CHAPTER XIV

Onward from Koto-ri

_Assembly of Division at Koto-ri--Activation of Task Force Dog--Air Drop of Bridge Sections--Division Planning for Attack--Battle of 1/1 in the Snowstorm--Advance of RCT-7 and RCT-5--Marine Operations of 9 and 10 December--Completion of Division Breakout_

The progress of the 1st Marine Division breakout depended in no small degree on the reliable communications provided by the division radio relay linking up Hagaru, Koto-ri, Chinhung-ni, and Hungnam. At 1440 on 6 December the vehicles of the Hagaru relay terminal joined Division Train No. 1, whereupon the station at Koto-ri became in turn the terminal.[574]

[574] Smith, _Notes_, 1056.

This station was located on the highest point of ground just south of the Koto-ri perimeter. And though it was outside the defense area, the Chinese did not bother it until the Marines were breaking camp. Then the opposition consisted only of harassing small-arms fires instead of the attack which might have been expected.[575]

[575] Col A. Sutter interv, 8 Aug 56; Bartley ltr, 7 Feb 56.

In fact, the enemy did not launch another large-scale assault on Koto-ri after his costly repulse on the night of 28–29 November. Although the perimeter was surrounded throughout the first six days of December, incipient CCF attacks were broken up in the enemy’s assembly areas. Excellent observation as well as casualty evacuation was provided by the OYs taking off from the Koto-ri airstrip. They were the eyes of an impressive array of Marine fire power--tanks, 4.2-inch, and 81mm mortars as well as aircraft and Captain McClelland’s Easy Battery of 2/11.

“The artillery 105’s and the mortars did a grand job,” commented Major Bartley. “They were always available, shifted their fires quickly and accurately, and serviced their pieces amazingly well in the cold weather.”[576]

[576] Bartley ltr, 7 Feb 56. This section is also based on 1stMar _SAR_, 18–24, and the 2/1 _SAR_, 15–18.

As a further asset, the Koto-ri perimeter was defended by adequate numbers in comparison to Hagaru during the first critical week of CCF attacks. On 30 November, when Baker Company of the 1st Tank Battalion returned to Koto-ri after the Task Force Drysdale battle, three platoons of tanks were added to the Dog Company platoon already attached to 2/1. The next day Colonel Puller’s RCT-1 (-) was further strengthened by the arrival of the 2d Battalion of the 31st Infantry, 7th Infantry Division, the last unit to reach Koto-ri from the south. These Army troops had been ordered to Hagaru, but owing to the changing situation they were directed by X Corps on 1 December to remain at Koto-ri. Under the operational control of Colonel Puller, 2/31 took over a sector at the southern end of the perimeter.

Sporadic CCF small-arms fire was received on each of the first six days of December, and enemy troop movements were observed at all points of the compass. On several occasions a few mortar shells were lobbed into the perimeter. Not a single Marine casualty was suffered during the period,[577] though CCF losses were estimated at 646 killed and 322 wounded.

[577] Not so fortunate was 2/31, which lost 5 KIA and 10 WIA expanding the perimeter to the south on 3 Dec. CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1850 3 Dec 50.

Daily air drops were required to keep the perimeter supplied with ammunition, rations, and other essentials. Captain Norman Vining, the Battalion FAC, who had once been a carrier landing signal officer, guided planes to satisfactory drop zones with makeshift paddles. One day a case of .30 caliber cartridges broke free from its chute and hurtled through the top of Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s tent during a conference. Narrowly missing several officers, it hit the straw at their feet and bounced high into the air before landing on a crate used as a table.

_Assembly of Division at Koto-ri_

Koto-ri being second only to Hagaru as an advance base, Colonel Puller at times had responsibilities which are usually shouldered by an ADC. On 29 November he had been the organizer of Task Force Drysdale, and on 6 December it became his task to make ready for the reception of the 10,000 troops from Hagaru.

Although the Koto-ri perimeter was already overcrowded, Puller directed that hot food and warming tents be provided for all Hagaru troops upon arrival. More than 14,000 men would then be organized for the next stage of the breakout. Strength estimates were as follows:[578]

[578] Smith, _Notes_, 1069–1071.

Marine garrison at Koto-ri 2,640 U. S. Army units at Koto-ri 1,535 Royal Marine Commandos at Koto-ri 25 Marines arriving from Hagaru 9,046 U. S. Army troops arriving from Hagaru 818 Royal Marine Commandos arriving from Hagaru 125 ROK police attached to RCT-5 40 ------- 14,229

Puller dealt with the problem of casualty evacuation at Koto-ri by ordering that the OY strip be lengthened so that larger aircraft could land. The engineers of Charlie Company started the job on 6 December, and progress speeded up as the Dog Company engineers arrived next day from Hagaru with their heavy equipment.

The strip had been widened by 40 feet and extended by 300 on 7 December when the first TBM landed. These planes had been borrowed from the Navy and 1stMAW administrative flight lines and assigned to VMO-6. They could fly out several litter patients and as many as nine ambulatory cases. Captain Alfred F. McCaleb, Jr., of VMO-6 and First Lieutenant Truman Clark of VMF(N)-513, evacuated a total of 103 casualties. The carrier landing training of the Marines stood them in good stead as Captain Malcolm G. Moncrief, Jr., a qualified landing signal officer of VMF-312, directed the TBMs to their landings at Koto-ri with paddles.[579]

[579] “Carrier Deck,” _Leatherneck Magazine_, xxxiv, no. 3 (Mar 51), 19–20; 1stMar _SAR_, 23; 2/1 _SAR_, 17–18; 1stEngrBn _SAR_, 13; 1stMedBn _SAR_, 12; and VMO-6 _SAR_, 17–18; 1stMAW _SAR_, 7; BrigGen E. C. Dyer Comments, n. d.

The clearing station established at Koto-ri by Company D of the 1st Medical Battalion (Lieutenant Commander Gustave T. Anderson (MC), USN had a normal bed capacity of only 60 but somehow continued to handle a total of 832 cases, including non-battle casualties. The Company D medics were assisted during their last few days at Koto-ri by Captain Hering, the Division surgeon, and Commander Howard A. Johnson (MC), USN, the CO of the 1st Medical Battalion. Captain Richard S. Silvis (MC), USN, surgeon of the 2d Marine Division, on temporary duty in Korea as an observer, also took an active part.[580]

[580] 1stMedBn _SAR_, 3–7.

Surgical assistance was welcomed by the Company D medics, since operations at Koto-ri were performed under the most difficult conditions. Only tents being available for patients, the hundreds of casualties brought from Hagaru added to the necessity for speedy evacuation. About 200 cases were flown out on the 7th by TBMs and liaison aircraft. By the following morning the engineers had lengthened the OY strip to 1750 feet, but a heavy snowfall put an end to nearly all air activity. In spite of the risks involved, one Air Force C-47 did get through to Koto-ri, where it could be heard but not seen while circling blindly about the perimeter. By a miracle the plane landed safely and took off with 19 casualties. The following day saw air evacuation of casualties in full swing, with about 225 being flown out to clear the hospital tents of all serious cases.[581]

[581] _Ibid._ See also Smith, _Notes_, 995–998, 1110–1112.

_Activation of Task Force Dog_

A large tent in the middle of the perimeter served both as office and sleeping quarters for General Smith and his staff. Planning was immediately resumed after they arrived at Koto-ri on the afternoon of 6 December. Before leaving Hagaru it had been recognized that the enemy might be saving his main effort for the mountainous ten-mile stretch from Koto-ri to Chinhung-ni. In such terrain a mere CCF platoon could do a great deal of mischief, and the planners agreed that it would be necessary for 1/1 to attack northward from Chinhung-ni and clear the road. This meant that the battalion must be relieved by an Army unit, and a request was made verbally to General Almond.[582]

[582] Smith, _Notes_, 1063–1064.

