PART II.

CONTAINING REMARKS on some Particulars in a SPEECH at opening the BUDGET in _April 1776_.

SECT. I.

_Supplemental Observations on the Surplus of the Revenue; the Quantity of Coin in the Kingdom; and Paper-Credit._

It is well known, that the great minister who presides over our finances, took occasion, at opening the Budget in April last, to enter into a particular account of the state of the nation. In this account, he represented us as in a condition the most sound and happy; our trade and revenue flourishing; our common people well provided for; our debts and taxes light; our current specie sufficiently ample; our paper-circulation safe; and the BANK, in particular, as little less firm and durable than the world.

This account, so encouraging and flattering, was generally understood to be given in designed opposition to another account very different, which had been given in the _Observations on Civil Liberty_.—It cannot, therefore, I hope, be thought too presuming in me to offer the following remarks in my own defence.

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I have grounded my opinion of the hazardous state of the kingdom, partly on the smallness of the surplus in the revenue, and the nature and circumstances of our paper-circulation, compared with the quantity of _specie_ in the kingdom, and the weight of our debts and taxes.

The surplus of the revenue I have made out in two different methods; and by a deduction so minute, that it is, I think, scarcely possible it should be materially wrong. One of these methods brings it out 338,759_l._ _per ann._[81]: and the other, 300,000_l._ _per ann._ supposing the expence of calling in the gold coin, and the profits of lotteries excluded; the land-tax at three shillings in the pound; and the peace establishment the same that it has been at a medium for eleven years, from 1764 to 1775.

Nothing more was said in opposition to this, than a general intimation, that had it not been for the war with _America_, the peace-establishment for the navy would have been reduced, and a sufficient surplus gained (including lotteries) to enable parliament to pay off a million every year of the public debt.

* * * * *

I am very sensible that reductions of the public expences and improvements in the revenue are practicable, which would give such a surplus. But I am afraid, they will never take place. Nor can I think it proper, in determining what permanent surplus we possess, to include those pernicious profits of lotteries, by which infinitely more is upon the whole lost than gained; or, to form our judgment of the expence of _future_ years, by any other rule than the medium expence of _past_ years.—It would, however, give little consolation, were there a certainty that, had peace continued, a MILLION annually of the public debt would have been discharged. This would have made a very slow progress in discharging our debts. A million every year discharged in peace, and eight or ten millions every year added in war, would leave us under the necessity of breaking at last. But hitherto we have not proceeded in a course so favourable. The great person to whom I refer, must know, that in 1772, he announced in the _House of Commons_, his intention to pay off a _million and a half_ every year, and SEVENTEEN MILLIONS in ten years; that yet only 2.800,000_l._ was paid off in the three subsequent years; and that, on account of the increase of the _navy_ and _civil-list_ debts, there has not been in fact the ability (without the help of lotteries) to pay half that sum.

* * * * *

In page 74th of the _Observations on Civil Liberty_, I have said, “that it has appeared lately, that the gold specie of the kingdom, is no more than about TWELVE MILLIONS AND A HALF.”—This assertion has been much controverted; and it is therefore necessary I should give a distinct account of the reasons on which it was grounded.

I had learnt from unquestionable authority, that the quantity of gold coin brought into the mint, by the Acts of Parliament and Proclamations in 1773 and 1774, was about NINE MILLIONS[82]; or as much as, when recoined, amounted nearly to that sum.—I find also, that it was expected by the best judges, that the proclamation lately issued would bring in about _three_ millions. These two sums make up _twelve_ millions; and they include the gold coin of _Ireland_. Let this be estimated at a[83] million; and the whole gold coin of _Britain_, to be brought in by all the calls, will be ELEVEN millions; and none will remain, except that part which was deficient less than a grain in a guinea, and remained in the kingdom, at the time the coin Act took effect in June 1773. We are here left entirely to conjecture. But it should be remembered, that for many years before 1773, the heavy coin was catched up as soon as issued, and either clipped, or melted down and exported; and that from hence arose such a scarcity of heavy coin, that, in some counties, heavy guineas might be disposed of at a premium.—In such circumstances, an allowance of about a million and a half, for the coin deficient less than a grain in a guinea before the coin Act in 1773, seems to be sufficient; and therefore, it might, I think, with reason be said, that it appeared that the gold coin of the kingdom was about TWELVE MILLIONS AND A HALF.

* * * * *

But there is another reason, by which I have been convinced, that this is a moderate estimate.

The quantity of gold coin, deficient between three and six grains in a guinea, was 4.800,000_l._ and this, when recoined, made 4.600,000_l._—The coin deficient less than three grains could not have been so much, for the following reasons. First, new coin being rougher, wears faster than old coin; and therefore, does not remain so long in any given degree of deficiency.—Secondly, coin, deficient less than three grains, is subject to several peculiar causes of diminution and destruction.—Clipping and sweating remove part of it to greater degrees of deficiency; and part is destroyed by being melted down and exported; whereas, lighter coin is diminished only by being worn[84].

These reasons seem to prove, that if the gold coin, deficient in June 1773 less than three grains, is estimated at _five millions_, (that is, at a little more than the coin deficient between three and six grains) it will be rated rather too high; and the conclusion will be, that the whole of our gold coin (exclusive of the _Irish_) might possibly be _less_, but could not have been _much more_, than the sum at which I have reckoned it.

* * * * *

Such have been the facts and arguments by which my judgment has been determined in this instance.—But it must not be overlooked, that it helps only to ascertain the quantity of _circulating_ specie in the kingdom, as distinguished from that which is _hoarded_. When the _Observations on Civil Liberty_ were published, I did not apprehend, that this part of the coin could be considerable enough to deserve regard. But the contrary has lately appeared. The Proclamation issued last summer, and which it was expected would bring in about three millions, has, I am informed, brought in about _six millions and a half_. This exceeds the sum at which I have been led to state the _whole_ gold coin deficient less than three grains; and proves, that several millions must have been hoarded[85]. Nor, I think, will this appear incredible, when it is recollected, that only gold coin under three grains of deficiency is likely to be hoarded; and also, that distrust of the _Funds_ and of Paper-money has a particular tendency to increase the practice of hoarding.

Assisted, therefore, by this new light, I would now state the _circulating_ gold coin of the kingdom before 1773, nearly as I did before; and call it TWELVE or THIRTEEN MILLIONS. But the whole gold coin (including the hoarded part) I would reckon at SIXTEEN or SEVENTEEN MILLIONS[86].

