Chapter 53

Relation with Great Britain.--Close of the Year 1860.--Prince of Wales's Visit to the United States.--Exchange of Congratulatory Notes.--Dawn of the Rebellion.--Lord Lyons's Dispatch.--Mr. Seward's Views.--Lord John Russell's Threats.--Condition of Affairs at Mr. Lincoln's Inauguration.--Unfriendly Manifestations by Great Britain. --Recognizes Belligerency of Southern States.--Discourtesy to American Minister.--England and France make Propositions to the Confederate States.--Unfriendly in their Character to the United States.--Full Details given.--Motives inquired into.--Trent Affair. --Lord John Russell.--Lord Lyons.--Mr. Seward.--Mason and Slidell released.--Doubtful Grounds assigned.--Greater Wrongs against us by Great Britain.--Queen Victoria's Friendship.--Isolation of United States.--Foreign Aid to Confederates on the Sea.--Details given.-- So-called Neutrality.--French Attempt to establish an Empire in Mexico.--Lord Palmerston in 1848, in 1859, in 1861.--Conclusive Observations.

At the close of the year 1860 the long series of irritating and dangerous questions which had disturbed the relations of the United States and Great Britain, from the time of the Declaration of Independence, had reached final and friendly solution. The fact gave unalloyed satisfaction to the American people and to their Government. Mr. Buchanan was able to say in his message of December, in language which Lord Lyons truly described as "the most cordial which has appeared in any President's message since the foundation of the Republic,"--

"Our relations with Great Britain are of the most friendly character. Since the commencement of my Administration the two dangerous questions arising from the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and from the right of search claimed by the British Government have been amicably and honorably adjusted. The discordant constructions of the Clayton- Bulwer Treaty, which at different periods of the discussion bore a threatening aspect, have resulted in a final settlement entirely satisfactory to this government. The only question of any importance which still remains open is the disputed title between the two governments to the Island of San Juan in the vicinity of Washington Territory." It was obvious that neither government looked forward to any trouble from this source.

To give manifestation of the cordiality with which our friendship was reciprocated, Her Majesty had selected this auspicious year for a visit of her son, the Prince of Wales, to this country. His Royal Highness was received everywhere by the government and the people with genuine and even enthusiastic hospitality, and at the termination of his visit Lord Lyons was instructed to express the thanks of Her Majesty.

"One of the main objects," His Lordship wrote to Secretary Cass on the 8th of December, 1860, "which Her Majesty had in view in sanctioning the visit of His Royal Highness was to prove to the President and citizens of the United States the sincerity of those sentiments of esteem and regard which Her Majesty and all classes of her subjects entertain for the kindred race which occupies so distinguished a position in the community of nations. Her Majesty has seen with the greatest satisfaction that her feelings and those of her people in this respect have been met with the warmest sympathy in the great American Union; and Her Majesty trusts that the feelings of confidence and affection, of which late events have proved beyond all question the existence, will long continue to prevail between the two countries to their mutual advantage and to the general interests of civilization and humanity. I am commanded to state to the President that the Queen would be gratified by his making known generally to the citizens of the United States her grateful sense of the kindness with which they received her son, who has returned to England deeply impressed with all he saw during his progress through the States, and more especially so with the friendly and cordial good will manifested towards him on every occasion by all classes of the community."

Mr. William Henry Trescott, then Assistant Secretary of State, replied to Lord Lyons's note without delay, writing on the 11th of December: "I am instructed by the President to express the gratification with which he has learned how correctly Her Majesty has appreciated the spirit in which His Royal Highness was received throughout the Republic, and the cordial manifestation of that spirit by the people of the United States which accompanied him in every step of his progress. Her Majesty has justly recognized that the visit of her son aroused the kind and generous sympathies of our citizens, and, if I may so speak, has created an almost personal interest in the fortunes of the Royalty which he so well represents. The President trusts that this sympathy and interest towards the future representative of the Sovereignty of Great Britain are at once an evidence and a guaranty of that consciousness of common interest and mutual regard which have bound in the past, and will in the future bind together more strongly than treaties, the feelings and the fortunes of the two nations which represent the enterprise, the civilization, and the constitutional liberty of the same great race. I have also been instructed to make this correspondence public, that the citizens of the United States may have the satisfaction of knowing how strongly and properly Her Majesty has appreciated the cordial warmth of their welcome to His Royal Highness."

VISIT OF THE PRINCE OF WALES.

Time was soon to test "the sincerity of those sentiments of esteem and regard which Her Majesty and all classes of her subjects entertain for the kindred race which occupies so distinguished a position in the community of nations." Within a few days after the exchange of this correspondence it became the duty of Lord Lyons to announce to his government that the domestic differences "in the great American Union" were deepening into so fierce a feud that from different motives both General Cass the Secretary of State, to whom his letter had been addressed, and Mr. Trescott the Assistant Secretary of State, by whom it had been answered, had resigned, and that the United States, one "of the two great nations which represent the enterprise, the civilization, and the constitutional liberty of the same great race," was about to confront the gravest danger that can threaten national existence.

The State of South Carolina passed its Ordinance of Secession December 17, 1860. From that date until the surrender of Fort Sumter, April 14, 1861, many of the most patriotic and able statesmen of the country and a large majority of the people of the North hoped that some reasonable and peaceful adjustment of the difficulties would be found. The new Administration had every right to expect that foreign powers would maintain the utmost reserve, both in opinion and in action, until it could have a fair opportunity to decide upon a policy. The great need of the new President was time. Both he and his advisers felt that every day's delay was a substantial gain, and that the maintenance of the _status quo_, with no fresh outbreak at home and no unfriendly expression aborad, was of incalculable advantage to the cause of the Union.

Amid the varying and contradictory impressions of the hour, Lord Lyons had reported events as they occurred, with singular fairness and accuracy. Just one month before Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated, on the 4th of February, 1861, His Lordship wrote to Lord John Russell, at that time Her Majesty's Minister of Foreign Affairs: "Mr. Seward's real view of the state of the country appears to be that if bloodshed can be avoided until the new government is installed, the seceding States will in no long time return to the Confederation. He seems to think that in a few months the evils and hardships produced by secession will become intolerably grievous to the Southern States, that they will be completely re-assured as to the intentions of the Administration, and that the conservative element which is now kept under the surface by the violent pressure of the Secessionists will emerge with irresistible force. From all these causes he confidently expects that when elections for the State Legislatures are held in the Southern States in November next, the Union party will have a clear majority and will bring the seceding States back into the Confederation. He then hopes to place himself at the head of a strong Union party having extensive ramifications both in the North and in the South, and to make 'Union or Disunion, not Freedom or Slavery,' the watchwords of political parties." It can scarcely escape notice how significant, even at this early period, is the use in this dispatch of the word "confederation" as applied to the United States,--a use never before made of it in diplomatic communication since the establishment of the Constitution, and indicating, only too clearly, the view to be taken by the British Government of the relation of the States to the Union.

Whatever may have been the estimate at home of the policy attributed to Mr. Seward, it was certainly one which would commend itself to the sympathy of a friendly nation, and one, to the success of which no neutral power would hesitate to contribute all the aid it could rightfully render. The dispatch of Lord Lyons was received in London on the 18th of February, and on the 20th Lord John Russell replied as follows: "The success or failure of Mr. Seward's plans to prevent a disruption of the North-American Union is a matter of deep interest to Her Majesty's Government, but they can only expect and hope. They are not called upon nor would they be acting prudently were they to obtrude their advice on the dissentient parties in the United States. Supposing however that Mr. Lincoln, acting under bad advice, should endeavor to provide excitement for the public mind by raising questions with Great Britain, Her Majesty's Government feel no hesitation as to the policy they would pursue. They would in the first place be very forbearing. They would show by their acts how highly they value the relations of peace and amity with the United States. But they would take care to let the government which multiplied provocations and sought for quarrels understand that their forbearance sprung from the consciousness of strength and not from the timidity of weakness. They would warn a government which was making political capital out of blustering demonstrations that our patience might be tried too far."

THREATS FROM LORD JOHN RUSSELL.

It is impossible to mistake the spirit or the temper of this dispatch. It is difficult to account for the manifest irritation of its tone except upon the ground that Lord John Russell saw in a possible reconciliation, between North and South, something that threatened the interest or jarred upon the sympathy of the British Government. It was at least sufficient and ominous warning of what the United States might expect from "the confidence and affection" which had only a few weeks before been outpoured so lavishly by Her Majesty's Government. The fact is worthy of emphasis that since the cordial interchange of notes touching the visit of the Prince of Wales there had not been a single word of unkindness in the correspondence of the two governments. But our embarrassments had been steadily deepening, and according to many precedents in the career of that illustrious statesman, Lord John seems to have considered the period of our distress a fitting time to assert that "British forbearance springs from the consciousness of strength and not from the timidity of weakness."

On the 4th of March, 1861, the administration of Mr. Lincoln assumed the responsibility of government. At that date the organization of the Southern Confederacy had not been perfected. Four States which ultimately joined it had not yet seceded from the Union. There had been no overt act of violence. The Administration still believed in the possibility of a peaceful settlement. But on the 12th of April Fort Sumter was attacked. On the 14th it was surrendered. On the 15th the President issued his Proclamation calling out seventy-five thousand militia and summoning Congress to meet on the 4th of July. On the 17th the President of the Confederacy authorized the issue of letters of marque. On the 19th the President of the United States proclaimed a blockade of the Southern ports and declared that privateers with letters of marque from the Southern Confederacy would be treated as pirates.

This condition of affairs rendered the relation of foreign powers to the Union and to the Confederacy at once urgent and critical. It is true that Fort Sumter had surrendered to a warlike demonstration, but fortunately no blood had been shed. It is true that letters of marque had been authorized, but none had been actually issued. It is true that a blockade had been proclaimed, but some time must elapse before it could be practically enforced. All that can be said is that the rebellion had organized itself with promptness and courage for a conflict. There was still a pause. Neither party thoroughly realized the horror of the work before them, though every day made it more clearly apparent. Until then the United States was the only organized government on our soil known to England, and with it she had for three-quarters of a century maintained commercial and political relations which had grown closer and more friendly every year. The vital element of that government was Union. Whatever might be the complicated relations of their domestic law, to the world and to themselves the United States of America was the indivisible government. This instinct of union had gathered them together as colonies, had formed them into an imperfect confederation, had matured them under a National Constitution. It gave them their vigor at home, their power and influence abroad. To destroy their union was to resolve them into worse than colonial disintegration.

But the separation of the States was more than the dissolution of the Union. For, treating with all due respect the conviction of the Southern States as to the violation of their constitutional rights, no fair-minded man can deny that the central idea of the secession movement was the establishment of a great slave-holding empire around the Gulf of Mexico. It was a bold and imperial conception. With an abounding soil, with millions of trained and patient laborers, with a proud and martial people, with leaders used to power and skilled in government, controlling some of the greatest and most necessary of the commercial staples of the world, the haughty oligarchy of the South would have founded a slave republic which, in its successful development, would have changed the future of this continent and of the world. When English statesmen were called upon to deal with such a crisis, the United States had a right to expect, if not active sympathy, at least that neutrality which would confine itself within the strict limit of international obligation, and would not withhold friendly wishes for the preservation of the Union.

RELATIONS OF ENGLAND AND THE UNION.

England had tested slowly but surely the worth of the American Union. As the United States had extended its territory, had developed in wealth, had increased in population, richer and richer had become the returns to England's merchants and manufacturers; question after question of angry controversy had been amicably settled by the conviction of mutual, growing, and peaceful interests. And while it had become a rhetorical truism with English historians and statesmen, that relations with the independent Republic were stronger, safer, and more valuable than those of the old colonial connection, her own principles of constitutional liberty were re- invigorated by the skill and the breadth with which they were applied and administered by her own children in a new country. England could not but know that all this was due to the Union,-- the Union which had concentrated the weakness of scattered States into a government that protected the citizen and welcomed the immigrant, which carried law and liberty to the pioneer on the remotest border, which had made of provincial villages centres of wealth and civilization that would not have discredited the capitals of older nations, and which above all had created a Federal representative government whose successful working might teach England herself how to hold together the ample colonies that still formed the outposts of her Empire.

More than all, a Cabinet, every member of which by personal relation of tradition connection belonged to the great liberal party that felt the achievement of Emancipation to be a part of its historic glory, should have realized that no diminution of a rival, no monopoly of commerce, could bring to England any compensation for the establishment of a slave-holding empire upon the central waters of the world.

With this natural expectation the Government in less than sixty days after Mr. Lincoln's inauguration, sent its minister to London, confident that he would at least be allowed to present to the British Government for friendly consideration, the condition and policy of the Republic before any positive action should disturb the apparently amicable relations of the two countries. Mr. Charles Francis Adams, who was selected for this important duty, was instructed to explain to the British Government that the peculiar relation of the States to the Federal Government, and the reticence and reservations consequent upon a change of administration, had hitherto restrained the action of the President in the formation and declaration of his policy; that without foreign interference the condition of affairs still afforded reasonable hope of a satisfactory solution; and especially that it was necessary, if there existed a sincere desire to avoid wrong and injury to the United States, for foreign powers to abstain from any act of pretended neutrality which would give material advantage or moral encouragement to the organized forces of the rebellion.

Before Mr. Adams could cross the Atlantic the British Government, although aware of his mission and its object, decided upon its own course, in concerted action with France, and without reference to the views or wishes or interest of the United States. On the day before Mr. Adams's arrival in England, as if to give him offensive warning how little his representations would be regarded, Her Majesty's Government issued a proclamation recognizing the confederated Southern States as belligerents. It is entirely unnecessary to discuss the question of the right to recognize belligerency. The great powers of Europe had the same right to recognize the Southern Confederacy as a belligerent that they had to recognize it as an established nationality, and with the same consequences,--all dependent upon whether the fact so recognized were indeed a fact. But the recognition of belligerency or independence may be the means to achieve a result, and not simply an impartial acquiescence in a result already achieved. The question therefore was not whether foreign powers had a right to recognize, but whether the time and method of such recognition were not distinctly hostile,-- whether they were not the efficient and coldly calculated means to strengthen the hands of the Rebellion.

Events proved that if the English Government had postponed this action until the Government of the United States had been allowed a frank discussion of its policy, no possible injury to English interests could have resulted. It was but a very short time before the rebellion assumed proportions that led to the recognition of the Confederacy as a belligerent by the civil, judicial, and military authorities of the Union; a recognition by foreign powers would then have been simply an act of impartial neutrality. But, declared with such precipitancy, recognition could be regarded only as an act of unfriendliness to the United States. The proof of this is inherent in the case:--

1. The purpose of the secession, openly avowed from the beginning, was the dissolution of the Union and the establishment of an independent slave-empire; and the joint recognition was a declaration that such a result, fraught with ruin to us, was not antagonistic to the feelings or to the supposed interests of Europe, and that both the commercial ambition of England and the military aspirations of France in Mexico hoped to find profit in the event.

ENGLAND'S RECOGNITION OF BELLIGERENCY.

2. This recognition of belligerency in defiance of the known wishes and interests of the United States, accompanied by the discourteous refusal to allow a few hours' delay for the reception of the American minister, was a significant warning to the seceded States that no respect due to the old Union would long delay the establishment of new relations, and that they should put forth all their energies before the embarrassed Administration could concentrate its efforts in defense of the National life.

3. The recognition of the belligerent flag of the Southern Confederacy, with the equal right to supplies and hospitality, guarantied by such recognition, gave to the insurgents facilities and opportunities which were energetically used, and led to consequences which belong to a later period of this history, but the injury and error of which were emphatically rebuked by a judgment of the most important tribunal that has ever been assembled to interpret and administer international law.

The demand which naturally followed for a rigid enforcement of the blockade, imposed a heavy burden upon the Government of the United States just at the time when it was least prepared to assume such a burden. Apologists for the unfriendly course of England interpose the plea that the declaration of blockade by the United States was in fact a prior recognition of Southern belligerency. But it must be remembered that when the United States proposed to avoid this technical argument by closing the insurgent ports instead of blockading them, Mr. Seward was informed by Lord Lyons, acting in concert with the French minister, that Her Majesty's Government "would consider a decree closing the ports of the South actually in possession of the insurgent or Confederate States, as null and void, and that they would not submit to measures on the high seas in pursuance of such decree." Bitterly might Mr. Seward announce the fact which has sunk deep into the American heart: "It is indeed manifest in the tone of the speeches, as well as in the general tenor of popular discussion, that neither the responsible ministers nor the House of Commons nor the active portion of the people of Great Britain sympathize with this government, and hope, or even wish, for its success in suppressing the insurrection; and that on the contrary the whole British nation, speaking practically, desire and expect the dismemberment of the Republic."

This very decided step towards a hostile policy was soon followed by another even more significant. On the 9th of May, 1861, only a few days before the Proclamation of Her Britannic Majesty, recognizing the belligerency of the Southern Confederacy and thus developing itself as a part of a concerted and systematic policy, Lord Cowley, the British Ambassador at Paris, wrote to Lord John Russell: "I called this afternoon on M. Thouvenel, Minister of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of obtaining his answer to the proposals contained in your Lordship's dispatch of the 6th inst. relative to the measures which should be pursued by the Maritime Powers of Europe for the protection of neutral property in presence of the events which are passing in the American States. M. Thouvenel said the Imperial Government concurred entirely in the views of Her Majesty's Government in endeavoring to _obtain of the belligerents_ a _formal_ recognition of the second, third, and fourth articles of the Declaration of Paris. Count de Flahault (French Ambassador in London) would receive instructions to make this known officially to your Lordship. With regard to the manner in which this endeavor should be made, M. Thouvenel said that he thought a communication should be addressed to both parties _in as nearly as possible the same language_, the consuls being made the organs of communication with the Southern States."

Communicating this intelligence to Lord Lyons in a dispatch dated May 18, 1861, Lord John Russell added these instructions: "Your Lordship may therefore be prepared to find your French colleague ready to take the same line with yourself in his communications with the Government of the United States. I need not tell your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government would very gladly see a practice which is calculated to lead to great irregularities and to increase the calamities of war renounced by _both_ the contending parties in America as it has been renounced by almost _every other nation_ in the world. . . . You will take such measures as you shall judge most expedient to transmit to Her Majesty's consul at Charleston or New Orleans a copy of my previous dispatch to you of this day's date, to be communicated at Montgomery to the President of the so-styled Confederate States."

The identity of the address and the equality upon which both the belligerents were invited to do what had been done by "almost every other _nation_ of the world" need not be emphasized.

ACTION OF CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT.

On July 5, 1861, Lord Lyons instructed Mr. Bunch, the British Consul at Charleston, South Carolina:--

"The course of events having invested the States assuming the title of Confederate States of America with the character of belligerents, it has become necessary for Her Majesty's Government to obtain from the existing government in those States securities concerning the proper treatment of neutrals. I am authorized by Lord John Russell to confide the negotiation on this matter to you, and I have great satisfaction in doing so. In order to make you acquainted with the views of Her Majesty's Government, I transmit to you a duplicate of a dispatch to me in which they are fully stated." His Lordship then proceeded to instruct the consul as to the manner in which it might be best to conduct the negotiation, the object being to avoid as far as possible a direct official communication with the authorities of the Confederate States. Instructions to the same purport were addressed by the French Government to their consul at Charleston.

