CHAPTER XIV

The Drive to Uijongbu

_Operations of 28 September--Liberation Ceremony at Seoul--Crumbling of NKPA Resistance--RCT-7 and the Battle for Uijongbu--Last Days of Inchon-Seoul Operation--Summaries and Conclusions--MacArthur’s Report to United Nations_

As rapidly as the advance of the troops permitted, preparations were made for the restoration of civil government to Seoul. A group of former city officials had arrived by plane from Pusan; and on 26 September, Mayor Lee opened a temporary office in Yongdungpo. The police chief, construction engineer, and the health and welfare officials also resumed their old duties.

Collecting points were set up for handling the civilian wounded. The following statistics, comprising the patients treated for all causes by the 1st Medical Battalion of the 1st Marine Division, show that Korean civilians were second in numbers only to the Marines themselves:

U. S. Marine 2,811 Korean civilian 1,908 U. S. Army 358 KMC and ROK 322 U. S. Navy 78 POW [448]39

[448] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex How How.

The problem of food for a city with a pre-war population of a million and a half was met during the advance when stores of rice and other supplies were turned over to Seoul officials by the Marines. Medical supplies found in the city were redistributed for use in Seoul and Inchon hospitals as well as the hospital established at Yongdungpo by Captain Hering, the Division Surgeon, expressly for the treatment of civilian wounded.

A shipment of some 50 tons of rice through X Corps, plus large amounts located in Seoul by the Marines, enabled the officials to take over without critical food shortages. On the 28th, Mayor Lee moved into the city hall at Seoul and acted immediately to re-establish police authority, clear destroyed areas and provide for the restoration of such public utilities as water and electricity.[449] These prompt measures did much to ease the hardships of thousands of returning refugees.

[449] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 312–313.

_Operations of 28 September_

The 5th Marines passed an uneventful day on 28 September, having taken its assigned objectives and been pinched out by the 1st Marines on the right and the 7th Marines on the left, as planned. An assembly area was established in the vicinity of the Women’s University, and though the regiment sent out patrols, no enemy were encountered.[450]

[450] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen.

The 7th Marines put in a busy day at seizing objectives which consisted of the high ground north of Seoul on both sides of the main highway from the capital to Uijongbu. Opposition was light to moderate, with the stiffest resistance occurring in areas which indicated that the enemy intended to put up a fight to protect his escape route to Uijongbu. Seventy-five tons of American-made dynamite and explosives, captured by the 7th Marines, were believed to have been originally supplied to the ROK forces before the war and abandoned during the NKPA invasion.[451] Total advances for the day ranged from 1,500 yards in the zone of the 3d Battalion to 2,600 yards in the zone of the 2d Battalion.

[451] _Ibid._, Annex Roger Roger.

When the 1st Marines jumped off at 0645 on the 28th, the 1st and 2d Battalions were in assault. The 3d Battalion remained in an assembly area in the rear and continued mopping up along with the 2d KMC Battalion. Although organized resistance in the city had been broken, the 1st Battalion met stubborn resistance from enemy groups and encountered many mines. The 2d Battalion, on the left, made headway against light opposition.

These attacks cleared the remainder of Seoul and took the assault battalions to Hill 133 (Objective ABLE) commanding the city on the northeast.[452]

[452] _Ibid._, Annex Peter Peter.

General Smith visited the CPs of all three regiments on the 28th by helicopter. He found Colonel Puller at the Ducksoo Palace, near the intersection of the streetcar lines. Colonel Litzenberg’s CP was located a short distance to the west, and Lieutenant Colonel Murray had established his headquarters in the Women’s University on the northwest outskirts of the city.

Later that day Generals Smith and Craig displaced the Division CP from Oeoso-ri to a barracks area in Seoul, southwest of South Mountain. The two Marine generals took over a former infirmary, but they decided that the mortuary slab was too depressing and had that fixture removed.[453]

[453] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 308, 338–339.

_Liberation Ceremonies at Seoul_

Planning for impressive liberation ceremonies at Seoul had begun while the street fighting was at its height. The 1st Marine Division was requested by Corps to furnish two honor guards and a band. Musical instruments having been left behind in Japan, air shipment was prescribed.[454]

[454] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 27 Sep 50, _Notes_, 313–315.

General MacArthur had hoped to hold the liberation ceremony at Seoul on 25 September, just three months to the day after the launching of the NKPA invasion. The enemy, however, was not cooperative with respect to this date; and even on the morning of the 29th, three NKPA counterattacks were repulsed on the outskirts of the city. As it proved, General MacArthur vetoed plans for a ceremony with band music. “I will personally conduct the proceedings without being introduced,” said his message to X Corps, and he specified that there be no honor guard.[455]

[455] CinCFE msg to CG X Corps, 28 Sep 50.

Two pre-dawn counterattacks on the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, were not auspicious beginnings for the day of the liberation exercises. The first occurred at 0445 on 29 September, when the OP, located on a spur projecting forward of the MLR and defended by a rifle platoon, was infiltrated by an estimated 70 to 100 NKPA troops. A second enemy attack hit the left flank of the battalion shortly afterwards. Both attempts were repulsed with total losses of 48 to the Communists, and the Marines had casualties of 4 KIA and 28 WIA, most of them resulting from hand grenades.[456]

[456] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter.

Another assault, launched by the enemy at 0600 in the zone of action of the 7th Marines, was repulsed without trouble. Most of the fighting on 29 September was done by this regiment, which pushed forward to gain all the rest of its objectives before nightfall.

At dawn, in preparation for the liberation ceremony, Marine guards were unobtrusively stationed along the route of approach from the new floating bridge to the Government Palace. This duty fell chiefly on 3/1, with elements of the 5th Marines being responsible for security in the western part of the city.

General MacArthur and President Syngman Rhee drove directly to the Palace after separate arrivals at Kimpo Airfield. The guests included Korean dignitaries and United Nations officials in addition to high-ranking representatives of military organizations.

The commander in chief opened the ceremony with a moving five-minute address ending with the Lord’s Prayer. The rumble of artillery could be heard at times, and some of the guests glanced up apprehensively at the shattered skylight overhead.

“Occasional falls of glass from the dome and drifting smoke and ashes were part of the scene,” commented a Marine officer. “Unheeded noise of rifle shots punctuated the talks. Grim Marines from Puller’s regiment surrounded the seated audience.... The youth of the guards was offset by the tall, gray-haired figures of Generals Smith and Barr at the front of the audience. They were patently the men who had borne precisely and capably the load of decision.”[457]

[457] Col E. H. Forney memo to authors, Dec 54.

With the 1st Marine Division still responsible for security, it was a relief to General Smith when the distinguished visitors departed unharmed. Not all the mines had been removed from the streets as yet, and it was suspected that snipers might still be lurking in the ruins.[458]

[458] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 29 Sep 50.

_Crumbling of NKPA Resistance_

Although more hard fighting lay ahead in the Inchon-Seoul operation, X Corps alerted its major units on 29 September to the possibility of a new amphibious landing on the east coast of Korea. This was one of the earliest announcements of the planning which led to the Wonsan landing and the advance to the Chosin Reservoir, but the history of those events belongs in the next volume of this series.