* * * * *

An account very different from this was given at opening the Budget; the substance of which I will state as faithfully as my memory will enable me; and just as I understood it.

“From the beginning of the year 1772, to the 23d of April last, 13.200,000_l_. had been coined at the Tower; and on that day there was 600,000_l_. more ready to be coined.—All this, (it was intimated) is now left in the kingdom. The last Proclamation, it was expected, would bring in three millions more; which, added to the coin deficient less than a grain resting in the kingdom at the time of the Coin Act in 1773, and issued before 1772, will make the whole, EIGHTEEN OR NINETEEN MILLIONS[87].”

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On this account I would observe,

First. That if just, it proves that, in 1773, a _third_ at least of the _circulating_ coin was in the best state possible. For the late calls having shewn, that there was then, in _Britain_ and _Ireland_, no more than about twelve _millions_ deficient _more_ than a grain; six millions (that is, a third of eighteen millions) or seven millions (that is, more than a third of nineteen millions) must have been deficient _less_ than a grain.[88]—It will also follow, (since the quantity brought in by the first call is known to have been 4.900,000l.) that but little more than a _fourth_ could have been deficient so much as six grains, or a shilling in a guinea.—No person can think this credible who recollects the distress of traffic, and the complaints of the kingdom before 1773.

Secondly. The truth of the account I have stated depends, in a great measure, on the supposition, that all the gold coined since the beginning of 1772 is now in the kingdom. I cannot conceive on what grounds this was taken for granted.—From the beginning of 1772 to June 1773, the practice of clipping was more prevalent than it had ever been. During the greatest part of 1772, the price of gold was so much above mint price, that a profit, from 2 to 4 _per cent_. might be got by melting heavy guineas[89]. And, in February in that year, the price of gold was at 4l. 1s. 6d. per ounce; and 4½ _per cent._ might be got by melting heavy guineas. Instead, therefore, of believing, that all the gold coined since the beginning of 1772 remains with us; I think it almost certain, that the greatest part of all coined during the first year and a half of this period, has been either clipped or melted into bullion. That part which was clipped has been recoined; and that part which was melted has been either recoined or exported; and, therefore, neither has made any addition to the coin of the kingdom.

These observations demonstrate, that the amount of the gold coin at the time of the Coin Act in 1773, must have been near the sum at which I have reckoned it. There may, for ought I know, have been an increase since; but I shall not believe there has, till I know, whether the coin brought in by the last proclamation has been all recoined and issued. But this cannot be expected; for should it be done, FOUR MILLIONS[90] more will have been coined and issued, than has been brought in.—The truth, therefore, may be, that the coinage, since June 1773, has been carried on only to provide a supply of new coin to be exchanged for old; in which case, the quantity of coin in the kingdom, even according to this method of computing it, will come out nearly the same with that which I have given.

* * * * *

After all, let the _specie_ of the kingdom, including the silver, be allowed to be as considerable as some have asserted; or about four millions more than I have reckoned it; the difference arising from hence will not be of particular consequence; and it will be still true, that notwithstanding all our increase of trade and apparent opulence, the _specie_ of the kingdom[91] is not much more than it was at the _Revolution_.—What then is all the rest of our circulating cash? What is it keeps up rents; feeds our luxury; pays our taxes; supplies the revenue, and supports government?—Paper, chiefly, emitted, not only at the Bank, but by tradesmen, merchants, and bankers in every corner of the kingdom.—And is this a solid and permanent support?[92] Is there, in the annals of the world, another instance of a great kingdom so supported?—The causes are numberless which may suddenly destroy it; and were this to happen, we should fall at once, with a debt of 140 millions upon us, to the state we were in before the REVOLUTION.—Imagination cannot paint to itself the shock this would give.—I must repeat here what I have said in the _Observations on Civil Liberty_, page 73, &c. that we should think of nothing but guarding ourselves against the danger of such a situation, by restricting our paper currency, and gradually discharging our public debts.—In giving this admonition, I look upon myself as doing my country one of the best offices in my power; and acting in the character of one who calls to another to awake who is sleeping over a precipice.—But I know I call in vain.—The great minister who directs our finances has assured us all is well; and, under this persuasion, we are advancing, with unsuspicious and careless speed, to the catastrophe I have pointed out; and pursuing measures which must increase the difficulty of avoiding it, and the distress attending it.

Among these measures I have mentioned the present new coinage.—Before this coinage, I have observed, the light money always remained, because nothing could be got by melting and exporting it. But now, as soon as gold rises to the price it bore for many years before 1773, the melters and exporters of coin will be saved the trouble of selection; and every piece on which they can lay their hands will be proper for their purpose.—It seems, therefore, obvious, that, in consequence of this measure, all our coin may be carried away, and the whole superstructure of paper supported by it, break down, before we are aware of any danger.

I will take this opportunity to add, that this measure will at the same time increase our paper. This has been the consequence of the two former calls; but it will probably be more the consequence of the last call. For, as no coin is now to be current which is more than a grain deficient; and as also a great deal of it is already at or near that limit; the vexation attending it will be so intolerable, that it will be generally cried down, and paper substituted in its room.—Certain it is, that nothing can prevent this evil, but another evil; I mean, the deficient coin forcing itself again into circulation, and furnishing clippers with more employment than ever; and, consequently, a return, with increased violence, of the confusion and distress which took place before the Coin Act in 1773.—This, indeed, will be much the least of the two evils; nor, in my opinion, are there any methods of preventing the diminution of the coin, which will not produce greater evils, except such alterations in its form[93] as shall render clipping less practicable, joined to the execution of severe laws against clippers, and a strict vigilance in detecting them.

Upon the whole, it seems to me, that enough had been done by the first coin act to restore the gold coin; and that all which has been done since, at the expence of about 650,000l. has been nothing but a preparation of the coin for melters and exporters, to the dreadful hazard of the kingdom.—These are my present views of this subject. But I must say, that I suspect my own judgment in this instance. The noble Lord, who is furnished with infinitely more of the means of information than I am, intimated, if I remember rightly, that there is no such danger: And though I did not understand the reason he assigned for this assertion, I must believe, that, in a matter so particularly interesting to the kingdom, he has gone upon the best evidence.

SECT. II.

_Of the State of the Nation; and the War with America._

At the beginning of the preceding section, I have taken notice of the flattering account which was given, at opening the Budget in April last, of the state of the kingdom with respect to its commerce, revenue, and opulence. On that account I shall beg leave to offer the following reflections.