What then was the point of the negotiations committed to these consuls? It will be found in the dispatch from Lord John Russell, communicated by his order to Mr. Bunch. It was the accession of the United States and of the Confederate States to the Declaration of Paris of April 16, 1856. That Declaration was signed by the Ministers of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey. It adopted as article of Maritime Law the following points:--

"1. Privateering is and remains abolished.

"2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods with the exception of contraband of war.

"3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag.

"4. Blockades in order to be binding must be effective,--that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy."

The Powers signing the Declaration engaged to bring it to the knowledge of those Powers which had not taken part in that Congress of Paris, and to invite them to accede to it; and they agreed that "the present Declaration is not and shall not be binding except between those Powers which have acceded or shall accede to it." It was accepted by all the European and South American Powers. The United States, Mexico, and the Oriental Powers did not join in the general acceptance.

The English and French consuls in Charleston, having received these instructions, sought and found an intermediary whose position and diplomatic experience would satisfy the requirements. This agent accepted the trust on two conditions,--one, that he should be furnished with the instructions as proof to the Confederate Government of the genuineness of the negotiation, the other, that the answer of the Confederate Government should be received in whatever shape that government should think proper to frame it. The negotiations in Richmond which had by this time become the seat of the Insurgent Government were speedily concluded, and on the 13th of August, 1861, the Confederate Government passed the following resolution:--

"WHEREAS the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey, in a conference held at Paris on the 16th of April, 1856, made certain declarations concerning Maritime Law, to serve as uniform rules for their guidance in all cases arising out of the principles thus proclaimed;

"AND WHEREAS it being desirable not only to attain certainty and uniformity as far as may be practicable in maritime law, but also to maintain whatever is just and proper in the established usages of nations, the Confederate States of America deem it important to declare the principles by which they will be governed in their intercourse with the rest of mankind: Now therefore be it

"_Resolved_, by the Congress of the Confederate States of America,

"1st, That we maintain the right of privateering as it has been long established by the practice and recognized by the law of nations.

"2d, That the neutral flag covers enemy's goods with the exception of contraband of war.

"3d, That neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag.

"4th, Blockades in order to be binding must be effective; that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy."

ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND THE CONFEDERACY.

"These resolutions," says Mr. Bunch to Lord Lyons on Aug. 16, 1861, "were passed on the 13th inst., approved on the same day by the President, and I have the honor to enclose herewith to your Lordship the copy of them which has been sent to Mr. ---- by the Secretary of State to be delivered to M. de Belligny and myself." On Aug. 30, 1861, Lord Lyons wrote to Lord John Russell: "I have received, just in time to have the enclosed copy made for your Lordship, a dispatch from Mr. Consul Bunch reporting the proceedings taken by him in conjunction with his French colleague M. de Belligny to obtain the adherence of the so-called Confederate States to the last three articles of the Declaration of Paris;" and a few days later he says, "I am confirmed in the opinion that the negotiation, which was difficult and delicate, was managed with great tact and judgment by the two consuls."

Upon the discovery of this "difficult and delicate negotiation," Mr. Seward demanded the removal of Mr. Bunch. Lord John Russell replied to Mr. Adams Sept. 9, 1861, "The undersigned will without hesitation state to Mr. Adams that in pursuance of an agreement between the British and French Government, Mr. Bunch was instructed to communicate to the persons exercising authority in the so-called Confederate States the desire of those governments that the second, third, and fourth articles of the Declaration of Paris should be observed by those States in the prosecution of the hostilities in which they were engaged. Mr. Adams will observe that the commerce of Great Britain and France is deeply interested in the maintenance of the articles providing that the flag covers the goods, and that the goods of a neutral taken on board a belligerent ship are not liable to confiscation. Mr. Bunch, therefore, in what he has done in this matter, has acted in obedience to the instructions of his government, who accept the responsibility of his proceedings so far as they are known to the Foreign Department, and who cannot remove him from his office for having obeyed instructions."

Here then was a complete official negotiation with the Confederate States. Mr. Montagu Bernard, in his ingenious and learned work, _The Neutrality of Great Britain during the American War_, conceals the true character of the work in which the British Government had been engaged: "The history of an unofficial application made to the Confederate States on the same subject is told in the two following dispatches. It will be seen that the channel of communication was a private person instructed by the British and French consuls, who had been themselves instructed by the ministers of their respective governments at Washington." The presence of a private intermediary at one point cannot break the chain of official communication if the communications are themselves official. For certain purposes the governments of England and France consulted and determined upon a specific line of policy. That policy was communicated in regular official instructions to their minister in Washington. The Ministers were to select the instruments to carry it out, and the persons selected were the official consular representatives of France and England, who although residing at the South held their _exequatures_ from the United-States Government. They were instructed to make a political application to the government of the Confederacy, and Lord John Russell could not disguise that government under the mask of "the persons exercising authority in the so-called Confederate States." Their application was received by the Confederate Government through their agent just as it would have been received through the mail addressed to the Secretary of State. Their application was officially acted upon by the Confederate Congress, and the result contained in an official document was transmitted to them, and forwarded by them to their immediate official superiors in Washington, who recognized it as a successful result of "a difficult and delicate negotiation." It was then sent to the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries, and the responsibility of the act was fully and finally assumed by those ministers.

Nor can it be justified as an application to a belligerent, informing him that in the exercise of belligerent rights England and France would expect a strict conformity to International Law. The four articles of the Treaty of Paris were not provisions of International Law. They were explicit modifications of that law as it had long existed, and the Declaration itself stated that it was not to bind any of the Powers which had not agreed expressly to accept it. It was therefore an invitation, not to a belligerent but to the Southern Confederacy, to accept and thus become a part to an international compact to which in the very nature of things there could be no parties save those whose acceptance constituted an international obligation. It has never yet been claimed that a mere insurgent belligerent, however strong, occupied such position. If instead of declaring by resolution that the second, third, and fourth articles of the Declaration of Paris were principles which by their own voluntary action they would adopt as rules for their own government, the Confederate States had, with an astute policy which the invitation itself seems intended to suggest, demanded that they should be allowed to accept the Declaration in the same method in which it had been accepted "by every other nation," it is difficult to see how their demand could have been refused; and if it has been admitted, what would have been wanting to perfect the recognition of the independence of the Southern Confederacy?

THE PARIS CONVENTION.

The motive of England and France in this extraordinary negotiation with the Confederacy is plain. The right of privateering was not left untouched except with deep design. By securing the assent of the Confederacy to the other three articles of the Paris Convention, safety was assured to British and French cargoes under the American flag, while every American cargo was at risk unless protected by a Foreign flag--generally the flag of England. It would have been impossible to invent a process more gainful to British commerce, more harmful to American commerce. While the British and French consuls were conducting this negotiation with the Confederate States, the British and French ministers were conducting another to the same purport with the United States. Finally Mr. Seward offered to waive the point made by Secretary Marcy many years before at the date of the Declaration, and to accept the four articles of the Paris Convention, pure and simple. But his could not be done, because the Confederate States had not accepted the first article abolishing privateering and her privateers must therefore be recognized. England and France used this fact as a pretext for absolutely declining to permit the accession of the United States, one of the great maritime powers of the world, to a treaty which was proclaimed to be a wise and humane improvement of the old and harsh law of nations, and to which in former years the United States had been most earnestly invited to give her assent. This course throws a flood of light on the clandestine correspondence with the Confederacy, and plainly exposes the reasons why it was desired that the right of privateering should be left open to the Confederates. Through that instrumentality great harm could be inflicted on the United States and at the same time England could be guarded against a cotton famine. To accomplish these ends she negotiated what was little less than a hostile treaty with an Insurgent Government. This action was initiated before a single battle was fought, and was evidently intended as encouragement and inspiration to the Confederates to persist in their revolutionary proceedings against the Government of the United States. Any reasonable man, looking at the condition of affairs, could not doubt that the public recognition of the independence of the Confederacy by England and France, was a foregone and rapidly approaching conclusion.

With this condition of affairs leading necessarily to a more pronounced unfriendliness, an incident occurred towards the close of the year which seriously threatened a final breach of amicable relations. On the 9th of November, 1861, Captain Wilkes of the United-States steamer _San Jacinto_, seized the persons of James M. Mason and John Slidell, ministers from the Southern Confederacy, and their secretaries, on board the British mail-steamer _Trent_ on her way from Havana to Kingston. Messrs. Mason and Slidell were accredited by the Executive of the Southern Confederacy to the Governments of England and France. Their avowed object was to obtain the recognition by those governments of the independence of the new Southern Republic, and their success would have been a most dangerous if not a fatal blow to the cause of the Union. But they were not by any recognized principle of international law contraband of war, and they were proceeding from a neutral port to a neutral port in a neutral vessel. The action of the officer who seized them was not authorized by any instructions, and the seizure was itself in violation of those principles of maritime law for which the United States had steadily and consistently contended from the establishment of its national life. The difficulty of adjustment lay not in the temper or conviction of either government, but in the passionate and very natural excitement of popular feeling in both countries. In the United States there was universal and enthusiastic approval of the act of Captain Wilkes. In England there was an equally vehement demand for immediate and signal reparation.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL AND LORD LYONS.

Lord John Russell, after reciting the facts, instructed Lord Lyons in a dispatch of Nov. 30, 1861: "Her Majesty's Government therefore trust that when this matter shall have been brought under the consideration of the Government of the United States, that government will of its own accord offer to the British Government such redress as alone would satisfy the British nation; namely, the liberation of the four gentlemen and their delivery to your Lordship in order that they may again be placed under British protection, and a suitable apology for the aggression which has been committed. Should these terms not be offered by Mr. Seward you will propose them to him." In a dispatch of the same date Lord John Russell says to Lord Lyons: "In my previous dispatch of this date I have instructed you by command of Her Majesty to make certain demands of the Government of the United States. Should Mr. Seward ask for delay in order that this grave and painful matter should be deliberately considered, you will consent to a delay not exceeding seven days. If at the end of that time no answer is given, or if any other answer is given except that of compliance with the demands of Her Majesty's Government, your Lordship is instructed to leave Washington with all the members of your Legation, bringing with you the archives of the Legation, and to repair immediately to London. If however you should be of opinion that the requirements of Her Majesty's Government are substantially complied with you may report the facts to Her Majesty's Government for their consideration, and remain at your post until you receive further orders." The communication of this peremptory limitation of time for a reply would have been an offensive threat; but it was a private instruction to guide the discretion of the minister, not to be used if the condition of things upon its arrival promised an amicable solution. It must also in justice be remembered that excited feeling had been shown by different departments of our own Government as well as by the press and the people. The House of Representatives had unanimously adopted a resolution thanking Captain Wilkes "for his brave, adroit, and patriotic conduct;" and the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Gideon Welles, had publicly and officially approved his action.

The spirit in which Lord Lyons would receive his instructions was indicated in advance by his own dispatch to Lord John Russell of Nov. 19, 1861: "I have accordingly deemed it right to maintain the most complete reserve on the subject. To conceal the distress which I feel would be impossible, nor would it if possible be desirable; but I have expressed no opinion on the questions of international law involved; I have hazarded no conjecture as to the course which will be taken by Her Majesty's Government. On the one hand I dare not run the risk of compromising the honor and inviolability of the British flag by asking for a measure of reparation which may prove to be inadequate. On the other hand I am scarcely less unwilling to incur the danger of rendering a satisfactory settlement of the question more difficult by making a demand which may turn out to be unnecessarily great. In the present imperfect state of my information I feel that the only proper and prudent course is to wait for the orders which your Lordship will give, with a complete knowledge of the whole case. I am unwilling moreover to deprive any explanation or reparation which the United-States Government may think it right to offer, of the grace of being made spontaneously. I know too that a demand from me would very much increase the main difficulty which the government would feel in yielding to any disposition which they may have to make amends to Great Britain. The American people would more easily tolerate a spontaneous offer of reparation made by its government from a sense of justice than a compliance with a demand for satisfaction from a foreign minister."

In accordance with the sentiments thus expressed, Lord Lyons, interpreting his discretion liberally and even generously, called upon Mr. Seward on the 19th of December, 1861, and the following is his official account of the interview: "The Messenger Seymour delivered to me at half-past eleven o'clock last night your Lordship's dispatch of the 30th ultimo, specifying the reparation required by Her Majesty's Government for the seizure of Mr. Mason and Mr. Slidell and their secretaries on board the royal mail-steamer _Trent_. I waited on Mr. Seward this afternoon at the State Department, and acquainted him in general terms with the tenor of that dispatch. I stated in particular, as nearly as possible in your Lordship's words, that the only redress which could satisfy Her Majesty's Government and Her Majesty's people would be the immediate delivery of the prisoners to me in order that they might be placed under British protection, and moreover a suitable apology for the aggression which had been committed. I added that Her Majesty's Government hoped that the Government of the United States would of its own accord offer this reparation; that it was in order to facilitate such an arrangement that I had come to him without any written demand, or even any written paper at all, in my hand; that if there was a prospect of attaining this object I was willing to be guided by him as to the conduct on my part which would render its attainment most easy. Mr. Seward received my communication seriously and with dignity, but without any manifestation of dissatisfaction. Some further conversation ensued in consequence of questions put by him with a view to ascertain the exact character of the dispatch. At the conclusion he asked me to give him to- morrow to consider the question and to communicate with the President. On the day after he should, he said, be ready to express an opinion with respect to the communication I had made. In the mean time he begged me to be assured that he was very sensible of the friendly and conciliatory manner in which I had made it."

SECRETARY SEWARD AND LORD LYONS.

On the 26th of December Mr. Seward transmitted to Lord Lyons the reply of the United States to the demand of the British Government. In forwarding it to his Government Lord Lyons said: "Before transmitting to me the note of which a copy enclosed in my immediately preceding dispatch of to-day's date, Mr. Seward sent for me to the State Department, and said with some emotion that he thought that it was due to the great kindness and consideration which I had manifested throughout in dealing with the affair of the _Trent_, that he should tell me with his own lips that he had been able to effect a satisfactory settlement of it. He had now however been authorized to address to me a note which would be satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government. In answer to inquiries from me Mr. Seward said that of course he understood Her Majesty's Government to leave it open to the Government of Washington to present the case in the form which would be most acceptable to the American people, but that the note was intended to be and was a compliance with the terms proposed by Her Majesty's Government. He would add that the friendly spirit and discretion which I had manifested in the whole matter from the day on which the intelligence of the seizure reached Washington up to the present moment had more than any thing else contributed to the satisfactory settlement of the question."

In his reply Mr. Seward took the ground that we had the right to detain the British vessel and to search for contraband persons and dispatches, and moreover that the persons named and their dispatches were contraband. But he found good reason for surrendering the Confederate envoys in the fact that Captain Wilkes had neglected to bring the _Trent_ into a Prize Court and to submit the whole transaction to Judicial examination. Mr. Seward certainly strained the argument of Mr. Madison as Secretary of State in 1804 to a most extraordinary degree when he apparently made it cover the ground that we would quietly have submitted to British right of search if the "Floating Judgment-seat" could have been substituted by a British Prize Court. The seizure of the _Trent_ would not have been made more acceptable to the English Government by transferring her to the jurisdiction of an American Prize-Court, unless indeed that Court should have decided, as it most probably would have decided, that the seizure was illegal. Measuring the English demand not by the peremptory words of Lord John Russell but by the kindly phrase in which Lord Lyons in a personal interview verbally communicated them, Mr. Seward felt justified in saying that "the claim of the British Government is not made in a discourteous manner." Mr. Seward did not know that at the very moment he was writing these conciliatory words, British troops were on their way to the Dominion of Canada to menace the United States, and that British cannon were shotted for our destruction.

Lord John Russell, however much he might differ from Mr. Seward's argument, found ample satisfaction to the British Government in his conclusion. He said in reply: "Her Majesty's Government having carefully taken into their consideration the liberation of the prisoners, the delivery of them into your hands, and the explanations to which I have just referred, have arrived at the conclusion that they constitute the reparation which Her Majesty and the British nation had a right to expect." And thus, by the delivery of the prisoners in the form and at the place least calculated to excite or wound the susceptibilities of the American people, this dangerous question was settled. It is only to be regretted that the spirit and discretion exhibited by the eminent diplomatist who represented England here with such wisdom and good temper, had not been adopted at an earlier date and more steadily maintained by the British Government. It would have prevented much angry controversy, much bitter feeling; it would have averted events and consequences which still shadow with distrust a national friendship that ought to be cordial and constant.

ENGLAND, FRANCE, PRUSSIA, AND AUSTRIA.

The painful event impressed upon the Government of the United States a profound sense of its isolation from the sympathy of Europe. The principle of maritime law, which was so promptly and rigorously applied, was one for which the United States had contended in its weakness against the usages of the world and against the arms of Great Britain. There was apparent now an eager resolution to enforce it, when that enforcement was sure to embarrass us and to provoke a spirit of derisive triumph in our foes. It was clear that no effort would be spared to restrict our belligerent rights within the narrowest possible limits. Not content with leaving us to settle this question with England, France and Prussia and Austria hastened to inform us in language professedly friendly, that England would be supported in her demand for reparation, cost what it might to us in prestige, and in power to deal with the Rebellion at home. At this time there was but one among the great nations of the world which adhered to an active and avowed friendship for us. "We desire above all things the maintenance of the American Union as one indivisible nation," was the kindly and always to be remembered greeting that came to us from the Emperor of Russia.

The profound ability exhibited by Mr. Seward as Secretary of State has long been acknowledged and emphasized by the admiration and gratitude of the country. In the _Trent_ affair he acted under a pressure of circumstances more harassing and perplexing than had ever tested the skill of American diplomacy. It is with no disposition to detract from the great service rendered by him that a dissent is expressed from the ground upon which he placed the surrender of Mason and Slidell. It is not believed that the doctrine announced by Mr. Seward can be maintained on sound principles of International Law, while it is certainly in conflict with the practice which the United States had sought to establish from the foundation of the Government. The restoration of the envoys on any such apparently insufficient basis did not avoid the mortification of the surrender; it only deprived us of the fuller credit and advantage which we might have secured from the act. It is to be regretted that we did not place the restoration of the prisoners upon franker and truer ground, viz., that their seizure was in violation of the principles which we had steadily and resolutely maintained--principles which we would not abandon either for a temporary advantage or to save the wounding of our National pride.

The luminous speech of Mr. Sumner, when the papers in the _Trent_ case were submitted to Congress, stated the ground for which the United States had always contended with admirable precision. We could not have refused to surrender Mason and Slidell without trampling upon our own principles and disregarding the many precedents we had sought to establish. But it must not be forgotten that the sword of precedent cut both ways. It was as absolutely against the peremptory demand of England for the surrender of the prisoners as it was against the United States for the seizure of them. Whatever wrong was inflicted on the British Flag by the action of Captain Wilkes, had been time and again inflicted on the American flag by officers of the English Navy,--without cause, without redress, without apology. Hundreds and thousands of American citizens had in time of peace been taken by British cruisers from the decks of American vessels and violently impressed into the naval service of that country.

Lord Castlereagh practically confessed in Parliament that this offense against the liberty of American citizens had been repeated thirty-five hundred times. According to the records of our own department of State as Mr. Sumner alleges "the quarter-deck of a British man-of-war had been made a floating judgment-seat six thousand times and upwards, and each time some citizen or other person was taken from the protection of our national flag without any form of trial whatever." So insolent and oppressive had British aggression become before the war of 1812, that Mr. Jefferson in his somewhat celebrated letter to Madame de Stael-Holstein of May 24, 1813, said, "No American could safely cross the ocean or venture to pass by sea from one to another of our own ports. _It is not long since they impressed at sea two nephews of General Washington returning from Europe, and put them, as common seamen, under the ordinary discipline of their ships of war_."

