Volume II, “The Inchon-Seoul Operation

Library of Congress Catalogue Number: 57-60727

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office Washington 25, D. C. Price $2.75 Official Price of this Publication $2.75

Foreword

The breakout of the 1st Marine Division from the Chosin Reservoir area will long be remembered as one of the inspiring epics of our history. It is also worthy of consideration as a campaign in the best tradition of American military annals.

The ability of the Marines to fight their way through twelve Chinese divisions over a 78-mile mountain road in sub-zero weather cannot be explained by courage and endurance alone. It also owed to the high degree of professional forethought and skill as well as the “uncommon valor” expected of all Marines.

A great deal of initiative was required of unit commanders, and tactics had to be improvised at times on the spur of the moment to meet unusual circumstances. But in the main, the victory was gained by firm discipline and adherence to time-tested military principles. Allowing for differences in arms, indeed, the Marines of 1950 used much the same fundamental tactics as those employed on mountain roads by Xenophon and his immortal Ten Thousand when they cut their way through Asiatic hordes to the Black Sea in the year 401 B.C.

When the danger was greatest, the 1st Marine Division might have accepted an opportunity for air evacuation of troops after the destruction of weapons and supplies to keep them from falling into the enemy’s hands. But there was never a moment’s hesitation. The decision of the commander and the determination of all hands to come out fighting with all essential equipment were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Marine Corps.

R. MCC. PATE _General, U. S. Marine Corps,_ _Commandant of the Marine Corps._

Preface

This is the third in a series of five volumes dealing with the operations of the United States Marine Corps in Korea during the period 2 August 1950 to 27 July 1953. Volume III presents in detail the operations of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing as a part of X Corps, USA, in the Chosin Reservoir campaign.

The time covered in this book extends from the administrative landing at Wonsan on 26 October 1950 to the Hungnam evacuation which ended on Christmas Eve. The record would not be complete, however, without reference to preceding high-level strategic decisions in Washington and Tokyo which placed the Marines in northeast Korea and governed their employment.

Credit is due the U. S. Army and Navy for support on land and sea, and the U. S. Navy and Air Force for support in the air. But since this is primarily a Marine Corps history, the activities of other services are described here only in sufficient detail to show Marine operations in their proper perspective.

The ideal of the authors has been to relate the epic of the Chosin Reservoir breakout from the viewpoint of the man in the foxhole as well as the senior officer at the command post. Grateful acknowledgment is made to the 142 Marine officers and men who gave so generously of their time by contributing 338 narratives, letters, and interviews. In many instances this material was so detailed that some could not be used, because of space limitations. But all will go into the permanent Marine archives for the benefit of future historians.

Thanks are also extended to the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as Marine officers, who offered valuable comments and criticisms after reading the preliminary drafts of chapters. Without this assistance no accurate and detailed account could have been written.

The maps contained in this volume, as in the previous ones, have been prepared by the Reproduction Section, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia. The advice of officers of the Current History Branch of the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, has also been of aid in the preparation of these pages.

E. W. SNEDEKER _Major General, U. S. Marine Corps,_ _Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3._

Contents

_Page_

I Problems of Victory 1

Decision to Cross the 38th Parallel--Surrender Message to NKPA Forces--MacArthur’s Strategy of Celerity--Logistical Problems of Advance--Naval Missions Prescribed--X Corps Relieved at Seoul--Joint Planning for Wonsan Landing

II The Wonsan Landing 21

ROK Army Captures Wonsan--Marine Loading and Embarkation--Two Weeks of Mine Sweeping--Operation Yo-Yo--Marine Air First at Objective--MacArthur Orders Advance to Border--Landing of 1st Marine Division

III First Blood at Kojo 43

1/1 Sent to Kojo--Marine Positions in Kojo Area--The All-Night Fight of Baker Company--2/1 Ordered to Kojo--Security Provided for Wonsan Area--Marines Relieved at Kojo

IV Majon-ni and Ambush Alley 61

Marines Units Tied in for Defense--Political Aspects of Mission--Roads Patrolled by Rifle Companies--Air Drop of Supplies Requested--First Attack on Perimeter--KMC Battalion Sent to Majon-ni--Movement of 1st Marines to Chigyong

V Red China to the Rescue 79

Chinese in X Corps Zone--Introducing the New Enemy--Communist Victory in Civil War--Organization of the CCF--The Chinese Peasant as a Soldier--CCF Arms and Equipment--Red China’s “Hate America” Campaign--CCF Strategy and Tactics

VI The Battle of Sudong 95

The MSR from Hungnam to Yudam-ni--ROKs Relieved by 7th Marines--CCF Counterattack at Sudong--Two Marine Battalions Cut Off--End of NKPA Tank Regiment--The Fight for How Hill--Disappearance of CCF Remnants--Koto-ri Occupied by 7th Marines

