U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5) The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
CHAPTER XV
The Hungnam Redeployment
_Marines Billeted in Hungnam Area--Embarkation of 1st Marine Division--The Last Ten Days at Hungnam--Marines Arrive at New Assembly Area--Contributions of Marine Aviation--Losses Sustained by the Enemy--Results of the Reservoir Campaign_
“Wave and look happy!” These were the first words to greet some of the weary, unshaven Marines upon arrival in the Hamhung-Hungnam area. They grinned obligingly in response to the press photographers snapping pictures of the motor column from the roadside. They were happy indeed to be back in a world of hot meals and hot baths. They were happy to be alive.
Marines and attached Army troops found it astonishing as well as flattering to learn that such expressions as “epic” and “saga” and “miracle of deliverance” were being applied to the breakout in American newspapers. The press correspondents in turn were astonished to learn that never for a moment had the men doubted that they would slug their way out to the seacoast.
“The running fight of the Marines and two battalions of the Army’s 7th Infantry Division from Hagaru to Hamhung--40 miles by air but 60 miles over the icy, twisting mountainous road--was a battle unparalleled in U. S. military history,” commented _Time_. “It had some aspects of Bataan, some of Anzio, some of Dunkirk, some of Valley Forge, some of the ‘Retreat of the 10,000’ (401–400 B. C.) as described in Xenophon’s _Anabasis_.”
Not until the Marines had fought their way as far as Chinhung-ni, the weekly newsmagazine continued, did there appear to be much hope that they would come out as an organized force. Then “for the first time it looked as if most of the 20,000 [Marines] would get through.”[627]
[627] _Time, the Weekly Newsmagazine_, lvi, no. 25 (18 Dec 50), (Pacific Edition), 18–19.
By reading contemporary press accounts it is possible to recapture the mood of the American public upon realization of the disaster which had overtaken the Eighth Army. “It was defeat--the worst defeat the United States ever suffered,” reported _Time_ in the issue of 11 December 1950. “The Nation received the fearful news from Korea with a strange-seeming calmness--the kind of confused, fearful, half-believing matter-of-factness with which many a man has reacted upon learning that he has cancer or tuberculosis. The news of Pearl Harbor, nine years ago to the month, had pealed out like a fire bell. But the numbing facts of the defeat in Korea seeped into the national consciousness slowly out of a jumble of headlines, bulletins, and communiques; days passed before its enormity finally became plain.”[628]
[628] _Time_, lvi, no. 24 (11 Dec 50), (Pacific Edition), 9.
_Newsweek_ called it “America’s worst military licking since Pearl Harbor. Perhaps it might become the worst military disaster in American history. Barring a military or diplomatic miracle, the approximately two-thirds of the U. S. Army that had been thrown into Korea might have to be evacuated in a new Dunkerque to save them from being lost in a new Bataan.”[629]
[629] _Newsweek_, xxxvi, no. 24 (11 Dec 50) 11. “Such quotations,” comments General MacArthur, referring to the excerpts from _Time_ and _Newsweek_, “certainly do not reflect the mood of the American public at the time, but rather the emotional reaction of irresponsible writers.... Neither [of the two news magazines] had the slightest access to the basic information and factors which involved the decisions and operations of our government and its higher military commanders.... The unreliability of these nonprofessional estimates of the situation is indeed eloquently demonstrated by comparing them with the actual military reports by the commands involved.” Gen D. MacArthur ltr to MajGen E. W. Snedeker, 17 Oct 56.
The situation in west Korea was depressing enough. But at least the Eighth Army had a line of retreat left open. It was with apprehension that the American public stared at front-page maps showing the “entrapment” of the 1st Marine Division and attached U. S. Army units and British Marines by Chinese forces. Press releases from Korea did not encourage much expectation that the encircled troops could save themselves from destruction by any means other than surrender. In either event the result would be a military catastrophe without a parallel in the Nation’s history.
The first gleam of hope was inspired by the news that the Marines had seized the initiative at Yudam-ni and cut a path through Chinese blocking the route to Hagaru. Then came the thrilling reports of the air drops of supplies at Hagaru and the mass evacuation of casualties by air. Much of the humiliation felt by newspaper readers was wiped clean by pride as General Smith’s troops fought through to Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni in sub-zero cold. The air drop of the bridge sections was a dramatic climax to the realization that what had been a hope was now a fact--the Chosin Reservoir troops had saved themselves and inflicted a major defeat on the Chinese Communists in the doing. Testimony of POWs had left no doubt that the mission of the three CCF corps was the annihilation of the surrounded United States forces, but the result had been enemy losses which did not fall far short of annihilation of the CCF units themselves.
It was in a spirit of prayerful thanksgiving, therefore, that Americans read about the column of grimy, parka-clad men which came out of the mountains of northeast Korea on 11 December 1950. They had come out fighting and they had brought their wounded and most of their equipment out with them.
_Marines Billeted in Hungnam Area_
As late as 9 December it had been General Smith’s understanding that the 1st Marine Division would occupy a defensive sector south and southwest of Hungnam. Then Colonel McAllister at Hungnam was notified by X Corps that plans for the defense of the Hungnam area had been changed, so that the Marines were to embark immediately for redeployment by water to South Korea. General Smith was informed on the 10th, and so promptly was the new plan put into effect that the first Marine units were already loading out before the last elements of the Division arrived at Hungnam.[630]
[630] The Division Embarkation Section began revision of its standby embarkation order on 10 December and the following day was able to issue Embarkation Order 3-50. EmbO memo to HistO, subj: Historical Diary, 19 Dec 50.
No changes were necessary in the plans for the reception of Marine units in the Hungnam area worked out by Colonel Snedeker and Colonel McAllister on orders of General Smith. On 8 December, Snedeker had issued detailed instructions which designated defensive sectors for RCT-1 at Chigyong and for RCT-5 and RCT-7 in the vicinity of Yonpo Airfield. The 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion was charged with making such preparations to receive the returning troops as putting up tents, installing stoves, erecting heads and equipping galleys.[631]
[631] Smith, _Notes_, 1065–1066, 1119; 1stMarDiv memo: “Plan for receiving 1stMarDiv Units, Hamhung-Hungnam area,” 0800 8 Dec 50.
The Navy, as usual, was ready. On 15 November, it may be recalled, General Smith had candidly expressed his misgivings about the strategic outlook to Admiral Morehouse and Captain Sears. Morehouse was chief of staff to Admiral Joy, ComNavFE, and Sears served in a like capacity under Admiral Doyle, CTF-90. This frank discussion had not fallen upon deaf ears; and on the 28th, only a few hours after the first CCF attacks at Yudam-ni, ComNavFE alerted CTF-90 as to the possible need for a redeployment operation by sea. The following day Joy advised that events in the Chosin Reservoir area made it desirable for ships of TF-90 to be on six hours’ notice either in Korean waters or at Sasebo, Japan.[632]
[632] Except when otherwise noted, the remainder of this section is based on the following sources: ComPhibGruOne, _Action Report, Hungnam_, 1–2, 4–6; Forney _Special Report_, 5–7; X Corps, _OpnO_ 9, 5 Dec 50; X Corps, _Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation_, 2–3; X Corps _OI 27_, 9 Dec 50; Gen L. C. Shepherd, Jr., ltr to MajGen E. W. Snedeker, 25 Oct 56.
CTF-90 commenced planning immediately for either an administrative or emergency outloading. His OpnO 19-50, issued on the 28th for planning purposes, provided for half of the amphibious force to conduct redeployment operations on the east coast under Doyle as ComPhibGruOne, while the other half had a similar mission on the west coast under Admiral Thackrey, ComPhibGruThree.
At this time ComPhibGruThree and most of the amphibious units were in Japanese ports for upkeep and replenishment. All were directed by Admiral Joy on the 29th to proceed to Sasebo.
ComPhibGruOne had just completed the opening of Hungnam as a major resupply port and was preparing to withdraw to Japan with the remaining amphibious force. On 30 November, however, the deteriorating situation of ground forces in Korea made it necessary for all units of TF-90 to be in Korean waters. The emergency appeared to be more critical on the west coast, and two-thirds of the smaller amphibious ships were allotted to the Inchon area while the transports were divided equally between Inchon and Hungnam.
The first week of December was devoted to planning and preparing for a redeployment of X Corps by sea which appeared more likely every day. Mine sweeping operations were resumed at Hungnam to enlarge the swept anchorage area and provide swept channels for gunfire support ships.
X Corps OpnO 9-50, issued on 5 December, provided for the defense of the Hungnam area by setting up a perimeter with a final defense line about seven miles in radius. Pie-shaped sectors of fairly equal area, converging on the harbor, were assigned to the following major units from east to west--1st ROK Corps (less one division at Songjin), 7th Infantry Division, 3d Infantry Division (with the 1st KMC Regiment(-)), and the 1st Marine Division. The Marine sector included Yonpo Airfield.
On 8 December a conference held on board the _Mount McKinley_ by ComNavFE and CTF-90 was attended by Vice Admiral Struble, Com7thFlt, Rear Admiral John M. Higgins, ComCruDivFive, and Lieutenant General Shepherd, CG FMFPac.
General Shepherd was present as “Representative of Commander Naval Forces, Far East, on matters relating to the Marine Corps and for consultation and advice in connection with the contemplated amphibious operation now being planned.”[633]
[633] ComNavFE endorsement on CG FMFPac ser 8432, 6 Dec 50. “Although it was not necessary for me to exercise my command functions,” commented General Shepherd, “I had been orally directed to do so by both Admirals Radford and Joy if I considered it expedient. As I recall, I was directed to take charge of the naval phase of the evacuation of Hungnam as Representative of the Commander, Naval Forces, Far East. In compliance with these instructions I exercised close overall supervision of this phase of the operation and made suggestions to both Admiral Doyle and General Almond relative to the embarkation and evacuation of the Marine Forces from Hungnam.” Shepherd ltr, 25 Oct 56.
General Almond was directed on the 9th to redeploy to South Korea and to report to the commanding general of the Eighth Army after assembling in the Ulsan-Pusan-Masan area. He was to release the 1st ROK Corps as soon as possible to the ROK Army in the Samchok area. An assembly area in the vicinity of Masan, widely separated from the other units of X Corps, was specified for the 1st Marine Division.
CTF-90 was assigned the following missions:
(1) Provide water lift for and conduct redeployment operations of UN forces in Korea as directed;
(2) Control all air and naval gunfire support in designated embarkation areas;
(3) Protect shipping en route to debarkation ports;
(4) Be responsible for naval blockade and gunfire support of friendly units East Coast of Korea, including Pusan;
(5) Be prepared to conduct small-scale redeployment operations, including ROK forces and UN prisoners of war;
(6) Coordinate withdrawal operations with CG X Corps and other commands as appropriate;
(7) Support and cover redeployment operations in the Hungnam or other designated Korean embarkation area.
No such large-scale sea lift of combined Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine elements, not to mention the ROK units, had been attempted since Okinawa. The time was so short, moreover, that action could not wait on detailed planning and organization. In any event the job had to be done.
An enormous fleet of shipping must be assembled from every available source in the Far East. More than 100,000 troops must be embarked, and it was estimated at first that 25,000 Korean refugees must be evacuated, though this figure had to be nearly quadrupled. Mountains of supplies and thousands of vehicles must be outloaded from a comparatively small port. While these activities were in progress, the perimeter must be protected with naval gunfire and aircraft against an enemy credited by X Corps G-2 estimates with the capabilities of launching an attack of six to eight depleted divisions against the Hamhung-Hungnam area.
It was aptly dubbed “an amphibious landing in reverse,” since the plan called for the methodical shrinking of the perimeter, under cover of air strikes and naval gunfire, until the last platoon of the ground forces had embarked. Then would come the grand finale of the demolitions.
_Embarkation of 1st Marine Division_
The Wonsan evacuation was instructive as a rehearsal for the Hungnam redeployment. From 2 to 10 December, Lieutenant Colonel Crowe’s 1st Shore Party Battalion had charge of the outloading while sharing the defense of the harbor with a battalion from the 3d Infantry Division and two KMC battalions. Another Marine outfit, Company A of the 1st Amphibian Truck Battalion, speeded up the operation by making hundreds of round trips between docks and ships with DUKWs.[634]
[634] The sources of this section, unless otherwise stated, are as follows: Forney, _Special Report, 8–18_; _MCB Study_, II-C-114–115; ComPhibGruOne _Action Report, Hungnam_, 5–10, 25; 1stMAW _HD, Dec 50_, 1–2; Smith, _Notes_, 120–1123; Maj R. W. Shutts, _Report on Amphibious Withdrawal of the U. S. X Corps from Hungnam, Korea_, 1–9; MGCIS-1 _HD, Dec 50_; X Corps _OpnO 10_, 11 Dec 50; 1stMarDiv _EmbO 3-50_, 11 Dec 50; Shepherd ltr, 25 Oct 56; LtGen W. H. Tunner, USAF, ltr to MajGen Snedeker, 8 Dec 56.
Air cover and naval gunfire from supporting ships of TE-90.21 was so effective that Wonsan had no enemy interference worth mentioning. Covering missions continued to be fired until the last friendly troops withdrew, and operations were completed without the necessity of destroying UN supplies and equipment. Altogether, 3834 troops, 7009 Korean civilians, 1146 vehicles, and 10,013 bulk tons of cargo had been outloaded when the operation was completed on 10 December. One detachment of Shore Party troops sailed for Pusan with the DUKWs in preparation for unloading the 1st Marine Division upon its arrival at that port.
The Hungnam evacuation plan, as outlined in X Corps OpnO 10-50, issued on 11 December, provided for the immediate embarkation of the 1st Marine Division and the 3d ROK Division. A smaller perimeter than the original concept was to be defended meanwhile by the 7th and 3d Infantry Divisions, with the latter having the final responsibility. Major units were to withdraw gradually by side-slipping until only reinforced platoons remained as covering forces holding strong points. Plans called for naval gunfire and air support to be stepped up as the perimeter contracted.
CTF-90 assumed control of all naval functions on 10 December after approving loading plans made at a conference of Navy officers and representatives of X Corps. Colonel Forney, Deputy Chief of Staff, X Corps, was appointed Corps evacuation control officer with responsibility for the operation of the Hungnam port and was assigned a small staff. Major Richard W. Shutts, of General Shepherd’s party, was placed in charge of the Operations Section. Two more former TTUPac Marines on the X Corps staff were assigned sections--Major Charles P. Weiland, the Loading Section; and Major Jack R. Munday, the Navy Liaison Section. Lieutenant Colonel Harry E. Moisell, USA, headed the Movement Section, and Captain William C. Cool, USA, the Rations Section.
Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Warren served as Colonel Forney’s executive officer until he was incapacitated by pneumonia and relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Crowe.
The 2d Engineer Special Brigade, USA, was responsible for operation of the dock facilities, traffic control in the dock areas, and for furnishing Japanese stevedores, winch operators, cargo handling equipment, and dunnage. A reinforced company from the 1st Shore Party Battalion worked the LST and small craft beaches while controlling the lighterage for ships loading in the stream.
It was decided on 11 December that 1st Marine Division staging to assembly areas should commence immediately. Loading had to be expedited so that ships could be used for a second and even third turn-around. Embarkation Order 3-50, issued by the Division on the 11th, assigned vehicle and cargo assembly areas to units, and an embarkation control office was set up in the dock area.
As compensation for the cramped confines of the Hungnam harbor, the tidal range was less than a foot as compared to the maximum of 31 feet at Inchon. And though the docks had space for only seven ships, Major Weiland planned to double-berth four additional ships and load them from the outboard side. In addition, 11 LSTs could be handled simultaneously--seven at GREEN Beach One, and the others at GREEN Beach Two.
Marine units awaiting shipping remained on a standby basis, ready to begin loading at once upon assignment of space by the embarkation officer. The Division rear CP at Hungnam had become the only CP with General Smith’s arrival; and on the 11th General Craig, the ADC, returned from emergency leave.
General MacArthur flew to Yonpo Airfield on the 11th for a brief conference with General Almond and approved the X Corps plan. A date of 27 December was set for Corps units to pass under the control of the Eighth Army in South Korea.
The outloading of the 1st Marine Division was making good progress on the 12th when General Smith visited the docks on a tour of inspection. That evening he and General Shepherd attended a dinner at the Corps CP in honor of General Almond’s 58th birthday. The Army was represented by Major Generals Barr, Soule, and Clark L. Ruffner, X Corps Chief of Staff.
By the following day the 5th and 7th Marines were ready to sail. Embarkation officers loaded their ships by sight, planning as they went along. Not knowing in advance what type of ship might be assigned, they found that carefully calculated stowage diagrams were out of the question. Under these circumstances, amphibious training and experience were invaluable.
Space in the tent city established by X Corps to the rear of the LST beaches had been made available to Marine units awaiting embarkation. Most of them, however, moved directly from their bivouac areas to the beach.
While the Marines were outloading, the two Army divisions defending the perimeter had only minor patrol actions. Their artillery supplied most of the interdiction fires at the outset, with naval gunfire giving the deep support. Vigorous air support by Navy, Air Force, and Marine planes also did much to discourage any hostile intentions the enemy may have had.
MGCIS-1, the ground control intercept squadron at Yonpo, stopped directing the high altitude fighters on 11 December and passed over to the USS _Mount McKinley_ the task of keeping the perimeter clear of any enemy planes. Over-all control of air still remained ashore with MTACS-2.
At 1500 on the 13th General Smith went aboard the USS _Bayfield_ and opened the Division CP. As his last duty on shore, he attended memorial services held by the Division at the Hungnam Cemetery. While the commanding general paid his tribute to the honored dead, Chinese POWs were making preparations for the interment of the last bodies brought down from Chinhung-ni.
The Marine loading was completed on the 14th. At a conference that day with CTF-90 on board the _Mount McKinley_, General Smith inquired as to the possibility of having the ships carrying the Marines unload at Masan instead of Pusan, thus saving a 40-mile movement by truck. Admiral Doyle pointed out that this procedure was not feasible because of the lack of lighterage facilities at Masan. The additional turn-around time, moreover, would have delayed the evacuation of remaining Corps units.
The 14th was also the day when Marine air strikes from Yonpo ended with the departure of the last of the Wing’s land-based fighters for Japan. Shortly after midnight the Air Defense Section of MTACS-2 passed control of all air in the Hungnam area to the Navy’s Tactical Air Control Squadron One of TF-90 aboard the USS _Mount McKinley_. The Marine squadron then set up a standby TACC aboard an LST until the final withdrawal on 24 December.
At 1030 on 15 December, as the _Bayfield_ sailed, the curtain went down on one of the most memorable campaigns in the 175-year history of the Marine Corps. A total of 22,215 Marines had embarked in shipping consisting of an APA, an AKA, 3 APs, 13 LSTs, 3 LSDs, and 7 commercial cargo ships.
The Yonpo airlift continued, however, until 17 December when the field was closed and a temporary airstrip nearer the harbor was made available to twin-engine R4D’s for the final phase of the air evacuation. The only Marine units left in Hungnam were a reinforced Shore Party company, an ANGLICO group and one and a half companies (88 LVTs) of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion. They passed under the operational control of X Corps to assist in the outloading of Army units. Also, Colonel Boeker C. Batterton, commanding MAG-12, had moved to Hungnam for the final evacuation of his air group from Yonpo and to arrange for loading its heavy equipment and remaining personnel aboard SS _Towanda Victory_. Then on 18 December he flew his command post to Itami.[635]
[635] LtGen T. J. Cushman Comments, n. d.; MAG-12 _WD, Dec 50_.
_The Last Ten Days at Hungnam_
With ten days remaining for the embarkation of the two Army divisions, the problem of Korean refugees threatened to disrupt the schedule. But CTF-90 contrived somehow to find the shipping, and the homeless Koreans were willing to put up with any hardships to escape from Communist domination. It became standard practice to embark at least 5000 on an LST, not counting children in arms, and no less than 12,000 human sardines found standing room on one commercial cargo ship.[636]
[636] Unless otherwise stated, the sources for this section are the same as for the last.
The most fragile link in the complex chain of operations was represented by the two 390-ton diesel electric tugs. No others were available, nor were spare parts to be had, yet both tugs had clocked more than 5000 running hours since the last overhaul. Thus it seemed almost a miracle that neither broke down for more than three hours in all, and repairs were made with materials at hand.
On the 18th, when the last ROKs sailed for Samchok, the 7th Infantry Division was in the midst of its outloading. By 20 December all troops of this unit had embarked, according to schedule. Responsibility for the defense of Hungnam then passed to Admiral Doyle as General Almond and his staff joined CTF-90 on board the flagship _Mount McKinley_. General Soule’s 3d Division now manned the shore defenses alone.[637]
[637] VAdm J. H. Doyle ltr, 5 Oct 56.
When the perimeter contracted to the immediate vicinity of Hungnam, following the evacuation of Hamhung and Yonpo Airfield, two cruisers, seven destroyers, and three rocket-firing craft covered the entire front from their assigned positions in mine-swept lanes. A total of nearly 34,000 shells and 12,800 rockets was fired by these support ships, with the battleship _Missouri_ contributing 162 16-inch rounds at the finish of the bombardment. About 800 more 8-inch shells and 12,800 more 5-inch shells were expended at Hungnam than during the naval gunfire preparation for the Inchon landing.
Seven embarkation sites were employed (see Map 30). From left to right they were designated as PINK Beach, BLUE Beach, GREEN One and Two Beaches, and YELLOW One, Two, and Three Beaches. The 7th RCT, holding the left sector, was to embark from PINK Beach. BLUE and GREEN One Beaches were assigned to the 65th RCT in the center, while the 15th RCT had GREEN Two and the three YELLOW Beaches.
H-hour had been set at 1100 on the 24th, and seven LSTs were beached at 0800 to receive 3d Infantry Division troops. Soon the three regiments were reduced to as many battalions which acted as covering forces while the other troops fell back to assigned beaches. All withdrawals were conducted methodically along specified routes by units using marking panels. Then the battalions themselves pulled out, leaving only seven reinforced platoons manning strong points. The Hungnam redeployment came to an end when these platoons boarded an LST after a search for stragglers. Air and naval gunfire support had made it an uneventful finish except for the accidental explosion of an ammunition dump on PINK Beach, resulting in two men killed and 21 wounded.
All beaches were clear by 1436 on Sunday afternoon, the 24th, with Able and Baker Companies of the Amtrac Battalion sticking it out to the end. Marines of these units provided fires to cover the flanks of the last withdrawals and manned 37 LVTs evacuating Army troops from PINK Beach. With the exception of three LVTs lost in the ammunition dump explosion on that beach, all LVTs and LVT(A)s were safely reembarked on LSDs at the finish of the operation.[638]
[638] 1stAmphTracBn _HD, Dec 50_, 5.
Remarkably few supplies had to be left behind for lack of shipping space. Among them were 400 tons of frozen dynamite and 500 thousand-pound bombs. They added to the tumult of an awe-inspiring demolitions scene. The entire Hungnam waterfront seemed to be blown sky-high in one volcanic eruption of flame, smoke, and rubble which left a huge black mushroom cloud hovering over the ruins.
The chill, misty dawn of Christmas Day found the _Mount McKinley_ about to sail for Ulsan with CTF-90 and Generals Almond and Shepherd after an eminently successful operation. It had been pretty much the Navy’s show, in the absence of enemy interference, and the final statistics were staggering--105,000 military personnel, 91,000 Korean refugees, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 measurement tons of cargo loaded out in 193 shiploads by 109 ships.
“With naval, air and surface units effectively isolating the beachhead, we were able to take our time and get everything out,” commented Admiral Joy on 26 December. “Admiral Doyle has turned in another brilliant performance. We never, never contemplated a Dunkirk--not even faintly.”[639]
[639] CinCFE Special Communique, 26 Dec 50, with attached report from Gen Almond and a Navy announcement in _New York Times_, 27 Dec 50.
_Marines Arrive at New Assembly Area_
While the remaining X Corps units completed outloading at Hungnam, the Marines were landing at Pusan and proceeding by motor march to their new assembly area in the vicinity of Masan. General Craig, the ADC, had gone ahead with the advance party from Hungnam and made arrangements for the reception of the Division.[640]
[640] Smith, _Notes_, 1126. A detailed account of the arrival of the 1st Marine Division at Pusan and Masan will be found in the first chapter of Volume IV of this series.
News from the front in West Korea was not encouraging as the Eighth Army planned further withdrawals, for G-2 reports indicated that the advancing Chinese were about to launch a great new offensive shortly. Despite the persistent rumors that all Korea might be evacuated by UN forces, General MacArthur insisted in his special communique of 26 December that operations “were skilfully conducted without loss of cohesion and with all units remaining intact....
In its broad implications I consider that these operations, initiated on 24 November and carried through to this [Hungnam] redeployment, have served a very significant purpose--possibly in general result the most significant and fortunate of any conducted during the course of the Korean campaign.
The might of a major military nation was suddenly and without warning thrown against this relatively small United Nations Command but without attaining a decision.
Due to intervening circumstances beyond our power to control or even detect, we did not achieve the United Nations objective.
But at a casualty cost less than that experienced in a comparable period of defensive fighting on the Pusan perimeter, we exposed before too late secret political and military decisions of enormous scope and threw off balance enemy preparations aimed at surreptitiously massing the power capable of destroying our forces with one mighty extended blow.”[641]
[641] CinCFE Special Communique, 26 Dec 50.