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First. The observations in the last section prove, I think, that it is not so well supported by facts, as there is reason to wish. I am sensible, indeed, that we never made a more gay and splendid appearance. But no considerate person will draw much encouragement from hence. That pride and security; that luxury, venality and dissipation which give us this appearance, are melancholy symptoms; and have hitherto been the forerunners of distress and calamity.

Secondly. When this account was given there was a particular end to be answered by it. Additional taxes were to be imposed; and it was necessary to reconcile the public to the prospect of a great increase of its burthens, in order to carry on the war with _America_.—On other occasions, different accounts had been given. In order to prove the justice of taxing the _Americans_, the weight of our own taxes had been often insisted upon; and the difficulty of raising a sufficient force among ourselves to reduce them, had been urged as a reason for seeking and employing, at a great expence, the assistance of foreign powers. On such occasions, I have heard our unhappy and embarrassed situation mentioned; and, at the end of the last session of Parliament, one of our greatest men, whose opinion in favour of coercion, had contributed to bring us into our present situation, acknowledged the distress attending it, and represented the vessel of the state as having never before rode in so dangerous a storm.—This is, without doubt, the truth. But, if the account on which I am remarking was just, we were then safe and happy; nor was the vessel of the state ever wafted by more gentle and prosperous gales.

But the reflection which, on this occasion, has given me most pain is the following.

If, without _America_, we can be in a state so flourishing, a war to reduce _America_ must be totally inexcuseable. I wish I could engage attention to this. War is a dreadful evil; and those who involve a people in it _needlessly_, will find they have much to answer for. Nothing can ever justify it, but the necessity of it to secure some _essential_ interest against unjust attacks. But, it seems, there is no interest to be secured by the present war. The revenue has never flourished so much, as since _America_ has been rendered hostile to us; and it is now reckoned by many a decided point, that little depends on the _American_ trade. It follows then, that if the end of the present war is to “obtain a revenue,” it is a revenue we do not want; if “to maintain authority,” it is an authority of no use to us.—Must not humanity shudder at such a war?—Why not let _America_ alone, if we can subsist without it?—Why carry fire and sword into a happy country to do ourselves no good?

Some of the very persons who depreciate the value of the colonies, as a support to our revenue and finances, yet say, that we are now under a necessity of reducing them, or perishing. I wish such persons would give an account of the causes which, according to their ideas, create this dreadful necessity. Is it the same that led _Haman_ of old to reckon all his honours and treasures nothing to him, while _Mordecai_ the Jew would not bow to him?—Or, are we become so luxurious, that luxury even in the revenue is become necessary to us; and so depraved, that, like many individuals in private life, having lost _self_-dominion, we cannot subsist without dominion over _others_?

It must not be forgotten, that I speak here on the supposition, that it is possible for this country to be as safe and prosperous without _America_ as some have asserted, and as was implied in what was said at opening the last Budget.—This is far from being my own opinion.—Some time or other we shall, in all probability, feel severely, in our commerce and finances, the loss of the colonies. As a source of revenue they are, I think, of great importance to us; but they are still more important as supports to our navy, and an aid to us in our wars. It appears now, that there is a force among them so formidable and so growing, that, with its assistance, any of the great _European_ powers may soon make themselves masters of all the _West-Indies_ and _North-America_; and nothing ought to be more alarming to us than that our natural enemies see this, and are influenced by it.—With the colonies united to us, we might be the greatest and happiest nation that ever existed. But with the colonies separated from us, and in alliance with _France_ and _Spain_, we are no more a people.—They appear, therefore, to be indeed worth any price.—Our existence depends on keeping them.—But HOW are they to be kept?—Most certainly, not by forcing them to unconditional submission at the expence of many millions of money and rivers of blood. The resolution to attempt this, is a melancholy instance of that infatuation, which sometimes influences the councils of kingdoms. It is attempting to keep them by a method, which, if it succeeds, will destroy their use, and make them not worth the having; and which, if it does _not_ succeed, will throw them into the scale of rival powers, kindle a general war, and undo the empire.

The extension of our territories in _America_, during the last war, increased the expence of our _peace_-establishment, from 2.400,000l. _per ann._ to four millions _per ann._—Almost all the provinces in _America_, which used to be ours, are now to be conquered. Let the expence of this be stated at 25 or 30 millions; or, at a capital bearing a million _per annum_ interest.—_America_ recovered by the sword must be kept by the sword, and forts and garrisons must be maintained in every province to awe the wretched inhabitants, and to hold them in subjection. This will create another addition of expence; and both together cannot, I suppose, be stated at less than two millions _per annum_.—But how is such an increase of revenue to be procured?—The colonies, desolated and impoverished, will yield no revenue.—The surplusses of the sinking fund have, for many years, formed a necessary part of the current and ordinary supplies.—It must, therefore, be drawn from _new_ taxes.—But can the kingdom bear such an increase of taxes? Or, if it can, where shall we find a surplus for discharging an enormous debt of above 160 millions? And what will be our condition, when the next foreign war shall add two millions _per annum_ more to our expences?—Indeed this is a frightful prospect. But it will be rendered infinitely more frightful by carrying our views to that increase of the power of the Crown which will arise from the increase of the army, from the disposal of new places without number, and the patronage of the whole continent of _North-America_.

These consequences have been stated moderately on the supposition, that we shall succeed in subduing _America_; and that, while we are doing it, our natural enemies will neglect the opportunity offered them, and continue to satisfy themselves with assisting _America indirectly_.—But should the contrary happen.—I need not say what will follow.

Some time ago this horrid danger might have been avoided, and the colonies kept by the easiest means.—By a prudent lenity and moderation.—By receiving their petitions.—By giving up the right we claim to dispose of their property, and to alter their governments.—By guarantying to them, in these respects, a legislative independence;[94] and establishing them in the possession of equal liberty with ourselves.—This a great and magnanimous nation should have done. This, since the commencement of hostilities, would have brought them back to their former habits of respect and subordination; and might have bound them to us for ever.

