half-ton bomb had not been powerful enough, Spofford reasoned that depth charges might start a chain reaction in which mines would detonate mines. But a precision drop by naval planes met with no success, and there was nothing left but a return to the slow, weary, and dangerous work of methodical sweeping.[76]

[76] ComNavFE OpSum 219; ComNavFE IntSum 82.

The flying boats, Mariners and Sunderlands, were called upon to assist by conducting systematic aerial searches for moored and drifting mines, which they destroyed by .50 caliber machine-gun fire. Soon an effective new technique was developed as the seaplanes carried overlays of Hydrographic Office charts to be marked with the locations of all mines sighted. These charts were dropped to the sweepers and were of considerable assistance in pinpointing literally hundreds of mines.[77]

[77] ComFltAirWing 6, “Evaluation information,” in CinCPacFlt _Interim Evaluation Report No. 1_, D8.

On the 18th one of the Japanese sweepers, the _JMS-14_, hit a mine and went down. In spite of this loss, the end seemed in sight. No attempt was being made to clear all the mines; but with a lane swept into the harbor, it remained only to check the immediate area of the landing beaches. So hopeful did the outlook appear that it was more disillusioning when the ROK _YMS 516_ disintegrated on 19 October after a terrific explosion in the supposedly cleared lane. Thus was TG 95.6 rudely introduced to the fact that the sweepers had to deal with magnetic mines in addition to the other types. The mechanism could be set to allow as many as 12 ships to pass over the mine before it exploded. This meant, of course, that the sweepers must make at least 13 passes over any given area before it could be considered safe.[78]

[78] Smith, _Notes_, 404–407; Karig, _Korea_, 324–326.

The _Mount McKinley_ having arrived off Wonsan that same day, Admiral Doyle and General Almond, with six members of the X Corps staff, went by boat to the battleship _Missouri_ for a conference with Admiral Struble. CJTF-7 asserted that he would not authorize the administrative landing until the magnetic mines were cleared from the shipping lane--a task which he estimated would take three more days. This announcement led to General Almond’s decision to fly ashore in the _Missouri’s_ helicopter on the 20th and establish his CP in Wonsan.[79] So rapidly had the situation changed, it was hard to remember that this date had once been set as D-Day when the Marine landing force would fight for a beachhead.

[79] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50; Smith, _Notes_, 404–405; ComPhibGruOne “Operations Report,” 11–12; LtCol H. W. Edwards, “A Naval Lesson of the Korean Conflict,” _U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings_, lxxx, no. 12 (Dec 54), 1337–1340; Karig, _Korea_, 324–326; 1stMarDiv G-1 Journal 20 Oct 50.

_Operation Yo-Yo_

Shortly after 1700 on the afternoon of 19 October, a rumor swept through the 250 ships of the Tractor and Transport Groups. “War’s over!” shouted the excited Marines. “They’re taking us back to Pusan for embarkation to the States.”

Rumor seemed to have the support of fact on this occasion, for compass readings left no doubt that the armada had indeed executed a maritime “about face” to head southward. What the men on the transports did not know was that the reversal of direction had been ordered for purely military reasons as a result of the conference that day on the _Missouri_.

It was puzzling enough to the troops the following morning when the ships resumed their original course. But this was nothing as compared to their bewilderment late that afternoon as the Tractor and Transport Groups turned southward again.

Every twelve hours, in accordance with the directive of CJTF-7, the fleet was to reverse course, steaming back and forth off the eastern coast of Korea until the last of the magnetic mines could be cleared from the lane in preparation for an administrative landing at Wonsan.[80]

[80] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 12; Smith, _Notes_, 404; Struble Comments, 16 Mar 56.

Marines have always been ready with a derisive phrase, and “Operation Yo-Yo” was coined to express their disgust with this interlude of concentrated monotony. Never did time die a harder death, and never did the grumblers have so much to grouse about. Letters to wives and sweethearts took on more bulk daily, and paper-backed murder mysteries were worn to tatters by bored readers.

On the 22d, at CJTF-7’s regular daily meeting, Admirals Struble and Doyle conferred in the destroyer _Rowan_ with Admiral Smith and Captain Spofford. It was agreed that the sweeping could not be completed until the 24th or 25th, which meant that Operation Yo-Yo might last a week.[81]

[81] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 12; Struble Comments, 16 Mar 56.