The new operation was suggested by the rapid disintegration of the main body of the NKPA invasion forces. In a single day, 26 September, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division had advanced more than 100 miles; and a total of about 23,600 prisoners were taken by the Eighth Army before the end of the month. Enemy resistance was still encountered, to be sure, and sometimes it was of a desperate nature as Red Korean troops fought to escape encirclement. But all hope and heart had gone out of the Communist cause. One Eighth Army column sliced across the peninsula to Kunsan while other spearheads drove northward and ROK units pushed up the east coast nearly to Samchok. NKPA opposition was crumbling everywhere as demoralized invasion troops threw away their weapons and changed to civilian clothes in the hope of making their way to North Korea through the ever tightening Eighth Army cordon.[459]

[459] U. S. MilAcad, _Operations in Korea_, 18–19.

The X Corps troops in the Seoul area had enough on their hands to finish the old operation before starting a new one. 1st Marine Division OpnO 13-50, issued at 2000 on 29 September, provided for the securing of the captured city by these means:

(1) a continuation of the attack to the east;

(2) the conduct of reconnaissances in force to the north and northwest;

(3) the relief of elements of the 7th Infantry Division north of the river Han;

(4) the seizure of prescribed blocking positions.[460]

[460] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 318.

The Division plan of maneuver called for the three Marine rifle regiments to take blocking positions forming a rough semi-circle defending Seoul from three sides--the 5th Marines to the northwest, the 7th Marines to the north, and the 1st Marines to the northeast. Responsibility for the area north of the Han river and west of the Pukhan River had passed to the 1st Marine Division, and at 1500 on 30 September the following missions were assigned by OpnO 14-50:

RCT-1--To protect the right flank of the Division and be prepared to assemble in Division reserve by battalions for a motor lift. Blocking positions, as assigned by OpnO 13-50, consisted of high ground from two to five miles northeast of Seoul.

RCT-5--To continue reconnaissance in force with minimum of a reinforced battalion to Suyuhyon and establish a blocking position; to protect the left flank of the Division; and to be prepared to provide a reinforced rifle company for Task Force Kumpo, on order. These attachments to be made: 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, and one battery of 50th AAA Battalion, USA; Company A, 1st Tank Battalion; Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion; and a company from the 1st Motor Transport Battalion.

RCT-7--To advance rapidly and seize blocking positions in the vicinity of Uijongbu. These attachments to be made: 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, and one battery of 50th AAA Battalion, USA; Company D, 1st Tank Battalion; and one company of the KMC Regiment.

The KMC Regiment (less the 1st and 3d Battalions and one company of the 5th Battalion, with a detachment of ANGLICO attached) was meanwhile to advance to the east and seize blocking positions at the junction of the Han and Pukhan rivers where the road leading northeast from Seoul reaches that point. The 1st KMC Battalion had been attached to the 7th Infantry Division, and the 3d Battalion was operating on the Kumpo Peninsula.

Task Force Kumpo, when activated on Division order, was to consist of the 3d KMC Battalion and Battery C, 50th AAA Battalion, USA, plus a 5th Marines rifle company and a tank detachment, if required. As it proved, however, X Corps held responsibility for the defense of this area until 2 October, when the 187th Airborne RCT was relieved by Task Force Kumpo.[461]

[461] _Ibid._, 318–319, 336–337. Both “Kimpo” and “Kumpo” are used in reports to designate the same area--the peninsula formed by the mouth of the Han. The first name was derived from the airfield, of course, and the second from the principal town of the peninsula.

Two more small fire fights awaited the 5th Marines in carrying out the missions assigned by Division OpnO 14-50. At 1030 on 1 October, while patrolling the extensive area of regimental responsibility, a detachment of 2/5 made contact with an NKPA force estimated at 150 to 200 men. Air strikes and mortar fire soon took the fight out of the enemy, who left 30 dead behind.

At 0600 on 1 October the 3d Battalion, reinforced with a battery of artillery and a platoon of tanks and engineers, moved out toward Suyuhyon. Charlie Company of 1/5 followed in trace to protect the battalion rear and provide security for returning motor transport.

Two road blocks were cleared before the battalion tied in for the night on high ground just short of the objective. Then, at 0230 the next morning, the enemy struck in estimated company strength. The attempt was repulsed by machine-gun fire, and 67 Red Korean bodies were found at daybreak in the attack area. At 0700 the column resumed the march to Suyuhyon, which was occupied without further incident.[462]

[462] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Queen Queen: basic rpt and Peter.

The 1st Marines found little difficulty in carrying out all missions assigned by Division OpnO 14-50. In fact, the regiment had only a few minor patrol actions after taking blocking positions northeast of Seoul.

Colonel Litzenberg’s men were now making the main effort of the 1st Marine Division. Preparations for the drive to Uijongbu began with every indication that the enemy was bent upon flight. A patrol from the 3d Battalion found 30 Korean bodies beside a wall, including several women and a child, whose hands had been bound behind them before they were shot. The victims, according to a POW, were members of the families of ROK soldiers.[463]

[463] _Ibid._, Annex Roger Roger.

Positions had been consolidated by the late afternoon of 30 September in readiness for the jump-off in the morning. The 7th Marines might well have been called Task Force Litzenberg at this stage for it was reinforced by Major Parry’s 3d Battalion of the 11th Marines, Captain Lester T. Chase’s Company D of the 1st Tank Battalion, Captain Byron C. Turner’s Company D of the 1st Engineer Battalion, and Captain Kim’s Company C of the 5th KMC Battalion.

The drive to the new objective began at 0630 on 1 October in a column of battalions. Air reconnaissance had made it appear likely that any NKPA resistance would probably take advantage of a tactical bottleneck, about halfway to Uijongbu, where steep and rocky ridges overlooked a narrow defile through which the road passed. Colonel Litzenberg and his staff decided to maneuver by sending the 1st Battalion to make a broad feint to cover the entry of the 3d Battalion into the defile with tank support while the 2d Battalion followed in reserve.

Lieutenant Colonel Davis secured his preliminary objectives, then swiftly spread out on both sides of the defile for his feint. Unfortunately, Major Roach was delayed by an enemy mine field, which brought the 3d Battalion and the tanks to a halt while the engineers cleared the way. Davis’ simulated attack had meanwhile disclosed that the enemy was entrenched in depth along the high ground on each side of the defile. Both Marine battalions took heavy NKPA artillery and mortar fire before halting for the night.[464]

[464] This section is derived from: 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annexes Oboe Oboe and Roger Roger; 1st MAW _SAR_, Annex Item:Queen; Col H. L. Litzenberg interv with HistDiv, 22 Apr 51; Hammond interv, 17 Aug 54; and Capt R. T. Bey interv, 17 Nov 54.

