CHAPTER XII

Mission Completed

_Collapse of the 9th NKPA Division--Attacks of 5 September--Two Marine Tanks Killed--The Brigade’s Final Action--Brigade Embarkation at Pusan--Results of Brigade Operations--Summaries and Conclusions_

The casualties of 2/5 for 3 September totaled 18 dead and 77 wounded, most of them being taken by Company D. Lieutenant Colonel Murray ordered the 3d Battalion to pass through the 2d, therefore, and continue the attack on the right of the MSR at 0800 the next morning. The 1st Battalion was to resume its advance south of the MSR, while the Reconnaissance Company far out on the left would move forward to a new blocking position.[342]

[342] This section is derived from: Brig SAR 3d Bn, 5th Marines (3/5) SAR, 1–6 Sep 50; Craig, 23 May 54; and Taplett, 20 Apr 54.

Shortly after dawn on the 4th, the 1st Platoon of engineers went forward and removed the mines ahead of 1/5’s positions. Preparatory fires by 1/11 at 0750 routed a group of enemy on the peak on Baker Company’s front, and the Marine riflemen had a field day as the Reds threw away their weapons and pelted westward.

Companies A and B jumped off at 0800 and advanced rapidly over the high ground south of the MSR against negligible resistance. The attackers frequently observed small groups of enemy fleeing in all directions, and many of the Communists were cut down by Brigade air, artillery, and armor. Twelve prisoners were captured before 1/5 reached its half of Brigade Objective One at 1505. This was the high ground south of the MSR at Kang-ni, over 3,000 yards from the line of departure.

Shortly after 0800, 3/5 had launched a two-pronged assault against Hill 117, core of the NKPA 9th Division’s resistance the previous day. Company G advanced through Easy Company’s lines just above the MSR and pushed across the intervening rice paddies. The Marines charged over a small knoll in their path but found the enemy positions unoccupied except for several dead. Bohn quickly led the company to the southern slopes of Hill 117, which was strangely quiet by comparison with the tumult of the previous day. In capturing the southern half of the hill, Company G killed only 15 North Koreans.

Simultaneously with Bohn’s advance, Company H swung wide to the right and passed through the thin ranks of Dog Company on the northern tip of Hill 117. The attackers drove south against negligible resistance and quickly linked with Company G, securing the objective at 0840.

A connecting road runs from Myong-ni to the MSR, tracing the eastern base of Hill 117. Since engineers on the previous night had located the enemy minefield east of the junction on the main road, Taplett moved his headquarters to the MSR via the connecting road. The lead vehicle, a personnel carrier loaded with communications men, struck a Communist mine on the secondary route east of the newly captured objective. The resulting explosion caused 10 casualties.

By noon the engineers had cleared the road of several Russian-type mines identical to those found during the night. The two anti-vehicular minefields were among the first such obstacles encountered by the UN forces in the Korean conflict.

After seizing Hill 117, Companies G and H continued the attack westward by advancing abreast on the high ground north of the MSR. Contact with 1/5 on the left was maintained, but the 9th Infantry on the right soon fell behind and disappeared from sight.

At 1045 Company G ran into machinegun fire coming from the 3/5 area of the Brigade objective, the hill north of Kang-ni. Taplett blasted the hill with Marine air and artillery, and the North Koreans were in full retreat within an hour. MAG-33 and 1/11 rained death on the retreating Reds and continued to pound the hill preparatory to an assault by Company G. Bohn led his troops forward and secured the objective at 1515.

Looking across the stream bed to the north of their new positions, the Marines of George Company spotted enemy infantry escorting a T-34 tank and withdrawing into the 9th Infantry zone. The Communist column was quickly dispersed by machinegun fire.

_Collapse of NKPA 9th Division_

Marines following up the 3,000-yard advance along the MSR saw, a picture of devastation unequalled even by the earlier defeat of the NKPA 4th Division. Hundreds of enemy dead were strewn along the road, hillsides and ridgelines. On the MSR between Hill 117 and Kang-ni lay a long column of North Koreans who had been caught by Marine air and artillery while attempting to reinforce Red lines. The dead leader was a lieutenant colonel whose briefcase contained a lengthy artillery treatise among other less scholarly documents.[343]

[343] _Ibid._

In addition to knocked-out and abandoned Communist tanks, vehicles, mortars, and antitank guns, the countryside was littered with enough small arms, ammunition, and gear to equip several hundred men. Even the North Korean paymaster had been caught in the sweeping tide of Brigade arms, and Marines distributed a huge quantity of worthless currency among themselves.

Not only did the Marines reap a harvest of enemy materiel; they also recaptured a great quantity of United States Army equipment lost during the Communist drive. American tanks, artillery pieces, mortars, vehicles, small arms, and ammunition and supply dumps were turned over to the 2d Division by the Brigade.

The destruction of the enemy camp left Army and Marine intelligence officers inundated by captured enemy documents. Muster rolls, ledgers, maps, orders, textbooks, and propaganda material were heaped into separate piles.

Late in the afternoon of 4 September, the 9th Infantry moved into positions on the high ground northeast of 3/5. This completed the advance to Phase Line One of the 2d Division’s counterattack plan. The second phase line on G-3 maps was drawn through Hill 125 and Observation Hill, 3,000 yards west of Kang-ni.

When informed that the Brigade had completed the first part of its mission, General Keiser authorized General Craig to advance toward Phase Line Two.

Beyond Kang-ni, the Brigade’s right boundary became the MSR, so that 3/5 could not advance westward from its half of Objective One. Major Charles H. Brush, Murray’s S-3, radioed Newton and passed on orders for the battalion commander to take the next piece of high ground, Cloverleaf Hill, just south of the MSR at Hwayong-ni, about a thousand yards away.

The 1st Battalion struck out through the intervening rice paddy, Company A on the left and Baker Company just below the MSR. Fenton’s unit had hardly begun the advance when it was stopped by heavy machinegun fire coming from the high ground north of Hwayong-ni. Newton then called for an air strike on the ridge and also requested 3/5 to keep it covered with supporting fire during Company B’s attack.

Enemy resistance evaporated with accustomed rapidity, and the Marines reported Cloverleaf Hill secure at 1800. Murray then ordered both front line battalions to establish night defenses and be prepared to continue the attack at 0800, 5 September.

The extent and trace of the Brigade front line on the night of 4–5 September was almost identical to that of 24 hours before. Again Newton’s battalion was in front on the left by a good 1,000 yards, and Companies A and B were stretched across a line almost a mile long, with the left flank wide open.

Separated from both 1/5 on the left and the 9th Infantry on the right, the 3d Battalion established a perimeter defense, even though it was in the center of the counterattack zone.

There was considerable tension and excitement after darkness on 4 September, although the Brigade lines were never seriously threatened. The engineers were busy in 1/5’s zone until after midnight, creeping to the front and flanks to lay mines. The 3d Battalion was shelled heavily throughout the night, and 1/5’s CP took direct hits killing 1 Marine and wounding 2 others. One of the wounded was Second Lieutenant James R. Young, Newton’s Assistant S-3. The artillery liaison officer, First Lieutenant Joris J. Snyder, was knocked unconscious for several hours, though he received not a scratch from the 120-mm. explosion a few yards away.

At 0230 night-fighter planes of Major Joseph H. Reinburg’s VMF(N)-513 bombed the North Korean mortar position causing most of the damage, and the shelling slackened appreciably. Completing this mission, the Marine pilots dumped general purpose and fragmentation bombs on enemy vehicles and troops in the area.[344]

[344] VMF(N)-513 SAR, Appendix 6, 16.

Companies G and H reported movement forward of their lines before dawn, and 3/5’s 81-mm. mortars quickly illuminated the front, disclosing several small groups of enemy. There was a flurry of fire, but the Reds gave no indication of organizing for an assault. One of the groups, either by error or suicidal folly, stumbled into the area of Taplett’s CP. A listening post of Weapons Company took the intruders under fire, killing an NKPA officer and routing the others.

_Attacks of 5 September_

Marines of the 3d Battalion were startled at daybreak, 5 September, when a company of North Koreans attacked the 9th Infantry’s left flank in full view of 3/5’s positions on the adjacent high ground. George, How, and H & S Companies poured machinegun fire into the mass of Reds at ranges of 600–1,000 yards. Most of the Red attackers were cut down before they could flee into the hills west of the Army lines.[345]

[345] This section is derived from: Annex How; 3/5 SAR, 1–6 Sep 50; Taplett, 20 Apr 54; and Fenton, 8 May 54.

Company B, on its high ground south of Hwayong-ni, heard the firing in 3/5’s area at daybreak and steeled itself for a possible counterattack from the right flank. When Newton received word of the abortive attack on the 9th Infantry, he ordered his two rifle companies to prepare to move out at 0800 as planned.

The Marines of Companies A and B were organizing their attack formation on Cloverleaf Hill when two Air Force P-51’s came in for an uncontrolled air strike on the high ground north of Hwayong-ni. Strafing the ridge from north to south, the planes riddled Cloverleaf Hill as they pulled out of their dives. The 2 exposed companies were showered with bullets, and it seemed miraculous that only 1 Marine was wounded.

At 0820, 1/5 jumped off to the west to seize the Brigade’s portion of Phase Line Two--Hill 125 and Observation Hill. Beyond these hills lay Obong-ni Ridge, blocking the path to the Naktong River, third and final phase line of the 2d Division counterattack. Because of its tactical importance and great significance, battle-scarred Obong-ni was designated a special objective, apart from the phase lines.

Half a mile west of Hwayong-ni the MSR makes a right-angle turn to the south, proceeds in that direction for 1,000 yards, then resumes its westward course through the cut between Hill 125 and Observation Hill.

Companies A and B, with the latter on the right, moved rapidly through the rice paddy below the MSR after leaving their line of departure on Cloverleaf Hill. At the road bend mentioned above, the MSR turned across Baker Company’s front. When Fenton’s unit crossed over to the base of the high ground leading to Hill 125, Companies A and B were separated by the MSR as it resumed its westward course. Stevens’ unit started up the long eastern slopes of Observation Hill, while Fenton’s men secured the eastern extension of Hill 125.

Obong-ni Ridge rumbled its first greeting to 1/5 at 0935 when mortars and artillery fired at the Marine attackers from emplacements around the hill. The Reds were answered immediately by 1/11 and Newton’s 81-mm. mortar platoon; and the rifle companies continued the advance to Phase Line Two, securing their objectives at 1100.

Murray ordered 1/5 to hold up until the 9th Infantry tied in on Fenton’s right. Communist automatic weapons on Obong-ni Ridge fired on the Marines sporadically during this interlude.

At 1000, while 1/5 was attacking to the west, the 3d Battalion had swung southward behind Cloverleaf Hill to take positions on the 5th Marines’ left. This was in preparation for Murray’s contemplated assault on Obong-ni Ridge by two battalions. It was planned that Newton’s unit would take the northern half of the long hill and 3/5 the southern portion.

Company G led the 3d Battalion advance through the rice paddy south of Cloverleaf Hill. Artillery and 75-mm. recoilless guns paved the way by raking possible enemy hiding places, enabling the infantrymen to proceed rapidly. Bohn’s destination was Hill 91, a shoe-like projection jutting out from the southern reaches of Obong-ni Ridge. Reaching the base of the high ground, Bohn requested that supporting fires be lifted. Attached tanks, 75’s, and 1/11 immediately shifted their destruction to Obong-ni Ridge.

Company G started up the slopes of Hill 91, while an attached 75-mm. recoilless gun obliterated a wheel-mounted machinegun and its crew going into position on the crest. The Marines had climbed only a few yards when Bohn was ordered by Taplett at 1230 to withdraw the company to Observation Hill.

Company H, then passing between Hill 91 and Observation Hill on its way to Obong-ni’s eastern approaches, received the same order from the Battalion commander. The assault on the ridge had been canceled, and Murray was concentrating his regiment along the MSR.

_Two Marine Tanks Killed_

Throughout the Brigade advance on 5 September, the Marines were hampered by heavy rain and fog which prevented MAG-33 and VMO-6 from operating effectively. Thus the enemy was offered a rare opportunity to mount a daylight attack.[346]

[346] This section is derived from: Annex How; LtCol M. R. Olson, interv with author, 15 Jun 54; Taplett, 20 Apr 54; Muetzel, 5–6 Jan 54 (with comments by Maj J. R. Stevens); and Fenton, 8 May 54.

After Company B received orders to hold up on Hill 125, Fenton ordered his men to dig foxholes along the rain-soaked crest facing Tugok village and Finger Ridge to the west and Obong-ni Ridge to the southwest. The company commander directed the attached 1st Platoon of tanks to remain in the road cut, just to the rear of the famous bend around the forward slopes of Hill 125. Peering through the rain and fog, the Marine tankmen could see the dead, black hulls of the three T-34’s knocked out by the Brigade 2 weeks earlier.