The situation had its serious aspects on LSTs and transports which were not prepared for a voyage around Korea taking nearly as long as a crossing of the Pacific. Food supplies ran low as gastro-enteritis and dysentery swept through the crowded transports in spite of strict medical precautions. The MSTS transport _Marine Phoenix_ alone had a sick list of 750 during the epidemic. A case of smallpox was discovered on the _Bayfield_, and all crewmen as well as passengers were vaccinated that same day.[82]

[82] _Ibid._, 11; 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex VV, (hereafter 7thMTBn _SAR_), 2; ComPhibGruOne msg to BuMed, 0034 27 Oct 50.

On the 23d, as the _Mount McKinley_ proceeded into the inner harbor at Wonsan, there could be no doubt that the final mine sweeping would be completed by the 25th. Operation Yo-Yo came to an end, therefore, when Admiral Doyle directed the amphibious fleet to arrive on the 25th, prepared for an administrative landing. The order of entry called for the Transport Group to take the lead, followed by the vessels of the Tractor Group.[83]

[83] CTF 90 msg to CTG 90.2, 1119 24 Oct 50 in G-3 Journal, X Corps _WD_ 10–25 Oct 50.

On the morning of the 25th, Admirals Struble and Doyle held a final conference with General Almond and Captain Spofford. By this time they had decided to land the Marines over YELLOW and BLUE Beaches on Kalma Peninsula, as originally conceived in 1stMarDiv OpnO 16-50. The inner harbor of Wonsan would remain closed until completely clear of mines, and then it would be developed as a supply base.[84]

[84] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 12–13; Smith, _Notes_, 407; CG 1stMarDiv msg to subordinate units, 1450 24 Oct 50; Smith ltr, 3 Feb 56.

_Marine Air First at Objective_

The sense of frustration which oppressed the Marine ground forces during Operation Yo-Yo would have been increased if they had realized that the air maintenance crews had beaten them to Wonsan by a margin of twelve days. Even more humiliating to the landing force troops, Bob Hope and Marilyn Maxwell were flown to the objective area. On the evening of the 24th they put on a USO show spiced with quips at the expense of the disgruntled Leathernecks in the transports.

Planning for Marine air operations in northeast Korea had been modified from day to day to keep pace with the rapidly changing strategic situation. On 11 October, when ROK forces secured Wonsan, preparations for air support of an assault landing were abandoned. Two days later Major General Field Harris, CG 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and Tactical Air Command X Corps (TAC X Corps), flew to Wonsan. After inspecting the airfield he decided to begin operations without delay.[85]

[85] Unless otherwise stated this section is based on: 1stMAW _HD_, _Oct 50_; 1stMAW _SAR_, annex K (hereafter MAG-12 _SAR_), 1, appendix G (hereafter VMF-312 _SAR_), 3, 5–6; and Smith, _Notes_, 433–441.

These developments, of course, were accompanied by amendments to the original plan which had assigned Marine Fighter Squadrons (VMFs)-214 and -323 the air support role in the naval task force, with Marine Aircraft Group (MAG)-12 to be landed as soon as the field at Wonsan was secured.

In response to changing conditions, VMF-312 aircraft flew from Kimpo to Wonsan on the 14th, and R5Ds lifted 210 personnel of the advance echelons of Headquarters Squadron (Hedron)-12, Service Squadron (SMS)-12, and Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron (VMF(N))-513. Two LSTs sailed from Kobe with equipment of MAG-12, and Combat Cargo Command aircraft of Far East Air Force began flying in aviation gasoline. Bombs and rockets were flown to Wonsan by the planes of VMF(N)-513.[86]

[86] E. H. Giusti and K. W. Condit, “Marine Air at the Chosin Reservoir,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, xxxvii, no. 7 (Jul 52), 19–20; 1stMAW _SAR_, annex K, appendix H (hereafter VMF(N)-513 _SAR_), sec 6, 2.

On the 16th, VMFs-214 and -323 departed Sasebo for station off Wonsan in the CVE’s _Sicily_ and _Badoeng Strait_. From the following day until the 27th these two fighter squadrons were to provide air cover for the mine sweeping operations off Wonsan and the ensuing 1st Marine Division administrative landing.[87]

[87] 1stMAW _SAR_, annex J, appendix Q (hereafter VMF-214 _SAR_), 2.

TAC X Corps OpnO 2-50, issued on 15 October, had contemplated the opening of the port at Wonsan and arrival of the surface echelon within three days. Until then the two squadrons at Wonsan airfield were to be dependent on airlift for all supplies.