Questions as to the proper evaluation of the Eighth Army withdrawal turned into a controversy during coming months with political as well as military implications. Press representatives, military critics and soldiers of other nations, while crediting MacArthur with a great victory at Inchon, were for the most part of the opinion that the Eighth Army withdrawal of November and December was a costly reverse.[642]
[642] General MacArthur’s comments are as follows: “This, again, is a non-professional estimate belied by the facts and the viewpoints of all senior commanders present.... It was the purpose of Red China to overwhelm and annihilate, through a ‘sneak’ attack, the Eighth Army and X Corps by the heavy assault of overwhelming forces of a new power, not heretofore committed to war, against which it knew or rightly surmised there would be no retaliation. This plan was foiled by our anticipatory advance which uncovered the enemy’s plot before he had assembled all of his forces, and by our prompt strategic withdrawal before he could inflict a crippling blow of a ‘Pearl Harbor’ nature.... This was undoubtedly one of the most successful strategic retreats in history, comparable with and markedly similar to Wellington’s great Peninsula withdrawal. Had the initiative action not been taken and an inert position of adequate defense assumed, I have no slightest doubt that the Eighth Army and the X Corps both would have been annihilated. As it was, both were preserved with practically undiminished potential for further action. I have always regarded this action, considering the apparently unsurmountable difficulties and overwhelming odds, as the most successful and satisfying I have ever commanded.” MacArthur ltr, 17 Oct 56.
Marine officers in Korea had no first-hand knowledge of EUSAK operations. It was obvious, however, that an Eighth Army retirement south of the 38th Parallel had made it desirable if not actually necessary for X Corps to withdraw from northeast Korea, even though General Almond held that a Hamhung-Hungnam perimeter could be defended throughout the winter.
_Contributions of Marine Aviation_
The close coordination of aviation with the ground forces in the Chosin campaign was due in large measure to the assignment of additional pilots to the 1st Marine Division as forward air controllers. They had been plucked from 1st Marine Aircraft Wing squadrons barely in time to join their battalions before embarking at Inchon. Increasing the number of FACs to two per battalion did much to bring air support down to the company level when needed.[643]
[643] Air Officer _SAR_, 4.
Air units frequently had to rely upon charts with place names, grid coordinates, and scales different from those in the hands of the ground troops. Here the Marine system of the man on the ground talking the pilot onto the target by reference to visual land marks paid off.
Cloudy, stormy weather was common. Three night fighter pilots were lost because of icing, disorientation, and insufficient radio aids to navigation. Two VMF-212 land-based pilots saved themselves from destruction only by landing on the _Badoeng Strait_ with their last drops of gas.
With the approach of winter and cold weather, aircraft on the landing strips had to be run up every two hours at night to keep the oil warm enough for early morning takeoffs. Ordnance efficiency dropped. Planes skidded on icy runways. Once, after a six inch snow, 80 men and ten trucks worked all night to clear and sand a 150-foot strip down the runway at Yonpo.[644]
[644] The material in this section is derived from: MAG-12 _SAR_, annex C, 10; VMF-214 _SAR_, annex F, 23; 1stMAW _SAR_, annex J, appendix S (VMF-323), 4, 9, 11; 1stMAW _SAR_, 5–7; Maj H. D. Kuokka Comments, n. d.
As early as mid-November it once took hours of scraping and chipping on the _Badoeng Strait_ to clear three inches of glazed ice and snow off the decks, catapults, arresting wires, and barriers. Planes which stood the night on the flight deck had to be taken below to the hangar deck to thaw out. On another occasion VMF-214 had to cancel all flight operations because 68-knot winds, heavy seas, and freezing temperatures covered the _Sicily’s_ flight deck and aircraft with a persistent coat of ice.
One pilot of VMF-323 had to return shortly after takeoff because water vapor froze in his oil breather tube in flight. With the back pressure throwing oil all over his windshield and billowing black vapor and smoke out of his cowl, he landed only to have the front of his Corsair burst into flames when the escaped oil dripped on the hot exhaust stacks. Quick work by the deck crews extinguished the fire.
A hazard as great as being shot down was a crash landing or bail-out at sea, where the water was cold enough to kill a man in 20 minutes. Survival clothing and equipment was so bulky that pilots could barely get into their cockpits.
Maintenance and servicing problems ashore, complicated by dirt, dust, and the scarcity of parts, kept mechanics working to the point of exhaustion. Insufficient trucks forced the ground crews to refuel and arm planes by hand, often from rusting fuel drums. Two destructive crashes, one fatal, were attributed to accumulated water in gasoline.
Aboard ship until mid-November, VMF-214 was able to keep 91 per cent of its planes operative. When suddenly deployed ashore to Wonsan, its aircraft availability dropped to 82 per cent and at Yonpo to 67 per cent. Once back at sea again in December, it jumped up to 90 per cent.
Basic difference in close air support doctrine between the Navy and Marines and Air Force were resolved by close and friendly liaison between the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and the Fifth Air Force commands; by a Marine aviator attached to the Joint Eighth Army-Fifth Air Force Operations Center at Seoul; and by indoctrination of non-Marine units of the X Corps in the Marine-Navy style of close air support. Difficulties in inter-service communications slowed Fifth Air Force operations orders to carrier squadrons, both Navy and Marine. Messages were routed via FEAF and ComNavFe in Tokyo and arrived hours late. Ashore, even MAG-12 during the first two weeks at Wonsan received its Fifth Air Force mission orders six to 36 hours late. A direct radio teletype between 1st MAW and 5thAF headquarters alleviated the situation. And when the CG 1st MAW received full control of the air over the X Corps area on 1 December, these problems were eased.
Actual control of air support for the scattered ground units demonstrated close cooperation between the Navy and Marine Corps. This was evident from the time the Navy’s Tactical Air Control Squadron One on the USS _Mount McKinley_ passed control to the Air Defense Section of MTACS-2 at Hamhung to the time that control returned to the ship in the Hungnam evacuation.
When the Marines had control, the ship stood by as an emergency TACC and acted as a radar reporting station for MTACS-2. When control was passed back afloat, the Air Defense Section of MTACS-2 stood by as a standby TACC aboard an LST until the last man was pulled off the beach. Furthermore, three officers from MGCIS-1 went aboard _Mount McKinley_ to help out as Air Defense controllers. They were experienced. All through the Wonsan-Chosin campaign, the MGCIS had directed the defensive fighter patrols, circling Wonsan and Yonpo, to check all unidentified aircraft before the latter got close enough to do any damage, MGCIS-1 also steered lost planes to base in bad weather, occasionally vectored them into the GCA radar-controlled landing pattern, and even assisted MTACCS-2 in directing air support planes to FACs.[645]
[645] MGCIS-1 _HD Dec 50_, 2; MTACS-2 _HD Dec 50_, 7.
Tactical air support in the X Corps zone was directed to the ground units by the Air Support Section of MTACS-2. From 26 October to 11 December, 3703 sorties in 1053 missions were controlled by the TACPs of Marine, Army, and ROK units. Close air support missions accounted for 599 of the total (468 for 1st Marine Division, 8 for 3d Infantry Division, 56 for 7th Infantry Division, and 67 for ROKs). The remaining 454 missions were search and attack.[646]
[646] The remainder of this section, unless otherwise noted, is based upon Smith, _Notes_, 1149–1161, 1222.
When FAC communications failed from valley to valley, aircraft became radio relays and controllers. This was highlighted by the airborne TADC, orbiting over the road from Hagaru.
Approximately half of the Marine air missions were in support of non-Marine ground units. The ROK and the U. S. Army units were not as well supplied with experienced FACs as the 1st Marine Division. In these areas four Air Force “Mosquitos” (AT-6 “Texan” training planes) were assigned to X Corps to assist in the control of air support.[647]
[647] 1stMAW _HDs, Oct-Dec 50_.
When shore-based Marine air support was about to cease with the closing of Yonpo air field, VMF-214 and VMF-212 quickly moved their operations aboard carrier; and during the final phases of the Hungnam evacuation, almost half of the Marine tactical air strength was operating from carrier bases. VMF-214 flew back aboard _Sicily_ on 7 December without missing a mission and VMF-212, which had moved to Itami on 4 December to draw and test a new complement of carrier Corsairs, was aboard the USS _Bataan_ eight days later. When the month ended, still another squadron, VMF-312, was polishing up its carrier landing technique for seaborne duty.[648]
[648] VMF-312 _HD, Dec 50_, 2.
The outcome of the Hagaru withdrawal owed much to air-dropped supplies and to casualty evacuations by General Tunner’s Combat Cargo Command (CCC). Assisting Combat Cargo in Marine support were the Wing’s R4D twin engine transports and TBM World War II type torpedo bombers, both of which were flown largely by the field-desk pilots on the Wing and Group staffs. Most of the Marines’ share of the heavy airlifting, however, was done by the four engine R5D transports of Colonel Dean C. Roberts’ VMR-152. Early in October this squadron had been temporarily shifted from the trans-Pacific airlift of the Navy’s Fleet Logistics Air Wing to support the Marines in the Wonsan campaign. In Korea its operations were controlled by the Combat Cargo Command, which committed an average of five Marine R5D’s a day into the CCC airlift. In such missions these transports supported all UN units from Pyongyang to Yonpo and points north. Marine transports not committed by the CCC for general UN support in Korea were available for Wing use. From 1 November until Christmas, VMR-152 safely carried five million pounds of supplies to the front and evacuated more than 4000 casualties.[649]
[649] ComNavFE msg to CinCPacFlt, 0858 1 Oct 50; CinCPacFlt msg to ComNavFE, 2245 2 Oct 50; CG 1stMAW msg to CO VMR-152, 0620 12 Oct 50; VMF-152 _SAR_, 6; Col R. R. Yeaman Comments, 19 Sep 56 and 6 Nov 56. By 25 December when VMR-152 returned to Navy control it had flown 729,790 miles in Korean lifts and carried 8,068,800 pounds of cargo, 234,000 pounds of mail and 11,314 passengers, including 4276 casualties.
The Chosin Reservoir campaign opened two new chapters in Marine aviation history. The first was the use of the airborne TADC to control the air support of the division column between Hagaru and Chinhung-ni. The second was the appearance of VMF-311, the first Marine jet squadron to fly in combat. Beginning on 10 December the newly arrived squadron flew interdiction missions for four days from Yonpo. Then it moved to Pusan to operate for the remainder of the month with 5th Air Force jets streaking up the long peninsula to cover the withdrawal of the Eighth Army.[650]
[650] 1stMAW _SAR_, annex K, appendix F (VMF-311), 2; VMF-311 _HD, Dec 50_.
Appreciation for the assistance given by Marine aviation to Marine ground forces was expressed in a letter of 20 December from General Smith to General Harris, the Commanding General of the 1st Marine Air Wing. The Division Commander said:
Without your support our task would have been infinitely more difficult and more costly. During the long reaches of the night and in the snow storms many a Marine prayed for the coming of day or clearing weather when he knew he would again hear the welcome roar of your planes as they dealt out destruction to the enemy. Even the presence of a night heckler was reassuring.
Never in its history has Marine Aviation given more convincing proof of its indispensable value to the ground Marines. A bond of understanding has been established that will never be broken.[651]
[651] MajGen O. P. Smith ltr to MajGen F. Harris, 20 Dec 50.
The story of air support in the Chosin Reservoir campaign would not be complete without a summary of the results of VMO-6. Marines took a proprietary interest in Major Gottschalk’s squadron, which had put into effect the helicopter techniques worked out at Quantico by the experimental squadron, HMX-1. Some of these techniques were having their first test in combat, for the development of rotary-wing aircraft in 1950 was at a pioneer stage comparable to that of fixed-wing aircraft in the first year of World War I. On 28 October, VMO-6 had a strength of 25 officers, 95 enlisted men, ten light fixed-wing aircraft (eight OY-2s, two L5Gs) and nine HO3S-1 helicopters. From that date until 15 December the squadron made 1544 flights for a total of 1624.8 hours. The principal missions were as follows:
Reconnaissance--OYs, 393; helicopters, 64; Transportation--OYs, 130; helicopters, 421; Evacuation--OYs, 29; helicopters, 191; Liaison--OYs, 35; helicopters, 90; Artillery spot--OYs, 39; helicopters, 0; Utility--OYs, 26; helicopters, 60; Rescue--OYs, 0; helicopters, 11.[652]
[652] VMO-6 _SAR_, 20; LtCol V. J. Gottschalk, _Transcript of Informal Remarks at HQMC_, 17 May 51.
But statistics can give no idea of the most significant achievement of VMO-6 in the Reservoir campaign. For during the most critical period the only physical contact between units separated by enemy action was provided by the OYs and helicopters. The importance of this contribution can hardly be overestimated.
_Losses Sustained by the Enemy_
Marine losses in northeast Korea, as reported to the Secretary of the Navy, included a total of 4418 battle casualties from 26 October to 15 December 1950--604 KIA, 114 DOW, 192 MIA, and 3508 WIA. The 7313 non-battle casualties consisted largely of minor frostbite and indigestion cases who were soon restored to active duty.[653] Eight Marine pilots were KIA or died of wounds, four were MIA, and three were wounded. General Smith estimated that a third of the non-battle casualties were returned to duty during the operation.[654]
[653] Smith, _Notes_, 1146–1149. See Appendix E for a day-by-day accounting of Marine casualties.
[654] Smith ltr, 21 Oct 56.
Enemy losses for the same period were estimated at a total of 37,500--15,000 killed and 7500 wounded by Marine ground forces, plus 10,000 killed and 5000 wounded by Marine air. Not much reliance can be placed in such figures as a rule, but fortunately we have enemy testimony as to heavy losses sustained by the Chinese Communists. This evidence goes far toward explaining why they did not interfere with the Hungnam redeployment.
Contrary to expectations, Chinese military critiques have been candid in admitting failures and unsparing in self-criticism. Among captured documents are summaries of the operations of the three CCF armies encountered by the Marines in the Chosin Reservoir area. These major units, representing at least 11 and probably 12 divisions, were as follows:
20th CCF Army--58th, 59th, and 60th Divisions, with the 89th Division of the 30th Army attached;
26th CCF Army--76th, 77th, and 78th Division, with probably the 94th Division of 32d Army attached;
27th CCF Army--79th, 80th, and 81st Divisions, with the 70th Division of 24th Army attached.[655]
[655] A CCF army consisted of three or four divisions and therefore might be considered generally the equivalent of a U. S. corps. This account of CCF units and movements is derived from the _MCB Study_, II-C-116–125, which in turn is based on an analysis of CCF prisoner interrogations and captured enemy documents. The Board, consisting of senior officers, was given the mission in 1951 of preparing “an evaluation of the influence of Marine Corps forces on the course of the Korean War, 4 Aug 50–15 Dec 50.”
All three armies were major units of the 9th Army Group of the 3d CCF Field Army. In mid-October the leading elements of the 4th CCF Field Army had crossed the Yalu to oppose the U. S. Eighth Army. The operations of X Corps in northeast Korea being considered a threat to the left flank, the 42d Army was detached with a mission of providing flank protection, pending relief by units of the 3d CCF Field Army. Three divisions, the 124th, 125th, and 126th were represented. While the last hovered on the left flank of the 4th Field Army, the 124th was hard hit near Sudong during the first week of November by RCT-7 of the 1st Marine Division.
In order to cover the withdrawal of the remnants, the 125th Division moved south of Hagaru from the Fusen Reservoir area. Both CCF divisions then fell back to Yudam-ni, where they were relieved by units of the 20th Army, 3d Field Army. This ended the operations of the 4th Field Army in northeast Korea.
Shortly after the appearance of the 20th Army in the Yudam-ni area, the 27th Army moved into positions north of the Chosin Reservoir. Thus the enemy had available eight divisions for the attacks of 27–28 November on the Marines in the Yudam-ni area and the three 7th Infantry Division battalions east of the Chosin Reservoir. If it may be assumed that these CCF divisions averaged 7500 men each, or three-fourths of full strength, the enemy had a total of 60,000 men in assault or reserve.
The Chinese, as we know, failed to accomplish their basic mission, which prisoners agreed was the destruction of the 1st Marine Division. In every instance the efforts of the first night were the most formidable, with enemy effectiveness declining sharply after a second or third attack. The explanation seems to be that the 12 divisions were sent into northeast Korea with supplies which would have been sufficient only if the first attempts had succeeded. The following comment by the 26th Army supports this conclusion:
A shortage of transportation and escort personnel makes it impossible to accomplish the mission of supplying the troops. As a result, our soldiers frequently starve. From now on, the organization of our rear service units should be improved.[656]
[656] Translations of CCF documents referred to in this section are found in HQ 500th Military Intelligence Group, Document 204141, “Compilation of Battle Experiences Reported by Various Armies in their Operation Against U. S. Forces in Korea.” Among the units covered are the 20th, 26th, and 27th Armies.
The troops were hungry. They ate cold food, and some had only a few potatoes in two days. They were unable to maintain the physical strength for combat; the wounded personnel could not be evacuated.... The fire power of our entire army was basically inadequate. When we used our guns there were no shells and sometimes the shells were duds.
The enemy’s tactical rigidity and tendency to repeat costly errors are charged by the 20th Army to inferior communications:
Our signal communication was not up to standard. For example, it took more than two days to receive instructions from higher level units. Rapid changes of the enemy’s situation and the slow motion of our signal communication caused us to lose our opportunities in combat and made the instructions of the high level units ineffective....
We succeeded in the separation and encirclement of the enemy, but we failed to annihilate the enemy one by one. The units failed to carry out the orders of the higher echelon. For example, the failure to annihilate the enemy at Yut’an-ni [Yudam-ni] made it impossible to annihilate the enemy at Hakalwu-ri [Hagaru]. The higher level units’ refusal of the lower level units’ suggestion of rapidly starting the combat and exterminating the enemy one by one gave the enemy a chance to break out from the encirclement.
One of the most striking instances of the tactical inflexibility which stultified Chinese efforts was found at Hagaru. With only a depleted Marine Infantry battalion and service troops available to defend a perimeter four miles in circumference, the enemy needed mere daylight observation to ascertain and avoid the most strongly defended positions. Yet these were just the positions chosen for the attack, not only on the first night but also the second occasion 48 hours later.
“The [CCF] tactics were mechanical,” commented the 27th Army. “We underestimated the enemy so we distributed the strength, and consequently the higher echelons were overdispersed while the lower echelon units were overconcentrated. During one movement, the distance between the three leading divisions was very long, while the formations of the battalions, companies, and units of lower levels were too close, and the troops were unable to deploy. Furthermore, reconnaissance was not conducted strictly; we walked into the enemy fire net and suffered heavy casualties.”
Summing up the reasons why the Marines at Yudam-ni were not “exterminated promptly,” the 27th Army concludes that it was “because our troops encountered unfavorable conditions during the missions and the troops suffered too many casualties.” This would seem to be another way of saying that the Chinese failed to destroy the 1st Marine Division because they themselves were nearly destroyed in the attempt. At any rate, evidence from the enemy documents points overwhelmingly to crippling losses both from Marine fire power and non-battle casualties chargeable to lack of equipment and supplies.
The 20th Army had a hundred deaths from tetanus caused by improper care of wounds. Hundreds of other soldiers were incapacitated by typhus or ailments of malnutrition and indigestion.
More than 90 per cent of the 26th Army suffered from frostbite. The 27th Army complained of 10,000 non-combat casualties alone out of a strength of four divisions:
The troops did not have enough food, they did not have enough houses to live in, they could not stand the bitter cold, which was the reason for the excessive non-combat reduction in personnel (more than 10 thousand persons), the weapons were not used effectively. When the fighters bivouacked in snow-covered ground during combat, their feet, socks, and hands were frozen together in one ice ball; they could not unscrew the caps on the hand grenades; the fuses would not ignite; the hands were not supple; the mortar tubes shrank on account of the cold; 70 per cent of the shells failed to detonate; skin from the hands was stuck on the shells and the mortar tubes.
Testimony as to the effects of Marine fire power is also given by the 26th Army:
The coordination between the enemy infantry, tanks, artillery, and airplanes is surprisingly close. Besides using heavy weapons for the depth, the enemy carries with him automatic light firearms which, coordinated with rockets, launchers, and recoilless guns are disposed at the front line. The characteristic of their employment is to stay quietly under cover and open fire suddenly when we come to between 70 and 100 meters from them, making it difficult for our troops to deploy and thus inflicting casualties upon us.
The 20th and 27th Armies appear to have been bled white by the losses of the first week. Early in December, units of the 26th Army appeared on the east side of the MSR between Hagaru and Koto-ri, and this unit furnished most of the opposition from 6 to 11 December.
Seven divisions in all were identified by the 1st Marine Division; and since the taking of prisoners was not a matter of top priority with men fighting for existence, it is likely that other CCF units were encountered. The CCF 9th Army Group, according to a prisoner questioned on 7 December, included a total of 12 divisions. This POW gave the following statement:
Missions of the four (4) armies in 9th Group are to annihilate the 1st Division which is considered to be the best division in the U. S. After annihilating the 1st Marine Division they are to move south and take Hamhung.[657]
[657] 1stMarDiv PIR 47, encl. 1. The four armies referred to by the POW were the 20th, 26th, 27th, and 30th. Actually the 30th Army did not exist, as one of its divisions had been attached to each of the other three armies.
As to the reason why the Chinese took no advantage of the Hungnam redeployment, there seems little doubt that the 9th Army Group was too riddled by battle and non-battle casualties to make the effort. This is not a matter of opinion. Following the Hungnam redeployment, as the U. S. Eighth Army braced itself to meet a new CCF offensive, UN and FECOM G-2 officers were naturally concerned as to whether the remaining 9th Army Group troops in northeast Korea would be available to strengthen the CCF 4th Field Army. It was estimated that only two weeks would be required to move these troops to West Korea, where they had the capability of reinforcing the CCF attack against the Eighth Army.
Efforts to locate the 9th Army Group were unavailing for nearly three months. Then a prisoner from the 77th Division of the 26th Army was captured by U. S. Eighth Army troops on 18 March 1951. During the following week POW interrogations established that three divisions of the 26th Army were in contact with Eighth Army units northeast of Seoul.
“The only conclusion to be drawn,” comments the _Marine Corps Board Study_, “based on information collected by 1stMarDiv and X Corps, and that by UN and FEC, is that all corps of 9th Army Group had been rendered militarily ineffective in the Chosin Reservoir operation and required a considerable period of time for replacement, re-equipment, and reorganization.”[658]
[658] _MCB Study_, II-C-125.
Thus it appears that the Marines not only saved themselves in the Chosin Reservoir fights; they also saved U. S. Eighth Army from being assailed by reinforcements from northeast Korea in the CCF offensive which exploded on the last night of 1950.
_Results of the Reservoir Campaign_
There could be no doubt, after taking into account the CCF mission, that the 9th Army Group, 3d Field Army, had sustained a reverse in northeast Korea which amounted to a disaster. On the other hand, it might have been asked whether a retrograde movement such as the Marine breakout, even though aggressively and successfully executed, could be termed a victory.
This question involves issues too complex for a clearcut positive answer, but it would be hard to improve upon the analysis of results in the _Marine Corps Board Study_:
Although the operations of this phase constitute a withdrawal, despite the fact that CG 1stMarDiv characterized them as “an attack in a new direction,” the withdrawal was executed in the face of overwhelming odds and conducted in such a manner that, contrary to the usual withdrawal, some very important tactical results were achieved. These may be summarized as follows:
1. Extricated 1stMarDiv from a trap sprung by overwhelming enemy ground forces by skilful employment of integrated ground and air action which enabled the Division to come through with all operable equipment, with wounded properly evacuated and with tactical integrity.
2. Outfought and outlasted at least seven CCF divisions under conditions of terrain and weather chosen by the enemy and reputedly to his liking. Although frostbite took a heavy toll of the Division it hit CCF units far harder, perhaps decisively.
3. In the process of accomplishing “2” above, rendered militarily non-effective a large part of 9th CCF Army Group. Those units not contacted by 1stMarDiv were fixed in the Chosin Reservoir area for possible employment against the Division and consequently suffered from the ravages of sub-zero cold and heavy air attacks.
4. As a direct result of “3” above, enabled X Corps to evacuate Hungnam without enemy interference and, consequently, as a combat effective unit with all personnel and serviceable equipment. Pressure on X Corps by 9th CCF Army Group during the seaward evacuation of the Corps, a most difficult operation, would undoubtedly have altered the result.[659]
[659] Quotations in this section, except when otherwise noted, are from the _MCB Study_, II-C-125–127.
Improvisations in tactics were now and then made necessary by unusual conditions of terrain, weather or enemy action. But on the whole the Marines saved themselves in the Reservoir campaign by the application of sound military tactics. In the doing they demonstrated repeatedly that the rear makes as good a front as any other for the militarily skilled and stout-hearted, and that a unit is not beaten merely because it is surrounded by a more numerous enemy.