VII Advance to the Chosin Reservoir 125

Attacks on Wonsan-Hungnam MSR--Appraisals of the New Enemy--The Turning Point of 15 November--Changes in X Corps Mission--Marine Preparations for Trouble--Supplies Trucked to Hagaru--Confidence of UN Command--Marine Concentration on MSR

VIII Crisis at Yudam-ni 151

Marine Attack on 27 November--Marine Disposition Before CCF Attack--The Battle of Northwest Ridge--Chinese Seize Hill 1403--Fighting at 3/5’s CP--The Battle of North Ridge

IX Fox Hill 177

Encirclement of Company C of RCT-7--Fox Company at Toktong Pass--Marine Counterattacks on North Ridge--Second Night’s Attacks on Fox Hill--Not Enough Tents for Casualties--The Turning Point of 30 November

X Hagaru’s Night of Fire 197

Four-Mile Perimeter Required--Attempts to Clear MSR--Intelligence as to CCF Capabilities--Positions of Marine Units--CCF Attacks from the Southwest--East Hill Lost to Enemy--The Volcano of Supporting Fires--Marine Attacks on East Hill

XI Task Force Drysdale 221

CCF Attacks on 2/1 at Koto-ri--Convoy Reinforced by Marine Tanks--The Fight in Hell Fire Valley--Attack of George Company on East Hill--High Level Command Conference--CCF Attacks of 1 December at Hagaru--Rescue of U. S. Army Wounded--First Landings on Hagaru Airstrip

XII Breakout From Yudam-ni 249

Joint Planning for Breakout--The Fight for Hills 1419 and 1542--March of 1/7 Over the Mountains--Attack of 3/5 on 1–2 December--The Ridgerunners of Toktong Pass--CCF Attacks on Hills 1276 and 1542--Advance of Darkhorse on 2–3 December--Entry into Hagaru Perimeter

XIII Regroupment at Hagaru 277

4,312 Casualties Evacuated by Air--537 Replacements Flown to Hagaru--Air Drops of Ammunition--Planning for Breakout to Koto-ri--3/1 Relieved by RCT-5 at Hagaru--East Hill Retaken from Chinese--Attack of RCT-7 to the South--Advance of the Division Trains

XIV Onward From Koto-ri 305

Assembly of Division at Koto-ri--Activation of Task Force Dog--Air Drop of Bridge Sections--Division Planning for Attack--Battle of 1/1 in the Snowstorm--Advance of RCT-7 and RCT-5--Marine Operations of 9 and 10 December--Completion of Division Breakout

XV The Hungnam Redeployment 333

Marines Billeted in Hungnam Area--Embarkation of 1st Marine Division--The Last Ten Days at Hungnam--Marines Arrive at New Assembly Area--Contributions of Marine Aviation--Losses Sustained by the Enemy--Results of the Reservoir Campaign

_Appendixes_

A Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations 361

B Task Organization, 1st Marine Division 365

C Naval Task Organization 373

D Effective Strength of 1st Marine Division 379

E 1st Marine Division Casualties 381

F Command and Staff List, 8 October-15 December 1950, 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing 383

G Enemy Order of Battle 397

H Air Evacuation Statistics 399

I Unit Citations 401

Bibliography 405

Index 413

Illustrations

_Photographs_

Sixteen-page sections of photographs follow pages 148 and 276.

_Maps and Sketches_

_Page_ 1 Eighth Army Advances and Restraining Lines 4

2 Area of Operations, 1st Marine Division, October-December 1950 12, 122

3 Wonsan and Harbor 16

4 Kojo Area 47

5 Majon-ni and Road to Wonsan 62

6 Majon-ni Perimeter 64

7 The Main Supply Route of the 1st Marine Division 97

8 Battle of Sudong, 1st Phase 101

9 Chinhung-ni Tank Fight, 4 November 111

10 Action of 4–5 November and Funchilin Pass 115

11 1st Marine Division Zone and Objectives 130

12 Yudam-ni 153

13 Marine Attacks, 27 November 155

14 Battle of Northwest Ridge 162

15 Action at 3/5’s CP 169

16 The Battle of North Ridge 173

17 Hagaru Defensive Perimeter 199

18 East Hill Attacks, 29 November 212

19 Koto-ri Perimeter, 28 November-7 December 223

20 Attempts to Reinforce Hagaru, 28 November-1 December 227

21 Task Force Drysdale Ambush, 28 November 230

22 East Hill Attacks, 30 November 237

23 Breaking off Action, 30 November 252

24 Breakout from Yudam-ni, 1 December 256

25 Breakout from Yudam-ni, 2–4 December 269

26 Seizure of East Hill and Chinese Counterattack 6–7 December 289

27 Last Night at Hagaru, 6–7 December 292

28 Breakout from Hagaru to Koto-ri, 6–7 December 295

29 Funchilin Pass and Advances of 8–10 December 310

30 Hungnam Docks and Beaches 344