PART II.

In the foregoing disquisitions, I have, from one leading principle, deduced a number of consequences, that seem to me incapable of being disputed. I have meant that they should be applied to the great question between this kingdom and the Colonies which has occasioned the present war with them.

It is impossible, but my readers must have been all along making this application; and if they still think, that the claims of this kingdom are reconcileable to the principles of true liberty and legitimate government, I am afraid, that nothing I shall farther say will have any effect on their judgments. I wish, however, they would have the patience and candour to go with me, and grant me a hearing some time longer.

Though clearly decided in my own judgment on this subject, I am inclined to make great allowances for the different judgments of others. We have been so used to speak of the Colonies as _our_ Colonies, and to think of them as in a state of subordination to us, and as holding their existence in _America_ only for our use, that it is no wonder the prejudices of many are alarmed, when they find a different doctrine maintained. The meanest person among us is disposed to look upon himself as having a body of subjects in _America_; and to be offended at the denial of his right to make laws for them, though perhaps he does not know what colour they are of, or what language they talk.—Such are the natural prejudices of this country.—But the time is coming, I hope, when the unreasonableness of them will be seen; and more just sentiments prevail.

* * * * *

Before I proceed, I beg it may be attended to, that I have chosen to try this question by the general principles of Civil Liberty; and not by the practice of former times; or by the _Charters_ granted the colonies.—The arguments _for_ them, drawn from these last topics, appear to me greatly to outweigh the arguments _against_ them. But I wish to have this question brought to a higher test, and surer issue. The question with all liberal enquirers ought to be, not what jurisdiction over them _Precedents_, _Statutes_, and _Charters_ give, but what reason and equity, and the rights of humanity give.—This is, in truth, a question which no kingdom has ever before had occasion to agitate. The case of a free country branching itself out in the manner _Britain_ has done, and sending to a distant world colonies which have there, from small beginnings, and under free legislatures of their own, increased, and formed a body of powerful states, likely soon to become superior the parent state.—This is a case which is new in the history of mankind; and it is extremely improper to judge of it by the rules of any narrow and partial policy; or to consider it on any other ground than the general one of reason and justice.—Those who will be candid enough to judge on this ground, and who can divest themselves of national prejudices, will not, I fancy, remain long unsatisfied.—But alas! Matters are gone too far. The dispute probably must be settled another way; and the sword alone, I am afraid, is now to determine what the rights of _Britain_ and _America_ are.—Shocking situation!—Detested be the measures which have brought us into it: And, if we are endeavouring to enforce injustice, cursed will be the war.—A retreat, however, is not yet impracticable. The duty we owe our gracious sovereign obliges us to rely on his disposition to stay the sword, and to promote the happiness of all the different parts of the Empire at the head of which he is placed. With some hopes, therefore, that it may not be too late to reason on this subject, I will, in the following Sections, enquire what the war with _America_ is in the following respects.

1. In respect of Justice.

2. The Principles of the Constitution.

3. In respect of Policy and Humanity.

4. The Honour of the Kingdom.

And lastly, The Probability of succeeding in it.

SECT. I.

_Of the Justice of the War with America._

The enquiry, whether the war with the Colonies is a _just_ war, will be best determined by stating the power over them, which it is the end of the war to maintain: And this cannot be better done, than in the words of an act of parliament, made on purpose to define it. That act, it is well known, declares, “That this kingdom has power, and of right ought to have power to make laws and statutes to bind the Colonies, and people of _America_, in all cases whatever.”—Dreadful power indeed! I defy any one to express slavery in stronger language. It is the same with declaring “that we have a right to do with them what we please.”—I will not waste my time by applying to such a claim any of the preceding arguments. If my reader does not feel more in this case, than words can express, all reasoning must be vain.

But, probably, most persons will be for using milder language; and for saying no more than, that the united legislatures of _England_ and _Scotland_ have of right power to tax the Colonies, and a _supremacy_ of legislation over _America_.—But this comes to the same. If it means any thing, it means, that the property and the legislations of the Colonies, are subject to the absolute discretion of _Great Britain_, and ought of right to be so. The nature of the thing admits of no limitation. The Colonies can never be admitted to be judges, how far the authority over them in these cases shall extend. This would be to destroy it entirely—If _any_ part of their property is subject to our discretion, the _whole_ must be so. If we have a right to interfere at all in their internal legislations, we have a right to interfere as far as we think proper.—It is self-evident, that this leaves them nothing they can call _their own_.—And what is it that can give to any people such a supremacy over another people?—I have already examined the principal answers which have been given to this enquiry. But it will not be amiss in this place to go over some of them again.

* * * * *

It has been urged, that such a right must be lodged somewhere, “in order to preserve the UNITY of the British Empire.”

Pleas of this sort have, in all ages, been used to justify tyranny.—They have in RELIGION given rise to numberless oppressive claims, and slavish Hierarchies. And in the _Romish Communion_ particularly, it is well known, that the POPE claims the title and powers of the supreme head on earth of the Christian church, in order to preserve its UNITY.—With respect to the _British Empire_, nothing can be more preposterous than to endeavour to maintain its unity, by setting up such a claim. This is a method of establishing unity, which, like the similar method in religion, can produce nothing but discord and mischief.—The truth is, that a common relation to one supreme executive head; an exchange of kind offices; tyes of interest and affection, and _compacts_, are sufficient to give the British Empire all the unity that is necessary. But if not—If, in order to preserve its _Unity_, one half of it must be enslaved to the other half, let it, in the name of God, want Unity.

Much has been said of “the _Superiority_ of the British State.” But what gives us our superiority?—Is it our _Wealth_?—This never confers real dignity. On the contrary: Its effect is always to debase, intoxicate, and corrupt.—Is it the _number of our people_? The colonies will soon be equal to us in number.—Is it our _Knowledge_ and _Virtue_? They are probably _equally_ knowing, and _more_ virtuous. There are names among them that will not stoop to any names among the philosophers and politicians of this island.

“But we are the PARENT STATE.”—These are the magic words which have fascinated and misled us.—The English came from _Germany_. Does that give the _German_ states a right to tax us?—Children, having no property, and being incapable of guiding themselves, the author of nature has committed the care of them to their parents, and subjected them to their absolute authority. But there is a period when, having acquired property, and a capacity of judging for themselves, they become independent agents; and when, for this reason, the authority of their parents ceases, and becomes nothing but the respect and influence due to benefactors. Supposing, therefore, that the order of nature in establishing the relation between parents and children, ought to have been the rule of our conduct to the Colonies, we should have been gradually relaxing our authority as they grew up. But, like mad parents, we have done the contrary; and, at the very time when our authority should have been most relaxed, we have carried it to the greatest extent, and exercised it with the greatest rigour. No wonder then, that they have turned upon us; and obliged us to remember, that they are not Children.

“But we have, it is said, protected them, and run deeply in debt on their account.”—The full answer to this has been already given, (page 26.) Will any one say, that all we have done for them has not been more on our _own_ account,[17] than on _theirs_?—But suppose the contrary. Have they done nothing for us? Have they made no compensation for the protection they have received? Have they not helped us to pay our _taxes_, to support our poor, and to bear the burthen of our debts, by taking from us, at our own price, all the commodities with which we can supply them?—Have they not, for our advantage, submitted to many restraints in acquiring property? Must they likewise resign to us the disposal of that property?—Has not their exclusive trade with us been for many years one of the chief sources of our wealth and power?—In all our wars have they not fought by our side, and contributed much to our success? In the last war, particularly, it is well known, that they ran themselves deeply in debt; and that the parliament thought it necessary to grant them considerable sums annually as compensations for going beyond their abilities in assisting us. And in this course would they have continued for many future years; perhaps, for ever.—In short; were an accurate account stated, it is by no means certain which side would appear to be most indebted. When asked as _freemen_, they have hitherto seldom discovered any reluctance in giving. But, in obedience to a demand, and with the bayonet at their breasts, they will give us nothing but blood.

It is farther said, “that the land on which they settled was ours.”—But how came it to be ours? If sailing along a coast can give a right to a country, then might the people of _Japan_ become, as soon as they please, the proprietors of _Britain_. Nothing can be more chimerical than property founded on such a reason. If the land on which the Colonies first settled had any proprietors, they were the natives. The greatest part of it they bought of the natives. They have since cleared and cultivated it; and, without any help from us, converted a wilderness into fruitful and pleasant fields. It is, therefore, now on a double account their property; and no power on earth can have any right to disturb them in the possession of it, or to take from them, without their consent, any part of its produce.

But let it be granted, that the land was ours. Did they not settle upon it under the faith of charters, which promised them the enjoyment of all the rights of _Englishmen_; and allowed them to tax themselves, and to be governed by legislatures of their own, similar to ours? These charters were given them by an authority, which at the time was thought competent; and they have been rendered sacred by an acquiescence on our part for near a century. Can it then be wondered at, that the Colonies should revolt, when they found their charters violated; and an attempt made to force INNOVATIONS upon them by famine and the sword;—But I lay no stress on charters. They derive their rights from a higher source. It is inconsistent with common sense to imagine, that any people would ever think of settling in a distant country, on any such condition, as that the people from whom they withdrew, should for ever be masters of their property, and have power to subject them to any modes of government they pleased. And had there been express stipulations to this purpose in all the charters of the colonies, they would, in my opinion, be no more bound by them, than if it had been stipulated with them, that they should go naked, or expose themselves to the incursions of wolves and tigers.

The defective state of the representation of this kingdom has been farther pleaded to prove our right to tax _America_. We submit to a parliament that does not represent us, and therefore they ought.—How strange an argument is this? It is saying we want liberty; and therefore, they ought to want it.—Suppose it true, that they are indeed contending for a better constitution of government, and more liberty than we enjoy: Ought this to make us angry?—Who is there that does not see the danger to which this country is exposed?—Is it generous, because we are in a sink, to endeavour to draw them into it? Ought we not rather to wish earnestly, that there may at least be ONE FREE COUNTRY left upon earth, to which we may fly, when venality, luxury, and vice have completed the ruin of liberty here?

It is, however, by no means true, that _America_ has no more right to be exempted from taxation by the _British_ parliament, than _Britain_ itself.—_Here_, all freeholders, and burgesses in boroughs, are represented. _There_, not one _Freeholder_, or any other person, is represented.—_Here_, the _aids_ granted by the represented part of the kingdom must be proportionably _paid_ by themselves; and the laws they make for _others_, they at the same time make for _themselves_. _There_, the aids they would grant would not be _paid_, but _received_, by themselves; and the laws they made would be made for _others only_.—In short. The relation of one country to another country, whose representatives have the power of taxing it (and of appropriating the money raised by the taxes) is much the same with the relation of a country to a single despot, or a body of despots, within itself, invested with the like power. In both cases, the people taxed and those who tax have separate interests; nor can there be any thing to check oppression, besides either the abilities of the people taxed, or the humanity of the _taxers_.—But indeed I can never hope to convince that person of any thing, who does not see an essential difference[18] between the two cases now mentioned; or between the circumstances of individuals, and classes of men, making parts of a community imperfectly represented in the legislature that governs it; and the circumstances of a whole community, in a distant world, not at all represented.