X Corps had received orders on 1 December for the 3d Infantry Division to assemble in the Wonsan area prepared for further operations, possibly to join the Eighth Army in west Korea. Although General Almond initiated execution of the order immediately, he sent the highest ranking Marine officer on his staff, Colonel Forney, and the Corps G-2, Lieutenant Colonel William W. Quinn, to Tokyo to explain the implications of the withdrawal of this Army division from northeast Korea. Following a conference with General Hickey, GHQ Chief of Staff, the Division was released back to X Corps on the 3d, and General Almond ordered it to return to the Hamhung area to protect this vital port area and to assist the breakout of the 1st Marine Division by relieving 1/1 at Chinhung-ni.[583]

[583] X Corps _Special Report, Chosin Reservoir_, 17–18; Forney, _Special Report_, 3.

At 2115 on 6 December the 1st Marine Division requested by dispatch that the relief be completed the next day in order to free 1/1 for the attack to the north. The relief column, designated Task Force Dog and commanded by Brigadier General Armistead D. Mead, ADC of the 3d Infantry Division, consisted of the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, the 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion, plus detachments of engineers, signalmen, and antiaircraft troops. Brushing aside some Chinese roadblocks, it arrived at Chinhung-ni on the afternoon of the 7th and relieved 1/1 immediately.[584]

[584] Smith, _Notes_, 1063–1064; X Corps _Special Report, Chosin Reservoir_, 20–24; X Corps _OI 26_, 5 Dec 50; and Dolcater, _3d Infantry Division in Korea_, 90; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CG X Corps, 2115 6 Dec 50; CG X Corps msg X 13811, 7 Dec 50; Col D. M. Schmuck Comments, n. d.

_Air Drop of Bridge Sections_

Another problem which the 1st Marine Division planners had faced at Hagaru called for an engineering solution. As early as 4 December the commanding general was notified that a critical bridge three and a half miles south of Koto-ri (see Map 29) had been blown by the enemy for the third time. At this point water from the Chosin Reservoir was discharged from a tunnel into four penstocks, or large steel pipes, which descended sharply down the mountainside to the turbines of the power plant in the valley below. Where the pipes crossed the road, they were covered on the uphill side by a concrete gatehouse, without a floor. On the downhill side was the one-way bridge over the penstocks which the enemy had thrice destroyed. Between the cliff and the sheer drop down the mountainside there was no possibility of a bypass. Thus the gap of 16 feet (24 feet, counting the abutments) must be spanned if the Division was to bring out its vehicles, tanks and guns.[585]

[585] Except when otherwise specified, this section is based on the following sources: Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 48–63; Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 15 Jul 51, 72–73; Smith, _Notes_, 1057–1059, 1075, 1095–1109; 1stEngBn _SAR_, 3–14; Geer, _The New Breed_, 361–362, 369; LtCol J. H. Partridge Comments, n. d.

Following the destruction of the original concrete bridge, the enemy had blown a temporary wooden structure and an M-2 steel treadway span installed by Army engineers. No prefabricated bridging was available at Hagaru, and time did not permit the construction of a timber trestle bridge. The possibility of Bailey bridge sections was considered but rejected for technical reasons. Finally, after a detailed study of the break from the air on 6 December, Lieutenant Colonel Partridge estimated that four sections of an M-2 steel treadway bridge would be required. Prospects did not appear bright when a bridge section was badly damaged on the 6th after being test-dropped at Yonpo by an Air Force C-119. Nevertheless, it was decided to go ahead the next day with the drop at Koto-ri.[586]

[586] Smith, _Notes_, 1057–1059, 1075, 1095–1097; Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 48–53; 1stEngBn _SAR_, 13–14.

There were four U. S. Army treadway bridge (Brockway) trucks at Koto-ri, two of which were operative. After conferring with First Lieutenant George A. Babe of the 1st Engineer Battalion and Colonel Hugh D. McGaw of the 185th Engineer (C) Battalion, USA, Partridge decided to request a drop of eight sections in order to have a 100% margin of safety in case of damage.

After analyzing the causes of the unsuccessful test drop, Captain Blasingame of the Air Delivery Platoon had larger parachutes flown to Yonpo from Japan, accompanied by Captain Cecil W. Hospelhorn, USA, and a special crew of Army parachute riggers. Blasingame and a hundred-man work detail from the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion worked all night at Yonpo to make ready for the drop next day by eight C-119s of the Air Force.

At 0930 on 7 December three of the 2500-pound bridge sections were dropped inside the Koto-ri perimeter and recovered by the Brockway trucks. The remaining five sections were delivered by noon, one of them falling into the hands of the Chinese and one being damaged.

Plywood center sections were also dropped so that the bridge could accommodate any type of Marine wheel or tracked vehicle. Thus the tanks could cross on the metal spans only, while the trucks could manage with one wheel on the metal span and the other on the plywood center.[587]

[587] Partridge interv 25 Jun 51, 48–53; Capt C. W. Hospelhorn, “Aerial Supply in Korea,” _Combat Forces Journal_, I, no. 10 (May 51), 29–30.

All the necessary equipment having been assembled at Koto-ri by the late afternoon of the 7th, the next problem was to transport it three and a half miles to the bridge site. Colonel Bowser, the Division G-3, directed the engineers to coordinate their movements with the progress made by RCT-7 the following morning. Lieutenant Colonel Partridge attended a briefing conducted by Colonel Litzenberg on the eve of the assault, and it was agreed that the trucks with the bridge section would accompany the regimental train. First Lieutenant Ewald D. Vom Orde’s First Platoon of Company D engineers was designated as the escort. First Lieutenant Charles C. Ward’s engineers led the 7th Marines trains. Both platoons were assigned the task of installing the bridge sections.

_Division Planning for Attack_

On the assumption that the gap over the penstocks would be successfully spanned, the 1st Marine Division issued OpnO 26-50 at 1850 on 7 December. Although the last operation order had specified the Hamhung area as the objective, it was found necessary at Koto-ri to give more explicit instructions for the advance to the southward.

The plan was simple. Recognizing the sharp cleft of Funchilin Pass as the most difficult defile of the entire breakout, General Smith ordered the seizure of the heights overlooking the pass from the north end of Hill 1081, dominating the road through the pass. In its details the plan shaped up as follows:

(1) RCT-7 (reinforced with the Provisional Army battalion) to attack south from Koto-ri at 0800 on 8 December and seize Objectives A and B--the first being the southern extension of Hill 1328, about 2500 yards southwest of Koto-ri, and the other the second nose due south of Koto-ri.

(2) RCT-5 to attack and seize Objective D (Hill 1457, two and a half miles south of Koto-ri) while RCT-7 continued its attack and seized Objective C (a nose dominating the MSR two and three-fourths miles south of Koto-ri).

(3) At 0800, as RCT-7 jumped off at Koto-ri, the 1st Battalion of RCT-1 was to attack from Chinhung-ni and seize Objective E (Hill 1081, three miles to the north).

(4) RCT-1 (less the 1st Battalion but reinforced by 2/31) was to protect Koto-ri until the Division and regimental trains cleared, whereupon it was to relieve RCTs 5 and 7 on Objectives A, B, C and D.

(5) Upon relief by RCT-1, RCTs 5 and 7 were to proceed south along the MSR to the Hamhung area.