At 1420 the sporadic sniping from the front suddenly increased to the intensity of preparatory fire, and Baker Company was pinned down on its ridgeline positions. The northern tip of Obong-ni Ridge blazed with NKPA machineguns, whose chatter was soon joined by that of automatic weapons concealed in Tugok and at the northern base of Observation Hill. A Communist antitank gun on Finger Ridge added its voice intermittently to the chorus.

Fenton’s radio went dead just as he reported the situation to Newton at his OP on the high ground to the east. As luck would have it, every other radio in the company area was inoperative because of the mud and rain; and Fenton was unable to warn the Marine tanks in the road cut that enemy armor and troops were advancing toward the road bend from the west.

As the Communist vehicles swung into the turn, a company of Red soldiers left the road and assaulted Company B’s positions by advancing up the draw on the Marines’ left front. The intense overhead fire supporting the Red Infantry enabled them to get well up the forward slopes. Meanwhile, a squad of North Koreans advanced up the draw leading from Tugok and harassed Fenton’s right front.

To stop the attack, the Marines were forced to man the crest of Hill 125. Thus exposed to the enemy’s supporting fire, Company B had to pay a heavy price in casualties.

During the advance of the Communist armor, it was determined that the first 2 of the 3 vehicles were T-34 tanks and the last a tracked armored personnel carrier. Fenton immediately deployed his assault squad on the slopes below his left flank to meet the threat on the MSR.

Lieutenant Pomeroy, unaware of the enemy tanks around the bend, advanced his M-26’s so that the machineguns on Obong-ni Ridge could be taken under massed fire. Thus, as the first Marine tank reached the bend, its 90-mm. gun was pointing to the left front, a quarter turn away from the enemy armor.

The lead T-34 fired on the Marine vehicle as soon as it came into view. Before the turret of the M-26 could be turned to take aim, several more 85-mm. projectiles struck; and the Brigade lost its first tank to enemy action. The second M-26 in column tried to squeeze by the first to render assistance, and it too was knocked out by 85-mm. fire in the restricted passageway.

The crews of both Marine tanks managed to get out of their vehicles through the escape hatches. Some of the wounded were aided by the engineer mine-clearance team accompanying the tank column.

Since the road bend was now blocked, the remainder of Pomeroy’s tanks could do nothing but park in the road cut. It was Marine infantrymen who stepped in at this point and blunted the NKPA victory on the MSR.

Company B’s assault squad plastered the lead T-34 with 3.5″ rocket fire and stopped it cold. Shortly afterwards, the 1st Battalion’s assault platoon reached the fight scene and went into action with its 3.5’s. In short order the infantrymen had completed the destruction of the first tank, knocked out the second, and destroyed the enemy personnel carrier.

The historic road bend, as seen through the rain and mist, had become a graveyard of armor. A total of 8 steel monsters were sprawled there in death: 5 T-34’s and 1 armored carrier of the NKPA, and 2 Pershing tanks of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade.

_The Brigade’s Final Action_

On Hill 125 the fight reached a climax as Marines exchanged grenades and small-arms fire with the North Koreans slithering up the slopes in the driving rain. Company B had used all of its 60-mm. mortar shells and was running low on grenades and small arms ammunition. Enemy automatic weapons on the ridges to the front were still cutting down the Marine defenders at 1500 when Fenton sent a runner to Newton requesting more ammunition.[347]

[347] _Ibid._

The endurance contest was still in progress half an hour later, as the 9th Infantry moved into positions on the high ground north of Hill 125. Having no communications with his own supporting arms, Fenton sent a messenger to the Army unit commander, asking that he place artillery fire on the Marine front.

When Army shells began falling in answer to the request, 1/5’s 81-mm. mortars belatedly got into the fight and worked over the forward slopes of Hill 125 to within 50 yards of Company B’s positions. The heavy supporting fire turned the tide, and enemy pressure slackened considerably.

During the final stage of the enemy’s attack, Company A was being relieved on Observation Hill by 3/5. Stevens told his platoon leaders to leave their grenades and extra ammunition on the hill, since his orders were to withdraw to the rear. While the relief was taking place, however, Company A was ordered to reinforce Fenton’s unit against the enemy’s attack on Hill 125. Muetzel’s 2d Platoon, after recovering its ammunition, was augmented by a machinegun section, mortar squad, and two SCR-300 radios, before the young officer led the unit across the MSR to lend a hand.

When Stevens’ relief by 3/5 was completed, he added the 1st Platoon to Company B’s reinforcements, and himself withdrew to Cloverleaf Hill with the 3d Platoon as ordered.

The reinforcements were fed into Fenton’s line as fast as they reached the summit of Hill 125. By this time every man in Company B had been committed to the forward wall--mortarmen, clerks, signalmen, and all. Lieutenant Howard Blank combined his Able Company mortars with those of the defenders and immediately followed up the artillery and 81-mm. fire which had blunted the attack. These final concentrations of 60-mm. mortar fire on Obong-ni and Finger Ridges and the forward slopes of Hill 125 ended the enemy attack. The surviving Reds withdrew to Tugok.

At 1600, during the dying minutes of the Brigade’s final action in the Pusan Perimeter, Newton was ordered back to the regimental CP for a conference. The executive officer, Major Merlin R. Olson, took over 1/5 from the battalion OP on the ridge east of Hill 125.

The 5th Marines commander had called the leaders of his battalions to brief them on General Craig’s last field directive, which began with the long awaited words:

“THIS MY OPN ORDER 22-50 X COMMENCING AT 2400 5 SEPT BRIG MOVES BY RAIL AND MOTOR TO STAGING AREA PUSAN FOR FURTHER OPERATION AGAINST THE ENEMY X PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF MOVEMENT 5TH MARS WILL STAND RELIEVED BY ELMS OF 2ND INF DIV COMMENCING AT DARKNESS ... CONCEAL FROM THE ENEMY ACTIVITIES CONNECTED WITH YOUR WITHDRAWAL....”

Taplett’s 3d Battalion had sustained 24 casualties from artillery and mortar fire between its occupation of Observation Hill and the time it was relieved by a company of the 23d Infantry shortly after midnight. Plodding rearward through mud and driving rain, 3/5’s long column began its three-and-a-half-mile march to an entrucking point 2,000 yards west of Yongsan.

Following 3/5 were the weary, mud-soaked troops of the 1st Battalion. Having successfully defended Hill 125 at a cost of 2 killed and 23 wounded, Baker Company had filed down to the road after being relieved by another company of the 23d Infantry. Muetzel brought up the rear with Company A’s contingent, and a battalion column was formed at Olson’s check point east of Hill 125.

By dawn of 6 September, the two battalions were loading aboard trucks to follow the rest of the Brigade. Numbed by fatigue and icy rain, the bent forms huddled together in the cargo vehicles had no regrets as they bade good-bye to the Pusan perimeter.

_Brigade Embarkation at Pusan_

The movement to Pusan was completed by the morning of 7 September, and the Brigade troops found themselves back at the docks where they had landed a little more than a month before. In fact, the docks were to be their bivouac area during the next 6 days; the men slept in the open and took their meals on board the transports in which they would soon be sailing around the peninsula.

The survivors of the Naktong fights--even the latecomers who had joined the Brigade at the Bean Patch--felt old and worn when they saw the large draft of shiny new Marines just landed as third rifle companies organized with their own NCO’s and platoons. The veterans had forgotten how young and untroubled a Marine could look; how neat and clean he could appear in a recently issued utility jacket.

The new companies were immediately assigned to their battalions. It was another job for officers and NCO’s who had the responsibility of replacing equipment lost in action as well as servicing ordnance, motor transport and other heavy equipment which had been sent from the Bean Patch to Pusan late in August.[348]

[348] Col J. L. Stewart, interv with author, 10 Jun 54.

General Craig and his staff had their headquarters in one of the Pusan University buildings. There was no opportunity for planning, let alone rehearsals, for the forthcoming amphibious assault at Inchon. Craig and his officers had all they could do to get the Brigade ready for embarkation.

Among the tasks to be accomplished in less than a week, it remained to give some weapons training to the 3,000 troops of the 1st Korean Marine Regiment. This newly raised unit, attached to the Brigade for embarkation, was to make a name for itself within the next year and become the fourth rifle regiment of the 1st Marine Division. But in September 1950 there were great gaps in the training of the KMC’s. The men kept their rifles scrupulously clean, and they could strip an M-1 expertly, but few of them had ever fired a shot.

Marine NCO’s had the hazardous duty of giving the eager and excited KMC’s their first target practice after eight rounds of ammunition for each man had been acquired. No Marine casualties resulted, fortunately, but puffed and bruised cheeks were the rule among Koreans having their first experience with an M-1’s recoil.

There was, of course, no end of “scuttlebutt” going the rounds of the Marines as to their destination. One day the troops were lined up in formation and read a long lecture on the hydrographic aspects of the west coast port of Kunsan. It is to be hoped that this red herring made some impression upon the Koreans who were listening, since Pusan was a headquarters of enemy spies. As for the Marines, most of them concluded that at least Kunsan could be eliminated from the list of possible objectives.

The secret was well kept by Brigade officers in the higher echelons. Two engineer officers, First Lieutenant Ernest P. Skelt and Commissioned Warrant Officer Willard C. Downs, were given the secret mission of constructing wooden scaling ladders for the next operation. This project gave rise to more rumors, but it is safe to say that few men in the ranks knew the answer when the Brigade was deactivated at 0001 on 13 September 1950. The components immediately resumed their old unit designations in the 1st Marine Division and sailed to take part in the amphibious assault on Inchon scheduled for the 15th.[349]

[349] The Inchon-Seoul operation of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Air Wing from 15 September to 7 October 1950 is to be the subject of Volume II of this historical series devoted to Marine operations in Korea.

_Results of Brigade Operations_

As the mountains behind Pusan faded from sight, General Craig and his men could reflect that the Brigade’s 67 days of existence had been productive. Altogether, the Marine air-ground team had fought three difficult offensive operations in a month while traveling 380 miles with a third of its organic transportation plus Army vehicles.

Total casualties for the Brigade included 148 KIA, 15 DOW, 9 MIA (seven of whom were later reclassified as KIA after recovery of the bodies) and 730 WIA.[350] It was estimated that the Marines inflicted total casualties of 9,900 killed and wounded on opposing NKPA units. Enemy losses of arms and equipment were on such a scale as to impair the effectiveness of the forces concerned.

[350] Brig SAR, basic report.

In its initial operation, as a component of Task Force Kean, the Brigade had the major part in the first sustained Eighth Army counterattack--the military equivalent of a hard left jab which rocks an opponent back on his heels. General MacArthur, when reporting to the United Nations, asserted that “this attack not only secured the southern approaches to the beachhead, but also showed that the North Korean forces will not hold under attack.”[351]

[351] MCBS, I-II-A-18-19. This valuable operational study by Marine senior officers has been the guide for the summaries and analyses of Brigade results in these pages.

The Communist drive in this sensitive area came closest of all NKPA thrusts to the vital UN supply port of Pusan. Up to that time the NKPA units spearheading the advance--the 6th Infantry Division and the 83d Motorcycle Regiment--had never suffered a reverse worth mentioning since the outset of the invasion. Then the counterattack by the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade hurled the enemy back 26 miles in 4 days from the Chindong-ni area to Sachon.

It was estimated that the Marine air-ground team killed and wounded 1,900 of the enemy while destroying nearly all the vehicles of an NKPA motorized battalion in addition to infantry armament and equipment. The enemy threat in this critical area was nullified for the time being, and never again became so serious. Marine efforts assisted Army units of Task Force Kean in taking new defensive positions and defending them with fewer troops, thus freeing some elements for employment on other fronts. Finally, the Marines earned more time and space for the building up of Eighth Army forces in preparation for a decisive UN counteroffensive.

The next Brigade operation, the first battle of the Naktong, ranks with the hardest fights of Marine Corps history. The enemy, after showing skill and aggressiveness in breaching the last natural barrier of the Pusan Perimeter, widened his Naktong bridgehead and took strong defensive positions in preparation for an all-out offensive while still maintaining his material superiority.

Only two Eighth Army units were available for a counterattack--the 27th Infantry and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. The Army regiment being needed in reserve on the southern front, the “firemen of the Pusan Perimeter” were placed under the operational control of the 24th Infantry Division on the central front. There the Marines had the mission of clearing the enemy from Obong-ni Ridge and two other large hill masses of the Naktong Bulge.