The unforeseen ten-day delay in clearing a lane through the mine field made it difficult to maintain flight operations. Fuel was pumped by hand from 55-gallon drums which had been rolled along the ground about a mile from the dump to the flight line. Muscle also had to substitute for machinery in ordnance sections which had only one jeep and eight bomb trailers for moving ammunition.[88]

[88] Giusti and Condit, “Marine Air at the Chosin Reservoir,” 20; 1stMAW _HD_, _Oct 50_; TAC X Corps _OpnO 2-50_, 15 Oct 50, in _Ibid._

Despite such difficulties, air operations from the new field were speeded up when General Almond landed to establish the X Corps CP at Wonsan on the 20th, after taking control of I ROK Corps. Armed reconnaissance sorties were flown regularly and attacks made on retreating bodies of NKPA troops. On the 24th a VMF-312 flight surprised a column of about 800 Korean Reds near Kojo, 39 miles southeast of Wonsan, and scattered it with heavy losses.

There were administrative as well as operational problems to be solved. If an assault landing had been carried out at Wonsan, the provision for air support would have been planned in a manner similar to that of Inchon. But the change to an administrative landing caused the 1st MAW to be placed under the control of the Far East Air Forces. This was in accordance with a CinCFE directive to the effect that when both FEAF and Naval air were assigned missions in Korea, coordination control would be exercised by CG FEAF. He had in turn delegated that control north of the 38th parallel, including close-support operations of carrier-borne planes, to CG Fifth Air Force.

An effort was made at first by MAG-12 officers to comply with Fifth AF procedures, which required the schedule for any given day’s strikes to be submitted to that headquarters by 1800 the previous day. Obviously, the distance separating X Corps in Wonsan from Fifth Air Force Headquarters in Seoul made it virtually impossible to get clearance in time. This issue was speedily settled by a conference in which Major General Earle E. Partridge, USAF, CG Fifth Air Force, gave General Harris oral permission to plan and execute supporting missions for X Corps in northeast Korea while awaiting clearance from the Fifth AF.

His decision was made on the basis of a liberal interpretation of the authority of CG 1st MAW to take action “in emergencies.” In practice, the arrangement worked out smoothly during this preliminary period, and on 12 November CG Fifth Air Force confirmed his oral agreement with a written directive.

Direction of air operations in support of X Corps was exercised by MAG-12 for the 1st MAW from 15 October to 9 November. Night operations did not begin until late in October for lack of runway lights at Wonsan, so that VMF(N)-513 flew daytime missions along with VMF-312. The two carrier-based squadrons conducted flights in a similar manner. Aircraft reported at designated times to specified Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs) for operations directed by a daily Fifth AF order, some of them in response to previously submitted requests of ground units for air support.

Major Vincent J. Gottschalk’s Marine Observation Squadron (VMO)-6 was under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division, though it was under the administrative direction of MAG-12. Two helicopter pilots, Captain Wallace D. Blatt and First Lieutenant Chester C. Ward, flew from Kimpo to Wonsan on 23 October. The rest of the squadron had proceeded by LST. A flight echelon of helicopters, commanded by Captain Victor A. Armstrong, VMO-6 executive officer, remained temporarily at Kimpo at the request of the Fifth Air Force to evacuate casualties of the 187th Airborne RCT in the Sukchon area.[89]

[89] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex WW (hereafter VMO-6 _SAR_), 2.

_MacArthur Orders Advance to Border_

From all that has gone before, it might be expected that UN strategy and tactics, after frequent modification, had finally been decided upon by mid-October 1950. This was not the case, and a brief recapitulation of events in western and central Korea is now necessary in order to set the scene for the sweeping changes that followed.

General Walker’s Eighth Army, as mentioned earlier, had deployed along the 38th Parallel after relieving X Corps above Seoul on 7 October. Two days later, armored elements of the 1st Cavalry Division crossed the boundary to spearhead the U. S. I Corps drive on Sariwon and Pyongyang. The former city was secured on 17 October with the help of the 27th Commonwealth Brigade, while the 24th Infantry Division moved up the west coast on the left of the Kaesong-Sariwon-Pyongyang axis.[90] The 1st Cavalry Division continued the attack toward Pyongyang on the 18th, entering the Red capital with the 1st ROK Division the next day. Pyongyang was secured on 21 October, and elements of the 1st Cavalry Division also occupied the undefended port city of Chinnampo, 35 miles to the southwest.[91]

[90] EUSAK _WD Sum, Oct 50_, 13–23.