At least the day’s attacks had unmasked the enemy’s positions and exposed them to savage attacks by the Corsairs of VMF-312. RCT-7 continued the attack at 0630 on the 2d, with Roach on the left of the road and Davis on the right. About halfway through the defile the 3d Battalion was pinned down by a concentration of NKPA artillery, mortar, and small-arms fire. Again the tanks were held up while the engineers cleared away mines, working in a hail of bullets. The tanks of the 1st Platoon repaid the favor by closing in on two huts sheltering NKPA troops and killing an estimated 35. Here an attached dozer tank, without blade, had a freakish accident when two men in the turret were wounded by enemy fire down a 105mm gun tube while the breech was open.

The 1st Battalion managed to cross the stream east of the defile and seize the high ground just beyond. But the day ended with gains of only 300 yards in the defile.

Roach’s men returned to the attack in the morning, supported by the tanks of the 2d Platoon. Again VMF-312 flew one close air support sortie after another. Major Charles E. McLean was hit by enemy AA fire but crash-landed his plane in friendly territory. First Lieutenant Robert O. Crocker was killed in action shortly after being brought down by NKPA small-arms fire.

VMF-312 fliers intercepted an enemy convoy and First Lieutenant Franklin Stratton reported the destruction of seven out of eight trucks. The tanks also gave the infantry helpful support, firing 167 90mm rounds during the day and an estimated 20,000 machine gun rounds at enemy troops along the ridge.

While 1/7 cleared the high ground on the east side of the road and 3/7 on the west side, Colonel Litzenberg directed Major Webb D. Sawyer[465] to pass between them with 2/7 and drive directly along the highway. Progress was satisfactory from the start. When Sawyer’s men began to overrun abandoned NKPA artillery pieces and supply dumps, they pounded ahead with the realization that enemy resistance was broken.

[465] Lieutenant Colonel Hinkle, the former 2/7 commander, had been wounded and evacuated on 28 September.

At five that afternoon the 2d Battalion entered the ruins of Uijongbu, evacuated by the enemy. The last large-scale fight of the Inchon-Seoul operation had ended in a smashing victory for the Division’s youngest regiment.

Identifications showed that the Marines had been opposed by three battalions of the 31st Regiment of the 31st NKPA Division. Elements of the 17th and Seoul Divisions and of an artillery battalion were also encountered. These troops had been supported by 13 tanks, of which four were killed by Marine air attacks and two captured in a damaged condition by 2/7 after the others escaped.

The three-mile advance of RCT-7 on 3 October had resulted in the cutting of lateral communications to the east and west of Uijongbu and the securing of an important blocking position on the X Corps final phase line. Losses of 13 killed and 111 wounded were suffered by the regiment in the three-day fight.

_Last Days of Inchon-Seoul Operation_

The climax of the battle was witnessed by General Cates, who visited the front on 3 October, accompanied by Major Generals Edwin A. Pollock and Clayton C. Jerome. After being briefed at the Division CP by the G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4, the Commandant inspected the positions of RCT-1 and RCT-5 by helicopter before taking a jeep tour along the road to Uijongbu to watch Colonel Litzenberg’s men slug their way forward into the battered town.[466]

[466] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 2–3 Oct 50.

That evening the fighting virtually came to an end, for the 1st Marine Division had a total of only seven casualties during the last four days of the Inchon-Seoul operation. The rifle regiments had only to maintain their blocking positions while patrolling to front and flank.

Operations on the Kumpo Peninsula, which had been sputtering intermittently ever since the occupation of the airfield, also drew to a close.[467] Responsibility for the area having passed from Corps back to Division on 2 October, elements of the 187th Airborne RCT were relieved by Task Force Kumpo, consisting of the 3d KMC Battalion, a detachment from the 1st Signal Battalion, and Battery C of the 50th AAA Battalion, USA.

[467] Capt J. E. Dolan memo to authors, 24 Nov 54.

Naval gunfire had found its greatest mission of the exploitation phase in support of the widely assorted units which protected the left flank of X Corps at various times. The 187th, being short on artillery, had relied on the naval gunfire and spot teams commanded by Lieutenant (jg) Leo D. McMillan, USN, and First Lieutenant J. E. Dolan, of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines. These officers and their men remained with Task Force Kumpo after it relieved the 187th, but patrols reported no enemy contacts after 2 October. The chief activity on the peninsula was listening to the baseball games of the World Series, which came in clearly over the radios of the naval gunfire teams.[468]

[468] _Ibid._

As directed on 5 October by OpnO 15-50, the last to be issued by the Division in the Inchon-Seoul Operation, the major Marine units were scheduled to close into staging areas in Inchon as follows:

5th Marines 1800 on 5 October; 11th Marines 1700 on 6 October; 1st Marines Prior to darkness, 6 October; 7th Marines Midafternoon, 7 October; KMC Regiment Prior to darkness, 7 October.

An impressive ceremony was held on the 6th, when the cemetery established by the Marines on the outskirts of Inchon was taken over by the United Nations. After an invocation by Chaplain R. M. Schwyhart of the 1st Marine Division, General Almond made a few remarks and laid a wreath on the grave of an unknown soldier. Then General Smith, General Barr, and Colonel Lee performed the same ceremony over Marine, Army, and ROK graves. Volleys were fired, taps were sounded, and the dedication ended with the national anthems of the United States and Korea.[469]

[469] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 342; 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex George, 7.

There could be no doubt, as the Marines prepared to mount out for a new amphibious operation, that the NKPA invaders had been knocked out of the war by the combined X Corps and Eighth Army offensives. The Red Korean retreat had become a rout, and Marine staff officers considered it doubtful whether the enemy could hold the east coast port of Wonsan long enough to defend it against the proposed new Marine assault landing.[470]

[470] Wonsan fell without a fight on 10 October, before the Marines embarked, to ROK units advancing up the coastal route.

It was apparent, in fact, that only the active intervention of Red China or the Soviet Union could save the North Korean People’s Republic from imminent collapse. At this time, however, it did not seem likely that any such attempt would be made.

And so it was that one of the most remarkable amphibious operations in Marine Corps annals came uneventfully to an end on 7 October 1950. Early in the morning the Division CP displaced from Seoul to a housing area just north of Ascom City. At 0935, in accordance with X Corps OpnO 5, General Smith reported to Admiral Doyle, ComPhibGru One, for duty as commander of the landing force for the proposed Wonsan assault. And at 1200 the Inchon-Seoul operation passed into history when the last troops of the 7th Marines were relieved in the Uijongbu area by elements of the Eighth Army.

_Summaries and Conclusions_

At this stage the men of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing were still too close to the operation to see it clearly in detail. If there was any one overwhelming impression they all had in common, it was a sense of the speed with which events had raced toward a climax.

This was by no means an illusion. Hundreds of Marine reservists had watched baseball games or enjoyed picnics with their families on the Fourth of July, never dreaming that shortly after Labor Day they would be scrambling out of landing boats to assault a flaming Asiatic seaport on the other side of the earth!