The NKPA 4th Infantry Division had taken maximum advantage of strong defensive terrain in accordance with the precepts taught by Soviet and Chinese Communist military instructors. This enlarged bridgehead was credited by CINCFE with giving the enemy the capability of mounting a serious threat to the main railroad from Pusan to Taegu.

It took a bitter and costly effort on the part of the Brigade, but the result was the most smashing defeat ever given an NKPA major unit up to this time. This reverse turned into a rout and slaughter toward the end as Marine air, artillery, armor, and mortars inflicted terrible losses. Broken NKPA forces were cut down in flight or while trying to swim the Naktong.

If the Brigade’s first operation may be likened to a hard left jab, the fight in the Naktong Bulge is comparable to a solid right dealing a knockdown blow. The enemy lurched back to his feet, it is true, but the three rifle regiments of the NKPA 4th Infantry Division had to be filled up with hastily trained recruits.

Arms ranging from rifles to howitzers were abandoned as impediments by the routed Communists, so that the rebuilt NKPA 4th Infantry Division needed new armament and equipment of all sorts. General MacArthur’s summary of the action, reported to the UN Security Council on 18 September 1950, stated that “attacks by the United States 24th Division and the Marines eliminated a major penetration of the Naktong defense line on 18 August. Here, the enemy 4th Division was decisively defeated, lost its bridgehead, and was thrown westward across the Naktong River, suffering very heavy losses in both personnel and equipment.”

Never before had a major NKPA unit taken such a staggering defeat. As evidence of recent victories won over United States troops, the 4th Infantry Division had brought captured American machineguns and 105-mm. howitzers into the Naktong Bulge. Among the most important results achieved by the Brigade, therefore, was the hurt done to Red Korean morale.

Not only was the enemy’s Naktong bridgehead liquidated; he also lost heavily in time, which was becoming more valuable to him than space if he hoped to profit from his rapidly dwindling advantage in numbers. Not until 10 days later did the Communists establish another bridgehead in the Naktong Bulge area, and then it was their misfortune to encounter the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade again.

During the early morning hours of 1 September 1950, the enemy made his final effort to smash through to Pusan. Again the 27th Infantry was needed on another front, so that the Marines, as the only other mobile reserve unit, were committed under the operational control of the 2d Infantry Division, The seriousness of the situation in the Naktong Bulge is indicated by the fact that the enemy had enlarged his new bridgehead with a penetration of about 4,000 yards in the sector of the 2d Division. Elements of four enemy divisions had been identified on the central front when the Marines jumped off on the morning of 3 September.

The Brigade’s 3-day fight did not end as decisively as the first battle of the Naktong. That is because it was an unfinished fight. The Marines were pulled out on the night of 5 September, after gains of 2,500 to 3,000 yards that day, and it can only be conjectured what General Craig and his men might have accomplished during the next 48 hours.

As it was, the Brigade had a prominent part in disrupting the enemy’s effort to sever the Pusan-Taegu lifeline. Heavy losses both in personnel and equipment were inflicted on NKPA forces, and the Marines helped to reduce the enemy’s new bridgehead by 8,000 to 10,000 yards.

Not only had the enemy lost the battle; he had lost the war, as it proved, for EUSAK staff officers were even then planning a great UN counterstroke in the Pusan Perimeter. This drive was to be in conjunction with the amphibious assault on Inchon.

The turning point in the UN fortunes of war owed in no small measure to the three counterattacks by the Marines in the Pusan Perimeter. As for the overall effects, it would be hard to improve upon the analysis and evaluation in the Marine Corps Board Study:

“A careful examination of any of these operations in which Marines engaged discloses that a single failure would have a profound effect upon the entire UN effort.... On 3 separate occasions the Brigade was attached to the defending UN forces at points of dangerous enemy penetrations and 3 times Marine units spearheaded the counterattacking elements and effectively stopped the enemy’s efforts, seizing the initiative from him, inflicting serious losses upon him, and forcing the abandonment of immediate attempts at decisive penetration.”[352]

[352] MCBS, I-II-A-36.

_Summaries and Conclusions_

No Marine tactical organization of history ever did more than the Brigade to uphold the tradition of the Corps as a force-in-readiness. The transition from activation to embarkation took only 6 days, and it may be recalled that the Brigade became the first United States unit to get into the fight after crossing the Pacific from the American mainland.

Although the components had been hastily thrown together without opportunity for training or rehearsals, there were singularly few instances of tactical fumbling during the early actions. Some of the men had their only weapons familiarization instruction in actual battle, when they fired new arms for the first time. But thanks to the steadying influence of combat-wise company officers and NCO’s, the Marines of the Brigade soon gained competence.

The Brigade command and staff faced unusual problems arising from such factors as emergency situations, hurried planning, oral orders, incomplete intelligence, and lack of adequate maps. There were decisions now and then which officers would not have made if they had been endowed with the wisdom of knowledge after the event. But on the basis of information at the time, the Brigade command and staff need no whitewashing from history. Marine victories, on the other hand, may be attributed in large degree to a high order of leadership and professional ability in the upper echelons as well as on the company and platoon level.

It might have been argued that it was a waste to commit amphibious specialists to the operations of mountain warfare. But Marines were also trained as infantry, and gravel-crunching fighting men were needed to correct an illusion held by many of their countrymen. Atomic bombs, guided missiles, jet planes, and other marvelous new weapons had convinced a large section of the public that the day of push-button warfare was at hand. These Americans sincerely believed that wars could be waged at long distance, and the Marines of the Brigade served their country well by demonstrating that even in the tactical millenium it was necessary to seek out the enemy and close with him. For if there was any outstanding figure of the conflict in Korea, it was some second lieutenant making split-second decisions which meant life or death for a platoon holding a hill position against enemy attack in the darkness.

The three squadrons of MAG-33 provided support which the Brigade reported as “the best close air support in the history of the Marine Corps ... outstanding in its effectiveness.” Army infantry officers were frankly envious on occasion; and Colonel Paul L. Freeman, USA, commanding the 23d Infantry, commented that “the Marines on our left were a sight to behold. Not only was their equipment superior or equal to ours, but they had squadrons of air in direct support. They used it like artillery. It was ‘Hey, Joe--This is Smitty--Knock the left of that ridge in front of Item Company.’ They had it _day and night_. It came off nearby carriers, and not from Japan with only 15 minutes of fuel to accomplish mission.”[353]

[353] Quoted in MCBS, I-II-A-35; and I-IV-B-9.

The UN forces, of course, had complete supremacy in the air. On two occasions the Marines of the Brigade were briefly strafed by NKPA night hecklers making a “scalded-cat” raid. During the interlude at the Bean Patch an enemy plane winged its way under cover of darkness to cut loose with a brief burst of machinegun bullets before disappearing into the night. But United States Air Force planes had virtually destroyed the little NKPA air force during the first few weeks of the war, so that the men of the Brigade were virtually unopposed in the air.

The time interval between a request for Marine air support and the actual delivery varied according to local conditions, but the ground forces seldom had cause for complaint. All-weather Squadron VMF(N)-513, based at Itazuke, Japan, was prevented by reason of faulty communications and liaison from responding to every request for dawn, dusk or night support during early Brigade operations, but such missions were flown effectively in the Naktong Bulge. Meanwhile, the Corsairs of VMF-214 and VMF-323, orbiting on station and always available for short notice employment, gave fresh proof that the Navy-Marine concept of carrier-based tactical aircraft was sound in practice. Following are the statistics of MAG-33 operations in Korea from 3 August to 14 September 1950:

_Missions in close support_ _Squadron_ _Total _Miscellaneous ------------------------------- sorties_ sorties_ _USMC_ _Army_ _ROK_ _Total_

VMF-214 670 162 337 111 60 508 VMF-323 498 90 304 83 21 408 VMF(N)-513 343 264 21 50 8 79 ------------------------------------------------------ Totals 1511 516 662 244 8 995[354]

[354] MCBS, II, Appendix 64.

Demands on the time of the original 4 helicopters of VMO-6 made it necessary to fly 2 more machines in from Japan. The rotary-wing aircraft had so many “firsts” to their credit in the Pusan Perimeter that a major tactical innovation was obviously in the making. The flights of General Craig, Colonel Snedeker and Lieutenant Colonel Stewart alone were enough to indicate that the helicopter was capable of working a revolution in command and staff procedures.

Altogether, the participation of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was an important factor in stopping the NKPA invasion in August 1950 and punishing the invaders so severely that they were ripe for a crushing defeat the following month. The Marines, moreover, did a great deal to restore the national pride of countrymen who had been hurt and bewildered by the outcome of the first month’s operations.

It was humiliating to read on the front page that only 5 years after reaching our greatest military strength of history, United States troops were being pushed around by Asiatic peasants of a Soviet-trained organization calling itself the North Korean People’s Army. Perhaps these Americans did not remember that the decline in our Armed Forces was due to overwhelming popular demands for the disbanding of our victorious armies of 1945. At any rate, the United States paid the penalty of unpreparedness in 1950 when its first ground-force units were beaten by better trained and equipped NKPA troops. Worse yet, correspondents at the front intimated that these defeats were due to the softness of our youth. It was charged that United States troops had been so pampered by motor transport that they could no longer march, let alone fight.

The Marines helped to change all that. The Marines and the better Army units proved that they were more than a match for the enemy when it came to marching as well as fighting. The Marines did their best to restore the pride of Americans who read about the advance to Kosong or the fight on Obong-ni Ridge. The Marines, in short, deserved the pat on the back conveyed in a dispatch to the Brigade on 23 August 1950 from their Commandant, General Clifton B. Cates:

“I AM VERY PROUD OF THE PERFORMANCE OF YOUR AIR-GROUND TEAM. KEEP ON HITTING THEM, FRONT, FLANKS, REAR, AND TOPSIDE! WELL DONE!”

APPENDIX A

Glossary of Military and Aeronautical Terms

AKA--Attack cargo ship. APA--Attack transport ship. ADC--Assistant Division Commander. BAR--Browning automatic rifle. BLT--Battalion landing team. BuAer--Bureau of Aeronautics CCF--Chinese Communist Forces (refers to entire Chinese force employed in Korea). CG--Commanding general. CINCFE--Commander in Chief, Far East. CincPacFlt--Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. CINCUNC--Commander in Chief, United Nations Command. CNO--Chief of Naval Operations. CO--Commanding officer. COMNAGFE--Commander Naval Air Group Far East COMNAVFE--Commander Navy Far East. COMPHIBGRUONE--Commander Amphibious Group One. COMSEVENTHFLT--Commander Seventh Fleet. COS--Combined Operations Section. CP--Command Post. CSG--Combat Service Group. CTF--Commander Task Force. CVG--Carrier Air Group. DOW--Died of wounds. EUSAK--Eighth United States Army in Korea. FAC--Forward Air Controller. FEAF--Far East Air Force. FECOM--Far East Command. FL--Flight leader. FMF--Fleet Marine Force (Pac = Pacific; Lant = Atlantic). GHQFEC--General Headquarters, Far East Command. HF--High frequency (radio). InfDiv--Infantry Division. JCS--Joint Chiefs of Staff. JOC--Joint Operations Center. KIA--Killed in action. KMC--Korean Marine Corps. KVA--Korean Volunteer Army. LSD--Landing ship, dock. LST--Landing ship, tank. MAG--Marine Aircraft Group. MCBS--Marine Corps Board Study. MGCIS--Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron. MIA--Missing in action. MSR--Main supply route. MTACS--Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron. NCO--Noncommissioned officer. NK--North Korea(n). NKPA--North Korean Peoples Army. OP--Observation post. OY--Light observation plane. POL--Petroleum oil lubricants. POW--Prisoner of war. ProvCasCo--Provisional Casual Company. RCT--Regimental Combat Team. ROK--Republic of Korea. SAC--Supporting Arms Center. SAR--Special Action Report. SecNav--Secretary of the Navy. TAC--Tactical Air Coordinator. TAC X Corps--Tactical Air Command, X Corps. TACC--Tactical Air Control Center. TACP--Tactical Air Control Party. TACRON--Tactical Air Control Squadron. TAD--Tactical Air Direction. TADC--Tactical Air Direction Center. TAO--Tactical Air Observer. TAR--Tactical air request. T/E--Table of equipment. T/O--Table of organization. UN--United Nations. VHF--Very high frequency (radio). VMF--Marine fighter type aircraft (squadron). VMF(N)--Marine night fighter type aircraft, all-weather (squadron). VMO--Marine observation type aircraft (squadron). VMR--Marine transport type aircraft (squadron). WIA--Wounded in action.