After the war of 1812 these unendurable insults to our flag were not repeated by Great Britain, but her Government steadily refused to make any formal renunciation of her right to repeat them, so that our immunity from like insults did not rest upon any better foundation than that which might be dictated by considerations of interest and prudence on the part of the offending Power. The wrong which Captain Wilkes committed against the British flag was surely not so great as if he had seized the persons of British subjects--subjects, if you please, who were of kindred blood to one who stands as high in the affection of the British people as Washington stands in the affection of the American people,--if indeed there be such a one in English tradition.

The offense of Captain Wilkes was surely far below that in the essential quality of outrage. He had not touched the hair of a British subject's head. He had only removed from the hospitality and shelter of a British ship four men who were bent on an errand of destruction to the American Union. His act cannot be justified by the canons of International Law as our own Government has interpreted and enforced them. But in view of the past and of the long series of graver outrages with which Great Britain had so wantonly insulted the American flag, she might have refrained from invoking the judgment of the civilized world against us, and especially might she have refrained from making in the hour of our sore trial and our deep distress, a demand which no British Minister would address to this Government in the day of its strength and its power.

FRIENDLY POSITION OF THE QUEEN.

It would be ungracious to withhold an expression of the lasting appreciation entertained in this country of the course pursued by Her Majesty, the Queen of England, throughout this most painful ordeal. She was wiser than her Ministers, and there can be little doubt but for her considerate interposition, softening the rigor of the British demand, the two nations would have been forced into war. On all the subsequent occasions for bitterness towards England, by reason of the treatment we experienced during the war, there was an instinctive feeling among Americans that the Queen desired peace and good will, and did not sympathize with the insidious efforts at our destruction, which had their origin in her dominions. It was fortunate that the disposition of the Queen, and not of her Ministry, was represented in Washington by Lord Lyons. The good sense and good temper of His Lordship were of inestimable value to both countries, in making the task of Mr. Seward practicable, without increasing the resentment of our people.

It was well that the Government and people of the United States were so early taught that their value to the world of foreign principles, foreign feeling, and foreign interests was only what they could themselves establish; that in this contest they must depend upon themselves; and that the dissolution of their National Unity and the destruction of their free, popular Government from the lack of courage and wisdom in those whose duty it was to maintain them, would not be unwelcome to the Principalities and Powers that "were willing to wound, but yet afraid to strike." This is not the time to describe the vacillating and hesitating development of this hostile policy; but as the purpose of the United-States Government grew more steady, more resolute, and more self-reliant, a sickening doubt seemed to becloud the ill-concealed hope of our ruin. It was not long until the brave and deluded rebels of the South learned that there was no confidence to be placed in the cruel and selfish calculation which encouraged their desperate resistance with the show of sympathy, but would not avow an open support or make a manly sacrifice in their behalf.

This initial policy of foreign powers had developed its natural consequences. It not only excited but it warranted in the Southern Confederacy the hope of early recognition. It seemed impossible that, with this recognized equality between the belligerents, there would not occur somewhere just such incidents as the seizure of the _Trent_ or the capture of the _Florida_ which would render it very difficult to maintain peaceful relations between foreign Powers and the United States. The neutrality laws were complicated. Men- of-war commanded by ambitious, ardent, and patriotic officers would sometimes in the excitement of honorable feeling, sometimes in mistaken sense of duty, vindicate their country's flag; while it was the interest of the officers of the Confederate cruisers, as bold and ingenious men who ever commanded ship, to create, wherever they could, difficulties which would embarrass the interests of neutrals and intensify between the United States and foreign Powers the growing feeling of distrust. Thus from month to month the Government of the United States could never feel secure that there would not arise questions which the indignation of its own people and the pride and latent hostility of foreign government would place beyond the power of friendly adjustment. Such questions did arise with England, France, Brazil, Spain, and even with Mexico, which the common disinclination to actual war succeeded in postponing rather than settling. But as the civil war went on, three classes of questions took continuous and precise shape. Their scope and result can be fully and fairly considered. These were--

1. The building and equipping of Confederate cruisers and their treatment as legitimate national vessels of war in the home and colonial ports of foreign powers.

2. The establishment at such ports as Nassau, in the immediate vicinity of the blockaded ports of the Southern States, of depots of supplies, which afforded to the Confederates enormous advantages in the attempt to break the blockade.

3. The distinct defiance of the traditional policy of the United States by the invasion of the neighboring Republic of Mexico for the avowed purpose of establishing there a foreign and monarchical dynasty.

SECRET SERVICE OF THE CONFEDERACY.

No sooner had Her Brittanic Majesty's proclamation, recognizing the belligerent rights of the Southern Confederacy, been issued, than a naval officer of remarkable ability and energy was sent from Montgomery to Liverpool. In his very interesting history of the services rendered by him, that officer says: "The chief object of this narrative is to demonstrate by a plain statement of facts that the Confederate Government, through their agents, did nothing more than all other belligerents have heretofore done in time of need; namely, tried to obtain from every possible source the means necessary to carry on the war in which they were engaged, and that in so doing they took particular pains to understand the municipal law of those countries in which they sought to supply their wants, and were especially careful to keep with the statutes. . . .

"The object of the Confederate Government was not merely to build a single ship, but it was to maintain a permanent representative of the Navy Department abroad, and to get ships and naval supplies without hindrance so long as the war lasted. To effect this purpose it was manifestly necessary to act with prudence and caution and to do nothing in violation of the municipal law, because a single conviction would both expose the object and defeat the aim." His solicitor "therefore drew up a case for counsel's opinion and submitted it to two eminent barristers, both of whom have since filled the highest judicial positions. The case was submitted; was a general and not a specific proposition. It was not intimated for what purpose and on whose behalf the opinion was asked, and the reply was therefore wholly without bias, and embraced a full exposition of the Act in its bearing upon the question of building and equipping ships in Her Majesty's dominions.

"The inferences drawn from the investigation of the Act by counsel were put in the following form by my solicitor:--

"'1. It is no offense (under the Act) for British subjects to equip, etc., a ship at some country _without_ Her Majesty's dominions though the intent be to cruise against a friendly State.

"'2. It is no offense for _any_ person (subject or no subject) to _equip_ a ship _within_ Her Majesty's dominions if it be _not_ done with the intent to cruise against a friendly State.

"'3. The mere building of a ship _within_ Her Majesty's dominions by any person (subject or no subject) is no offense, _whatever may be the intent of the parties_, because the offense is not in the _building_, but the _equipping_.

"'Therefore any ship-builder may build any ship in Her Majesty's dominions, provided he does not equip her within Her Majesty's dominions, and he had nothing to do with the acts of the purchasers done _within_ Her Majesty's dominions without his concurrence, or without Her Majesty's dominions even with his concurrence.'"-- [BULLOCK's _Secret Service of the Confederate States_, vol. i, pp. 65-67.]

It is an amazing courtesy which attributes to the eminent counsel a complete ignorance of the object and purpose for which their weighty opinion was sought in the construction of British law. Such ignorance is feigned and not real, and the pretense of its existence indicates either on the part of the author or the counsel a full appreciation of the deadly consequences of that malign interpretation of England's duty for which two illustrious members of the English Bar were willing to stand sponsors before the world. Conceding, as we fairly may concede, that the decision in the case of the _Alexandra_ is confirmatory of the opinion given by these leaders of the British bar, the result was simply the establishment and administration of the Naval Department of the Confederacy in England. There was its chief, there were its financial agents, there its workshops. There were its vessels armed and commissioned. Thence they sailed on their mission of destruction, and thither they returned to repair their damages, and to renew their supplies. Under formal contracts with the Confederate Government the colonial ports of Nassau and the Bermudas were made depots of supplies which were drawn upon with persistent and successful regularity. The effects of this thoroughly organized system of so-called neutrality that supplied ports, ships, arms, and men to a belligerent which had none, are not matters of conjecture or exaggeration; they have been proven and recorded. In three years fifteen million dollars' worth of property was destroyed,--given to the flame or sunk beneath the waters,--the shipping of the United States was reduced one- half, and the commercial flag of the Union fluttered with terror in every wind that blew, form the whale-fisheries of the Arctic to the Southern Cross.

MINISTER DAYTON'S INDIGNANT PROTEST.

With this condition of affairs, permitted and encouraged by England and France, our distinguished minister at Paris was justified in saying to the Government of Louis Napoleon on the reception of the Confederate steamer _Georgia_ at Brest, in language which though but the bare recital of fact was of itself the keenest reproach to the French Government:--

"The _Georgia_, like the _Florida_, the _Alabama_, and other scourges of peaceful commerce, was born of that unhappy decree which gave the rebels who did not own a ship-of-war or command a single port the right of an ocean belligerent. Thus encouraged by foreign powers they began to build and fit out in neutral ports a class of vessels constructed mainly for speed, and whose acknowledged mission is not to fight, but to rob, to burn, and to fly. Although the smoke of burning ships has everywhere marked the track of the _Georgia_ and the _Florida_ upon the ocean, they have never sought a foe or fired a gun against an armed enemy. To dignify such vessels with the name of ships-of-war seems to me, with deference, a misnomer. Whatever flag may fly from their mast-head, or whatever power may claim to own them, their conduct stamps them as piratical. If vessels of war even, they would by this conduct have justly forfeited all courtesies in ports of neutral nations. Manned by foreign seamen, armed by foreign guns, entering no home port, and waiting no judicial condemnation of prizes, they have already devastated and destroyed our commerce to an extent, as compared with their number, beyond any thing known in the records of privateering."

It would seem impossible that such a state of things could be the result of the impartial administration of an honest neutrality. It must be attributed to one of two causes;--either the municipal law of foreign countries was not sufficient to enable the governments to control the selfishness or the sentiment of their people,--to which the reply is obvious that the weakness and incompetence of municipal law cannot diminish or excuse international obligations: or it must have been due to a misconception of the obligations which international law imposes. How far there may have been a motive for this misconception, how far the wish was father to the thought of such misconstruction, it is perhaps needless now to inquire. The theory of international law maintained by the foreign Powers may be fairly stated in two propositions:--

1. That foreign Powers had the right, and in due regard to their own interests were bound, to recognize belligerency as a fact.

2. That belligerents once recognized, were equals and must be treated with the same perfect neutrality.

It is not necessary to deny these propositions, but simply to ascertain their real meaning. In its primary and simple application, the law of belligerency referred to two or more belligerents, equally independent. Its application to the case of insurgents against an established and recognized government is later, involves other and in some respects different considerations, and cannot even now be regarded as settled. To recognize an insurgent as a belligerent is not to recognize him as fully the equal of the government from which he secedes. This would be simply to recognize his independence. The limitation which international law places upon this recognition is stated in the English phrase, "the right to recognize belligerency as a fact;"--that is, to recognize the belligerent to the extent of his war capacity but no farther. The neutral cannot on this principle recognize in the belligerent the possession of any power which he does not actually possess, although in the progress of the contest such power may be developed.

The Southern Confederacy had an organized government and great armies. To that extent its power was a fact. But when foreign governments recognized in the insurgents the rights of ocean belligerency, they went beyond the fact. They were actually giving to the Confederacy a character which it did not possess and which it never acquired. For the Confederacy had not a ship or an open port. Whenever an insurgent power claims such right, it must be in condition to assume and discharge the obligation which such rights impose. When any power, insurgent or recognized, claims such right,--the right to fly its flag, to deal in hostility with the commerce of the world, to exercise dangerous privileges which may affect the interests and complicate the relations of other nations,--it must give to the world a guaranty that it is both able and willing to administer the system of maritime law under which it claims such rights and powers, by submitting its action to the regular and formal jurisdiction of Prize Courts. Strike the Prize Court out of modern maritime law and the whole system falls, and capture on the sea becomes pure barbarism,--distinguished from piracy only by the astuteness of a legal technicality. The Southern Confederacy could give no guaranty. Just as it undertook to naturalize foreign seamen upon the quarter-deck of its roving cruisers, so it undertook to administer a system of maritime law which precluded the most solemn and important of its provisions-- a judicial decision--and converted the humane and legal right of capture into an absolute and a ruthless decree of destruction. No neutral has the right to make or accept such an interpolation into the recognized and essential principles of the law of maritime warfare.

ENGLAND'S MALIGNANT NEUTRALITY.

The application of this so-called neutrality to both the so-called belligerents was not designed nor was it practicable. In referring to the obligation of the neutral to furnish no assistance to either of the belligerents, one of the oldest and most authoritative of international law writers says: "I do not say to give assistance equally but to give no assistance, for it would be absurd that a state should assist at the same time two enemies. And besides it would be impossible to do it with equality: the same things, the like number of troops, the like quantity of arms and munitions furnished under different circumstances are no longer equivalent succors." Assistance is not a theoretical idea; it is a plain, practical, unmistakable fact. When the United States had, at vast cost and by incredible effort, shut the Southern Confederacy from the sea and blockaded its ports against the entry of supplies, when that government had no resources within its territory by which it could put a ship upon the ocean, or break the blockade from within, then it was that England allowed Confederate officers to camp upon her soil, organize her labor, employ her machinery, use her ports, occupy her colonial stations, almost within sight of the blockaded coast, and to do this continuously, systematically, defiantly.

By these acts the British government gave the most valuable assistance to the South and actually engaged in defeating the military operations of the United States. There was no equivalent assistance which Great Britain could or did render to the United States. They might have rendered other assistance, but none which would compensate for this. Let it be supposed for one moment that Mexico had practiced, on the other side of the Rio Grande, the same sort of neutrality,--that she had lined the bank of the river with depots of military supplies; that she had allowed officers of the Confederate army to establish themselves and organize a complete system for the receipt of cotton and the delivery of merchandise on her territory; that her people had served as factors, intermediaries, and carriers,--would any reasonable interpretation of international law consider such conduct to be impartial neutrality? But illustration does not strengthen the argument. The naked statement of England's position is its worst condemnation. Her course, while ingeniously avoiding public responsibility, gave unceasing help to the Confederacy --as effective as if the intention had been proclaimed. The whole procedure was in disregard of international obligation and was the outgrowth of what M. Prevost-Paradol aptly charaterized as a "malignant neutrality."

It cannot be said in reply that the Governments of England and France were unable to restrain this demonstration of the sympathy, this exercise of the commercial enterprise of their people. For the time came when they did restrain it. As soon as it became evident that the Confederacy was growing weaker, that with all its marvelous display of courage and endurance it could not prevent the final success of the Union, there was no longer difficulty in arresting the building of the iron-clads on the Mersey; then the watchfulness of home and colonial authorities was quickened; then supplies were meted out scantily; then the dangers of a great slave empire began to impress Ministerial consciences, and the same Powers prepared to greet the triumph of the Union with well-feigned satisfaction. But even if this change had not occurred the condition of repressed hostility could not have lasted. It was war in disguise --not declared, only because the United-States Government could not afford to multiply its enemies, and England felt that there was still uncertainty enough in the result to caution her against assuming so great a risk. But the tension of the relation was aptly described by Mr. Seward in July, 1863, when he said,--

"If the law of Great Britain must be left without amendment and be construed by the government in conformity with the rulings of the chief Baron of the Exchequer [the _Alexandra_ case] then there will be left for the United States no alternative but to protect themselves and their commerce against armed cruisers proceeding from British ports as against the naval forces of a public enemy. . . . British ports, domestic as well as colonial, are now open under certain restrictions to the visits of piratical vessels, and not only furnish them coals, provisions, and repairs, but even receive their prisoners when the enemies of the United States come in to obtain such relief from voyages in which they have either burned ships they have captured, or have even manned and armed them as pirates and sent them abroad as auxiliaries in the work of destruction. Can it be an occasion for either surprise or complaint that if this condition of things is to remain and receive the deliberate sanction of the British Government, the navy of the United States will receive instructions to pursue these enemies into the ports which thus in violation of the law of nations and the obligations of neutrality become harbors for the pirates? The President very distinctly perceives the risks and hazards which a naval conflict thus maintained will bring to the commerce and even to the peace of the two countries. But he is obliged to consider that in the case supposed, the destruction of our commerce will probably amount to a naval war, waged by a portion at least of the British nation against the government and people of the United States--a war tolerated although not declared or avowed by the British Government. If through the necessary employment of all our means of national defense such a partial war shall become a general one between the two nations, the President thinks that the responsibility for that painful result will not fall upon the United States."

ENGLAND'S MALIGNANT NEUTRALITY.

The truth is that the so-called neutral policy of foreign Powers was the vicious application of obsolete analogies to the conditions of modern life. Because of the doctrine of belligerent recognition had in its origin referred to nations of well established, independent existence, the doctrine was now pushed forward to the extent of giving ocean belligerency to an insurgent which had in reality no maritime power whatever. It was an old and recognized principle that the commercial relations of the neutral should not be interfered with unless they worked positive injury to the belligerent. The new application made the interests of neutral commerce the supreme factor in determining how far belligerent rights should be respected. The ship-building and carrying-trade of England were to be maintained and encouraged at any cost to the belligerent. Under the old law, a belligerent had the right to purchase a ship and a cargo, or a neutral might run a blockade, taking all the risk of capture. By the new construction, power was to be given to a belligerent to transfer the entire administration of its naval service to foreign soil, and to create and equip a navy which issued from foreign waters, ready not for a dangerous journey to their own ports of delivery, but for the immediate demonstration of hostile purpose. No such absurd system can be found in the principles or precedents of international law; no such system would be permitted by the great powers of Europe if to-morrow they should engage in war.

The principle of this policy was essentially mercenary. It professed no moral sense. It might be perfectly indifferent to the high or the low issues which the contest between the belligerents involved; it was deaf to any thing which might be urged by justice of humanity or friendship; it was the cynical recognition of the truth of the old proverb that "It is an ill wind which blows good to no one." It was the same principle upon which England declares with audacious selfishness that she cannot sacrifice that portion of her Indian revenue which comes from the opium trade or the capital which is invested in its growth and manufacture, and that China must therefore take the poison which diseases and degrades her population. But selfish as is this market-policy, it is a policy of circumstance. It may be resisted with success or it may be abandoned because it cannot succeed. It creates bitterness; it leads to war; it may in its selfishness cause the destruction of a nation, but it does not necessarily imply a desire for that destruction. But there was in the foreign policy of Europe towards the United States during the civil war the manifestation of a spirit more intense in its hostility, more dangerous in its consequences. It was the spirit of enmity to the Union itself, and the emphatic demonstration of this feeling was the invasion of Mexico for the purpose of converting the republic by force into an empire. Louis Napoleon's enterprise was distinctly based on the utter destruction of the American Union.

The Declaration of Independence by the British Colonies in America was something more than the creation of a new sovereignty. It was the foundation of a new system both of internal government and foreign relation, a system not entirely isolated from the affairs of the Old World but independent of the dynastic complications and the territorial interests which controlled the political conflicts of Europe. At first, with its material resources undeveloped, its territorial extension limited and surrounded by the colonies of the great Powers, this principle although maintained as a conviction, could not manifest itself in action. But it showed itself in that abstinence from entangling alliances which would avoid the dangers of even a too friendly connection. In time our territory expanded. The colonies of foreign nations following our example became independent republics whose people had the same aspirations, whose governments were framed upon the same basis of popular right. The rapidity of communication, supplied by the railroad and the telegraph, facilitated and concentrated this political cohesion, and there had been formed from the borders of Canada to the Straits of Magellan a complete system of republics (to which Brazil can scarcely be considered an exception) professing the same political creed, having great commercial interests in common, and which with the extinction of some few jealousies, were justified in the anticipation of a prosperous and peaceful future. There was not an interest or an ambition of a single one of these republics which threatened an interest or an ambition of a single European power.