Speed was an essential if the assault landing were to be completed on the prescribed D-day. But there was no place for the proverbial haste that leads to waste. It had to be the speed of precision--an acceleration of men and events made possible by the amphibious know-how of a Navy-Marine Corps team that had worked together throughout the Pacific operations of World War II.

Sometimes this acceleration was so unobtrusive as to pass almost unnoticed. Shipping does not grow on trees, particularly the enormous amounts of shipping required for a major amphibious operation. Yet the U. S. Navy made it appear a simple and routine matter to assemble from all the seven seas an invasion fleet made up of craft ranging from cruisers to rowboats.

The Marines, as the Landing Force, worked hand-in-hand with the Attack Force commanded by Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, who had no superior in the world of 1950 as an amphibious specialist. From preliminary planning to final execution, Doyle and his staff officers of PhibGru One supplied a precision which had much to do with the success of an operation holding so many potentialities of disaster.

Looking back, some of the Marine participants could hardly recall a full night’s sleep from 25 July 1950, the date of the order directing that the 1st Marine Division be brought up to full war strength, until 7 October 1950, when the operation came to a victorious end. From the mobilization at Camp Pendleton to the street fighting in Seoul, it was often necessary to utilize the hours of darkness ordinarily devoted to rest. At Kobe, for instance, there were so few copies of the plans for the Inchon landing that they were circulated on a 24-hour schedule for study by Marine officers who took turns.

The acceleration of the 1st Marine Division in 64 days from a peacetime basis to the capture of Seoul has been summarized as follows:

(a) Expansion from a reduced peace strength (less the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade) to a reinforced war strength, less one RCT, was completed in a period of approximately 15 days.

(b) Administrative sea lift and movement of over 15,000 personnel, organic equipment, and partial resupply from San Diego to the Far East Command commenced in less than three weeks after expansion was ordered.

(c) Debarkation and unloading from administrative shipping, and reembarkation and reloading at Kobe, Japan for the assault landing at Inchon were done in a period averaging about seven days per unit, two days of which were lost due to a heavy typhoon in the Kobe area.

(d) Completed planning and the issuance of the complete operation order for the amphibious landing at Inchon were accomplished 17 days after the receipt of the initial directive.

(e) The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was disengaged from active combat with the enemy on the South Korean front at midnight on 5 September, moved to Pusan, and outloaded in combat shipping in less than 7 days.

(f) A successful assault landing was executed at Inchon, Korea, on 15 September under some of the most adverse landing conditions in the history of amphibious operations.

(g) The Force Beachhead Line approximately six miles from landing beaches was seized within 24 hours after the main landing on Beaches RED and BLUE.

(h) Kimpo Airfield, a primary objective of the operation in the 1st Marine Division’s zone of action, was captured 50 hours and 35 minutes after H-Hour, D-Day.

(i) The first assault crossing of the Han River (400 yards wide at the crossing site) was executed by RCT-5, employing LVTs, DUKWs, and pontoon ferries, less than five days after landing at Inchon.

(j) The remainder of the Division crossed the Han River without bridging, and after intense fighting completed the seizure of Seoul 12 days after landing at Inchon.

(k) The effectiveness of the Marine air-ground team and close air support doctrine were reaffirmed with outstanding success.

(l) The ability of Marine units to participate in extended land operations, provided additional transportation requirements are met during the emergency, was demonstrated in the Inchon-Seoul operation.[471]

[471] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 365–366.

In any such summary, it is understood that credit for the accomplishments of the 1st Marine Division was shared by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Two more days of fighting remained for the squadrons at Kimpo after the relief of the ground forces, since Marine air operations cover the period from 7 September to 9 October 1950. Altogether, 2,774 combat sorties were flown by the five Marine squadrons during this 33-day period, most of them in close support of infantry units. Following are the totals:

--------------+--------+---------- Squadron | Days in| Combat | Action| Sorties --------------+--------+---------- VMF-214 | 16 | 484 VMF-323 | 22 | 784 VMF-212 | 19 | 607 VMF-312 | 10 | 288 VMF(N)-542 | 19 | 573 | +---------- Total | |[472]2,774 --------------+--------+----------

[472] Summaries and statistics for Marine air have been derived form: 1st MAW _SAR_, Annexes Able, Item, Jim, Queen, Sugar; also E. H. Giusti and K. W. Condit, “Marine Air over Inchon-Seoul,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, 36, no. 6 (Jun 52): 19–27.

Note that the total of 2,774 combat sorties includes 38 flown by two aircraft of VMF-312, which began operating from Kimpo nine days before the rest of the squadron arrived.

“No enemy air operations of any significance were encountered,” stated the TAC X Corps report. “Some enemy antiaircraft fire from light to moderate was encountered. Most of this AA fire was of small caliber.”

Eleven Marine planes (not counting VMO-6 aircraft) were shot down by NKPA ground forces. Six pilots and a crewman were killed in action and two pilots wounded.

As an example of the types of missions, the 326 combat sorties flown by VMF-322 fell into these categories: close air support, 163; reconnaissance, 99; rescue cover, 18; deep support, 17; helicopter escort, 8; photo escort, 6; combat air patrol, 6; tactical air control, 4; leaflet, 2; R4D escort, 2; message drop, 2. In addition, the squadron was credited with 151 noncombat sorties.

There could be no question that Marine close air support had won the esteem of Army infantry units. Generals Harris and Cushman were the recipients of many spontaneous comments of appreciation from individuals as well as formal endorsements. (See Appendix L for the record.)

On the other hand, the Marines had cause to be grateful for the deep support and interdiction strikes provided by the Naval fast carrier planes of JTF-7 in combination with the Fifth Air Force, which was committed primarily to the support of the Eighth Army in South Korea. During the first two weeks of September, JTF-7 had responsibility for the gradual isolation of the Inchon target area by means of air operations conducted as far as 150 miles north of the objective and 100 miles to the south.

The air defense of our forces at sea and in the Inchon area, and the air interdiction operations of the first five or six days of the landing--these were carried out largely by Naval air effort under Commander JTF-7. Mutual assistance between JTF-7 and the Fifth Air Force was provided for, with coordination being achieved by the delineation of areas for each.[473]

[473] VAdm A. D. Struble ltr to authors, 3 May 55.

VMO-6, under the control of the 1st Marine Division and administration control of MAG-33, completed a total of 643 helicopter and OY flights in 515 hours. Of the 139 seriously wounded men evacuated by helicopter from the firing line, a large proportion owed their lives to the speed and ease with which they were transported to the hospital. The helicopters also were credited with twelve rescue missions of friendly pilots shot down behind the enemy lines.[474]

[474] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex William William.

In the long run, of course, it took the coordinated efforts of ground, air, and sea forces to win the final victory in one of the most unusual and difficult amphibious operations of all time. And though this book is limited to an account of Marine activities primarily, the Marines who took part would be first to acknowledge how much the final victory owed to the efforts of other ground forces--the U. S. Army units, the KMC Regiment, and the ROK contingents.