MONTESQUIEU has observed, that ENGLAND, in planting colonies, should have _commerce_, not _dominion_, in view; the increase of dominion being incompatible with the security of public liberty.—Every advantage that could arise from commerce they have offered us without reserve; and their language to us has been—“Restrict us, as much as you please, in _acquiring_ property by regulating our trade for your advantage; but claim not the disposal of that property after it has been acquired.—Be satisfied with the authority you exercised over us before the present reign.—PLACE US WHERE WE WERE IN 1763.”—On these terms they have repeatedly sued for a reconciliation. In return, we have denounced them _Rebels_; and with our fleets in their ports, and our bayonets at their breasts, have left them no other alternative than to acknowledge our supremacy, and give up rights they think most sacred; or stand on the defensive, and appeal to heaven.—They have chosen the latter.

In this situation, if our feelings for _others_ do not make us tremble, our feelings for _ourselves_ soon may.—Should we suffer the consequences I have intimated, our pride will be humbled.—We shall admire the plans of moderation and equity which, without bloodshed or danger, would have kept _America_.—We shall wish for the happiness of former times; and remember, with anguish, the measures which many of us lately offered their lives and fortunes to support.

* * * * *

I must not conclude these observations, without taking particular notice of a charge against the colonies, which has been much insisted on.—“They have, it is said, always had independency in view; and it is this, chiefly, that has produced their present resistance.”—It is scarcely possible there should be a more unreasonable charge. Without all doubt, our connexion with them might have been preserved for ages to come, (perhaps _for ever_) by wise and liberal treatment. Let any one read a pamphlet published in 1761, by Dr. _Franklin_, and entitled, _The interest of Great Britain with respect to her Colonies_; and let him deny this if he can.—Before the present quarrel, there prevailed among them the purest affection for this country, and the warmest attachment to the House of HANOVER. And since the present quarrel begun, and not longer ago than the beginning of last winter, independency was generally dreaded among them. There is the fullest evidence for this; and all who are best acquainted with _America_, must know it to be true. As a specimen of this evidence, and of the temper of _America_ till the period I have mentioned, I will just recite the following facts.

In the resolutions of the _Assembly_, which met at _Philadelphia_, July 15, 1774, after making the strongest professions of affection to _Britain_, and duty to their sovereign, they declare their abhorrence of every idea of an unconstitutional independence on the parent state.—An assembly of delegates from all the towns of the county of _Suffolk_ (of which _Boston_ is the capital) delivered in September 1774, to General Gage, a remonstrance against fortifying _Boston-neck_. In this remonstrance, they totally disclaim every wish of independence.—The same is done in the instructions given by the several colonies to the first deputies chosen for a general Congress.—In the petition of the first Congress to the King, they declare they shall always, carefully and zealously, endeavour to support and maintain their connexion with _Great Britain_. In the memorial of the same Congress to the people of this country, they repeat this assurance.—In the order of the _Congress_, which met in May 1775, for a general fast, they call upon all _America_ to unite in beseeching the Almighty to avert the judgments with which they were threatened, and _to bless their rightful Sovereign_, that so _a reconciliation might be brought about with the parent state_.—And in their declaration setting forth the causes of their taking arms, they warn us, “that, should they find it necessary, foreign assistance was undoubtedly attainable;” but at the same time declare, “that they did not mean to dissolve the union which had so long and so happily subsisted between them and this country; that necessity had not yet driven them to that desperate measure, or induced them to excite any other nation to war against us; and that they had not raised armies with ambitious designs of forming independent states, but solely for the protection of their property against violence, and the defence of that freedom which was their birth-right.”—In the instructions, delivered Nov. 9, 1775, by a committee of the representatives of the province of _Pensylvania_, to their delegates in the third general congress; they enjoin them, in behalf of the province, “utterly to reject any propositions, should such be made, that might lead to a separation from the mother country.”

What reason can there be for thinking the colonies not sincere in all these declarations?—In truth; it was not possible they should be otherwise than sincere; for so little did they think of war, at the time when most of these declarations were made, that they were totally unprepared for it: And, even when hostilities were begun at LEXINGTON in April 1775, they were so destitute of every instrument of defence, particularly ammunition, that _half_ the force which is now invading them, would have been sufficient to conquer them at once.

I will beg leave to add on this occasion, the following extracts from letters, written by some leading persons at NEW-YORK, the genuineness of which may be depended on.

_New-York, August_ 3d. 1775.—“I am sensible of the many artifices and falshoods which have been used to biass the minds of your countrymen, who believe evil reports of us; and, particularly, that we are aiming at independence.—Of this be assured, that even HANCOCK and ADAMS are averse to independence. There was a lye current last week, that the congress had finally agreed upon independence to take place the 10th of March next, should not our grievances be redressed before that time. I wrote to one of our delegates, to enquire whether this report was true. In his answer he declares, upon his honour, that he believed there was not one man in the Congress who would dare to make a motion tending to independence; or, that if any one did, two could not be found to support the motion.—None but those who are on the spot can conceive what a spirit is gone forth among all ranks and degrees of men.—We deserve to be free. It is a heavy sacrifice we are making. Trade is at an end. We expect our city to be knocked about our ears. But I declare solemnly, I will submit to all, and die in a log-house in the wilds of America, and be free; rather than flourish in servitude.”—In a subsequent letter, dated NEW-YORK, Jan. 3d. 1776, the same person writes as follows:—“It is in the power of the ministry to annihilate all our disputes, by restoring us to the situation we were in at the conclusion of the last war. If this is done, we shall immediately return to our allegiance. But if not, be assured, that an awful scene will be opened in the spring. Let me repeat a caution to you; believe not the insinuations of our enemies, who would make you all believe that _independence_ is what _America_ aims at. It is an insidious falshood. Madmen will be found in all large societies. It would be singular, were there none such to be found in a body of three millions of people and upwards. But they are like a grain of sand on the sea shore.”

Another person writes thus.—NEW-YORK, Nov. 2d. 1775. “We love and honour our King. He has no subjects in all his dominions more attached to his person, family and government, notwithstanding the epithet of rebels bestowed upon us. No charge is more unjust than the charge that we desire an independence on _Great Britain_. Ninety-nine in a hundred of the inhabitants of this country deprecate this as the heaviest of evils. But if administration will persist in their present measures, this will and must inevitably be the event; for submit to the present claims of the British parliament, while unrepresented in it, you may be assured they never will. And what deserves notice is, that all the violence of _Britain_ only unites the _Americans_ still more firmly together, and renders them more determined to be free or die. This spirit is unconquerable by violence; but they may be easily won by kindness.—Serious people of all denominations among us, episcopal and non-episcopal, are much employed in prayer to God for the success of the present struggles of _America_. They consider their cause as the cause of God; and as such, they humbly commit it to him, confident of success in the end, whatever blood or treasure it may cost them.”