THE REPUBLICS OF AMERICA.

It needs no argument to show that the central element of the stability of this system of American republics was the strength of the Federal Union, its growth into a harmonious nationality, and its ability to prevent anywhere on the two continents the armed intervention of foreign Powers for the purpose of political domination. This strength was known and this resolution publicly declared, and it is safe to affirm that before 1861 or after 1865 not one nor all of the European Powers would have willingly challenged this policy. But the moment the strength of the Union seemed weakened, the moment that the leading Republic of this system found itself hampered and embarrassed by internal dissensions, all Europe --that Europe which upon the threatening of a Belgian fortress, or the invasion of a Swiss canton, or the loss of the key to a church in Jerusalem, would have written protocols, summoned conferences, and mustered armies--quietly acquiesced in as wanton, wicked, and foolish an aggression as ever Imperial folly devised. The same monarch who appealed with confidence to Heaven when he declared war to prevent a Hohenzollern from ascending the throne of Spain, appealed to the same Heaven with equal confidence and equal success when he declared war to force a Hapsburg upon the throne of Mexico.

The success of the establishment of a Foreign Empire in Mexico would have been fatal to all that the United States cherished, to all that it hoped peacefully to achieve. The scheme of invasion rested on the assumption of the dissolution of the Union and its division into two hostile governments; but aside from that possibility, it threatened the United States upon the most vital questions. It was at war with all our institutions and our habits of political life, for it would have introduced into a great country on this continent, capable of unlimited development, that curious and mischievous form of government, that perplexing mixture of absolutism and democracy,--imperial power supported by universal suffrage,-- which seems certain to produce aggression abroad and corruption at home, and which must have injuriously influenced the political growth of the Spanish-American Republics. Firmly seated in Mexico, it would have spread through Central America to the Isthmus, controlling all canal communications between the two oceans which were the boundaries of the Union, while its growth upon the Pacific Coast would have been in direct rivalry with the natural and increasing power of the United States. Commanding the Gulf of Mexico it would have controlled the whole commerce of the West- Indian islands and radically changed their future. Bound by dynastic connection, checked and directed by European influence, it could not have developed a national policy in harmony with neighboring States, but its existence and its necessary efforts at expansion would have made it not only a constant menace to American Republics but a source of endless war and confusion between the great Powers of the world. The policy signally failed. But surely European statesmen, without miraculous foresight, might have anticipated that its success would have been more dangerous than its defeat, and that the conservative strength of the Union might be even to them an influence of good and not of evil.

FORMER VIEWS OF LORD PALMERSTON.

In 1859 Lord Palmerston wrote to Lord John Russell: "It is plain that France aims through Spain at getting fortified points on each side of the Gut of Gibraltar which in the event of war between Spain and France on the one hand and England on the other would by a cross fire render that strait very difficult and dangerous to pass and thus virtually shut us out of the Mediterranean. . . . The French Minister of War or of marine said the other day that Algeria never would be safe till France possessed a port on the Atlantic coast of Africa. Against whom would such a port make Algeria safe? Evidently only against England, and how could such a port help France against England? Only by tending to shut us out of the Mediterranean." Later in the same year writing to the same colleague, he says, "Till lately I had strong confidence in the fair intentions of Napoleon towards England, but of late I have begun to feel great distrust and to suspect that his formerly declared intention of avenging Waterloo has only lain dormant and has not died away. He seems to have thought that he ought to lay his foundation by beating with our aid or with our concurrence or our neutrality, first Russia, then Austria, and by dealing with them generously to make them his friends in any subsequent quarrel with us. . . . Next he has been assiduously laboring to increase his naval means, evidently for offensive as well as for defensive purposes, and latterly great pains have been taken to raise throughout France and especially among the army and navy, hatred of England and a disparaging feeling of our military and naval means."

Is it not strange that, even with such apprehensions, the destruction of the Union was so welcome in England that it blinded the eyes of her statesmen and her people? They should surely have seen that the establishment of a Latin empire under the protection of France, in the heart of the Spanish-American Republics, would open a field far more dangerous to British interests than a combination for a French port in Africa, and that in pursuing his policy the wily Emperor was providing a throne for an Austrian archduke as a compensation for the loss of Lombardy. There was a time when Lord Palmerston himself held broader and juster views of what ought to be the relations between England and the United States. In 1848 he suggested to Lord John Russell a policy which looked to a complete unification of the interests of the two countries: "If as I hope," said His Lordship, "we shall succeed in altering our Navigation Laws, and if as a consequence Great Britain and the United States shall place their commercial marines upon a footing of mutual equality with the exception of the coasting-trade and some other special matters, might not such an arrangement afford us a good opportunity for endeavoring to carry in some degree into execution the wish which Mr. Fox entertained in 1783, when he wished to substitute close alliance in the place of sovereignty and dependence as the connecting link between the United States and Great Britain? A treaty for mutual defense would no longer be applicable to the condition of the two countries as independent Powers, but might they not with mutual advantage conclude a treaty containing something like the following conditions:--

"1. That in all cases of difference which may hereafter unfortunately arise between the contracting parties, they will in the first place have recourse to the mediation of some friendly Power, and that hostilities shall not begin between them until every endeavor to settle their difference by such means shall have proved fruitless.

"2. That if either of the two should at any time be at war with any other Power, no subject or citizen of the other contracting party shall be allowed to take out letters of marque from such Power under pain of being treated and dealt with as a pirate.

"3. That in such case of war between either of the two parties and a third Power, no subject or citizen of the other contracting party shall be allowed to enter into the service naval or military of such third Power.

"4. That in such case of war as aforesaid, neither of the contracting parties shall afford assistance to the enemies of the other by sea or by land, unless war should break out between the two contracting parties themselves after the failure of all endeavors to settle their differences in the manner specified in Article 1."

At the time Lord Palmerston expressed these opinions, we had just closed the Mexican war, with vast acquisition of territory and with a display of military power on distant fields of conquest which surprised European statesmen. Our maritime interests were almost equal to those of the United Kingdom, our prosperity was great, the prestige of the Nation was growing. In the thirteen intervening years between that date and the outbreak of the Southern Rebellion we had grown enormously in wealth, our Pacific possessions had shown an extraordinary production of precious metals, our population had increased more than ten millions. If an alliance with the United States was desirable for England in 1848, it was far more desirable in 1861, and Lord Palmerston being Prime Minister in the latter year, his power to propose and promote it was far greater. Is there any reason that will satisfactorily account for His Lordship's abandonment of this ideal relation of friendship between the two countries except that he saw a speedier way of adding to the power of England by conniving at the destruction of the Union? His change from the policy which he painted in 1848 to that which he acted in 1861 cannot be satisfactorily explained upon any other hypothesis than that he could not resist the temptation to cripple and humiliate the Great Republic.

FIXED POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.

This brief history of the spirit rather than the events which characterized the foreign relations of the United States during the civil war, has been undertaken with no desire to revive the feelings of burning indignation which they provoked, or to prolong the discussion of the angry questions to which they gave rise. The relations of nations are not and should not be governed by sentiment. The interest and ambition of states, like those of men, will disturb the moral sense and incline to one side or the other the strict balance of impartial justice. New days bring new issues and old passions are unsafe counselors. Twenty years have gone by. England has paid the cost of her mistakes. The Republic of Mexico has seen the fame and the fortunes of the Emperors who sought her conquest sink suddenly--as into the pits which they themselves had digged for their victims--and the Republic of the United States has come out of her long and bitter struggle, so strong that never again will she afford the temptation or the opportunity for unfriendly governments to strike at her National life. Let the past be the past, but let it be the past with all the instruction and the warning of its experience.

The future safety of these continents rests upon the strength and the maintenance of the Union, for had dissolution been possible, events have shown with what small regard the interests or the honor of either of the belligerents would have been treated. It has been taught to the smaller republics that if this strength be shattered they will be the spoil of foreign arms and the dependent provinces again of foreign monarchs. When this contest was over, the day of immaturity had passed and the United States stood before the world a great and permanent Power. That Power can afford to bury all resentments. Tranquil at home, developing its inexhaustible resources with a rapidity and success unknown in history, bound in sincere friendship, and beyond the possibility of a hostile rivalry, with the other republics of the continents, standing midway between Asia and Europe, a Power on the Pacific as well as on the Atlantic, with no temptation to intermeddle in the questions which disturb the Old World, the Republic of the United States desires to live in amicable relation with all peoples, demanding only the abstinence of foreign intervention in the development of that policy which her political creed, her territorial extent, and the close and cordial neighborhood of kindred governments have made the essential rule of her National life.

[NOTE.--In the foregoing chapter the term "piratical" is used without qualification in referring to the Southern cruisers, because it is the word used in the quotations made. It undoubtedly represented the feeling of the country at that time, but in an impartial discussion of the events of the war the word cannot be used with propriety. Our own Courts have found themselves unable to sustain such a conclusion. Looking to the future it is better to rest our objections to the mode of maritime warfare adopted by the Confederacy upon a sound and enduring principle; viz., that the recognition of ocean belligerency, when the belligerent cannot give to his lawful exercise of maritime warfare the guaranty of a prize jurisdiction, is a violation of any just or reasonable system of international law. The Confederacy had the plea of necessity for its course, but the jurisdiction of England for aiding and abetting the practice has not yet been presented.]

[NOTE.--Her Britannic Majesty's principal ministers of State in 1861-2,--at the time of the correspondence touching the _Trent_ affair, referred to in the preceding chapter,--were as follows:--

_Premier_--Lord Palmerston. _Lord High Chancellor_--Lord Westbury. _Lord President of the Council_--Earl Granville. _Lord Privy Seal_--The Duke of Argyll. _Secretary for Foreign Affairs_--Lord John Russell. _Secretary for the Colonies_--The Duke of Newcastle. _Secretary for the Home Department_--Sir George Gray. _Secretary of State for War_--Sir G. C. Lewis. _Secretary of State for India_--Sir Charles Wood. _Chancellor of the Exchequer_--Rt. Honorable W. E. Gladstone. _Secretary for Ireland_--Rt. Honorable Edward Cardwell. _Postmaster-General_--Lord Stanley of Alderney. _President Board of Trade_--Rt. Honorable Charles Pelham Villiers.

The same Ministry, with unimportant changes, continued in power throughout the whole period of the Rebellion in the United States.]

ADDENDUM.

The Tenth chapter of this volume having been given to the press in advance of formal publication, many inquiries have been received in regard to the text of Judge Black's opinion of November 20, 1860, referred to on pp. 231, 232. The opinion was submitted to the President by Judge Black as Attorney-General. So much of the opinion as includes the points which are specially controverted and criticized is here given--about one-half of the entire document. It is as follows:--

. . . "I come now to the point in your letter which is probably of the greatest practical importance. By the Act of 1807 you may employ such parts of the land and naval forces as you may judge necessary for the purpose of causing the laws to be duly executed, in all cases where it is lawful to use the militia for the same purpose. By the Act of 1795 the militia may be called forth 'whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the execution thereof obstructed, in any State by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of Judicial proceedings, or by the power vested in the marshals.' This imposes upon the President the sole responsibility of deciding whether the exigency has arisen which requires the use of military force, and in proportion to the magnitude of that responsibility will be the care not to overstep the limits of his legal and just authority.

"The laws referred to in the Act of 1795 are manifestly those which are administered by the judges, and executed by the ministerial officers of the courts for the punishment of crime against the United States, for the protection of rights claimed under the Federal Constitution and laws, and for the enforcement of such obligations as come within the cognizance of the Federal Judiciary. To compel obedience to these laws, the courts have authority to punish all who obstruct their regular administration, and the marshals and their deputies have the same powers as sheriffs and their deputies in the several States in executing the laws of the States. These are the ordinary means provided for the execution of the laws; and the whole spirit of our system is opposed to the employment of any other, except in cases of extreme necessity arising out of great and unusual combinations against them. Their agency must continue to be used until their incapacity to cope with the power opposed to them shall be plainly demonstrated. It is only upon clear evidence to that effect that a military force can be called into the field. Even then its operations must be purely defensive. It can suppress only such combinations as are found directly opposing the laws and obstructing the execution thereof. It can do no more than what might and ought to be done by a civil posse, if a civil posse could be raised large enough to meet the same opposition. On such occasions, especially, the military power must be kept in strict subordination to the civil authority, since it is only in aid of the latter that the former can act at all.

"But what if the feeling in any State against the United States should become so universal that the Federal officers themselves (including judges, district attorneys, and marshals) would be reached by the same influences, and resign their places? Of course, the first step would be to appoint others in their stead, if others could be got to serve. But in such an event, it is more than probable that great difficulty would be found in filling the offices. We can easily conceive how it might become altogether impossible. We are therefore obliged to consider what can be done in case we have no courts to issue judicial process, and no ministerial officers to execute it. In that event troops would certainly be out of place, and their use wholly illegal. If they are sent to aid the courts and marshals, there must be courts and marshals to be aided. Without the exercise of those functions which belong exclusively to the civil service, the laws cannot be executed in any event, no matter what may be the physical strength which the Government has at its command. Under such circumstances, to send a military force into any State, with orders to act against the people, would be simply making war upon them.

"The existing laws put and keep the Federal Government strictly on the defensive. You can use force only to repel an assault on the public property and aid the Courts in the performance of their duty. If the means given you to collect the revenue and execute the other laws be insufficient for that purpose, Congress may extend and make them more effectual to those ends.

"If one of the States should declare her independence, your action cannot depend upon the righteousness of the cause upon which such declaration is based. Whether the retirement of the State from the Union be the exercise of a right reserved in the Constitution, or a revolutionary movement, it is certain that you have not in either case the authority to recognize her independence or to absolve her from her Federal obligations. Congress, or the other States in Convention assembled, must take such measures as may be necessary and proper. In such an event, I see no course for you but to go straight onward in the path you have hitherto trodden-- that is, execute the laws to the extent of the defensive means placed in your hands, and act generally upon the assumption that the present constitutional relations between the States and the Federal Government continue to exist, until a new code of things shall be established either by law or force.

"Whether Congress has the constitutional right to make war against one or more States, and require the Executive of the Federal Government to carry it on by means of force to be drawn from the other States, is a question for Congress itself to consider. It must be admitted that no such power is expressly given; nor are there any words in the Constitution which imply it. Among the powers enumerated in Article 1, Section 8, is that 'to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and to make rules concerning captures on land and water.' This certainly means nothing more than the power to commence and carry on hostilities against the foreign enemies of the nation. Another clause in the same section gives Congress the power 'to provide for calling forth the militia,' and to use them within the limits of the State. But this power is so restricted by the words which immediately follow that it can be exercised only for one of the following purposes: 1. To execute the laws of the Union; that is, to aid the Federal officers in the performance of their regular duties. 2. To suppress insurrection against the State; but this is confined by Article 4, Section 4, to cases in which the State herself shall apply for assistance against her own people. 3. To repel the invasion of a State by enemies who come from abroad to assail her in her own territory. All these provisions are made to protect the States, not to authorize an attack by one part of the country upon another; to preserve the peace, and not to plunge them into civil war. Our forefathers do not seem to have thought that war was calculated 'to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.' There was undoubtedly a strong and universal conviction among the men who framed and ratified the Constitution, that military force would not only be useless, but pernicious, as a means of holding the States together.

"If it be true that war cannot be declared, nor a system of general hostilities carried on by the Central Government against a State, then it seems to follow that an attempt to do so would be _ipso facto_ an expulsion of such State from the Union. Being treated as an alien and an enemy, she would be compelled to act accordingly. And if Congress shall break up the present Union by unconstitutionally putting strife and enmity and armed hostility between different sections of the country, instead of the domestic tranquility which the Constitution was meant to insure, will not all the States be absolved from their Federal obligations? Is any portion of the people bound to contribute their money or their blood to carry on a contest like that?

"The right of the General Government to preserve itself in its whole constitutional vigor by repelling a direct and positive aggression upon its property or its officers cannot be denied. But this is a totally different thing from an offensive war to punish the people for the political misdeeds of their State Government, or to enforce an acknowledgment that the Government of the United States is supreme. The States are colleagues of one another, and if some of them shall conquer the rest, and hold them as subjugated provinces, it would totally destroy the whole theory upon which they are now connected.

"If this view of the subject be correct, as I think it is, then the Union must utterly perish at the moment when Congress shall arm one part of the people against another for any purpose beyond that of merely protecting the General Government in the exercise of its proper constitutional functions.

"I am, very respectfully, yours, etc.,

"J. S. BLACK."

ERRATUM.

In Chapter VIII., there is some inaccuracy in regard to the number of killed in the John Brown raid at Harper's Ferry. According to the official report of Colonel Robert E. Lee, U.S.A., who commanded the military force that relieved Harper's Ferry, the insurgents numbered in all nineteen men,--fourteen white, five colored. Of the white men, ten were killed; two, John Brown and Aaron C. Stevens, were badly wounded; Edwin Coppee, unhurt, was taken prisoner; John E. Cooke escaped. Of the colored men, two were killed, two taken prisoner, one unaccounted for.

THE APPENDICES.

The progress of the country, referred to so frequently in the text, is strikingly illustrated and verified by the facts contained in the several appendices which follow.

The appendices include a variety of subjects, and they have all been selected with the view of showing the progress and development of the Nation in the different fields of enterprise and human labor.

The tabular statements as to the population and wealth of the country will be found especially accurate and valuable. The statistics relating to Education and the Public Schools, to Agriculture, to Railways, to Immigration, to the Army, to Shipping, to the Coal and Iron Product, to National and State Banks, to the Circulation of Paper Money, to the price of Gold, and to the Public Debt, will be found full of interest.

Thanks are due and are cordially given to Mr. Joseph Nimmo, Jr., Chief of the Bureau of Statistics, and Mr. Charles W. Seaton, Superintendent of the Census, for valuable aid rendered in the preparation of the appendices.

For courtesies constantly extended, and for most intelligent and discriminating aid of various kinds, the sincerest acknowledgments are made to Mr. Ainsworth R. Spofford, the accomplished Librarian of Congress.

APPENDIX A. POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES AT EACH CENSUS, FROM 1790 TO 1880 INCLUSIVE. [From the Reports of the Superintendents of the Census.]

STATES AND STATES AND TERRITORIES. 1880. 1870. 1860. 1850. 1840. 1830. 1820. 1810. 1800. 1790. TERRITORIES.