But enough has been said by others on this point; nor is it possible for me to throw any new light upon it. To finish, therefore, what I meant to offer under this head, I must beg that the following considerations may be particularly attended to.

* * * * *

The question now between us and the Colonies is, Whether, in respect of taxation and internal legislation, they are bound to be subject to the jurisdiction of this kingdom: Or, in other words, Whether the _British_ parliament has or has not of right, a power to dispose of their property, and to model as it pleases their governments?—To this supremacy over them, we say, we are entitled; and in order to maintain it, we have begun the present war.—Let me here enquire,

_1st._ Whether, if we have now this supremacy, we shall not be equally entitled to it in any future time?—They are now but little short of half our number. To this number they have grown, from a small body of original settlers, by a very rapid increase. The probability is, that they will go on to increase; and that, in 50 or 60 years, they will be _double_ our number;[19] and form a mighty Empire, consisting of a variety of states, all equal or superior to ourselves in all the arts and accomplishments, which give dignity and happiness to human life. In that period, will they be still bound to acknowledge that supremacy over them which we now claim? Can there be any person who will assert this; or whose mind does not revolt at the idea of a vast continent, holding all that is valuable to it, at the discretion of a handful of people on the other side the _Atlantic_?—But if, at _that_ period, this would be unreasonable; what makes it otherwise _now_?—Draw the line, if you can.—But there is a still greater difficulty.

* * * * *

_Britain_ is now, I will suppose, the seat of Liberty and Virtue; and its legislature consists of a body of able and independent men, who govern with wisdom and justice. The time may come when all will be reversed: When its excellent constitution of government will be subverted: When, pressed by debts and taxes, it will be greedy to draw to itself an increase of revenue from every distant Province, in order to ease its own burdens: When the influence of the crown, strengthened by luxury and an universal profligacy of manners, will have tainted every heart, broken down every fence of Liberty, and rendered us a nation of tame and contented vassals: When a General _Election_ will be nothing but a general _Auction_ of _Boroughs_: And when the PARLIAMENT, the Grand Council of the nation, and once the faithful guardian of the state, and a terror to evil ministers, will be degenerated into a body of _Sycophants_, dependent and venal, always ready to confirm _any_ measures; and little more than a public court for registering royal edicts.—Such, it is possible, may, some time or other, be the state of _Great Britain_.—What will, at that period, be the duty of the Colonies? Will they be still bound to unconditional submission? Must they always continue an appendage to our government; and follow it implicitly through every change that can happen to it?—Wretched condition, indeed, of millions of freemen as good as ourselves.—Will you say that we now govern equitably; and that there is no danger of any such revolution?—Would to God this were true.—But will you not always say the same? Who shall judge whether we govern equitably or not? Can you give the Colonies any _security_ that such a period will never come? Once more.

* * * * *

If we have indeed that power which we claim over the legislations, and internal rights of the Colonies, may we not, whenever we please, subject them to the arbitrary power of the crown?—I do not mean, that this would be a disadvantageous change: For I have before observed, that if a people are to be subject to an external power over which they have no command, it is better that power should be lodged in the hands of one man than of a multitude. But many persons think otherwise; and such ought to consider that, if this would be a calamity, the condition of the Colonies must be deplorable.—“A government by King, Lords, and Commons, (it has been said) is the perfection of government;” and so it is, when the Commons are a just representation of the people; and when also, it is not extended to any distant people, or communities, not represented. But if this is the _best_, a government by a king only must be the _worst_; and every claim implying a right to establish such a government among any people must be unjust and cruel.—It is self-evident, that by claiming a right to alter the constitutions of the Colonies, according to our discretion, we claim this power: And it is a power that we have thought fit to exercise in _one_ of our Colonies; and that we have attempted to exercise in _another_.—_Canada_, according to the late extension of its limits, is a country almost as large as half _Europe_; and it may possibly come in time to be filled with British subjects. The _Quebec_ act makes the king of _Great Britain_ a despot over all that country.—In the Province of _Massachuset’s Bay_ the same thing has been attempted and begun.

The act for BETTER _regulating their government_, passed at the same time with the _Quebec_ act, gives the king the right of appointing, and removing at his pleasure, the members of one part of the legislature; alters the mode of chusing juries, on purpose to bring it more under the influence of the king; and takes away from the province the power of calling any meetings of the people without the king’s consent.[20]—The judges, likewise, have been made dependent on the king, for their nomination and pay, and continuance in office.—If all this is no more than we have a right to do; may we not go on to abolish the house of representatives, to destroy all trials by juries, and to give up the province absolutely and totally to the will of the king?—May we not even establish popery in the province, as has been lately done in _Canada_, leaving the support of protestantism to the king’s discretion?—Can there be any Englishman who, were it his own case, would not sooner lose his heart’s blood than yield to claims so pregnant with evils, and destructive to every thing that can distinguish a _Freeman_ from a _Slave_?

I will take this opportunity to add, that what I have now said, suggests a consideration that demonstrates, on how different a footing the Colonies are with respect to our government, from particular bodies of men _within_ the kingdom, who happen not to be represented. Here, it is impossible that the represented part should subject the unrepresented part to arbitrary power, without including themselves. But in the Colonies it is _not_ impossible. We know that it _has_ been done.

SECT. II.

_Whether the War with ~America~ is justified by the Principles of the Constitution._

I have proposed, in the next place, to examine the war with the Colonies by the principles of the constitution.—I know, that it is common to say that we are now maintaining the constitution in _America_. If this means that we are endeavouring to establish our own constitution of government there; it is by no means true; nor, were it true, would it be right. They have chartered governments of their own, with which they are pleased; and which, if any power on earth may change without their consent, that power may likewise, if it thinks proper, deliver them over to the _Grand Seignior_.—Suppose the Colonies of _France_ had, by compacts, enjoyed for many years, free governments open to all the world, under which they had grown and flourished; what should we think of that kingdom, were it to attempt to destroy their governments, and to force upon them its own mode of government? Should we not applaud any zeal they discovered in repelling such an injury?—But the truth is, in the present instance, that we are not maintaining but violating our own constitution in _America_. The essence of our constitution consists in its independency. There is in this case no difference between _subjection_ and _annihilation_. Did, therefore, the Colonies possess governments perfectly the same with ours, the attempt to subject them to ours would be an attempt to ruin them. A free government loses its nature from the moment it becomes liable to be commanded or altered by any superior power.

But I intended here principally to make the following observation.

The fundamental principle of our government is, “The right of a people to give and grant their own money.”—It is of no consequence, in this case, whether we enjoy this right in a proper manner or not. Most certainly we do not. It is, however, the _principle_ on which our government, as a _free_ government, is founded. The _spirit_ of the constitution gives it us; and, however imperfectly enjoyed, we glory in it as our first and greatest blessing. It was an attempt to encroach upon this right, in a trifling instance, that produced the civil war in the reign of _Charles_ the First.—Ought not our brethren in _America_ to enjoy this right as well as ourselves? Do the principles of the constitution give it _us_, but deny it to _them_? Or can we, with any decency, pretend that when we give to the king _their_ money, we give him _our own_?[21]—What difference does it make, that in the time of _Charles the First_ the attempt to take away this right was made by _one man_: but that, in the case of _America_, it is made by a body of men?

In a word. This is a war undertaken not only against the principles of our own constitution; but on purpose to destroy other similar constitutions in _America_; and to substitute in their room a military force. See page 23, 24.—It is, therefore, a gross and flagrant violation of the constitution.

SECT. III.

_Of the Policy if the War with ~America~._

In writing the present Section, I enter upon a subject of the last importance, on which much has been said by other writers with great force, and in the ablest manner[22]. But I am not willing to omit any topic which I think of great consequence, merely because it has already been discussed: And, with respect to this in particular, it will, I believe, be found that some of the observations on which I shall insist, have not been sufficiently attended to.

* * * * *

The object of this war has been often enough declared to be “maintaining the supremacy of this country over the colonies.” I have already enquired how far reason and justice, the principles of Liberty, and the rights of humanity, entitle us to this supremacy. Setting aside, therefore, now all considerations of this kind, I would observe, that this supremacy is to be maintained, either merely _for its own sake_, or for the sake of some public interest connected with it and dependent upon it.—If _for its own sake_; the only object of the war is the extension of dominion; and its only motive is the lust of power.—All government, even _within_ a state, becomes tyrannical, as far as it is a needless and wanton exercise of power; or is carried farther than is absolutely necessary to preserve the peace and to secure the safety of the state. This is what an excellent writer calls GOVERNING TOO MUCH; and its effect must always be, weakening government by rendering it contemptible and odious.—Nothing can be of more importance, in governing distant provinces and adjusting the clashing interests of different societies, than attention to this remark. In these circumstances it is _particularly_ necessary to make a sparing use of power, in order to preserve power.—Happy would it have been for _Great Britain_, had this been remembered by those who have lately conducted its affairs. But our policy has been of another kind. At the period when our authority should have been most concealed, it has been brought most in view; and by a progression of violent measures, every one of which has increased distress, we have given the world reason to conclude, that we are acquainted with no other method of governing than _by force_.—What a shocking mistake!—If our object is power, we should have known better how to use it; and our rulers should have considered, that freemen will always revolt at the sight of a naked sword; and that the complicated affairs of a great kingdom, holding in subordination to it a multitude of distant communities, all jealous of their rights, and warmed with spirits as high as our own, require not only the most skilful, but the most cautious and tender management. The consequences of a different management we are now feeling. We see ourselves driven among rocks, and in danger of being lost.

* * * * *

The following reasons make it too probable, that the present contest with _America_ is a contest for power only[23], abstracted from all the advantages connected with it.

_1st._ There is a love of power inherent in human nature; and it cannot be uncharitable to suppose that the nation in general, and the cabinet in particular, are too likely to be influenced by it. What can be more flattering than to look across the _Atlantic_, and to see in the boundless continent of _America_, increasing MILLIONS whom we have a right to order as we please, who hold their property at our disposal, and who have no other law than our will. With what complacency have we been used to talk of them as OUR subjects?—Is it not the interruption they now give to this pleasure; is it not the opposition they make to our pride; and not any injury they have done us, that is the secret spring of our present animosity against them?—I wish all in this kingdom would examine themselves carefully on this point. Perhaps, they might find, that they have not known what spirit they are of.—Perhaps, they would become sensible, that it was a spirit of domination, more than a regard to the true interest of this country, that lately led so many of them, with such savage folly, to address the throne for the slaughter of their brethren in _America_, if they will not submit to them; and to make offers of their lives and fortunes for that purpose.—Indeed, I am persuaded, that, were pride and the lust of dominion exterminated from every heart among us, and the humility of Christians infused in their room, this quarrel would be soon ended.

* * * * *

_2dly._ Another reason for believing that this is a contest for power only is, that our ministers have frequently declared, that their object is not to draw a revenue from _America_; and that many of those who are warmest for continuing it, represent the _American trade_ as of no great consequence.