Since these letters were written, the sentiments of _America_, with respect to _independence_, have been much altered. But it should be remembered, that this alteration has been owing entirely to OURSELVES; I mean, to the measures of the last winter and summer, and particularly the following.

First. The rejection of the petition from the Congress brought over by Governor PENN. In this petition they professed, in strong language, that they still retained their loyalty to the King and attachment to this country; and only prayed, “that they might be directed to some mode by which the united applications of the Colonies might be improved into a happy reconciliation; and that, in the mean time, some measures might be taken for preventing their farther destruction, and for repealing such statutes as more immediately distressed them.”—The Colonies had often petitioned before without being heard. They had, therefore, little hope from this application; and meant that, if rejected, it should be their last.

Secondly. The last prohibitory bill, by which our protection of them was withdrawn; their ships and effects confiscated; and open war declared against them.

Thirdly. Employing _foreign_ troops to subdue them. This produced a greater effect in _America_ than is commonly imagined. And it is remarkable, that even the writers in _America_ who answered the pamphlet entitled COMMON SENSE, acknowledge, that should the _British_ ministry have recourse to foreign aid, it might become[95] proper to follow their example, and to embrace the necessity of resolving upon _independence_.

I have, further, reason to believe, that the answer to the last petition of the City of London, presented in March 1776,[96] had no small share in producing the same effect.

By these measures, and others of the same kind, those Colonists who had all along most dreaded and abhorred independence, were at last reconciled to it.—I can, however, say from particular information, that even so lately as the month of June last, an accommodation might have been obtained with the Colonies, on a reasonable and moderate plan; without giving up any one of the rights claimed by this country, except that of altering their charters and disposing of their property.—And, as it would have restored peace and prevented the desolating calamities into which _America_ and _Britain_ are now plunged, no friend to humanity can avoid regretting that such a plan, when offered, was not adopted. But our rulers preferred coercion and conquest: And the consequence has been, that the Colonies, after being goaded and irritated to the utmost, resolved to disengage themselves, and directed the CONGRESS to declare them Independent States; which was accordingly done, as is well-known, on the 4th of July last. Since that time, they have, probably, been making applications to foreign powers; and it is to be feared, that _now_ we may in vain offer them the very terms for which they once sued.—All this is the necessary consequence of the principles by which human nature is governed.—There was a time when, perhaps, we should ourselves have acted with more violence; and, instead of remonstrating and praying, as _America_ has done, have refused the most advantageous terms when offered with defiance, and under an awe from a military force. Had King WILLIAM, instead of coming over by invitation to deliver us, invaded us; and, at the head of an army, offered us the BILL OF RIGHTS; we should, perhaps, have spurned at it; and considered LIBERTY itself as no better than SLAVERY, when enjoyed as a boon from an insolent conqueror.—But we have all along acted as if we thought the people of _America_ did not possess the feelings and passions of _men_, much less of _Englishmen_.—It is indeed strange our ministers did not long ago see, that they had mistaken the proper method of treating the Colonies; and that though they might be gradually _influenced_ to any thing, they could be dragooned to nothing.—Had King _James the Second_ avoided violence; and been a little more patient and secret in pursuing his views, he might have gained all he wished for. But an eager haste and an open avowal of the odious claims of prerogative ruined him.—This has been since considered; and a plan both here and in _Ireland_,[97] less _expeditious_ indeed, but more _sure_, has been pursued. And had the same plan been pursued in _America_, the whole empire might in time have been brought, without a struggle, to rest itself quietly in the lap of corruption and slavery. It may, therefore, in the issue prove happy to the Colonies, that they have not been thought worthy of any such cautious treatment. Our coercive measures have done all for them that their warmest patriots could have desired. They have united them among themselves, and bound them together under one government. They have checked them in the career of vicious luxury; guarded them against any farther infection from hence; taught them to seek all their resources within themselves; instructed them in the use of arms; and led them to form a naval and military power which may, perhaps, in time, become superior to any force that can attack them, and prove the means of preserving from invasion and violence, a government of justice and virtue, to which the oppressed in every quarter of the globe may fly, and find peace, protection, and liberty.—In short. These measures have, in all probability, hastened that disruption of the _new_ from the _old_ world, which will begin a new _æra_ in the annals of mankind;[98] and produce a revolution more important, perhaps, than any that has happened in human affairs.—As a friend, therefore, to the general interest of mankind, I ought, probably, to rejoice in these measures; and to bless that all-governing Providence, which, often, out of the evil intended by wretched mortals, brings the greatest good.—But when I consider the _present_ sufferings which these measures must occasion, and the _catastrophe_ with which they threaten GREAT-BRITAIN; I am shocked; and feel myself incapable of looking forward, without distress, to the fate of an empire, once united and happy, but now torn to pieces, and falling a sacrifice to despotic violence and blindness. Under the impressions of these sentiments, and dreading the awful _crisis_ before us, I cannot help, however impotent my voice, crying out to this country—“Make no longer war against _yourselves_. Withdraw your armies from your Colonies. Offer your power to them as a _protecting_, not a _destroying_ power. Grant the security they desire to their property and charters; and renounce those notions of dignity, which lead you to prefer the exactions of force to the offerings of gratitude, and to hazard _every thing_ to gain _nothing_.—By such wisdom and equity _America_ may, perhaps, be still preserved; and that dreadful breach healed, which your enemies are viewing with triumph, and all _Europe_ with astonishment.”

But what am I doing?—At the moment I am writing this, the possibility of a reconciliation may be lost.—_America_ may have formed an alliance with FRANCE—And the die may be cast.

SECT. III.

_Of Schemes for raising Money by Public Loans._

The following observations were occasioned by the scheme for the public loan of last year, proposed to the _House of Commons_ at opening the _Budget_, and afterwards agreed to. I have thought proper, therefore, to introduce these observations here; and, as they appear to me of some importance, I shall endeavour to explain them with as much care and perspicuity as possible.