Alabama . . . . . . 1,262,505 996,992 964,201 771,623 590,756 309,527 127,901 . . . . . . . . . . Alabama. Arkansas . . . . . . 802,525 484,471 435,450 209,897 97,574 30,388 { *18} . . . . . . . . . . Arkansas. { 14,255} California . . . . . 864,694 560,247 379,994 92,597 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . California. Colorado . . . . . . 194,327 39,864 34,277 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Colorado. Connecticut . . . . 622,700 537,454 460,147 370,792 309,978 297,675 { *100} 261,942 251,002 237,946 . Connecticut. { 275,148} Delaware . . . . . . 146,608 125,015 112,216 91,532 78,085 76,748 72,749 72,674 64,273 59,006 . Delaware. Florida . . . . . . 269,493 187,748 140,424 87,445 54,477 34,730 . . . . . . . . . . . . . Florida. Georgia . . . . . . 1,542,180 1,184,109 1,057,286 906,185 691,392 516,823 340,985 252,433 162,686 82,548 . Georgia. Illinois . . . . . . 3,077,871 2,539,891 1,711,951 851,470 476,183 157,445 55,162 12,282 . . . . . . . Illinois. Indiana . . . . . . 1,978,301 1,680,637 1,350,428 988,416 685,866 343,031 147,178 24,520 5,641 . . . . Indiana. Iowa . . . . . . . . 1,624,615 1,194,020 674,913 192,214 43,112 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Iowa. Kansas . . . . . . . 996,096 364,399 107,206 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kansas. Kentucky . . . . . . 1,648,690 1,321,011 1,155,684 982,405 779,828 687,917 { *182} 406,511 220.955 73,677 . Kentucky. { 564,135} Louisiana . . . . . 939,946 726,915 708,002 517,762 352,411 215,739 { *484} 76,556 . . . . . . . Louisiana. { 152,923} Maine . . . . . . . 648,936 626,915 628,279 583,169 501,793 399,455 { *66} 228,705 151,719 96,540 . Maine. { 298,269} Maryland . . . . . . 934,943 780.894 687,049 583,034 470,019 447,040 407,350 380,546 341,548 319,728 . Maryland. Massachusetts . . . 1,783,085 1,457,351 1,231,066 994,514 737,699 610,408 { *128} 472,040 422,845 378,787 . Massachusetts. { 523,159} Michigan . . . . . . 1,636,937 1,184,059 749,113 397,654 212,267 31,639 { *131} 4,762 . . . . . . . Michigan. { 8,765} Minnesota . . . . . 780,773 439,706 172,023 6,077 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Minnesota. Mississippi . . . . 1,131,597 827,922 791,305 606,526 375,651 136,621 75,448 40,352 8,850 . . . . Mississippi. Missouri . . . . . . 2,168,380 1,721,295 1,182,012 682,044 383,702 140,455 { *29} 20,845 . . . . . . . Missouri. { 66,557} Nebraska . . . . . . 452,402 122,993 28,841 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nebraska. Nevada . . . . . . . 62,266 42,491 6,857 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nevada. New Hampshire . . . 346,991 318,300 326,073 317,976 284,574 269,328 { *139} 214,460 183,858 141,885 . New Hampshire. { 244,022} New Jersey . . . . . 1,131,116 906,096 672,035 489,555 373,306 320,823 { *149} 245,562 211,149 184,139 . New Jersey. { 277,426} New York . . . . . . 5,082,871 4,382,759 3,880,735 3,097,394 2,428,921 1,918,008 { *701} 949,059 589,051 340,120 . New York. {1,372,111} North Carolina . . . 1,399,750 1,071,361 922,622 869,039 753,419 737,987 638,829 555,500 478,103 393,751 . North Carolina. Ohio . . . . . . . . 3,198,062 2,665,260 2,339,511 1,980,329 1,519,467 937,903 { *139} 230,760 45,365 . . . . Ohio. { 581,295} Oregon . . . . . . . 174,768 90,923 52,465 13,294 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Oregon. Pennsylvania . . . . 4,282,891 3,521,951 2,906,215 2,311,786 1,724,033 1,348,233 { *1,951} 810,001 602,365 434,373 . Pennsylvania. {1,047,507} Rhode Island . . . . 276,531 217,353 174,620 147,545 108,830 97,129 { *44} 76,931 69,122 68,825 . Rhode Island. { 83,105} South Carolina . . . 995,577 705,606 703,708 688,507 594,398 581,185 502,741 415,115 345,591 249,073 . South Carolina. Tennessee . . . . . 1,542,359 1,258,520 1,109,801 1,002,717 829,210 681,904 { *52} 261,727 105,602 35,691 . Tennessee. { 422,771} Texas . . . . . . . 1,591,749 818,579 604,215 212,592 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Texas. Vermont . . . . . . 332,286 330,551 315,098 314,120 291,948 280,652 { *15} 217,895 154,465 85,425 . Vermont. { 235,966} Virginia . . . . . . 1,512,565 1,225,163 1,956,318 1,421,661 1,239,797 1,211,405 { *250} 974,600 880,200 747,610 . Virginia. {1,065,116} West Virginia . . . 618,457 442,014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . West Virginia. Wisconsin . . . . . 1,315,497 1,054,670 755,881 305,391 30,945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wisconsin.

Total, States . . 49,371,340 38,115,641 31,183,744 23,067,262 17,019,641 12,820,868 { *4,631} 7,215,858 5,294,390 . . . . . Total, States. {9,600,783}

Arizona . . . . . . 40,440 9,658 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Arizona. Dakota . . . . . . . 135,177 14,181 4,837 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dakota. District of Columbia 117,624 131,700 75,080 51,687 43,712 39,834 33,039 24,023 14,003 . . . . District of Columbia. Idaho . . . . . . . 32,610 14,999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Idaho. Montana . . . . . . 39,159 20,595 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Montana. New Mexico . . . . . 119,565 91,874 93,516 61,547 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New Mexico. Utah . . . . . . . . 143,963 86,786 40,273 11,380 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utah. Washington . . . . . 75,116 23,955 11,594 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Washington. Wyoming . . . . . . 20,789 9,118 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wyoming.

Total, Territories 784,443 443,730 259,577 124,614 43,712 39,834 33,039 24,023 14,093 . . . . . Total, Territories.

On the public ships . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,100 5,318 . . . . . . . . . . . . . On the public ships. In U. S. Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . *4,631 . . . . . . . . . . In U. S. Service.

Total, U. S. . . . 50,155,783 38,558,371 31,443,321 23,191,876 17,069,453 12,866,020 9,633,832 7,239,881 5,308,483 3,929,214 . . Total, U. S.

* All other persons, except Indians, not taxed.

APPENDIX B.

APPORTIONMENT AMONG THE STATES OF REPRESENTATIVES IN CONGRESS AFTER EACH CENSUS.

Admitted By Cons- By 1st By 2nd By 3d By 4th By 5th By 6th By 7th By 8th By 9th By 10th STATES. to the titution, Census, Census Census, Census, Census, Census, Census, Census, Census, Census, Union. 1789. 1790. 1800. 1810. 1820. 1830. 1840. 1850. 1860. 1870. 1880. RATIO OF REPRESENTATION . . . . 30,000. 33,000. 33,000. 35,000. 40,000. 47,700. 70,680. 93,423. 127,381. 131,425. 154,325.

Alabama . . . . . . . . 1819 . . . . . . . . 3 5 7 7 6 8 8 Arkansas . . . . . . . . 1836 . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 California . . . . . . . 1850 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 4 6 Colorado . . . . . . . . 1876 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 Connecticut . . . . . . . ---- 5 7 7 7 6 6 4 4 4 4 4 Delaware . . . . . . . . ---- 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Florida . . . . . . . . 1845 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 2 2 Georgia . . . . . . . . ---- 3 2 4 6 7 9 8 8 7 9 10 Illinois . . . . . . . . 1818 . . . . . . . . 1 3 7 9 14 19 20 Indiana . . . . . . . . 1816 . . . . . . . . 3 7 10 11 11 13 13 Iowa . . . . . . . . . . 1846 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6 9 11 Kansas . . . . . . . . . 1861 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 7 Kentucky . . . . . . . . 1792 . . 2 6 10 12 13 10 10 9 10 11 Louisiana . . . . . . . 1812 . . . . . . . . 3 3 4 4 5 6 6 Maine . . . . . . . . . 1820 . . . . . . . . 7 8 7 6 5 5 4 Maryland . . . . . . . . ---- 6 8 9 9 9 8 6 6 5 6 6 Massachusetts . . . . . . ---- 8 14 17 20 13 12 10 11 10 11 12 Michigan . . . . . . . . 1837 . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 6 9 11 Minnesota . . . . . . . . 1858 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 3 5 Mississippi . . . . . . . 1817 . . . . . . . . 1 2 4 5 5 6 7 Missouri . . . . . . . . 1821 . . . . . . . . 1 2 5 7 9 13 14 Nebraska . . . . . . . . 1867 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 3 Nevada . . . . . . . . . 1864 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 1 New Hampshire . . . . . . ---- 3 4 5 6 6 5 4 3 3 3 2 New Jersey . . . . . . . ---- 4 5 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 7 7 New York . . . . . . . . ---- 6 10 17 27 34 40 34 33 31 33 34 North Carolina . . . . . ---- 5 10 12 13 13 13 9 8 7 8 9 Ohio . . . . . . . . . . 1802 . . . . . . 6 14 19 21 21 19 20 21 Oregon . . . . . . . . . 1859 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 1 1 Pennsylvania . . . . . . ---- 8 13 18 23 26 28 24 25 24 27 28 Rhode Island . . . . . . ---- 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 South Carolina . . . . . ---- 5 6 8 9 9 9 7 6 4 5 7 Tennessee . . . . . . . 1796 . . . . 3 6 9 13 11 10 8 10 10 Texas . . . . . . . . . 1845 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 6 11 Vermont . . . . . . . . 1791 . . 2 4 6 5 5 4 3 3 3 2 Virgina . . . . . . . . ---- 10 19 23 23 22 21 15 13 11 9 10 West Virginia . . . . . 1863 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 Wisconsin . . . . . . . 1848 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 8 9

65 105 141 181 213 240 223 237 293 293 325

APPENDIX C.

PUBLIC DEBT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1791-1883.

Statement of the Outstanding Principal of the Public Debt of the United States on the 1st of January of each Year from 1791 to 1842 inclusive; and on the 1st of July of each Year from 1843 to 1883 inclusive.

The amount given for the year 1791 represents the debt of the Revolution under the Funding Bill of Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury. The debt had decreased to a considerable extent by the year 1812. In consequence of the war with Great Britain, which began that year, there was a rapid increase, the maximum being reached in 1816. Thenceforward, with the exception of the years 1822, 1823, and 1824,--a period of extreme financial depression,--the debt was steadily decreased, until in the year 1835, under the Presidency of General Jackson, it was extinguished,--the total amount outstanding being only $37,000 in bonds which were not presented for payment. The creation of a new debt, however, began at once, and was increased in the years 1847, 1848, and 1849 by the Mexican war. This, in turn, was quite steadily reduced until the financial panic of 1857, when, during the administration of Mr. Buchanan, there was another incease. The debt was about eighty millions of dollars in amount when the civil war began.

Year. Amount. Year. Amount. Year. Amount. Year. Amount. 1791 $75,463,476.52 1815 $ 99,833,660.15 1839 $ 3,573,343.82 1863 $1,119,772,138.63 1792 77,227,924.66 1816 127,334,933.74 1840 5,270,875.54 1864 1,815,784,370.57 1793 80,352,634,04 1817 123,491,965.16 1841 13,594,480.73 1865 2,680,647,869.74 1794 78,427,404.77 1818 103,466,633.83 1842 20,601,226.28 1866 2,773,236,173.69 1795 80,747,587,39 1819 95,529,648.28 1843 32,742,922.00 1867 2,678,126,103.87 1796 83,762,172.07 1820 91,015,566.15 1844 23,461,652.50 1868 2,611,687,851.19 1797 82,064,479.33 1821 89,987,427.66 1845 15,925,303.01 1869 2,588,452,213.94 1798 79,228,529.12 1822 93,546,676.98 1846 15,550,202.97 1870 2,480,672,427.81 1799 78,408,669.77 1823 90,875,877.28 1847 38,826,534.77 1871 2,353,211,332,32 1800 82,976,294.35 1824 90,269,777.77 1848 47,044,862.23 1872 2,253,251,328.78 1801 83,038,050,80 1825 83,788,432.71 1849 63,061,858.69 1873 2,234,482,993.20 1802 86,712,632.25 1826 81,054,059.99 1850 63,452,773.55 1874 2,251,690,468.43 1803 77,054,686.30 1827 73,987,357.20 1851 68,304,796.02 1875 2,232,284,531.95 1804 86,427,120.88 1828 67,475,043.87 1852 66,199,341.71 1876 2,180,395,067.15 1805 82,312,150.50 1829 58,421,413.67 1853 59,803,117.70 1877 2,205,301,392.10 1806 75,723,270.66 1830 48,565,406.50 1854 42,242,222.42 1878 2,256,205,892.53 1807 69,218.398.64 1831 39,123,191.68 1855 35,586,858.56 1879 2,245,495,072.04 1808 65,196,317.97 1832 24,322,235,18 1856 31,972,537.90 1880 2,120,415,370.63 1809 57,023,192.09 1833 7,001,698.83 1857 28,699,831.85 1881 2,069,013,569.58 1810 53,173,217.52 1834 4,760,082.08 1858 44,911,881.03 1882 1,918,312,994.03 1811 48,005,587.76 1835 37,513.05 1859 58,496,837.88 1883 1,884,171,728.07 1812 45,209,737.90 1836 336,957.83 1860 64,842,287.88 1813 55,962,827.57 1837 3,308,124.07 1861 90,580,873.72 1814 81,487,846.24 1838 10,434,221.14 1862 524,176,412.13

APPENDIX D.

Showing the Highest and Lowest Price of Gold in the New-York Market every Month, from the Suspension of Specie Payment by the Government in January, 1862, until Resumption in January, 1879, a Period of Seventeen Years. 1862. 1863. 1864. 1865. 1866. 1867. MONTH. Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest January . . . 103-5/8 100 160-3/4 133-5/8 159-3/8 151-1/2 233-3/4 198-1/8 144-5/8 129 137-7/8 132 February . . . 104-3/4 102-1/8 172-1/2 152-1/2 161 157-1/4 216-1/2 196-5/8 140-5/8 135-7/8 140-1/2 135-1/4 March . . . . 102-3/8 101-1/4 171-3/4 139 169-3/4 159 201 148-1/4 136-1/2 125 140-3/8 133-3/8 April . . . . 102-1/4 101 157-7/8 145-1/2 184-3/4 166-1/4 153-5/8 144 129-5/8 125-1/2 142 132-3/8 May . . . . . 104-1/8 102-1/8 154-3/4 143-1/2 190 168 145-3/8 128-5/8 141-1/2 125-1/8 138-7/8 134-7/8 June . . . . . 109-1/2 103-3/8 148-3/8 140-1/2 250 193 147-3/8 135-7/8 167-3/4 137-5/8 138-3/4 136-1/2 July . . . . . 120-1/8 108-3/4 145 123-1/4 285 222 146 138-3/4 155-3/4 147 140-5/8 138 August . . . . 116-1/4 112-1/2 129-3/4 122-1/8 259-1/2 231-1/2 145-3/8 140-1/4 152-1/4 146-1/2 142-3/8 139-7/8 September . . 124 116-1/2 143-1/8 126-7/8 254-1/2 191 145 142-5/8 147-1/8 143-1/4 146-3/8 141 October . . . 133-1/2 122 156-3/4 140-3/8 227-3/4 189 149 144-1/8 154-3/8 145-1/2 145-5/8 140-1/4 November . . . 133-1/4 129 154 143 260 210 148-3/4 145-7/8 148-5/8 137-1/2 141-1/2 138-1/8 December . . . 134 128-1/2 152-3/4 148-1/2 243 212-3/4 148-1/2 144-5/8 141-3/4 131-1/4 137-7/8 133

1868. 1869. 1870. 1871. 1872. 1873. MONTH. Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest January . . . 141-7/8 133-1/4 136-5/8 134-5/8 123-1/4 119-3/8 111-1/4 110-1/2 110-1/8 108-1/2 114-1/4 111-5/8 February . . . 144 139-5/8 136-1/4 130-7/8 121-1/2 115 112-1/2 110-3/4 111 109-1/2 115-7/8 112-7/8 March . . . . 141-3/8 137-7/8 132-1/4 130-7/8 116-3/8 110-1/4 112 110-1/8 110-5/8 109-3/4 118-1/2 114-5/8 April . . . . 140-3/8 137-3/4 134-3/8 131-1/4 115-5/8 111-1/2 111-1/4 110-1/8 110-5/8 109-3/4 118-1/2 114-5/8 May . . . . . 140-1/2 139-1/8 144-7/8 134-5/8 115-1/2 113-3/4 112-1/4 111 114-3/4 112-1/8 118-5/8 116-5/8 June . . . . . 141-1/2 139-1/8 139-5/8 136-1/2 114-3/4 110-7/8 113-1/8 111-3/4 114-3/4 113 118-1/4 115 July . . . . . 145-1/4 140-1/8 137-7/8 134 122-3/4 111-1/8 113-1/4 111-3/4 115-1/4 113-1/2 116-3/8 115 August . . . . 150 143-1/2 136-5/8 131-1/4 122 114-3/4 113-1/8 111-5/8 115-5/8 112-1/8 116-1/4 114-3/8 September . . 145-1/8 141-1/8 162-1/2 130-5/8 116-3/4 113 115-1/8 112-1/4 115-1/8 112-5/8 116-1/8 110-7/8 October . . . 140-3/8 133-3/4 132 128-1/8 114-1/4 111-1/8 115 111-1/2 115-1/4 112-1/4 111-1/4 107-5/8 November . . . 137 132-1/8 128-5/8 121-1/2 113-1/4 110 112-5/8 110-1/2 114-1/4 111-3/8 110-1/2 106-1/8 December . . . 136-3/4 134-1/2 124 119-1/2 111-1/4 110-1/2 110-3/8 108-1/2 113-3/8 111-1/8 112-5/8 108-3/8

1874. 1875. 1876. 1877. 1878. MONTH. Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest January . . . 112-1/8 110-1/8 113-3/8 111-3/4 113-1/4 112-1/2 107-1/8 105-1/4 102-7/8 101-1/4 February . . . 113 111-3/8 115-3/8 113-1/4 114-1/8 112/3-4 106-1/8 104-5/8 102-3/8 101-5/8 March . . . . 113-5/8 111-1/4 117 114 115 113-3/4 105-3/8 104-1/4 102 100-3/4 April . . . . 114-3/8 111-3/4 115-1/2 114 113-7/8 112-1/2 107-7/8 104-3/4 101-1/4 100-1/8 May . . . . . 113-1/8 111-7/8 116-3/8 115 113-1/4 112-1/4 107-3/8 106-1/4 101-1/4 100-3/8 June . . . . . 112-1/4 110-1/2 117-1/2 116-1/4 113 111-7/8 106-3/8 104-3/4 101 100-5/8 July . . . . . 110-7/8 109 117-1/4 111-3/4 112-1/2 111-3/8 106-1/8 105-1/8 101-1/2 100-3/8 August . . . . 110-1/4 109-1/4 114-3/4 112-5/8 112-1/8 109-3/8 105-1/2 103-7/8 100-3/4 100-1/2 September . . 110-1/4 109-3/8 117-3/8 113-3/4 110-3/8 109-1/4 104 102-7/8 100-1/2 100-1/8 October . . . 110-3/8 109-3/4 117-5/8 114-1/2 113-1/4 108-7/8 103-3/8 102-1/2 101-3/8 100-1/4 November . . . 112-3/8 110 116-3/8 114-1/8 110-1/8 108-1/8 103-3/8 102-1/2 100-1/2 100-1/8 December . . . 112-3/8 110-1/2 115-1/4 112-1/8 109 107 103-3/8 102-1/2 100-1/2 100

Table showing the Total Amount of Gold and Silver Coin issued from the Mints of the United States in each Decennial Period since 1790.