But what deserves particular consideration here is, that this is a contest from which no advantages can possibly be derived.—Not a revenue: For the provinces of America, when desolated, will afford no revenue; or if they should, the expence of subduing them and keeping them in subjection will much exceed that revenue.—Not any of the advantages of trade: For it is a folly, next to insanity, to think trade can be promoted by impoverishing our customers, and fixing in their minds an everlasting abhorrence of us.—It remains, therefore, that this war can have no other object than the extension of power.—Miserable reflection!—To sheath our swords in the bowels of our brethren, and spread misery and ruin among a happy people, for no other end than to oblige them to acknowledge our supremacy. How horrid!—This is the cursed ambition that led a _Cæsar_ and an _Alexander_, and many other mad conquerors, to attack peaceful communities, and to lay waste the earth.

But a worse principle than even this, influences some among us. Pride and the love of dominion are principles hateful enough; but blind resentment and the desire of revenge are infernal principles: And these, I am afraid, have no small share at present in guiding our public conduct.—One cannot help indeed being astonished at the virulence, with which some speak on the present occasion against the Colonies.—For, what have they done?—Have they crossed the ocean and invaded us? Have they attempted to take from us the fruits of our labour, and to overturn that form of government which we hold so sacred?—This cannot be pretended.—On the contrary. This is what we have done to them.—We have transported ourselves to their peaceful retreats, and employed our fleets and armies to stop up their ports, to destroy their commerce, to seize their effects, and to burn their towns. Would we but let them alone, and suffer them to enjoy in security their property and governments, instead of disturbing us, they would thank and bless us. And yet it is WE who imagine ourselves ill-used.—The truth is, we expected to find them a cowardly rabble who would lie quietly at our feet; and they have disappointed us. They have risen in their own defence, and repelled force by force. They deny the plenitude of our power over them; and insist upon being treated as free communities.—It is THIS that has provoked us; and kindled our governors into rage.

I hope I shall not here be understood to intimate, that _all_ who promote this war are actuated by these principles. Some, I doubt not, are influenced by no other principle, than a regard to what they think the just authority of this country over its colonies, and to the unity and indivisibility of the British Empire. I wish such could be engaged to enter thoroughly into the enquiry, which has been the subject of the first part of this pamphlet; and to consider, particularly, how different a thing maintaining the authority of government _within_ a state is from maintaining the authority of one people over another, already happy in the enjoyment of a government of their own. I wish farther they would consider, that the desire of maintaining authority is warrantable, only as far as it is the means of promoting some end, and doing some good; and that, before we resolve to spread famine and fire through a country in order to make it acknowledge our authority, we ought to be assured that great advantages will arise not only to ourselves, but to the country we wish to conquer.—That from the present contest no advantage to _ourselves_ can arise, has been already shewn, and will presently be shewn more at large.—That no advantage to the Colonies can arise from it, need not, I hope, be shewn. It has however been asserted, that even _their_ good is intended by this war. Many of us are persuaded, that they will be much happier under our government, than under any government of their own; and that their liberties will be safer when held for them by us, than when trusted in their own hands.—How kind is it thus to take upon us the trouble of judging for them what is most for their happiness? Nothing can be kinder except the resolution we have formed to exterminate them, if they will not submit to our judgment.—What strange language have I sometimes heard? By an armed force we are now endeavouring to destroy the laws and governments of America; and yet I have heard it said, that we are endeavouring to support law and government there. We are insisting upon our right to levy contributions upon them; and to maintain this right, we are bringing upon them all the miseries a people can endure; and yet it is asserted, that we mean nothing but their security and happiness.

But I have wandered a little from the point I attended principally to insist upon in this section, which is, “the folly, in respect of policy, of the measures which have brought on this contest; and its pernicious and fatal tendency.”

The following observations will, I believe, abundantly prove this.

_1st._ There are points which are likely always to suffer by discussion. Of this kind are most points of authority and prerogative; and the best policy is to avoid, as much as possible, giving any occasion for calling them into question.

The colonies were at the beginning of this reign in the habit of acknowledging our authority, and of allowing us as much power over them as our interest required; and more, in some instances, than we could reasonably claim. This habit they would have retained: and had we, instead of imposing new burdens upon them, and increasing their restraints, studied to promote their commerce, and to grant them new indulgences, they would have been always growing more attached to us. Luxury, and, together with it, their dependence upon us, and our influence[24] in their assemblies, would have increased, till in time perhaps they would have become as corrupt as ourselves; and we might have succeeded to our wishes in establishing our authority over them.—But, happily for _them_, we have chosen a different course. By exertions of authority which have alarmed them, they have been put upon examining into the grounds of all our claims, and forced to give up their luxuries, and to seek all their resources within themselves: And the issue is likely to prove the loss of _all_ our authority over them, and of all the advantages connected with it. So little do men in power sometimes know how to preserve power; and so remarkably does the desire of extending dominion sometimes destroy it.—Mankind are naturally disposed to continue in subjection to that mode of government, be it what it will, under which they have been born and educated. Nothing rouses them into resistance but gross abuses, or some particular oppressions out of the road to which they have been used. And he who will examine the history of the world will find, there has generally been more reason for complaining that they have been too patient, than that they have been turbulent and rebellious.

Our governors, ever since I can remember, have been jealous that the Colonies, some time or other, would throw off their dependence. This jealously was not founded on any of their acts or declarations. They have always, while at _peace_ with us, disclaimed any such design; and they have continued to disclaim it since they have been at _war_ with us. I have reason, indeed, to believe, that independency is, even at this moment,[25] generally dreaded among them as a calamity to which they are in danger of being driven, in order to avoid a greater.—The jealousy I have mentioned, was, however, natural; and betrayed a secret opinion, that the subjection in which they were held was more than we could expect them always to endure. In such circumstances, all possible care should have been taken to give them no reason for discontent, and to preserve them in subjection, by keeping in that line of conduct to which custom had reconciled them, or at least never deviating from it, except with great caution; and particularly, by avoiding all direct attacks on their property and legislations. Had we done this, the different interests of so many states scattered over a vast continent, joined to our own prudence and moderation, would have enabled us to maintain them in dependence for ages to come.—But instead of this, how have we acted?—It is in truth too evident, that our whole conduct, instead of being directed by that sound policy and foresight which in such circumstances were absolutely necessary, has been nothing (to say the best of it) but a series of the blindest rigour followed by retractation; of violence followed by concession; of mistake, weakness and inconsistency.—A recital of a few facts, within every body’s recollection, will fully prove this.

In the 6th of _George the Second_, an act was passed for imposing certain duties on all foreign spirits, molasses and sugars imported into the plantations. In this act, the duties imposed are said to be GIVEN and GRANTED by the Parliament to the King; and this is the first _American_ act in which these words have been used. But notwithstanding this, as the act had the appearance of being only a regulation of trade, the colonies submitted to it; and a small direct revenue was drawn by it from them.—In the 4th of the present reign, many alterations were made in this act, with the declared purpose of making provision for raising a revenue in America. This alarmed the Colonies; and produced discontents and remonstrances, which might have convinced our rulers this was tender ground, on which it became them to tread very gently.—There is, however, no reason to doubt but in time they would have sunk into a quiet submission to this revenue act, as being at worst only the exercise of a power which then they seem not to have thought much of contesting; I mean, the power of taxing them EXTERNALLY.—But before they had time to cool, a worse provocation was given them; and the STAMP-ACT was passed. This being an attempt to tax them INTERNALLY; and a direct attack on their property, by a power which would not suffer itself to be questioned; which eased _itself_ by loading _them_; and to which it was impossible to fix any bounds; they were thrown at once, from one end of the continent to the other, into resistance and rage.—Government, dreading the consequences, gave way; and the Parliament (upon a change of ministry) repealed the _Stamp-Act_, without requiring from them any recognition of its authority, or doing any more to preserve its dignity, than asserting, by the declaratory law, that it was possessed of full power and authority to make laws to bind them in all cases whatever.—Upon this, peace was restored; and, had no farther attempts of the same kind been made, they would undoubtedly have suffered us (as the people of _Ireland_ have done) to enjoy quietly our declaratory law. They would have recovered their former habits of subjection; and our connexion with them might have continued an increasing source of our wealth and glory.—But the spirit of despotism and avarice, always blind and restless, soon broke forth again. The scheme for drawing a revenue from _America_, by parliamentary taxation, was resumed; and in a little more than a year after the repeal of the _Stamp-Act_, when all was peace, a third act was passed, imposing duties payable in _America_ on tea, paper, glass, painters colours, &c.— This, as might have been expected, revived all the former heats; and the Empire was a second time threatened with the most dangerous commotions.—Government receded again; and the Parliament (under another change of ministry) repealed all the obnoxious duties, EXCEPT that upon tea. This exception was made in order to maintain a shew of dignity. But it was, in reality, sacrificing safety to pride; and leaving a splinter in the wound to produce a gangrene.—For some time, however, this relaxation answered its intended purposes. Our commercial intercourse with the Colonies was again recovered; and they avoided nothing but that tea which we had excepted in our repeal. In this state would things have remained, and even tea would perhaps in time have been gradually admitted, had not the evil genius of _Britain_ stepped forth once more to embroil the Empire.

The _East India_ company having fallen under difficulties, partly in consequence of the loss of the _American_ market for tea, a scheme was formed for assisting them by an attempt to recover that market. With this view an act was passed to enable them to export their tea to _America_ free of all duties here, and subject only to 3d. per pound duty, payable in _America_. It was to be offered at a low price; and it was expected the consequence would prove that the Colonies would be tempted to buy it; a precedent gained for taxing them; and at the same time the company relieved. Ships were, therefore, fitted out; and large cargoes sent. The snare was too gross to escape the notice of the Colonies. They saw it, and spurned at it. They refused to admit the tea; and at BOSTON some persons in disguise threw it into the sea.—Had our governors in this case satisfied themselves with requiring a compensation from the province for the damage done, there is no doubt but it would have been granted. Or had they proceeded no farther in the infliction of punishment, than stopping up the port and destroying the trade of Boston, till compensation was made, the province might possibly have submitted, and a sufficient saving would have been gained for the honour of the nation. But having hitherto proceeded without wisdom, they observed now no bounds in their resentment. To the Boston port bill was added a bill which destroyed the chartered government of the province; a bill which withdrew from the jurisdiction of the province, persons who in particular cases should commit murder; and the _Quebec_ bill. At the same time a strong body of troops was stationed at _Boston_ to enforce obedience to these bills.

* * * * *

All who knew any thing of the temper of the Colonies saw that the effect of this sudden accumulation of vengeance, would probably be not intimidating but exasperating them, and driving them into a general revolt. But our minister had different apprehensions. They believed that the malecontents in the Colony of _Massachusett’s_ were a small party, headed by a few factious men; that the majority of the people would take the side of government, as soon as they saw a force among them capable of supporting them; that, at worst, the Colonies in general would never make a common cause with this province; and that, the issue would prove, in a few months, order, tranquility and submission.—Every one of these apprehensions was falsified by the events that followed.

When the bills I have mentioned came to be carried into execution, the whole province was thrown into confusion. The courts of justice were shut up, and all government was dissolved. The commander in chief found it necessary to fortify himself in Boston; and the other Colonies immediately resolved to make a common cause with this Colony.