Inevitably the Marine campaign has been compared to that classic of all military breakouts--the march of the immortal Ten Thousand which is the subject of Xenophon’s _Anabasis_. Stranded in the hostile Persian Empire in the year 401 B. C., these Greek mercenaries cut their way to safety through Asiatic hordes. The following description of the tactics used by Xenophon and his lieutenant Cherisophus to overcome road blocks in mountain country will have a familiar ring to Marine veterans of the Reservoir:
The enemy, by keeping up a continuous battle and occupying in advance every narrow place, obstructed passage after passage. Accordingly, whenever the van was obstructed, Xenophon, from behind, made a dash up the hills and broke the barricade, and freed the vanguard by endeavoring to get above the obstructing enemy. Whenever the rear was the point attacked, Cherisophus, in the same way, made a detour, and by endeavoring to mount higher than the barricaders, freed the passage for the rear rank; and in this way, turn and turn about, they rescued each other, and paid unflinching attention to their mutual needs.[660]
[660] Xenophon, _The Anabasis of Cyrus_, Henry C. Dakyns, trans., in F. R. B. Godolphin, _The Greek Historians_, (2 vols., New York, 1942), II, 297–298.
Spears and arrows have been superseded by bazookas and machine guns, but the basic infantry tactics of the Reservoir breakout were essentially those which served Xenophon and the Ten Thousand more than 33 centuries ago. Organization, combat, training, spirit, and discipline enabled the Marines, like the Hellenes before them, to overcome numerical odds and fight their way over Asiatic mountain roads to the sea.
The over-all strategic effects of the Reservoir campaign, as summarized by the Marine Corps Board Study, were as follows:
1. Played a prominent part ... in enabling X Corps, a considerable segment of the total UN forces in Korea, to be withdrawn from Hungnam as a combat effective force available for employment with the Eighth Army in South Korea at a time when that Army was retreating and was in critical need of a reinforcement.
2. Were largely responsible for preventing reinforcement of CCF forces on Eighth Army front by 12 divisions during a period when such reinforcement might have meant to Eighth Army the difference between maintaining a foothold in Korea or forced evacuation therefrom, by being instrumental in rendering 9th CCF Army Group, a force of three corps of four divisions each, militarily noneffective for a minimum period of three months.
That the breakout of the 1st Marine Division had affected American political and military policy at the highest levels was the assertion of an editorial in _Time_. Referring to what it termed the “Great Debate,” in December 1950, as to whether American forces should be withdrawn from Korea, the news-magazine commented:
When the Marines fought their way down to Hungnam through the “unconquerable Chinese hordes,” and embarked for Pusan with their equipment, their wounded, and their prisoners, the war in Asia took on a different look. The news stories, pictures and newsreels of the Hungnam action contributed more to forming U. S. policy than all the words in the “Great Debate.” The nation--and the revitalized Eighth Army--now knows that U. S. fighting men will stay in Korea until a better place and a better opportunity is found to punish Communist aggression.[661]
[661] _Time_, lvii, no. 9 (26 Feb 51).
General Douglas MacArthur as CINCUNC, in his 11th report of operations of UN forces in Korea, submitted the following to the United Nations Organization regarding the Chosin Reservoir operation:
In this epic action, the Marine Division and attached elements of the 7th Infantry Division marched and fought over 60 miles in bitter cold along a narrow, tortuous, ice-covered road against opposition of from six to eight Chinese Communist Force divisions which suffered staggering losses. Success was due in no small part to the unprecedented extent and effectiveness of air support. The basic element, however, was the high quality of soldierly courage displayed by the personnel of the ground units who maintained their integrity in the face of continuous attacks by numerically superior forces, consistently held their positions until their wounded had been evacuated, and doggedly refused to abandon supplies and equipment to the enemy.
United Nations Air Forces threw the bulk of their effort into close support of ground forces cutting their way through overwhelming numbers of Chinese Communists. The toll of the enemy taken by the United Nations aircraft contributed in large measure to the successful move of our forces from the Chosin Reservoir to the Hamhung area despite the tremendous odds against them. Air support provided by the United States Marine Air Force and Naval Aircraft in this beleaguered area, described as magnificent by the ground force commanders, represented one of the greatest concentrations of tactical air operations in history.[662]
[662] Gen Douglas MacArthur, CinCUNC _11th Report of the Operations in Korea of United Nations Forces_, 31 Jan 51. See Appendix H for transcript of Presidential Unit Citation awarded to the 1stMarDiv and the Distinguished Unit Citation awarded to the 1stMAW.
Rear Admiral James H. Doyle attributed the successful evacuation at Hungnam in large measure to the Marine breakout. Writing to General Smith several months later, he asserted that he had “filled in what has been a neglected page in the story of the Hungnam redeployment. It is simply this: that the destruction of enemy forces wrought by the First Marine Division on the march down the hill was a major factor in the successful withdrawal; and that the destruction was so complete the enemy was unable to exert serious pressure at any time on the shrinking perimeter. To my mind, as I told you at Hungnam, the performance of the First Marine Division on that march constitutes one of the most glorious chapters in Marine Corps history.”[663]
[663] RAdm T. H. Doyle ltr to MajGen O. P. Smith, 2 Mar 51.
Letters of commendation were received by the 1st Marine Division from General Cates, CMC, General Shepherd, Admiral Joy, General Collins, Chief of Staff, USA, General Almond, and many other high-ranking military leaders. But for depth of feeling, for sincerity and emotion, there was no message which appealed more to the officers and men of the Division than the concluding paragraph of this tribute from the commanding general who had guided their destinies with unswerving courage and who had come out with them, Major General Oliver P. Smith:
The performance of officers and men in this operation was magnificent. Rarely have all hands in a division participated so intimately in the combat phases of an operation. Every Marine can be justly proud of his participation. In Korea, Tokyo and Washington there is full appreciation of the remarkable feat of the division. With the knowledge of the determination, professional competence, heroism, devotion to duty, and self-sacrifice displayed by officers and men of this division, my feeling is one of humble pride. No division commander has ever been privileged to command a finer body of men.[664]
[664] 1stMarDiv memo 238-50, 19 Dec 50.
APPENDIX A
Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations
ADC--Assistant Division Commander. AdmO--Administrative Order. AF--Air Force. AGC--Amphibious Force Flagship. AH--Hospital Ship. AirDelPlat--Air Delivery Platoon. AirO--Air Officer. AirSptSec--Air Support Section. AKA--Assault Cargo Ship. AKL--Cargo, Ship, Light. AM--Minesweeper. AmphTracBn--Amphibian Tractor Battalion. AmphTrkBn--Amphibian Truck Battalion. AMS--Auxiliary Motor Minesweeper. ANGLICO--Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company. AP--Transport. APA--Assault Transport. APD--High Speed Transport. ARG--Internal Combustion Engine Repair Ship. ARL--Landing Craft Repair Ship. ArmdAmphBn--Armored Amphibian Battalion. ARS--Salvage Vessel. AT--Antitank. ATF--Ocean Tug, Fleet. AutoMaintCo--Automotive Maintenance Company. AutoSupCo--Automotive Supply Company. BB--Battleship. BLT--Battalion Landing Team. Bn--Battalion. Btry--Battery. BuMed--Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. C-47--Douglas Transport (same as R4D). CA--Heavy Cruiser. CCF--Chinese Communist Forces. CG--Commanding General. CIC--Counter Intelligence Corps, USA. CinCFE--Commander in Chief, Far East. CinCPacFlt--Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. CinCUNC--Commander in Chief, United Nations Command. CL--Light Cruiser. CO--Commanding Officer. Co--Company. ComFltAirWing--Commander Fleet Air Wing. ComNavFE--Commander Naval Forces Far East. ComPacFlt--Commander Pacific Fleet. ComPhibGruOne--Commander Amphibious Group One. ComSeventhFlt--Commander Seventh Fleet. ComUNBlockandCortFor--Commander United Nations Blockade and Escort Force. CP--Command Post. CR--Command Report. C/S--Chief of Staff. CSG--Combat Service Group. CSUSA--Chief of Staff, U. S. Army. CTF--Commander Task Force. CTG--Commander Task Group. CVE--Escort Aircraft Carrier. CVL--Light Aircraft Carrier. DD--Destroyer. DDR--Radar Picket Destroyer. DE--Destroyer Escort. Det--Detachment. DMS--High Speed Minesweeper. DOW--Died of Wounds. EmbO--Embarkation Order. EmbO--Embarkation Officer. EngrBn--Engineer Battalion. EUSAK--Eighth U. S. Army in Korea. FABn--Field Artillery Battalion (USA). FAC--Forward Air Controller. FEAF--Far East Air Force. FECOM--Far East Command. F4U--Chance-Vought “Corsair” Fighter-Bomber. FMFPac--Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. FO--Forward Observer. FragOrder--Fragmentary Order. Fum&BathPlat--Fumigation and Bath Platoon. GHQ--General Headquarters. Gru--Group. H&SCo--Headquarters and Service Company. HD--Historical Diary. Hedron--Headquarters Squadron. HMS--Her Majesty’s Ship. HMAS--Her Majesty’s Australian Ship. HMCS--Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship. HMNZS--Her Majesty’s New Zealand Ship. HO3S--Sikorsky Helicopter. HQBn--Headquarters Battalion. HQMC--Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps. InfDiv--Infantry Division (USA). Interv--Interview. ISUM--Intelligence Summary. JANIS--Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies. JCS--Joint Chiefs of Staff. JMS--Japanese Minesweeper. JSPOG--Joint Strategic Planning and Operations Group. JTF--Joint Task Force. KIA--Killed in Action. KMC--Korean Marine Corps. Ln--Liaison. LSD--Landing Ship, Dock. LSM--Landing Ship, Medium. LSMR--Landing Ship, Medium-Rocket. LST--Landing Ship, Tank. LSTH--Landing Ship, Tank--Casualty Evacuation. LSU--Landing Ship, Utility. Ltr--Letter. LVT--Landing Vehicle, Tracked. MAG--Marine Aircraft Group. MAW--Marine Aircraft Wing. MS--Manuscript. MedBn--Medical Battalion. MedAmbCo--Medical Ambulance Company, USA. MIA--Missing in Action. MISD--Military Intelligence Service Detachment (USA). MP--Military Police. MRO--Movement Report Office. msg--Message. MSR--Main Supply Route. MSTS--Military Sea Transport Service. MTACS--Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron. MTBn--Motor Transport Battalion. NavBchGru--Naval Beach Group. NavFE--Naval Forces Far East. NCO--Noncommissioned Officer. NK--North Korea(n). NKPA--North Korean Peoples Army. N.d.--Date not given. N.t.--Time not given. O--Officer; Order. OCMH--Office of the Chief of Military History (USA). OI--Operation Instruction. OpnO--Operation Order. OpnPlan--Operation Plan. OrdBn--Ordnance Battalion. OY--Consolidated-Vultee Light Observation Plane. PCEC--Escort Amphibious Control Vessel. PF--Frigate. PhibGru--Amphibious Group. PIR--Periodic Intelligence Report. PLA--People’s Liberation Army. Plat--Platoon. POL--Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants. POR--Periodic Operation Report. POW--Prisoner of War. QMPetDistCo--Quartermaster Petroleum Distribution Company (USA). QMSubsistSupCo--Quartermaster Subsistence Supply Company (USA). R4D--Douglas Transport (Navy and Marine designation of C-47). RCT--Regimental Combat Team. Recon--Reconnaissance. Reinf--Reinforced. RktBn--Rocket Battalion. RM--Royal Marines. ROK--Republic of Korea. R & O File--Records and Orders File. ROKA--Republic of Korea Army. ROKN--Republic of Korea Navy. SAC--Supporting Arms Coordinator. SAR--Special Action Report. SCAJAP--Shipping Control Authority, Japan. SecDef--Secretary of Defense. ServBn--Service Battalion. SigBn--Signal Battalion. SigRepCo--Signal Repair Company. SitRpt--Situation Report. SP--Shore Party. SMS--Marine Supply Squadron. TAC--Tactical Air Coordinator; Tactical Air Commander. TACP--Tactical Air Control Party. Tacron--Tactical Air Control Squadron. TADC--Tactical Air Direction Center. T-AP--Transport Operated by MSTS. TBM--General Motors “Avenger” Torpedo Bomber. TE--Task Element. T/E--Table of Equipment. Tel--Telephone Message. TF--Task Force. TG--Task Group. TkBn--Tank Battalion. Trk--Truck. T/O--Table of Organization. TU--Task Unit. UDT--Underwater Demolitions Team. U/F--Unit of Fire. UN--United Nations. UNC--United Nations Command. URpt--Unit Report. USA--United States Army. USAF--United States Air Force. USMC--United States Marine Corps. USN--United States Navy. VMF--Marine Fighter Squadron. VMF(N)--All-Weather, Fighter Squadron. VMO--Marine Observation Squadron. VMR--Marine Transport Squadron. WD--War Diary. WD Sum--War Diary Summary. WIA--Wounded in Action. YMS--Motor Minesweeper.
APPENDIX B
Task Organization 1st Marine Division
In order to present a true picture of the Task Organization of the 1st Marine Division during its operations in northeast Korea the organization will be presented for the following periods:
1. Wonsan Landing (OpnO 16-50) 2. Advance to the Reservoir (OpnO 19-50) 3. Movement south from Hagaru (OpnO 25-50) 4. Hungnam Evacuation (OpnO 27-50)
1. TASK ORGANIZATION OF 1ST MARINE DIVISION FOR WONSAN LANDING
_1st Marine Division, (Reinf), FMF_ MajGen O. P. SMITH
HqBn, 1stMarDiv, less dets LtCol M. T. STARR 163rd MISD, USA 441st CIC Det, USA 1st SigBn, less dets Maj R. L. SCHREIER Carrier Plat, FMF Det, 4th SigBn, USA 2d SigRepUnit, USA Det, 205th SigRepCo, USA 1st ServBn, less dets LtCol C. L. BANKS 1stMTBn LtCol O. L. BEALL 1st OrdBn Maj L. O. WILLIAMS 1st SPBn, less dets LtCol H. P. CROWE SPCommSec, 1stSigBn Det, 1st CSG Det, NavBchGru 1 1st MedBn, less dets Cdr H. B. JOHNSON, USN 2d Plat, 560thMedAmbCo, USA 7thMTBn Maj J. F. STEPKA 1st CSG, less dets Col. J. S. COOK 1st Fum&BathPlat, FMF 1st AirDelPlat, FMF Plat, 20th QMSubsistSupCo, USA Plat, 506th QMPetDisCo, USA NavBchGru 1, less dets
_Regimental Combat Team 1_ Col L. B. PULLER
1st Marines Det, 5th KMC Bn Co C, 1st EngrBn Co C, 1st MTBn Co D, 1st MedBn Plat, 1stArmd AmphBn Det, 1stSigBn FO & LnO Secs, 2/11 LnDet, 1stTkBn SP Gru B Det, MP Co Det, 1st CSG Det, NavBchGru 1
_Regimental Combat Team 5_ LtCol R. L. MURRAY
5th Marines Co A, 1st EngrBn Co D, 1st MTBn Co C, 1st MedBn Det, 1stSigBn FO & LnO Secs, 1/11 SP Gru A Det, MP Co Det, 1st CSG Det, NavBchGru 1
_Regimental Combat Team 7_ Col H. L. LITZENBERG
7th Marines Det, 3d KMC Bn Co D, 1st EngrBn Co B, 1st MTBn Co D, 1st MedBn Plat, 1st ArmdAmphBn Det, 1st SigBn FO & LnO Secs, 3/11 LnDet, 1st TkBn SP Gru C Det, MP Co Det, 1st CSG Det, NavBchGru 1
_11th Marines, Reinf_ Col J. H. BROWER
Btry C, 1st 4.5″ RktBn 1st AmphTrkCo, FMF
_1st Tank Battalion_, less dets LtCol H. T. MILNE _1st Engineer Battalion_, less dets LtCol J. H. PARTRIDGE _3d KMC Battalion_, less dets Maj KIM YUN GUN _5th KMC Battalion_, less dets Col KIM TAI SHIK _1st AmphTracBn, FMF_ LtCol E. F. WANN _Reconnaissance Company, 1stMarDiv_ 1stLt R. B. CROSSMAN _VMO-6_ Maj V. J. GOTTSCHALK
2. TASK ORGANIZATION FOR ADVANCE TO THE RESERVOIR
_1st Marine Division, Reinf, FMF_ MajGen O. P. SMITH
HqBn, less dets 163d MISD 441st CIC Det 1stSigBn, Reinf, less dets 1stServBn, Reinf, less dets Co A. 7th MTBn (less 1 plat) Det, 1st MTBn 1st OrdBn 1stMedBn, less dets 1st AmphTracBn Co B, 1st ArmdAmphBn (less 1st Plat) 7th MT Bn, less dets 1st CSG, Reinf 1st AmphTrkCo 1st AirDelPlat 1st Fum&Bath Plat
_Regimental Combat Team 1_ Col L. B. PULLER
1st Marines 2/11 Co D, 1st MedBn Co C, 1st TkBn Co C, Reinf, 1st EngrBn Det, 1stSigBn Det, 1stServBn Det, MP Co
_Regimental Combat Team 7_ Col H. L. LITZENBERG
7th Marines 3/11 Recon Co, 1stMarDiv 1st MTBn, less dets Co D, Reinf, 1st EngrBn Co E, 1st MedBn Det, 1stSigBn Det, MP Co Det, 1stServBn
_Regimental Combat Team 5_ LtCol R. L. MURRAY
5th Marines 1/11 Co A, Reinf, 1stEngrBn Co C, 1stMedBn Co, 1stMTBn Det, 1stSigBn Det, MP Co Det, 1stServBn
_11th Marines, Reinf_, less dets Col J. H. BROWER
Btry C, 1st 4.5″ RktBn
_1st Tank Battalion, Reinf_, less dets LtCol H. T. MILNE Tk Plat, 5thMar Tk Plat, 7thMar
_1st Engineer Battalion_, less dets LtCol J. H. PARTRIDGE _VMO-6_ Maj V. J. GOTTSCHALK
3. TASK ORGANIZATION FOR MOVEMENT SOUTH FROM HAGARU
(Except where noted the organization remained the same for the movement south from Koto-ri.).
_1st Marine Division, Reinf, FMF_ MajGen O. P. SMITH
HqBn, Reinf, less dets 163d MISD 181st CIC 1stSigBn, Reinf, less dets 1st ServBn, Reinf, less dets Co A, 7thMTBn, less dets AutoSup Co, 1stMTBn AutoMaint Co, 1stMTBn 1stOrdBn, less dets 1stMedBn, Reinf, less dets 1st Fum&Bath Plat 2d Plat, 506thMedAmbCo, USA (under opn control X Corps) 1stAmphTracBn, Reinf, less dets 1st CSG, Reinf 7thMTBn, less dets Co A, 1stAmphTracBn 1st AirDel Plat 1stSPBn (under opn control 3dInfDiv) 1stTkBn, less dets VMO-6
_Regimental Combat Team 5_ LtCol R. L. MURRAY
5th Marines, less Tk Plat 1/11 Btry D, 2/11 (released to RCT 1 on passage through Koto-ri) 11th Marines, Reinf, less dets 4/11, less Btry L Det, 96th FABn, USA 3/1 (released to RCT 1 on passage through Koto-ri) Det, 1stSigBn Tk Co, 31st Inf, USA Prov Plat, 1stTkBn Co A, 1stEngrBn (released to RCT 1 on passage through Koto-ri) Det, 1stEngrBn 41 Commando, RM Division Train 2 LtCol H. T. MILNE Traffic Plat, MP Co Det, 513th TrkCo, USA Det, 1stMTBn Co D, 10thEngr(C)Bn, USA Det, 1stMedBn Det, 1stServBn Det, 1stSigBn Det, 515th Trk Co, USA
_Regimental Combat Team 7_ Col H. L. LITZENBERG
7th Marines, less Tk Plat 3/11 Btry L, 4/11 (released to RCT 1 on arrival Koto-ri) ProvBn, 31st Inf, USA Det, 1stSigBn Co D, 1stTkBn Co D, Reinf, 1stEngrBn Division Train 1 LtCol C. L. BANKS Det, HqBn, 1stMarDiv Det, Hq X Corps Det, 1stServBn Det, 1stOrdBn Det, 7thMTBn Det, X Corps Ord Co, USA MP Co, 1stMarDiv, less dets 1stMTBn, less dets Det, 1stSigBn AirSptSec, MTACS-2 Det, 1stMedBn
_Regimental Combat Team 1_ Col L. B. PULLER
1st Marines, less 3/1 and Tk Plat 2/31, Reinf, USA 2/11, less Btry D (Btry D attached on passage Koto-ri) Btry L, 4/11 (Btry L attached on arrival Koto-ri) Cos A & B, 7thMTBn Co C, Reinf, 1stMTBn Det, 1stSigBn Det, 1stServBn Det, HqBn, 1stMarDiv Det, 1stOrdBn Cos B & D, 1stMedBn Recon Co, 1stMarDiv Det, 1stEngr Bn Det, 7th Mar Det, 41 Commando, RM (released to 41 Commando on passage Koto-ri by RCT 5) Co B, Reinf, 1stTkBn Misc elms, USA
4. TASK ORGANIZATION FOR HUNGNAM EVACUATION.
_Forward Echelon_ BrigGen E. A. CRAIG
_Main Body, 1st Marine Division_, MajGen O. P. SMITH
_Reinf, FMF_, less dets
_Regimental Combat Team 7_ Col H. L. LITZENBERG
7th Marines, less Tk Plat 3/11 Co D, 1stEngrBn 1st CSG, less dets Det, HqBn 1stServBn Co A, 7th MTBn Det, 1stSigBn 1stMedBn, Reinf 1st Fum&Bath Plat
_Regimental Combat Team 5_ LtCol R. L. MURRAY
5th Marines 1/11 41 Commando, RM Co A, 1stEngrBn 1stOrdBn 1stMTBn Det, 1stSigBn
_Regimental Combat Team 1_ Col L. B. PULLER
1st Marines 2/11 Co C, 1stEngrBn 1stTkBn Tk Plat, 5th Mar Tk Plat, 7th Mar Det, 1stSigBn
_HqBn, Reinf_, less dets LtCol M. T. STARR
1stSigBn, less dets 163d MISD, USA 181st CIC Det, USA
_11th Marines, Reinf_, less dets LtCol C. A. YOUNGDALE
Btry C, 1st 4.5″ RktBn 1st EngrBn, less dets 7thMTBn, less dets ANGLICO, 1stSigBn
_1stSPBn_, less dets LtCol H. P. CROWE
_1st AmphTracBn, Reinf, FMF_ LtCol E. F. WANN
Co A, Reinf, 1stAmphTrkBn, FMF Co B, 1stArmdAmphBn, FMF
APPENDIX C
Naval Task Organization
1. _Wonsan Landing_
JTF 7 VAdm A. D. Struble TF 90 Attack Force RAdm J. H. Doyle TG 91.2 Landing Force (1st MajGen O. P. Smith MarDiv) TE 90.00 Flagship Element _Mount McKinley_ 1 AGC TE 90.01 Tactical Air Control Cdr T. H. Moore Element TU 90.01.1 TacRon 1 TU 90.01.2 TacRon 3 TE 90.02 Naval Beach Group Capt W. T. Singer Element TU 90.02.1 Headquarters Unit TU 90.02.2 Beachmaster Unit LCdr M. C. Sibisky TU 90.02.3 Boat Unit One LCdr H. E. Hock TU 90.02.4 Amphibious LCdr M. T. Jacobs, Jr. Construction Bn. TU 90.02.5 Underwater LCdr W. R. McKinney Demolitions Team Unit TG 90.1 Administrative Group RAdm L. A. Thackery TE 90.10 Flagship Element Capt J. B. Stefonek _Eldorado_ 1 AGC TU 90.1.1 Medical Unit _Consolation_ 1 AH _LST 898_[665] _LST 975_[665] 2 LST TU 90.1.2 Repair and Salvage Capt P. W. Mothersill Unit _Lipan_ _Cree_ _Arikara_ 3 ATF _Conserver_ 1 ARS _Askari_ 1 ARL _Gunston Hall_ _Fort Marion_ _Comstock_ _Catamount_ _Colonial_ 5 LSD Plus other units as assigned TU 90.1.3 Service Unit LCdr J. D. Johnston 15 LSU TG 90.2 Transport Group Capt V. R. Roane TE 90.21 Transport Division Capt S. G. Kelly ABLE _Bayfield_ _Noble_ _Cavalier_ _Okanogan_ 4 APA _Washburn_ _Seminole_ _Titania_ _Oglethorpe_ _Archenar_ 5 AKA _Marine Phoenix_ 1 T-AP TE 90.22 Transport Division Capt A. E. Jarrell BAKER _Henrico_ _George Clymer_ _Pickaway_ _Bexar_ 4 APA _Union_ _Algol_ _Alshain_ _Winston_ _Montague_ 5 AKA _Aiken Victory_ 1 T-AP _Robin Goodfellow_ 1 Commercial freighter TG 90.3 Tractor Group Capt R. C. Peden _Gunston Hall_[666] _Fort Marion_[666] _Comstock_[666] _Catamount_[666] _Colonial_[666] 5 LSD _LST 1123_ _LST 715_ _LST 742_ _LST 799_ _LST 802_ _LST 845_ _LST 883_ _LST 898_ _LST 914_ _LST 973_ _LST 975_ _LST 1048_ 12 LST 23 SCAJAP LSTs 23 LST TG 90.4 Control Group LCdr C. Allmon _PCEC 896_ 1 PCEC TU 90.4.1 Control Unit Lt S. C. Pinksen BLUE _Wantuck_ 1 APD TU 90.4.2 Control Unit Lt A. C. Ansorge YELLOW _Horace A. Bass_ 1 APD TG 95.6 Minesweeping and Capt R. T. Spofford Protection Group _Collett_ 1 DD _Diachenko_ 1 APD _Doyle_ _Endicott_ 2 DMS _Pledge_ _Incredible_ 2 AM _Kite_ _Merganser_ _Mockingbird_ _Osprey_ _Redhead_ _Chatterer_ 7 AMS HMS _Mounts Bay_ HMNZS _Pukaki_ HMNZS _Putira_ _LaGrandiere_ (French) 4 PF 8 Japanese mine sweepers 4 Japanese mine destruction and buoying vessels 1 ROKN 1 AKL Plus other units assigned TG 90.6 Reconnaissance Group Cdr S. C. Small _Horace A. Bass_ _Wantuck_ 2 APD UDT 1 UDT 3 2 UDT TG 96.8 Escort Carrier Group RAdm R. W. Ruble _Badoeng Strait_ _Sicily_ 2 CVE _Taussig_ _Hanson_ _George K. Mackenzie_ _Ernest G. Small_ _Southerland_ _Rowan_ 6 DD TG 95.2 Gunfire Support Group RAdm G. R. Hartman _Helena_ _Rochester_ _Toledo_ 3 CA HMS _Ceylon_ 1 CL HMS _Cockade_ HMCS _Alhabaskan_ HMAS _Warramunga_ 3 DD of DesRon 9 6 DD LSMR 401[667] LSMR 403[667] LSMR 404[667]
2. _Hungnam Evacuation_
TF 90 Amphibious Force, Naval Forces Far East RAdm J. H. Doyle TE 90.00 Flagship Element _Mount McKinley_ TE 90.01 Tactical Air Control Element Cdr R. W. Arndt TacRon ONE TE 90.02 Repair and Salvage Unit Cdr L. C. Conwell _Kermit Roosevelt_ ARG _Askari_ ARL _Bolster_ _Conserver_ 2 ARS _Tawakoni_ ATF TE 90.03 Control Element LCdr C. Allmon _Diachenko_ _Begor_ 2 APD PCEC 882 PCEC TG 90.2 Transport Group Capt S. G. Kelly TE 90.21 Transport Element Capt A. E. Jarrell _Bayfield_ _Henrico_ _Noble_ 3 APA _Winston_ _Seminole_ _Montague_ 3 AKA _Begor_ _Diachenko_ 2 APD PCEC 882 PCEC _Fort Marion_[668] _Colonial_[668] _Catamount_[668] 3 LSD LST 742 LST 715 LST 845 LST 802 LST 883 LST 799 LST 898 LST 914 LST 975 LST 973 LST 1048 11 LST
TG 90.8 Gunfire Support Group RAdm R. H. Hillenkoetter _St. Paul_ _Rochester_ 2 CA _Zellars_ _Charles S. Sperry_ _Massey_ _Forrest Royal_ 4 DD LSMR 401 LSMR 403 LSMR 404 3 LSMR
Plus DD as assigned from TG 95.2 TG 95.2 Blockade, Escort and RAdm J. M. Higgins Minesweeping Group _Rochester_ CA _English_ _Hank_ _Wallace L. Lind_ _Borie_ 4 DD _Sausalito_ _Hoquiam_ _Gallup_ _Gloucester_ _Bisbee_ _Glendale_ 6 PF
TG 95.6 Minesweeping Group Capt R. T. Spofford _Endicott_ _Doyle_ 2 DMS _Incredible_ AM _Curlew_ _Heron_ 2 AMS
TG 96.8 Escort Carrier Group RAdm R. W. Ruble _Badoeng Strait_ _Sicily_ 2 CVE _Bataan_ CVL _Lofberg_ _John A. Bole_ _Mackenzie_ _Taussig_ _Ernest G. Small_ _Brinkley Bass_ _Arnold J. Isbell_ 7 DD _Hanson_ DDR
Vessels attached TF 90 for operational control.