(6) RCT-1 was to follow RCT-5 and protect the Division rear.[588]

[588] 1stMarDiv _OpnO_ 26-50, 7 Dec 50. The task organization remained as it was during the move from Hagaru to Koto-ri. For the regimental orders, see 1stMar _OpnO_ 16-50, 7 Dec 50; 5thMar _OpnO_ 44-50, 7 Dec 50; and 7thMar _Frag O_, 7 Dec 50. Other sources for this section are: 11thMar _SAR_, 9; and Smith, _Notes_, 1062.

Artillery plans provided for one battery of 2/11 and one of 3/11 to answer the calls of RCT-7 for supporting fires. The other batteries of 3/11 were to move south with the motor column while two batteries of 1/11 supported RCT-5. The remaining battery of 3/11 was attached to 2/11 with a mission of moving south to Chinhung-ni and taking a position from which to support the withdrawal of RCT-1 as rearguard. Easy Battery of 2/11, left behind at Koto-ri, was laid to fire to the north and west, while Fox Battery of 2/11 and the 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion at Chinhung-ni supported the attack of 1/1 on Hill 1081.

The plan of the 1stMAW for air support was essentially the same as the one which proved so effective during the advance from Hagaru to Koto-ri.

An object lesson of that movement had been the personnel and equipment losses suffered by the Division trains as a consequence of a late start. The planners were determined not to repeat this mistake. As a further precautionary measure, General Smith directed that the tanks form the last elements of the motor column.[589] Thus in the event of a breakdown on the twisting, single-lane road, it would not be necessary to abandon all the vehicles behind a crippled tank.

[589] CG 1stMarDiv msg to COs 1st, 5th, 7th Mars, 1stTkBn, 1100 8 Dec 50.

As for the enemy situation, G-2 summaries indicated that early in December the CCF 26th Corps, consisting of the 76th, 77th and 78th Divisions, reinforced by the 94th Division of the 32d Corps, had moved down from the north and taken positions on the east side of the MSR between Hagaru and Koto-ri. There they relieved the 60th Division, which moved into the area south of Koto-ri. The 76th and 77th Divisions occupied positions along the MSR in the Koto-ri area, while the 78th and 94th Divisions were apparently held in reserve. Elements of the 89th Division, operating from the mountainous area southwest of Koto-ri, conducted harassing operations against the MSR in the vicinity of Chinhung-ni as well as Koto-ri.

The 60th CCF Division held prepared positions on the high ground south of Koto-ri commanding Funchilin Pass and the MSR leading to Chinhung-ni. That these positions included Hill 1081, the dominating terrain feature, was revealed by prisoners taken in the vicinity by patrols of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, prior to 8 December.

_Battle of 1/1 in the Snowstorm_

Division plans had not called for the swirling snowstorm which reduced visibility to 50 feet and precluded air support at first light on 8 December. In spite of weather conditions, the assault battalions of RCT-7 moved out from Koto-ri on schedule after 1/1 attacked northward from Chinhung-ni.

The planners had realized that the success of the movement to Chinhung-ni would depend to a large extent on the seizure of Objective E--Hill 1081. On 2 December Lieutenant Colonel Schmuck had led a reconnaissance patrol into Funchilin Pass as far north as this position. Sighting large numbers of Chinese on both sides of the road, he called for artillery fires with good effect. This reconnaissance did much to establish Hill 1081 as the key terrain feature.

Although 1/1 had patrolled aggressively, the battalion had engaged in no large-scale actions so far in the Reservoir campaign. The men were fresh, well-rested and spoiling for a fight when they moved out at 0200 on 8 December from an assembly area south of Chinhung-ni after being relieved by Task Force Dog.

Schmuck’s battle plan provided for the three companies to advance in column along the MSR in the predawn darkness. Since orders were to attack at 0800, a start at 0200 was considered necessary in order to make the six-mile approach march.

Captain Wray’s Charlie Company, in the lead, was to take Objective 1, the southwestern nose of Hill 1081, and hold it while the other two companies passed through to carry out their missions. Captain Barrow’s Able Company was to attack east of the MSR and fight its way to the summit of Hill 1081; and Captain Noren’s Baker Company to advance to the left flank, along the slopes between Barrow and the MSR.[590]

[590] This section, except when otherwise noted, is derived from the following sources: _Ibid._; 1stMar _SAR_, 19–20, 24–26; 1stMar _URpt (S-3) 13_; Bates interv, 16 Mar 53, 108–112, Geer, _The New Breed_, 364–368; Col D. M. Schmuck, LtCol D. W. Bridges, LtCol W. L. Bates interv, 8 Aug 56; special mention should also be made of the two-part article, “Last Barrier,” by S. L. A. Marshall in the _Marine Corps Gazette_, xxvii, no. 1 (Jan 53), 20–23, and no. 2 (Feb 53), 40–46; LtCol D. W. Bridges interv, 14 Dec 56.

The combination of snow and darkness reduced visibility almost to zero as 1/1 set out along the slippery MSR five hours before daybreak. All heavy equipment had been sent to the rear from Chinhung-ni, and the only vehicles were two ambulances and a radio jeep.

In the snow-muffled silence of the night the men took on protective coloring as feathery flakes clung to their parkas. Objective 1 was seized shortly after dawn, following a difficult approach march against negligible resistance. The battalion commander prepared for the next phase by bringing up 81mm mortars and an attached platoon of 4.2s and emplacing those weapons in Wray’s position. He also directed that the five attached Army self-propelled quad-.50 caliber and twin 40mm guns of B Company 50th AAA (AW) Bn be moved to a little rise off to the left of the road in the vicinity of the village of Pehujang. From this position they covered the MSR as far as the bridge over the penstocks.

At 1000 the main attack was set in motion. Baker Company advanced along the wooded western slope of Hill 1081 as Barrow attacked up the hogback ridge leading to the summit. The snowstorm fought on the side of the Marines by hiding their movements from the Chinese occupying the high ground east of the MSR around the great horseshoe bend where the road passed under the cable car line.

Noren’s men saw hundreds of enemy footprints but met only scattered opposition until they came to the first CCF roadblock on their left flank. There they were stopped by two machine guns, but a Marine patrol worked around on the uphill side and routed the Communists with a machine gun and 60mm mortar attack.

In the absence of air and artillery support, the 4.2s and 81mm mortars emplaced in the Charlie Company position were called upon whenever visibility permitted. Surprise was Noren’s best resource, however, when Baker Company came up against the CCF bunker complex on the western slope of Hill 1081. The enemy had so little warning that the Marines found a kettle of rice cooking in the largest bunker, an elaborate log and sandbag structure which had evidently been a CCF command post. The entire complex was taken after a brief but savage fight in which all defenders were killed or routed. Schmuck set up his CP in a captured bunker, where he and his officers soon discovered that several regiments of Chinese lice had not yet surrendered.

Only enough daylight was left for the sending out of patrols, whereupon Noren secured for the night. His losses amounted to three killed and six wounded.

Barrow’s men had no physical contact with Baker Company while clawing their way upward along an icy ridge line too narrow for deployment. A sudden break in the snow afforded the Able Company commander a glimpse of a CCF stronghold on a knob between him and his objective, the topographical crest of Hill 1081. The drifting flakes cut off the view before he could direct mortar fire, but Barrow decided to attack without this support and rely upon surprise. Advancing in column along the steep and narrow approach, he sent Lieutenant Jones with two squads of the 2d Platoon to execute a wide enveloping movement on the left. Lieutenant McClelland’s 1st Platoon had a similar mission on the right. Barrow himself led Staff Sergeant William Roach’s 3d Platoon in a front attack.