Many of these units, like the Marines, had been handicapped by a hasty build-up which allowed little or no time for special training and rehearsals. No greater feat of organization was recorded in 1950 than the creation of a new 7th Infantry Division from the bare bones of the old in only a few weeks. The Marines saw more of the 32d Infantry than General Barr’s other units, for it was this regiment which protected the right flank during critical periods of the advance on Seoul while elements of the 187th Airborne RCT were responsible for the security of the left flank.

The Army artillery units, amphibian tractor troops, and AAA companies also deserve their full share of credit for the victory. And though the Marines were not often in contact with the ROKs, they realized how much these allies had contributed, often under the most adverse circumstances.

Naturally, the Marines felt a special interest in the KMC Regiment, which they had trained and equipped. The KMCs repaid this feeling by the valor with which they fought in every phase of the operation from the mopping up of Inchon to the battle for Seoul.

The Inchon landing and its exploitation have been made the subject of a study by officers of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, who summed up the over-all effects as follows:

(a) The amphibious envelopment at Inchon produced a decisive threat to the North Korean forces which led directly to the rapid disintegration of their front on the Pusan Perimeter. The 1st Marine Division was the landing force in this amphibious envelopment.

(b) It completed the dislocation of the enemy’s entire logistical system by the capture of Seoul, which, together with the combat action of other UN forces, shattered the enemy in all of South Korea, causing the complete rout of the North Korean forces. The 1st Marine Division played a principal role in the capture of Seoul.

(c) The successful completion of the campaign made available to UN forces the port facilities of Inchon and the extensive Seoul communications complex for carrying offensive action into North Korea.

(d) By the direct action of the 1st Marine Division, the enemy’s potential was reduced by the capture of 4,692 POWs, by inflicting 13,666 casualties on the enemy, by destroying 44 tanks, and by destroying or capturing much other material.[475]

[475] MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 45–46. Here again it may be noted that later reports, not available when this study was made, indicate that duplicate claims were entered for four of these 44 tanks, with two others unaccounted for in records. The actual total, therefore, is 38.

In view of such far-reaching results, total casualties for the 1st Marine Division of 366 KIA, 49 DOW, 6 MIA, and 2,029 WIA cannot be considered excessive for an operation fraught with so many calculated risks. No man’s life was given in vain, for the Communist challenge to the free nations was met in Korea and the aggressors beaten so decisively that the world would soon have had peace except for the intervention of Red China.

_MacArthur’s Report to United Nations_

Again it is worthy of emphasis that the victory was not won by any one nation or any one branch of the military service. As far as this country is concerned, the Inchon-Seoul operation was conducted jointly by the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. General Douglas MacArthur was spokesman for all of them late in September 1950, in these extracts from the Sixth Report of the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, to the Security Council of the United Nations:

“Events of the past two weeks have been decisive. The strategic concepts designed to win the war are rapidly proving their soundness through aggressive application by our ground, sea, and air forces.

“The seizure of the heart of the enemy’s distributing system in the Seoul area has completely dislocated his logistical supply to his forces in South Korea and has quickly resulted in their disintegration. Caught between our northern and southern forces, both of which are completely self-sustaining because of our absolute air and naval supremacy, the enemy is thoroughly shattered through disruption of his logistical support and our combined combat activities.

“The prompt junction of our two forces is dramatically symbolic of this collapse.

“The obstacles to this wide envelopment were not only the enemy opposition, but also the natural obstacles of poor beaches fronted by miles of mud flats, a narrow channel and an extraordinary tidal range of over 29 feet. The success demonstrated a complete mastery of the technique of amphibious warfare, clockwork coordination, and cooperation between the units and services participating. There was nothing noteworthy about the North Korean opposition, but there could have been. The potential was there. The North Koreans were proceeding with the construction of coastal fortifications, dug-in tanks and guns of all calibers, beach defenses and mining operations. Had this development been delayed for as much as a month, the enemy would have been ready and the assault, if possible, would have been more costly to United Nations forces.”

At no time, not even when the United Nations forces were fighting with their backs to the wall at Pusan, did the commander in chief ever have any doubts as to the outcome. It was fitting, therefore, that he should have summed up the results of the combined Eighth Army and X Corps offensives in this conclusion written after the securing of Seoul:

“A successful frontal attack and envelopment has completely changed the tide of battle in South Korea. The backbone of the North Korean army has been broken and their scattered forces are being liquidated or driven north with material losses in equipment and men captured.”