APPENDIX B

Command and Staff List of the First Provisional Marine Brigade

_7 July--13 September 1950_

Commanding General BrigGen Edward A. Craig Deputy Commander BrigGen Thomas J. Cushman Chief of Staff Col Edward W. Snedeker G-1 Maj Donald W. Sherman G-2 LtCol Ellsworth G. Van Orman G-3 LtCol Joseph L. Stewart G-4 LtCol Arthur A. Chidester

_Special Staff Section_

Adjutant Capt Harold G. Schrier Supply Officer Maj James K. Eagan Air Officer Maj James N. Cupp Signal Officer Maj Elwin M. Stimpson Air Observer Capt Edwin L. Rives Signal Supply Officer 1stLt Joseph E. Conners Engineer Supply Officer Capt William R. Gould Liaison Officer LtCol Edward R. Hagenah Brigade Surgeon Capt Eugene R. Hering, Jr., USN Brigade Dental Officer LtComdr Jack J. Kelly, USN

_Headquarters and Service Battalion_

(32 officers--183 enlisted men)

Commanding Officer Maj Richard E. Sullivan Executive Officer Capt Samuel Jaskilka (to 18 Aug 50) CoComdr, Hq Co 1stLt Nathaniel F. Mann, Jr.

_Detachment, 1st Signal Battalion_

(4 officers--99 enlisted men)

DetComdr Capt Earl F. Stanley

_Company A, 1st Motor Transport Battalion_

(6 officers--112 enlisted men)

Commanding Officer Capt Arthur W. Ecklund

_Company C, 1st Medical Battalion_

(5 officers--94 enlisted men)

Commanding Officer Comdr Robert A. Freyling, USN

_Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion_

(12 officers--213 enlisted men)

Commanding Officer Maj William L. Batchelor

_Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion_

(9 officers--209 enlisted men)

Commanding Officer Capt George W. King

_Detachment, 1st Ordnance Battalion_

(5 officers--119 enlisted men)

DetComdr 1stLt Meyer La Bellman

_Company A, 1st Tank Battalion_

(9 officers--173 enlisted men)

Commanding Officer Capt Gearl M. English PlatComdr 1st Plat 1stLt William D. Pomeroy PlatComdr 2d Plat 2dLt Robert M. Winter (to 3 Sep 50, WIA) 2dLt John S. Carson (3 Sep 50, KIA) PlatComdr, 3d Plat 2dLt Granville G. Sweet

_1st Battalion, 11th Marines_

(44 officers--474 enlisted men)

Commanding Officer LtCol Ransom M. Wood Executive Officer Maj Francis R. Schlesinger Headquarters Battery: Commanding Officer Capt James W. Brayshay Service Battery: Commanding Officer 1stLt Kenneth H. Quelch Battery A: Commanding Officer Capt James D. Jordan Battery B: Commanding Officer Capt Arnold C. Hofstetter Battery C: Commanding Officer Capt William J. Nichols, Jr.

_Detachment, 1st Service Battalion_

(11 officers--161 enlisted men)

DetComdr Capt Thomas M. Sagar

_Detachment, 1st Combat Service Group_

(5 officers--104 enlisted men)

DetComdr Maj Thomas J. O’Mahoney

_Detachment, Reconnaissance Company_

(2 officers--37 enlisted men)

DetComdr Capt Kenneth J. Houghton

_Detachment, Military Police Company_

(2 officers--36 enlisted men)

DetComdr 1stLt Nye G. Rodes

_1st Amphibian Tractor Company_

(10 officers--244 enlisted men)

Commanding Officer Maj James P. Treadwell

_1st Amphibian Truck Platoon_

(1 officer--75 enlisted men)

Commanding Officer 1stLt James E. Condra

_VMO-6_

Commanding Officer Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk

_5th Marines_

(132 officers--2452 enlisted men)

Commanding Officer LtCol Raymond L. Murray Executive Officer LtCol Lawrence C. Hays, Jr. S-1 1stLt Alton C. Weed S-2 Maj William C. Esterline S-3 LtCol George F. Waters, Jr. (to 29 Aug 50) Maj Charles H, Brush, Jr. S-4 Maj Harold Wallace

Special Staff, 5th Marines:

Chaplain LtComdr Orlando Ingvolstad, Jr., USN Medical Officer Lt (jg) William E. Larsen, USN (to 11 Aug 50) LtComdr Byron D. Casteel Supply Officer Capt John V. Huff Motor Transport Officer Capt William F. A. Trax (to 15 Aug 50) 1stLt James O. Alison Ordnance Officer CWO Bill E. Parrish Disbursing Officer Capt Kenneth L. Shaw Communications Officer Maj Kenneth B. Boyd Naval Gunfire Officer Lt Jerry C. Ragon, USN Air Officer 1stLt Leo R. Jillisky

1st Battalion, 5th Marines:

Commanding Officer LtCol George R. Newton Executive Officer Maj Merlin R. Olson CO, H & S Company Capt Walter E. Godenius CO, Company A Capt John R. Stevens CO, Company B Capt John L. Tobin (to 17 Aug 50, WIA) Capt Francis I. Fenton, Jr. CO, Weapons Company Maj John W. Russell

2d Battalion, 5th Marines:

Commanding Officer LtCol Harold S. Roise Executive Officer LtCol John W. Stevens, II CO, H & S Company 1stLt David W. Walsh CO, Company D Capt John Finn, Jr. (to 8 Aug 50, WIA) Capt Andrew M. Zimmer (to 17 Aug 50, WIA) 1stLt Robert T. Hanifin, Jr. (to 22 Aug 50) 1stLt H. J. Smith CO, Company E Capt George E. Kittredge (to 7 Aug 50, WIA) 1stLt William E. Sweeney (to 18 Aug 50) Capt Samuel Jaskilka CO, Weapons Company Maj Walter Gall (to 10 Aug 50) Maj Theodore F. Spiker

3d Battalion, 5th Marines:

Commanding Officer LtCol Robert D. Taplett Executive Officer Maj John J. Canney CO, H & S Company 1stLt Arthur E. House, Jr. (to 22 Aug 50) 1stLt Harold D. Fredericks CO, Company G 1stLt Robert D. Bohn CO, Company H Capt Joseph C. Fegan, Jr. (to 18 Aug 50, WIA) Capt Patrick E. Wildman CO, Weapons Company Capt Patrick E. Wildman (to 19 Aug 50) Maj Murray Ehrlich

_Forward Echelon, 1st Marine Air Wing_

Commanding General BrigGen Thomas J. Cushman Chief of Staff Col Kenneth H. Weir

Marine Air Group 33:

Commanding Officer Col Allen C. Koonce (to 20 Aug 50) Col Frank G. Dailey Deputy Commander LtCol Norman J. Anderson Executive Officer LtCol Radford C. West CO, VMF-214 LtCol Walter E. Lischeid CO, VMF-323 Maj Arnold A. Lund CO, VMF(N)-513 Maj Joseph H. Reinburg CO, Hq Squadron Capt Norman D. Glenn CO, Service Squadron LtCol James C. Lindsay CO, MTACS-2 Maj Christian C. Lee

APPENDIX C

Citations and Commendations

September 29, 1950

PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION

The President of the Republic of Korea takes profound pleasure in citing for outstanding and heroic performance of duty on the field of battle during the period 2 August 1950–6 September 1950.

THE FIRST UNITED STATES PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE for the Award of THE PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION

The First United States Provisional Marine Brigade was a vital element in the first major counterattack against the enemy.

In late July and early August 1950, the enemy had swept through the Chulla Provinces and had rapidly approached along the south Korean coast to a point only 35 miles from the vital port of Pusan. Together with the 25th Infantry Division, the First United States Provisional Marine Brigade, from 7 August to 12 August 1950, played a major role in attacking and driving back the enemy.

During the period 17 August to 20 August 1950 in conjunction with the 24th Infantry Division and units of the 2d Infantry Division, the First United States Provisional Marine Brigade attacked a great pocket of enemy forces who had successfully crossed the Naktong River and established a firm beachhead on the eastern bank. The Brigade attacked with such determination and skill as to earn the admiration of all who saw or knew of its battle conduct.

Later, on the night of 31 August-1 September, the enemy again launched an all-out offensive against the United Nations Forces. The First United States Provisional Marine Brigade was in Army reserve at that time. With the 2d Infantry Division, the Brigade again was committed in almost the same area of its earlier action against the Naktong pocket in the neighborhood of Yongsan. Again the gallant Marine forces were instrumental in preventing the enemy from capturing their objective and cutting the north-south lines of communication of the United Nations Forces.

The brilliant performance of duty in combat in Korea of each individual of the First United States Provisional Marine Brigade is in accord with the highest traditions of the military service.

This citation carries with it the right to wear the Presidential Unit Citation Ribbon by each individual of the First United States Provisional Marine Brigade which served in Korea in the stated period.

(Signed) SYNGMAN RHEE

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to the

FIRST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE, REINFORCED

for service as set forth in the following CITATION:

“For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor forces in Korea from 7 August to 7 September 1950. Functioning as a mobile, self-contained, air-ground team, the First Provisional Marine Brigade, Reinforced, rendered invaluable service during the fierce struggle to maintain the foothold established by friendly forces in the Pusan area during the early stages of the Korean conflict. Quickly moving into action as numerically superior enemy forces neared the Naktong River on the central front and penetrated to within 35 miles of Pusan in the southern sector, threatening the integrity of the entire defensive perimeter, this hard-hitting, indomitable team counterattacked serious enemy penetrations at three different points in rapid succession. Undeterred by roadblocks, heavy hostile automatic weapons and highly effective artillery fire, extremely difficult terrain and intense heat, the Brigade met the invaders with relentless determination and, on each crucial occasion, hurled them back in disorderly retreat. By combining sheer resolution and esprit de corps with sound infantry tactics and splendid close air support, the Brigade was largely instrumental in restoring the line of defense, in inflicting thousands of casualties upon the enemy and in seizing large amounts of ammunition, equipment and other supplies. The brilliant record achieved by the unit during the critical early days of the Korean conflict attests to the individual valor and competence of the officers and men and reflects the highest credit upon the First Provisional Marine Brigade, Reinforced, and the United States Naval Service.”

All of the First Provisional Marine Brigade except the First Amphibian Tractor Company participated in operations against enemy aggressor forces in Korea from 7 August to 7 September 1950.

The following reinforcing units of the First Provisional Marine Brigade participated in operations against enemy aggressor forces in Korea from 7 August to 7 September 1950:

Forward Echelon, First Marine Aircraft Wing (less ground personnel)

Marine Air Group Thirty-Three, Reinforced (less ground personnel)

Marine Observation Squadron Six plus Helicopter Section, Headquarters Squadron

Air Support Section of Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron Two

United States Army: Counter Intelligence Corps and Military Intelligence Special Detachment personnel attached to the Headquarters Company, Headquarters and Service Battalion, First Provisional Marine Brigade.

For the President, (Signed) R. A. ANDERSON _Secretary of the Navy_

HEADQUARTERS

EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY KOREA (EUSAK)

Office of the Commanding General

APO 301

22 August 1950

Subject: Commendation

Thru: Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division

To: Commanding General, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade

1. It gives me great pleasure to commend you, your officers and men, for the part your organization played in the successful attack which began 17 August 50 against a determined enemy occupying a bridgehead east of the NAKTONG RIVER in the vicinity of KUJIN-SAN and ended only when the bridgehead had been eliminated with great loss of men and equipment to the enemy.

2. Through excellence in leadership and grit and determination in all ranks, your organization helped materially in preventing the enemy from penetrating our lines at a critical time. In so doing it has upheld the fine tradition of the Marines in a glorious manner and by close cooperation has proved unification of the services a success.

3. Please accept my sincere thanks and congratulations. I ask that you convey to your splendid command, the traditional “Well Done.”

WALTON H. WALKER _Lieutenant General, United States Army_ _Commanding_

HEADQUARTERS

24TH INFANTRY DIVISION

APO 24, 28 August 1950

To: Commanding General, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, APO 25

1. I am pleased and privileged to add my personal commendation to that of the Army Commander. And, on behalf of all officers and enlisted personnel of my command, I desire to express our sincere appreciation for the decisive and valiant offensive actions conducted by your command which predominately contributed to the total destruction of the Naktong pocket.

2. The esprit, aggressiveness and sheer determination continuously displayed by all personnel of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade in the face of fierce enemy resistance and counteraction has aroused the highest admiration of every member of my command.

JOHN E. CHURCH _Maj Gen, USA_ _Commanding_

HEADQUARTERS

1ST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE, FMF (REINFORCED)

_c/o_ Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif.