_Missouri_ BB _Duncan_ DDR (from 10 Dec) _Foss_ DE (from 9 Dec) _Consolation_ AH (from 2 Dec)
[665] Reported to CTG 95.2 upon arrival at objective area.
[666] Carrying 3 LSU.
[667] Reported to CTF 90 when released by CTG 95.2.
[668] 3 LSU embarked
APPENDIX D
Effective Strength of 1st Marine Division[669]
----------+--------+--------+--------+--------+------- |Organic |Attached|Attached| | Date | USMC | U. S. | Royal |Attached| |and USN | Army |Marines | KMC | Total ----------+--------+--------+--------+--------+------- 8 Oct 50 | 23,533 | 78 | 0 | 2,159 | 25,770 26 Oct 50 | 23,608 | 83 | 0 | 1,588 | 25,279 27 Nov 50 | 25,166 | 73 | 234 | 0 | 25,473 5 Dec 50 | 21,551 | 2,535 | 157 | 0 | 24,243 8 Dec 50 | 21,039 | 2,448 | 157 | 0 | 23,644 15 Dec 50 | 19,362 | 14 | 144 | 0 | 19,520 ----------+--------+--------+--------+--------+-------
[669] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex A (G-1), 4.
APPENDIX E
1st Marine Division Casualties[670]
--------+-----+-----+-----+-------+----------- | | | | | Non-battle Date | KIA | DOW | MIA | WIA | casualties --------+-----+-----+-----+-------+----------- 8Oct50 | | | | | 21 9Oct50 | | | | | 12 10Oct50 | | | | | 11 11Oct50 | | | | | 35 12Oct50 | | | | | 23 13Oct50 | | | | | 5 14Oct50 | | | | | 5 15Oct50 | | | | | 4 16Oct50 | | | | | 3 17Oct50 | | | | | 5 18Oct50 | | | | | 2 19Oct50 | | | | | 1 20Oct50 | | | | | 4 21Oct50 | | | | | 1 22Oct50 | | | | | 2 23Oct50 | | | | | 1 24Oct50 | | | | | 5 25Oct50 | | | | | 12 26Oct50 | | | | | 43 27Oct50 | 22 | | 4 | 44 | 54 28Oct50 | 1 | | | 3 | 68 29Oct50 | | | | | 115 30Oct50 | 1 | | | 5 | 52 31Oct50 | | | | | 36 1Nov50 | | | | | 29 2Nov50 | 22 | 2 | | 67 | 64 3Nov50 | 22 | 3 | 1 | 162 | 93 4Nov50 | 17 | 4 | | 84 | 126 5Nov50 | 1 | 1 | | 23 | 94 6Nov50 | 5 | 1 | | 38 | 87 7Nov50 | 15 | | | 60 | 51 8Nov50 | 1 | 2 | | 17 | 50 9Nov50 | 2 | 7 | | | 50 10Nov50 | 3 | | | 20 | 57 11Nov50 | 8 | | | 16 | 48 12Nov50 | 2 | | | 4 | 40 13Nov50 | 7 | | | 9 | 63 14Nov50 | | | | | 66 15Nov50 | | | | 1 | 172 16Nov50 | 1 | | | 2 | 136 17Nov50 | | | | 2 | 77 18Nov50 | | | | | 79 19Nov50 | | | | 1 | 58 20Nov50 | | | | | 46 21Nov50 | 4 | | | 5 | 63 22Nov50 | | | | | 65 23Nov50 | 1 | | | 3 | 58 24Nov50 | 3 | | | 8 | 51 25Nov50 | | | | 8 | 55 26Nov50 | 2 | | 1 | 5 | 68 27Nov50 | 37 | 1 | 17 | 186 | 96 28Nov50 | 95 | 3 | 43 | 539 | 259 29Nov50 | 60 | 14 | 42 | 396 | 105 30Nov50 | 27 | 6 | 6 | 183 | 102 1Dec50 | 27 | 14 | 6 | 111 | 134 2Dec50 | 55 | 2 | 33 | 231 | 180 3Dec50 | 16 | 1 | 6 | 194 | 196 4Dec50 | 10 | 6 | 4 | 202 | 582 5Dec50 | 2 | 7 | 2 | 81 | 469 6Dec50 | 32 | 4 | 7 | 212 | 262 7Dec50 | 51 | 16 | | 281 | 304 8Dec50 | 29 | 8 | 4 | 127 | 170 9Dec50 | 6 | 7 | 1 | 46 | 224 10Dec50 | 7 | 5 | 8 | 45 | 266 11Dec50 | 9 | 4 | 3 | 38 | 308 12Dec50 | | 2 | 4 | 3 | 123 13Dec50 | | | | 1 | 52 14Dec50 | | | | | 103 15Dec50 | | 1 | | | 34 16Dec50 | | | | | 90 17Dec50 | | | | 1 | 105 18Dec50 | | | | | 282 19Dec50 | | | | | 202 20Dec50 | | | | | 151 21Dec50 | | | | 1 | 111 22Dec50 | | | | | 68 23Dec50 | | | | 3 | 79 24Dec50 | 1 | | | 10 | 42 --------+-----+-----+-----+-------+----------- Total | 604 | 114 | 192 | 3,485 | 7,338 --------+-----+-----+-----+-------+-----------
[670] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex E, appendix 2 (Casualty Reporting Section, 12Jan51); Smith, _Notes_, 1147–1149.
APPENDIX F
Command and Staff List
8 October-15 December 1950
1ST MARINE DIVISION
Commanding General MajGen Oliver P. Smith Assistant Division Commander BrigGen Edward A. Craig Chief of Staff Col Gregon A. Williams Deputy Chief of Staff Col Edward W. Snedeker G-1 Col Harvey S. Walseth (to 28 Nov) LtCol Bryghte D. Godbold G-2 Col Bankson T. Holcomb, Jr. G-3 Col Alpha L. Bowser, Jr. G-4 Col Francis A. McAlister
_Special Staff_
Adjutant Maj Philip J. Costello Air Officer Maj James N. Cupp Artillery Officer Col James H. Brower (to 30 Nov) Col Carl A. Youngdale Amphibian Tractor Officer LtCol Erwin F. Wann, Jr. Armored Amphibian Officer LtCol Francis H. Cooper Chaplain Cdr Robert H. Schwyhart (ChC), USN Chemical Warfare and Radiological Defense Officer Maj John H. Blue Dental Officer Capt Mack Meradith (DC), USN Embarkation Officer Maj Jules M. Rouse Engineer Officer LtCol John H. Partridge Exchange Officer Capt Wilbur C. Conley Food Director Maj Norman R. Nickerson Inspector Col John A. White Historical Officer 2dLt John M. Patrick Legal Officer LtCol Albert H. Schierman Motor Transport Officer Maj Henry W. Seeley Naval Gunfire Officer LtCol Loren S. Fraser Ordnance Officer Capt Donald L. Shenaut Provost Marshal Capt John H. Griffin Public Information Officer Capt Michael Capraro (to 6 Nov) Maj Carl E. Stahley Shore Party Officer LtCol Henry P. Crowe Signal Officer LtCol Albert Creal Special Services Officer Capt Raymond H. Spuhler (to 29 Nov) LtCol John M. Bathum Supply Officer Col Gordon S. Hendricks Surgeon Capt Eugene R. Hering (MC), USN Tank Officer LtCol Harry T. Milne
_Attached Units_
Commanding Officer, 163d Military Intelligence Specialist Detachment, USA Capt Fujio F. Asano, USA Commanding Officer, 181st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, USA Maj Millard E. Dougherty, USA Commanding Officer, 41st Independent Commando, Royal Marines LtCol Douglas B. Drysdale, RM
_Headquarters Battalion_
Commanding Officer LtCol Marvin T. Starr Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company Maj Frederick Simpson Commanding Officer, Military Police Company Capt John H. Griffin Commanding Officer, Reconnaissance Company 1stLt Ralph B. Crossman (to 23 Nov) Maj Walter Gall
_1st Marines_
Commanding Officer Col Lewis B. Puller Executive Officer LtCol Robert W. Rickert S-1 Capt William G. Reeves S-2 Capt Stone W. Quillian S-3 Maj Robert E. Lorigan S-4 Maj Thomas T. Grady Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company Capt Frank P. Tatum Commanding Officer, 4.2-inch Mortar Company Capt Frank J. Faureck Commanding Officer, Antitank Company Capt George E. Petro
_1st Battalion, 1st Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Jack Hawkins (to 7 Nov) LtCol Donald M. Schmuck Executive Officer Maj Maurice H. Clarke Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company Capt William B. Hopkins Commanding Officer, A Company Capt Robert H. Barrow Commanding Officer, B Company Capt Wesley Noren Commanding Officer, C Company Capt Robert P. Wray Commanding Officer, Weapons Company Maj William T. Bates, Jr.
_2d Battalion, 1st Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Allan Sutter Executive Officer Maj Clarence J. Mabry Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company Capt Raymond Dewees, Jr. Commanding Officer, D Company Capt Welby W. Cronk Commanding Officer, E Company Capt Charles D. Frederick (to 6 Nov) 1stLt Harold B. Wilson (6–17 Nov) Capt Jack A. Smith Commanding Officer, F Company Capt Goodwin C. Groff Commanding Officer, Weapons Maj Whitman S. Bartley (to 16 Nov) Company Capt William A. Kerr
_3d Battalion, 1st Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Thomas L. Ridge Executive Officer Maj Reginald R. Myers Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company Capt Thomas E. McCarthy Commanding Officer, G Company Capt George C. Westover (to 30 Oct) Capt Carl L. Sitter Commanding Officer, H Company Capt Clarence E. Corley Commanding Officer, I Company 1stLt Joseph R. Fisher Commanding Officer, Weapons Company Maj Edwin H. Simmons
_5th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Raymond L. Murray Executive Officer LtCol Joseph L. Stewart S-1 1stLt Alton C. Weed S-2 Maj William C. Easterline S-3 Maj Theodore J. Spiker S-4 Maj Harold Wallace Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company Capt Harold G. Schrier (to 9 Oct) Capt Jack E. Hawthorn Commanding Officer, 4.2-inch Mortar Company 1stLt Robert M. Lucy Commanding Officer, Antitank Company 1stLt Almarion S. Bailey
_1st Battalion, 5th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol George R. Newton (to 17 Nov) LtCol John W. Stevens, II Executive Officer Maj Merlin R. Olson Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company Capt Walter E. G. Godenius Commanding Officer, A Company Capt John R. Stevens (to 17 Nov) Capt James B. Heater Commanding Officer, B Company Capt Francis I. Fenton (to 13 Oct) 1stLt John R. Hancock Commanding Officer, C Company 1stLt Poul F. Pedersen (to 6 Nov) Capt Jack R. Jones Commanding Officer, Weapons Company Maj John W. Russell
_2d Battalion, 5th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Harold S. Roise Executive Officer LtCol John W. Stevens, II (to 12Nov) Maj Glen E. Martin (13–21Nov) Maj John L. Hopkins Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company 1stLt David W. Walsh (to 8 Oct) Capt Franklin B. Mayer Commanding Officer, D Company Capt Samuel S. Smith Commanding Officer, E Company Capt Samuel Jaskilka (to 12 Dec) Capt Lawrence W. Henke, Jr. Commanding Officer, F Company Capt Uel D. Peters (to 6 Dec) 1stLt Charles “H” Dalton Commanding Officer, Weapons Company Maj James W. Bateman (to 10 Oct) Maj Glen E. Martin (11 Oct-12 Nov) Maj James W. Bateman (13–21 Nov) Maj Glen E. Martin
_3d Battalion, 5th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Robert D. Taplett Executive Officer Maj John J. Canney (to 28 Nov) Maj Harold W. Swain Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company Capt Roland A. Marbaugh (to 4 Dec) Capt Raymond H. Spuhler Commanding Officer, G Company 1stLt Charles D. Mize (to 17 Nov) Capt Chester R. Hermanson (18 Nov-2 Dec) 1stLt Charles D. Mize Commanding Officer, H Company 1stLt Donald E. Watterson (to 8 Nov) Capt Harold B. Williamson Commanding Officer, I Company Capt Harold G. Schrier Commanding Officer, Weapons Company Maj Murray Ehrlich (to 18 Nov) Maj Harold W. Swain (19–28 Nov) 1stLt Hubert J. Shovlin
_7th Marines_
Commanding Officer Col Homer L. Litzenberg, Jr. Executive Officer LtCol Frederick R. Dowsett (to 7 Dec) LtCol Raymond G. Davis S-1 Capt John R. Grove S-2 Capt Donald R. France (to 6 Dec) S-3 Maj Henry J. Woessner, II S-4 Maj David L. Mell (to 22 Nov) Maj Maurice E. Roach Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company Capt Nicholas L. Shields (to 3 Dec) Maj Walter T. Warren (4–7 Dec)[671] Maj Rodney V. Reigard[672] Commanding Officer, 4.2-inch Mortar Company Maj Stanley D. Low (to 2 Nov) 1stLt Gordon Vincent (3–18 Nov) Maj Rodney V. Reigard Commanding Officer, Antitank Company 1stLt Earl R. DeLong (to 20 Oct) Maj Walter T. Warren (21 Oct-8 Dec) 1stLt Earl R. DeLong
_1st Battalion, 7th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Raymond G. Davis (to 7 Dec) Maj Webb D. Sawyer Executive Officer Maj Raymond V. Fridrich Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company Capt Elmer L. Starr (to 22 Nov) 1stLt Wilbert R. Gaul Commanding Officer, A Company Capt David W. Banks (to 20 Nov) 1stLt Eugenous M. Hovatter Commanding Officer, B Company Capt Myron E. Wilcox, Jr. (to 27 Nov) 1stLt Joseph R. Kurcaba (27 Nov-8-Dec) 1stLt William W. Taylor Commanding Officer, C Company Capt William E. Shea (to 16 Nov) Capt John F. Morris Commanding Officer, Weapons Company Maj William E. Vorhies
_2d Battalion, 7th Marines_
Commanding Officer Maj Webb D. Sawyer (to 9 Nov) LtCol Randolph S. D. Lockwood Executive Officer Maj Roland E. Carey (to 9 Nov) Maj Webb D. Sawyer (10 Nov-8 Dec) Maj James F. Lawrence, Jr. Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company Capt Walter R. Anderson Commanding Officer, D Company Capt Milton A. Hull (to 28 Nov) 1stLt James D. Hammond, Jr. Commanding Officer, E Company Capt Walter D. Phillips, Jr. (to 28 Nov) 1stLt Raymond O. Ball (28 Nov) 1stLt Robert T. Bey Commanding Officer, F Company Capt Elmer J. Zorn (to 6 Nov) Capt William E. Barber (7 Nov-3 Dec) 1stLt John M. Dunne (3–6 Dec) 1stLt Welton R. Abell Commanding Officer, Weapons Company Capt Harry L. Givens, Jr. (to 12 Nov) Maj Joseph L. Abel (13–19 Nov) Capt Harry L. Givens, Jr.
_3d Battalion, 7th Marines_
Commanding Officer Maj Maurice E. Roach (to 10 Nov) LtCol William F. Harris (11 Nov-6 Dec) Maj Warren Morris Executive Officer Maj Warren Morris (to 6 Dec) Maj Jefferson D. Smith, Jr. Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company Capt Eric R. Haars (to 29 Nov) Commanding Officer, G Company Capt Thomas E. Cooney (to 27 Nov) Capt Eric R. Haars (29 Nov-3 Dec) 1stLt George R. Earnest Commanding Officer, H Company 1stLt Howard H. Harris (to 11 Nov) Capt Leroy M. Cooke (12–27 Nov) 1stLt Howard H. Harris (27 Nov-1 Dec) 1stLt Harold J. Fitzgeorge (1–5 Dec) 2dLt Minard P. Newton Commanding Officer, I Company Capt Richard H. Sengewald (to 14 Oct) 1stLt William E. Johnson (15 Oct-3 Dec) 1stLt Alfred I. Thomas Commanding Officer, Weapons Company Maj Jefferson D. Smith (to 5 Dec) 1stLt Austin S. Parker (6–10 Dec) 1stLt Robert E. Hill
_11th Marines_
Commanding Officer Col James H. Brower (to 30 Nov) LtCol Carl A. Youngdale Executive Officer LtCol Carl A. Youngdale (to 30 Nov) S-1 Maj Floyd M. McCorkle S-2 Capt William T. Phillips S-3 LtCol James O. Appleyard S-4 Maj Donald V. Anderson Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battery Capt Albert H. Wunderly (to 7 Nov) Capt Clarence E. Hixson (15–25 Nov) 1stLt William C. Patton Commanding Officer, Service Battery Maj Donald V. Anderson (to 16 Nov) 1stLt Joseph M. Brent Commanding Officer, Battery C, 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battalion 1stLt Eugene A. Bushe
_1st Battalion, 11th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Ransom M. Wood (to 15 Nov) LtCol Harvey A. Feehan Executive Officer Maj Francis R. Schlesinger Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battery Capt James W. Brayshay (to 25 Nov) Commanding Officer, Service Battery 1stLt Kenneth H. Quelch Commanding Officer, A Battery Capt James D. Jordan Commanding Officer, B Battery Capt Arnold C. Hoffstetter (to 8 Oct) Capt Gilbert N. Powell Commanding Officer, C Battery Capt William J. Nichols, Jr.