Period. Gold. Silver. Period. Gold. Silver. 1793-1800 . . $ 1,014,290.00 $ 1,440,454.75 1851-1860 . . $330,237,085.50 $ 46,582,183.00 1801-1810 . . 3,250,742.50 3,569,165.25 1861-1870 . . 292,409,545.50 13,188,601.90 1811-1820 . . 3,166,510.00 5,970,810.95 1871-1880 . . 393,125,751.00 155,123,087.10 1821-1830 . . 1,903,092.50 16,781,046.95 1881-1883 . . 204,076,239.00 84,268,825.65 1831-1840 . . 18,756,487.50 27,309,957.00 1841-1850 . . 89,239,817.50 22,368,130.00 Total . . .$1,337,179,561.00 $376,602,262.55

APPENDIX E.

The following statement exhibits the total valuation of real and personal estate in the United States, according to the Census Returns of 1850, 1860, 1870, and 1880.

Both the "true" and the "assessed" valuation are given, except in 1850, which gives only the "true." The dispartiy between the actual propery and that which is assessed for taxation is very striking.

The effect of the war and the consequent abolition of slavery on the valuation of property in the Southern States is clearly shown by the figures.

In all comparisons of value between the different periods, it must be borne in mind, that, in 1870, gold was at an average premium of 25.3 per cent. To equate the valuation with those of other years, there must be a reduction of one-fifth on the reported valuation of 1870, both "true" and "assessed."

The four periods exhibit a more rapid accumulation of wealth in the United States than was ever known before in the history of the world.

STATES 1850. 1860. 1870. 1880. STATES AND Assessed Assessed Assessed AND TERRITORIES. True Value. Value. True Value. Value. True Value. Value. True Value. TERRITORIES.

Alabama . . . . . . . . . $228,204,332 $432,198,762 $495,237,078 $155,582,595 $201,835,841 $122,867,228 $428,000,000 . . Alabama. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,410,295 3,440,791 9,270,214 41,000,000 . . Arizona. Arkansas . . . . . . . . 39,841,025 180,211,330 219,256,473 94,528,843 156,394,691 86,409,364 286,000,000 . . Arkansas. California . . . . . . . 22,161,872 139,654,667 207,874,613 269,644,068 638,767,017 584,578,036 1,343,000,000 . . California. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17,338,101 20,243,303 74,471,693 240,000,000 . . Colorado. Connecticut . . . . . . . 155,707,980 341,256,976 444,274,114 425,433,237 774,631,524 327,177,385 799,000,000 . . Connecticut. Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,924,489 5,599,752 20,321,530 118,000,000 . . Dakota. Delaware . . . . . . . . 21,062,556 39,767,233 46,242,181 64,787,223 97,180,833 59,951,643 130,000,000 . . Delaware. District of Columbia . . 14,018,874 41,084,945 41,084,945 74,271,693 126,873,618 99,401,787 220,000,000 . . District of Columbia. Florida . . . . . . . . . 22,862,270 68,929,685 73,101,500 32,480,843 44,163,655 30,938,309 120,000,000 . . Florida. Georgia . . . . . . . . . 335,425,714 618,232,387 645,895,237 227,219,519 268,169,207 239,472,599 606,000,000 . . Georgia. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,292,205 6,552,081 6,440,876 29,000,000 . . Idaho. Illinois . . . . . . . . 156,265,006 389,207,372 871,860,282 482,899,575 2,121,680,579 786,616,394 3,210,000,000 . . Illinois. Indiana . . . . . . . . . 202,650,264 411,042,424 528,835,371 663,455,044 1,268,180,543 727,815,131 1,681,000,000 . . Indiana. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . 23,714,638 205,168,983 247,338,265 302,515,418 717,644,750 398,671,251 1,721,000,000 . . Iowa. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . 22,518,232 31,327,895 92,125,861 188,892,014 160,891,689 700,000,000 . . Kansas. Kentucky . . . . . . . . 301,628,456 528,212,693 666,043,112 409,544,294 604,318,552 350,563,971 902,000,000 . . Kentucky. Louisiana . . . . . . . . 233,998,764 435,787,265 602,118,568 253,371,890 323,125,666 160,162,439 382,000,000 . . Louisiana. Maine . . . . . . . . . . 122,777,571 154,380,388 190,211,600 204,253,780 348,155,671 235,978,716 511,000,000 . . Maine. Maryland . . . . . . . . 219,217,364 297,135,238 376,919,944 423,834,918 643,748,976 497,307,675 837,000,000 . . Maryland. Massachusetts . . . . . . 573,342,286 777,157,816 815,237,433 1,591,983,112 2,132,148,741 1,584,756,802 2,623,000,000 . . Masschusetts. Michigan . . . . . . . . 59,787,255 163,533,005 257,163,983 272,242,917 719,208,118 517,666,359 1,580,000,000 . . Michigan. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . 32,018,773 52,294,413 84,135,322 228,909,590 258,028,687 792,000,000 . . Minnesota. Mississippi . . . . . . . 228,951,130 509,472,912 607,324,911 177,278,800 209,197,345 110,628,129 354,000,000 . . Mississippi. Missouri . . . . . . . . 137,247,707 266,935,851 501,214,398 556,129,969 1,284,922,897 532,795,801 1,562,000,000 . . Missouri. Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,943,411 15,184,522 18,609,802 40,000,000 . . Montana. Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . 7,426,949 9,131,056 54,584,616 69,277,483 90,585,782 385,000,000 . . Nebraska. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25,740,973 31,134,012 29,291,459 156,000,000 . . Nevada. New Hampshire . . . . . . 103,652,835 123,810,809 156,310,860 149,065.290 252,624,112 164,755,181 363,000,000 . . New Hampshire. New Jersey . . . . . . . 200,000,000 296,682,492 467,918,324 624,868,971 940,976,064 572,518,361 1,305,000,000 . . New Jersey. New Mexico . . . . . . . 5,174,471 20,838,780 20,813,768 17,784,014 31,349,793 11,363,406 49,000,000 . . New Mexico. New York . . . . . . . . 1,080,309,216 1,390,464,638 1,843,338,517 1,967,001,185 6,500,841,264 2,651,940,006 6,308,000,000 . . New York. North Carolina . . . . . 226,800,472 292,297,602 358,739,399 130,378,622 260,757,244 156,100,202 461,000,000 . . North Carolina. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . 504,726,120 959,867,101 1,193,898,422 1,167,731,697 2,235,430,300 1,534,360,508 3,238,000,000 . . Ohio. Oregon . . . . . . . . . 5,063,474 19,024,915 28,930,637 31,798,510 51,558,932 52,522,084 154,000,000 . . Oregon. Pennsylvania . . . . . . 722,486,120 719,253,335 1,416,501,818 1,313,236,042 3,808,340,112 1,683,459,016 4,942,000,000 . . Pennsylvania. Rhode Island . . . . . . 80,508,794 125,104,305 135,337,588 244,278,854 295,965,646 252,538,673 400,000,000 . . Rhode Island. South Carolina . . . . . 288,257,694 489,319,128 548,138,754 183,913,337 208,146,989 133,560,135 322,000,000 . . South Carolina. Tennessee . . . . . . . . 201,246,686 382,495,200 493,903,892 253,782,161 498,237,724 211,778,538 705,000,000 . . Tennessee. Texas . . . . . . . . . . 52,740,473 267,792,335 365,200,614 149,732,929 159,052,542 340,364,515 825,000,000 . . Texas. Utah . . . . . . . . . . 986,083 4,158,020 5,596,118 12,565,842 16,159,995 24,775,279 114,000,000 . . Utah. Vermont . . . . . . . . . 92,205,049 84,758,619 122,477,170 102,548,528 235,349,553 86,806,775 302,000,000 . . Vermont. Virginia . . . . . . . . 430,701,082 657,021,336 793,249,681 365,439,917 409,588,133 308,455,135 707,000,000 . . Virginia. Washington . . . . . . . . . . 4,394,735 5,601,466 10,642,863 13,562,164 23,810,693 62,000,000 . . Washington. West Virginia . . . . . . included in Virginia 140,538,273 190,651,491 139,622,705 350,000,000 . . West Virginia. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . 42,056,595 185,945,489 273,671,668 333,209,838 702,307,329 438,971,751 1,139,000,000 . . Wisconsin. Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,516,748 7,016,748 13,621,829 54,000,000 . . Wyoming.

Total for U. S. . . . . $7,135,780,228 $12,084,560,005 $16,159,616,068 $14,178,986,732 $30,068,518,507 $16,902,993,543 $43,642,000,000 . . Total for U. S.

APPENDIX F.

OWNERSHIP AND LOCATION OF PROPERTY.

In the following table, the column headed "Location" gives the valuation of the property located in each State and Territory, by the Census of 1880. The column headed "Ownership" gives the value of property owned by the residents of the several States and Territories, wherever that property may be located. Some interesting results are shown. Residents of New York own thirteen hundred millions of property not located in their State; residents of Pennsylvania, four hundred and fifty millions. Many of the States show a large proportion of their property owned elsewhere. Considerably more than half the property of Nevada is owned outside the State. The whole table presents one of the most interesting deductions of the Census Bureau.

STATES AND Ownership. Location. TERRITORIES.

Alabama . . . . . . $378,000,000 $428,000,000 Arizona . . . . . . 23,000,000 41,000,000 Arkansas . . . . . . 246,000,000 286,000,000 California . . . . . 1,430,000,000 1,343,000,000 Colorado . . . . . . 149,000,000 240,000,000 Connecticut . . . . 852,000,000 779,000,000 Dakota . . . . . . . 68,000,000 118,000,000 Delaware . . . . . . 138,000,000 136,000,000 Dist. of Columbia . 223,000,000 220,000,000 Florida . . . . . . 95,000,000 120,000,000 Georgia . . . . . . 554,000,000 606,000,000 Idaho . . . . . . . 12,000,000 29,000,000 Illinois . . . . . . 3,092,000,000 3,219,000,000 Indiana . . . . . . 1,499,000,000 1,681,000,000 Iowa . . . . . . . . 1,415,000,000 1,721,000,000 Kansas . . . . . . . 575,000,000 760,000,000 Kentucky . . . . . . 880,000,000 902,000,000 Louisiana . . . . . 422,000,000 382,000,000 Maine . . . . . . . 501,000,000 511,000,000 Maryland . . . . . . 869,000,000 837,000,000 Massachusetts . . . 2,795,000,000 2,623,000,000 Michigan . . . . . . 1,370,000,000 1,580,000,000 Minnesota . . . . . 638,000,000 792,000,000 Mississippi . . . . 324,000,000 354,000,000 Missouri . . . . . . 1,530,000,000 1,562,000,000 Montana . . . . . . 29,000,000 40,000,000 Nebraska . . . . . . 200,000,000 385,000,000 Nevada . . . . . . . 69,000,000 156,000,000 New Hampshire . . . 328,000,000 363,000,000 New Jersey . . . . . 1,433,000,000 1,305,000,000 New Mexico . . . . . 30,000,000 49,000,000 New York . . . . . . 7,619,000,000 6,208,000,000 North Carolina . . . 446,000,000 461,000,000 Ohio . . . . . . . . 3,301,000,000 3,238,000,000 Oregon . . . . . . . 126,000,000 154,000,000 Pennsylvania . . . . 5,393,000,000 4,942,000,000 Rhode Island . . . . 420,000,000 400,000,000 South Carolina . . . 296,000,000 322,000,000 Tennessee . . . . . 666,000,000 705,000,000 Texas . . . . . . . 725,000,000 825,000,000 Utah . . . . . . . . 67,000,000 114,000,000 Vermont . . . . . . 289,000,000 302,000,000 Virginia . . . . . . 693,000,000 707,000,000 Washington . . . . . 48,000,000 62,000,000 West Virginia . . . 307,000,000 350,000,000 Wisconsin . . . . . 969,000,000 1,139,000,000 Wyoming . . . . . . 20,000,000 54,000,000

$43,642,000,000 $43,642,000,000

APPENDIX G

The following table exhibits the amount of revenue collected at the Customs Houses on foreign imports each year, from 1789 to 1883, under the various tariff laws; also the amount of internal revenue collected each year, from the foundation of the government to 1883. The separate table gives the amount collected each year under the income-tax while in force, and the total amount received from the tax on spirits and beer for twenty-one years after it was first levied in 1862.

Receipts of the United States from March 4, 1789, to June 30, 1883.

Years. From Customs. From Internal Revenue. 1789-1791 $4,399,473.00 1792 3,443,070.85 $208,942.81 1793 4,255,306.56 337,705.70 1794 4,801,065.28 274,089.62 1795 5,588,461.62 337,755.36 1796 6,567,987.94 475,289.60 1797 7,549,649.65 575,491.45 1798 7,106,061.93 644,357.95 1799 6,610,449,31 779,136.44 1800 9,080,932.78 809,396.55 1801 10,750,778.93 1,048,033.43 1802 12,438,235.74 621,898.89 1803 10,479,417.61 215,179.69 1804 11,098,565.33 50,941.29 1805 12,938,487.04 21,747.15 1806 14,667,698.17 20,101.45 1807 15,845,521.61 13,051.40 1808 16,363,550.58 8,190.23 1809 7,257,506.62 4,034.29 1810 8,583,309.31 7,430.63 1811 13,313,222.73 2,295.95 1812 8,958,777.53 4,903.06 1813 13,224,623.25 4,755.04 1814 5,998,772.08 1,662,984.83 1815 7,282,942.22 4,678,059.07 1816 36,306,874.88 5,124,708.31 1817 26,283,348.49 2,678,100.77 1818 17,176,385.00 955,270.20 1819 20,283,608.76 229,593.63 1820 15,005,612.15 106,260.53 1821 13,004,447.15 69,027.63 1822 17,589,761.94 67,665.71 1823 19,088,433.44 34,242.17 1824 17,878,325.71 34,663.37 1825 20,098,713.45 25,771.35 1826 23,341,331.77 21,589.93 1827 19,712,283.29 19,885.68 1828 23,205,523.64 17,451.54 1829 22,681,965.91 14,502.74 1830 21,922,391.39 12,160.62 1831 24,224,441.77 6,933.51 1832 28,465,237.24 11,630.65 1833 29,031,508.91 2,759.00 1834 16,214,957.15 4,196.09 1835 19,391,310.59 10,459.48 1836 23,409,940.53 370.00 1837 11,169,290.39 5,493.84 1838 16,158,800.36 2,467.27 1839 23,137,924.81 2,553,32 1840 13,499,502.17 1,682.25 1841 14,487,216.74 3,261.36 1842 18,187,908.76 495.00 1843 7,046,843.91 103.25 1844 26,183,570.94 1,777.34 1845 27,528,112.70 3,517.12 1846 26,712,667.87 2,897.26 1847 23,747,864.66 375.00 1848 31,757,070.96 375.00 1849 28,346,738.82 1850 39,668,686.42 1851 49,017,567.92 1852 47,339,326.62 1853 58,931.865.52 1854 64,224,190.27 1855 53,025.794.21 1856 64,022,863.50 1857 63,875,905.05 1858 41,789,620.96 1859 49,565,824.38 1860 53,187,511.87 1861 39,582,125.64 1862 49,056,397.62 1863 69.059,642.40 $37,640,787.95 1864 102,316,152.99 109,741,134.10 1865 84,928,260.60 209,464,215.25 1866 179,046,651.58 309,226,813.42 1867 176,417,810.88 266,027,537.43 1868 164,464,599.56 191,087,589.41 1869 180,048,426.63 158,356,460.86 1870 194,538,374.44 184,899,756.49 1871 206,270,408.05 143,098,153.63 1872 216,370,286.77 130,642,177.72 1873 188,089,522.70 113,729,314.14 1874 163,103,833.69 102,409,784.90 1875 157,167,722.35 110,007,493.58 1876 148,071,984.61 116,700,732.03 1877 130,956,493.07 118,630,407.83 1878 130,170,680.20 110,581,624.74 1879 137,250,047.70 113,561,610.58 1880 186,522,064.60 124,009,373.92 1881 198,159,676.02 135,264,385.51 1882 220,410,730.25 146,497,595.45 1883 214,706,496.93 144,720,368.98

Total $5,073,240,329.60 $3,098,575,330.71

From Distilled Spirits. Years. From Income Tax. | From Fermented Liquors. 1863 $2,741.858.25 $5,176,530.50 $1,628,933.82 1864 20,294,731.74 30,329,149.53 2,290,009.14 1865 32,050,017.44 18,731,422.45 3,734,928.06 1866 72,982,159.03 33,268,171.82 5,220,552.72 1867 66,014,429.34 33,542,951.72 6,057,500.63 1868 41,455,598.36 18,655,630.90 5,955,868.92 1869 34,791,855.84 45,071,230.86 6,099,879.54 1870 37,775,873.62 55,606,094.15 6,319,126.90 1871 19,162,650.75 46,281,848,10 7,389,501.82 1872 14,436,861.78 49,475,516.36 8,258,498.46 1873 5,062,311.62 52,099,371.78 9,324,937.84 1874 139,472.09 49,444,089.85 9,304,679.72 1875 232.64 52,081,991.12 9,144,004.41 1876 588.27 56,426,365.13 9,571,280.66 1877 97.79 57,469,429.72 9,480,789.17 1878 50,420,815.80 9,937,051.78 1879 52,570,284.69 10,729,320.08 1880 61,185,508.79 12,829,802.84 1881 3,021.92 67,153,974.88 13,700,241.21 1882 69,873,408.18 16,153,920.42 1883 74,368,775.20 16,900,615.81

Total $366,911,760.48 $979,232,561.53 $180,031,443.95

APPENDIX H.

IMPORTANT CROPS.

The following table exhibits the aggregate production in the United States, for a series of years ending wih 1882, of certain crops which contribute largely to the national wealth. The total acreage, the yield per acre, and the value per acre, are given in each case.