1355 1:DWS/1dp Ser 596 9 Sep 1950

From: The Commanding General

To: All officers and men of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF (Reinforced)

Subj: Letter of commendation from the Commanding General, Eighth United States Army in Korea, of 22 August 1950 with first endorsement by the Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division

Encl: (1) Copy of subj ltr and endorsement

1. It is with extreme pride in your accomplishments that I publish to all officers and men of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade the enclosed copy of a letter from the Commanding General, Eighth United States Army in Korea, and endorsement by the Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division, United States Army, commending the Brigade.

2. The realization that your professional skill, esprit de corps, outstanding bravery, and determination to succeed in all missions has been specifically commended by the Army and Division Commanders under whom the Brigade was serving at the time is indeed a source of gratification to me as it will also be to you.

(Signed) E. A. Craig E. A. CRAIG

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Index

_Achernar_ (AK), USS, 53, 64, 90

Africa, 8

Aircraft, American: AD (Skyraider), 47 B-29 (Superforts), 47 F4U (Corsair), 48, 98, 139, 140, 141, 142, 146, 151, 181, 186, 193, 194, 221, 243 F-51 (Mustangs), 140, 231 Four-engine Marine aircraft, 65 Helicopters, 50, 87, 90, 95, 111, 131, 140, 148, 150 HO3S-1 helicopter, 50, 95, 101 Japan-based Air Force planes, 38 Light Observation planes, 50, 90, 126, 150, 151 OY-2 observation planes, 95, 110, 224 R4D transport, 110

Aircraft, enemy: Il-10 ground attack bombers, 29 PO-2 primary trainers, 29 YAK-type, 38, 47 YAK-7B fighters, 29 YAK-18 advanced trainers, 29 Russian-made, 17

Air Force, U. S., 140, 231, 243 Far East Air Forces, U. S., 47, 110 Fifth Air Force, 66, 90, 141 Bomber Command, Far East Air Force, 47

Air Support, U. S., 47, 110

Air Support Section. _See_ Marine Units

Almond, MajGen Edward A., USA, 56, 211

Alaska, 4

Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS). _See_ Far East Command

_Alshain_ (AKA) USS, 53

American Military Government. _See_ Korea, Republic of

Ammunition, American, 98 90-mm., 63, 193 81-mm. mortar, 190 60-mm. mortar, 153, 235 3.5-inch rocket, 193, 235

Ammunition, enemy: 122-mm., 126 85-mm., 235

Anderson, Corpsman William H., USN, 137

_Anderson_ (APA), USS, 53, 64, 90

Andong, 96

Anglo-American blockading force, 47. _See also_ Navy, U. S.

Antung, 21

Appleman, LtCol Roy E., USA, 34_n_, 45

Arkadis, 2dLt Nickolas A., 184, 191

Armageddon, 37

Army forces, U. S., 174

Army, U. S. troops. _See_ U. S. Ground Forces; and Army units

Army, U. S., Units: General Headquarters, Far East, 41, 56, 60, 62 Army of occupation in Japan, U. S., 43 Eighth U. S. Army in Korea (EUSAK), 43, 45, 46, 47, 57, 59, 62, 65–68, 69 _map_, 70, 88, 90, 92, 96, 98, 99, 103, 143, 150, 207, 208, 210–212, 214, 239, 240 X Corps, 210, 211 2d Infantry Division, 88, 174, 212–215, 229, 236, 241 7th Infantry Division, 43, 211 24th Infantry Division, 43, 45–47, 67, 68, 88, 96, 98, 173–176, 207, 240 25th Infantry Division, 43, 45–47, 67, 68, 88, 99, 100, 103–106, 124, 147, 148, 150, 152, 208, 212, 215 1st Cavalry Division, 43, 46, 67, 68, 96 5th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), 88, 96, 100, 103, 106, 111–113, 123, 143,152 1st Battalion, 5th RCT, 123, 124 2d Battalion, 5th RCT, 112, 152 9th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), 175–179, 182, 186, 187, 196 29th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), 46, 67, 68 9th Infantry Regiment, 174, 212, 215–218, 228–231, 233, 235 19th Infantry Regiment, 175, 196 21st Infantry Regiment: 1st Battalion, 175, 178, 196 23d Infantry Regiment, 215, 236, 237, 243 24th Infantry Regiment, 122, 148 2d Battalion, 116, 117, 120 27th Infantry Regiment, 103, 105, 240, 241 2d Battalion, 103 32d Infantry Regiment, 211 34th Infantry Regiment, 46, 175–177, 196 35th Infantry Regiment, 100, 123 8th Field Artillery Battalion, 126 90th Field Artillery Battalion, 147 159th Field Artillery Battalion, 150 555th Field Artillery Battalion, 147, 150–152 2d Engineer Battalion, 215 72d Tank Battalion, 215 8076th Surgical Hospital, 194 Task Force Hill, 174 Task Force Kean, 101, 112, 120, 122–124, 147, 151, 239 Task Force Perry, 67 Task Force Smith, 45, 174 Korean Military Advisory Group, 33 Pusan Logistical Command, 88, 96

Asia, 6, 13, 17, 41

Austria, 10

_Badoeng Strait_ (CVE-116), USS, 53, 64, 89, 90, 92, 95, 98, 139, 142

Bailey, Cant Almarion S., 192_n_, 221

Barstow, California, 51, 63. _See also_ Marine Corps Supply Depot

Barth, BrigGen George B., USA, 99, 150

Barrett, Sgt Edward F., 121

Bartlett, Col Eugene M., USA, 65

Bataway, Sgt Melvin R., 168 _pic._

Batchelor, Maj William L., 143

Battalion Landing Team (BLT), 48, 58

Battles: Changchun, 13 Mukden, 7, 13 Stalingrad, 10, 19, 23, 24 Tsinan, 13 Tsushima, 7 Valmy, 7 Yalu, 7

Bean Patch, 166 _pic._, 207, 208, 210, 211, 237, 243

Blackmon, Sgt Thomas, 109

_Black Swan_, HMS, 40

Blank, Lt Howard, 236

Bohn, 1stLt Robert D., 104, 104_n_, 119, 122, 129_n_, 132, 135, 135_n_, 136, 137, 201, 201_n_, 203, 204, 206, 228, 233

Bolkow, TSgt George W., 224

Bougainville, 52

Boxer Rebellion, 6

Brigade Commander. _See_ Craig, BrigGen E. A.

Brush, Maj Charles H., 174

Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer), 52

Buettner, Sgt Lee, 108

Bulgaria, 16

Byrnes, James F., U. S. Secretary of State, 2, 3_n_.

Cahill, 2dLt John H., 104, 105_n_, 106, 108–115, 115_n_, 117, 119, 204, 206

Cairo Conference, 1

Canzona, 1stLt Nicholas A., 156

Caribbean, 53

Carr, 1stLt Ira T., 117

Carson, 2dLt John S., 222

Casteel, LtCdr Byron D., USN, 194

Casualties: Army, 67 enemy, 97, 123 Marine, 109–111, 113, 116, 117, 122, 155, 161 _pic._, 163 _pic._, 186, 206, 227, 237, 239

Cates, Gen Clifton B., 48, 48_n_, 49_n_, 49, 53, 54, 58, 60, 244

Central Powers, 7

Changchon, 144, 146, 147, 151, 152 ambush, 145 _map_

Changchun, Battle of, 13

Changwon, 92–95, 99, 103, 105, 110, 111, 113, 143

Chemulpo (Inchon), 4, 7

Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, 12, 14

Chidester, LtCol Arthur A., 66, 88, 91, 160 _pic._

Chief of Naval Operations. _See_ Sherman, Adm Forrest P.

Chief of Staff to General MacArthur. _See_ Almond, MajGen Edward A., USA

China, 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12–14, 16, 23, 25, 53 Civil War in, 13, 14, 22 Japanese invasion of, 1937, 8, 10

China-Russia-Japan Triangle, 3

Chindong-ni, 100, 103, 103_n_, 104–106, 107 _map_, 110–113, 115, 119, 120, 123, 124, 126, 128, 129, 132, 147, 148, 150, 152, 208, 239

Chinese Civil War, 153

Chinese Communists, 10, 12, 13, 19, 20

Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), 20, 31 8th Route Army, 23, 24 56th Army, 96 164th Infantry Division, 21 166th Infantry Division, 21, 96 Northeast Democratic United Army, 20

Chinese Nationalists, 12, 13, 20, 22, 25

Chinese Nationalist army, 13

Chinhae, 66, 95, 99, 209

Chinju, 46, 66, 67, 68, 70, 97, 98, 100, 112, 122, 123, 143

Chinnampo, 31

Chistyakov, Gen Ivan (Russian), 10, 19

Choe Yong Gun, Marshal, NKPA, 23, 24

Chongjin, 21

Chongju, 36

Chorwon, 31

Chukchon-ni, 217, 219

Chuminjin, 40

Chunchon, 32, 39, 40

Church, BrigGen John H., USA, 41, 46, 173–176, 178, 207

“Citizen-Marines”. _See_ Marine Corps Organized Reserve

Civil War, U. S., 54

_Clymer_ (APA), USS, 53, 91, 92

“Cold War”, 6, 9, 13

Cole, Lt Doyle, 140

Collins, Gen J. Lawton, USA, 208

Combat zone, reconnaissance of, 66

Commandant of the Marine Corps. _See_ Cates, Gen Clifton B.

Commander in Chief, Far East. _See_ MacArthur, Gen Douglas

Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. _See_ Radford, Adm Arthur W.

Commander Naval Forces, Far East. _See_ Joy, VAdm C. Turner

Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. _See_ Shepherd, LtGen Lemuel C., Jr.

Commanding General, Eighth Army. _See_ Walker, Gen Walton H., USA

Commanding General, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. _See_ Craig, BrigGen Edward A.

Commanding General, 25th Division. _See_ Kean, MajGen W. B.

Commanding Officer, 5th Marines. _See_ Murray, LtCol R. L.

Commanding Officer, VMO-6. _See_ Gottschalk, Maj Vincent J.

Commando parties, 47

Communications: HF net, 142 radio vans, 88 SCR-300 radios, 106, 109, 224, 236 TAD net, 142 TAO net, 142 TAR net, 142 VHF net, 142

Communism, 9, 13, 14

Communists, 13, 17, 62 army, 13 doctrine, 3 Empire, 8

Cottrell, TSgt Johnnie C., 137

Counselman, 2dLt John D., 136

Counterattack, enemy, 12–13 Aug 50, 154 _map_

Cowling, 2dLt David R., 146

Craig, BrigGen Edward A., 49, 52, 55, 55_n_, 56, 56_n_, 57, 58, 60, 60_n_, 62, 62_n_, 63–66, 68, 70, 87, 88, 88_n_, 89–95, 99–101, 105, 111, 111_n_, 112, 112_n_, 120_n_, 123, 125, 128, 128_n_, 129, 129_n_, 131, 135, 135_n_, 136, 140, 144, 147, 147_n_, 148, 148_n_, 150, 152, 156, 158 _pic._, 159 _pic._, 173, 174, 177, 178, 178_n_, 179, 181, 186_n_, 194, 196, 207, 207_n_, 210–212, 212_n_, 213, 213_n_, 215, 216, 216_n_, 217, 217_n_, 219, 227_n_, 229, 236–238, 241, 244

Crowson, SSgt T. Albert, 181, 182, 190

Cushman, BrigGen Thomas H., 49, 52, 55, 56, 60, 62, 65, 87, 89, 95, 140, 159 _pic._

Czar Nicholas II, 3, 9

Czar, Russian, 7

Czechoslovakia, 10, 38

D-Day, Sachon Offensive, 100, 126

D-Day, Inchon Landing, 210, 211

Dairen, 4

Dallin, David J., 9_n_, 12_n_

Daly, Col John, USA, 151

Dean, MajGen William F., USA, 45, 46, 67

DeFazio, T/Sgt Ernest L., 158 _pic._

Delafield, Wisconsin, 52

Dennis, S/Sgt Saweren J., 225

Department of State, U. S., 14, 37

Deputy Commander, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. _See_ Cushman, BrigGen Thomas H.