_2d Battalion, 11th Marines_
Commanding Officer LtCol Merritt Adelman Executive Officer Maj Donald E. Noll (to 25 Oct) Maj Neal G. Newell Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battery Capt George J. Batson Commanding Officer, Service Battery Capt Herbert R. Merrick, Jr. Commanding Officer, D Battery Capt Andrew J. Strohmenger (to 8 Dec) Capt Richard E. Roach Commanding Officer, E Battery Capt John C. McClelland, Jr. Commanding Officer, F Battery Capt George J. Kovich, Jr. (to 19 Nov) 1stLt Howard A. Blancheri
_3d Battalion, 11th Marines_
Commanding Officer Maj Francis F. Parry Executive Officer Maj Norman A. Miller, Jr. Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battery 1stLt Michael B. Weir (to 11 Nov) 1stLt Eugene H. Brown (12–18 Nov) 1stLt John J. Brackett Commanding Officer, Service Battery Capt Robert A. Thompson (to 17 Oct) Capt Ernest W. Payne (18 Oct-30 Nov) Capt Samuel A. Hannah Commanding Officer, G Battery Capt Samuel A. Hannah (to 30 Nov) Capt Ernest W. Payne Commanding Officer, H Battery Capt Benjamin S. Read (to 8 Dec) 1stLt Wilber N. Herndon Commanding Officer, I Battery Capt John M. McLaurin, Jr. (to 30 Nov) Capt Robert T. Patterson
_4th Battalion, 11th Marines_
Commanding Officer Maj William McReynolds Executive Officer Maj Thomas M. Coggins (to 8 Nov) Maj Maurice J. Coffey Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battery Capt Charles S. Cummings (to 25 Oct) Capt Paul L. Hirt Commanding Officer, Service Battery Capt Armand G. Daddazio Commanding Officer, K Battery 1stLt Robert C. Messman (to 27 Nov) 1stLt Robert C. Parrott (28 Nov-11 Dec) Capt Arthur D. Challacombe Commanding Officer, L Battery Capt Lawrence R. Cloern Commanding Officer, M Battery Capt Vernon W. Shapiro
_1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion_
Commanding Officer LtCol Erwin F. Wann, Jr. Executive Officer Maj Arthur J. Barrett Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company Capt Frank E. Granucci Commanding Officer, A Company Maj James P. Treadwell Commanding Officer, B Company Capt Russell Hamlet Commanding Officer, C Company Maj Arthur J. Noonan
_1st Armored Amphibian Battalion_
Commanding Officer LtCol Francis H. Cooper Executive Officer Maj Richard G. Warga Commanding Officer, Headquarter Company Capt Roger B. Thompson Commanding Officer, Service Company Capt Rex Z. Michael, Jr. Commanding Officer, A Company Capt Bernard G. Thobe Commanding Officer, B Company Capt Lewis E. Bolts
_1st Combat Service Group_
Commanding Officer Col John H. Cook, Jr. Executive Officer LtCol Edward A. Clark Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company Capt Francis L. Miller Commanding Officer, Maintenance Company Maj Edward H. Voorhees Commanding Officer, Supply Company Maj Robert W. Hengesback Commanding Officer, Support Company Maj Donald B. Cooley, Jr. Commanding Officer, Truck Company Capt John A. Pearson (to 11 Nov) 2dLt Alan G. Copp (11–30 Nov) Capt Jack W. Temple Commanding Officer, 1st Fumigation and Bath Company 1stLt James L. Dumas Commanding Officer, 1st Air Delivery Platoon Capt Hersel D. C. Blasingame
_1st Engineer Battalion_
Commanding Officer LtCol John H. Partridge Executive Officer Maj Richard M. Elliott Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company Capt James H. McRoberts (to 20 Nov) Maj Hewitt A. Snow Capt Edward B. Newton Commanding Officer, Service Company Maj James W. McIllwain (to 22 Nov) Capt Philip A. Terrell, Jr. Commanding Officer, A Company Capt George W. King (to 2 Dec) Capt William R. Gould Commanding Officer, B Company Capt Orville L. Bibb Commanding Officer, C Company Capt Lester G. Harmon (to 12 Nov) 1stLt Ronald L. Glendinning Commanding Officer, D Company Capt Byron C. Turner
_1st Medical Battalion_
Commanding Officer Cdr Howard A. Johnson, USN Executive Officer Cdr William S. Francis, USN Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company Cdr William S. Francis, USN Commanding Officer, A Company Cdr Byron E. Bassham, USN Commanding Officer, B Company LCdr James A. Kaufman, USN Commanding Officer, C Company Cdr Harold A. Streit, USN Commanding Officer, D Company LCdr Gustave J. Anderson, USN Commanding Officer, E Company LCdr John H. Cheffey, USN (to 15 Oct) Lt (jg) Ernest N. Grover, USN (15–30 Oct) LCdr Charles K. Holloway, USN
_1st Motor Transport Battalion_
Commanding Officer LtCol Olin L. Beall Executive Officer Maj John R. Barreiro, Jr. Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company Capt George B. Loveday Commanding Officer, A Company Capt Arthur W. Ecklund Commanding Officer, B Company Capt James C. Camp, Jr. Commanding Officer, C Company Capt Garfield M. Randall (to 30 Nov) 1stLt Norman E. Stow Commanding Officer, D Company Capt Bernard J. Whitelock (9 Dec) 1stLt Philip R. Hade Commanding Officer, Automotive Maintenance Company Maj Edward L. Roberts Commanding Officer, Automotive Supply Company 1stLt Mildridge E. Mangum Commanding Officer, Amphibian Truck Company, FMF[673] Capt John Bookhout
_1st Ordnance Battalion_
Commanding Officer Maj Lloyd O. Williams Executive Officer Maj Samuel A. Johnstone, Jr. Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company Capt Theodore Tunis (to 13 Nov) Capt Gordon H. Moore Commanding Officer, Ordnance Supply Company Capt Russel S. LaPointe (to 5 Dec) 1stLt Victor F. Brown Commanding Officer, Ammunition Company Capt Harvey W. Gagner (to 30 Nov) 1stLt Charles H. Miller Commanding Officer, Ordnance Maintenance Company Capt George L. Williams
_1st Service Battalion_
Commanding Officer LtCol Charles L. Banks Executive Officer Maj John R. Stone Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company Capt Morse “L” Holladay Commanding Officer, Service Company Capt Robert A. Morehead Commanding Officer, Support Company Capt Richard W. Sinclair (to 27 Oct) Capt Thomas M. Sagar
_1st Shore Party Battalion_
Commanding Officer LtCol Henry P. Crowe Executive Officer LtCol Horace H. Figuers Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company Capt William T. Miller Commanding Officer, A Company Maj William L. Batchelor (to 22 Nov) Capt Nathaniel H. Carver Commanding Officer, B Company Maj Henry Brzezinski Commanding Officer C Company Maj George A. Smith (to 24 Nov) Maj Murray F. Rose
_1st Signal Battalion_
Commanding Officer Maj Robert L. Schreier Executive Officer Maj Elwyn M. Stimson Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company Capt Howard K. Alberts (to 14 Nov) Capt Earl F. Stanley Commanding Officer, Signal Company Maj Richard A. Glaeser Commanding Officer, ANGLICO Maj Fulton L. Oglesby (to 16 Nov) Maj Frederick M. Steinhauser
_1st Tank Battalion_
Commanding Officer LtCol Harry T. Milne Executive Officer Maj Douglas E. Haberlie (to 1 Dec) Maj Philip C. Morrell Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company Capt Bruce W. Clarke (to 18 Nov) 1stLt Frederick L. Adams Commanding Officer, Service Company Capt Philip C. Morell (to 1 Dec) Maj Douglas E. Haberlie Commanding Officer, A Company Capt Gearl M. English (to 1 Dec) 1stLt Robert J. Craig Commanding Officer, B Company Capt Bruce F. Williams Commanding Officer, C Company Capt Richard M. Taylor Commanding Officer, D Company Capt Lester T. Chase (to 18 Nov) Capt Bruce W. Clarke (19 Nov-10 Dec) 1stLt Paul E. Sanders
_7th Motor Transport Battalion_
Commanding Officer Maj Joseph F. Stepka (to 7 Nov) LtCol Carl J. Cagle Executive Officer Maj Vernon A. Tuson Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company 1stLt Reed T. King Commanding Officer, A Company Capt Ira N. Hayes Commanding Officer, B Company Capt Clovis M. Jones Commanding Officer, C Company Capt Fred B. Rogers Commanding Officer, D Company Capt Joseph L. Bunker
_Marine Observation Squadron 6_
(Under operational control of 1stMarDiv and administrative control of 1stMAW) Commanding Officer Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk Executive Officer Capt Victor A. Armstrong (to 13 Nov) Capt Andrew L. McVickers
1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING
Commanding General MajGen Field Harris Assistant Commanding General BrigGen Thomas J. Cushman Chief of Staff Col Kenneth H. Weir (8 Oct-1 Nov) Col Caleb T. Bailey (2 Nov-15 Dec) Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations[674] Col Edward C. Dyer G-1 Col Raymond E. Hopper G-2 LtCol Winsor V. Crockett, Jr. G-3 LtCol Howard A. York (to 9 Nov) LtCol Paul J. Fontana (10 Nov-28 Nov)[675] LtCol Howard A. York (29 Nov-15 Dec) G-4 Col Thomas J. Noon Commanding Officer, Rear Echelon, Itami Col Roger T. Carleson Commanding Officer, Headquarters Squadron, One Capt Earl “B” Sumerlin, Jr.
_Marine Aircraft Group 12_
Commanding Officer Col Boeker C. Batterton Deputy Group Commander LtCol Paul J. Fontana Commanding Officer, Headquarters Squadron 12 Maj John E. Hays Commanding Officer, Service Squadron 12 Maj Claude H. Welch (to 4 Nov) Maj Charles E. J. McLean
_Marine Aircraft Group 33_
Commanding Officer Col Frank C. Dailey Deputy Group Commander LtCol Radford C. West Commanding Officer, Headquarters Squadron 33 Capt Walter “L” Hilton Commanding Officer, Marine Service Squadron 33 LtCol James C. Lindsay
_Squadrons_
Commanding Officer, Marine Fighter Squadron 212 LtCol Richard W. Wyczawski Commanding Officer, Marine Fighter Squadron 214 Maj Robert P. Keller (to 2 0Nov) Maj William M. Lundin Commanding Officer, Marine Fighter Squadron 312 LtCol “J” Frank Cole Commanding Officer, Marine Fighter Squadron 311 LtCol Neil R. McIntyre (from 8 Nov) Commanding Officer, Marine Fighter Squadron 323 Maj Arnold A. Lund Commanding Officer, Marine All-Weather Squadron 513 Maj J. Hunter Reinburg (to 4 Nov) LtCol David C. Wolfe Commanding Officer, Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron 542 LtCol Max J. Volcansek, Jr. Commanding Officer, Marine Transport Squadron 152 Col Deane C. Roberts Commanding Officer, Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1 Maj Harold E. Allen Commanding Officer, Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2 Maj Christian C. Lee
[671] Additional duty.
[672] Additional duty.
[673] Redesignated Company A, 1st Amphibian Truck Battalion, 15 Nov.
[674] Also Deputy C/S, Air Support, X Corps.
[675] Additional duty.
APPENDIX G
Enemy Order of Battle
1. North Korean
During operations around Wonsan the 1st Marine Division encountered fragments and stragglers from many NKPA divisions. The organized elements were chiefly from the 2d, 5th, and 15th Divisions.
2. Chinese
42d Army 124th Division In action against 7th Marines south of 370th Regiment Sudong 2 Nov. Badly cut up in actions 371st Regiment of 3–6 Nov. 372nd Regiment 125th Division Not in contact. Probably to west of 373rd Regiment 124th Division. 374th Regiment 375th Regiment 126th Division Screened Chinese retreat to Hagaru. 376th Regiment Never heavily engaged. 377th Regiment 378th Regiment 20th Army 58th Division First in action at Hagaru 28 Nov. 172nd Regiment Badly cut up in attacks on Hagaru. 173rd Regiment 174th Regiment 59th Division In contact with 7th Marines southwest 175th Regiment of Yudam-ni 23 Nov. Later defended 176th Regiment Toktong Pass. 177th Regiment 60th Division In contact with 7th Marines southeast 178th Regiment of Yudam-ni 25 Nov. Later moved to 179th Regiment Funchilin Pass area. 180th Regiment 89th Division First contacted by 7th Marines west 266th Regiment of Hagaru 22 Nov. About 2 Dec 267th Regiment moved south to Majon-dong area. 268th Regiment 27th Army 79th Division Attacked Yudam-ni 27 Nov. 235th Regiment 236th Regiment 237th Regiment 80th Division Attacked 7th Infantry Division units 238th Regiment east of Reservoir 27 Nov. 239th Regiment 240th Regiment 81st Division No report of contact until 13 Dec. 241st Regiment May have been in Yudam-ni area. 242nd Regiment 243rd Regiment 90th Division No contact reported. May have been 268th Regiment in reserve near Hagaru. 269th Regiment 270th Regiment 26th Army 76th Division First contacts east of Hagaru 5 Dec. 226th Regiment Suffered heavy losses around Koto-ri. 227th Regiment 228th Regiment 77th Division First contacts at Hagaru 5 Dec. 229th Regiment 230th Regiment 231st Regiment 78th Division Not reported in contact. May not 232nd Regiment have reached area in time for combat. 233rd Regiment 234th Regiment 88th Division Not reported in contact. May not 263rd Regiment have reached area in time for combat. 264th Regiment 265th Regiment
APPENDIX H
Air Evacuation Statistics[676]
--------+------------------+------------------+-----------+----- | HAGARU | KOTO-RI | YUDAM-NI | +----+------+------+----+------+------+----+------+----- Date | OY | C-47 | HO4S | OY | C-47 | HO4S | OY | HO4S |Total --------+----+------+------+----+------+------+----+------+----- 27Nov50 | 19 | 0| 0 | 0| 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 21 28Nov50 | 24 | 0| 18 | 0| 0 | 0 | 0 | 32 | 74 29Nov50 | 31 | 0| 16 | 0| 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | 69 30Nov50 | 62 | 0| 0 | 0| 0 | 0 | 0 | 49 | 111 1Dec50 | 52 | 157| 2 | 0| 0 | 7 | 1 | 3 | 222 2Dec50 | 0 | 960| 0 | 47| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |1,007 3Dec50 | 0 | 464| 0 | 53| 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 523 4Dec50 | 0 | 1,046| 0 | 89| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |1,135 5Dec50 | 0 | 1,580| 0 | 48| 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |1,630 6Dec50 | 0 | 137| 0 | 0| 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 140 7Dec50 | 0 | 0| 0 | 226| 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 232 8Dec50 | 0 | 0| 0 | 0| 19 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 19 9Dec50 | 0 | 0| 0 | 21| 277 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 300 10Dec50 | 0 | 0| 0 | 0| 8 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 12 --------+----+------+------+----+------+------+----+------+----- Totals |188 | 4,344| 36 | 484| 304 | 24 | 3 | 112 |5,493 --------+----+------+------+----+------+------+----+------+-----
[676] X Corps, _Special Report, Chosin Reservoir_, 93; Smith, _Notes_, 844; and VMO-6 _SAR_, 13–18. TBM evacuation included under OY for Koto-ri, 2 to 7 December 1950.
APPENDIX I
Unit Citations
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON
The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to the
FIRST MARINE DIVISION, REINFORCED
for service as set forth in the following CITATION:
“For extraordinary heroism and outstanding performance of duty in action against enemy aggressor forces in the Chosin Reservoir and Koto-ri area of Korea from 27 November to 11 December 1950. When the full fury of the enemy counterattack struck both the Eighth Army and the Tenth Corps on 27 and 28 November 1950, the First Marine Division, Reinforced, operating as the left flank division of the Tenth Corps, launched a daring assault westward from Yudam-ni in an effort to cut the road and rail communications of hostile forces attacking the Eighth Army and, at the same time, continued its mission of protecting a vital main supply route consisting of a tortuous mountain road running southward to Chinhung-ni, approximately 35 miles distant. Ordered to withdraw to Hamhung in company with attached army and other friendly units in the face of tremendous pressure in the Chosin Reservoir area, the Division began an epic battle against the bulk of the enemy Third Route Army and, while small intermediate garrisons at Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri held firmly against repeated and determined attacks by hostile forces, gallantly fought its way successively to Hagaru-ri, Koto-ri, Chinhung-ni and Hamburg over twisting, mountainous and icy roads in sub-zero temperatures. Battling desperately night and day in the face of almost insurmountable odds throughout a period of two weeks of intense and sustained combat, the First Marine Division, Reinforced, emerged from its ordeal as a fighting unit with its wounded, with its guns and equipment and with its prisoners, decisively defeating seven enemy divisions, together with elements of three others, and inflicting major losses which seriously impaired the military effectiveness of the hostile forces for a considerable period of time. The valiant fighting spirit, relentless perseverance and heroic fortitude of the officers and men of the First Marine Division, Reinforced, in battle against a vastly outnumbering enemy, were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.”
The following reinforcing units of the First Marine Division participated in operations against enemy aggressor forces in Korea from 27 November to 11 December 1950:
ORGANIC UNITS OF THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION: First Marine Division (less Detachment Headquarters Battalion; Detachment First Signal Battalion; Detachment First Service Battalion; Detachment Headquarters and Companies A and C, First Tank Battalion; Automotive Supply Company, First Motor Transport Battalion; Automotive Maintenance Company, First Motor Transport Battalion; Detachment First Ordnance Battalion; Detachment Headquarters and Company A, First Medical Battalion; First Shore Party Battalion; 4.5″ Rocket Battery and Service Battery, Fourth Battalion, Eleventh Marines).
ATTACHED MARINE CORPS UNITS: Companies A and B, Seventh Motor Transport Battalion; Detachment Radio Relay Platoon.
ATTACHED ARMY UNITS: Provisional Battalion (Detachments, 31st and 32nd Regimental Combat Teams); Company D, 10th Engineer Combat Battalion; Tank Company, 31st Infantry Regiment; Headquarters Company, 31st Infantry Regiment; Company B, 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment; 2nd Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment (less Company E); 185th Engineer Combat Battalion (less Company A).
For the President,
R. B. ANDERSON _Secretary of the Navy_
GENERAL ORDERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
No. 72 Washington 25, D. C., 9 August 1951
DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION
1. The 1st Marine Air Wing, Fleet Marine Force, is cited for outstanding performance of duty and extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy in the areas of Chosin Reservoir, Hagaru-ri, and Koto-ri, Korea, during the period 22 November to 14 December 1950. The historic role of close-support air missions flown by personnel on land and carrier based aircraft during the operations of the X Corps, United States Army, contributed immeasurably to the successful withdrawal of the X Corps when hordes of Chinese Communist and North Korean troops had encircled their positions endangering the entire operation. In their magnificent employment of close-support doctrine and in their exceedingly effective interdiction missions and night combat air patrols, the 1st Marine Air Wing flew 2,572 day and night sorties during this period, inflicting 10,313 enemy casualties and destroying 723 buildings, 144 vehicles, 17 tanks, 9 bridges, 4 locomotives, 3 command posts, 30 boxcars, 47 gun positions, and 19 supply, ammunition, and fuel dumps. These missions were flown over hazardous mountain terrain under extremely adverse weather conditions and in the face of intense enemy antiaircraft and small-arms fire. The normally ground-based Tactical Air Direction Center was ingeniously improvised into an airborne center in a C-54 aircraft without appreciable loss of efficiency in operations and the responsibility for controlling aircraft was assumed and accomplished in a remarkable manner through day and night operations by controlling personnel. Airborne tactical air coordinators also were established to supplement the airborne center to direct specific strikes in areas not under surveillance of ground control parties to the end that every available sortie was utilized to maximum effectiveness. In the evacuation of friendly casualties by cargo airplanes, the use of helicopters for rescue of air personnel shot down by the enemy and the evacuation of wounded, and the high state of aircraft availability maintained by ground personnel working under hazardous and extremely adverse conditions because of intense cold, personnel of the entire 1st Marine Air Wing displayed fortitude, courage, and marked esprit de corps. Although suffering a considerable loss of personnel and equipment during this trying period, the morale and effectiveness of the 1st Marine Air Wing were sustained at a constantly high level. The repeated acts of valor and gallantry by the officers and men of the 1st Marine Air Wing, Fleet Marine Force, and their enviable combat record reflect great credit on the members thereof and are in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service.
By order of the Secretary of the Army:
J. LAWTON COLLINS Chief of Staff, United States Army
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Index
Aid station, 192, 258, 316
Aircraft Air Force and Navy Bombers, 143 AT-6 (Mosquito), 98, 349 B-26, 282 C-47, 69, 138, 246, 247, 278, 279, 281, 282, 308, 323 C-119, 191, 247, 282, 311 Carrier planes, 254 F4U (Corsair), 57, 67, 68, 70, 100, 102, 113, 118, 152, 156, 179, 193, 194, 218, 222, 224, 238, 255, 257, 263, 266, 268, 271, 287, 288, 290, 320, 347, 349 F-51 (Mustang), 190 HO3S-1 _See_ Helicopters. L5G, 246, 351 Marine aircraft, 254, 264, 272 Mariners, 29 Navy planes, 325 Night fighters, 282 Observation planes (OY-2s), 66–69, 73, 152, 201, 202, 245, 246, 272, 288, 298, 305, 308, 351 R4D, 137, 138, 278, 279, 281, 282, 341, 349 R5D, 32, 191, 279, 296, 321, 349 Spotter plane, 154 Sunderlands, 29 TBM, 307, 349, 368 Transport planes, Marine, 191
Air drop, 68, 69, 191, 194, 243, 247, 250, 275, 277, 280, 282, 283, 306, 311, 322, 334, 349
Air Force, 311 Far East Air Forces (FEAF), 10, 35, 247 Combat Cargo Command, 32, 191, 247, 279, 281, 282, 349 Fifth Air Force, 34, 254, 287, 348, 350 Commanding general, 33 Headquarters, 33 RAAF Australian F-51s (Mustangs), 190
Air strikes, 56, 57, 109, 118, 147, 156, 224, 225, 230, 231, 238, 251, 258, 264, 265, 268, 271, 273, 288, 290, 320, 324, 326. _See also_ Air Support.