It took more than an hour for the two flanking forces to get into position. Not until they had worked well around the Chinese bunker complex did Barrow give the signal for attack. Perhaps because silence had been enforced during the stealthy advance, the assault troops yelled like Indians as they closed in on the foe. Out of the snowstorm Barrow’s men “erupted with maximum violence,” and the enemy was too stunned to put up much of a fight. The only effective resistance came from a single CCF machine gun which caused most of the Marine casualties before Corporal Joseph Leeds and his fire team knocked it out, killing nine Communists in the process.

More than 60 enemy bodies were counted after the Marines cleaned out the bunkers and shot down fleeing Chinese. Barrow’s losses were 10 men killed and 11 wounded.

By this time it was apparent that the Chinese had held an integrated system of bunkers and strong points extending to the summit of Hill 1081. The battalion had been strictly on its own all day, all contact with the infantry of Task Force Dog having ended with the relief. When communications permitted, however, 1/1 could count on the excellent direct support of the 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion, USA, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Leon F. Lavoie. The Army cannoneers had set up near Fox Battery of 2/11, using the fire control data of this Marine artillery unit.

The night was clear, promising air and artillery support in the morning, as Able Company consolidated in the captured CCF positions. Although the battalion aid station was only 700 yards away, the terrain was so difficult that litter bearers took several hours to struggle down with the Marine wounded. About midnight the Chinese interrupted with an attack in estimated platoon strength, but Barrow’s men drove them off with CCF losses of 18 killed.

The rest of the night passed quietly, and Baker Company had no disturbance on the high ground overlooking the MSR.

_Advance of RCT-7 and RCT-5_

While these events were taking place, the attack to the south from Koto-ri also fell short of the day’s objectives. Colonel Litzenberg’s plan called for two of his four battalions (the fourth being the Provisional Battalion of Army troops) to clear the high ground on either side of the road so that a third battalion could advance astride the MSR, followed by the reserve battalion and regimental train.

Major Morris, commanding 3/7, had been assigned the task of attacking on the right at 0800 and seizing Objective A, the southernmost of the cluster of hills known collectively as Hill 1328. He made such slow progress against CCF and small-arms fire that at 1100 Colonel Litzenberg suggested the commitments of 3/7’s reserve company. “All three companies,” replied Morris, “are up there--fifty men from George, fifty men from How, thirty men from Item. That’s it!”[591]

[591] Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 68–69.

Early in the afternoon of 8 December, Litzenberg committed his reserve, 2/7, to assist 3/7. Lockwood’s battalion was on the road south of 3/7 and attacked west in an attempt to get in the rear of the enemy holding up 3/7. Easy and Fox Companies attacked abreast and by 1800 the two battalions had joined on the northeastern slopes of the objective. In view of the approaching darkness, however, the attack was postponed until morning, and the troops consolidated for the night short of the objective, which was seized the following morning.

Litzenberg’s plan for the seizure of the heights overlooking the northern entrance to Funchilin Pass provided for the Army Provisional Battalion to take Objective B. The soldiers jumped off at 0800, on the left of the MSR, supported by two tanks of the 5th Marines AT Company. By 0900 the battalion had secured its objective without meeting any resistance. Litzenberg then ordered a further advance of 800 yards to the northwestern tip of Hill 1457. At 1330 the Army troops secured their second objective, still without resistance and tied in with 1/5 for the night.[592]

[592] FSCC tel to G-3, X Corps, 1245 8 Dec 50 in G-3 Journal; X Corps _CR_, 8 Dec 50; RCT-7 _URpt 6_; 7thMar _SAR_, 25; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 17 Nov 56; LtCol W. Morris Comments, 15 Oct 56.

Lieutenant Colonel Davis having become regimental executive officer after Dowsett was wounded, Major Sawyer took over command of 1/7. His plan called for the battalion to advance about 2000 yards down the road and wait for 3/7 to come up on his right flank. Then the two battalions would move along together.

The 1st Battalion jumped off at 0800 and reached its phase line without opposition. First Lieutenant Bobbie B. Bradley’s platoon advanced down the road to gain contact with the Chinese while the remainder of the battalion halted. When 2/7 began its attack in support of 3/7, Sawyer’s battalion moved out. Bradley’s patrol having run into opposition from the northern reaches of Hill 1304, Companies A and C moved west of the MSR in a double envelopment of the enemy position. Company B continued the advance towards Objective C, meeting a heavy cross fire from Chinese to their front and on Hill 1304. Lieutenant Kurcaba was killed and Lieutenants Chew Een Lee and Joseph R. Owen wounded. First Lieutenant William W. Taylor took command and managed to clear the enemy from his front just before dusk.

Able and Charlie Companies faced less resistance in overrunning the foxholes and two bunkers on Hill 1304. With dusk falling, Sawyer did not attempt a further advance. Able and Charlie Companies dug in on Hill 1304 while Baker set up a perimeter slightly short of Objective C. The first serials of the truck convoy had moved closely on the heels of 1/7 and had to be backed up to a level area near Objective A. There they formed a perimeter reinforced with H&S and Weapons Companies of 1/7.[593]

[593] 7thMar _SAR_, 25; RCT-7 _URpt 6_; CO 1/7 msg to CO 7thMar, 1341 8 Dec 50; Geer, _The New Breed_, 362–363. LtCol W. D. Sawyer Comments, 26 Oct 56.

Division OpnO 26-50 had directed Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s RCT-5 to await orders before attacking Objective D. It was nearly noon on the 8th before the 1st Battalion, in assault, was directed to move out from Koto-ri.

Lieutenant Colonel Stevens followed the MSR for a mile, then sent two companies out to the left to occupy the objective, Hill 1457. Baker Company seized the intervening high ground and set up to cover the attack of Charlie Company up the slopes of the ridge leading to the objective. Charlie Company fell in with a patrol from the Army Provisional Battalion attached to the RCT-7, and the two combined forces to drive the enemy off the high ground about 1550. A weak Chinese counterattack was easily repulsed, and at 1700 as darkness fell Baker and Charlie Companies tied in with the Army troops while Able Company formed its own perimeter overlooking the MSR. In reserve, the 41st Commando moved into the high ground behind 1/5 to guard against infiltration.[594]

[594] 1/5 _SAR_, 19; S-3 5thMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1800 8 Dec 50; Maj Stewart tel to CO 5thMar, 1940 8 Dec 50; 5thMar _SAR_, 34; Smith, _Notes_, 1072.

The day’s story would not be complete without reference to the Treadway bridge train, which moved out about 1400 on the 8th in the trace of 1/7. Instructions were to install the sections at the first opportunity, but the site had not been secured as darkness approached. A few Chinese mortar rounds falling in the vicinity of the vulnerable Brockway trucks influenced a decision to return them closer to Koto-ri.[595]

[595] G-3 1stMarDiv tel to CO 1stEngBn, 1325 8 Dec 50; G-3 1stMarDiv tel to G-3 X Corps, 1450 8 Dec 50, in G-3 Journal, X Corps _CR_, 8 Dec 50; D/Engrs _SAR_, 10.

Summing up the attacks of 8 December, weather and terrain had done more than the enemy to prevent all assault units of the 1st Marine Division from securing their assigned objectives. Casualties had not been heavy, however, and for the most part the troops were in a position for a renewal of their efforts in the morning.