[91] _Ibid._, 25–30.

A vertical envelopment on 20 October had come as a dramatic supplement to the attack on Pyongyang. The 187th Airborne RCT parachuted successfully into the Sukchon-Sunchon area, about 30 miles north of the city, thereby cutting the two principal NKPA escape routes to Manchuria. After watching the drop from his plane, General MacArthur stopped off at Pyongyang and declared that the surprise stroke had closed the trap on the enemy. At his Tokyo headquarters the next day, he predicted that the war would end shortly.[92]

[92] Schnabel, _The Korean Conflict_.

In mountainous central Korea on the right flank of I US Corps, the 6th ROK Division had been leading the rapid advance of South Korean forces under EUSAK. With Hwachon captured on 8 October, the division went on to take the vital hubs of Chorwon on the 10th and Kumwha on the 11th. It made contact with ROK Capitol Division elements from Wonsan the following day. During the next 24 hours, the 6th Division advanced 20 miles, and the 7th and 8th ROK Divisions fanned out to exploit the deepening penetration. On 14 October the 6th closed on Yangdok, about midway between Wonsan and Pyongyang.[93]

[93] EUSAK _WD Sum, Oct 50_, 11–20.

Thereafter the ROK forces in the center of the peninsula began veering northwest, so that by 22 October, the day after Pyongyang fell to I Corps, the vanguard 6th Division was bearing down on Kunu-ri,[94] about 45 air miles to the north of the capital.

[94] _Ibid._, 20–32.

From the foregoing, it is obvious that a trans-peninsular drive by X Corps was no longer necessary after mid-October. In fact, both in Washington and in Tokyo the attitude prevailed that the Korean war was nearing an end. President Truman had deemed a meeting of minds appropriate at this time, and he flew to Wake Island for a conference with General MacArthur on 15 October.[95]

[95] The following summary of the Wake Island meeting is primarily based on: Gen O. N. Bradley, Comp., _Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island Conference on October 15, 1950_ (Washington, 1951); and Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 364–367. These accounts are strongly objected to in MacArthur ltr, 24 Feb 36. For a differing account of the meeting see: C. A. Willoughby and J. Chamberlain, _MacArthur 1941–1951_ (New York, 1954), 382–383; Whitney, _MacArthur_, 384–395, 416; and Gen D. MacArthur, “Gen. MacArthur Makes His Reply,” _Life_, xl, no. 7 (13 Feb 56), 107–108. Participants in the conference besides Truman and MacArthur were: Secretary of the Army Frank Pace; Ambassador Philip Jessup; Ambassador to Korea John Muccio; General Bradley; Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk; Admiral Arthur W. Radford, CinCPacFlt; Averell Harriman; and BrigGen Courtney Whitney of FECOM Headquarters.

Various aspects of American policy in the Far East were discussed at the meeting, but the Korean situation ranked high on the agenda. When asked by President Truman about the chances of Russian or Chinese interference in the war, General MacArthur replied, “Very little.” His conclusion agreed with that held by many in high government circles, although officials in both Washington and Tokyo realized that the possibility of Communist intervention could not be dismissed entirely.

MacArthur stated that about 300,000 Chinese troops were stationed in Manchuria, of whom from 100,000 to 125,000 had been deployed along the Yalu River boundary with Korea. He estimated that only 50,000 to 60,000 of these troops could get across the river. If they attempted to move on Pyongyang, he said, they would be “slaughtered,” owing to the proximity of UN air bases.

The commander in chief added that Russia had no troops immediately available for a thrust into the peninsula. It would take six weeks for a Soviet division to assemble at the border, and by that time winter would have set in. And while Russia had a fairly good air force in Siberia and Manchuria, tactical support of Chinese ground troops would be difficult to control. “I believe Russian air would bomb the Chinese as often as they would bomb us,” MacArthur remarked.[96]

[96] By way of comparison, MacArthur paid tribute to the Marine Corps’ highly technical system of tactical air employment: “Ground support is a very difficult thing to do. Our marines do it perfectly. They have been trained for it. Our own Air and Ground Forces are not as good as the marines but they are effective.”