Air strip C-47, 149 OY strip (Yudam-ni), 253 OY strip (Hagaru), 137 OY strip (Majon-ni), 63
Air support, 54–56, 108, 109, 190, 194, 243, 253, 268, 286, 296, 302, 313, 320, 321, 339, 340, 343, 349, 350. _See also_ Air Strikes. Breakout, 286, 287 Close, 70, 100, 102, 117, 152, 217, 254, 255, 263, 272, 286, 296, 299, 325, 348, 358 Evacuation, 278, 279, 281, 285, 308, 341 Observation, 163 Procedures, 33 Reconnaissance, 152, 163
Air operations, 349 Cargo, 349 Control, 348, 349 Air Defense Controllers, 348 Cover, 338 Innovations, 350 Problems, 347
Almond, Lt Gen Edward M., USA, 8–10, 10_n_, 11, 14, 15, 18, 24, 26, 29, 31, 32, 37–39, 54, 55, 57, 58, 76, 80, 82_n_, 90_n_, 98, 120, 126, 131, 132, 134, 134_n_, 137, 205, 238, 239, 250, 280, 285, 302, 308, 337, 340, 342, 343, 346, 339
Alvarez, SSgt. R. C, 183_n_, 257_n_, 266_n_, 288_n_
Ambushes, 70, 72
Ambush Alley, 62, 70, 72, 75, 77
Ammer, 1st Lt Henry G., 255
Ammunition, 194, 257, 259, 277, 282, 283, 285, 287, 302 Artillery, 160, 250, 254, 279 Bomb, 266 Mortar, 179, 201, 291, 324 Small arms, 144, 160
Amyotte, Cpl George A. J., 329, 330
Anbyon, 56, 59
Anderson, LtCol Berry K., USA, 245, 288
Anderson, LCdr Gustave T., (MC) USN, 307
Antung, Manchuria, 124
Anzio, 333
Arioli, Lt Peter E., (MC) USN, 264
Armor, body, 330
Armstrong, Capt Victor A., 34
Army, 247, 307
Army Units, U. S. Eighth U. S. Army in Korea (EUSAK), 1, 3, 8, 10, 11, 14, 18, 26, 34–36, 43, 58, 63, 81, 82, 99, 118, 129, 132, 133, 142, 145, 146, 205, 238, 239, 277, 334, 337, 340, 345, 346, 350, 352, 355, 358 121st Army Evacuation Hospital, 189, 246 181st Counter Intelligence Corps team (CIC), 65 Fourth Signal Battalion, 127, 207, 290 Provisional Battalion, 245, 294, 296, 297, 312, 317, 318, 321, 324 Special Operations Company, 81, 126 IX Corps, 34, 35 X Corps, 1, 8–11, 14, 14_n_, 15, 18, 21–27, 33, 34, 36–38, 40–44, 59, 65, 75, 76, 81, 98, 125, 129, 131–134, 141, 143, 145, 147, 149, 188, 238, 240, 246, 280, 306, 308, 335–338, 340, 342, 352, 355, 357, 358 Command Post. _See_ Headquarters, X Corps, below. Headquarters, 11, 29, 76, 98, 206, 340 Railway Transportation Section, 138 Tactical Air Command, (TAC X Corps), 31 1st Cavalry Division, 15, 34, 58, 82 2d Infantry Division, 36, 150 3d Infantry Division, 36, 43, 58, 59, 75, 76, 98, 126, 131, 136, 140, 145, 146, 308, 309, 326, 337–339, 342, 343 7th Infantry Division, 10, 14, 23, 24, 26, 58, 98, 123, 131, 135, 145, 146, 238, 288, 309, 333, 337, 339, 342, 352, 358 24th Infantry Division, 34 2d Engineer Special Brigade, 138, 139 187th Airborne RCT 34 7th Regimental Combat Team, 343 15th Regimental Combat Team, 343 1st Battalion, 74, 77 17th Regimental Combat Team, 75, 144 31st Infantry Regiment, 148, 205, 243, 288 Company B, 225, 226, 228, 229, 231, 232, 234 2d Battalion, 306, 312, 326, 328, 331 Tank Company, 326 32d Infantry Regiment, 243 1st Battalion, 140 65th Regimental Combat Team, 75, 126–128, 326, 327 2d Battalion, 127 10th Engineer Battalion, 235 Company D, 206, 213 185th Engineer Battalion, 311, 325 50th Antiaircraft Artillery (Automatic-weapons) Battalion, 315 57th Field Artillery Battalion, 243 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 14, 309, 313, 316, 326 96th Field Artillery Battalion, 14, 126–128
Artillery, 73 Army, 340 Chinese Communist Forces, 206, 220 Marine, 108–110, 117, 118, 165, 178, 201, 202, 240, 266, 272, 287, 291 Support, 100, 147, 156, 179, 194, 208, 217, 220, 253, 255, 257, 258, 260, 287, 290, 296, 302, 320, 321, 325
Ascom City, 11
Audas, SSgt John D., 191
Austin, Capt Bernard L., 15
Avant, Maj Percy F., Jr., 299
Babe, 1stLt George A., 311
_Badoeng Strait_ (CVE), USS, 32, 286, 347
Ball, 1stLt Raymond O., 174
Banks, LtCol Charles L., 207, 214, 215, 241, 285, 322
Banks, Capt David W., 100, 103
Barber, Capt William E., 180, 190, 191, 193, 194, 200, 264, 265
Barr, MajGen David G., USA, 75, 84, 84_n_, 98, 238, 239, 288, 340
Barrett, Capt R. L., Jr., 208_n_, 209, 216_n_
Barrow, Capt Robert H., 49, 51_n_, 55_n_, 69, 70, 72, 221, 314–316, 320
Bartley, LtCol Whitman S., 279_n_, 305_n_, 306
_Bataan_ (CVL), USS, 287, 333, 334, 349
Bates, Maj W. L., Jr., 221_n_, 222, 314_n_, 321, 355
Batterton, Col Boeker C., 342
_Bayfield_ (APA), USS, 25, 31, 341
Beaches Hungnam BLUE, 343 GREEN, 340, 343 PINK, 343 YELLOW, 342 Wonson BLUE, 22, 31, 39, 40 RED, 26 YELLOW, 22, 31, 39, 40, 45
Beall, LtCol Olin L., 99, 160, 180, 244, 245, 285
Bear, 120
Beech, Keyes, 192, 194, 323
Beeler, 1stLt James D., 68
Belleau Wood, 302
Belli, 1stLt George S., 46_n_, 48, 51, 52, 57
Benson, Pfc Robert F., 181
Betts, 1stLt Harrison F., 210, 216
Bey, 1stLt R. T., 100_n_, 104_n_, 108, 108_n_, 167, 168, 172, 183_n_, 186
Beyes, 1stLt Warren J., 107_n_
Blanchard, LtCol Robert M., USA, 74
Blancheri, 1stLt Howard A., 222
Blankenship, Capt C. P., 244_n_
Blasingame, Capt Hersel D. C., 69, 311
Blatt, Capt Wallace D., 34
Blocking and Escort Force, United Nations, 27
Blumenson, Capt Martin, USA, 8_n_, 11_n_, 243_n_
Booby trap, 43, 71
Boley, 2dLt James J., 209
Borgomainero, SSgt Russell J., 164
Bott, 2dLt Kenneth A., 67
Bowman, Lt George, 263_n_
Bowser, Col Alpha L., 26_n_, 38_n_, 39_n_, 43_n_, 54, 60, 89_n_, 92_n_, 100_n_, 136, 205, 206, 213, 311
_Boxer_ (CV), USS, 17, 25
Bradley, 1stLt Bobbie B., 318
Bradley, Gen O. N., USA, 35_n_
Breakout Logistics, 247 Plans, 238, 239, 250, 251
Bridge, 274, 286, 296, 297, 302 M-2 Steel Treadway, 311, 319, 329–331
Bridges, Maj David W., 46_n_, 49, 49_n_, 50_n_, 51_n_, 314_n_, 321_n_, 325_n_
Brower, Col. James H., 40, 220, 247_n_
_Brush_ (DD), USS, 27
Brzezinski, Maj Henry, 40
Buck, 1stLt John A., 226_n_, 232, 234
Bunkers, Chinese Communist Forces, 315, 316, 320, 325
Burke, 1stLt John L., Jr., 207
Cafferatta, Pvt Hector A., 181
Cahill, 2dLt John H., 167, 182, 270
Camaratta, 2dLt August L., 270
Camp Lejeune, 330_n_
Canney, Maj John J., 171
Canzona, 1stLt N. A., 215_n_, 219, 235, 238, 241, 300_n_, 327, 331_n_
Capraro, Capt M. J., 226_n_, 229_n_, 232, 234
Carey, 2dLt Richard E., 202, 203, 220_n_, 235_n_, 241_n_, 326
Carlon, 1stLt Francis B., 49–51
Carlson, CWO Allen, 275
Caruso, Sgt Matthew, 297
Cashion, 2dLt Dana B., 182, 182_n_
Casualties Army, U. S., 74, 81, 127, 214, 243–245, 306_n_, 343 Chinese Communist Forces, 108–110, 112, 117, 121, 147, 164, 166, 168, 174, 181–183, 186, 188, 190, 194, 222, 224, 226, 241, 242, 263, 266, 290, 293, 294, 299, 306, 315, 316, 320, 324, 351, 354, 355 Enemy losses, 118 Evacuation, 55, 57, 138, 139, 245, 246, 253, 305, 307, 319, 334, 349 Control Officer, 339 Marine, 51, 52, 54, 57, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 100, 102, 109, 116–118, 121, 124, 127, 157, 166, 168, 174, 178, 179, 181, 182, 186, 188, 190–192, 194, 201, 210, 216, 219, 224, 225, 234, 240–243, 245, 247, 258, 264, 265, 272, 275, 278–281, 284, 290, 291, 293, 298, 299, 302, 303, 306–308, 315, 316, 319, 323, 325, 328, 330–332, 351, 385 Casualty list, 57 North Korean (NKPA), 51, 53, 70, 72, 73 Personnel losses, 69 Republic of Korea Army, 214
Catania, Lt Alfred J., 226_n_
Cates, Gen Clifton B., 133, 134_n_, 359
_Ceylon_ (CL), HMS, 28
Chabek, 1stLt Jack A., 179
Challacombe, Capt Arthur D., 266
Chamberlain, J., 35_n_
Chambers 1stLt George C, 49, 52
Chandler, 1stLt J. B., 294_n_
Changjin, 44, 96, 99, 132, 134, 135, 200, 204, 230, 286
_Chatterer_ (AMS), USS, 27
Cherisophus, 357
Chiang Kai-shek, 83, 84
Chidester, LtCol Arthur A., 231, 234, 283
Chigyong, 77, 80–82, 124, 126, 128, 136, 140, 147, 197, 204, 205, 335
Chiles, LtCol John H., USA, 135, 145
China, 3, 5, 7 Central Committee, 85 Civil War, 83–85 “Hate America” campaign, 91 Intervention, 35, 131 Kiangsi Province (South China), 83 North China, Occupation by Marines, 85 People’s Revolutionary Military Council, 86 “Resist America, Aid Korea” movement, 90 Seventh Party Congress, 85
Chinese Communist Forces, 5, 81, 85, 98, 99, 129, 203 Assault, 168 Bugle calls, 104 Bunkers. _See_ Bunkers. Command Post, 315 Counterstroke, 146 Entrenchment, 156, 157 Equipment, 88 Fortifications, 157 Intervention, 128, 129, 142, 143 Jet fighters, 142 Logistics, 88, 93, 353 “Long March”, 83 Organization, 85, 86, 88 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 83–85 Plans, 353 Rank, 88 Recruiting, 87 Reinforcements, 296 Roadblock, 109 Strategic concepts, 90 Strategy, 91 Strong point, 325 Tactics, 89, 91–94, 354 Training, 87 Troops, 79, 98 Uniforms, 89 Units 3d Field Army, 161, 352, 356 4th Field Army, 99, 352, 355 9th Army Group, 161, 352, 354–356, 358 20th Army, 149, 352–355 24th Army, 352 26th Army, 313, 352–355 27th Army, 352, 354, 355 30th Army, 352 32d Army, 313, 352 42d Army, 82, 99, 352 58th Division, 149, 220, 242, 285, 326, 352 59th Division, 149, 161, 242, 285, 352 60th Division, 149, 225, 285, 313, 352 70th Division, 352 76th Division, 352 77th Division, 286, 313, 352, 355 78th Division, 286, 313, 352 79th Division, 161, 167, 171, 178, 266, 285, 352 80th Division, 285, 352 81st Division, 352 89th Division, 161, 167, 178, 187, 285, 313, 352 94th Division, 313, 352 124th Division, 82, 99, 105, 110, 118, 120, 352 125th Division, 99, 332 126th Division, 99, 123, 167, 332 172d Regiment, 220, 242 173d Regiment, 220, 242 174th Regiment, 220, 242 176th Regiment, 242 179th Regiment, 225 235th Regiment, 167, 168, 172, 174, 184, 185, 186, 266 236th Regiment, 167, 168, 170, 174, 187 237th Regiment, 167, 170 267th Regiment, 167 370th Regiment, 99, 103, 107, 110 371st Regiment, 103, 104, 107, 110 372d Regiment, 103, 110 Chinese Nationalists, 84, 85
Chinhung-ni, 96, 98, 110, 112–114, 116, 117, 120, 124, 133–141, 146–149, 202, 221, 284, 303, 307–309, 312–314, 323–327, 331, 333, 333, 341, 330 Tank Battle, 113
Chinnampo, 8, 27, 34
Chonchon-ni, 52, 33, 37
Chongjin, 28, 44, 45, 76, 132, 145
Chongju, 9
Chongsanjangsi, 36–38
Chou En-Lai, 7
Chorwon, 35
Chosin, 38 Campaign, 346, 348, 336 Plans, 38 Results, 356–339 Reservoir, 82, 96, 98, 99, 110, 116, 117, 120, 123, 124, 132, 133, 137, 139, 145–149, 151, 198, 205, 238, 239, 266, 309, 350, 352 Withdrawal from. _See_ Breakout.
Cho Il Kwon, Col (NKPA), 50
Chuchonhujang, 132
CIC, 66, 70, 71, 73, 202, 203
Civil affairs, 65, 66, 73
Clark, Maj Albert L, 299
Clark, 1stLt Truman, 299, 307
Clearing stations, 139, 210, 211, 246, 307
Clements, 1stLt Leonard M., 174
Clothing, cold weather, 58, 80, 281
Cochran, Maj Robert L., 107, 117
Codispoti, Capt Gildo S., 224
Coffman, 2dLt Harold L., 69, 71_n_
Cole, LtCol J. Frank, 68
_Collett_ (DD), USS, 28
Collins, Capt E. E., 172_n_, 183_n_, 186_n_
Collins, Gen J. Lawton, USA, 5, 359
Colmery, 1stLt Harry W., 217
Command Post. _See_ Unit concerned.
Commander in Chief Far East (CinCFE). _See_ General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, USA.
Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet (CinCPacFlt). _See_ Adm Arthur W. Radford, USN.
Commander Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7). _See_ VAdm A. D. Struble, USN.
Commiskey, 2dLt Henry A., 49
Communications, 210, 349 Wire, 282
Composite battalion, 251
Condit, Kenneth W., 32_n_, 138_n_
Conference, 33
Connell, Capt H. G., 100_n_, 103
_Consolation_ (AH), USS, 139, 246
Convoy, 43, 48, 70, 74, 73, 231, 235, 272, 274, 286 Enemy, 116 Motor, 38, 59, 62, 77, 149, 180, 200, 318 Supply, 68
Cook, Col John H., Jr., 40
Cooke, Capt Leroy M., 154, 165
Cool, Capt William C, 339
Coon, Cpl G. L., 294_n_
Cooney, Capt Thomas E., 118, 120, 154, 157_n_
Corbet, 2dLt R. H., 184
Corley, Capt Clarence E., Jr., 66, 67, 71_n_, 73_n_, 201, 204_n_, 208_n_, 208–211, 216
Corman, Capt Otis W. S., 117
Correspondents, press, 281, 282, 322
Craig, BrigGen Edward A., 45_n_, 54_n_, 55, 55_n_, 56, 56_n_, 76_n_, 125, 125_n_, 137, 285, 340, 345
Craven, LCdr John H., USN, 121_n_, 172_n_, 272, 278
Craven, 1stLt William A., 49
Cronin, Maj Angus J., 274
Cronk, Capt Welby W., 224
Crossman, 1stLt Ralph B., 82, 99, 109, 112_n_, 114_n_, 116_n_, 329
Crowe, LtCol Henry P., 40, 338, 339
Crutchfield, 2dLt James L., 68
Counter Intelligence Corps. _See_ CIC.
Cushman, BrigGen Thomas J., 286, 342
D-Day (Wonsan Landing), 11
Dairen, 142
Dakyns, Henry C., 357_n_
Damnation Battalion, 251
Dana, 1stLt C. C., 180_n_, 190_n_
Danford, SSgt R. R., 180_n_, 190_n_
Davidson, Sgt Charles V., 240
Davis, Maj Daniel H., 107
Davis, Sgt K. E., 208_n_, 210
Davis, LtCol Raymond G., 80_n_, 99, 99_n_, 100, 103, 103_n_, 104, 106, 108_n_, 112, 112_n_, 121_n_, 148, 149, 178, 190, 254_n_, 257, 258, 259_n_, 260, 261, 263, 264, 270–273, 294, 317
Davis, Capt W. J., 100, 100_n_, 103_n_, 116_n_, 259_n_, 264
Dawe, 2dLt Harold L., 187
Degernes, 2dLt Mayhlon, L., 208, 209
Delong, 1stLt Earl R., 108, 109
Demolitions, 302 Teams, 301 C3 explosive, 208
DeMott, Pfc Robert D., 329, 330
Dennis, 1stLt Carl E., 236
Denny, 2dLt Paul E., 165
Derevyanko, LtGen Kuzma, (USSR), 90
Dickerson, Sgt C W., 229_n_
Dirst, WO Lloyd V., 231
Dolcater, Capt Max W., USA, 74_n_, 76_n_, 77_n_, 126_n_, 127_n_, 309_n_
Dowsett, LtCol Frederick W., 114_n_, 121_n_, 297, 317
Doyle, RAdm James H., USN, 15, 23–25, 29–31, 38, 76, 134, 240, 336, 337, 341, 342_n_, 345, 359 Amphibious Group, 18
Doyle, Capt R. A., 67_n_, 68_n_
_Doyle_ (DMS), USS, 27
Drury, Clifford M., 40_n_
Drysdale, LtCol Douglas B., RM., 140, 225, 226, 228–231, 235, 300
Duffy, 1stLt Leroy M., 63, 64
Duke, Capt Irving T., 15
Dumps, 138 Ammunition, 215, 343 Enemy, 117 RCT-7, 140 Supply, 41, 46, 48, 160, 195, 197, 214, 282, 285 Area, 241 Medical, 139, 149 ROK, 44, 54
Duncan, David, 322
Dunkerque, 334
Dunkirk, 333, 345
Dunne, 1stLt John M., 180
Durham, Maj Thomas A., 171
Dyer, BrigGen E. C., 387_n_
Dysentery, 30
Eagan, Maj James K., 231, 234_n_
Earney, Maj W. R., 103_n_, 107_n_, 116_n_, 120_n_, 193_n_, 251, 266_n_
Eberle, MajGen George L., USA, 10, 11_n_
Edwards, LtCol H. W., 29_n_
Elledge, 1stLt Raymond J., 113
_Endicott_ (DMS), USS, 27
Endsley, 2dLt Wendell C., 208, 209
Enemy, 74
Engineers, 263, 279, 293, 302, 324 Army, 311 Demolitions crew, 257
_English_ (DD), USS, 56
Englehardt, 1stLt Floyd J., 191, 246
Estess, Sgt M. L., 229_n_
Ewen, RAdm Edward C., USN, 15
Faber, TSgt Don, 270
Faith, LtCol Don C., USA, 243, 244
Far East Command. _See_ General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. General Headquarters, 5, 8, 22 Joint Special Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG), 8, 9, 11, 13, 22, 23
Farish, Capt George B., 57, 246
Farmer, 1stLt Chester B., 52
Feehan, LtCol Harvey A., 156, 250, 274
Fisher, 1stLt Joseph R., 66, 200, 204_n_, 208, 209, 216, 240
Fisher, Sgt Robert, 52
Fleischaker, Lt Robert J., (MC) USN, 67
Floodlights, 210, 247
Forney, Col Edward H., 98, 239, 281, 308, 336, 338, 339
Forrest, 1stLt Shelby M., 107
Forward Air Controller (FAC), 53, 67, 70, 113, 193, 255, 263, 265, 288, 294, 306, 346, 349
Forward Observer (FO) team, 67
Foster, Sgt Charles, 118
Foster, Pvt Richard J., 127_n_
France, Capt Donald R., 297
Frederick, Capt Charles D., 72
Freeman, Capt A. Z., 159_n_, 180_n_
Fridrich, LtCol R. V., 254_n_, 259_n_, 260, 264_n_
Frostbite, 351, 354
Fuel, 275, 285 Diesel oil, 282 Gasoline, 277, 282
Funchilin Pass, 96, 110, 112, 114, 116, 117, 120, 121, 312–314, 317, 320
Fusen Reservoir, 38, 99, 123
Gall, Maj W., 329
Gallo, SSgt Saverio P., 202
Gastro-enteritis, 30
GCA, 348
Geer, LtCol Andrew, 62_n_, 73_n_, 103_n_, 107_n_, 112_n_, 116_n_, 120_n_, 179_n_, 186_n_, 187_n_, 189_n_, 190_n_, 271_n_, 288_n_, 314_n_, 318_n_
_George Clymer_ (APA), USS, 25
Giusti, Ernest H., 32_n_
Godolphin, F. R. B., 357_n_
Goggin, 1stLt W. F., 100_n_, 108_n_, 109_n_, 110_n_, 120, 120_n_
Golden, Pfc Jack, 67
Goss, 2dLt Harvey A., 67
Gottschalk, Maj Vincent J., 34, 68_n_, 245, 350
Gould, Capt William R., 300–302, 330
Graeber, 1stLt William C., 81, 99_n_, 100_n_, 103_n_, 106
Grayson, MSgt E. F., 229_n_
Greene, 1stLt Daniel, 255, 263
Griffen, Lt (jg) Cornelius J., (ChC) USN, 297
Groff, Capt Goodwin C., 224
Ground Control Approach. _See_ GCA.
Guadalcanal, 302
Guerrillas, 59, 67, 70–72, 74, 81, 82, 125–128, 145, 326 First Raid on MSR, 81
Gugeler, Capt Russel A., USA, 243_n_
Hagaru, 96, 98, 117, 121, 124, 131, 134–141, 146–149, 151, 159–161, 178, 180, 189, 191, 193, 195, 197, 198, 200–205, 206_n_, 207–211, 213–220, 222, 225, 229–231, 235, 238–247, 249, 250, 254, 260, 262, 270, 271, 273, 274, 277, 278, 280–283, 285–291, 293, 294, 298, 305–309, 311, 313, 319, 324, 326, 333, 334, 349, 350, 353, 355 Airstrip, 134, 137, 138, 195, 197, 200, 210, 219, 235, 246, 247, 281, 302 Breakout, 287, 288, 294, 296–302 Air cover, 286, 287 Demolitions, 301 Plans, 283–286, 294 Destruction of excess material, 285 Intelligence, 202–204, 206, 285 Medical, 278, 279 Military government, 202, 203
Hall, 2dLt Wayne L., 208, 209
Hamhung, 7, 18, 38, 41, 45, 58, 59, 76, 77, 79–82, 95, 96, 98, 99, 125–128, 131, 133–138, 146, 150, 201, 205, 239, 246, 280, 304, 312, 332, 333, 338, 342, 346, 348, 355
Han River, 15
Hancock, 1stLt John R., 257, 293
Hangkow, 85
_Hank_ (DD), USS, 56
Hapsu, 132, 145
Hargett, 1stLt Ernest C., 112, 116, 328, 329_n_, 330
Harmon, Capt Lester G., 69
Harriman, Averell, 35_n_
Harris, MajGen Field, 31, 33, 137, 165_n_, 239, 350
Harris, 1stLt H. H., 103_n_, 116, 116_n_, 117, 118, 120_n_, 165, 166, 258
Harris, LtCol William F., 165, 257, 272, 297
Harrison, TSgt C. L., 229_n_
Harrison, Col C. W., 2_n_, 81_n_
Harrison, CWO Willie S., 300, 330
Hartman, RAdm Charles C., USN, 15
Hawkins, LtCol Jack, 44_n_, 46, 48, 48_n_, 49, 51_n_, 53_n_, 54_n_, 55, 55_n_, 58, 58_n_
Heater, Capt James B., 293
_Helena_ (CA), USS, 28
Helicopters, 54, 56–58, 68, 72, 104, 117, 125, 147–150, 191, 195, 205, 245, 254, 285, 288, 325, 351 HO3S-1, 202, 246, 351 HMX-1, 351
Hell Fire Valley, 230, 296, 297, 299, 302. _See also_ Task Force, Drysdale.
Henderson, Col Frederick P., 323
Henderson, RAdm George R., USN, 15
Henneberger, Capt Harry G. C., 107
Hering, Capt Eugene R., (MC) USN, 245, 278, 279, 307
Hermanson, Capt Chester R., 255, 257
Hickey, MajGen Doyle O., USA, 9, 10, 11_n_, 205, 309
Highway, 95
Higginbotham, Capt S. W., 294_n_, 299_n_
Higgins, RAdm John M., USN, 337
Higgins, Marguerite, 281, 323
Hill D, 312. _See also_ Hill 1457.
Hill, East, 204–207, 213–220, 240–242, 286, 288, 290, 291, 293, 301, 303, 326
Hill, Fox, 180–182, 190, 191, 194, 201, 202, 204, 254, 264, 270
Hill, How, 114, 120. _See also_ Hill 891.
Hill 109----49, 51, 52, 57
Hill 117----49, 53, 55
Hill 185----49, 51, 52
Hill 532----103
Hill 698----100, 102, 103, 103_n_, 104, 105, 107–109, 112
Hill 727----103–105, 107, 108, 112
Hill 891----110, 114, 116, 117, 117_n_, 118–120
Hill 987----110, 114, 116, 117, 117_n_, 118, 120
Hill 1081----312–316, 320, 321, 324–326, 328
Hill 1100----257
Hill 1167----158, 168, 253
Hill 1182----228, 232
Hill 1236----226, 232
Hill 1240----158, 160, 167, 168, 170, 174, 177, 178, 183, 187, 189, 253, 257
Hill 1276----159, 253, 257, 265, 268
Hill 1282----158, 160, 167, 168, 170, 172, 174, 177, 178, 183–187, 251, 253, 255, 257. _See also_ Ridge, North.
Hill 1294----159, 253
Hill 1304----117_n_, 318, 321
Hill 1328----312, 317, 318, 327
Hill 1384----158, 167, 170, 171, 182
Hill 1403----152, 154, 156–158, 165, 166, 170, 183, 187, 188
Hill 1419----178, 179, 257–259
Hill 1426----154, 157, 159, 253
Hill 1457----312, 317, 318, 321, 328, 329
Hill 1520----261–264, 268
Hill 1542----257, 258, 266–268
Hill 1653----190, 263, 264
Hinds, 1stLt John R., 290
Hodes, BrigGen Henry I., USA, 238, 243
Hoffstetter, Pfc Donald O., 67
Holland, 1stLt Dan C., 100_n_, 103, 113
Holloway, LCdr Charles K., USN, 99
Holmes, 1stLt Donald M., 65
Honeycutt, 1stLt J. H., 288_n_, 291
Hood, Maj H. E., 282_n_, 296
Hope, Bob, 31
Hopkins, 2dLt Frederick W., 65, 236, 241
Hospelhorn, Capt Cecil W., USA, 311
Hospital, 139, 197, 281
House, 1stLt Arthur E., 257
Hovatter, 1stLt Eugenous M., 220, 258, 259_n_, 260, 264, 321
Hubbell, J. C., 327_n_
Huchanggangu, 132
Huichon, 132, 133, 146, 149
Huksu-ri, 109, 116_n_, 123, 131, 135, 140, 147, 149
Hull, Capt Milton A., 100_n_, 102, 102_n_, 108, 108_n_, 109, 154_n_, 167_n_, 172_n_, 174, 187
Hungmun-ni, 201
Hungnam, 9, 22, 23, 58, 75, 76, 95, 96, 109, 125, 126, 131, 136, 138, 139, 141, 148, 150, 200, 205, 246, 281, 305, 325, 327, 332, 333, 335, 336, 338, 345, 346, 348, 357 Cemetery, 341 Evacuation, 338–343, 349 Plans, 335–337 Warnings, 239 Mine clearance, 135 Redeployment, 338, 355, 359 Withdrawal to. _See_ Breakout.
Hwachon, 35
Hyesanjin, 98, 132, 144
Imjin, 62, 64, 66, 74
Inchon, 10, 11, 13–15, 17, 18, 21–27, 33, 143, 336, 340, 346 Amphibious assault, 1 Landing, 3, 5, 343 Inchon-Seoul Operation, 10, 11_n_, 14, 281
_Incredible_ (AM) USS, 27
Indigestion, 351
Itami, 287, 342
Iwo Jima, 302
Iwon, 58, 75
Jaeger, 2dLt John W., 236
Japan, 36, 43, 247, 279, 281, 311 Logistical command, 10
Jaskilka, Capt Samuel, 161_n_, 164, 165_n_, 166, 188_n_, 293
Jennings, 1stLt William E., 107_n_
Jessup, Ambassador Philip, 35_n_
Jeter, 1stLt Manning T., Jr., 288
Jochums, 1stLt Robert E., 217, 218, 235_n_
Johnson, Capt David G., 288
Johnson, 1stLt Horace L., Jr., 210, 211, 216
Johnson, Cdr Howard A., (MC) USN, 308
Johnson, Secretary of Defense Louis, 5
Johnson, 1stLt Richard M., 290
Johnson, 1stLt William E., 118, 267
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 5–9, 37, 128, 129
Joint Eighth Army-Fifth Air Force Operations Center (JOC), 348
Joint Special Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG). _See_ Far East Command.