Dickerson, T/Sgt Sidney S., 181, 182, 189

Downs, CWO Willard C., 238

Doyle, RAdm James H., USN, 24, 53

Duncan, 2dLt Edward F., 132

Duncan, T/Sgt David N., 225

Eddy, 2dLt Rodger E., 184

El Toro, California, 50, 51, 53, 55

Emmelman, 2dLt Edward T., 113, 115

Empress Augusta Bay, 52

England. _See_ Great Britain

English, Capt Gearl M., 50, 63, 92

Erskine, MajGen Graves B., 52, 210

Estonia, 10

Eubanks, 1stLt Fred F., Jr., 198

Europe, 8, 9, 12, 41

Far East, 1, 3, 4, 6–9, 13, 22, 39, 40, 43, 45, 48, 49

Far East Command: General Headquarters, Tokyo, 41, 56, 60, 62, 64 Military Intelligence Section, GS, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, 16_n_, 17_n_, 19_n_, 21_n_, 22_n_, 26_n_, 27_n_, 28_n_, 30_n_, 33_n_, 39_n_, 130_n_

Fegan, Capt Joseph C., Jr., 104, 104_n_, 119, 120_n_, 120–122, 129, 135, 135_n_, 136, 137, 151, 155, 201, 201_n_, 203, 204

Fenton, Capt Francis I., Jr., 189_n_, 190, 195, 196, 196_n_, 198, 219, 220, 222, 224, 229, 231, 231_n_, 233, 233_n_, 234–236

Field, 2dLt Paul R., 193

Finger Ridge, 175–177, 193, 196, 203, 206, 234, 236

Finn, Capt John, Jr., 113–116

Florida, 42

Formosa, 4, 14, 41

Forney, Col Edward H., 211

_Fort Marion_ (LSD), USS, 53, 63

Fox, Capt George C., 190_n_, 192, 192_n_, 195_n_, 196, 196_n_, 197, 198, 200, 201, 217_n_, 220, 222, 224

France, 4

Freeman, Col Paul L., USA, 243

French Revolution, 7

Fukuoka, Japan, 65

Fullerton, TSgt C. R., 192_n_, 193

Gall, Maj Walter, 117, 117_n_, 129

Garvin, BrigGen Crump, USA, 66, 87

Gay, MajGen Hobart R., USA, 46

Geer, Andrew, 51_n_, 54_n_

General Headquarters (GHQ). _See_ Far East Command

Genghis Khan, 13

Georgia, 42

Germany, 4, 6, 8–10

Giaquinto, Cpl Raymond, 136

Giusti, Maj Ernest H., 48_n_, 140_n_

Golden Gate Bridge, 64

Gottschalk, Maj Vincent J., 50

Great Britain: 27th Infantry Brigade, 2, 14

Green, A. Wigfall, 34_n_

Grew, Joseph C., 9_n_

Guadalcanal, 53, 109

Guam, Marianas Islands, 42, 52

Gugeler, Capt R. A., USA, 174_n_

_Gunston Hall_ (LSD), USS, 53, 63

Hadong, 67, 98

Haiti, 52

Haman, 104, 119, 121

Hamhung, 20, 31

Han, Lt (NKPA), 17

Han River, 40, 173

Haneda Airport, 56

Hanifin, Capt R. T., Jr., 113_n_, 114–116, 189

Harris, MajGen Field, 159 _pic._

Harvey, Lt(jg) Robert J., USN, 206

Hawaii, 88

Hay, John, U. S. Secretary of State, 6

Helicopters. _See_ Aircraft, American

Henderson, Cpl Virgil W., 224

_Henrico_ (APA), USS, 53, 63, 64, 90

Hetrick, 2dLt Lawrence W., 119, 156

Hickey, Lt(jg) Bernard L., USN, 194, 219

Hideyoshi, Japanese war lord, 3

Hill, Col John G., USA, 174, 176–178, 186

Hill: Hill 88--136, 137 Hill 91--222, 224, 233 Hill 99--104, 106, 110, 111, 119, 121, 123 Hill 102--179, 182, 183, 190, 193, 195, 197, 200 Hill 109--179, 182–184, 190, 191, 193, 195–198, 200 Hill 117--179, 181, 182, 190, 191, 195–198, 200, 220, 221, 222, 224, 225, 227–229 Hill 125--175, 177, 181, 193, 229, 231, 234–237 Hill 190--129 Hill 143--179, 181–184, 190, 191, 195, 201 Hill 147--179, 184, 186, 201 Hill 153--179, 184, 186, 201 Hill 202--147, 153, 155 Hill 207--175, 178, 179, 183, 201, 203, 204, 206 Hill 250--146 Hill 255--103, 104, 110–112, 119, 121–123 Hill 301--146 Hill 308--124, 125, 127, 129 Hill 311--175, 178, 203, 204, 206, 207 Hill 342--104–106, 109–117, 123, 124, 129 Hill 347--108 Cloverleaf, 176–178, 229–231, 233, 236 Observation, 175–178, 181, 184, 189, 190, 191, 193, 195, 196, 229, 231, 233, 234, 236 Red Slash, 179

Hodge, LtGen John R., USA, 10, 14, 15

Hodge, TSgt Paul A., 200

Hongchon, 23

Houghton, Capt Kenneth J., 144, 146

Hungary, 10

Hwachon, 32

Hwayong-ni, 229–231

Iceland, 53

Il-li, 215

Inchon, 17, 40, 42, 56, 98, 210, 211, 237, 238, 241

Ingvolstad, LtCdr Orlando, Jr., USN, 194

Intelligence, U. S.: Army, 20, 23_n_ Captured NK documents, 17, 29 Japanese maps, 127 POW interrogations, 28, 29, 31

Italy, 8

Itami, Japan, 62, 65, 89 Air Force Base, 60, 87, 89, 90

Itazuke, Japan, 243 Airfield, 90, 141

“Iron Curtain,” 10

Iwo Jima, 51, 52

_Jamaica_, HMS, 40

James, Cpl Melvin, 121, 121_n_

Japan, 1–4, 6–9, 41, 43, 45, 46, 56, 57, 61 _map_, 62, 87, 89, 211, 243 Celestial Empire, 4 Russian WWII declaration of war on, 9 U. S. occupation of, WWII, 9 Japan sea, 41 _Kamikaze_ tactics of, 2

Jaskilka, Capt Samuel, 217, 221, 224

Johnston, 2dLt Thomas H., 191, 192

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 48, 49, 57–60

Joint Operations Center (JOC), 141

Joy, VAdm C. Turner, USN, 41, 48, 49, 53, 56, 57, 70, 211

_Juneau_ (CL), USS, 40, 47

Kaechon, 31

Kaesong, 32, 39

Kanggye, 31

Kang-ni, 227, 229

Kapyong, 40

Karig, Capt Walter, USNR, 40_n_

Kean, MajGen William B., USA, 45, 88, 92, 99, 101, 105, 112, 124, 147, 207

Keiser, MajGen Lawrence B., USA, 212, 213, 215, 229

Kim Il Sung, Red Korean prime minister, 16, 22, 23, 25

Kim Mu Chong, LtGen, NKPA, 19, 20, 25

Kim Sung Chu, 23

Kim Ung, LtGen, NKPA, 24

King, Maj George J., 141_n_

King, Capt George W., 128

Kipling, Rudyard, 6

Kittredge, Capt George E., Jr., 111

Klein, Lt (jg) Chester L., USN, 194

Kobe, Japan, 60, 64, 65, 89, 90, 210

Kochang, 67, 68, 68_n_

Korea, 1–4, 6–8, 10, 11 _map_, 14–17, 19–21, 23, 24, 32, 37, 41–43, 45–47, 51, 53, 56, 58–60, 61 _map_, 62, 63, 65, 70, 87–90, 96, 97, 126, 127, 141, 150, 173, 209, 210, 242, 243 American landing in, 1871, 3 Annexation of by Japan, 1910, 7 Civil War in, 14, 23. _See also_ Republic of Korea and North Korean Peoples Democratic Republic Conflict in, historical background, 3 Japanese possession, 1 North. _See_ People’s Democratic Republic of Partition of, 10 People’s Army. _See_ People’s Democratic Republic of People’s Democratic Republic of, 12, 14, 16, 16_n_, 19, 20, 21, 34, 36, 114–116, 120, 123, 135, 136, 174, 183, 193, 200, 201, 203, 217, 220, 224, 228, 231, 234, 235, 239 Agrarian Reform, 16, 21 People’s Army, 19, 20, 22, 23_n_, 67, 98, 104, 108, 128, 135, 173, 200, 203, 212, 244 Air Force, 29 armament, 21 Aviation Section of Pyongyang Military Academy, organization of, 29 Casualties, 239 Commander in Chief. _See_ Kim Il Sung conscription program of, 31 Decoration “Hero of the Korean Democratic People’s Republic”, 25; “Order of the National Flag, 1st Class”, 25 Deputy Commander in Chief. _See_ Choe Yong Gun, Marshal, NKPA Division Headquarters, organization of, 26 First Amphibious Operation in Korea, 39 Front Headquarters, organization of, 26 infantry division, organization of, 27 invasion of South Korea, 32, 37, 44 _map_ Order of Battle in, 35 _map_ organization of, 26 rifle regiment, organization of, 27 rifle company, organization of, 27 rifle platoon, organization of, 27 spies, 22 strength of, 213 training of, 22, 31, 32 Units: I Corps, 25 II Corps, 25 III Corps, 25 105th Armored Division, 21, 29, 32, 39, 97 1st Infantry Division, 20, 25, 32, 39 2d Infantry Division, 20, 21, 32, 39, 215 3d Infantry Division, 20, 30, 32, 39 4th Infantry Division, 21, 32, 39, 174, 175, 186, 196, 203, 214, 228, 240 5th Infantry Division, 21, 22, 32, 39 6th Infantry Division, 21, 22, 32, 39, 96–98, 100, 106, 108, 112, 117, 124, 147, 153, 239 7th Infantry Division, 21, 22 8th Infantry Division, 21, 22 9th Infantry Division, 21, 22, 214, 216, 219, 227 10th Infantry Division, 215 12th Infantry Division, 21, 22 13th Infantry Division, 21, 22, 33 14th Infantry Division, 21, 22 15th Infantry Division, 21, 22, 32, 33, 39 10th Mechanized Infantry Division, 21, 22 849th Anti-tank Regiment, 29 5th Infantry Regiment, 174 6th Infantry Regiment, 96 13th Infantry Regiment, 96, 117 14th Infantry Regiment, 96 15th Infantry Regiment, 96, 117 16th Infantry Regiment, 174 18th Infantry Regiment, 174, 182, 190, 203 206th Mechanized Infantry Regiment, 29, 30 107th Medium Tank Regiment, 29, 174 109th Medium Tank Regiment, 29 203d Medium Tank Regiment, 29 83d Motorcycle Regiment, 96–98, 139, 147, 239 308th Armored Battalion, 29 Aviation Society, 28 Labor Party of, 25 Minister of National Defense. _See_ Choe Yong Gun, Marshal, NKPA. Navy, 40 People’s Assembly at Pyongyang, 15 People’s Committee, 12 Prime Minister. _See_ Kim Il Sung Supreme People’s Council, 16, 24 population of, 42 Republic of, 15, 16, 16_n_, 21–23, 26, 33, 34, 36–38, 47, 62, 67, 214 American Military Government of, 15 army, 16, 33, 34, 40, 45 Army units: Capital Division, 34, 214 1st Infantry Division, 34, 214 2d Infantry Division, 34 3d Infantry Division, 34, 36, 214 5th Infantry Division, 34, 36 6th Infantry Division, 34, 214 7th Infantry Division, 34 8th Infantry Division, 34, 214 17th Regiment, 34 Interim Legislature of, 15 invasion of, 17, _map_ front endpaper National Assembly of, 15, 16 Navy units: 1st Korean Marine Regiment, 238 Security Force, 15 Russian Occupation of, 1945, 10, 19, 20 South. _See_ Republic of Terrain, 42 trusteeship of, 2, 14, 15 United States occupation of, 10, 16 Volunteer Army, 19, 20, 23

Kosong, 100, 131, 132, 135–137, 139, 140, 143, 148, 156, 244

Kosong Turkey Shoot, 139, 146

Kremlin, 19, 21, 23

Krulak, Col Victor H., 49, 53

Kumchon, 67, 68

Kum River, 46, 96, 97, 173

Kumwan, 68_n_

Kunsan, 96, 97, 238

Kurtz, SSgt Charles F., Jr., 135

Kwangju, 36, 97

Kyoto, 60

Landrum, Col Eugene M., USA, 65, 68, 88, 92

Latham, Henry J., 159 _pic._

Latvia, 10

Lawson, TSgt Frank J., 197

League of Nations, 37

Lee Hwal, Col, NKPA, 28

Lenin, Nickolai, 13

Lennon, 2dLt Thomas P., 206

Liaotung Peninsula, 4, 7, 8 Russian 25-year lease of, 6

Lischeid, LtCol Walter E., 98

Lischeski, TSgt F. J., 144_n_, 147

“Long March”, 25

Lueddeke, Lt Gustave F., 101

Lund, Maj Arnold A., 90, 139, 140

MacArthur, Gen of the Army Douglas, 9, 33, 38, 40, 45, 48, 49, 53, 56–60, 62, 210, 211, 239, 240

McMullen, TSgt Orval F., 191, 195, 200, 220, 222

McNeely, Maj Morgan J., 113, 132, 135

Macy, Sgt Jack, 110

Main Supply Route (MSR): enemy, 47 Marine, 94, 104, 106, 111, 112, 115, 117, 120, 120_n_, 122–124, 129, 135, 136, 143, 151, 156, 175, 177–179, 181, 182, 190, 193, 195, 196, 203, 216–222, 224, 225, 227–229, 231–236

Manchukuo, 8. _See also_ Manchuria.