As for the Koto-ri perimeter, the 8th had passed with only scattered small-arms fire being received by the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 1st Marines, in Division reserve. All day the Dog Company roadblock, on the route to Hagaru, was like a dam holding back the human torrent of Korean refugees. From this throng rose a low-pitched wail of misery as homeless men, women, and children huddled without shelter in the snowstorm of the 8th. It was a distressing spectacle to the Marines in the perimeter, yet the refugees could not be admitted because of the probability that Chinese soldiers had infiltrated among them, watching for an opportunity to use hidden weapons. There was little the Marines could offer by way of succor except medical care in some instances. Two women gave birth during the bitterly cold night of the 8th with the assistance of Navy medics. In the morning the crowd of refugees, swollen by new arrivals, waited with the patience of the humble to follow the Marine rear guard to the seacoast.[596]

[596] 2/1 _SAR_, 18–19.

White is the color of mourning in Korea, and snowflakes drifted down gently over the common grave in which 117 Marines, soldiers, and Royal Marine Commandos were buried on the 8th at Koto-ri. Lack of time had prevented the digging of individual graves in the frozen soil.[597] Although the necessity of conducting a mass burial was regretted, all available space in planes and vehicles was needed for the evacuation of casualties.

[597] Smith, _Notes_, 1112–1113; Smith, _Chronicle_, 110. According to the terms of the Armistice of 27 July 1953, the remains were delivered to the Americans after the cease-fire.

_Marine Operations of 9 and 10 December_

New snow sparkled in the sunlight as the day of 9 December dawned bright, clear, and cold. A brief reconnaissance convinced Captain Noren that in the early darkness of the previous evening he had stopped one ridge short of his objective--the northwest slopes of Hill 1081, covering the approach to the cable underpass. Baker Company of 1/1 moved forward without CCF interference to the position.

Captain Barrow had his men test-fire their weapons before mounting the final assault on the dominating knob of the hill. This proved to be a wise precaution, since many of the mechanisms had frozen. After thawing them out, Able Company attacked in column with the 1st Platoon in the lead. Although the assault troops had the benefit of excellent air, artillery, and mortar support, they came under intense small-arms fire from Communists occupying camouflaged log and sandbag bunkers. McClelland’s men were hard hit but his left flank squad worked its way forward in brief rushes to positions within 200 yards of Objective E, the topographical crest of Hill 1081. At this point Staff Sergeant Ernest J. Umbaugh organized a squad grenade attack which wiped out the first CCF bunker.

A stretch of about 175 yards, swept bare in places by the icy wind, now lay between the Marines and the final knob. Barrow perceived that this deadly CCF field of fire could be skirted by troops working their way around a shelf jutting from the military crest. Under cover of fire from his 60mm mortars and a strike by four Corsairs, he brought up his 2d and 3d platoons. While McClelland profited by the cover of scrub trees to come up behind the objective, Jones built up a base of fire to cover the direct assault of Roach’s platoon as it stormed up the crest. McClelland had to contend with the enemy’s last-ditch stand in two log bunkers which the 1st platoon knocked out by tossing grenades through the embrasures. The Communists resisted to the last gasp, but at 1500 the Marines were in undisputed possession of Hill 1081.

Sergeant Umbaugh paid with his life at the moment of victory, and Barrow had only 111 able-bodied men left of the 223 he had led out from Chinghung-ni. But the Marines had won the decisive battle of the advance from Koto-ri; they held the key height dominating Funchilin Pass, though 530 counted enemy dead testified to the desperation of the CCF defense.

Able Company had the most spectacular part, but the victory owed to the united efforts of all three rifle companies and supporting arms. While Barrow held the crest of the hill, Noren pushed farther along the cable car track, meeting stubborn resistance from scattered enemy groups.[598]

[598] 1stMar _SAR_, 24–26; Bates interv, 16Mar53, 108–112; Schmuck-Bridges-Bates interv, 8 Aug 56; Marshall, “Last Barrier, II,” 40–46; Schmuck Comments.

The collapse of CCF resistance on Hill 1081 had a beneficial effect on the Marine advance from Koto-ri. RCT-7 continued its attack on the morning of the 9th with effective air and artillery support. Lieutenant Hovatter’s Able Company of 1/7 seized the remainder of Hill 1304 while Lieutenant Taylor’s Baker Company moved south to Objective C. The Army Provisional Battalion occupied the high ground between Objectives C and D.

These movements were carried out against ineffectual enemy resistance or none at all. Whenever a few Communists dared to raise their heads along the MSR, the airborne TADC in the R5D had the communications equipment to control aircraft on station and to direct their employment in response to ground force units.

The 1st Battalion of RCT-5 maintained its positions on Objective D (Hill 1457) all day. At Koto-ri the other two battalions and regimental headquarters made preparations to move out the following day.

As a preliminary to the withdrawal of RCT-1 (-) from Koto-ri, the 3d Battalion was relieved in its positions along the perimeter by the 41st Commando. Lieutenant Colonel Ridge’s men then moved out to relieve 3/7 on Objective A and occupy Objective B. The 2d Battalion of RCT-7 (less a company with the regimental train) outposted the MSR between Objectives A and C at about 1630.[599]

[599] 7thMar _SAR_, 26; RCT-7 _URpt 6_; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.; 1stMar _SAR_, 25; 3/1 _SAR_, 8; 5thMar _SAR_, 35; 1/5 _SAR_, 19; Smith, _Notes_, 1077; Sawyer Comments, 25 Oct 56.

Captain Morris’ Charlie Company and a platoon of Baker Company, 1/7, moved down the MSR and secured the bridge site after a short fight. While Charlie Company outposted the area, the Baker platoon crossed behind the broken bridge and suddenly found about 50 Chinese in foxholes. “They were so badly frozen,” reported Sawyer, “that the men simply lifted them from the holes and sat them on the road where Marines from Charlie Company took them over.”[600] Late in the afternoon a patrol from 1/7 attempted to make contact with 1/1 by moving down the MSR. Chinese fire forced the men off the road and they scrambled across the defile below the overpass and into 1/1’s lines.[601]

[600] Sawyer Comments, 25 Oct 56.

[601] _Ibid._, Schmuck Comments.

Lieutenant Colonel Partridge arrived with Weapons Company, 1/7, and the bridge sections followed in the Brockway truck. Even the enemy lent a hand when Communist prisoners were put to work as laborers. After the abutments were constructed, a Brockway truck laid the treadways and plywood panels in position so that both trucks and tanks could cross.

At about 1530, three hours after the start, the bridge was in place. Partridge drove his jeep to the top of the pass to inform Lieutenant Colonel Banks, Commanding Division Train No. 1, that he could begin the descent.

Sawyer’s troops had not been idle that afternoon and a total of about 60 CCF prisoners were taken during attacks to drive the enemy back from the bridge site. At about 1700 Partridge returned, and an hour later the first elements of the Division trains began to cross. Only a few vehicles had reached the other side when a disastrous accident threatened to undo everything that had been accomplished. A tractor towing an earth-moving pan broke through the plywood center panel, rendering it useless. And with the treadways spaced as they were, the way was closed to wheeled vehicles.

A first ray of hope glimmered when an expert tractor driver, Technical Sergeant Wilfred H. Prosser, managed to back the machine off the wrecked bridge. Then Partridge did some mental calculations and came up with the answer that a total width of 136 inches would result if the treadways were placed as far apart as possible. This would allow a very slight margin at both extremes--two inches to spare for the M-26s on the treadways; and barely half an inch for the jeeps using the 45-inch interval between the metal lips on the inboard edges of the treadways.