Part of the conference dealt with the rehabilitation of Korea and the eventual departure of UN troops after the fighting had ceased. MacArthur expressed his belief that organized resistance would end by Thanksgiving (23 November). He hoped to withdraw EUSAK to Japan by Christmas, leaving X Corps, reconstituted with the 2d and 3d U. S. Infantry Divisions and other UN detachments, as a security force until peace and order were fully restored. All present seemed to agree that elections should be held early to achieve stability in the re-united country, and that the ROK Army must be made tough enough to deter the Chinese Communists from any aggressive moves.

The conference ended on a note of general optimism. President Truman pinned a Distinguished Service Medal on the commander in chief (his fifth), and the latter boarded his plane and departed shortly after the meeting.

Once back in Tokyo, MacArthur issued on 17 October a new order that would become effective if Pyongyang fell before X Corps landed at Wonsan (as was the case four days later). This draft established parallel zones of action for EUSAK and X Corps in North Korea, with the Taebaek Range as the dividing line. The restraining line for UN Forces was advanced as much as 60 miles to a lateral drawn through Chongsanjangsi-Koingdong-Pyongwon-Toksil-li-Pungsan-Songjin (see Map 1). ROK Forces, of course, would still drive all the way to the borders of Manchuria and the USSR.[97]

[97] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50; Schnabel, _Korean Conflict_.

On 24 October, just as the 1st Marine Division was preparing to land at Wonsan, General MacArthur did away with the restraining line altogether. The original restriction on the advance of UN elements, he told his subordinate commanders, was based on the possibility of enemy capitulation. Since there appeared to be no prospect of a formal surrender, he now authorized Generals Walker and Almond to use whatever of their ground forces were necessary to secure all of North Korea. And he enjoined them “... to drive forward with all speed and with full utilization of all their force.”[98]

[98] CinCUNC msg CX 67291, 24 Oct 50; X Corps _WD Sum_, _Nov 50_, 5.

The commander in chief received a message from JCS the next day, telling him that they considered his new order “not in consonance” with their 27 September authorization, which had stipulated a policy of using only ROK ground forces in the provinces bordering Russia and Manchuria. The matter had caused some concern in Washington, the Joint Chiefs said, and they wanted to know MacArthur’s reasons for making the decision.[99]

[99] JCS msg 94933, 24 Oct 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 372.

In reply they were informed that the commander in chief’s decision was a “matter of military necessity,” since the ROK Army lacked both the strength and the seasoned commanders required for securing North Korea. MacArthur added that the 27 September authorization had “... merely enunciated the [restraining line] provision as a matter of policy,” and had admitted the possibility of JCS instructions being modified in accordance with developments. He stated further that he possessed the authority to so modify from Secretary of Defense Marshall himself, who had told him “... to feel unhampered tactically and strategically....” Assuring the Joint Chiefs that he understood the reasons for their apprehension, he warned that “... tactical hazards might even result from other action than that which I have directed.”[100]

[100] CinCFE msg 67397, 25 Oct 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 372.

And there the matter rested.

_Landing of 1st Marine Division_

It was at a X Corps staff meeting on 18 October that General Almond disclosed MacArthur’s plan for parallel zones of action and the new Chongsanjansi-Songjin restraining line in North Korea. Upon establishing his CP at Wonsan two days later, he accordingly assumed command of all UN and ROK forces north of the 39° 10′ parallel and east of the Taebaek Range.[101]

[101] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50.

By this time the ROK Capitol Division was occupying Hamhung, Hungnam, and nearby Yonpo Airfield, all of which had been captured on 17 October during the swift drive northward.[102] The ROK 3d Division had one regiment at Wonsan, another at Kojo, and the third en route to Hamhung.[103]

[102] EUSAK _WD_, 23 Oct 50.

[103] X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50.

On the 21st, General Almond requested CJTF-7 to land one battalion of Marines at Kojo immediately, for the purpose of relieving the ROK regiment defending that locale. He contended that Navy LSTs could beach there safely, since SCAJAP ships had already done so. Learning of the proposed landing, Admiral Doyle argued against it and Admiral Struble forbade it on the ground that the military requirement did not justify the risk incident to negotiating unswept waters. Thus the landing was called off, although the Marines had not heard the last of Kojo.[104]

[104] “Summary of Activities, 21 Oct,” in _Ibid._; ComPhibGruOne “Operations Report,” 13; Smith, _Notes_, 404–407; Struble Comments, 14 Mar 56.