Disappointed by these consequences, our ministers took fright. Once more they made an effort to retreat; but indeed the most ungracious one that can well be imagined. A proposal was sent to the Colonies, called Conciliatory; and the substance of which was, that if any of them would raise such sums as should be demanded of them by taxing themselves, the Parliament would forbear to tax them.—It will be scarcely believed, hereafter, that such a proposal could be thought conciliatory. It was only telling them; “If you will tax yourselves BY OUR ORDER, we will save ourselves the trouble of taxing you.”—They received the proposal as an insult; and rejected it with disdain.

At the time this concession was transmitted to _America_, open hostilities were not begun. In the sword our ministers thought they had still a resource which would immediately settle all disputes. They considered the people of _New-England_ as nothing but a mob, who would be soon routed and forced into obedience. It was even believed, that a few thousands of our army might march through all _America_, and make all quiet where-ever they went. Under this conviction our ministers did not dread urging the Province of _Massachusett’s Bay_ into rebellion, by ordering the army to seize their stores, and to take up some of their leading men.—The attempt was made.—The people fled immediately to arms, and repelled the attack.—A considerable part of the flower of the British army has been destroyed.—Some of our best Generals, and the bravest of our troops, are now[26] disgracefully and miserably imprisoned at _Boston_.—A horrid civil war is commenced;—And the Empire is distracted and convulsed.

Can it be possible to think with patience of the policy that has brought us into these circumstances? Did ever Heaven punish the vices of a people more severely by darkening their counsels? How great would be our happiness could we now recall former times, and return to the policy of the last reigns?—But those times are gone.—I will, however, beg leave for a few moments to look back to them; and to compare the ground we have left with that on which we find ourselves. This must be done with deep regret; but it forms a necessary part of my present design.

* * * * *

In those times our Colonies, foregoing every advantage which they might derive from trading with foreign nations, consented to send only to us whatever it was for our interest to receive from them; and to receive only from us whatever it was for our interest to send to them. They gave up the power of making sumptuary laws, and exposed themselves to all the evils of an increasing and wasteful luxury, because we were benefited by vending among them the materials of it. The iron with which providence had blessed their country, they were required by laws, in which they acquiesced, to transport hither, that our people might be maintained by working it for them into nails, ploughs, axes, &c. And, in several instances, even one Colony was not allowed to supply any neighbouring Colonies with commodities, which could be conveyed to them from hence.—But they yielded much farther. They consented that we should have the appointment of one branch of their legislature. By recognizing as their King, a King resident among us and under our influence, they gave us a negative on all their laws. By allowing an appeal to us in their civil disputes, they gave us likewise the ultimate determination of all civil causes among them.—In short. They allowed us every power we could desire, except that of taxing them, and interfering in their internal legislations: And they had admitted precedents which, even in these instances, gave us no inconsiderable authority over them. By purchasing our goods they paid our taxes; and, by allowing us to regulate their trade in any manner we thought most for our advantage, they enriched our merchants, and helped us to bear our growing burdens. They fought our battles with us. They gloried in their relation to us. All their gains centered among us; and they always spoke of this country and looked to it as their home.

Such WAS the state of things.—What is it now?

Not contented with a degree of power, sufficient to satisfy any reasonable ambition, we have attempted to extend it.—Not contented with drawing from them a large revenue _indirectly_, we have endeavoured to procure one _directly_ by an authoritative seizure; and, in order to gain a pepper-corn in this way, have chosen to hazard millions, acquired by the peaceable intercourse of trade.—Vile policy! What a scourge is government so conducted?—Had we never deserted our old ground: Had we nourished and favoured _America_, with a view to commerce, instead of considering it as a country to be governed: Had we, like a liberal and wise people, rejoiced to see a multitude of free states branched forth from ourselves, all enjoying independent legislatures similar to our own: Had we aimed at binding them to us only by the tyes of affection and interest; and contented ourselves with a moderate power rendered durable by being lenient and friendly, an umpire in their differences, an aid to them in improving their own free governments, and their common bulwark against the assaults of foreign enemies: Had this, I say, been our policy and temper; there is nothing so great or happy that we might not have expected. With their increase our strength would have increased. A growing surplus in the revenue might have been gained, which, invariably applied to the gradual discharge of the national debt, would have delivered us from the ruin with which it threatens us. The Liberty of _America_ might have preserved our Liberty; and, under the direction of a patriot king or wise minister, proved the means of restoring to us our almost lost constitution. Perhaps, in time, we might also have been brought to see the necessity of carefully watching and restricting our paper-credit: And thus we might have regained safety; and, in union with our Colonies, have been more than a match for every enemy, and risen to a situation of honour and dignity never before known amongst mankind.—But I am forgetting myself.—Our Colonies are likely to be lost for ever. Their love is turned into hatred; and their respect for our government into resentment and abhorrence.—We shall see more distinctly what a calamity this is, and the observations I have now made will be confirmed, by attending to the following facts.

* * * * *

Our American Colonies, particularly the Northern ones, have been for some time in the happiest state of society; or, in that middle state of civilization, between its first rude and its last refined and corrupt state. Old countries consist, generally, of three classes of people; a GENTRY; a YEOMANRY; and a PEASANTRY. The Colonies consist only of a body of YEOMANRY[27] supported by agriculture, and all independent, and nearly upon a level; in consequence of which, joined to a boundless extent of country, the means of subsistence are procured without difficulty, and the temptations to wickedness are so inconsiderable, that executions[28] are seldom known among them. From hence arises an encouragement to population so great, that in some of the Colonies they double their own number in fifteen years; in others, in eighteen years; and in all, taken one with another, in twenty-five years.—Such an increase was, I believe, never before known. It demonstrates that they must live at their ease; and be free from those cares, oppressions, and diseases which depopulate and ravage luxurious states.

* * * * *

With the population of the Colonies has increased their trade; but much faster, on account of the gradual introduction of luxury among them.—In 1723 the exports to _Pensylvania_ were 16,000l.—In 1742 they were 75,295l.—In 1757 they were increased to 268,426l. and in 1773 to half a million.

The exports to all the Colonies in 1744 were 640,114l.—In 1758, they were increased to 1.832,948l. and in 1773, to three millions.[29] And the probability is, that, had it not been for the discontents among the Colonies since the year 1764, our trade with them would have been this year double to what it was in 1773; and that in a few years more, it would not have been possible for the whole kingdom, though consisting only of manufacturers, to supply the American demand.

This trade, it should be considered, was not only thus an increasing trade; but it was a trade in which we had no rivals; a trade certain, constant, and uninterrupted; and which, by the shipping employed in it, and the naval stores supplied by it, contributed greatly to the support of that navy which is our chief national strength.—Viewed in these lights it was an object unspeakably important. But it will appear still more so if we view it in its connexions and dependencies. It is well known, that our trade with _Africa_ and the _West-Indies_ cannot easily subsist without it. And, upon the whole, it is undeniable, that it has been one of the main springs of our opulence and splendour; and that we have, in a great measure, been indebted to it for our ability to bear a debt so much heavier, than that which, fifty years ago, the wisest men thought would necessarily sink us.

This inestimable prize, and all the advantages connected with _America_, we are now throwing away. Experience alone can shew what calamities must follow. It will indeed be astonishing if this kingdom can bear such a loss without dreadful consequences.—These consequences have been amply represented by others; and it is needless to enter into any account of them—At the time we shall be feeling them—The Empire dismembered; the blood of thousands shed in an unrighteous quarrel; our strength exhausted; our merchants breaking; our manufacturers starving; our debts increasing; the revenue sinking; the funds tottering; and all the miseries of a public bankruptcy impending—At such a _crisis_ should our natural enemies, eager for our ruin, seize the opportunity—The apprehension is too distressing.—Let us view this subject in another light.

* * * * *

On this occasion, particular attention should be given to the present SINGULAR situation of this kingdom. This is a circumstance of the utmost importance; and as I am afraid it is not much considered, I will beg leave to give a distinct account of it.

At the REVOLUTION, the _specie_ of the kingdom amounted, according to[30] _Davenant’_s account, to eighteen millions and a half.—From the ACCESSION to the year 1772, there were coined at the mint, near 29 millions of gold; and in ten years only of this time, or from January 1759 to January 1769, there were coined eight millions and a half.[31] But it has appeared lately, that the gold specie now left in the kingdom is no more than about twelve millions and a half.[32]—Not so much as half a million of _Silver specie_ has been coined these sixty years; and it cannot be supposed, that the quantity of it now in circulation exceeds two or three millions. The whole specie of the kingdom, therefore, is probably at this time about fifteen millions. Of this some millions must be hoarded at the _Bank_.—Our circulating _specie_, therefore, appears to be decreased. But our wealth, or the quantity of money in the kingdom, is greatly increased. This is paper to a vast amount, issued in almost every corner of the kingdom; and, particularly, by the BANK OF ENGLAND. While this paper maintains its credit it answers all the purposes of specie, and is in all respects the same with money.

Specie represents some real value in goods or commodities. On the contrary; paper represents immediately nothing but specie. It is a promise or obligation which the emitter brings himself under to pay a given sum in coin; and it owes its currency to the credit of the emitter; or to an opinion that he is able to make good his engagement; and that the sum specified may be received upon being demanded.—Paper, therefore, represents coin; and coin represents real value. That is, the one is a _sign_ of wealth. The other is the _sign_ of that _sign_.—But farther. Coin is an _universal_ sign of wealth, and will procure it every where. It will bear any alarm, and stand any shock.—On the contrary. Paper, owing its currency to opinion, has only a local and imaginary value. It can stand no shock. It is destroyed by the approach of danger; or even the _suspicion_ of danger.

In short. Coin is the basis of our paper-credit; and were it either all destroyed, or were only the quantity of it reduced beyond a certain limit, the paper circulation of the kingdom would sink at once. But, were our paper destroyed, the coin would not only remain, but rise in value, in proportion to the quantity of paper destroyed.

From this account it follows, that as far as, in any circumstances, specie is not to be procured in exchange for paper, it represents _nothing_, and is, worth _nothing_.—The specie of this kingdom is inconsiderable, compared with the amount of the paper circulating in it. This is generally believed; and, therefore, it is natural to enquire how its currency is supported.—The answer is easy. It is supported in the same manner with all other bubbles. Were all to demand specie in exchange for their notes, payment could not be made; but, at the same time that this is known, every one trusts, that no alarm producing such a demand will happen, while he holds the paper he is possessed of; and that if it should happen, he will stand a chance for being first paid; and this makes him easy. And it also makes all with whom he traffics easy.—But let any events happen which threaten danger; and every one will become diffident. A run will take place; and a bankruptcy follow.