* * * * *

In order to raise _two millions_, the Legislature created last year a new capital in the 3 _per cent._ consolidated annuities, of 2.150,000l. Every share of 77l. 10s. in this new capital was valued at 65l. 17s. 6d. or every 100l. _stock_ at 85l. For the whole new capital, therefore, Government has received in money, 1.827,500l.—The remaining sum, necessary to make up _two millions_, was a compensation advanced to Government for relinquishing the profits of a Lottery, consisting of 60,000 tickets, each of the same value with 10l. _three per cent. stock_; and might have been obtained, without annexing the Lottery to the annuities.—This new capital the public may be obliged to redeem at _par_; in which case, 322,500l. (being the difference between 1.827,500 and 2.150,000l.) that is 17½ _per cent._ will be paid by the public more than it has received.—In this transaction, therefore, Government has acted as a private person would act, who, in order to raise 850l. on a mortgage, should promise for it 30l. _per ann._ (or 3½ _per cent._ interest) and 150l. (that is 17½ _per cent_. nearly) over and above the principal, when the mortgage came to be discharged.—Such a _premium_ (should the mortgage be discharged soon) would be very extravagant; but, if _never_ to be discharged, would be insignificant: Nor would it be possible to account for such a bargain, except by supposing, that the borrower, instead of meaning to repay the sum he borrowed, chose to continue _always_ paying interest for it, or returning 30l. annually for 850l. once advanced; and to subject his estate, for that purpose, to an eternal incumbrance.

The public, I have said, may be obliged to discharge the new capital, lately created, at _par_; and, consequently, to suffer a loss by this year’s loan of 322,500l. This will, undoubtedly, happen, should the nation prosper, and the public debts be put into a regular and fixed course of redemption; for the 3 _per cents._ would then soon rise to _par_.

The extravagance I have pointed out is the more to be regretted, because it was entirely needless; for the same sum might as well have been borrowed by schemes, which would not have subjected the public to the necessity of paying, when the loan came to be discharged, more money than had been received.—For instance. The sum advanced for the new capital of 2.150,000l. _three per cent._ annuities, might have been procured by offering 3½ _per cent._ on a capital equal to the sum advanced; or on 1.827,500l. And the remainder, necessary to make up _two millions_, might have been obtained by the profits of a Lottery, consisting of 60,000 tickets each worth 10l. in MONEY. This scheme would have differed but little in value from the other; and the interest, or the annuity payable by the public, would have been 63,962l. at 3½ _per cent._ on a capital of 1.827,500l.;[99] instead of 64,500l. at 3 _per cent._ on a capital of 2.150,000l.

When a 100l. _stock_ in the 3 _per cent._ annuities is sold at 85¾, purchasers get 3½ _per cent._ interest for their money. When, therefore, the 3 _per cents_ are at this price, 3½ _per cents_ would be at _par_; and a capital of 1.827,500l. might be redeemed by the public, (without losing any advantage arising from its debts being at a discount,) by paying this sum; or by returning the money borrowed[100]. But in the same circumstances, a capital of 2.150,000l. in the 3 _per cent._ annuities, for which 85l. _per cent._ or, in the whole, 1.827,500l. had been received, could not be redeemed without offering 86 or 87 _per cent._ for it; nor, therefore, without paying _more_ than the original sum borrowed.—When the 3 _per cents_ are near _par_, there would be a loss of 322,500l. in redeeming the same capital; whereas, the former annuities, for which the same sum had been advanced, might be always discharged by either paying the very sum[101] advanced, or a _less sum_.—In all possible circumstances, therefore, these annuities would have the advantage.—But we never, when contracting debts, carry our views to the discharge of the principal; and the consequences must prove fatal.

* * * * *

It is necessary I should observe, in justice to our present ministers, that in adapting the scheme on which I have made these remarks, they have only followed the example of former ministers; and that, however needless a waste it occasions of public money, there is reason to fear it will be followed by future ministers; for the increase of difficulty and expence in redeeming the public debts, which such schemes create, being to be felt _hereafter_, it makes no impression, and is little regarded.

* * * * *

In 1759, the fifth year of the last war, the lenders of 6.600,000l. were granted a capital in the 3 _per cents_ of 7.590,000l. together with the profits of the Lottery. Subtract from the sum advanced, 150,000l. for the profits of the Lottery; and it will appear, that, in this instance, 1.140,000l. was _needlessly_ added to the capital; there being no reason to doubt, but that lenders would then have readily advanced 6.600,000l. for a capital of 6.450,000l. bearing 3½ _per cent._[102] interest, provided the profits of a Lottery were annexed; instead of advancing the same sum for a nominal capital near 18 _per cent._ greater, but bearing 3 _per cent._ interest.

* * * * *

Again. In 1762, in order to raise 12 millions, every contributor of 80l. was entitled to a capital of 100l. to bear 4 _per cent._ interest for 19 years; and afterwards to become redeemable, and to bear interest at 3 _per cent._ And for the remaining 20l. necessary to make up a 100l. contributors were entitled to an annuity of 1l. for 98 years.—This was the same with promising, for every 60l. advanced, a 100l. capital in the 3 _per cent._ annuities, not redeemable for 19 years; and, for the remaining 40l. necessary to make up 100l. an annuity of 2l. for 19 years; and, after that, of 1l. for 79 years.

By this scheme no less a sum than 4.800,000l. was needlessly added to the capital of the public debts. For, had 5 _per cent._ been offered for every 60l. advanced;[103] and, for the remaining 40l. an annuity of 2l. during 19 years, and afterwards of 1l. for 79 years; equal encouragement would have been given to contributors; the annuity payable by the public would have been the same; and the new capital would have been 7.200,000l. bearing 5 _per cent._ interest; which might, at any time, have been redeemed with a saving of a million _per ann._ (the first payment to be made immediately) in _five_ years and a _quarter_: Whereas now, this debt will not become redeemable till 1781; and then, it will form a capital of 12 millions, not capable of being redeemed with the same saving, in less than _nine_ years and a half. Five millions and a quarter,[104] therefore, will be wasted.

The capital of 12 millions four _per cent._ annuities created this year, were made irredeemable for 19 years, to guard against the effects of an apprehension then unavoidable, that an interest of 4 _per cent._ would, if the capitals were redeemable, be reduced, whenever peace came, to 3 _per cent._ as had been done in the preceding peace.—But this end would have been answered, with equal effect and more advantage to the public, by pledging the faith of Parliament, that whatever interest was promised on any capital, should not be _reduced_ for 19 years; or (which comes to the same) that the capital should not be _redeemed_, during that term, by borrowing money, and creating a new capital bearing _lower_ interest. This would have placed capitals bearing any interest on the same footing _nearly_ with the 3 _per cent._ annuities; and an assurance, that no part of them should be discharged, without at the same time discharging an equal capital in the 3 _per cents_, would have placed them _entirely_ on the same footing.—Had it, however, been necessary, on account of the fear of a reduction of interest, to make the capital here proposed bearing 5 _per cent_, and the capitals to be mentioned presently bearing 4 _per cent._ irredeemable, (and therefore the interest irreducible) for any term (suppose till 1781); had, I say, even this been necessary (and more could not have been necessary) no advantage of great consequence would have been lost. These capitals would, during that term, have been exactly the same burden on the public with the capitals which were actually created; and after that term, they would have been a much less burden, as will be shewn at the end of this section.