On 22 October, General Smith issued a new plan based on the proposed X Corps deployment as far north as the Chongsanjangsi-Songjin line. The 1st Marine Division would now occupy the southern part of the extended corps zone, with each regiment responsible for the security of its assigned sector.[105] But again planning went for naught when, two days later, General Almond received MacArthur’s order to disregard the restraining line and use whatever forces necessary to drive rapidly to the Manchurian and Soviet borders. On 25 October, therefore, X Corps directed the 1st Marine Division to concentrate one RCT in the Hamhung area and to relieve elements of the I ROK Corps at the Chosin and Fusen Reservoirs. South Korean troops had already begun their advance on these vital power centers, some 50 to 60 air miles north of Hamhung.[106]

[105] 1stMarDiv _OpnPlan_ 4-50, 22 Oct 50. “G-3 (Col Bowser) and G-4 (Col McAlister) landed by boat at Wonsan through a very narrow swept channel on the 23rd or 24th of October. Advance Parties of the Division were contacted at this time and a reconnaissance of the entire Wonsan area was made to select and mark administrative assembly areas for units of the Division. Included in this reconnaissance was the St. Benedict Abbey, which was selected as the assembly area for the 7th Marines in view of its projected employment to the north shortly after landing.” Bowser Comments.

[106] X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50; X Corps G-3 Journal, in _ibid._; Smith, _Notes_, 285.

It was also on the 25th that the 1st Marine Division finally began its administrative landing at Wonsan--as anticlimactic a landing as Marines have ever made. Five LSTs loaded with Engineer, Shore Party, and Combat Service Group elements beached on Kalma Peninsula in the evening. Since the approaches had not been declared clear until late afternoon, the main ship-to-shore movement was delayed until the next day. Thus, 26 October actually became D-Day--or “Doyle Day,” as it was referred to by an impatient General Almond.[107]

[107] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex PP (hereafter 1stMar _SAR_), 4; and Smith, _Notes_, 407–409. The orders covering the actual debarkation of troops were contained in CTF 90 msgs to CTG 90.2, 0240 and 0910 23 Oct 50; CTG 90.2 msg to CTE 90.22, 1328 25 Oct 50; and CG 1stMarDiv msg to subordinate units, 1450 24 Oct 50. The order to land was given in CTF 90 msg to CTG 90.2, 0707 25 Oct 50.

At first light on the 26th, landing craft clustered around the transport vessels in the swept channel as troops spilled down debarkation nets. The first of 39 scheduled waves were shortly on the way, with amphibious craft of every description churning the water.[108] LSUs began disgorging armor of the 1st Tank Battalion at 0730, and the big machines, fitted with deep-water fording adapters, thrashed through the surf and onto the loose sand.[109] Simultaneously, swarms of vehicles of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion crawled ashore shuttling troops and cargo.[110]

[108] “At the time of the administrative landing we thought that we might as well use the planned ship-to-shore movement for scheduled waves in order to avoid making a new ship-to-shore plan. In this way we were able to execute by referring to our original plan [OpnO 16-50] for the assault landing without issuing an entire new order.” Bowser Comments.

[109] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex OO (hereafter 1stTkBn _SAR_), 2–8.

[110] 1stAmphTracBn _HD Oct 50_, 2–3.

At 0900, LSTs landed the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 1st Marines on YELLOW Beach, while Colonel Lewis B. Puller’s regimental headquarters splashed ashore out of landing craft dispatched from the _Noble_. The reserve battalion, 2/1, remained on board ship until the 28th. By 1700, the 3d Battalion was in position for the night and the 1st was well on the way to Kojo for a special mission. In the midst of the landing, Colonel Puller received a message from General Smith congratulating him on his being selected for promotion to brigadier general.[111]

[111] 1stMar _SAR_, 4; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1355 26 Oct 50.

Troops of the 7th Marines marched ashore on BLUE Beach without incident, and the assembled battalions moved to assigned areas north of Wonsan. At 1300, Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg opened his regimental CP at St. Benedict’s Abbey, which had been gutted by the retreating Communists.[112]

[112] 7thMar _SAR_, 12; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1628 26 Oct 50. For a detailed account of the tragedy of St. Benedict’s, see Capt Clifford M. Drury (ChC), USNR, _The History of the Chaplains Corps_, _U. S. Navy_, (MS) V.

Advance parties of the 5th Marines began landing over both beaches at 0800. Priority was given to unloading the reserve unit’s cargo, and the majority of troops remained on board transports for the night. Most of the regiment debarked the next day and assembled about three miles northwest of Wonsan, where Lieutenant Colonel Murray established his CP at 1800.[113]

[113] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex QQ, (hereafter 5thMar _SAR_), 8.