Thanks to skillful handling of the bulldozers the treadways were soon respaced. And in the early darkness Partridge’s solution paid off when the first jeep crossed, its tires scraping both edges. Thus the convoy got under way again as an engineer detachment guided vehicles across with flashlights while Sawyer’s troops kept the enemy at a distance.[602]

[602] Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 56–65.

Advance reports of the bridge drop had brought press representatives flocking to Koto-ri in casualty evacuation planes. David Duncan, of _Life_, a former Marine, took realistic photographs of the troops which attracted nation-wide attention. Keyes Beech sent out daily reports while making notes for a book about his adventures in Korea. Miss Marguerite Higgins, who refused to be outdone by male colleagues, was twice requested to leave Koto-ri before nightfall by Marine officers who respected her pluck as a reporter but felt that the perimeter was no place for a woman in the event of an enemy attack.

Hundreds of words were written about the bridge drop. Some of these accounts were so dramatized as to give Stateside newspaper readers the impression that the span had been parachuted to earth in one piece, settling down neatly over the abutments. Headlines reported the progress of the 1st Marine Division every day, and front-page maps made every American household familiar with the names of such obscure Korean mountain hamlets at Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni.

General Shepherd and Colonel Frederick P. Henderson flew up to the perimeter on the 9th for a conference with General Smith. Before their departure they were informed that all remaining casualties at Koto-ri would be evacuated that day.[603]

[603] Smith, _Notes_, 1114; _Chronicle_, 111–112.

All night long on 9–10 December an endless stream of troops and vehicles poured across the span that was doubtless the world’s most famous bridge for the moment. “The sensation throughout that night,” recalled Lieutenant Colonel Partridge in retrospect, “was extremely eerie. There seemed to be a glow over everything. There was no illumination and yet you seemed to see quite well; there was artillery fire, and the sound of many artillery pieces being discharged; there was the crunching of the many feet and many vehicles on the crisp snow. There were many North Korean refugees on one side of the column and Marines walking on the other side. Every once in a while, there would be a baby wailing. There were cattle on the road. Everything added to the general sensation of relief, or expected relief, and was about as eerie as anything I’ve ever experienced in my life.”[604]

[604] Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 66.

Advancing jerkily by stops and starts, the column met no serious opposition from Chinese who appeared to be numbed by cold and defeat. Prisoners taken that night brought the total up to more than a hundred during the movement from Koto-ri to Chinhung-ni. Some of them were suffering from gangrene, the result of neglected frozen limbs, and others showed the effects of prolonged malnutrition. These captives testified that CCF losses from both battle and non-battle casualties had been crippling.

At 0245 on the morning of the 10th the leading elements of the 1st Battalion, RCT-7, began to arrive at Chinhung-ni. A traffic regulating post had been set up at that point the day before by Colonel Edward W. Snedeker, Division Deputy Chief of Staff, for the purpose of controlling the movement of Marine units to the south.[605]

[605] Smith, Notes, 1077; Narrative of Col E. W. Snedeker [Apr 51].

The remaining elements of RCT-7 were strung out from Objective C to the cableway crossing of the MSR. Traffic moved without a hitch until 0400, when two trucks bogged down in a U-shaped bypass across a partially frozen stream about 2000 yards beyond the treadway bridge. Major Frederick Simpson, commanding the 1st Divisional Train, had the vehicles pushed off to one side while the engineers built up the road. After a delay of three hours the column got under way again, with the first vehicles reaching Chinhung-ni at 0830. Ultimately both Division trains got through without a fight, thanks to avoiding the delays which had caused so much trouble during the advance from Hagaru to Koto-ri.[606]

[606] HqBn _HD Dec 50_, 9; 1stMTBn _SAR_, 13; Simpson interv, 11 Apr 51; LtCol F. Simpson Comments, 22 Oct 56.

Following the trains, the 7th Marines moved through the Pass. Lieutenant Colonel Lockwood’s 2/7 (less Company E, guarding the regimental train) led the way for the regimental command group, the Provisional Army Battalion, 3/7 and the 3d Battalion of the 11th Marines.[607]

[607] 7thMar _SAR_, 26; 3/11 _SAR_, 9.

During the early morning hours of the 10th George Company of 3/1 beat off an attack on Objective A by an enemy force estimated at 350 men. This was the only noteworthy instance of CCF activity otherwise limited to scattered shots, and it was believed that the Communists were side-slipping southward, parallel with the MSR. Confirmation of that assumption came at 1200, when Able Company of 1/1 sighted Chinese marching in platoon and company columns through the valley only about 1000 yards east of Hill 1081. Almost simultaneously other dense CCF columns crossed the field of fire of the attached Army self-propelled AAA guns while pouring around an adjacent slope. Lieutenant Colonel Schmuck called immediately for air strikes and artillery fires. Able Company hit the enemy with 4.2″ and 81mm mortar rounds, and the Army teams cut loose with .50 cal. and 40mm bursts. The slaughter continued for an hour as the Chinese kept on moving southward with that fatalism which never failed to astonish the Marines.

Baker Company of 1/1 launched an assault with close air support at 1300 on a CCF strong point adjacent to the railroad and north of the battalion’s positions overlooking the MSR. Noren’s men found 3.5″ rocket launchers their most effective weapon when clearing the Communists from heavily timbered and sandbagged bunkers. Excellent close air support was received, though two Marine KIA casualties resulted from an error by Navy planes.[608]

[608] 1stMarDiv _PIR 47_. Bates interv, 16Mar53; Schmuck-Bridges-Bates interv, 8 Aug 56; Schmuck Comments.

All day the seemingly endless column of vehicles and troops wound southward along the twisting mountain road. At 1030 General Smith and key members of his staff displaced from Koto-ri and proceeded by C-47 and helicopter to the rear CP of the Division at Hungnam. By 1800 both Division trains, all elements of RCT-7 and the 1st, 3d, and 4th Battalions of the 11th Marines had closed Chinhung-ni. There the infantrymen entrucked for Hungnam.[609]

[609] 7thMar _SAR_, 26; 11thMar _SAR_, 9–10; Smith _Chronicle_, 112; 1stMTBn _SAR_, 14; Gen O. P. Smith ltr, 21 Oct 56.

The 5th Marines column followed the 7th, with 3/5 leading the way and 2/5 close behind. Just south of Objective A a brief fire fight was necessary to silence a CCF machine gun, whereupon the movement continued without further incident until the two battalions reached Chinhung-ni at dusk. The 1st Battalion was not relieved by 2/1 until 1800 and did not close Chinhung-ni until the early morning hours of the 11th.[610]

[610] 5thMar _SAR_, 34–36; 1/5 _SAR_, 20; 2/5 _SAR_, 31; 3/5 _SAR_, 17–18; LtCol J. W. Stevens, II, Comments, 19 Oct 56.

The withdrawal of RCT-1 (-) and attached units from Koto-ri commenced on the afternoon of the 10th. The 3d Battalion, it will be recalled, had relieved RCT-7 units the day before on Objectives A, B and C, and the 1st Battalion occupied Objective E. The regimental plan called for 1/1 to hold the Hill 1081 area and protect the MSR until the other units of the regiment passed through, whereupon Schmuck’s battalion was to pull out with the tanks at the end of the column as the rear guard.