This is an account of what has often happened in _private_ credit. And it is also an account of what _will_ (if no change of measures takes place) happen some time or other in _public_ credit. The description I have given of our paper-circulation implies, that nothing can be more delicate or hazardous. It is an immense fabrick, with its head in the clouds, that is continually trembling with every adverse blast and every fluctuation of trade; and which, like the baseless fabrick of a vision, may in a moment vanish, and leave no wreck behind.—The destruction of a few books at the _Bank_; an improvement in the art of forgery; the landing of a body of _French_ troops on our coasts; insurrections threatening a revolution in government; or any events that should produce a general panic, however groundless, would at once annihilate it, and leave us without any other medium of traffic, than a quantity of _specie_ not much more than the money now drawn from the public by the taxes. It would, therefore, become impossible to pay the taxes. The revenue would fail. Near a hundred and forty millions of property would be destroyed. The whole frame of government would fall to pieces; and a state of nature would take place.—What a dreadful situation! It has never had a parallel among mankind; except at one time in _France_ after the establishment there of the Royal _Mississipi_ Bank. In 1720 this bank broke;[33] and, after involving for some time the whole kingdom in a golden dream, spread through it in one day, desolation and ruin.—The distress attending such an event, in this free country, would be greater than it was in _France_. Happily for that kingdom, they have shot this gulph. Paper-credit has never since recovered itself there; and their circulating cash consists now all of solid coin, amounting, according to the lowest account, to no less a sum than 1500 millions of _Livres_;[34] or near 67 millions of pounds sterling. This gives them unspeakable advantages; and, joined to that quick reduction of their debts which is inseparable[35] from their nature, places them on a ground of safety which we have reason to admire and envy.

* * * * *

These are subjects on which I should have chosen to be silent, did I not think it necessary, that this country should be apprized and warned of the danger which threatens it. This danger is created chiefly by the national debt. High taxes are necessary to support a great public debt; and a large supply of cash is necessary to support high taxes. This cash we owe to our paper; and, in proportion to our paper, must be the productiveness of our taxes.—King William’s wars drained the kingdom of its specie. This sunk the revenue, and distressed government. In 1694 the BANK was established; and the kingdom was provided with a substitute for specie. The taxes became again productive. The revenue rose; and government was relieved.—Ever since that period our paper and taxes have been increasing together, and supporting one another; and one reason, undoubtedly, of the late increase in the productiveness of our taxes has been the increase of our paper.

Was there no public debt, there would be no occasion for half the present taxes. Our paper-circulation might be reduced. The balance of trade would turn in our favour. Specie would flow in upon us. The quantity of property destroyed by a failure of paper-credit (should it in such circumstances happen) would be 140 millions less; and, therefore, the shock attending it would be _tolerable_. But, in the present state of things, whenever any calamity or panic shall produce such a failure, the shock attending it will be _intolerable_.—May heaven soon raise up for us some great statesman who shall see these things; and enter into effectual measures, if not now too late, for extricating and preserving us.

Public banks are, undoubtedly, attended with great conveniences. But they also do great harm; and, if their emissions are not restrained, and conducted with great wisdom, they may prove the most pernicious of all institutions; not only, by substituting _fictitious_ for _real_ wealth; by increasing luxury; by raising the prices of provisions; by concealing an unfavourable balance of trade; and by rendering a kingdom incapable of bearing any _internal_ tumults or _external_ attacks, without the danger of a dreadful convulsion: But, particularly, by becoming instruments in the hands of ministers of state to increase their influence, to lessen their dependence on the people, and to keep up a delusive shew of public prosperity, when perhaps ruin may be near. There is, in truth, nothing that a government may not do with such a mine at its command as a public Bank, while it can maintain its credit; nor, therefore, is there any thing more likely to be IMPROPERLY and DANGEROUSLY used.—But to return to what may be more applicable to our own state at present.

* * * * *

Among the causes that may produce a failure of paper-credit, there are two which the present quarrel with _America_ calls upon us particularly to consider.—The first is, “An unfavourable balance of trade.” This, in proportion to the degree in which it takes place, must turn the course of foreign exchange against us; raise the price of bullion; and carry off our specie. The danger to which this would expose us is obvious; and it has been much increased by the new coinage of the gold specie which begun in 1773. Before this coinage, the greatest part of our gold coin being light, but the same in currency as if it had been heavy, always remained in the kingdom. But, being now nearly of full weight, whenever a wrong balance of foreign trade alters the course of exchange, and gold in _coin_ becomes of less value than in _bullion_, there is reason to fear, that it will be melted down in such great quantities, and exported so fast, as in a little time to leave none behind;[36] the consequence which must prove, that the whole superstructure of paper-credit, now supported by it, will break down.—The only remedy, in such circumstances, is an increase of coinage at the mint. But this will operate too slowly; and, by raising the price of bullion, will only increase the evil.—It is the _Bank_ that at such a time must be the immediate sufferer: For it is from thence that those who want coin for any purpose will always draw it.

For many years before 1773, the price of gold in _bullion_ had been, from 2 to 3 or 4 _per cent_. higher than in _coin_. This was a temptation to melt down and export the coin, which could not be resisted. Hence arose a demand for it on the BANK; and, consequently, the necessity of purchasing bullion at a loss for a new coinage. But the more coin the Bank procured in this way, the lower its price became in comparison with that of bullion, and the faster it vanished; and, consequently, the more necessary it became to coin again, and the greater loss fell upon the Bank.—Had things continued much longer in this train, the consequences might have proved very serious. I am by no means sufficiently informed to be able to assign the causes which have produced the change that happened in 1772. But, without doubt, the state of things which took place before that year must be expected to return. The fluctuations of trade, in its best state, render this unavoidable. But the contest with our Colonies has a tendency to bring it on soon; and to increase unspeakably the distress attending it. All know that the balance of trade with them is greatly in our favour;[37] and that this balance is paid partly by direct remittances of bullion; and partly by circuitous remittances through _Spain_, _Portugal_, _Italy_, &c. which diminish the balance against us with these countries.—During the last year they have been employed in paying their debts, without adding to them; and their exportations and remittances for that purpose have contributed to render the general balance of trade more favourable to us, and, also, (in conjunction with the late operations of the Bank) to keep up our funds. These remittances are now ceased; and a few years will determine, if this contest goes on, how far we can sustain such a loss without suffering the consequences I have described.

The second event, ruinous to our paper circulation, which may arise from our rupture with _America_, is a deficiency in the revenue. As a failure of our paper would destroy the revenue, so a failure of the revenue, or any considerable diminution of it, would destroy our paper. The BANK is the support of our paper; and the support of the BANK is the credit of government. Its principal securities, are a capital of eleven millions lent to government; and money continually advanced to a vast amount on the Land-tax and Malt-tax, Sinking Fund, Exchequer Bills, Navy Bills, &c. Should, therefore, deficiencies in the revenue bring government under any difficulties, all these securities would lose their value, and the _Bank_ and Government, and all private and public credit, would fall together.—Let any one here imagine, what would probably follow, were it but suspected by the public in general, that the taxes were so fallen, as not to produce enough to pay the interest of the public debts, besides bearing the _ordinary_ expences of the nation; and that, in order to supply the deficiency and to hide the calamity, it had been necessary in any one year to anticipate the taxes, and to borrow of the Bank.—In such circumstances I can scarcely doubt, but an alarm would spread of the most dangerous tendency.—The next foreign war, should it prove _half_ as expensive as the last, will probably occasion such a deficiency; and bring our affairs to that crisis towards which they have been long tending.—But the war with _America_ has a greater tendency to do this; and the reason is, that it affects our resources more; and is attended more with the danger of internal disturbances.

Some have made the proportion of our trade depending on _North America_ to be near ONE HALF. A moderate computation makes it a THIRD.[38] Let it, however, be supposed to be only a FOURTH. I will venture to say, this is a proportion of our foreign trade, the loss of which, when it comes to be felt, will be found insupportable.—In the article of _Tobacco_ alone it will cause a deduction from the _Customs_ of at least 300,000_l._ _per ann._[39] including the duties paid on foreign commodities purchased by the exportation of tobacco. Let the whole deduction from the revenue be supposed to be only half a million. This alone is more than the kingdom can at present bear, without having recourse to lotteries, and the land-tax at 4s. in order to defray the common and necessary expences of peace. But to this must be added a deduction from the produce of the _Excises_, in consequence of the increase of the poor, of the difficulties of our merchants and manufacturers, of less national wealth, and a retrenchment of luxury. There is no possibility of knowing to what these deductions may amount. When the evils producing them begin, they will proceed rapidly; and they may end in a general wreck before we are aware of any danger.

In order to give a clearer view of this subject, I will in an Appendix[40], state particularly the national expenditure and income for eleven years, from 1764 to 1774. From that account it will appear, that the money drawn every year from the public by the taxes, does not fall greatly short of a sum equal to the whole _specie_ of the kingdom; and that, notwithstanding the late increase in the productiveness of the taxes, the whole surplus of the national income has not exceeded 338,759l. _per ann._ See the Second Tract, p. 160. This is a surplus so inconsiderable as to be scarcely sufficient to guard against the deficiencies arising from the common fluctuations of foreign trade, and of home consumption. It is NOTHING when considered as the only fund we have for paying off a debt of near 140 millions.—Had we continued in a state of profound peace, it could not have admitted of any diminution. What then must follow, when one of the most profitable branches of our trade is destroyed; when a THIRD of the Empire is lost; when an addition of many millions is made to the public debt; and when, at the same time, perhaps some millions are taken away from the revenue?—I shudder at this prospect.—A KINGDOM ON AN EDGE SO PERILOUS, SHOULD THINK OF NOTHING BUT A RETREAT.

SECT. IV.

_Of the Honour of the Nation as affected by the War with ~America~._

One of the pleas for continuing the contest with _America_ is, “That our honour is engaged; and that we cannot now recede without the most humiliating concessions.”

With respect to this, it is proper to observe, that a distinction should be made between the nation, and its rulers. It is melancholy that there should be ever any reason for making such a distinction. A government is, or ought to be, nothing but an institution for collecting and for carrying into execution the will of the people. But so far is this from being in general the fact, that the measures of government, and the sense of the people, are sometimes in direct opposition to one another; nor does it _often_ happen that any certain conclusion can be drawn from the one to the other.—I will not pretend to determine, whether, in the present instance, the dishonour attending a retreat would belong to the nation at large, or only to the persons in power who guide its affairs. Be this as it will, no good argument can be drawn from it against receding. The disgrace which may be implied in making concessions, is nothing to that of being the aggressors in an unrighteous quarrel; and dignity, in such circumstances, consists in retracting freely and speedily.—For, (to adopt on this occasion, words which I have heard applied to this very purpose, in a great assembly, by a peer to whom this kingdom has often looked as its deliverer, and whose ill state of health at this awful moment of public danger every friend to _Britain_ must deplore) to adopt, I say, the words of this great man—“RECTITUDE IS DIGNITY. OPPRESSION ONLY IS MEANNESS; AND JUSTICE, HONOUR.”