APPENDIX A

Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations

AAA(AW)Bn--Antiaircraft Artillery (Automatic Weapons) Battalion (USA). AD--Destroyer Tender. AE--Ammunition Ship. AerialDelPlat--Aerial Delivery Platoon. AF--Air Force; Store Ship. AGC--Amphibious Force Flagship. AH--Hospital Ship. AK--Cargo Ship. AKA--Assault Cargo Ship. AKL--Cargo Ship--Light. AKS--Stores Issue Ship. AM--Minesweeper. AmphTracBn--Amphibious Tractor Battalion. AmphTrkBn--Amphibious Truck Battalion. AMS--Auxiliary Motor Minesweeper. ANGLICO--Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company. AO--Oiler. AOG--Gasoline Tanker. AP--Transport. APA--Assault Transport. APD--High Speed Transport. ARG--Repair Ship--Internal Combustion Engines. ARH--Repair Ship--Heavy Hull Damage. ARL--Repair Ship--Landing Craft. ArmdAmphBn--Armored Amphibian Battalion. ARS--Salvage Vessel. AT--Antitank. ATF--Ocean Tug--Fleet. AV--Seaplane Tender. AVP--Seaplane Tender, Small. Bchmstr Unit--Beachmaster Unit. BLT--Battalion Landing Team. Bn--Battalion. CA--Heavy Cruiser. CG--Commanding General. CICDet--Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachment (USA). CinCFE--Commander in Chief, Far East. CinCPacFlt--Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. CL--Light Cruiser. CMC--Commandant of the Marine Corps. CNO--Chief of Naval Operations. CO--Commanding Officer. Co--Company. ComAirSupGrp--Commander Air Support Group. ComCarDiv--Commander Carrier Division. ComNavFE--Commander Navy Far East. ComPhibGruOne--Commander Amphibious Group One. CP--Command Post. C/S--Chief of Staff. CSG--Combat Service Group. CTF--Commander Task Force. CV--Aircraft Carrier. CVE--Aircraft Carrier--Escort. CVL--Aircraft Carrier--Light. DD--Destroyer. DDE--Escort Destroyer. DDR--Radar Picket Destroyer. DOW--Died of wounds. DUKW--Amphibious Truck. Emb Off--Embarkation Officer. EngrBn--Engineer Battalion. EngrPortConstCo--Engineer Port Construction Company (USA). EngrSpecBrig--Engineer Special Brigade (USA). ETO--European Theater of Operations. EUSAK--Eighth United States Army in Korea. FABn--Field Artillery Battalion (USA). FAC--Forward Air Controller. FBHL--Force Beachhead Line. FEAF--Far East Air Force. FECOM--Far East Command. F4U--Vought “Corsair” Fighter. FMF--Fleet Marine Force (Pac-Pacific; Lant-Atlantic). FO--Forward Observer. FSA--Fire Support Area. FSCC--Fire Support Coordination Center. F7F-3--Grumman “Tigercat” Night Fighter. Fum & Bath Plat--Fumigation and Bath Platoon. GCI--Ground Control Intercept. GHQ--General Headquarters. H & S Co--Headquarters and Service Company. HO3S-1--Sikorsky Helicopter. HqBn--Headquarters Battalion. HqCo--Headquarters Company. HqSq--Headquarters Squadron. InfDiv--infantry Division (USA). interv--Interview. JANIS--Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies. JCS--Joint Chiefs of Staff. JSPOG--Joint Strategic Planning and Operations Group. JTF--Joint Task Force. KIA--Killed in Action. KMC--Korean Marine Corps. LCM--Landing Craft, Mechanized. LCVP--Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel. LSD--Landing Ship, Dock. LSM--Landing Ship, Medium. LSMR--Landing Ship, Medium-Rocket. LST--Landing Ship, Tank. LSU--Landing Ship, Utility. LVT--Landing Vehicle, Tracked. LVT(A)--Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Armored). MAG--Marine Air Group. MAW--Marine Air Wing. MedBn--Medical Battalion. MGCIS--Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron. MIA--Missing in action. MOS--Military Occupational Specialty. MPCo--Military Police Company. MTACS--Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron. MTBn--Motor Transport Battalion. NCO--Noncommissioned Officer. NGF--Naval Gunfire. NK--North Korea(n). NKPA--North Korean Peoples Army. OCMH--Office of the Chief of Military History (USA). Off--Officer. OP--Observation Post. OpnO--Operation Order. OrdAmmCo--Ordnance Ammunition Company (USA). OrdBn--Ordnance Battalion. OY--Consolidated-Vultee light observation plane. PC--Submarine Chaser. PCEC--Escort Amphibious Control Vessel. PF--Frigate. PhibGru--Amphibious Group. PhibTraPac--Training Command, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet. PIR--Periodic Intelligence Report. Plat--Platoon. POL--Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants. POW--Prisoner of War. RAF--Royal Air Force. RcnCo--Reconnaissance Company. RCT--Regimental Combat Team. RktBn--Rocket Battalion. ROK--Republic of Korea. SAC--Supporting Arms Center. SAR--Special Action Report. SCAJAP--Supreme Commander Allied Powers, Japan. ServBn--Service Battalion. SigBn--Signal Battalion. SigRepCo--Signal Repair Company (USA). SPBn--Shore Party Battalion. SpOpnsCo--Special Operations Company (USA). TAC--Tactical Air Coordinator. TAC X Corps--Tactical Air Command, X Corps. TacAir--Tactical Air. TADC--Tactical Air Direction Center. T-AP--Transport Operated by MSTS. T/E--Table of Equipment. TF--Task Force. TG--Task Group. T/O--Table of Organization. UDT--Underwater Demolitions Team. UF--Unit of fire. UN--United Nations. UNC--United Nations Command. USA--United States Army. USAF--United States Air Force. USMC--United States Marine Corps. USN--United States Navy. VMF--Marine fighter type aircraft (squadron). VMF(N)--Marine night fighter type aircraft, all-weather (squadron). VMO--Marine observation type aircraft (squadron). VMR--Marine transport type aircraft (squadron). WIA--Wounded in action. WP--White phosphorous. YMS--Motor Minesweeper. YTB--Harbor Tug, Big. YW--District Barge, Water (self-propelled).

APPENDIX B

Build-Up of 1st Marine Division (Reinf)

(Figures include Marine Corps and Navy, both officer and enlisted)

------------------------------+---------+----------+-------------+---------- Authorized by CMC ltr conf. |1st Prov | Main | 7th RCT | Total in Ser. 03C20550 of 25 Jul 54 | Marine | body | (sailed | Inchon- and CMC ltr conf. Ser. | Brigade | (sailed | from | Seoul 03A21250 of 4 Aug 50 |(sailed | San Diego|Mediterranean| area on ---------------------+--------+San Diego| 10–22 Aug| 16 Aug 50 |23 Sep 50 | |14 Jul 50| 50 | and San | [477] Units |Strength| arrived | arrived | Diego | | | Pusan, | Kobe | 28 Aug- | | | Korea | Japan | 2 Sep 50 | | |2 Aug 50)|28 Aug to | arrived | | | |10 Sep 50)| Inchon on | | | | | 21 Sep 50) | | | | | [476] | ---------------------+--------+---------+----------+-------------+---------- DIVISION | 22,343 | 4,770 | 12,195 | 5,336 | 20,218 +--------+---------+----------+-------------+---------- Hq Bn | 923 | 259 | 725 | | 860 Hq Co | (656)| (182)| | | Mp Co | (140)| (38)| | | RcnCo | (127)| (39)| | | 1st Serv Bn | 827 | 173 | 656 | | 785 1st Sig Bn | 960 | 249 | 591 | 116 | 661 1st MT Bn | 783 | 118 | 582 | 89 | 761 1st Ord Bn | 558 | 124 | 438 | | 518 1st Med Bn | 636 | 99 | 432 | 107 | 667 1st Tank Bn | 907 | 181 | 677 | 132 | 921 1st SP Bn | 755 | 188 | 357 | 196 | 836 1st Engr Bn | 1,180 | 218 | 815 | 163 | 969 11th Marines | 3,108 | 518 | 1,845 | 697 | 3,009 1st Marines | 3,902 | | 3,942 | | 3,393 5th Marines | 3,902 | 2,643 |[478]1,135| | 3,170 7th Marines | 3,902 | | | 3,836 | 3,666 +========+=========+==========+=============+========== FMF TROOPS | 3,969 | 554 | 3,167 | | 2,973 +--------+---------+----------+-------------+---------- 1st Armd Amph Bn | 526 | | 490 | | 1st Amph Trac Bn | 944 | 256 | 720 | | [479]842 1st Amph Trk Co | 245 | 77 | 166 | | 236 Btry C, 1st 4.5″ | 90 | | 89 | | 77 Rkt Bn | | | | | Carrier Plat FMF | 94 | | 84 | | 86 1st Comb Serv Grp | 1,434 | 109 | 1,120 | | 1,167 7th MT Bn | 431 | | 418 | | 410 1st Air Delivery Plat| 63 | | 62 | | 63 1st Fum & Bath Plat | 30 | | 18 | | 30 VMO 6 | 112 | 112 | | | 62 +========+=========+==========+=============+========== Total reinforced | 26,312 | 5,324 | 15,362 | 5,336 | 23,191 division | | | | | ---------------------+--------+---------+----------+-------------+----------

[476] Activated 17 Aug 50. The 3d Bn 6th Marines, in the Mediterranean, was assigned to the 7th Marines and, upon arrival in Kobe, Japan, on 3 Sept 50, was redesignated the 3d Bn 7th Marines. Augmentation personnel for this Battalion arrived in Kobe, Japan, on 14 Sept 50 on the USS _Thomas Jefferson_. The regimental commander and his staff arrived by air at Kobe on 6 Sept 50.