CORN. Yield per Acre. Value Years. Bushels. Acres. | Value. per Acre. 1849 592.071,104 1859 838,792,742 1866 867,946,295 34,306,538 25 $591,666,295 1867 768,320,000 32,520,249 23 610,948,390 1868 906,527,000 34,887,246 25.9 569,512,460 $16.32 1869 760,944,549 1870 1,094,255,000 38,646,977 28.3 601,839,030 15.57 1871 991,898,000 34,091,137 29.1 478,275,900 14.02 1872 1,092,719,000 35,526,836 30.7 435,149,290 12.24 1873 932,274,000 39,197,148 23.8 447,183,200 11.41 1874 850,148,500 41,036,918 20.7 550,043,080 13.40 1875 1,321,069,000 44,841,371 29.4 555,445,930 12.38 1876 1,283,827,500 49,033,364 26.1 475,491,210 9.69 1877 1,342,558,000 50,369,113 26.6 480,643,400 9.54 1878 1,388,218,750 51,585,000 26.9 441,153,405 8.55 1879 1,754,591,676 62,368,504 28.1 1880 1,717,434,543 62,317,842 27.6 679,714,499 10.91 1881 1,194,916,000 64,262,025 18.6 759,482,170 11.82 1882 1,617,025,100 65,659,546 24.6 783,867,175 11.91

WHEAT. Yield per Acre. Value Years. Bushels. Acres. | Value. per Acre. 1849 100,485,944 1859 173,104,924 1866 151,999,906 15,424,496 10 $333,773,646 1867 212,441,400 18,321,561 11.5 421,796,460 1868 224,036,600 18,460,132 12.1 319,195,290 $17.29 1869 287,745,626 1870 235,884,700 18,992,591 12.4 245,865,045 12.94 1871 230,722,400 19,943,893 11.5 290,411,820 14.56 1872 249,997,100 20,858,359 11.9 310,180,375 14.87 1873 281,254,700 22,171,676 12.7 323,594,805 14.20 1874 309,102,700 24,967,027 12.5 291,107,895 11.66 1875 292,136,000 26,381,512 11 294,580,990 11.16 1876 289,356,500 27,627,021 10.4 300,259,300 10.86 1877 364,194,146 26,277,546 13.9 394,695,779 15.08 1878 420,122,400 32,108,560 13.1 326,346,424 10.15 1879 459,483,137 35,430,333 13 1880 498,549,868 37,986,717 13.1 474,201,850 12.48 1881 383,280,090 37,709,020 10.2 456,880,427 12.01 1882 504,185,470 37,067,194 13.6 444,602,125 12.00

POTATOES. Yield per Acre. Value Years. Bushels. Acres. | Value. per Acre. 1849 65,797,896 1859 111,148,867 1866 107,200,976 1,069,381 100 $72,939,029 1867 97,783,000 1,192,195 82 89,276,830 1868 106,090,000 1,131,552 93.7 84,150,040 $74.36 1869 143,337,473 1870 114,775,000 1,325,119 86.6 82,668,590 62.38 1871 120,461,700 1,220,912 98.6 71,836,671 58.83 1872 113,516,000 1,331,331 85.2 68,091,120 51.14 1873 106,089,000 1,295,139 81.9 74,774,890 57.73 1874 105,981,000 1,310,041 80.9 71,823,330 54.82 1875 166,877,000 1,510,041 110.5 65,019,420 43.05 1876 124,827,000 1,741,983 71.6 83,861,390 48.14 1877 170,092,000 1,792,287 94.9 76,249,500 42.54 1878 124,126,650 1,776,800 69.9 73,059,125 41.12 1879 169,458,539 1880 167,659,570 1,842,510 91 81,062,214 44.00 1881 109,145,494 2,041,670 53.5 99,291,341 48.63 1882 170,972,508 2,171,636 78.7 92,304,844 43.84

HAY. Yield per Acre. Value Years. Tons. Acres. | Value. per Acre. 1849 13,838,642 1859 19,083,896 1866 21,778,627 17,668,904 1.22 $317,561,837 1867 26,277,000 20,020,554 372,864,670 1868 26,141,900 21,541,573 1.21 351,941,030 $16.33 1869 27,316,048 1870 24,525,000 19,861,805 1.23 338,969,680 17.06 1871 22,239,409 19,009,052 1.17 351,717,035 18.50 1872 23,812,800 20,318,936 1.17 345,969,079 17.02 1873 25,085,100 21,894,084 1.34 339,895,486 15.52 1874 24,133,900 21,769,772 1.11 331,420,738 15.22 1875 27,873,600 23,507,964 1.18 342,203,445 14.55 1876 30,867,100 25,282,797 1.22 300,901,252 11.90 1877 31,629,300 25,367,708 1.24 271,934,950 10.72 1878 39,608,296 26,931,300 1.47 285,543,752 10.60 1879 35,150,711 30,631,054 1.15 1880 31,925,233 25,863,955 1.23 371,811,084 14.38 1881 35,135,064 30,888,700 1.14 415,131,366 13.43 1882 38,138,049 32,339,585 1.15 369,958,158 11.45

TOBACCO. Yield per Acre. Value Years. Pounds. Acres. | Value. per Acre. 1849 199,752,655 1859 434,209,461 1866 388,128,684 520,107 746 $ 53,778,888 1867 313,724,000 494,333 631 41,283,431 1868 320,982,000 427,189 751 40,081,942 $93.82 1869 262,735,341 481,101 569 32,206,325 66.94 1870 250,628,000 330,668 757 26,747,158 80.83 1871 263,196,100 350,769 570 25,901,421 73.84 1872 342,304,000 416,512 821.8 35,730,385 85.78 1873 372,810,000 480,878 775 30,865,972 64.19 1874 178,355,000 281,662 633.2 23,362,765 82.94 1875 379,347,000 559,049 678.5 30,342,600 54.27 1876 381,002,000 540,457 705 28,282,968 52.33 1877 440,000,000 1878 392,546,700 542,850 723.1 22,137,428 40.78 1879 472,661,157 638,841 739.9 1880 446,296,889 602,516 740.7 36,414,615 60.44 1881 449,880,014 646,239 696.1 43,372,336 1882 513,077,558 671,522 764 43,189,951 64.18

APPENDIX I.

The following table exhibits in a condensed and perspicuous form the operations of the Post-Office Department, from the foundation of the government. The very rapid increase in the revenue of the department after 1860 will be noted.

No. of Post Offices. | Extent of Post-Routes in Miles. | | Revenue of the Department. Years. | | | Expenditure of the Department. | | | | AMOUNT PAID FOR | | | | Salaries of Post-Masters. | | | | | Transportation of the Mail. 1790 75 1,875 $37,935 $32,140 $8,198 $22,081 1795 453 13,207 160,620 117,893 30,272 75,359 1800 903 20,817 280,804 213,994 69,243 128,644 1805 1,558 31,076 421,373 377,378 111,552 239,635 1810 2,300 36,406 551,684 495,969 149,438 327,966 1815 3,000 43,748 1,043,065 748,121 241,901 487,779 1816 3,260 48,673 961,782 804,422 265,944 521,979 1817 3,459 52,089 1,002,973 916,515 303,916 589,189 1818 3,618 59,473 1,130,235 1,035,832 346,429 664,611 1819 4,000 67,586 1,204,737 1,117,801 375,828 717,881 1820 4,500 72,492 1,111,927 1,160,926 352,295 782,425 1821 4,650 78,808 1,059,087 1,184,283 337,599 815,681 1822 4,709 82,763 1,117,490 1,167,572 335,299 788,618 1823 4,043 84,860 1,130,115 1,156,995 360,462 767,464 1824 5,182 84,860 1,197,758 1,188,019 383,804 768,939 1825 5,677 94,052 1,306,525 1,229,043 411,183 785,646 1826 6,150 94,052 1,447,703 1,366,712 447,727 885,100 1827 7,003 105,336 1,524,633 1,468,959 486,411 942,345 1828 7,530 105,336 1,659,915 1,689,945 548,049 1,086,313 1829 8,004 115,000 1,707,418 1,782,132 559,237 1,153,646 1830 8,450 115,176 1,850,583 1,932,708 595,234 1,274,226 1831 8,686 115,486 1,997,811 1,936,122 635,028 1,252,226 1832 9,205 104,466 2,258,570 2,266,171 715,481 1,482,507 1833 10,127 119,916 2,617,011 2,930,414 826,283 1,894,638 1834 10,693 119,916 2,823,749 2,910,605 897,317 1,925,544 1835 10,770 112,774 2,903,356 2,757,350 945,418 1,719,007 1836 11,091 118,264 3,408,323 3,841,766 812,803 1,638,052 1837 11,767 141,242 4,236,779 3,544,630 891,352 1,996,727 1838 12,519 134,818 4,238,733 4,430,662 933,948 3,131,308 1839 12,780 133,999 4,484,657 4,636,536 980,000 3,285,622 1840 13,468 155,739 4,543,522 4,718,236 1,028,925 3,296,876 1841 13,778 155,026 4,407,726 4,499,528 1,018,645 3,159,375 1842 13,733 149,732 4,456,849 5,674,752 1,146,256 3,087,796 1843 13,814 142,295 4,296,225 4,374,754 1,426,394 2,947,319 1844 14,103 144,687 4,237,288 4,296,513 1,358,316 2,938,551 1845 14,183 143,940 4,289,841 4,320,732 1,409,875 2,905,504 1846 14,601 152,865 3,487,199 4,084,297 1,042,079 2,716,673 1847 15,146 153,818 3,955,893 3,979,570 1,060,228 2,476,435 1848 16,159 163,208 4,371,077 4,326,850 2,394,703 1849 16,749 163,703 4,905,178 4,479,049 1,320,921 2,577,407 1850 18,417 178,672 5,552,971 5.212,953 1,549,376 2,965,786 1851 19,796 196,290 6,727,867 6,278,402 1,781,686 3,538,064 1852 20,901 214,284 6,925,971 7,108,459 1,296,765 4,225,311 1853 22,320 217,743 5,940,725 7,982,957 1,406,477 4,906,308 1854 23,548 219,935 6,955,586 8,577,424 1,707,708 5,401,382 1855 24,410 227,908 7,342,136 9,968,342 2,135,335 6,076,335 1856 25,565 239,642 7,620,822 10,405,286 2,102,891 6,765,639 1857 26,586 242,601 8,053,952 11,508,058 2,285,610 7,239,333 1858 27,977 260,603 8,186,793 12,722,470 2,355,016 8,246,054 1859 28,539 260,052 8,668,484 15,754,093 2,453,901 7,157,629 1860 28,498 240,594 8,518,067 19,170,610 2,552,868 8,808,710 1861 28,586 140,139 8,349,296 13,606,759 2,514,157 5,309,454 1862 28,875 134,013 8,299,821 11,125,364 2,340,767 5,853,834 1863 29,047 139,598 11,163,790 11,314,207 2,876,983 5,740,576 1864 28,878 139,171 12,438,254 12,644,786 3,174,326 5,818,469 1865 20,550 142,340 14,556,159 13,694,728 3,383,382 6,246,884 1866 23,828 180,921 14,386,986 15,352,079 3,454,677 7,630,474 1867 25,163 203,245 15,237,027 19,235,483 4,033,728 9,336,286 1868 26,481 216,928 16,292,601 22,730,593 4,255,311 10,266,056 1869 27,106 223,731 18,344,511 23,698,131 4,546,958 10,406,501 1870 28,492 231,232 19,772,221 23,998,837 4,673,466 10,884,653 1871 30,045 238,350 20,037,045 24,390,104 5,028,382 11,529,395 1872 31,863 251,398 21,915,426 26,658,192 5,121,665 15,547,821 1873 33,244 256,210 22,996,742 29,084,946 5,725,468 16,161,034 1874 34,294 269,097 26,447,072 32,126,415 5,818,472 18,881,319 1875 35,547 277,873 26,791,360 33,611,309 7,049,936 18,777,201 1876 36,383 281,708 27,895,908 33,263,488 7,397,397 18,361,048 1877 37,345 292,820 27,468,323 33,486,322 7,295,251 18,529,238 1878 39,258 301,966 29,277,517 34,165,084 7,977,852 19,262,421 1879 40,855 316,711 30,041,983 33,449,899 7,185,540 20,012,872 1880 42,989 343,888 33,315,479 36,542,804 7,701,418 22,255,984 1881 44,512 344,006 36,785,398 39,251,736 8,298,743 23,196,032 1882 46,231 343,618 41,876,410 40,039,635 8,964,677 22,846,112 1883 47,863 353,166 45,508,692 42,816,700 10,315,394 23,870,666

APPENDIX J.

The following table exhibits the number of miles of railroad in operation, and the number of miles constructed each year, in the United States, from 1830 to 1883 inclusive. It will be observed that nearly three-fourths of the total mileage have been constructed since 1869.

Year. Miles in Operation the the End of each Year. | Miles Constructed each Year. 1830 23 | 1831 95 72 1832 229 134 1833 380 151 1834 633 253 1835 1,098 465 1836 1,273 175 1837 1,497 224 1838 1,913 416 1839 2,302 389 1840 2,818 516 1841 3,535 717 1842 4,026 491 1843 4,185 159 1844 4,377 192 1845 4,633 256 1846 4,930 297 1847 5,598 668 1848 5,996 398 1849 7,365 1,369 1850 9,021 1,656 1851 10,982 1,961 1852 12,908 1,926 1853 15,360 2,452 1854 16,720 1,360 1855 18,374 1,654 1856 22,016 3,642 1857 24,503 2,487 1858 26,968 2,465 1859 28,789 1,821 1860 30,635 1,846 1861 31,286 651 1862 32,120 834 1863 33,170 1,050 1864 33,908 738 1865 35,085 1,177 1866 36,801 1,716 1867 39,250 2,449 1868 42,229 2,979 1869 46,844 4,615 1870 52,885 6,079 1871 60,293 7,379 1872 66,171 5,878 1873 70,278 4,107 1874 72,383 2,105 1875 74,096 1,713 1876 76,808 2,712 1877 79,089 2,281 1878 81,776 2,687 1879 86,497 4,721 1880 93,545 7,174 1881 103,334 11,142 1882 114,930 11,591 1883 119,937 6,608

APPENDIX K.

The following table gives the number of miles of railroad in operation in each State and Territory in the United States during the years 1865, 1870, 1875, 1877, 1879, 1880, 1881, and 1882 respectively.

STATES AND TERRITORIES. 1865. 1870. 1875. 1877. 1879. 1880. 1881. 1882.

Maine . . . . . . . . . 521 786 980 989 1,009 1,004 1,027 1,056 New Hampshire . . . . . 667 736 934 964 1,019 1,014 1,021 1,038 Vermont . . . . . . . 587 614 810 872 873 916 918 920 Masschusetts . . . .. 1,297 1,480 1,817 1,863 1,870 1,915 1,959 1,967 Rhode Island . . . . 125 136 179 204 210 211 212 212 Connecticut . . . . . . 637 742 918 922 922 922 959 962 New England . . . . . 3,834 4,494 5,638 5,814 5,903 5,982 6,096 6,155

New York . . . . . . . 3,002 3,928 5,423 5,725 6,008 6,062 6,332 7,037 New Jersey . . . . . . 864 1,125 1,511 1,661 1,663 1,602 1,781 1,870 Pennsylvania . . . . . 3,728 4,656 5,705 5,902 6,068 6,166 6,331 6,857 Delaware . . . . . . . 134 197 272 272 293 275 275 282 Maryland and Dist. of Columbia . . . . . . 446 671 929 944 966 1,005 1,030 1,063 West Virginia . . . . . 365 387 615 638 694 691 706 813 Middle States . . . . 8,539 10,964 14,455 15,142 15,679 15,891 16,455 17,922

Virginia . . . . . . . 1,407 1,449 1,608 1,635 1,672 1,897 2,224 2,446 Kentucky . . . . . . . 567 1,017 1,326 1,509 1,595 1,592 1,734 1,807 North Carolina . . . . 984 1,178 1,356 1,426 1,446 1,463 1,622 1,759 Tennessee . . . . . . . 1,296 1,492 1,630 1,656 1,701 1,845 1,902 2,067 South Carolina . . . . 1,007 1,139 1.335 1,406 1,424 1,427 1,479 1,517 Georgia . . . . . . . . 1,420 1,845 2,264 2,339 2,460 2,438 2,540 2,874 Florida . . . . . . . . 416 446 484 485 519 557 702 973 Alabama . . . . . . . . 805 1,157 1,800 1,802 1,832 1,845 1,859 1,909 Mississippi . . . . . . 898 990 1,018 1,088 1,140 1,133 1,188 1,309 Louisiana . . . . . . . 335 450 466 466 544 675 937 1,032 Southern States . . . 9,129 11,163 13,287 13,812 14,333 14,872 16,187 17,693

Ohio . . . . . . . . . 3,331 3,538 4,461 4,878 5,521 5,824 6,321 6,931 Michigan . . . . . . . 941 1,638 3,446 3,477 3,673 3,981 4,326 4,654 Indiana . . . . . . . . 2,217 3,177 3,963 4,057 4,336 4,020 4,406 5,018 Illinois . . . . . . . 3,157 4,823 7,109 7,334 7,578 7,900 8,309 8,752 Wisconsin . . . . . . . 1,010 1,525 2,566 2,701 2,896 3,169 3,471 3,824 Minnesota . . . . . . . 213 1,092 1,900 2,194 3,008 3,390 3,577 3,974 Dakota Territory . . . 65 275 290 400 1,320 1,733 2,133 Iowa . . . . . . . . . 891 2,683 3,850 4,134 4,779 5,401 6,165 6,968 Missouri . . . . . . . 925 2,000 2,905 3,198 3,740 3,964 4,206 4,500 Indian Territory . . . 275 275 275 279 285 350 Arkansas . . . . . . . 38 256 740 767 808 889 1,033 1,533 Texas . . . . . . . . . 465 711 1,685 2,210 2,591 3,257 4,926 6,007 Nebraska . . . . . . . 122 705 1,167 1,286 1,634 1,949 2,273 2,494 Kansas . . . . . . . . 40 1,501 2,150 2,352 3,103 3,446 3,655 3,866 Colorado . . . . . . . 157 807 1,045 1,208 1,576 2,193 2,772 New-Mexico Territory . 118 745 1,034 1,076 Wyoming Territory . . . 459 459 465 472 500 564 613 Idaho Territory . . . . 220 182 251 472 Utah Territory . . . . 257 506 506 593 747 782 967 Montana Territory . . . 10 110 267 659 Western States and Territories . . . . . 13,350 24,587 38,254 41,160 46,963 52,649 59,777 67,563

Nevada . . . . . . . . 593 601 627 720 738 894 948 California . . . . . . 214 925 1,503 2,080 2,209 2,201 2,315 2,643 Arizona Territory . . . 183 401 549 765 Oregon . . . . . . . . 19 159 248 248 295 561 627 807 Weashington Territory . 110 197 212 250 434 434 Pacific States and Territories . . . . . 233 1,677 2,462 3,152 3,619 4,151 4,819 5,597

RECAPITULATION. New-England States . . 3,834 4,494 5,638 5,814 5,903 5,982 6,096 6,155 Middle States . . . . . 8,539 10,964 14,455 15,142 15,679 15,891 16,455 17,922 Southern States . . . . 9,129 11,163 13,287 13,812 14,333 14,872 16,187 17,693 Western States and Territories . . . . . 13,350 24,587 38,254 41,169 46,963 52,649 59,777 67,563 Pacific States and Territories . . . . . 233 1,677 2,462 3,152 3,619 4,151 4,819 5,597

Grand Total . . . . . 35,085 52,885 74,096 79,089 86,497 93,545 103,334 114,930

APPENDIX L.

This table exhibits the total amount of pensions paid by the government from its foundation, including those to soldiers of the Revolution, war of 1812, Mexican war, war of the Rebellion, and the various Indian wars.