Manchuria, 4, 7–10, 13, 20, 21, 23, 24, 31. _See also_ Manchukuo. puppet state in, 8 Russia in (World War II), 9

Mao Tse-tung, 12, 14, 25

Marines, U. S., 3, 47, 52, 53, 56–58, 62–65, 70, 90, 92, 105, 106, 108, 113, 116, 119, 123, 125, 128, 129, 157 _pic._, 176, 182, 183, 240, 244 Air, 60, 62, 70, 98, 122, 132, 134, 186, 190, 207, 229, 240 Air crews, 168 _pic._ Air-ground team, 57, 68, 89, 91, 99, 238, 239, 244 Air Support Section, 87, 99 Equipment, 51 Expansion program, 58 Ground forces, 53, 54, 60, 62, 65, 70, 88, 93, 95, 98, 108, 140; landing of, 90 request for, 47 Units: Air 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 48, 89 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, 48 Marine Air Group-33, 49, 53, 60, 64, 68, 87, 90, 116, 122, 136, 140, 141, 181, 186, 187, 193, 203, 204, 221, 233, 242, 243 VMF-214, 89, 98, 141, 243 VMF-323, 89, 90, 98, 139–143 VMF(N)-513, 90, 141, 230, 230_n_, 243 VMO-6, 50, 66, 70, 89, 90, 95, 101, 110, 126, 140, 141, 194, 208, 209, 222, 224, 233, 243 Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron Two (MTACS-2), 89, 95, 141, 142 Marine Helicopter Squadron (Experimental) One (HMX-1), 50 Ground, Fleet Marine Force, 48, 141 Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, 48, 59 Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 48, 55, 56, 63, 87 V Amphibious Corps, 52 1st Marine Division, 48, 52, 56, 58, 59, 60, 87, 210, 211, 213, 216 2d Marine Division, 48 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, 49, 50, 52–60, 62–65, 68, 70, 87–93, 96, 98–101, 103, 105, 108, 111, 112, 124–126, 129, 136, 141, 148, 152, 155, 173, 175, 176, 178, 186, 194, 207–209, 211, 212, 219, 222, 229, 234, 235, 237–244; Action on Southwestern Front, 7–13 Aug 50, 102 _map_; activation of, 49; Advance Party, 56, 61, 65, 70; air component, number of personnel, 51; air-ground team, 56, 140, 141; departure of, 54, 55; expansion of, 60; ground forces, number of personnel, 51; ground elements, 64, 141; mobilization of, 59; Observation Section, organization of, 141; rear echelon, 93 1st Marine Regiment, 210 5th Marine Regiment, 49–52, 91, 94, 105, 126, 177–179, 194, 195, 209–211, 213, 216, 217, 221, 236; CO. _See_ Murray, LtCol Raymond L.; organization of, 49; 4.2-inch Mortar Company, 105; Anti-Tank Company, 103, 193, 221 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 63, 93, 94, 111, 119, 123–125, 127–129, 144, 147, 148, 152, 178, 179, 187, 189, 194, 196, 197, 206, 216, 217, 219, 221, 224, 225, 227–231, 233, 235–237; CO. _See_ Newton, LtCol George R. Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 127, 129, 190–193, 195–198, 146, 155, 200, 201, 203, 219–225, 227, 229–231, 236, 237 Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 123, 127, 129, 144, 146, 147, 153, 155, 189–193, 195, 197, 198, 200, 219–222, 225, 227, 229–231, 234–237 Weapons Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 127, 189, 190, 193 Anti-tank assault platoon, 193 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 94, 110, 114, 116, 117, 119, 120, 129, 131, 132, 142, 148, 152, 178, 179, 181–184, 186, 187, 189, 192, 194, 196, 200, 206, 216, 217, 221, 222, 224, 227; CO, _see_ Roise, LtCol H. S. Company D, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 112–117, 131, 132, 181–184, 189, 190, 217, 221, 224, 227, 228 Company E, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 111, 113, 114, 116, 181, 183, 184, 186, 190, 217, 221, 224, 227 Weapons Company, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 117 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, 94, 103–106, 110, 111, 119, 120, 122, 129, 132, 135–137, 139, 142, 144, 148, 150–152, 177–179, 196, 206, 216, 227, 229, 231, 233, 236, 237; CO. _See_ Taplett, LtCol Robert D. Company G, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, 104, 106, 111, 112, 114, 119, 121, 122, 132, 135, 136, 151, 201, 203, 204, 206, 227, 228, 230, 231, 233 Company H, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, 104, 111, 119–122, 135–137, 143, 151, 201, 203, 204, 206, 228, 230, 231 Weapons Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, 230 7th Marine Regiment, 210 9th Marine Regiment, 52 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, 51, 92, 103, 116, 122, 125, 126, 136, 139, 152, 176, 182, 187, 203, 208, 212, 222, 227, 228, 233 Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion, 51, 103, 119, 128, 156, 195, 201, 219, 225, 227 Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, 50, 63, 187, 192, 193, 203, 204, 222, 234 Company A, 1st Motor Transport Battalion, 51 1st Amphibious Tractor Company, 63 Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion, 143 Company C, 1st Medical Battalion, 143 Brigade Reconnaissance Company Detachment, 105, 131, 144, 227 Brigade Medical Section, 143 Combat Service Detachment, 92 Brigade Air Section, 110 Malaria and Epidemic Control Unit, 194 First Replacement Draft, activation of, 60

Marine Corps, U. S., 48, 50, 52, 56–58, 60, 92, 144, 147, 151, 153. _See also_ Marines, U. S. Air Station, El Toro, California. _See_ El Toro, California Hymn, 91 Organized Reserve, mobilization of, 58 Schools. _See_ Quantico, Virginia Supply Depot, Barstow, California, 51, 63

Martin, Col Robert R., USA, 46

Marx, Karl, 13

Masan, 66, 70, 88, 93, 94, 96, 97, 99, 100, 103, 104, 120, 122, 123, 143, 148, 207

Matthews, Francis P., 48

Medical Aid Stations, 194

Mediterranean, 210_n_

Mediterranean Fleet. _See_ Navy, U. S., 6th Fleet

Mesanjin, 31

Michaelis, Col John H., USA, 105, 106

Millar, TSgt Stanley G., 192

Miryang, 152, 173, 176, 177, 194, 211, 212; River, 173

Mokpo, 97, 98

Mokpu, 42, 97

Mongolia, 8, 10

Mongols, 10, 20

Montross, Lynn J., 50_n_, 54_n_

Morgan, TSgt Ray, 121

Moscow, 1, 9, 10, 12, 13, 22, 23, 26; Conference, 1945, 141

Moses, Captain Vivian, 140

Muccio, Ambassador John J., 15, 33, 34, 37

Muetzel, 2dLt Francis W., 158 _pic._, 190_n_, 196_n_, 198, 217, 220, 222, 224, 233_n_, 236, 237

Mukden, 7; Battle of, 7, 13

Munsan, 39

Murray, LtCol Raymond L., 51–53, 63, 65, 65_n_, 70, 90, 91, 91_n_, 101, 111, 112, 122, 124, 124_n_, 125, 127, 127_n_, 128, 128_n_, 129, 131, 132, 135, 143, 148_n_, 152, 176, 177–179, 186, 186_n_, 187, 196, 201, 213, 216, 217, 227, 229, 230, 233

Myong-ni, 216, 217, 221, 224, 228

Naktong, 96, 174, 214, 215, 237, 239, 240, 241; Bulge, 150, 173, 174, 175, 180, 185 _map_, 203, 206, 212, 213, 215, 240, 241, 243; River, 47, 66–68, 88, 150, 172 _pic._, 203, 207, 215, 231, 240 First Battle of, 17–19 Aug 50, 173–206, 199 _map_, 202 _map_, 205 _map_; 1st Provisional Marine Brigade Objective One, 129, 176–179, 192, 195, 198; Objective Two, 178, 201, 203, 204; Objective Three, 178, 179, 204, 206 Second Battle of, 3–6 Sep 50, 207-235, 218 _map_, 223 _map_, 232 _map_; 1st Provisional Marine Brigade Objective One, 217, 220, 221, 227, 229; Objective Two, 222

Nam Il, LtGen, NKPA, 24, 25

Nam River, 88

Namwon, 97

Nanking, 23

Nanam, 20, 31

Naval Blockade: United Nations, 40; U. S., of Formosa, 41; of Korean Coast, 41

Naval Forces in the Far East, 41

Naval Supply Depot, Oakland, California, 64

Naval Support, U. S., 47

Navy, U. S.: Sixth Fleet, U. S., 58, 210_n_ Seventh Fleet, U. S., 41, 211 Task Force 77, 47 Task Group 53.7, 63, 64, 89–91 Task Group 96.5, 40 PhibGroup One, 211 Amphibious Planning Group 1, 53 Task Unit 53.7.3, 63

Nazi invasion of Russia, 8

Nelson, Lt(jg) Bentley G., USN, 194

_Newsweek_, 39_n_

Newton, LtCol George R., 93, 94, 119, 123, 123_n_, 124, 124_n_, 125, 127, 128, 129, 146, 147, 155, 187, 189, 191, 195, 198, 200, 201, 217, 217_n_, 219, 221, 222, 224, 225

_New York Times_, 16_n_

No Name Ridge, 179, 180

Nonsan, 174

Oakley, 2dLt Arthur A., 113–115

Obong-ni, 183, 184

Obong-ni Ridge, 162 _pic._, 175–179, 181, 185 _map_, 187, 191–196, 199 _map_, 200–203, 206, 231, 233, 234, 236

Obregon, PFC Eugene A., 161 _pic._

O’Donnell, MajGen Emmett, USAF, 47

Offensive, Sachon, 145 _map_, 148 _map_

Okinawa, 41, 46, 51

Oliver, Robert T., 12_n_

Olson, Maj Merlin R., 236, 237; LtCol, 123_n_, 124_n_, 125_n_, 129_n_, 217_n_, 233_n_

O’Mahoney, Maj Thomas J., 92

Ongjin Peninsula, 17, 32, 39

“Open Door” Policy, 6

Osaka, 60

Osan, 45, 74

Oso-ri, 127, 128

Pacific Ocean, 7, 8

Paedun-ni, 100, 127, 129, 131, 132, 149 _map_

Pang, MajGen, NKPA, 97

Partridge, MajGen Earle E., USAF, 66, 70

Patton, Gen George S., USA, 45

Pearl Harbor, T. H., 55

Peiping, 24

Peleliu, 210

Pendleton, Camp Joseph H., California, 48–51, 51_n_, 52, 53, 87, 90

Pentagon, 41, 57, 59, 60

Perry, Commodore Matthew C., 3

Pescadores Group, 4

Peters, SSgt Carl W., 168 _pic._

Philippine Islands, 6, 41

_Pickaway_ (APA), USS, 53, 63, 65, 91

Plan Able, 58, 60

Plan Baker, 58

Pochon, 39

Pohang-dong, 46, 47, 67, 96

Poland, 10, 38

“Police Action”, 39

Pomeroy, 1stLt William D., 129, 204, 234, 235

Port Arthur, 4, 7

Potsdam Conference, July 1947, 9_n_

Pugok, 131

Pusan, 18, 42, 47, 62, 65–67, 70, 87–89, 92, 93, 95–97, 99, 141, 173, 208–211, 213, 214, 236–241 Harbor, 89, 91 Perimeter, 57, 96, 142, 150, 174, 210, 211, 213, 214, 236, 237, 239–242, 244. _See_ map inside back cover Terminal, 91 University, 237

Pyongyang, 4, 12, 14–16, 16_n_, 20–24, 26, 29, 34, 47, 214 Military Academy, 28, 30, 31

Quantico, Virginia, 50, 52

Radford, Adm Arthur W., USN, 48, 49

Reeves, MSgt Harold, 116

Regimental Combat Team (RCT). _See_ Army units, Marine units

Reid, 2dLt Wallace J., 113, 115

Reinburg, Maj Joseph H., 230

Rhodes, 1stLt Nye G., 158 _pic._

Richards, 1stLt Wayne E., 195

Robinson, SSgt Robert, 108

Roise, LtCol Harold S., 94, 110, 111, 111_n_, 112–114, 116, 129, 131, 132, 178, 181, 189, 216, 217, 219, 221, 222

Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 2, 3

Rumania, 10

Russell, Maj John W., 189

Russia, 1, 2, 4, 6–8, 13, 140; Czarist, 6; Nazi invasion of, 8. _See also_ Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Baltic Fleet, 7

Russian-Japanese Border Clashes, 8

Russian revolution of 1917, 8, 13

Russo-Japanese War, 3, 6

Sachon, 98, 100, 122, 125, 129, 136, 140, 142–144, 146–148, 156, 239

Sachon Offensive, 130 _map_, 133 _map_, 134 _map_

Sachon Offensive Situation Map, 149

Sadong, 31

Saint Johns Military Academy, 52

Saipan, 53

Sakhalin Island, 7, 8

Samchok, 40

Samchonpo, 156

San Clemente Island, 63

San Diego, California, 53, 63, 210

Sangnyong-ni, 112, 113, 124, 128, 129

Sasebo, Japan, 60, 64

Schryver, 1stLt Hugh C., 144, 190

Scott, Hugh D., Jr., 159 _pic._

Sebilian, 1stLt Robert C., 191

Secretary of the Navy. _See_ Matthews, Francis P.