[477] Based on Division Personnel Periodic Report No. 1 covering the period 15–23 Sept 50. The following losses and gains during the period are reflected in this report:

_Net _Losses_ _Gains_ Loss_

KIA 118 Replacements 28 WIA 845 Returned to duty 160 MIA 14 ----- ----- Non-battle Cas 286 188 1,075 ----- 1,263

[478] Augmentation personnel for the 5th Marines (Reinf) already in Korea. The CO, 1st Marines was charged with the assembly and organization of the augmentation units for the 5th Marines (Reinf). Augmentation personnel were organized into three reinforced rifle companies. (The battalions of the 5th Marines in Korea contained only two rifle companies each.) The reinforced rifle companies were embarked together on one ship. Augmentation personnel for units of the Brigade, other than the 5th Marines, were attached to the reinforced rifle companies.

[479] The 1st Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion was left in Kobe. In addition, at Kobe, were the Division Administrative Center and some 500 17-year olds, who, by order of SecNav, were removed from the troop list just before sailing for Inchon. As of 15 Sept 50 there were the following personnel of the 1st Marine Division (Reinf) at Kobe:

Key: _O_: Officers _E_: Enlisted

_Marine Corps_ _Navy_ _Total_ -------------- -------- ---------- _O_ _E_ _O_ _E_ _O_ _E_ 59 1,268 3 14 62 1,282

APPENDIX C

Task Organization of Marine Division for Inchon Landing

In order to present a concise picture of the Task Organization of the 1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF, for the period of 1 August-7 October 1950, task organizations are presented for the following five conditions:

(1) Completion of mobilization of the Division (less 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and RCT-7) at Camp Pendleton, Oceanside, California, 12 August.

(2) Organization for landing at INCHON, KOREA, 15 September.

(3) RCT-7 task organization on arrival INCHON, KOREA, 21 September.

(4) Intermediate temporary attachments and detachments during the period 15 September-7 October.

(5) Completion of INCHON-KIMPO-SEOUL operation on 7 October.

The detailed Task Organizations are as follows:

(1) Completion of Mobilization on WAR “K” series T/O, 12 August.

_1st Marine Division, (Reinf) FMF_ MajGen O. P. SMITH

HqBn, 1stMarDiv, less Brig Det LtCol M. T. STARR 1st SigBn, less Brig Det, 2 SP Comm Sects & Det Anglico Carrier Plat, FMF Maj R. L. SCHREIER 1st ServBn, less Brig Det LtCol C. L. BANKS 1st OrdBn, less Brig Det Maj L. O. WILLIAMS 1st MT Bn, less Cos A and D; 1st Amph Trk Co, FMF, less 1 Plat LtCol O. L. BEALL 1st Med Bn, less Cos A and E Comdr H. B. JOHNSON, USN 1st EngrBn, less Cos A and D LtCol J. H. PARTRIDGE 1st SP Bn, less Cos A and C LtCol H. P. CROWE 1st Tk Bn, less Cos A and D; Tk Plat AT Co, 1st Mar Tk Plat AT Co, 5th Mar LtCol H. T. MILNE 1st Amph Trac Bn, FMF, less Cos A and D LtCol E. F. WANN 1st Armd Amph Bn, FMF, less 1st Plat Co A and Cos C and D LtCol F. H. COOPER

1st CSG, SC, FMF, less BrigDet; 1st Fum & Bath Plat, SC, FMF 1st Aerial Del Plat, SC, FMF Col J. S. COOK 7th MT Bn, SC, FMF Maj J. F. STEPKA 1st Mar, less Tk Plat, AT Co; Cos C, F, and I, Reinf, 5th Mar Col L. B. PULLER 11th Mar, less 1st and 3rd Bns; Btry C, 1st 4.5″ Rkt Bn, FMF Col J. H. BROWER

(2) Organization for landing at INCHON, KOREA (1st Prov Mar Brig disbanded 13 September, units and detachments reverted control parent organizations of division). Task Organization from Annex “A”, 1st Mar Div Op Order 2-50 as derived from X Corps Op Order No. 1.

_1st Marine Division (Reinf) FMF_ MajGen O. P. SMITH

HqBn, Reinf, 1stMarDiv, less dets 163rd Mil Int Service Det 441st CIC Det 1st Sig Bn, Reinf, less dets; Det, 205th Sig Rep Co USA Carrier Plat, FMF Det, 4th Sig Bn, USA 1st Serv Bn, less Dets 1st MT Bn 1st Ord Bn, less dets Det, MTACS-2

_Blt-3, RCT-5_ LtCol R. D. TAPLETT

3dBn, 5th Mar Det, ANGLICO, 1st Sig Bn Det, Co A, 1st Tk Bn Recon Det, 11th Mar Team 1, SP Gp A 1stPlat, Co A, 1st SP Bn SP Comm Sqd, 1st Sig Bn Amm Sqd, 1st Ord Bn Det, Rat Sec, 1st Ser Bn Det, 1st CSG, (SP Aug) Det, Bchmstr Unit, USN

_RCT-5_ LtCol R. L. MURRAY

5th Mar, less 3dBn & Tk Plat, AT Co Co A, 1st Engr Bn Co C, 1st Med Bn Det Anglico, 1st Sig Bn ROK Marine Bn SP GP A, less Team 1; Co, A, 1st SP Bn, less 1 Plat Evac Sec, 1st SP Bn Det, Ord Sup Plat, CSG Det, Auto Sup Plat, CSG Det, Engr Sup Plat, CSG Det, CS Plat, CSG Det, Sig Sup Plat, CSG SP Comm Sec, 1st Sig Bn Det, 1st CSG (SP Aug) Det, Bchmstr Unit, USN 1st Traffic Plat, MP Co Police Sqd, MP Co FO & Ln Sec, 1st Bn, 11th Mar Co A, 1st Tk Bn, less det Det, Sig Co, 1st Sig Bn

_RCT-1_ Col L. B. PULLER

1st Mar, less Tk Plat, AT Co Co A, Reinf, 56th Amph Trac Bn, USA Btry C, 1st 4.5″ Rkt Bn, FMF Co C, Reinf, 1st Engr Bn, less det; Water Sup Sec Co D, 1st Med Bn, less det Det ANGLICO, 1st Sig Bn SP Gp B, less Team 3; Co B, 1st SP Bn, less 1 Plat & Equip Sec Evac Sec, 1st SP Bn Amm Plat, less 1 Sqd, 1st Ord Bn Rat Sec, 1st Ser Bn Fuel Sec, 1st Ser Bn SP Comm Sec, 1st Sig Bn

Det, Bchmstr Unit, USN Det, 1st CSG (SP Aug) 2d Traffic Plat, MP Co Police Sqd, MP Co FO & Ln Secs, 2d Bn, 11th Mar