I will add, that PRUDENCE, no less than true HONOUR, requires us to retract. For the time may come when, if it is not done voluntarily, we may be _obliged_ to do it; and find ourselves under a necessity of granting that to our distresses, which we now deny to equity and humanity, and the prayers of _America_. The possibility of this appears plainly from the preceding pages; and should it happen, it will bring upon us disgrace indeed, disgrace greater than the worst rancour can wish to see accumulated on a kingdom already too much dishonoured.—Let the reader think here what we are doing.—A nation, once the protector of Liberty in distant countries, and the scourge of tyranny, changed into an enemy to Liberty, and engaged in endeavouring to reduce to servitude its own brethren.—A great and enlightened nation, not content with a controuling power over millions of people which gave it every reasonable advantage, insisting upon such a supremacy over them as would leave them nothing they could call their own, and carrying desolation and death among them for disputing it.—What can be more ignominious?—How have we felt for the brave _Corsicans_, in their struggle with the _Genoese_, and afterwards with the _French_ government? Did GENOA or FRANCE want more than an absolute command over their property and legislations; or the power of binding them in all cases whatsoever?—The _Genoese_, finding it difficult to keep them in subjection, CEDED them to the _French_.—All such cessions of one people by another are disgraceful to human nature. But if our claims are just, may not we also, if we please, CEDE the Colonies to _France_?—There is, in truth, no other difference between these two cases than that the _Corsicans_ were not descended from the people who governed them, but that the _Americans_ are.

There are some who seem to be sensible, that the authority of one country over another, cannot be distinguished from the servitude of one country to another; and that unless different communities, as well as different parts of the same community, are united by an equal representation, all such authority is inconsistent with the principles of Civil Liberty.—But they except the case of the Colonies and _Great Britain_; because the Colonies are communities which have branched forth from, and which, therefore, as they think, belong to _Britain_. Had the colonies been communities of _foreigners_, over whom we wanted to acquire dominion, or even to extend a dominion before acquired, they are ready to admit that their resistance would have been just.—In my opinion, this is the same with saying, that the Colonies ought to be worse off than the rest of mankind, because they are our own _Brethren_.

Again. The United Provinces of _Holland_ were once subject to the _Spanish_ monarchy; but, provoked by the violation of their charters; by levies of money, without their consent; by the introduction of Spanish troops among them; by innovations in their antient modes of government; and the rejection of their petitions; they were driven to that resistance which we and all the world have ever since admired; and which has given birth to one of the greatest and happiest Republics that ever existed.—Let any one read also, the history of the war which the _Athenians_, from a thirst of Empire, made on the _Syracusans_ in _Sicily_, a people derived from the same origin with them; and let him, if he can, avoid rejoicing in the defeat of the _Athenians_.

Let him, likewise, read the account of the social war among the Romans. The allied states of _Italy_ had fought the battles of _Rome_, and contributed by their valour and treasure to its conquests and grandeur. They claimed, therefore, the rights of Roman citizens, and a share with them in legislation. The Romans, disdaining to make those their _fellow-citizens_, whom they had always looked upon as their _subjects_, would not comply; and a war followed, the most horrible in the annals of mankind, which ended in the ruin of the Roman Republic. The feelings of every _Briton_ in this case must force him to approve the conduct of the Allies, and to condemn the proud and ungrateful Romans.

But not only is the present contest with _America_ thus disgraceful to us, because inconsistent with our own feelings in similar cases; but also because condemned by our own practice in former times. The Colonies are persuaded that they are fighting for Liberty. We see them sacrificing to this persuasion every private advantage. If mistaken, and though guilty of irregularities, they should be pardoned by a people whose ancestors have given them so many examples of similar conduct. ENGLAND should venerate the attachment to Liberty amidst all its excesses; and, instead of indignation or scorn, it would be most becoming them, in the present instance, to declare their applause, and to say to the Colonies—“We excuse your mistakes. We admire your spirit. It is the spirit that has more than once saved _ourselves_. We aspire to no dominion over you. We understand the rights of men too well to think of taking from you the inestimable privilege of governing yourselves; and, instead of employing our power for any such purpose, we offer it to you as a friendly and guardian power, to be a mediator in your quarrels; a protection against your enemies; and an aid to you in establishing a plan of Liberty that shall make you great and happy. In return, we ask nothing but your gratitude and your commerce.”

This would be a language worthy of a brave and enlightened nation. But alas! it often happens in the _Political World_ as it does in _Religion_, that the people who cry out most vehemently for Liberty to themselves are the most unwilling to grant it to others.

But farther. This war is disgraceful on account of the persuasion which led to it, and under which it has been undertaken. The general cry was last winter, that the people of NEW-ENGLAND were a body of cowards, who would at once be reduced to submission by a hostile look from our troops. In this light were they held up to public derision in both Houses of Parliament; and it was this persuasion that, probably, induced a Nobleman of the first weight in the state to recommend, at the passing of the _Boston Port Bill_, coercive measures; hinting at the same time, that the _appearance_ of hostilities would be sufficient, and that all would be soon over, SINE CLADE.—Indeed no one can doubt, but that had it been believed some time ago, that the people of _America_ were brave, more care would have been taken not to provoke them.

Again. The manner in which this war has been hitherto conducted, renders it still more disgraceful.—English valour being thought insufficient to subdue the Colonies, the laws and religion of _France_ were established in _Canada_, on purpose to obtain the power of bringing upon them from thence an army of _French Papists_. The wild _Indians_ and their own Slaves have been instigated to attack them; and attempts have been made to gain the assistance of a large body of _Russians_.—With like views, _German_ troops have been hired; and the defence of our Forts and Garrisons trusted in their hands.

These are measures which need no comment. The last of them, in particular, having been carried into execution without the consent of parliament, threatens us with imminent danger; and shews that we are in the way to lose even the _Forms_ of the constitution.—If, indeed, our ministers can at any time, without leave, not only send away the national troops, but introduce _foreign_ troops in their room, we lie entirely at mercy; and we have every thing to dread.

SECT. V.

_Of the Probability of Succeeding in the War with ~America~._

Let us next consider how far there is a possibility of succeeding in the present war.

Our own people, being unwilling to enlist, and the attempts to procure armies of _Russians_, _Indians_, and _Canadians_ having miscarried; the utmost force we can employ, including foreigners, does not exceed, if I am rightly informed, 40,000 effective men. This is the force that is to conquer half a million _at least_[41] of determined men fighting on their own ground, within sight of their houses and families, and for that sacred blessing of Liberty, without which man is a beast, and government a curse. All history proves, that in such a situation, a handful is a match for millions.

In the _Netherlands_, a few states thus circumstanced, withstood, for a long course of years, the whole force of the Spanish monarchy, when at its zenith; and at last humbled its pride, and emancipated themselves from its tyranny.—The citizens of SYRACUSE also, thus circumstanced, withstood the whole power of the _Athenians_, and almost ruined them.—The same happened in the contest between the house of _Austria_, and the cantons[42] of _Switzerland_.—There is in this case an infinite difference between attacking and being attacked; between fighting to _destroy_, and fighting to _preserve_ or _acquire_ Liberty.—Were we, therefore, capable of employing a _land_ force against _America_ equal to its own, there would be little probability of success. But to think of conquering that whole continent with 30,000 or 40,000 men to be transported across the _Atlantic_, and fed from hence, and incapable of being recruited after any defeat—This is indeed a folly so great, that language does not afford a name for it.

With respect to our naval force, could it sail at land as it does at sea, much might be done with it; but as that is impossible, _little_ or _nothing_ can be done with it, which will not hurt _ourselves_ more than the _Colonists_.—Such of their maritime towns as they cannot guard against our fleets, and have not been already destroyed, they are determined either to give up to our resentment, or destroy themselves: The consequence of which will be, that these towns will be rebuilt in safer situations; and that we shall lose some of the principal pledges by which we have hitherto held them in subjection.—As to their trade; having all the necessaries and the chief conveniencies of life within themselves, they have no dependence upon it; and the loss of it will do them unspeakable good, by preserving them from the evils of luxury and the temptations of wealth; and keeping them in that state of virtuous simplicity which is the greatest happiness. I know that I am now speaking the sense of some of the wisest men in America. It has been long their wish that _Britain_ would shut up all their ports. They will rejoice, particularly, in the last restraining act. It might have happened, that the people would have grown weary of their agreements not to export or import. But this act will oblige them to keep these agreements; and confirm their unanimity and zeal. It will also furnish them with a reason for confiscating the estates of all the friends of our government among them, and for employing their sailors, who would have been otherwise idle, in making reprisals on British property. Their ships, before useless, and consisting of many hundreds, will be turned into ships of war; and that attention, which they have hitherto confined to trade, will be employed in fitting out a naval force for their own defence; and thus the way will be prepared for their becoming, much sooner than they would otherwise have been, a great maritime power. This act of parliament, therefore, crowns the folly of all our late measures.[43]—None who know me, can believe me to be disposed to superstition. Perhaps, however, I am not in the present instance, free from this weakness.—I fancy I see in these measures something that cannot be accounted for merely by human ignorance. I am inclined to think, that the hand of Providence is in them working to bring about some great ends.—But this leads me to one consideration more, which I cannot help offering to the public, and which appears to me in the highest degree important.

In this hour of tremendous danger, it would become us to turn our thoughts to Heaven. This is what our brethren in the Colonies are doing. From one end of _North America_ to the other, they are FASTING and PRAYING. But what are we doing?—We are ridiculing them as _Fanatics_, and scoffing at religion.—We are running wild after pleasure, and forgetting every thing serious and decent at _Masquerades_.—We are trafficking for Boroughs; perjuring ourselves at Elections; and selling ourselves for places.—Which side then is Providence likely to favour?

In _America_ we see a number of rising states in the vigour of youth, inspired by the noblest of all passions, the passion for being free; and animated by piety.—_Here_ we see an old state, great indeed, but inflated and irreligious; enervated by luxury; encumbred with debts; and hanging by a thread.—Can any one look without pain to the issue? May we not expect calamities that shall recover to _reflection_ (perhaps to _devotion_) our _Libertines_ and _Atheists_?

Is our cause such as gives us reason to ask God to bless it?—Can we in the face of Heaven declare, “that we are not the aggressors in this war; and that we mean by it, not to acquire or even preserve dominion for its own sake; not conquest, or Empire, or the gratification of resentment; but solely to deliver ourselves from oppression; to gain reparation for injury; and to defend ourselves against men who would plunder or kill us?”—Remember, reader, whoever thou art, that there are no other just causes of war; and that blood spilled, with any ether views, must some time or other be accounted for.—But not to expose myself by saying more in this way, I will now beg leave to recapitulate some of the arguments I have used; and to deliver the feelings of my heart in a brief, but earnest address to my countrymen.

* * * * *

I am hearing it continually urged—“Are they not our subjects?”—The plain answer is, they are not your subjects. The people of _America_ are no more the subjects of the people of _Britain_, than the people of _Yorkshire_ are the subjects of the people of _Middlesex_. They are your _fellow-subjects_.

“But _we_ are taxed; and why should not _they_ be taxed?”—_You_ are taxed by yourselves. _They_ insist on the same privilege.—They are taxed to support their own governments; and they help also to pay your taxes by purchasing your manufactures, and giving you a monopoly of their trade. Must they maintain _two_ governments? Must they submit to be _triple_ taxed?—Has your moderation in taxing yourselves been such as encourages them to trust you with the power of taxing them?