The movement from the Koto-ri perimeter commenced at 1500 when H&S Company of RCT-1 departed. The 2d Battalion (-) of the 11th Marines fell in behind, followed in order by a detachment of the 185th (C) Engineers, USA, the 2d Battalion of the 31st Infantry, USA, the 2d Battalion of RCT-1, the Division Reconnaissance Company and Lieutenant Colonel Milne’s tank column, consisting of Companies B and D of the 1st Tank Battalion, the Tank Company of the 31st Infantry, USA, and the Tank Platoon of the 5th Marines AT Company.[611]

[611] 1stMar _SAR_, 26; 2/1 _SAR_, 19; 1stMar _(S-3) URpt 13_, 16–17. The Marine Provisional Tank Platoon had reached Koto-ri with only two M4A3 tanks, one of which had to be cannibalized. Then the platoon was disbanded and integrated with its remaining M4A3 into B and D Companies. All the other tanks in the column were M-26s.

As the last elements left Koto-ri the 92d FA Battalion at Chinhung-ni began laying heavy concentrations on the evacuated base. Only scattered shots were received by the tail of the column from Chinese troops mingling with the Korean refugees. Several small enemy groups on the flanks of the column were taken under fire and dispersed.[612] But with 3/1 guarding Objectives A, B and C, no serious opposition developed during the first stage of the withdrawal.

[612] CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1700 10 Dec 50; Col C. A. Youngdale Comments, 19 Nov 56.

_Completion of Division Breakout_

At dusk on 10 December all indications made it appear that the movement of the 1st Marine Division southward would be completed according to plan with only minor losses of personnel and equipment. Following the seizure of Hill 1081, casualties had been comparatively light and enemy resistance ineffectual. Then, between midnight and 0100 on 11 December, two reverses occurred in areas the Marines supposed to be safe.

The MSR south of Chinhung-ni was under the protection of troops of the 3d Infantry Division--Task Force Dog at Chinhung-ni, and two battalions of the 65th Infantry in the vicinity of Sudong and Majon-dong. It was manifestly impossible, of course, for the Army troops to guard every yard of the road, for the rugged terrain offered many potential ambush sites.[613] Guerrilla activity had been reported near Sudong, but the division trains and the 5th and 7th Marines had passed through without incident.

[613] MajGen E. W. Snedeker Comments, n. d., and MajGen A. D. Mead, USA, ltr to Gen Snedeker, 6 Dec 56.

On the afternoon of the 10th, Korean civilians warned of an impending attack by Chinese soldiers who had infiltrated into this village. As previously indicated, Colonel Snedeker had arrived at Chinhung-ni the previous afternoon. At his suggestion Task Force Dog sent out an infantry patrol which returned with a report of no enemy activity.

At dusk an attack on the traffic turnaround outside Sudong caused Snedeker to halt all traffic at Chinhung-ni until the MSR was cleared. After a fire fight in the darkness, elements of the 65th Infantry reported at dusk that the enemy roadblock had been cleared, and the Marine column resumed its movement southward.[614]

[614] This is probably the same action referred to in 3dInfDiv _CR, Dec 50_, as occurring at 0130 11 Dec. The account of the Sudong ambush is based on: 1stMar _SAR_, 26; 1stMar _URpt (S-3) 13_, 18; Narrative of Col W. C. Winston, USA, 14 Jan 55; Cpl M. L. Wasson ltr to Col Winston, 16 May 51; Cpl D. E. Klepsig interv by H. L. Page, Jr., 6 Mar 52; Capt N. A. Canzona and J. C. Hubbell, “The 12 Incredible Days of Col John Page,” _Readers Digest_, lxix, no. 4 (Apr 56), 84–86. The Page and Winston material is in the possession of Capt Canzona.

During the next few hours Colonel Snedeker’s worst problem was lack of transport. The Division had requested that the maximum number of trucks, ambulances and narrow-gauge freight cars be collected at Majon-dong, the new railhead. Only about 150 trucks were actually made available, however, 110 of them being from Division service units in the Hungnam area.

In spite of this shortage, the flow of traffic was being maintained when an explosion of CCF activity brought every thing to a stop at Sudong shortly after midnight. Mountain defiles had usually been the scene of enemy ambushes, but this time the Chinese swarmed out from behind houses in the village with grenades and burp guns. Several truck drivers of the RCT-1 regimental train were killed by the first shots and their vehicles set on fire. In the flickering light a confused fight ensued as trucks to the rear stopped. The Marines of the RCT-1 train resisted as best they could, but leadership was lacking until Lieutenant Colonel John U. D. Page, USA, and Marine PFC Marvin L. Wasson teamed up as a two-man task force which routed a group of about 20 Chinese at the head of the vehicle column. The valiant Army artillery officer paid with his life, and Wasson received two wounds from a grenade explosion. Pausing only for first aid, he got back into the fight as another Army officer, Lieutenant Colonel Waldon C. Winston, commanding the 52d Transportation Truck Battalion, USA, directed a counterattack by Marine and Army service troops. Harry Smith, a United Press correspondent, also had a part in the action.

Wasson called for a machine gun to cover him while he fired three white phosphorus rounds from a 75mm recoilless at a house serving the enemy as a stronghold. It burst into flames and the survivors who ran out were cut down by machine-gun fire. The Marine PFC, a jeep driver who was dubbed “The Spirit of ’76” by Winston, then volunteered to help push trucks of exploding ammunition off the road.

Winston gradually brought order out of chaos, but it was daybreak before the MSR was cleared so that the column could start moving again. The RCT-1 regimental train had suffered casualties of eight killed and 21 wounded, while equipment losses consisted of nine trucks and an armored personnel carrier.

Lack of infantry protection was a factor in another reverse which occurred at the tail of the Division column. General Smith’s final orders for withdrawal provided that the tanks were to come out behind the 1st Marines’ train with the infantry of that regiment bringing up the rear.[615] Thus a breakdown in the armored column would not block the road for wheeled vehicles, yet the tanks would have protection against close-in attack.

[615] CG 1stMarDiv ltr to COs 1st, 5th, and 7thMars, 1530 9 Dec 50.

The 1st Marines prepared detailed plans for the leapfrogging of battalions during the final withdrawal phase. In effect these called for 2/1 to relieve 1/5 on Objective D and remain there until relieved in turn by 2/31. The Army battalion would hold until 3/1 passed through, then follow Ridge’s battalion down the MSR. After 2/1, 3/1 and 2/31 had passed through Lieutenant Colonel Schmuck’s positions around Hill 1081, 1/1 would follow as rear guard.[616]

[616] 1stMar _OpnO 16-50_, 7 Dec 50. This order issued before the decision to send the tanks down the MSR in one group makes no mention of protecting the armor.

The first departure from plan occurred when Lieutenant Colonel Sutter discovered, after starting up Hill 1457, that Objective D was so far from the road and so steep that most of the night would be required merely for the battalion to make the climb. No enemy having been sighted, he asked permission to return to the road and continue along the MSR. This request was granted by Colonel Puller and 2/1 resumed the march, followed by 2/11(-), 2/31 and H&S Company of RCT-1 in that order. Lieutenant Colonel Ridge’s 3/1, which remained on Objectives A, B and C until 2100, fell in at the end of the regimental column.[617]

[617] 1stMar _URpt (S-3) 13_, 18; Sutter interv, 8 Aug 56.

About midnight, after waiting for 3/1 to move down the pass, the tank column began its descent with only Recon Company as protection. Lieutenant Hargett’s platoon of 28 men guarded the last ten tanks and the other two platoons screened the middle and head of the column.[618] Behind the last machine, approaching as close as they dared, were the thousands of refugees. CCF soldiers had mingled with them, watching for an opportunity to strike, and Hargett had the task of keeping the Koreans at a respectful distance.

[618] Neither Capt Bruce F. Williams, commanding Baker Company, nor his platoon leaders realized that Hargett’s men were screening the rear of the tank column. Maj B. F. Williams Comments, 26 Dec 56.