Only the 2d Battalion and several reconnaissance parties of the 11th Marines landed on the 26th. The remainder of the artillery regiment went ashore the next day and bivouacked at the coastal town of Munpyong-ni, five miles above Wonsan. Colonel James H. Brower, the regimental commander, detached 2/11 to the 1st Marines at 1715 on 27 October, but the other battalions “... remained in a mobile state awaiting further orders.”[114]

[114] 11thMar _UnitReport_ (_URpt_), 21–28 Oct 50.

The Wonsan landing, though tactically insignificant at the moment, was a major logistical undertaking to such units as the 1st Engineer Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel John H. Partridge), the 1st Shore Party Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Henry P. Crowe), and the 1st Combat Service Group (Colonel John H. Cook, Jr.).

Representatives from these and other support and service units had flown to the objective area several days before the Division’s arrival. After completing an inspection of Wonsan, the Shore Party detachment employed 500 North Korean POWs and 210 civilians to improve landing sites and beach exits. This work continued 24 hours a day for nine days, until the vanguard LSTs grated ashore on Kalma Peninsula in the evening of 25 October.[115] At this point, Shore Party Group C (Major George A. Smith) assumed responsibility for YELLOW Beach in the north, and Group B (Major Henry Brzezinski) took over BLUE Beach.

[115] The concluding narrative of this chapter is derived from 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annexes MM (hereafter 1stSPBn SAR), 5–8, and UU (hereafter 1st CSG _SAR_) 6 and 1stSPBn, _HD for Advance Party_, 1–2.

With the arrival of the first waves of LSTs, LSUs, LVTs, and landing craft in the morning, there began a routine of unremitting toil that would abate only after all of X Corps had landed weeks later. Because of the shallow offshore gradient, many amphibious craft could not reach the beach with their heavy cargoes, and the Shore Party troops had to construct ramps which projected 30 feet into the water. These improvised piers were made of rice bags filled with sand, with the result that their maintenance required considerable effort in men and heavy equipment. A pontoon causeway constructed on 27 October lessened the difficulties connected with getting troops ashore, but other problems persisted.

One of these had to do with a sandbar that stretched across the boat lanes about 50 yards from the coast. Heavier craft frequently grounded here, and while some could be towed ashore by tractor dozers (TD-18s) and LVTs, others had to be unloaded in the water by cranes operating off the ramps and from barges.

Once men and supplies finally reached dry land, there was the difficulty of transporting them inland over the loose sand and around the sprawling dunes of the peninsular beaches. Trucks and trailers often bogged down to such depths that they had to be uprooted and towed by LVTs or dozers. This tied up the overworked tracked vehicles when they were badly needed elsewhere.

The Combat Service Group established its Class I, III, and V dumps according to plan on 26 October, but Class II and IV supplies arrived on the beach “... in a completely mixed condition,” owing to the haste of the outloading at Inchon. From D-Day onward, from 1500 to 2000 Korean civilians were hired daily to help segregate and issue supplies.

Upon the completion of mine sweeping in the inner harbor, the intact port facilities of Wonsan became operative on 2 November. During the next nine days, the Combat Service Group dispatched by rail to Hamhung 3900 tons of ammunition alone. On 9 November, the group was attached to X Corps for operational control, thereafter assuming specific responsibility for such varied tasks as: operation of all port facilities; unloading all X Corps elements; transporting all equipment and supplies to inland dumps and supply points; casualty evacuation; maintenance of an airhead at Wonsan Airfield; providing local security; traffic control in the port and its environs; and providing field maintenance for all units in the Wonsan area.

The magnitude of the logistical operation can be imagined from a survey of statistics mentioned in Shore Party reports. By 31 October, when the 1st Marine Division’s landing was completed, a total of 24 cargo vessels, 36 LSTs, and one LSM had been unloaded. Bulk cargo in the order of 18,402 tons had moved across the beaches along with 30,189 personnel and 4731 vehicles. During the same period, 2534 troops were outloaded with 70 vehicles and 4323 POWs. And in November, as the MAG-12 elements and the rest of X Corps poured ashore, the total of ships handled soared to 76 cargo and 52 LSTs, adding 30,928 personnel, 51,270 tons of supplies, and 7113 vehicles to the short-lived build-up in Northeast Korea.