“But they will not obey the _Parliament_ and the _Laws_.”—Say rather, they will not obey _your_ parliament and _your_ laws. Their reason is: They have no voice in your parliament. They have no share in making[44] your laws.—“Neither have _most_ of us.”—Then you so far want Liberty; and your language is, “_We_ are not free, Why will _they_ be free?”—But _many_ of you have a voice in parliament: _None_ of them have. _All_ your freehold land is represented: But not a foot of _their_ land is represented. At worst, therefore, you are only enslaved _partially_.—Were they to submit, they would be enslaved _totally_.—They are governed by parliaments chosen by themselves, and by legislatures similar to yours. Why will you disturb them in the enjoyment of a blessing so valuable? Is it reasonable to insist, that your discretion alone shall be their law; that they shall have no constitutions of government, except such as you shall be pleased to give them; and no property except such as your parliament shall be pleased to leave them?—What is your parliament?—Is there not a growing intercourse between it and the court? Does it awe ministers of state as it once did?—Instead of contending for a controuling power over the governments of _America,_ should you not think more of watching and reforming your own?—Suppose the worst. Suppose, in opposition to all their own declarations, that the Colonists are now aiming at independence.[45]—“If they can subsist without you;” is it to be wondered at? Did there ever exist a _community_, or even an _individual_, that would not do the same?—“If they _cannot_ subsist without you;” let them alone. They will soon come back.—“If you cannot subsist without them,” reclaim them by[46] kindness; engage them by moderation and equity. It is madness to resolve to butcher them. This will make them detest and avoid you for ever. Freemen are not to be governed by force; or dragooned into compliance. If capable of bearing to be so treated, it is a disgrace to be connected with them.

“If _they_ can subsist without _you_; and also _you_ without _them_,” the attempt to subjugate them by confiscating their effects, burning their towns, and ravaging their territories, is a wanton exertion of cruel ambition, which, however common it has been among mankind, deserves to be called by harder names than I chuse to apply to it.—Suppose such an attempt was to be succeeded: Would it not be a fatal preparation for subduing yourselves? Would not the disposal of _American_ places, and the distribution of an _American_ revenue, render that influence of the crown irresistible, which has already stabbed your liberties?

Turn your eyes to _India_: There more has been done than is now attempted in _America_. There ENGLISHMEN, actuated by the love of plunder and the spirit of conquest, have depopulated whole kingdoms, and ruined millions of innocent people by the most infamous oppression and rapacity.—The justice of the nation has slept over these enormities. Will the justice of heaven sleep?—Are we not now execrated on both sides of the globe?

* * * * *

With respect to the Colonists; it would be folly to pretend they are faultless. They were running fast into our vices. But this quarrel gives them a salutary check: And it may be permitted on purpose to favour them, and in _them_ the rest of mankind; by making way for establishing, in an extensive country possessed of every advantage, a plan of government, and a growing power that will astonish the world, and under which every subject of human enquiry shall be open to free discussion, and the friends of Liberty, in every quarter of the globe, find a safe retreat from civil and spiritual tyranny.—I hope, therefore, our brethren in _America_ will forgive their oppressors. It is certain _they know not what they are doing_.

CONCLUSION.

Having said so much of the war with America, and particularly of the danger with which it threatens us, it may be expected that I should propose some method of escaping from this danger, and of restoring this once happy Empire to a state of peace and security.—Various plans of pacification have been proposed; and some of them, by persons so distinguished by their rank and merit, as to be above my applause. But till there is more of a disposition to attend to such plans; they cannot, I am afraid, be of any great service. And there is too much reason to apprehend, that nothing but calamity will bring us to repentance and wisdom.—In order, however, to complete my design in these observations, I will take the liberty to lay before the public the following sketch of one of the plans just referred to, as it was opened before the holidays to the house of Lords by the _Earl of Shelburne_; who, while he held the seals of the Southern Department, with the business of the Colonies annexed, possessed their confidence, without ever compromising the authority of this country; a confidence which discovered itself by peace among themselves, and duty and submission to the Mother-country. I hope I shall not take an unwarrantable liberty, if, on this occasion, I use his Lordship’s own words, as nearly as I have been able to collect them.

“Meet the Colonies on their own ground, in the last petition from the Congress to the king. The surest, as well as the most dignified mode of proceeding for this country.—Suspend all hostilities—Repeal the acts which immediately distress America, namely, the last restraining act,—the charter act,—the act for the more impartial administration of justice;—and the Quebec act.—All the other acts (the custom house act, the post office act, &c.) leave to a temperate revisal.—There will be found much matter which both countries may wish repealed. _Some_ which can never be given up, the principle being that regulation of trade for the common good of the Empire, which forms our _Palladium_. _Other_ matter which is fair subject of mutual accommodation.—Prescribe the most explicit acknowledgment of your right of regulating commerce in its most extensive sense; if the petition and other public acts of the Colonies have not already, by their declarations and acknowledgments, left it upon a sufficiently secure foundation.—Besides the power of regulating the general commerce of the Empire, something further might be expected; provided a due and tender regard were had to the means and abilities of the several provinces, as well as to those fundamental, unalienable rights of _Englishmen_, which no father can surrender on the part of his son, no representative on the part of his elector, no generation on the part of the succeeding one; the right of judging not only of the _mode_ of raising, but the _quantum_, and the appropriation of such aids as they shall grant.—To be more explicit; the debt of _England_, without entering into invidious distinctions how it came to be contracted, might be acknowledged the debt of every individual part of the whole Empire, Asia, as well as America, included.—Provided, that full security were held forth to them, that such free aids, together with the Sinking Fund (Great Britain contributing her superior share) should not be left as the privy purse of the minister, but be unalienably appropriated to the original intention of that fund, the discharge of the debt;—and that by an honest application of the _whole_ fund, the taxes might in time be lessened, and the price of our manufactures consequently reduced, so that every contributory part might feel the returning benefit—always supposing the laws of trade duly observed and enforced.

“The time _was_, I am confident—and perhaps _is_, when these points might be obtained upon the easy, the constitutional, and, therefore, the indispensible terms of an exemption from parliamentary taxation, and an admission of the sacredness of their charters; instead of sacrificing their good humour, their affection, their effectual aids, and the act of NAVIGATION itself, (which you are now in the direct road to do) for a commercial quit-rent,[47] or a barren metaphysical chimæra.—How long these ends may continue attainable, no man can tell.—But if no words are to be relied on except such as make against the Colonies—If nothing is acceptable, except what is attainable by force; it only remains to apply, what has been so often remarked of unhappy periods,—_Quos deus vult, &c._”

These are sentiments and proposals of the last importance; and I am very happy in being able to give them to the public from so respectable an authority as that of the distinguished Peer I have mentioned; to whom, I know, this kingdom, as well as America, is much indebted for his zeal to promote those grand public points on which the preservation of Liberty among us depends; and for the firm opposition which, jointly with many others (Noblemen and Commoners of the first character and abilities,) he has made to the present measures.

Had such a plan as that now proposed been adopted a few months ago, I have little doubt but that a pacification would have taken place, on terms highly advantageous to this kingdom.—In particular. It is probable, that the Colonies would have consented to grant an annual supply, which, increased by a saving of the money now spent in maintaining troops among them, and by contributions which might have been gained from other parts of the Empire, would have formed a fund considerable enough, if unalienably applied, to redeem the public debt; in consequence of which, agreeably to Lord Shelburne’s ideas, some of our worst taxes might be taken off, and the Colonies would receive our manufactures cheaper; our paper-currency might be restrained; our whole force would be free to meet at any time foreign danger; the influence of the Crown would be reduced; our Parliament would become less dependent; and the kingdom might, perhaps, be restored to a situation of permanent safety and prosperity.

To conclude.—An important revolution in the affairs of this kingdom seems to be approaching. If ruin is not to be our lot, all that has been lately done must be undone, and new measures adopted. At that period, an opportunity (never perhaps to be recovered, if lost) will offer itself for serving essentially _this country_, as well as _America_; by putting the national debt into a _fixed_ course of payment; by subjecting to new regulations, the administration of the finances; and by establishing measures for exterminating corruption and restoring the constitution.—For my own part; if this is not to be the consequence of any future changes in the ministry, and the system of corruption, lately so much improved, is to go on; I think it totally indifferent to the kingdom who are _in_, or who are _out_ of power.

* * * * *

The following fact is of so much importance, that I cannot satisfy myself without laying it before the public.—In a Committee of the American CONGRESS in _June_ 1775, a declaration was drawn up containing an offer to GREAT BRITAIN, “that the Colonies would not only continue to grant extraordinary aids in time of war, but also, if allowed a free commerce, pay into the SINKING-FUND such a sum annually for ONE HUNDRED YEARS, as should be _more_ than sufficient in that time, if faithfully applied, to extinguish all the present debts of BRITAIN. Or, provided this was not accepted, that, to remove the groundless jealousy of _Britain_ that the Colonies aimed at Independence and an abolition of the Navigation Act, which in truth, they had never intended; and also, to avoid all future disputes about the right of making that and other Acts for regulating their commerce for the general benefit, they would enter into a covenant with _Britain_, that she should fully possess and exercise that right for _one hundred years_ to come.”

* * * * *

At the end of the preceding Tract I have had the honor of laying before the public the Earl of _Shelburne_’s plan of Pacification with the Colonies. In that plan, it is particularly proposed, that the Colonies should grant an annual supply to be carried to the Sinking Fund, and unalienably appropriated to the discharge of the public debt.—It must give this excellent Peer great pleasure to learn, from this resolution, that even this part of his plan, as well as all the other parts, would, most probably, have been accepted by the Colonies. For though the resolution only offers the alternative of either a _free_ trade, with extraordinary aids and an annual supply, or an _exclusive_ trade confirmed and extended; yet there can be little reason to doubt, but that to avoid the calamities of the present contest, BOTH would have been consented to; particularly, if, on our part, such a revisal of the laws of trade had been offered as was proposed in Lord Shelburne’s plan.

The preceding resolution was, I have said, drawn up in a Committee of the Congress. But it was not entered in their minutes; a severe Act of Parliament happening to arrive at that time, which determined them not to give the sum proposed in it.

FINIS.

FOOTNOTES

[11] See a particular explanation of this assertion in the Second Tract, Page 9.

[12] In _Great Britain_, consisting of near six _millions_ of inhabitants, 5723 persons, most of them the lowest of the people, elect one half of the _House of Commons_; and 364 votes chuse a ninth part. This may be seen distinctly made out in the _Political Disquisitions_, Vol. 1. Book 2. C. 4. a work full of important and useful instruction.

[13] See among others Mr. Locke on Government, and Dr. Priestley’s Essay on the first Principles of Government.

[14] See Dr. Priestly on Government, page 68, 69, &c.

[15] The independency of the Judges we esteem in this country one of our greatest privileges.—Before the revolution they generally, I believe, held their places _during pleasure_. King William gave them their places _during good behaviour_. At the accession of the present Royal Family their places were given them _during good behaviour_, in consequence of the Act of Settlement, 12 and 13 W. III. C. 2. But an opinion having been entertained by some, that though their commissions were made under the Act of Settlement to continue, during good behaviour, yet that they determined on the demise of the Crown; it was enacted by a statute made in the first year of his present Majesty, Chap. 23. “That the commissions of Judges for the time being shall be, continue, and remain in full force, during their good behaviour, notwithstanding the demise of his Majesty, or of any of his Heirs and Successors;” with a proviso, “that it may be lawful for his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, to remove any Judge upon the address of both Houses of Parliament.” And by the same Statute their salaries are secured to them during the continuance of their commissions: His Majesty, according to the preamble of the Statute, having been pleased to declare from the Throne to both Houses of Parliament, “That he looked upon the independency and uprightness of Judges as essential to the impartial administration of Justice, as one of the best securities to the Rights and Liberties of his loving Subjects, and as most conducive to the honour of his Crown.”