_11th Mar, less 3d Bn, reinf_ Col J. H. BROWER

96th FA Bn, USA Det, Co B, 1st Engr Bn 1st Amph Trk Co, FMF

_1st Tk Bn, less dets, reinf_ LtCol H. T. MILNE

Tk Plat, AT Co, 1st Mar Tk Plat, AT Co, 5th Mar

_1st Engr Bn, less dets_ LtCol J. H. PARTRIDGE

_1st SP Bn, less dets_ LtCol H. P. CROWE

H&S Co, 1st SP Bn, less dets SP Comm Sec, 1st Sig Bn Team 3, SP Gp B 3d Plat, Co B, 1st SP Bn Equip Sec, Co B, 1st SP Bn SP Comm Sec, 1st Sig Bn Det, Ord Sup Plat, CSG Det, Auto Sup Plat, CSG Det, Engr Sup Plat, CSG Det, Sig Sup Plat, CSG Det, GS Plat, CSG Det, Depot Plat, CSG

_Rcn Co, 1st MAR Div_ Capt K. J. HOUGHTON

_1st Amph Trac Bn, FMF_ LtCol E. F. WANN

_VMO-6_ Maj V. J. GOTTSCHALK

_ROK Marine Regt_ (-) Col SHIN, KMC

_2d Engr Spec Brig reinf_ Col J. TWITTY, USA

1st CSG, SC, FMF, less dets 1st Fum & Bath Plat 1st Aerial Del Plat Naval Beach Gp 1, less dets 7th MT Bn, SC, FMF 73d Engr (C) Bn, USA 50th Engr Port Const Co, USA 65th Ord Amm Co, USA

(3) RCT-7 Task Organization on landing at INCHON, KOREA, 21 September. Attachments reverted to parent control on arrival assembly areas.

_RCT-7_ Col H. L. LITZENBERG

7th Mar 3d Bn, 11th Mar Co D, 1st MT Bn Co D, 1st Tk Bn Co D, 1st Engr Bn Co E, 1st Med Bn Co C, 1st SP Bn Det, 1st Sig Bn (ANGLICO & 2 SP Comm Sec)

(4) Intermediate temporary attachments and detachments during the period 15 September-7 October.

18 Sept--32nd RCT USA attached 1st Mar Div

19 Sep--SpOpnsCo USA attchd 1st Mar Div 32nd RCT detached 1st MarDiv reverted to 7th Inf Div

23 Sep--17th ROK Regt attchd 1st Mar Div 17th ROK Regt detached 1st Mar Div

24 Sep--3d Bn, 187th Airborne RCT USA Attchd 1st Mar Div 3d Bn, KMC Regt detached 1st Mar Div attached 3d Bn, 187th AB RCT 1st Amph Trac Bn, FMF, less 3 Cos, detached 1st Mar Div attchd 7th Inf Div Co A, 1st Amph Tk and Trac Bn, USA, detached 1st Mar Div attchd 7th Inf Div

25 Sept--3d Bn, 187th AB RCT detached 1st Mar Div, attchd X Corps 3d Bn, KMC Regt det 3d Bn, 187th AB RCT attchd 1st MarDiv 161st KMC Bn (redesignated 5th KMC Bn) attchd 1st Mar Div Sp Opns Co, USA detached 1st Mar Div, attchd 3d Bn, 187th AB RCT

26 Sep--3d Bn KMC Regt detached 1st Mar Div, attchd 187th AB RCT (TF ABLE)

29 Sep--1st Amph Trac Bn, less 3d Cos, detached 7th Inf Div attchd 1st Mar Div 96th FA Bn, USA detached 1st Mar Div

30 Sep--50th AAA(AW)Bn attached 1st Mar Div

3 Oct--50th AAA(AW)Bn detached 1st Mar Div

(5) Completion of INCHON-SEOUL operation, 7 October, and prior to mounting out at INCHON.

_1st Marine Division Reinf, FMF_ MajGen O. P. SMITH

HqBn, 1st MarDiv 163d MISD 441st CIC Civ Asst Team LtCol M. T. STARR

1st Sig Bn Carrier Plat, FMF Maj R. L. SCHREIER

1st Serv Bn LtCol C. L. BANKS

1st Ord Bn Maj L. O. WILLIAMS

1st MT Bn 1st Amph Trk Co, FMF LtCol O. L. BEALL

1st Tk Bn LtCol H. T. MILNE

1st Med Bn Comdr H. B. JOHNSON, USN

1st SP Bn LtCol H. P. CROWE

1st Engr Bn LtCol J. H. PARTRIDGE

1st Mar Col L. B. PULLER

5th Mar LtCol R. L. MURRAY

7th Mar Col H. L. LITZENBERG

11th Mar Btry C, 1st 4.5″ Rkt Bn, FMF Col J. H. BROWER

1st Amph Trac Bn, FMF less Co D LtCol E. F. WANN

1st Armd Amph Bn, FMF less Cos C & D LtCol F. H. COOPER

7th MT Bn, SC, FMF Maj J. F. STEPKA

1st CSG, SC, FMF less dets; 1st Fum & Bath Plat 1st Aerial Del Plat Col J. S. COOK

APPENDIX D

Supplies and Equipment for Inchon

1st Marine Division Embarkation Order 1-50 of 31 August 1950 provided that the following supplies and equipment would be embarked in assigned shipping:

a. Class I

(1) Rations: 30 days as follows:

For attached Army units and 5th Marines (Reinf) Individual Assault Type C 5 days (Combat Unit Loaded) ( 5 days) Operational Type B 25 days (Unit Loaded) (25 days) PX Accessories Pack 30 days (Combat Unit Loaded) ( 5 days) (Unit Loaded) (10 days) (Convoy Loaded) (15 days)

For 1st Marine Division (Reinf) (Less Army elements and 5th Marines (Reinf)) 5 days Operational Type B (Convoy Loaded) Food Packet, Individual Assault 1A1 2 days (In hands of individuals) (1 day) Individual Combat, Type C 10 days (Combat Unit Loaded) ( 5 days) (Unit Loaded) ( 5 days) PX Accessories Pack 30 days (Combat Unit Loaded) ( 5 days) (Unit Loaded) (10 days) (Convoy Loaded) (15 days) Small Detachment 5 in 1 Type 5 days (Unit Loaded) ( 5 days) Individual Combat Type C (Convoy Loaded-Corps Reserve) 150,000 Rations (In hands of 1st Serv Bn)

(2) Water

(a) All water containers filled, not less than 5 gallons per man combat loaded; 5 gallons per man to be unit loaded.

(b) Assault Elements: 2 filled canteens per individual.

(c) Others: 1 filled canteen.

b. Class II

(1) Essential Class II items as determined by unit commanders. Vehicles to be loaded on priority basis within available space.

(2) Initial (less chemical warfare) in hands of units.

(3) Chemical warfare in hands of 1st Serv Bn.

(4) 30 day replenishment in hands of appropriate service units.

(5) All distillation units to have high priority for unloading.

(6) No special services gear to be lifted in assault shipping.

(7) Tentage: not to exceed 10% of T/E allowance.

(8) Other Class II in accordance AdOrder 2-50.