Seoul, 6, 32, 34, 37, 38, 40, 42, 46, 96, 98, 174 attack on, 39 fall of, 40 Russian legation at, 6 strafing of, 17 University, 208, 214

Shepherd, LtGen Lemuel C., Jr., 49, 53, 55, 158 _pic._

Sharp, Capt L. D., Jr., 64_n_

Sherman, Adm Forrest P., USN, 48, 49, 58, 60

Sherman, Gen William T., USA, 54

Shinka, 2dLt M. J., 181_n_, 182, 183

Ships: American: LST Q0119, 143 Enemy: Torpedo Boat, 39

Siban-ni, 98

Siberia, 9, 21

_Silcily_ (CVE), USS, 90, 95, 98, 142

Simpson, PFC Benjamin C., 192

Sinchon, 31

Singi, 123, 124

“Sino-Japanese War”, 4, 6

Sinuiju, 20, 21, 31, 32

Sinuiju Airfield, 28

Skelt, 1stLt Ernest P., 238

Smith, LtCol Charles B., USA, 45

Smith, 1stLt H. J., 221, 224

Smith, 1stLt James W., 146

Smith, MajGen Oliver P., 159 _pic._, 210, 211

Smolensk, 24

Snedeker, Col Edward W., 65, 70, 90, 91, 219

Snyder, 1stLt Joris J., 230

Soviet Russia, _See_ Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Spain, 37

Spanish-American War, 1898, 6

Spotter, LtComdr Otto E., USN, 195, 219

Stalin, Joseph, 1–3, 8, 9, 13

Stalingrad, Battle of, 10, 19, 23, 24

Stephens, Cpl Raymond E., 224

Stevens, Capt John R., 191, 192, 192_n_, 195, 197, 198, 200, 201, 217, 219, 220, 222, 224; Maj., 144_n_, 146, 190_n_, 196_n_, 233_n_

Stewart, Maj Frank R., Jr., 213, 214_n_

Stewart, Col J. L., 55, 56_n_, 62_n_, 65, 65_n_, 66, 66_n_, 68_n_, 70, 70_n_, 87, 87_n_, 88, 91, 91_n_, 99, 100, 100_n_, 101, 148, 150, 151, 178_n_, 208, 216, 217, 219, 237_n_, 244

Strategic triangle. _See_ China-Russia-Japan triangle

Strategy, Communist: “end run,” 65, 67 United Nations: delaying action, 40, 45, 46, 65

Stratemeyer, LtGen George E., USAF, 41, 60

Struble, VAdm Arthur D., USN, 41, 211

Summers, PFC Ralph J., 161 _pic._

Sunam-dong, 136

Sunchon, 97

Suwon, 40, 41, 45

Sweeney, 1stLt William E., 113, 114, 181_n_, 184, 191

Sweet, 2dLt Granville G., 192, 193, 222

Syngman, Dr. Rhee, 1, 15, 33, 158 _pic._, 209

Syngman, Madame Rhee, 209

Tactical Air Control Center, U. S. Air Force (TACC), 141

Tactical Air Control Party, 110, 139

Tactics: NKPA, 25 air, 22 artillery, 22 tank, 22 Soviet cold-war, 39

Taedabok Pass, 131, 132

Taegu, 36, 65, 66, 70, 88, 90, 92, 96, 98, 141, 173, 213, 240, 241

Taejon, 36, 40, 46, 67, 174, 175

Taepyong-ni, 110, 113, 114

Taesil-li, 127, 128, 149 _map_

Tanghong-ni, 143

Taplett, LtCol Robert D., 103–105, 105_n_, 110, 111, 119, 122, 132, 135, 135_n_, 136, 143, 148, 150–152, 177, 178, 201, 201_n_, 204, 206, 216, 227_n_, 228, 230, 233, 233_n_, 236

Tarawa, 53

Tartars, 10

Taylor, 1stLt David S., 147, 190

Tennant, Lt William G., USN, 194

Terrio, PFC Donald, 121, 121_n_

Thirty-eighth Parallel, 10, 12, 14–17, 21, 32, 37–39, 42, 59

Tobin, Cape John L., 123, 125, 144, 146, 153, 155, 189, 190

Togo, Adm, Japanese, 7

Tokkong-ni, 113, 117

Tokyo, 41, 43, 49, 56, 59, 60, 62, 65, 210, 211, 213, 216

Tompkins, Pauline, 6_n_

Tosan, 100, 103, 111, 112, 123, 124, 129, 149 _map_

Transportation: motor transport, 55 American: cargo trucks, 88 jeeps, 131, 140 M-44 armored personnel carriers, 151 motorcycles, 140 2½-ton trucks, 131 Army trucks, 93, 177 Marine truck, 166 _pic._ enemy, 139, 140 motorcycles, 139, 140, 158 _pic._

Trans-Siberian Railroad, 4

Treaties: Japan-England, treaty of alliance, 1902, 6 Japan-Korea, treaty of amity, 1887, 4 Portsmouth, treaty of, 5 September 1905, 7 Russia-China treaty of alliance, 1896, 4 Russia-China, treaty of alliance, 1902, 6 Russia-Japan, 1896, 7 Russia-Japan, 1898, 7 Russia-Nationalist China treaty of friendship, 8, 13

Triple Intervention (Russia-Germany-France), 4

Truce of the Bear, 6

Truman, President Harry S., 15, 38, 41, 45, 49, 58

Trygve Lie (U. N. Secretary-General), 37

Tsinan: battle of, 13 fall of, 13

Tsushima: battle of, 7 Straits, 90

Tugok, 175–177, 179, 182, 186, 189, 190, 193, 196, 234, 236

Uffelman, 1stLt Paul R., 184

Uijongbu, 39, 194

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 13, 14, 22, 25, 38, 64 American Joint Commission, 15 army, 22 army of occupation, 24 Nationalist China treaty of friendship and alliance, 1945, 13 withdrawal of occupation troops in Korea, 16

United Nations, 15, 16, 34, 37–39, 214 Commander. _See_ MacArthur, Gen Douglas Commission on Korea, 15, 38 Ground Forces, 66 forces, 96, 141, 228, 241, 243 General Assembly, 15 Naval blockade, 40 Security Council, 38, 45, 240

United States, 1, 3, 8, 13–15, 33, 34, 38, 40, 42, 50, 60 air-ground team, 48, 49 ground forces, 45–47, 120 commitment of, 38 first enemy contact by, 45 Lend Lease, 140 Naval blockade of Korean coast, 41

_Valley Forge_ (CV), USS, 48

Valmy, Battle of, 7

Van Orman, LtCol Ellsworth G., 91

Vasilev, LtGen, Russian, 22, 23

Vladivostok, 4, 21 Occupation of by Japan, 8

Waegwan, 67, 96

Walker, LtGen Walton H., USA, 45, 57, 62, 65–67, 70, 88, 89, 91, 92, 100, 104, 174

Wang Yun, Col, NKPA, 29

Wang Yun, MajGen, NKPA, 29

Washington, D. C., 48, 49, 52, 58

Washington, University of, 52

Weapons: enemy: antitank guns, 117, 131, 132, 137, 192, 222 automatic weapons, 131 “burp guns,” 113. _See also_ automatic weapons hand grenades, 120, 183 howitzers, 122-mm, 207 machineguns, 117, 124, 131, 135, 182–184 machinegun, 7.62-mm., 30 mortar, 111 mortar, 120-mm., 230 rifle, 85-mm., 30, 193, 221 self-propelled guns, 76-mm., 29 semiautomatic pistol, Tokarev, 21 small arms, 140, 155, 216, 224 tanks, Russian-made, 16 tank, T-34, 21, 30, 45, 46, 63, 162 _pic._, 175, 193, 208, 216, 221, 222, 228, 234 United States: guns, 20-mm., 140 guns, 75-mm., 46 guns, 90-mm., 50, 132, 137, 192, 193, 203, 222 howitzers, 105-mm., 46, 50, 55, 126, 139, 171 _pic._, 182, 240 howitzers, 155-mm., 46 machineguns, .50-caliber, 143 mortars, 60-mm., 114, 116, 131, 135, 153, 182, 197, 236 mortars, 81-mm., 117, 155, 184, 197, 200, 206, 220, 230, 235, 236 mortar, 4.2-inch, 105, 155, 184 rifle, 75-mm. recoilless, 104, 183, 193, 204, 219, 221 rifle, M-1, 238 rockets, air, 168 _pic._ rocket, 2.36″, 194 rocket, 5-inch, 47 rocket launchers, 3.5″, 46, 52, 153 tanks, 143, 157 _pic._, 160 _pic._, 167 tanks, light, 46, 150, 151 tanks, M-24, 43 tanks, M-26 “Pershing,” 50, 63, 93, 129, 137, 144, 163 _pic._, 192, 193, 203, 217, 219, 222, 234, 235 tanks, M4A3 medium, 50 supporting arms, 171 _pic._

Weir, Col Kenneth H., 56_n_, 62_n_, 87, 89, 95

Westerman, 1stLt Jack, 132, 135

Whampoa Military Academy, 23, 24

Wheatley, SSgt John I., 121

White, Sgt Bryan K., 225

_Whiteside_ (AKA), USS, 53

Williams, 2dLt John O., 120, 121, 203

Winter, 2dLt Robert M., 217, 219, 222

Wirth, 2dLt Leroy K., 116, 182, 189

“Wolfhounds.” _See_ 27th Infantry Regiment

Wonsan, 21

Wood, LtCol Ransom H., 51, 94, 126, 178

World War I, 7, 10, 52, 53 Armistice ending, 8

World War II, 1, 8, 10, 13, 19, 24–26, 37, 38, 43, 45, 48, 50–54, 56, 109, 140, 173

Wright, MSgt Edward A., 190

Wright, BrigGen Edwin K., USA, 56, 62, 211

Yaban-san, 105, 112, 117, 119

Yalta: conference, 2 agreement, 8

Yalu River, 4, 21, 42, 47; battle of, 7

Yellow Sea, 41, 98

Yenan, 19, 23, 25; Military School, 23, 25

Yonchon, 39

Yongdok, 96

Yongdungpo, 38, 96

Yongsan, 164 _pic._, 174, 175, 196, 212, 216, 217, 222, 237

Yosu, 97

Young, 2dLt James R., 230

Yugoslavia, 38

Yu Kyong Su, LtGen, NKPA, 25

Zimmer, Capt Andrew M., 116, 116_n_, 117, 117_n_, 129_n_, 131, 132, 181, 181_n_, 182, 183, 189, 189_n_

SET AND PRINTED FOR THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955. TEXT SET BY PHOTO COMPOSITION IN 12-POINT GARAMOND AND PRINTED ON MAX-OPAQUE VELLUM STOCK BY DEEP-ETCH OFFSET.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office Washington 25, D. C. - Price $2

Transcriber’s Notes

Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they were not changed.

Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left unbalanced.

The index was not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page references.

When illustrations had no captions or useful headings that could be used as captions, Transcriber added them and placed them in parentheses, usually by copying them from the List of Illustrations on page ix. Those parenthetical captions will be visible only in versions of this eBook that do not display the actual illustrations.

The first two maps are identical to the last two maps.

Footnote 265, originally footnote 7 on page 148: “18 May 5” was printed that way, with an incomplete year.

Footnote 278, originally footnote 6 on page 176: “Plan 13-60” was printed that way. All other Plans are numbered as “nn-50”, so this may be a misprint.

Page 245: Transcriber added “BuAer” and “LSD” to the Glossary.

Page 266: “Ground,” an index entry following “Marine Helicopter Squadron (Experimental)” under “Marines,” did not include a page reference.