Again. In January 1760, eight millions were borrowed by offering for this sum a capital of eight millions to carry 4 _per cent._ interest for 21 years, and afterwards 3 _per cent_, together with a _premium_ of 240,000l. stock carrying the same interest, and divided into 80,000l. lottery tickets, each 3l. stock.—This was the same with offering, for 80l. of every 100l. advanced, a capital of 100l. in the 3 _per cent._ annuities,[105] not redeemable for 21 years; and for the remainder besides a lottery ticket an annuity of 1l. for 21 years.—The same sum might have been raised by offering 4 _per cent_, irreducible during 21 years, or 3l. _per ann._ for 75l. of every 100l. advanced, and for the remaining 25l. an annuity of 1l. for 21 years, together with a lottery ticket.—In this case, the new capital, instead of 8.240,000l. bearing 3 _per cent._ not subject to redemption, and having an annuity of 82,400l. annexed to it, for 21 years; would have been 6.000,000l. bearing 4 _per cent._ with the same annuity annexed, but redeemable at _any_ time; and 240,000_l._[106] bearing 4 _per cent._ for 21 years, and afterwards 3 _per cent._

By the scheme likewise in 1761, for borrowing 11.400,000_l._ a capital of 100_l._ bearing 3 _per cent. interest_, was given for part of every 100_l._ advanced; and for the other part, an annuity of 1_l._ 2_s._ 6_d._ for 99 years. Had, in this case, 75_l._ FOUR _per cent._ STOCK, been offered for 75_l._ in _money_; and, for the remaining 25_l._ necessary to make up 100_l._ the said annuity of 1_l._ 2_s._ 6_d._ for 99 years;[107] the whole annual charge would have been the same; subscribers could not have been sensible of any difference in the encouragement offered them; and the public, in paying its debts, would have saved 2.850,000_l._

There was also this year 600,000_l._ received by government for 600,000_l._ stock, carrying 3 _per cent._ interest, and divided into 60,000 lottery tickets, each worth 10_l._ in stock.—As 150,000_l._ of this sum was paid for the profits of the lottery; and as 4 _per cent._ could not at this time be made of money laid out in the funds, it is out of doubt, that the same sum (or 600,000_l._) would have been given for 450,000_l._ stock, carrying 4 _per cent._ and divided into 60,000 lottery tickets, each of the same value with 7_l._ 10_s._ four _per cent._ stock; and thus 150,000_l._ more would have been saved.

In like manner; it will appear, that _three millions_, raised in 1757, by creating a capital of _three millions_ bearing 3 _per cent._ interest,[108] with a life annuity annexed of 1_l._ 2_s._ 6_d._ for every 100_l._ advanced; and also, _four millions and a half_ raised in 1758, by creating a capital of _four millions and a half_, bearing 3 _per cent._ with an annuity of a _half per cent._ annexed for 24 years; might have been raised by creating, in the former case, a capital of two millions and a half, and, in the latter, a capital of four millions, bearing 3½ _per cent._ interest, with the same annuities annexed.

In 1758, the additional sum of half a million was borrowed at 3 _per cent._ by a lottery, consisting of 50,000 tickets, each of the same real value with 10l. _stock_, but sold to the subscribers for 10l. in _money_[109]. As the 3 _per cents._ were now at 94, 3¼ _per cent._ could not be made of money laid out in the funds. Therefore, 350,000_l._ of this half million might have been raised at 3½ _per cent._ interest, and the remaining 150,000_l._ might have been procured for the profits of the lottery. Or (which is the same) 10_l._ each would have been given for 50,000 tickets, of the same value taken all together, with 350,000l. carrying 3½ _per cent._ interest; and a capital of 150,000_l._ would have been saved.

The same is true of the lottery, by which half a million was borrowed in 1756.—A million and a half also borrowed in this year, by creating a capital of a million and a half, bearing 3½ _per cent._ for 15 years, and afterwards 3 _per cent._ might have been procured, by creating a capital of only 1.400,000_l._ bearing 3¼ _per cent._ interest. But I will not examine any more of these loans. Let us next consider how detrimental they have been to the public.

* * * * *

All the savings and surplus monies of the kingdom from 1763 to 1775, have amounted (deducting 400,000_l._ gained by debts discharged at a discount) to 10.739,793_l._ and with this sum 11.139,793_l._ of the national debt has been paid off. (See the _Postscript_ at the end of this work.)—The needless addition which was made to the capital of the national debt, by injudicious schemes for raising money during the last war, exceeded this sum; and it follows, therefore, that the whole surplus of the revenue for twelve years, has not been sufficient to discharge the capital, to which in the last war a right was given, without receiving any money for it, or obtaining the least advantage by it.

The attentive reader must have observed, as I have gone along, that the extravagance on which I have insisted, has been the consequence of not separating, in the schemes for raising money, the premiums (consisting of short and long and life-annuities) from the perpetual annuities, and requiring them to be distinctly paid for; and also, of not attending to the difference between selling an _annuity_, and selling the _stock_ for which that annuity is paid. When a 100_l._ _stock_ in the 3 _per cents._ is at any given price, there is no one who would not be glad to purchase from government a perpetual annuity of 3_l._ at any _lower_ price[110]. But when government sells the _stock_, instead of the _annuity_, at that price, the public is injured in the manner I have represented.

Would any one, in selling any part of his property, offer to make the purchase-money an outstanding principal which he shall be bound to return?[111] This is what government has uniformly done in its proposals for raising money.—Were I to desire any sum to be lent me _without_ interest, offering as a _compensation_ or _premium_ an annuity for a given term, or an advantageous contract; the proposal would not be accepted, unless the annuity or the contract was worth the sum to be lent; and I should make myself a debtor to the purchaser for the very thing which I sold to him.—The absurdity would be the same, if instead of borrowing _without_ interest, I should in the same way borrow at a _low_ interest. In every such bargain, I should bring upon myself a needless debt, equal to the value of the _premium_.