Jones, Capt Clovis M., 205
Jones, 2dLt Donald R., 70, 316, 320
Jones, SSgt Donald T., 105
Jones, TSgt H. T., 72
Jones, Capt Jack R., 183, 184, 186, 293
Joy, VAdm C. Turner, USN, 10, 13, 23, 25, 27, 43, 134, 140, 239, 336, 337, 345, 348, 359
Kaesong, 9, 15, 34
Kalma Peninsula, 17, 18, 22, 26, 39, 40
Kanggye, 97, 132–134, 146
Karig, Walter, 23_n_, 27_n_, 28_n_, 29_n_, 142_n_
Katsuma, 58
Kaufer, 1stLt Edward E., 49
Keeton, Sgt E. J., 229_n_
Kerr, Capt William A., 224
Kerrigan, Maj W. E., 172_n_
Kiernan, Capt J. I., Jr., 53_n_, 244_n_
Kiesling, Cpl Curtis J., 179
Kiester, 1stLt K. E., 244_n_
Kim Il Sung, 7
Kimpo, 32, 34
King, Capt George W., 219
Kite (AMS), USS, 27
Klepsig, Cpl D. E., 327_n_
Knox, TSgt Edwin L., 268, 270, 271
Kobe, 32
Kogae-gol, 148
Koingdong, 36
Kojo, 33, 38, 39, 44–46, 48–59, 76, 131 Marine positions, 48 Railroad station, 48
Korea, 359 North, 8, 37 Entry into, 7 Orders, 5, 6, 89 Plans, 7–10 Political considerations, 2–5 North Korean People’s Republic, 3 People’s Political Council, 83 People’s Army (NKPA), 1–3, 5–7, 34, 43, 46, 50, 53, 54, 59, 63, 65, 66, 71, 79, 83, 100, 110, 125, 129, 146 Prisoners of War, 40, 65, 71, 72, 74, 124 Units 2d Division, 50 5th Division, 50, 55 10th Division, 50 15th Division, 66, 74 10th Regiment, 49, 50 45th Regiment, 66, 71, 73 48th Regiment, 66 50th Regiment, 66 344th Tank Regiment, 105, 110, 114 South Republic of Korea, 2, 3, 90 Army (ROKA), 3, 9, 22, 36, 37, 100, 213, 214, 342 Units I Corps, 22, 26, 38, 44, 58, 75, 131, 145, 337 II Corps, 15, 146, 150 Capital Division, 22, 35, 38 1st Division, 34 3d Division, 22, 38, 339 6th Division, 35, 81, 144_n_ 7th Division, 35 8th Division, 35 18th Regiment, 123 22d Regiment, 2d Battalion, 46 26th Regiment, 61, 81, 98, 99, 128, 131, 140 101st Engineer Group (C), 44 Navy. _See_ ships. Marine Corps (KMC), 73 1st Regiment, 58, 59, 131, 337, 338 1st Battalion, 45 3d Battalion, 22, 73, 76 5th Battalion, 22, 45, 56, 58, 76 Police, 307
Koto-ri, 80_n_, 82, 96, 98, 117, 120, 121, 123, 124, 135–137, 139–141, 146–148, 201, 204, 205, 220, 222, 224–226, 228, 229, 231, 232, 234, 235, 239, 245, 282–284, 286–288, 295–298, 300, 302, 303, 305–309, 311, 312, 319, 323, 335, 355 Airstrip (OY), 224, 279, 305, 307, 308 Air support, 307 Breakout air support plans, 313 Breakout, 314–331 Bridge, 309, 311, 312, 319, 322, 323 Intelligence, 313 Mass burial, 319 Plans, 308, 309, 312–314, 325, 326 Medical, 307, 308
Kowon, 126, 128
Krabbe, 2dLt Donald J., 156
Kraince, 1stLt F. R., 329_n_
Krieg, 1stLt Elmer A., 165
Krulak, Col Victor H., 58
Kulbes, Capt Philip A., 213
Kumwha, 35
Kunuri, 9, 35
Kuokka, Maj H. D., 287_n_, 347_n_
Kuomintang, 83
Kurcaba, 1stLt Joseph R., 260, 264, 265, 270, 318
Kyolmul-ni, 139, 141
Landing Signal Officer, Carrier, 306, 307
Lavoie, LtCol Leon F., USA, 316
Lawrence, Maj James F., 82
Lee, Lt Chew Een, 318
Lee, Maj Christian C., 296, 299
Lee, Feng Hsi, 185
Lee, Doctor Tong Kak, 243_n_
Leeds, Cpl Joseph, 316
Lessenden, LCdr Chester M. (MC) USN, 192, 278
Lett, Cpl C. P., 330
_Leyte Gulf_ (CV), USS, 17, 28, 286
Lice, 315
Lin Pao, 161
Lipscomb, 1stLt W. R., 244_n_
Litters, 259
Litzenberg, Col Homer L., 39, 80_n_, 82, 98, 99, 100_n_, 102, 103, 103_n_, 104, 107, 108_n_, 109, 110, 114, 116, 116_n_, 117, 118, 120, 121, 121_n_, 148_n_, 152, 160, 170_n_, 178, 188, 189, 193, 201, 249, 250_n_, 251_n_, 253, 254_n_, 258, 259_n_, 264_n_, 266_n_, 267_n_, 271, 272, 285, 287_n_, 288, 293, 294_n_, 296, 312, 317 Command Post, 117
Liu Sheng Hsi, 185
Lockwood, LtCol Randolph, 160, 198, 201, 207, 296, 297, 317, 324
Lodge, Capt O. R., 274
Longstaff, 1stLt Robert A., 246
Lorigan, Maj Robert E., 44_n_, 54_n_, 205, 225, 226_n_
Mabry, Maj Clarence J., 225
MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas, USA, 2, 3, 5, 6, 6_n_, 7–11, 11_n_, 14, 22, 23, 34–36, 36_n_, 37, 38, 43, 129, 131, 132, 133, 144, 146, 205, 334, 340, 345, 346, 358 Communique of 24 November, 144
MacLean, Col Allan D., USA, 243
_Maddox_ (DD), USS, 28
_Marine Phoenix_ (T-AP), USNS, 30
Magness, 2dLt B. L., 184
Main Supply Route (MSR), 95, 96, 98, 100, 103–106, 108–110, 114, 116, 118, 120, 123, 124, 133, 140, 141, 146–149, 154, 156, 159, 161, 163, 171, 178–182, 189, 193, 197, 202, 213, 221, 224, 239, 249, 250, 253, 254, 257, 261–263, 267, 268, 272, 274, 275, 283, 294, 296, 297, 312–315, 317, 318, 321, 324–329 Near Sudong, 3 November, 106 Wonsan to Hamhung, 79
Majon-dong, 82, 96, 99, 100, 116_n_, 124, 135–137, 139, 141, 228, 284, 326, 327, 331
Majon-ni, 44, 56, 61–74, 126, 202, 203 Logistics, 68
Manchuria, 6, 9, 34, 36, 37, 79, 80, 84, 85, 129, 142
Manpojin, 132, 133, 146
Mao Tse-tung, 70, 83, 84, 86, 89, 90, 90_n_, 91_n_ Strategic Aims, 89 Moscow, December of 1949, 90
Marine Corps, U. S. Air, 157, 293 Birthday, 73, 121 Units, Fleet Marine Force Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), 63, 341 1st Air Delivery Platoon, 69, 311 1st Combat Service Group, 39–41, 128, 138 7th Motor Transport Battalion, 141, 228, 234 Company B, 205 1st Marine Air Wing, 33, 45, 254, 279, 282, 286, 313, 341, 346, 348–350 Commanding General, 33 Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron-1 (MGCIS-1), 341, 348 Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron-2 (MTACS-2), 207, 296, 341 Air Defense Section, 341, 348 Air Support Section, 349 Marine Aircraft Group 12, 32–34, 42, 239, 342, 348 Headquarters Squadron 12, 32, 239 Service Squadron 12, 32 VMF-212, 273, 287, 347, 349 VMF-214, 32, 273, 287, 347–349 VMF-311, 350 VMF-312, 32, 33, 68, 69, 100, 102, 107, 113_n_, 116, 117, 152, 156, 217, 222, 224, 264, 273, 299, 307, 349 VMF-321, 230 VMF-323, 32, 273, 286, 347 VMF(N)-513, 32, 33, 53, 102, 107, 113_n_, 116, 117, 273, 307 VMF(N)-542, 124, 266, 273, 282, 326 VMR-152, 296, 350 VMO-6, 34, 56, 73, 152, 154, 191, 202, 205, 245, 272, 307, 350, 351 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, 2_n_ 1st Marine Division, 1, 10, 11, 14, 18, 21–27, 32, 34, 37–39, 41, 43–45, 54, 59, 63, 75, 77, 79, 80, 95, 99, 124, 126, 128, 131–134, 140, 145, 146, 148, 161, 178, 197, 198, 202, 222, 238, 246, 280, 281, 282, 302, 303, 305, 309, 312, 319, 323, 326, 332, 334, 335, 337, 339, 340, 346, 353–356, 358, 359 Command Post, 15, 25, 45, 54, 76, 125, 149, 150, 200, 203, 205, 211, 214, 222, 229, 238, 241, 245, 285, 287, 293, 325, 341 Rear Command Post, 340 1st Marine Command Group, 331 Headquarters Battalion, 125, 149, 203, 207, 220, 224, 225, 228, 229, 231, 234, 281, 282, 299 Military Police Company, 99, 299, 303 Reconnaissance Company, 22, 80, 82, 99, 109, 110, 112, 114, 135, 139–141, 148, 226, 326, 328, 331 Headquarters Company, 299, 303 Composite Battalion, 193, 194, 251 1st Marines, 14, 15, 22, 40, 44, 45, 54–56, 59, 68, 75, 76, 79, 80, 82, 126, 135, 136, 139–141, 147, 148, 228, 281, 284, 306, 312, 321, 325, 328, 335. _See also_ Col Lewis B. Puller Headquarters, 147 Commanding Officer, 73 H&S Company, 63, 71, 325, 328 Anti-tank Company, 222 4.2 Mortar Company, 222 1st Battalion, 39, 45, 46, 49, 53–56, 58, 76, 147, 221, 308, 309, 312–316, 320, 321, 325, 328, 331 Command Post, 211 Company A, 49, 53, 69, 71–73, 221, 314–316, 320, 324, 331 Company B, 48–54, 57, 221, 314–316, 320, 325 Company C, 49–51, 53, 314, 315 Weapons Company, 222 2d Battalion, 39, 55, 56, 58, 59, 71, 72, 77, 147, 222, 225, 229, 279, 306, 319, 325, 326, 328 Command Post, 226 Company D, 57, 77, 224, 319 Company E, 57, 72, 72_n_, 222, 224, 225 Company F, 57, 224, 225 Weapons Company, 224 3d Battalion, 39, 56, 61–63, 71, 77, 147, 197, 198, 200, 201, 215, 242, 243, 284, 286, 300, 321, 325, 326, 328 Commanding Officer, 73 Command Post, 67, 200, 204, 206, 210, 211, 213, 220, 242 H&S Company, 63, 68, 207 Company G, 66, 68, 71, 147, 204–206, 220, 225, 226, 228, 229, 231, 234, 235, 241, 242, 293, 324, 326 Company H, 66–68, 71, 73, 201, 204, 208, 209–211, 213, 214, 216, 220, 326 Company I, 66, 71, 73, 201, 204, 207–209, 211, 214, 216, 220, 240, 326 Weapons Company, 63, 65, 71, 197, 198, 204, 206, 208, 211, 215, 326 Fifth Marines, 15, 22, 25, 40, 44, 45, 76, 79, 80, 123, 135, 139–141, 147, 148, 150, 152, 158–160, 177, 182, 185, 188, 189, 192, 249, 251, 254, 278, 281, 284–287, 300, 312, 318, 325, 326, 335, 340. _See also_ LtCol Raymond L. Murray. Command Post, 40 Headquarters, 170 Anti-tank Company, 228, 229, 234, 290, 317, 326 1st Battalion, 45, 80, 123, 124, 126, 136, 158, 172, 180, 184, 186, 189, 253, 255, 257, 266, 268, 272, 274, 275, 286, 293, 300, 317, 318, 321, 325, 328 Company A, 112, 123, 174, 184–186, 193, 251, 274, 293, 318 Company B, 123, 187, 189, 257, 293, 318 Company C, 124, 183, 185–187, 266, 291, 293 2d Battalion, 56, 59, 76, 79, 81, 123, 124, 136, 147, 151, 152, 154, 157, 161, 163–166, 188, 189, 251, 257, 265, 272, 274, 286, 288, 291, 293, 300, 301, 325 H&S Company, 164 Company D, 123, 156, 157, 159, 163, 164, 266, 288, 290, 291, 294 Company E, 158, 163, 164, 166, 186–189, 266, 274, 275, 293 Company F, 156, 163, 164, 166, 188, 265, 290, 291 3d Battalion, 123, 124, 136, 147, 158, 170, 172, 185, 187, 188, 253–255, 257, 258, 261–263, 268, 270–272, 274, 286, 293, 300, 325 Command Post, 170, 171, 182, 262 H&S Company, 170, 171, 182 Company G, 170, 182, 189, 251, 255, 257, 262, 263, 268, 271, 272, 274 Company H, 170, 189, 261–263, 268, 271, 272, 274 Company I, 170, 171, 183, 189, 251, 262, 271 Weapons Company, 170, 182 Seventh Marines, 14, 15, 22, 25, 44, 54, 58, 59, 76, 79–81, 98–100, 102–104, 107, 109, 109_n_, 110, 112, 114, 116, 118, 120, 121, 123–125, 135–137, 139–141, 147–149, 151, 152, 154, 156, 159, 160, 177, 182, 183, 187, 189, 192, 249, 251, 253, 254, 257–265, 270, 272, 273, 281, 284–288, 293, 294, 296–298, 312, 314, 317–319, 321, 324–326, 335, 340, 352. _See also_ Col Homer L. Litzenberg. Headquarters, 148, 170, 189 Command Post, 39, 40, 98, 103, 104, 108–110, 261 4.2-inch Mortar Company, 103, 116, 186 Anti-tank Company, 103, 105, 106, 108, 160, 207, 215, 241 1st Battalion, 81, 99, 100, 102–105, 107, 109, 112–114, 116, 121, 147, 152, 157, 189, 190 H&S Company, 273, 318 Command Post, 103, 105, 106, 149, 193 Company A, 100, 103–105, 159, 189, 190, 258, 260, 264, 270, 296, 318, 321 Company B, 103, 104, 106, 157, 159, 178, 190, 193, 258, 260, 261, 264, 265, 270, 318, 321 Company C, 103–106, 113, 121, 157, 159, 178, 179, 182, 189, 190, 260, 261, 264, 294, 318, 321 Weapons Company, 108, 273, 318, 322 2d Battalion, 100, 103, 103_n_, 104, 106–109, 112, 116, 120, 147, 160, 167, 198, 200, 201, 207, 263, 290, 294, 296–298, 317, 318, 321, 324 Command Post (Sudong, 3 November), 106 Command Group, 294 Company D, 100, 102, 103, 108, 109, 151, 152, 157, 158, 160, 167, 168, 170, 174, 178, 183, 187, 251, 263, 268, 270, 294, 296 Company E, 102, 103, 106, 108, 151, 132, 158, 160, 168, 170, 172, 174, 178, 183, 184, 186, 251, 263, 268, 270, 294, 296, 317, 324 Company F, 103, 104, 106, 154, 158, 159, 180–182, 189–191, 193, 198, 200, 201, 207, 253, 254, 264, 272, 294, 317 Weapons Company, 160, 180, 198, 201, 207, 251, 294, 326 3d Battalion, 106, 112, 116–118, 120, 121, 148, 152, 154, 157, 161, 184–188, 251, 253, 254, 257, 261, 266, 275, 294, 296, 297, 317, 318, 321, 324 Command Post, 165 H&S Company, 171, 267 Company G, 116–118, 120, 154, 157, 159, 193, 251, 258, 266, 267, 294, 297, 317 Company H, 104, 114, 117, 118, 154, 157, 158, 163, 165, 166, 170, 171, 185, 187, 188, 257, 258, 260, 264, 297, 317 Company I, 104, 116, 117, 157, 159, 258, 266, 267, 297, 317 Weapons Company, 71, 251 Company J, 267 Eleventh Marines, 22, 40, 45, 80, 139, 147, 148, 177, 178, 287, 293 1st Battalion, 156, 160, 177, 262, 274, 287, 313, 325 Battery B, 275 Battery C, 275 2d Battalion, 40, 222, 287, 313, 325, 328 Battery D, 63, 204, 215, 287 Battery E, 222, 225, 305, 313 Battery F, 45, 46, 52, 53, 222, 313, 316 3d Battalion, 99, 100, 104, 107, 110, 116–118, 148, 177, 254, 262, 268, 287, 298, 303, 313, 324, 325 Battery G, 100, 107, 160, 197, 202, 268, 298 Battery H, 107, 192, 207, 215, 220, 241, 262, 298 Battery I, 100, 106, 160 4th Battalion, 137, 160, 177, 180, 192, 249, 254, 274, 287, 325 Provisional infantry platoons, 254 Battery K, 136, 177 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 39, 56, 311, 335, 341 Company A, 127, 338, 343 Company B, 343 Company C, 127 1st Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 56, 390 Company B, 56 1st Engineer Battalion, 39, 40, 137, 141, 200, 217, 247, 311 Headquarters Company, 300 Company A, 136, 152, 200, 215, 219, 236, 241, 262, 300, 301 Company B, 136, 200, 240 Company C, 46, 63, 69, 307 Company D, 99, 138, 204, 210, 212, 217, 247, 294, 296, 307 1st Medical Battalion, 308 H&S Company, 139 Division Hospital, 109, 139 Clearing stations, 149 Company A, 139 Company B, 139 Company C, 139, 149, 210 Company D, 46, 63, 139 Company E, 99, 139, 149, 245 1st Motor Transport Battalion, 45, 80, 99, 141, 160, 207, 244, 298, 303 1st Ordnance Battalion, 136, 138 1st Service Battalion, 99, 136, 138, 160, 207, 241 1st Regulating Detachment, 247, 282 1st Shore Party Battalion, 24, 39, 40, 56, 138, 338, 339 Shore Party Group C, 40 1st Signal Battalion, 99, 228, 234 1st Tank Battalion, 39, 58, 80, 81, 126, 137, 141, 149 H&S Company, 137, 228, 234 Company A, 45, 79, 80 Company B, 228, 229, 232–234, 306, 326 Company C, 56, 76 Company D, 127, 136, 137, 149, 201, 228, 229, 231, 234, 235, 306, 326
Marshall, George C., 6 General, USA, 84, 121_n_ Secretary of Defense, 37
Marshall, S. L. A., 92_n_, 314_n_, 321_n_
Martin, P. G., 112_n_
Masan, 337, 341, 345
Mason, Lt Ronald A., 73, 73_n_, 208, 209
Mattox, 2dLt Charles, 71
Maxwell, Marilyn, 31
McAlister, Col. Francis A., 38_n_, 205, 284, 335
McCaleb, Alfred F., Jr., 307
McCardell, Cpl E., 229_n_
McCarthy, 1stLt Robert C., 180, 182, 190, 191, 194_n_
McCarthy, Capt Thomas E., 71
McClane, Capt George E., 107
McClelland, Capt John C., Jr., 222, 224, 305
McClelland, 1stLt William A., 69, 316, 320
McDermott, Cpl Joseph E., 113
McDurmin, SSgt R. E., 103_n_
McElroy, Capt John W., USNR, 139
McFarland, 2dLt Robert L., 210
McGaw, Col Hugh D., 311
McGhee, Lt James M., 51_n_
McGuiness, 1stLt Clarence E., 297
McLaughlin, 1stLt Gerald J., 156
McLaughlin, LtCol J. N., 229_n_, 231–234
McNaughtton, 1stLt George C., 290, 291
McPhersen, SSgt Stanley B., 219
McReynolds, Maj William, 177, 192_n_, 250, 253, 254_n_, 287_n_
Mead, BrigGen Armistead D., USA, 309, 326_n_
Medical, 67
Medics, Navy, 247 Surgical teams, 139, 246
Medical supplies, 302 Plasma, 192
Meeker, 1stLt Ermine L., 240, 242, 274
Meister, Pfc William H., 57
Memorial services, 341
_Merganser_ (AMS), USS, 27
Merrit, 2dLt Max A., 184
Messman, 1stLt Robert C., 177
Military Sea Transport Service, 24
Miller, Capt J. H., 208, 209, 240_n_
Milne, LtCol Harry T., 137, 285, 294_n_, 300, 326
Mines, naval, 13, 27
_Missouri_ (BB), USS, 15, 28–30, 343
Mitchell, 1stLt Grady P., 210
Mitchell, 2dLt James M., 165
Mize, 1stLt Charles D., 270
_Mocking Bird_ (AMS), USS, 27
Moji, Japan, 75
Moisell, LtCol Harry E., 339
Moncrief, Capt Malcolm G., Jr., 307
Mongolia, 83
Monk, MSgt Matthew D., 48
Montross, Lynn, 179_n_, 180_n_, 246_n_, 330_n_
Mooney, 2dLt A. R., 103_n_, 116_n_, 120_n_
Moorad, George, 83_n_
Morehead, Capt Robert A., 160
Morehouse, RAdm Albert K., 134, 336
Morris, Capt. John F., 178–180, 260, 264, 270, 297, 321
Morris, Maj Warren, 193, 317
Moscow, 90, 98
Mortar support, 320
Motor march (Wonsan to Hamhung), 80
_Mount McKinley_ (AGC), USS, 22, 23, 25, 29, 31, 44, 45, 76, 337, 341–343, 348
Muccio, Ambassador to Korea John, 35_n_
Mukden, 142
Munchon, 45, 72, 74, 79–81, 126
Munday, Maj. Jack R., 339
Munsell, SSgt Russell A., 254
Mupyong-ni, 40, 80, 133–135, 145, 146, 148
Murphy, SSgt Daniel M., 172, 184
Murray, LtCol Raymond L., 25, 40, 80, 123, 124, 152_n_, 157, 160, 172, 178, 188, 212, 259, 271, 282, 285, 286, 288, 293, 299, 318
Myers, Maj Reginald R., 71, 216–218, 220, 236
Nanchang rebellion, 83
Nanking, 84, 85
Napalm, 266, 271, 288
Nash, SSgt J. B., 229_n_
National Security Council, 5
Naval Field Medical Research Laboratory, 330_n_
Naval gunfire, 338, 339, 343
Naval gunfire support, 54, 55, 343
Navy, U. S. Units Naval Forces Far East, 10 Commander, (ComNavFE). _See_ VAdm C. Turner Joy. Fleet Logistics Air Wing, 350 Seventh Fleet, 17 Transport Squadron One, 24 Tactical Air Control Squadron One, 341, 348 Joint Task Force 7, 13, 30, 50, 75. _See also_ VAdm A. D. Struble. Task Force 77, 15, 17, 254 Task Force 79, 15 Task Force 90, 15, 336 Commander (CTF 90), 336, 337, 339, 341, 342. _See also_ RAdm J. H. Doyle. Task Force 95, 15 Task Group 70.1, 15 Task Group 95.2 Support and Covering Group, 15, 28, 75 Task Group 95.6, 15, 27, 29 Task Group 96.2, 15 Task Group 96.8, 15 Tractor Group, 30, 31 Transport Group, 30, 31 Amphibious Group One (PhibGru 1), 21, 336 Commander (PhiGru 1), 26, 336 Amphibious Group Three (PhiGru 3), 336 Task Element 90.21, 338
Needham, 1stLt R. C., 202, 208, 209
_Newsweek_, 334
Newton, 2dLt Minard P., 116, 118, 165, 165_n_, 260, 264, 270
_New York Times_, 345_n_
Nichols, Capt Warren, 347
Nihart, LtCol F. B., 90_n_
_Noble_ (APA), USS, 39
Noel, Frank, 231, 233
Nolan, 2dLt Jack L., 164
Noren, Capt Wesley B., 48, 49_n_, 50_n_, 51, 51_n_, 52, 53, 53_n_, 57, 57_n_, 221, 279_n_, 314, 315, 320, 321, 325
North, Cpl C. R., 190_n_
Objective A, 312, 321, 324–326, 328. _See also_ Hill 1328.
Objective B, 312, 317, 321, 325, 326, 328
Objective C, 312, 318, 321, 324–326, 328
Objective D, 312, 321, 328. _See also_ Hill 1457.
Objective E, 312, 325. _See also_ Hill 1081.
Observation Posts, 63, 66, 71, 73, 74, 103
Office of The Chief of Military History (OCMH), 8_n_
Okinawa, 27, 338
Olson, Major M. R., 123
Operation _Yo-Yo_, 30, 31, 45
Oro-ri, 96, 99, 104, 123
_Osprey_ (AM) USS, 27
Owen, Lt Joseph, 318
Pace, Secretary of the Army Frank, 35_n_
Page, LtCol John U. D., USA, 327
Page, H. L., Jr., 327_n_
Pak, Sun Chol, MajGen (NKPA), 66, 73
Panikkar, K. M., 7
Parachute, 251, 277, 280
Parry, Maj Francis F., 99, 100_n_, 103_n_, 116, 177
Partridge, Gen Earle E., USAF, 33, 201, 210_n_, 247, 300_n_, 309_n_, 311, 312, 322, 323
Partridge, LtCol John H., 40, 137
_Partridge_ (AMS), USS, 27
Patrick, 2dLt C. E., 329_n_
Patrols, 66
Payne, SSgt Earle J., 179
Pearl Harbor, 334
Peckham, Capt Charles, 231
Peiping, 85, 98
Peiping-Tientsin (highway), 85_n_
Peleliu, 134, 302
Pendas, TSgt G. D., 226_n_, 241_n_
Pendry, Capt Edwin, 107_n_
Penstock Bridge, 315. _See also_ Treadway Bridge.