Progress was slow as the 40 tanks inched around the icy curves with lights on and dismounted crewmen acting as guides. Shortly before 0100 the ninth machine from the rear had a brake freeze which brought the tail of the column to a halt for 45 minutes. The rest of the tanks clanked on ahead, leaving the last nine stranded along the MSR southwest of Hill 1457 and about 2000 yards from the treadway bridge. The enemy took advantage of the delay when five CCF soldiers emerged in file from among the refugees as a voice in English called that they wished to surrender.[619]

[619] This description of the ambush at the rear of the tank column is based upon: Capt E. C. Hargett, interv by HistBr, G-3, 14 Dec 53; Maj W. Gall, 1stLt R. B. Grossman [sic], 1stLt F. R. Kraince, 1stLt E. C. Hargett, 2dLt C. E. Patrick, and 2dLt D. W. Sharon, interv by Capt K. A. Shutts, 11 Feb 51; _MCB Study_, II-C-111–113; Smith, _Notes_, 1087; HqBn _URpt 14_; Williams Comments, 26 Dec 56; Maj E. C. Hargett Comments, 17 Oct 56.

Hargett went to meet them cautiously, covered by Corporal George A. J. Amyotte’s BAR. Suddenly the leading Chinese stepped aside to reveal the other four producing hidden burp guns and grenades. Hargett pulled the trigger of his carbine but it failed him in the sub-zero cold. The former all-Marine football star then hurled himself at the enemy group, swinging his carbine. He crushed a Chinese skull like an eggshell, but a grenade explosion wounded him as the ambush developed into an attack from the high ground on the flank as well as the rear.

Before the remaining four Chinese could do Hargett any further harm, Amyotte shot them down, one by one. The fight turned into a wild melee in which friend could hardly be distinguished from foe.

Hargett’s platoon slowly fell back until the last tank was lost to the enemy along with its crew. The men in the next to last tank had buttoned up and could not be aroused to their danger by banging on the hull with rifle butts. While making the effort Hargett was stunned by an enemy explosive charge which blew PFC Robert D. DeMott over the sheer drop at the side of the road, leaving him unconscious on a ledge. The other men of his platoon believed that he had been killed and continued their withdrawal, only to find the next seven tanks abandoned with their hatches open.

Amyotte, wearing body armor, was covering the retirement, firing from prone, when a CCF grenade exploded after landing squarely on his back. The Chinese must have suspected black magic when he went on cooly picking off opponents as if nothing had happened.[620]

[620] Developed by the scientists of the Naval Field Medical Research Laboratory at Camp Lejeune, the ordinary utility jackets contained thin plates of fiberglas which would stop most shell or grenade fragments. Five hundred jackets had been air-shipped to the 1st Marine Division for field tests, but other supplies had a higher priority during the Chosin Reservoir campaign and only the 50 garments sent to Recon Company were worn in combat. Lynn Montross, “Development of Our Body Armor,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, xxxix, no. 6 (Jun 55), 10–16. The full story of the development of body armor, one of the most important tactical innovations of the Korean conflict, will be told in the next two volumes of this series.

It was a precarious situation for Hargett and his remaining 24 men. But they fought their way out without further casualties, and meanwhile tank crewmen had succeeded in freeing the brake of the lead tank and driving two tanks down the road. One of them was brought out by Corporal C. P. Lett, who had never driven before. “I’m going to get this tank out of here even if I get killed doing it!” he told Hargett. By sheer determination, coupled with luck, he maneuvered around the obstacles ahead and down the icy road to safety.

Captain Gould and his demolitions crew of engineers had been waiting for hours to blow the treadway bridge after the last elements of the Division crossed. With the passage of the two tanks and Hargett’s platoon, it was believed that all Marines who could be extricated were safely over the span. On this assumption, which later proved to be erroneous, CWO Willie Harrison set off the demolition charges.

The losses of the Recon platoon were three men MIA (two of them later changed to KIA) and 12 wounded. Crews of the two rear tanks were missing and presumed dead.[621] Hargett’s losses would have been more severe except for the fact that some of his men were wearing Marine body armor made of light-weight plastics.

[621] CO 1stTkBn tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, n.t., 11 Dec 50, gives tank personnel losses as 4 MIA.

To another man of Hargett’s platoon went the distinction of being the last Marine out at the finish of the Chosin Reservoir breakout. When durable PFC DeMott recovered consciousness, after being blown over the brink by the CCF pack charge explosion, he found himself precariously perched on a ledge overhanging the chasm. Slightly wounded, he managed to climb back on the road, where he encountered only Korean refugees. Upon hearing a tremendous detonation he realized that the bridge had been blown. He remembered, however, that pedestrians could cross through the gatehouse above the penstocks, and he came down the mountain with the refugees to Chinhung-ni. There he was given a welcome befitting one who has cheated death of a sure thing.

The remaining tanks made it safely to Chinhung-ni without benefit of infantry protection other than what was afforded by Recon Company.[622] Lieutenant Colonel Schmuck did not receive a copy of 1stMar OpnO 16-50, he explained, his only information being a Frag O designating 1/1 as rear guard and “a hasty, 30-second conference” with Colonel Puller when the 1st Marine command group passed through. “I was informed,” he added, “that the tanks were in the rear of the 1st Marines, that 2d Bn, 31st Infantry was bringing up the rear, and that as soon as that unit passed, I would employ my battalion as rear guard.... No mention at all was made of the Reconnaissance Company. In order to check off the units that passed endlessly through my lines, I established a check point at the incline railway overpass and kept a close record of movement.”

[622] 1stTkBn _SAR_, 36; Snedeker narrative, Apr 51; Statement of N. A. Canzona, n. d.; Williams Comments, 26 Dec 56.

A great deal of intermingling of units was observed by the 1/1 commander. At 0300, after sighting the lights of the tanks, he gave orders for Able Company to commence the withdrawal, in order “to consolidate my battalion for the rear guard action prior to daybreak.... When the first tanks reached my position, I was first startled to find no 2/31 accompanying them and then flabbergasted to discover that the Recon Company was somewhere out there ‘screening’ the movement. This canceled my carefully laid covering plan.”[623]

[623] Schmuck Comments.

No further trouble resulted for the tanks and Recon Company. Ahead of them the infantry units continued the movement southward from Chinhung-ni chiefly by marching because of the shortage of trucks. Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s men proved that footslogging is not a lost art by covering the 22 miles from Koto-ri to Majon-dong in a 20-hour hike with packs, heavy parkas, individual weapons and sleeping bags.[624]

[624] LtCol Sutter interv, 8 Aug 56.

Battle casualties of the division for the final stage, the attack from Koto-ri southward, were as follows:

------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+------------ Date | KIA | DOW | MIA | WIA | Totals[625] ------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+------------ 8 Dec | 29 | 8 | 4 | 127 | 168 9 Dec | 6 | 7 | 1 | 46 | 60 10 Dec | 7 | 5 | 8 | 45 | 65 11 Dec | 9 | 4 | 3 | 38 | 54 ------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+------------ Totals | 51 | 24 | 16 | 256 | 347 ------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+------------

[625] DivAdjutant _SAR_, appendix II, 3.

At 1300 on 11 December the last elements of the Division cleared Chinhung-ni. Majon-dong had been left behind at 1730 without audible regrets; and by 2100 all units, with the exception of the tanks, had reached assigned assembly areas in the Hamhung-Hungnam area. The armored column arrived at the LST staging area of Hungnam half an hour before midnight, thus bringing to an end the breakout of the 1st Marine Division.[626]

[626] Smith, _Notes_, 1091.