A worthy friend and able Lawyer has supplied me with this note. It affords, when contrasted with that _dependence_ of the Judges which has been thought reasonable in _America_, a sad specimen of the different manner in which a kingdom may think proper to govern itself, and the provinces subject to it.

[16] Montesquieu’s Spirit of Laws, Vol. I. Book 11. C. xix.

[17] This is particularly true of the _bounties_ granted on some American commodities (as pitch, tar, indigo, &c.) when imported into _Britain_; for it is well known, that the end of granting them was, to get those commodities cheaper from the Colonies, and in return for our manufactures, which we used to get from _Russia_ and other foreign countries. And this is expressed in the preambles of the laws which grant these bounties. See the Appeal to the Justice, &c. page 21, third edition. It is, therefore, strange that Doctor TUCKER and others, should have insisted so much upon these bounties as favours and indulgencies to the Colonies.—But it is still more strange, that the same representation should have been made of the compensations granted them for doing more during the last war in assisting us than could have been reasonably expected; and also of the sums we have spent in maintaining troops among them _without_ their consent; and in opposition to their wishes.—See a pamphlet, entitled “The rights of Great Britain asserted against the claims of America.”

[18] It is remarkable that even the author of the _Remarks on the Principal Acts of the 13th Parliament of Great Britain_, &c. finds himself obliged to acknowledge this difference.—There cannot be more detestable principles of government, than those which are maintained by this writer. According to him, the _properties_ and _rights_ of a people are only a kind of _alms_ given them by their civil governors. Taxes, therefore, he asserts, are not the _gifts_ of the people. See page 58, and 191.

[19] See Observations on Reversionary Payments, page 207, &c.

[20] See page 22.

[21] The author of _Taxation no Tyranny_ will undoubtedly assert this without hesitation, for in page 69 he compares our present situation with respect to the Colonies to that of the antient _Scythians_, who, upon returning from a war, _found themselves shut out of their_ OWN HOUSES by their SLAVES.

[22] See particularly, a speech intended to have been spoken on the bill for altering the Charter of the Colony of Massachuset’s Bay; the _Considerations on the Measures carrying on with respect to the British Colonies_; the _Two Appeals to the Justice and Interests of the People_; and the _further Examination_, just published, _of our present American Measures_, by the Author of the Considerations, &c.

[23] I have heard it said by a person in one of the first departments of the state, that the present contest is for DOMINION on the side of the Colonies, as well as on ours: And so it is indeed; but with this essential difference. _We_ are struggling for dominion over OTHERS. _They_ are struggling for SELF-dominion: The noblest of all blessings.

[24] This has been our policy with respect to the people of _Ireland_; and the consequence is, that we now see their parliament as obedient as we can wish.

[25] It should be remembered, that this was written some time before the Declaration of Independence in July 1776. See page 85 of the next Tract.

[26] In February 1776.—In a few weeks after this, they were driven from _Boston_; and took refuge at _Hallifax_ in _Nova Scotia_; from whence, after a strong reinforcement, they invaded the Province of _New-York_.

[27] Except the _Negroes_ in the Southern Colonies, who probably will now either soon become extinct, or have their condition changed into that of _Freemen_.—It is not the fault of the Colonies that they have among them so many of these unhappy people. They have made laws to prohibit the importation of them; but these laws have always had a negative put upon them here, because of their tendency to hurt our Negro trade.

[28] In the county of Suffolk, where Boston is, there has not been, I am informed, more than one execution these 18 years.

[29] Mr. Burke (in his excellent and admirable Speech on moving his resolutions for conciliation with the Colonies, P. 9. &c.) has shewn, that our trade to the Colonies, including that to _Africa_ and the _West-Indies_, was in 1772 nearly equal to the trade which we carried on with the whole world at the beginning of this Century.

[30] See Dr. Davenant’s works, collected and revised by Sir Charles Whitworth, Vol. I. Page 363, &c. 443, &c.

[31] See Considerations on Money, Bullion, &c. Page 2 and 11.

[32] The coin deficient between one grain and three grains was not called in at the time this was written. This call was made in the Summer of 1776; and it brought in above three millions more than was expected. The quantity of gold coin should therefore have been stated at about SIXTEEN MILLIONS, and the whole coin of the kingdom at 18 or 19 millions.—The evidence from which I have drawn this estimate may be found in the first Section of the Second Part of the next Tract.

[33] See Sir James Steuart’s Enquiry into the Principles of political Œconomy, Vol. II. Book 4, Chap. 32.

[34] See the Second Tract, P. 65.

[35] Their debts consist chiefly of money raised by annuities on lives, short annuities, anticipations of taxes for short terms, &c. During the whole last war they added to their _perpetual_ annuities only 12 millions sterling, according to Sir James Steuart’s account; whereas we added to these annuities near 60 millions. In consequence therefore of the nature of their debts, as well as of the management they are now using for hastening the reduction of them, they must in a few years, if peace continues, be freed from most of their incumbrances; while we probably (if no event comes soon that will unburthen us at once) shall continue with them all upon us.

[36] Mr. _Lowndes_ in the dispute between him and Mr. _Locke_, contended for a reduction of the standard of silver. One of his reasons was, that it would render the silver-coin more commensurate to the wants of the nation; and CHECK HAZARDOUS PAPER-CREDIT.—Mr. CONDUIT, Sir ISAAC NEWTON’S successor in the mint, has proposed, in direct contradiction to the laws now in being, that all the bullion imported into the kingdom should be carried into the mint to be coined; and only coin allowed to be exported. “The height, he says, of paper-credit is the strongest argument for trying this and _every other_ method that is likely to increase the coinage. For whilst paper-credit does in a great measure the business of money at home, Merchants and Bankers are not under a necessity, as they were formerly, of coining a quantity of specie for their home trade; and as Paper-credit brings money to the Merchants to be exported, the money may go away insensibly, and NOT BE MISSED TILL IT BE TOO LATE: And where Paper-credit is large and increasing, if the money be exported and the coinage decrease, THAT CREDIT MAY SINK AT ONCE, for want of a proportionable quantity of _Specie_, which alone can support it in a time of distress.”—See Mr. _Conduit’_s Observations on the state of our Gold and Silver Coins in 1730, Page 36, to 46.

[37] According to the accounts of the exports to, and imports from the North-American Colonies, laid before Parliament, the balance in our favour appears to have been, for 11 years before 1774, near a _million and a half_ annually.

[38] See the substance of the evidence on the petition presented by the _West-India_ Planters and Merchants to the House of Commons as it was introduced at the BAR, and summed up by Mr. GLOVER.

[39] The annual average of the payments into the Exchequer, on account of the duties on tobacco, was for five years, from 1770 to 1774, 219,117l. exclusive of the payments from _Scotland_.—Near one half of the _tobacco_ trade is carried on from _Scotland_; and above _four fifths_ of the tobacco imported is afterwards exported to _France_, _Germany_ and other countries. From _France_ alone it brings annually into the Kingdom, I am informed, about 150,000l. in money.

In 1775, being, alas! the _parting_ year, the duties on tobacco in ENGLAND brought into the _Exchequer_ no less a sum than 298,202l.

[40] All the accounts and calculations in the _Appendix_ here referred to, have been transferred to the 2d and 4th Sections of the 3d Part of the Second Tract.

[41] A quarter of the inhabitants of every country are fighting men.—If, therefore, the Colonies consist only of two millions of inhabitants, the number of fighting men in them will be half a million.

[42] See the Appendix to Dr. Zubly’s Sermon, preached at the opening of the Provincial Congress of _Georgia_.

[43] The apprehensions here expressed have been verified by the events which have happened since this was written. American privateers have spread themselves over the Atlantick. They have frightened us even on our own coasts, and seized millions of British property.

[44] “I have no other notion of slavery, but being bound by a law to which I do not consent.” See the case of _Ireland_’s being bound by acts of Parliament in _England_, stated by William Molyneux, Esq; Dublin.—In arguing against the authority of Communities, and all people not incorporated, over one another; I have confined my views to taxation and internal legislation. Mr. Molyneux carried his views much farther; and denied the right of _England_ to make any laws even to regulate the trade of _Ireland_. He was the intimate friend of Mr. Locke; and writ his book in 1698, soon after the publication of Mr. Locke’s Treatise on Government.

[45] See on this subject the second Section of the second Part of the next Tract, Page 77.

[46] Some persons, convinced of the _folly_ as well as _barbarity_ of attempting to keep the Colonies by slaughtering them, have very humanely proposed giving them up. But the highest authority has informed us, with great reason, “That they are too important to be given up.”—Dr. TUCKER has insisted on the depopulation, produced by migrations from this country to the Colonies, as a reason for this measure. But, unless the kingdom is made a prison to its inhabitants, these migrations cannot be prevented; nor do I think that they have any great tendency to produce depopulation. When a number of people quit a country, there is more employment and greater plenty of the means of subsistence left for those who remain; and the vacancy is soon filled up. The grand causes of depopulation are, not migrations, or even famines and plagues, or any other _temporary_ evils; but the permanent and slowly working evils of debauchery, luxury, high taxes, and oppression.

[47] See the Resolutions on the _Nova-Scotia_ petition reported to the House of Commons, November 29, 1775, by Lord North, Lord George Germaine, &c. and a bill ordered to be brought in upon the said Resolutions.—There is indeed, as Lord Shelburne has hinted, something very astonishing in these Resolutions. They offer a relaxation of the authority of this country, in points to which the Colonies have always consented, and by which we are great gainers; at the same time, that, with a rigour which hazards the Empire, we are maintaining its authority in points to which they will never consent; and by which nothing can be gained.

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS On the NATURE and VALUE of CIVIL LIBERTY, AND THE WAR WITH AMERICA:

ALSO

OBSERVATIONS on Schemes for raising Money by PUBLIC LOANS;

An Historical Deduction and Analysis of the NATIONAL DEBT;

And a brief Account of the DEBTS and RESOURCES of FRANCE.

Should the morals of the English be perverted by luxury;—should they lose their Colonies by restraining them, &c.—they will be enslaved; they will become insignificant and contemptible; and _Europe_ will not be able to shew the world one nation in which she can pride herself.

ABBE RAYNAL.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE LORD MAYOR, THE ALDERMEN, AND THE COMMONS OF THE CITY OF LONDON,

THIS TRACT, Containing ADDITIONS to those OBSERVATIONS on CIVIL LIBERTY, which they have honoured with their Approbation,

Is, with the greatest Respect and Gratitude, INSCRIBED, BY Their most obedient and humble Servant, RICHARD PRICE.

CONTENTS.

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INTRODUCTION vii