Persian Empire, 357
Peters, Capt Uel D., 154, 290
Peterson, 1stLt Elmer G., 180, 191, 192
Peterson, 2dLt Willard S., 262
Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL), 160, 283
_Philippine Sea_ (CV), USS, 17, 28, 286
Phillips, Capt W. D., 108, 168, 174
_Pirate_ (AM), USS, 27, 28
Plans and Orders United Nations Command (UNC) Operation Order 2, 9_n_ Commander in Chief, Far East (CinCFE) Operation Plan 9-50, 8, 9, 10, 22 Operation Plan 9-50 (Alternate), 23 Commander, Seventh Fleet Operation Order 16-50, 15 Commander, Naval Forces, Far East Operation Order 17-50, 27 Operation Plan 113-50, 13_n_, 25 Commander, Amphibious Group I Operation Order 16-50, 26 Commander, Task Force 90 Operation Order 19-50, 336 X Corps Operation Order 2-50, 32 Operation Order 3, 14_n_ Operation Order 4, 14, 15_n_, 21, 24 Operation Order 6, 76, 131, 132, 135, 147 Operation Order 7, 145, 146, 148 Operation Order 8-50, 239, 251 Operation Order 9-50, 336 Operation Order 10, 338_n_, 339 Operation Plan 8, 134, 135, 145 Operation Instruction (OI) 11, 26_n_ Operation Instruction 13, 76, 79 Operation Instruction 15, 80 Operation Instruction 17, 140 Operation Instruction 19, 249 Operation Instruction 22, 280 1st Marine Division Administrative Order (AdmO) 13-50, 24_n_ Administrative Order 20-50, 284 Embarkation Order (EmbO) 2-50, 21_n_ Embarkation Order 3-50, 335, 338_n_, 340 Operation Plan 4-50, 38 Operation Order 15-50, 17_n_ Operation Order 16-50, 21, 22, 22_n_, 26_n_, 31, 331 Operation Order 17-50, 26_n_ Operation Order 18-50, 44, 45, 79 Operation Order 19-50, 76 Operation Order 21-50, 135 Operation Order 22-50, 139, 140 Operation Order 23-50, 141, 147 Operation Order 24-50, 148 Operation Order 25-50, 284 Operation Order 26-50, 303, 312, 318 5th Marines Operation Order 39-50, 151_n_ 7th Marines Operation Order 14-50, 294 5th and 7th Marines Joint Operation Order 1-50, 250, 257 Joint Operation Order 2-50, 254
_Pledge_ (AM), USS, 27, 28
Podolak, Pfc Bruno, 213
Pohujang, 315
Polson, Capt Robert J., 251
Port Arthur, 142
Post War planning, 43
Post Exchange Section, 278
Press correspondent. _See_ Correspondents.
Press photographers, 333
_Princeton_ (CV), USS, 286
Prisoners, Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), 58, 81, 98, 99, 156, 290, 293, 299, 322, 323, 341
Prisoners of War (POW), 42, 49, 57, 65 Interrogations, 66
Propaganda (Chinese), 91
Prosser, TSgt Wilfred H., 322
Provisional platoons, 63
Puckett, 2dLt C. R., 82_n_, 109, 112_n_, 114, 116
Puller, Col Lewis B., 39, 54, 55, 58, 69–72, 76, 224, 225, 306, 307, 328, 331
Pungsan, 36, 145
Pusan, 337, 339, 341, 345, 350
Pusan Perimeter, 1, 10, 14, 24, 30, 66, 346
Pusong-ni, 231, 299
Pyongyang, 3, 9, 18, 22, 23, 34, 36, 63, 66, 71, 350
Pyongwon, 36
Quantico, 351
Quinn, LtCol William W., USA, 308
Radford, Adm Arthur W., USN, 35_n_, 337
Radio, 67, 264, 282, 305 Communication, 68 Marine, 179, 191 AN/GRC-9, 259 SCR 300, 52, 207, 259 SCR 610, 259
Railroad, 95
Rations, 160, 277, 282, 284, 302 “C” rations, 121
Read, Capt Benjamin S., 215
_Redhead_ (AMS), USS, 27
Reem, 2dLt Robert D., 118, 119
Refugees, 49, 302, 319, 323, 326, 338, 342, 345
Reller, Sgt Othmar J., 174
Replacements, 281, 293, 294 USMC, 302
Rhee, President Syngman, 2, 3
Ricardi, SSgt Anthony J., 118
Richards, 1stLt Wayne E., 152, 263
Rickert, LtCol Robert W., 205
Ridge, North, 151, 152, 157, 158, 161, 167, 168, 170, 172, 178, 182, 187–189, 192
Ridge, Northwest, 151, 152, 154, 156, 158, 161, 163, 166, 167, 170, 183, 187–189
Ridge, South, 151, 152, 159–161, 177, 178, 190, 253
Ridge, Southeast, 151, 152, 159, 160, 177, 190
Ridge, Southwest, 151, 152, 154, 156–159, 163, 167, 170, 177, 180, 182, 188, 189, 253
Ridge, LtCol Thomas L., 62_n_, 63, 63_n_, 65, 66_n_, 68, 71, 71_n_, 72, 73_n_, 74_n_, 197, 198, 200–202, 204–207, 210, 216, 220, 226_n_, 235_n_, 240_n_, 243_n_, 295, 321, 328
Ridgway, MajGen Matthew B., USA, 243
Rigg, LtCol Robert F., 86_n_
Roach, Maj Maurice E., 80_n_, 98, 104, 116–118, 120, 157, 160, 165, 251, 254_n_, 294_n_, 297
Roach, SSgt William, 316, 320
Road, Hamhung-Chosin Reservoir, 44
Roadblocks, 69, 72, 74, 105, 166, 319 CCF, 222, 224, 263, 274, 309, 315 USMC, 294
Roberts, Sgt Clayton, 51
Roberts, Col Dean C., 350
Robinson, Capt R. B., 53_n_
_Rochester_ (CA), USS, 15, 28
Roise, LtCol Harold S., 66_n_, 123, 124, 151, 152, 156, 164, 187, 188, 253, 265, 266, 272, 274, 275, 290, 293, 300–302
Rosen, Lt Norman R., USA, 213, 214
_Rowan_ (DD) USS, 30
Ruble, RAdm Richard W., USN, 15
Ruffner, MajGen Clark L., USA, 74_n_, 76, 340
Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State Dean, 35_n_
St. Benedict Abbey, 39, 40
Sakkat Mountain, 156, 157, 161
Samchok, 337, 342
Samgo Station, 112, 113
Sandbags, 208
Sariwon, 9, 34
Sasebo, Japan, 27, 32, 336
Sawyer Maj W. D., 80, 82, 100, 103, 106, 108, 152, 160, 207, 294_n_, 317, 318_n_, 321_n_, 322_n_ Command Post, 103
Schlegel, Pfc Eugene B., 219
Schnabel, Maj James F., USA, 5_n_, 8_n_, 11_n_, 35_n_, 36_n_, 129_n_, 142_n_, 143_n_
Schrier, Capt Harold O., 262
Schreier, 1stLt William J., 174
Schmuck, LtCol Donald M., 221, 309_n_, 314, 315, 321_n_, 322_n_, 324, 325, 328, 331
Sears, Capt Norman W., 134, 336
Seeburger, 1stLt Edward M., 174
Seeley, Maj Henry J., 232, 234
Seoul, 1, 3, 9, 11, 63, 66, 291, 293, 355
Sexton, Maj M. J., 281_n_, 288, 302_n_
Seydel, 1stLt Karle F., 291
Shanghai, 85
Shantung, 84
Sharon, 2dLt D. W., 82_n_, 109, 112–114, 116, 329_n_
Shea, Maj W. E., 103_n_
Shelnutt, Cape John C., 213
Shepherd, Capt G. E., 293
Shepherd, LtGen Lemuel C., Jr., 58, 323, 336, 337_n_, 338_n_, 340, 359
Sherman, Adm Forrest P., USN, 5
Ships AGC, 24 AKA, 24, 341 AP, 24, 341 APA, 24, 341 APD, 57 Cargo, 42, 341, 342 Cruiser, 342 Destroyer, 342 Hospital, 56 JMS-14 (Japanese Mine Sweepers), 29 LSD, 24, 341, 343 LSM, 24, 42 LSMR, 342 LST, 14, 24, 25, 30, 32, 34, 38, 40, 42, 55, 339–343, 348 LST 883, 56, 57 LST 973, 58 LST (ROK), 54 LST (SCAJAP), 24 LSTH, 54, 55 LSU, 24, 40 LVT, 14, 40, 41, 55, 343 LVT (A), 343 Transports, 30 Tugs, 342 YMS 516 (ROK Minesweeper), 29 YMS 905 (ROK Mine Sweeper), 27 _See also_ Ship by name
Shore Party, 40, 41, 339, 341
Shutts, Capt K. A., 202_n_, 229_n_, 259_n_, 288_n_, 298_n_, 329_n_
Shutts, Maj R. W., 338_n_, 339
Siberia, 36
_Sicily_ (CVE), USS, 32, 287, 347, 349
Silvis, Capt Richard S. (MC), USN, 308
Simmons, Maj Edwin H., 63_n_, 65, 65_n_, 66, 67, 67_n_, 197, 198, 204, 208, 235, 326
Simpson, LtCol F., 282, 298, 299, 324
Singalpajin, 132
Sinhung-ni, 123, 135, 139, 148, 243, 254, 262, 274
Sinhung-ni force, 243
Sinhung Valley, 123, 124
Sinuiju, 124, 142, 143
Sitter, Capt Carl L., 66, 204, 205, 226, 228, 229, 235, 236, 241, 242
Skelt, 1stLt Earnest P., 238, 241
Sleeping bags, 259
Sleds, 244
Smith, RAdm Allen E., USN, 15, 30
Smith, Maj George A., 40
Smith, Pfc Gerald J., 181
Smith, Harry, 327
Smith, 1stLt H. J., 291
Smith, Capt Jack A., 222
Smith, 1stLt L. R., 183_n_, 186
Smith, Capt Samuel S., 156, 288, 290, 291
Smith, MajGen Oliver P., 13–15, 21, 23–27, 29–32, 38, 39, 43–45, 54–58, 63, 76, 77, 80–82, 117, 125, 126, 128, 131, 133–136, 140, 145–148, 150, 189, 198, 200, 205, 206, 211, 220, 224, 229, 234_n_, 235, 238, 239, 241_n_, 243_n_, 244_n_, 245, 247_n_, 249, 250_n_, 253, 254, 271_n_, 275, 279_n_, 280_n_, 281–283, 285, 287, 288_n_, 294_n_, 305_n_, 307_n_, 308_n_, 309_n_, 311_n_, 312, 313, 318, 319_n_, 321_n_, 323, 324_n_, 325, 328, 329_n_, 332_n_, 335, 336, 338_n_, 340, 341, 345_n_, 349–351, 359
Sneakers, rubber, 104
Snedeker, Col E. W., 45_n_, 74, 125, 324, 327, 334, 335, 336_n_, 338_n_
Snelling, 2dLt Edward W., 216
Sniping, CCF, 244
Sniper fire, 57
Snow, 270
Snyder, 1stLt Robert E., 172, 172_n_, 174, 184, 186
Songchon, 95
Songchon river, 106_n_
Songjin, 28, 36–38, 95, 337
Sorensen, 1stLt George A., 288
deSoria, Charles, 282
Sota, 1stLt Anthony J., 174
Soule, MajGen Robert H., USA, 75, 342
Soyang-ni, 135, 137, 141
Spiker, Maj Theodore F., 151
Spofford, Capt Richard T., USN, 15, 27, 30, 31
Stalin, 90
Stamford, Capt Edward P., 243, 244
Stevens, LtCol John W., II, 158, 183_n_, 189, 257_n_, 272_n_, 274, 318, 325_n_
Stewart, Col J. L., 254_n_, 266_n_, 272_n_, 300_n_
Stiles, 2dLt Charles R., 63_n_, 71, 71_n_
Stocks, MSgt Marian M., 65
Storaasli, Capt Paul E., 206
Stoves, 281
Strategy Of Celerity, 8, 9 Massive compression envelopment, 144
Stratemeyer, LtGen George E., USAF, 10
Stretchers, 279
Strohmenger, Capt Andrew J., 64, 73, 204_n_, 215
Struble, VAdm Arthur D., USN, 15, 28–31, 38, 58, 337
Stuart, TSgt H. C., 297
Stuart, 1stLt Vaughan R., 300
Sudong, 81, 96, 98, 100, 103–110, 112, 116, 146, 251, 326, 327
Sudong ambush, 327, 328
Sukchon, 34
Sullivan, 1stLt Charles H., 299
Sunchon, 34
Sung Shin-lun, 161
Sung Wei-shan, 266, 267
Supplies, 24, 42, 117, 138, 282 In-transit depots, 138 Supply levels, 140 Advance Supply Point at Yonpo Airfield, 80 Supply Regulating Station Detachment, 138, 140, 141 Supply trains, 126 _See also_ Dumps
Supporting Arms Coordinator (SAC), 66, 67, 198
Supporting fire, 102
Surrender Message, 6, 8
Sutter, LtCol Allan, 55, 58, 59, 72, 77, 222, 224, 226, 228, 305_n_, 306, 328, 331
Swartley, LtCol J. N., 297
Sweeney, TSgt James E., 202_n_
_Swenson_ (DD), USS, 28
Swinson, Pfc Louis W., 171
Swords, 2dLt John J., 53
Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), 341, 348
Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs), 33, 69, 349
Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC), 296, 349 Airborne TADC, 321, 350
Tactics, Marine, 107, 354
Taebeck, Mountain Range, 17, 18, 36, 38
Tallent, SSgt Robert W., 89_n_
Tanchon, 28
Tanks Army, 244, 245, 293, 296 USMC, 55, 62, 68, 127, 134, 147, 160, 220, 222, 224, 229, 230, 232, 235, 240, 254, 261, 263, 268, 270, 272, 290, 291, 293, 294, 296, 300, 301, 305, 311, 313, 317, 326, 329–331 M4A3 (Sherman), 137, 326 M-26 (Pershing), 137, 160_n_, 322, 326 T-34 (NKPA), 105, 110, 112, 113 Tank-dozer, 68, 137, 138, 294 Provisional tank platoon, 137, 160_n_, 208, 291
Taplett, LtCol R. D., 147, 158, 167, 170, 171, 182, 183, 250, 254_n_, 257_n_, 258_n_, 261–263, 268, 271_n_, 272, 274, 275, 300
Task Force Anderson, 245
Task Force Dog, 309, 314, 316, 326, 327
Task Force Drysdale, 225, 226, 228–235, 298, 300, 306, 307
Task Force Faith, 244, 245, 288
Taylor, Capt R. M., 53_n_
Taylor, 1stLt William W., 318, 321
Tents, 281 Warming, 121
Thackrey, Adm Lyman A., USN, 336
Thanksgiving Day, 143, 148
Theros, Capt John G., 100_n_, 103_n_, 294
Thirty-eighth Parallel, 2, 3, 5–9, 54, 59, 346
_Thomas_ (DD), USS, 28
Thomas, 1stLt Alfred I., 267
Thomas, Maj R. C. W., 86_n_
Thornton, Cpl D. R., 159_n_, 180_n_, 181, 190_n_
Tientsin, 85
Tighe, Major Thomas B., 259, 270, 271
_Time_, 333, 334, 358_n_
Togwon, 70
Tokchon, 146
Toksil-li, 56, 141
Toktong Pass, 96, 101, 136, 147, 159, 179, 180, 190, 198, 201, 246, 253, 254, 265, 270–272
Tokyo, 35, 205, 308, 348, 359
Tonae-ri, 294
Tongchon, 50, 55–57
Tongjong-ni, 228
Tootsie Rolls, 278
_Towanda Victory_, SS, 342
Tractor Groups, 30
Tractor Dozers, 41, 149, 177, 210, 247, 253, 301
Trailers, 25
Transportation Rail and Motor Transport, 140 Railway, 138 Railway cars, 139, 327 Train, 45, 46, 54, 55, 59 Kowon, 127 Divisional, 313 No. 1, 285, 303, 305, 322, 324–326 No. 2, 293, 300 Regimental RCT-1, 327, 328 5th Marines, 300 7th Marines, 184, 294, 297, 312, 317, 321, 324 Supply, 128 Trucking Facilities, 141
Trapnell, 2dLt Nicholas M., 172, 184, 186
Treadway Bridge, 309, 315
Trip Flares, 71, 208, 240
Trompeter, Maj Joseph D., 63, 198
Troop Training Unit Pacific, 339
Tsung Hui Tzu, 185
Truman, President Harry S., 3, 5_n_, 6_n_ 7_n_, 8_n_, 9_n_, 35, 84, 129_n_, 142_n_
Tsinan, 84
Tsingtao, 85
Tuan-di, 141
Tunner, MajGen William H., USAF, 281, 338, 349
Turkish Brigade, 150
Turner, Capt Bryon C., 99
Twohey, SSgt. Richard B., 113
Typewriters, 281
Uiji, 143
Uijongbu, 14, 15
Ulsan, 337, 343
Umbaugh, SSgt Ernest J., 320
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 3, 5, 6 Intervention in the Korean War, 35–37, 83 Military Mission in Tokyo, 90
United Nations (UN), 1, 2 Forces, 5, 7, 8, 13 Headquarters, 145 Security Council, 3 Units EUSAK. _See_ Army Units. Independent Commando, Royal Marines, (41st Commandos), 140, 148, 149, 205, 220, 225, 226, 228–231, 233–236, 242, 273, 275, 300, 307, 318–321 Twenty-seventh Commonwealth Brigade, 34
United States, 90 Defense Department, U. S,, 142 Military Advisory Group in China, 75, 84 State Department, U. S. 3_n_, 6, 142
USO, 31
_Valley Forge_ (CV), USS, 17, 233, 286
Vehicles, 42, 197, 268, 284, 325 Ambulances, USMC, 314, 327 Amtrac, 127 DUKWS, 338, 339 Jeeps, 114, 137, 233, 244, 277, 296, 314, 322 Supply, 69 Tractors, USMC, 322 Trucks, 25, 68–70, 72, 74, 109, 160, 197, 228–230, 232, 235, 244, 277, 285, 296, 299, 311, 327, 328, 331, 347 Brockway, 311, 312, 319, 322 Enemy, 110, 117, 124 Column, 231, 235, 272, 274, 286 “Weasel” (M-29), 127
Vick, SSgt William L., 113, 166
Vining, Capt Norman, 230, 306
Vom Orde, 1stLt Ewald D., 312
Vorhies, Maj W. E., 108_n_
Wake Island, 35 Conference, 35, 36
Walker, Richard L., 83_n_
Walker, LtGen Walton H., USA, 9–11, 34, 37, 83, 86, 91_n_, 205
Walseth Col H. S., 229_n_, 232, 283
_Wantuck_ (APD), USS, 56
Ward, 1stLt Charles C., 312
Ward, Lt Chester C., 34
Warren, LtCol Charles E., 339
Warren, Maj Walter T., 215
Washington, D. C., 35, 37, 142, 359
Wasson, Pfc Marvin L., 327, 327_n_
Weapons Chinese Artillery, 102, 107, 215 75mm, 147 76mm, 215 Automatic, 268 3.5 Bazooka, 294 Burp guns, 210 Flares, 104 Grenades, 105, 118, 184, 185, 210, 217, 218, 225, 226 Machine guns, 105, 110, 118, 147, 157, 163, 179, 184, 193, 197, 218, 219, 225, 226, 228, 266, 291, 296, 315, 316, 325 Mines, land (Bouncing Betty), 74 Mortars, 102, 110, 117, 157, 163, 178, 191–193, 201, 209, 210, 220, 225, 228, 229, 235, 291, 319 Pistol, 226 Rifles, 190, 225, 226 2.36 Rockets, 299 Small-arms, 201, 229, 235 North Korean People’s Army Grenades, 127 High Explosives, 125 Mortars, 52, 298, 299, 302 South Korea Machine guns, 170, 171 United States Army self propelled AAA guns, 324 Bombs, 102 Grenades, 165 Marine, 113, 168, 181, 194, 217, 219, 232, 233, 255, 282 Howitzers 105mm, 156, 160, 215, 268, 275 155mm, 160, 274, 275, 287 Machine guns Army, 213 Heavy, 67, 180, 183, 191, 194, 211, 215, 225, 240, 259, 261, 271 USMC, 163–166, 168, 209, 219, 225, 229, 244, 266, 281, 291, 315, 327 Light, 219, 257, 299 Mines Booby traps, 43, 71, 208, 240 Clearance, 138 Mortars, 73, 108, 110, 184, 202, 225, 266 4.2 inch, 52, 107, 118, 152, 156, 160, 221, 222, 266, 281, 288, 305, 315, 324 60mm, 50, 51, 103, 105, 120, 178–180, 183, 209, 215, 216, 232, 265, 315, 320, 326 81mm, 50–52, 67, 103, 105, 156, 164, 165, 180, 184, 190, 193, 194, 204, 222, 224, 240, 251, 257, 259, 261, 264, 271, 290, 294, 305, 315, 326 Support, 217, 219 Pistol, 209 Rifles, 163, 164, 232, 281 BAR, 118, 161, 329 Carbine, 161, 209, 217, 232 M-1, 161, 217 75mm Recoilless, 57, 69, 105, 108, 109, 112, 113, 152, 156, 160, 193, 221, 232, 233, 275, 327 Rockets, 102, 271, 291 2.36, 290 5 inch, 113 3.5 launcher, 65, 103, 105, 113, 114, 185, 213, 226, 325 Small arms, 219
Weather, 121, 135, 136, 152, 161, 172, 194, 259, 297, 314, 315, 319, 320, 347
Webber, 1stLt Richard C., 174
Wedeneyer, Lt(jg) Robert G., (MC) USN, 297
Weible, Walter L., 10
Weiland, Maj Charles P., 339, 340
Westover, Capt John G., 213, 226_n_
Whipple, Maj R. E., 257_n_, 262, 271
Whitney, MajGen Courtney, USA, 6_n_, 7_n_, 8_n_, 9_n_, 35_n_, 129_n_, 205
Wiggins, TSgt Shelly, 69
Wilcox, Capt Myron E., 81, 178
Williams, Capt Bruce F., 329_n_, 331
Williams, Cpl C. W., 229_n_
Williams, 1stLt Leslie C., 258
Williamson, Capt Harold B., 268, 276
Willoughby, MajGen C. A., USA, 35_n_, 129, 205
Wilson, 1stLt H. S., 244, 282
Wilson, 1stLt John B., 81, 99, 100, 103_n_
Winecoff, Col J. L., 250_n_
Winston, LtCol Waldon C., USA, 327, 327_n_, 328
Wire, concertina, USMC, 240
Woessner, Maj Henry J., 98, 100_n_, 152_n_
Wonsan, 8–11, 14, 17, 18, 22, 34–37, 43–46, 50, 54, 56, 58, 59, 61, 63, 66, 68–72, 74–76, 79, 80, 95, 98, 125–128, 131, 136, 138, 145, 239, 308, 338, 348, 350 Airfield, 15, 18, 41, 56, 68, 69, 128, 239 Capture of, 22 Evacuation, 239, 338 Majon-ni Road, 62 Operation Air, 31–33 Embarkation, 21 Intelligence, 17, 18, 21 Landing, 14, 31, 37–41, 44, 281 Logistics, 10, 11, 18, 19, 24, 25, 41, 42 Mine sweeping, 27–29 Movement to the Objective, 30, 31 Orders, 14, 15, 17 Outloading, 24–26 Plans, 11–15, 22–24 Personnel, Landed at, 42 Population, 17 Shore Party Groups, 40
Wood, LtCol Ransom M., 156
_Worcester_ (CL), USS, 28
World War I, 351
World War II, 2
Wray, Capt Robert P., 49–51, 314, 315
Wright, BrigGen Edwin K., USA, 8, 10, 11_n_, 14_n_, 23_n_, 132, 205
Xenophon, 333, 357
Yalu River, 36, 81, 82, 98, 99, 131, 133, 142–146, 352 Advance to, 132, 146, 147, 150 Logistics, 138, 140, 141 Medical, 138, 139 Orders, 145, 148 Plans, 131–136, 139–141 Battle of the, 143 Bridges across the, 129, 142, 143 Hydro-electric plants along the, 142, 143
Yancey, CWO Dee R., 229, 232
Yancy, 1st Lt John, 108, 168, 174
Yangdok, 35
Yangtze Valley, 85
Yeaman, Col R. R., 350
Yenan, 83, 84
Yonghung, 45, 79, 126–128, 131 Bay, 17
Yonghung-Hamhung Railroad, 44
Yongnim-dong, 148
Yonpo, 95, 239, 286, 311, 341, 347, 348, 350 Airfield, 38, 246, 335, 337, 340, 342, 349
Yongwon, 9
Youngdale, Col C. A., 326_n_
Yudam-ni, 96, 102, 109_n_, 131, 135, 136, 139–141, 146–152, 154, 156–161, 163–168, 170–172, 174, 177–180, 182–195, 200–202, 204, 207, 221, 238, 239, 245, 247, 249, 250, 251, 253–255, 277–280, 282, 283, 286, 291, 334, 336, 352–354 Artillery, 177, 250 Breakout, 220, 254, 255, 257–275 Casualties, 280 Command, 249, 250 Medical, 192
Yugoslavia, 3_n_
Zullo, MSgt Rocco A., 226
✩ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1957--425570
Semper Fi Mac
Transcriber’s Notes
Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they were not changed.
Some abbreviations, such as “SAR”, usually, but not always, are italicized in the original book and in this eBook.
Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left unbalanced.
Illustrations in this eBook have been positioned between paragraphs and outside quotations. In versions of this eBook that support hyperlinks, the page references in the List of Illustrations lead to the corresponding illustrations.
Some dates, particularly the years, in the original book may be typographical errors, e.g., “29 Oct 40” instead of “29 Oct 50”. They are unchanged here.
In the Table of Contents, Transcriber added a link to the Index.
The index was not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page references. Spelling discrepancies between Index entries and the referenced text were resolved in favor of the referenced text.
Page 55: “and face enemy” was printed as “and fact enemy”.
Page 221: The chapter sub-heading originally was printed below the chapter summary. Here, it is shown above that summary, so as to be consistent with the sequence in other chapters.
Page 395: “(to 2 0Nov)” was misprinted that way.