I am afraid I have tired my reader’s attention on this subject. But as much depends upon a right understanding of it, I am anxious about shewing it in every possible light. In hopes, therefore, of being attended to a little longer, I shall endeavour to give a yet fuller view of this subject, and to prove its importance, by recapitulating some of the foregoing remarks, and comparing the _present_ state of our public debts, with that which would have been their state, had the errors I have pointed out, in the schemes of the public loans during the last war, been avoided.

* * * * *

The sum of 12 millions, borrowed in 1762, would have left, at the end of the war, a redeemable capital of 7.200,000l. carrying 5 _per cent._ interest, with an annuity added of 120,000l. for 18 years from January 1763, instead of an _ir_-redeemable capital of 12 millions carrying 4 _per cent._ for 18 years, and afterwards 3 _per cent._ See page 95, &c.

The sum of 12 millions, borrowed in 1761, would have left a redeemable capital of 9 millions bearing 4 _per cent._ interest, with a long annuity annexed; instead of 12 millions with the same annuity annexed. Page 100.

The sum of 8 millions, borrowed in 1760, would have left a redeemable capital of 6.180,000l. carrying 4 _per cent._ with an annuity of 82,400l. for 18 years from January 1763; instead of 8.240,000l. _ir_-redeemable, and carrying 4 _per cent._ for 18 years, and afterwards 3 _per cent._ Page 99.

The sum of 6.600,000l. borrowed in 1759, would have left a capital of 6.450,000l. carrying 3½ _per cent_; instead of a capital of 7.590,000l. carrying 3 _per cent._ Page 95.

The sum of five millions, borrowed in 1758, would have left a redeemable capital of 4.350,000l. bearing 3½ _per cent._ interest, with an annuity added of 22,500l. for 19 years from Midsummer 1763; instead of a capital of five millions irredeemable, and carrying 3½ _per cent._ for 19 years, and afterwards 3 _per cent._ Page 101, 102, &c.

The sum of three millions, borrowed in 1757, would have left a capital of two millions and a half bearing 3½ _per cent._ interest, instead of three millions bearing 3 _per cent._ interest.—And two millions, borrowed in 1756, instead of leaving a capital of two millions, would have left a capital of only 1.750,000l. Page 104.

The result, therefore, is, that the whole capital of the public debts would have been, at the end of the last war, near TWELVE MILLIONS AND A HALF less than it was; and at the same time, the annual charge not greater.—In 1775, the difference would have been much more considerable. For,

Supposing all the same sums applied since the last war to the discharge of the public debts that we know have been so applied, not only the _capital_ but the _annual charge_ would have been considerably less.—This will be demonstrated by the following account.

It may be learnt from the _Postscript_ at the end of this Tract, that 11.139,793l. of the public debts has been discharged with 10.739,793l. of the public money, derived from various savings and surplusses. All this money _might_ have been employed, and without doubt _would_ have been employed, in redeeming first the capital I have mentioned in Page 107, of 7.200,000l. bearing 5 _per cent._ interest; and afterwards, the two other capitals there mentioned of 9 millions, and of 6.180,000l. bearing 4 _per cent._ interest. It would have been sufficient to redeem the whole of the former capital, and also 3.539,793l. of the two last capitals; which would have set free for the public an annual charge of 501,591l.—To this sum must be added an annual charge of 256,000l. saved in 1765, 1766, 1767 and 1768, by redeeming, with 6.400,000l. borrowed in those years, so much of a debt unfunded at the end of the war, but afterwards funded, and carrying 4 _per cent._ interest. And also 12,537l. _per ann._ gained by changing 1.253,700l. from an interest of 4 to 3 _per cent._ and 7,500l. _per ann._ gained in 1771, by the ceasing of an annuity of a ½ _per cent._ annexed for 15 years to 1.500,000l. borrowed in 1756.—The total decrease, therefore, of the annual charge would have been 777,628l.—But at the same time there would have been the following additions to it.—First. There would have been the addition of 199,500l. _per ann._ being the interest of 6.650,000l. borrowed since 1763.—Secondly. Of 69,187l. _per ann._ being the interest of 2.306,240l. applied, in 1764 and 1765, to the discharge of German and army debts derived from the war, and which might have been converted into a funded capital bearing 3 _per cent._ interest, by borrowing money to pay them off, in order to avoid diverting money employed in redeeming capitals bearing 5 _per cent._

These two sums make 268,687l. which deducted from 777,628l. leaves 508,941l. And this is the clear annual charge which would have been saved to the public, exclusive of the savings which have arisen from the falling in of life-annuities.

But the annual charge that has in fact been saved is only 382,129[112].—The difference is 126,812l.—With this additional saving, as it fell in and increased from time to time during the course of 12 years, a million more of the public debts bearing 4 _per cent._ might have been redeemed; and this would have made a farther saving of 40,000l. _per ann._ It appears, therefore, upon the whole, that had the mistakes I have pointed out, in the loans of the last war, been avoided, (all other public measures remaining the same) the nation would _now_ have had 13 millions and a half less to pay, in order to redeem its debts; and also an annual charge upon it 166,812l. less.

All this supposes that the capitals of the 5 _per cent._ and 4 _per cent._ annuities in the improved schemes were redeemable.—But had they been made irredeemable till 1781, as mentioned in page 98, the public would not have been much less benefited: For, soon after 1781, these 5 and 4 _per cents._ (the former 7.200,000l. and the latter 15.180,000l.) might have been easily reduced to 3½ _per cent._ and this would have occasioned an annual saving of 183,900l. over and above the savings, which would have arisen in that year, from the extinction of the short annuities.

I will add, that had these annuities been made not only _irredeemable_ till 1781; but _irreducible_ for some time beyond that year, in the manner intimated in page 98, the public would still have been greatly benefited. For, the annual charge upon it would not at any time have been greater; but its debts would have been 12 millions and a half less; and, at the same time, they would have been capable of being discharged with more expedition, and at a less expence, than a smaller quantity of its present debts. See the note, page 94.

* * * * *

I cannot doubt but that all who will attentively examine these observations will find them to be just.—I have confined my enquiries to the loans of the last war. Had I extended them to all our loans, it would have appeared, that a greater sum than most persons can think credible,[113] has been such a needless addition to our debts as I have explained; or, “a pure and uncompensated loss, which might have been avoided by only framing differently the schemes of the public loans.”