Year. Pensions. 1791 $175,813.88 1792 109,243.15 1793 80,087.81 1794 81,399.24 1795 68,673.22 1796 100,843.71 1797 92,256.97 1798 104,845.33 1799 95,444.03 1800 64,130.73 1801 73,533.37 1802 85,440.39 1803 62,902.10 1804 80,092.80 1805 81,854.59 1806 81,875.53 1807 70,500.00 1808 82,576.04 1809 87,833.54 1810 83,744.16 1811 75,043.88 1812 91,042.10 1813 86,989.91 1814 90,164.36 1815 60,656.06 1816 188,804.15 1817 297,374.43 1818 890,719.90 1819 2,415,939.85 1820 3,208,376.31 1821 242,817.25 1822 1,948,199.40 1823 1,780,588.52 1824 1,499,326.59 1825 1,308,810.57 1826 1,566,593.83 1827 976,138.86 1828 580,573.57 1820 949,594.47 1830 1,363,297.31 1831 1,170,665.14 1832 1,184,422.40 1833 4,589,152.40 1834 3,364,285,30 1835 1,954,711.32 1836 2,882,797.96 1837 2,672,162.45 1838 2,156,057.29 1830 3,142,750.51 1840 2,603,562.17 1841 2,388,434.51 1842 1,378,931.33 1843 839,041.12 1844 2,032,008.99 1845 2,400,788.11 1846 1,811,097.56 1847 1,744,883.63 1848 1,227,496.48 1849 1,328,867.64 1850 1,866,886.02 1851 2,293,377.22 1852 2,401,858.78 1853 1,756.306.20 1854 1,232,665.00 1855 1,477,612.33 1856 1,296,229.65 1857 1,310,380.58 1858 1,219,768.30 1859 1,222,222.71 1860 1,100,802.32 1861 1,034,599.73 1862 852,170.47 1863 1,078,513.36 1864 4,985,473.90 1865 16,347,621.34 1866 15,605,549.88 1867 20.936,551.71 1868 23,782,386.78 1869 28,476,621.78 1870 28,340,202.17 1871 34,443,894.88 1872 28,533,402.76 1874 29,038,414.66 1875 29,456,216.22 1876 28,257,395.69 1877 27,963,752.27 1878 27,137,019.08 1879 35,121,482.39 1880 56,777,174.44 1881 50,059,279.62 1882 61,345,193.95 1883 66,012,573.64

$724,658,382.78

APPENDIX M.

The following table shows the distribution of the tonnage of the United-States merchant-marine employed in the foreign trade, the coasting trade, and the fisheries, from 1789 to 1883 inclusive.

Foreign Trade. | Coasting Trade. | | Whale Fisheries. Year Ended | | | Cod Fisheries. | | | | Mackerel Fisheries. | | | | | Total Merchant-Marine. Tons. Tons. Tons. Tons. Tons. Tons. Dec. 31, 1789 123,893 68,607 9,062 201,562 1790 346,254 103,775 28,348 478,377 1791 363,110 106,494 32,542 502,146 1792 411,438 120,957 32,062 564,457 1793 367,734 122,071 30,959 520,764 1794 438,863 162,578 4,129 23,048 628,618 1795 529,471 184,398 3,163 30,933 747,965 1796 576,733 217,841 2,364 34,962 831,900 1797 597,777 237,403 1,104 40,628 876,912 1798 603,376 251,443 763 42,746 898,328 1799 657,142 246,640 5,647 29,979 939,408 1800 667,107 272,492 3,466 29,427 972,492 1801 630,558 274,551 3,085 39,382 947,576 1802 557,760 289,623 3,201 41,522 892,106 1803 585,910 299,060 12,390 51,812 949,172 1804 680,514 317,537 12,339 52,014 1,042,404 1805 744,224 332,663 6,015 57,465 1,140,367 1806 798,507 340,540 10,507 59,183 1,208,737 1807 840,163 349,028 9,051 70,306 1,268,548 1808 765,252 420,819 4,526 51,998 1,242,595 1809 906,855 405,103 3,777 34,487 1,350,282 1810 981,019 405,347 3,589 34,828 1,424,783 1811 763,607 420,362 5,209 43,234 1,232,502 1812 758,636 477,972 2,930 30,459 1,269,997 1813 672,700 471,109 2,942 19,877 1,166,628 1814 674,633 466,159 562 17,855 1,159,209 1815 854,295 475,666 1,230 36,937 1,368,128 1816 800,760 522,165 1,168 48,126 1,372,219 1817 804,851 525,030 5,224 64,807 1,309,912 1818 589,954 549,374 16,750 69,107 1,225,185 1819 581,230 571,058 32,386 76,078 1,260,752 1820 583,657 588,025 36,445 72,040 1,280,167 1821 593,825 614,845 27,995 62,293 1,298,958 1822 582,701 624,189 48,583 69,226 1,324,699 1823 600,003 617,805 40,503 78,225 1,336,566 1824 636,807 641,563 33,346 77,447 1,389,163 1825 665,409 640,861 35,379 81,462 1,423,111 1826 696,221 722,330 41,984 73,656 1,534,191 1827 701,517 789,159 45,992 83,687 1,620,607 1828 757,998 842,906 54,801 85,687 1,741,392 1829 592,859 508,858 57,284 101,797 1,260,798 1830 537,563 516,979 39,705 61,556 35,973 1,191,776 1831 538,136 539,724 82,797 60,978 46,211 1,267,846 1832 614,121 649,627 73,246 55,028 47,428 1,439,450 1833 648,869 744,199 101,636 62,721 48,726 1,606,151 1834 749,378 783,619 108,424 56,404 61,082 1,758,907 Sept. 30, 1835* 788,173 797,338 97,649 77,338 64,443 1,824,941 1836 753,094 873,023 146,254 63,307 46,424 1,882,102 1837 683,205 956,981 129,137 80,552 46,811 1,896,686 1838 702,962 1,041,105 124,860 70,084 56,649 1,995,640 1839 702,400 1,153,552 132,285 72,258 35,984 2,096,479 1840 762,838 1,176,694 136,927 76,036 28,269 2,180,764 1841 788,398 1,107,068 157,405 66,552 11,321 2,130,744 1842 823,746 1,045,753 151,990 54,805 16,007 2,092,391 June 30, 1843* 856,930 1,076,156 152,517 61,224 11,776 2,158,603 1844 900,471 1,109,615 168,614 85,225 16,171 2,280,096 1845 904,476 1,223,218 190,903 76,901 21,414 2,417,002 1846 943,307 1,315,577 187,420 79,318 36,463 2,562,085 1847 1,047,454 1,488,601 103,859 77,681 31,451 2,839,046 1848 1,168,707 1,659,317 192,613 89,847 43,558 3,154,042 1849 1,258,756 1,770,376 180,186 81,756 42,942 3,334,016 1850 1,439,694 1,797,825 146,017 93,806 58,112 3,535,454 1851 1,544,663 1,899,976 181,644 95,617 50,539 3,772,439 1852 1,705,650 2,055,873 193,798 110,573 72,546 4,138,440 1853 1,910,471 2,134,258 193,203 109,228 59,850 4,407,010 1854 2,151,918 2,322,114 181,901 111,928 35,041 4,802,902 1855 2,348,358 2,543,255 186,848 111,915 21,625 5,212,001 1856 2,302,190 2,247,663 189,461 102,452 29,887 4,871,653 1857 2,268,196 2,336,609 195,842 111,868 28,328 4,940,843 1858 2,301,148 2,401,220 198,594 119,252 29,594 5,049,808 1859 2,321,674 2,488,929 185,728 129,637 27,070 5,145,038 1860 2,379,396 2,644,867 166,841 136,653 26,111 5,353,868 1861 2,496,894 2,704,544 145,734 137,846 54,795 5,539,813 1862 2,173,537 2,606,716 117,714 133,601 80,596 5,112,164 1863 1,926,886 2,960,633 99,228 117,290 51,019 5,155,056 1864 1,486,749 3,245,265 95,145 103,742 55,499 4,986,400 1865 1,518,350 3,381,522 90,516 65,185 41,209 5,096,782 1866 1,387,756 2,719,621 105,170 51,642 46,589 4,310,778 1867 1,515,648 2,660,390 52,384 44,567 31,498 4,304,487 1868 1,494,389 2,702,140 71,343 83,887** 4,351,759 1869 1,496,220 2,515,515 70,202 62,704 4,144,641 1870 1,448,846 2,638,247 67,954 91,460 4,246,507 1871 1,363,652 2,764,600 61,400 92,865 4,282,607 1872 1,359,040 2,929,552 51,608 97,547 4,437,747 1873 1,378,533 3,163,220 44,755 109,519 4,696,027 1874 1,389,815 3,292,439 39,108 78,290 4,800,652 1875 1,515,598 3,219,698 38,229 80,207 4,853,732 1876 1,553,705 2,598,835 30,116 87,802 4,279,458 1877 1,570,600 2,540,322 40,593 91,085 4,242,600 1878 1,589,348 2,497,170 39,700 86,547 4,212,765 1879 1,451,505 2,598,183 40,028 79,885 4,169,601 1880 1,314,402 2,637,686 38,408 77,538 4,068,034 1881 1,297,035 2,646,010 38,551 76,136 4,057,734 1882 1,259,492 2,795,777 32,802 77,862 4,165,933 1883 1,269,681 2,838,354 32,414 95,038 4,235,487

* Nine months ** After 1867 the tonnage engaged in mackerel fisheries is included in this column.

APPENDIX N.

The following table exhibits the immigration into the United States by decades from 1821 to 1880.

1821 1831 1841 1851 1861 1871 Countries. to to to to to to 1881. 1830. 1840. 1850. 1860. 1870. 1880.

England . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14,055 7,611 32,092 247,125 251,288 440,961 76,547 Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,724 207,381 780,719 914,119 456,593 444,589 79,909 Scotland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,912 2,667 3,712 38,331 44,681 98,926 16,451 Wales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170 185 1,261 6,319 4,642 6,779 1,316 Great Britain, not specified . . . . 7,942 65,347 229,979 132,199 349,766 7,908 7 Total British Isles . . . . . . . 75,803 283,191 1,047,763 1,338,093 1,106,970 989,163 165,230

Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,398 69,558 21,437 Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 22 5,074 4,738 7,416 7,278 1,939 Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 1,063 539 3,749 17,885 34,577 8,951 France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,497 45,575 77,262 76,358 37,749 73,301 5,653 Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,761 152,454 434,626 951,667 822,007 757,698 249,572 Hungary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488 13,475 6,756 Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468 2,253 1,879 9,231 12,982 60,830 20,103 Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,078 1,412 8,251 10,789 9,539 17,236 10,812 Norway and Sweden . . . . . . . . . 91 1,201 13,903 20,931 117,798 226,488 82,859 Russia and Poland . . . . . . . . . 91 646 656 1,621 5,047 54,606 14,476 Spain and Portugal . . . . . . . . . 2,622 2,954 2,759 10,353 9,047 9,767 464 Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,226 4,821 4,644 25,011 23,839 31,722 11,628 All other countries in Europe . . . 43 96 155 116 234 1,265 451 Total Europe, not British Isles . 23,013 212,497 549,739 1,114,564 1,073,429 1,357,801 435,101 Total Europe . . . . . . . . . . . 98,816 495,688 1,597,502 2,452,657 2,180,399 2,346,964 600,331

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 35 41,397 68,059 122,436 20,711 All other countries of Asia . . . . 8 40 47 61 385 632 64 Total Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 48 82 41,458 68,444 123,068 20,775

Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 52 55 210 324 221 37

British North American Provinces . . 2,277 13,624 41,723 59,309 184,713 430,210 95,188 Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,817 6,599 3,271 3,078 2,386 5,164 244 Central America . . . . . . . . . . 105 44 368 449 96 229 33 South America . . . . . . . . . . . 531 856 3,579 1,224 1,443 1,153 85 West Indies . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,834 12,301 13,528 10,660 9,698 14,461 1,009 Total America . . . . . . . . . . 11,564 33,424 62,469 74,720 198,336 451,216 96,559

Islands of the Atlantic . . . . . . 352 103 337 3,090 3,778 10,121 1,287 Islands of the Pacific . . . . . . 2 9 29 158 235 11,421 910 All other countries, not specified . 32,679 69,801 52,777 25,921 15,236 1,684 146

Aggregate . . . . . . . . . . . . 143,439 599,125 1,713,251 2,598,214 2,466,752 2,944,695 720,045

APPENDIX O.

COAL AND IRON PRODUCT.

The following table exhibits the quantity of coal produced in each State and Territory of the United States during the census years ended May 31, 1870, and 1880, and the calendar years 1876, 1877, 1878, 1879, and 1881 (weight expressed in tons of 2,240 pounds).

STATE OR 1870. 1876. 1877. 1878. 1879. 1880. 1881. TERRITORY. Tons. Tons. Tons. Tons. Tons. Tons. Tons.

_Anthracite_. Pennsylvania . . 15,648,437 21,436,667 23,619,911 20,605,262 26,142,689 28,640,819 28,500,016 Rhode Island . . 14,000 14,000 14,000 14,000 15,000 6,176 10,000 Virginia . . . . 2,817

_Bituminous_. Pennsylvania . . 7,800,386 11,500,000 12,500,000 13,500,000 14,500,000 18,425,163 20,000,000 Illinois . . . . 2,624,163 3,500,000 3,500,000 3,500,000 3,500,000 6,115,377 6,000,000 Ohio . . . . . . 2,527,285 3,500,000 5,250,000 5,000,000 5,000,000 6,008,595 8,250,000 Maryland . . . . 2,345,153 1,835,081 1,574,339 1,679,322 1,730,709 2,228,917 2,261,918 Missouri . . . . 621,930 900,000 900,000 900,000 900,000 556,304 1,750,000 West Virginia. . 608,878 800,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,250,000 1,839,845 1,500,000 Indiana . . . . 437,870 950,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,454,327 1,500,000 Iowa . . . . . . 263,487 1,500,000 1,500,000 1,500,000 1,600,000 1,461,116 1,750,000 Kentucky . . . . 32,938 650,000 850,000 900,000 1,000,000 946,288 1,100,000 Tennessee . . . 133,418 550,000 750,000 375,000 450,000 495,131 750,000 Virginia . . . . 61,803 90,000 90,000 75,000 90,000 43,079 100,000 Kansas . . . . . 150,582 125,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 771,142 750,000 Oregon . . . . . 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 43,205 300,000 Michigan . . . . 28,150 30,000 30,000 30,000 35,000 100,800 100,000 California . . . 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000 236,950 600,000 Arkansas . . . . 14,778 30,000 Montana . . . . 224 North Carolina . 350 Alabama . . . . 11,000 100,000 175,000 200,000 250,000 323,972 375,000 Nebraska . . . . 1,425 30,000 50,000 75,000 75,000 200 75,000 Wyoming . . . . 500,000 100,000 100,000 175,000 589,595 375,000 Washington . . . 100,000 150,000 150,000 170,000 145,015 175,000 Utah . . . . . . 45,000 45,000 60,000 225,000 225,000 Colorado . . . . 250,000 300,000 367,000 400,000 462,747 700,000 Georgia . . . . 100,000 154,644 150,000

Total bituminous 17,648,468 27,569,081 30,688,339 31,525,322 36,665,709 42,417,764 48,816,918 Total anthracite 15,662,437 21,436,667 23,619,911 20,605,262 26,142,689 28,649,812 28,510,016 Total anthracite and bituminous 33,310,905 49,005,748 54,308,250 52,130,584 62,808,398 71,067,576 77,326,934

APPENDIX O--_Concluded_.

The following table shows the quantity of pig-iron produced, imported, exported, and retained for consumption in the United States, from 1867 to 1882, expressed in tons of 2,240 pounds.

Total Production and Imports. Calendar Year Ended | Exports, Foreign and Domestic. Year. Production. June 30, Imports. | | Retained for Home Consumption. _Tons_. _Tons_. _Tons_. _Tons_._Tons_. 1866 1,205,663 1867 112,642 1,317,705 628 1,317,077 1867 1,305,023 1868 112,133 1,417,156 282 1,416,874 1868 1,431,250 1869 136,975 1,568,225 273 1,567,952 1869 1,711,287 1870 153,283 1,864,570 1,456 1,863,114 1870 1,665,178 1871 178,139 1,843,317 3,772 1,839,545 1871 1,706,793 1872 247,529 1,954,322 2,172 1,952,150 1872 2,548,713 1873 215,496 2,764,209 2,818 2,761,201 1873 2,560,963 1874 92,042 2,653,005 10,152 2,642,853 1874 2,401,262 1875 53,437 2,454,699 16,193 2,438,506 1875 2,023,733 1876 79,455 2,103,188 7,241 2,095,947 1876 1,868,961 1877 67,922 1,936,883 3,560 1,933,323 1877 2,006,594 1878 55,000 2,121,594 6,198 2,115,396 1878 2,301,215 1879 87,576 2,388,791 3,221 2,385,570 1879 2,741,853 1880 754,657 3,406,510 2,607 3,493,903 1880 3,835,191 1881 417,849 4,253,040 6,811 4,246,229 1881 4,144,254 1882 496,045 4,640,299 9,519 4,630,780

Quantity of Iron and Steel Railroad Bars produced, imported, exported, and retained for Consumption in the United States, from 1867 to 1882, expressed in tons of 2,240 pounds. Total Production and Imports. Calendar Production. Year | Exports, Foreign and Domestic. Year. Iron. Steel. Total. Ended Imports. | | Retained for Home Consumption. _Tons_. _Tons_. _Tons_. June 30, _Tons_. _Tons_. _Tons_._Tons_. 1866 384,623 384,623 1867 96,272 480,895 159 480,736 1867 410,319 2,277 412,596 1868 151,097 563,693 710 562,983 1868 445,972 6,451 452,423 1869 237,704 690,127 564 689,563 1869 521,371 8,616 529,987 1870 279,766 809,753 885 808,863 1870 523,371 30,357 553,571 1871 458,056 1,011,627 1,341 1,010,286 1871 658,467 34,152 692,619 1872 531,537 1,224,156 4,484 1,219,672 1872 808,866 83,991 892,857 1873 357,631 1,250,488 7,147 1,243,341 1873 679,520 115,192 794,712 1874 148,920 943,632 7,313 936,319 1874 521,847 129,414 651,261 1875 42,082 693,343 14,199 679,144 1875 447,901 259,699 707,000 1876 4,708 712,308 13,554 698,754 1876 417,114 368,269 785,383 1877 30 785,413 6,103 779,310 1877 296,911 385,865 682,776 1878 11 682,787 8,426 674,351 1878 288,295 499,817 788,112 1879 2,611 790,723 7,127 783,596 1879 375,143 618,851 993,994 1880 152,791 1,146,785 2,363 1,144,422 1880 440,859 864,353 1,305,212 1881 302,294 1,607,506 4,274 1,603,232 1881 436,233 1,210,285 1,646,518 1882 295,666 1,942,184 4,190 1,937,994

APPENDIX P.

The following table shows the number of men called for by the President of the United States, and the number furnished by each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia, both for the Army and Navy, from April. 15, 1861, to close of the war.

STATES Aggregate. Aggregate AND Men furnished Reduced to TERRITORIES. Quota | Paid Commutation. a Three Years' | | | Total. Standard. Maine . . . . . . . . . 73,587 70,107 2,007 72,114 56,776 New Hampshire . . . . . 35,897 33,937 692 34,629 30,849 Vermont . . . . . . . . 32,074 33,288 1,074 35,262 29,068 Massachusetts . . . . . 139,095 146,730 5,318 152,048 124,104 Rhode Island . . . . . 18,898 23,236 463 23,699 17,866 Connecticut . . . . . . 44,797 55,864 1,515 57,379 50,623 New York . . . . . . . 507,148 448,850 18,197 467,047 392,270 New Jersey . . . . . . 92,820 76,814 4,196 81,010 57,908 Pennsylvania . . . . . 385,369 337,936 28,171 366,107 265,517 Delaware . . . . . . . 13,935 12,284 1,386 13,670 10,322 Maryland . . . . . . . 70,965 46,638 3,678 50,316 41,275 West Virginia . . . . . 34,463 32,068 32,068 27,711 District of Columbia . 13,973 16,534 338 16,872 11,506 Ohio . . . . . . . . . 306,322 313,180 6,479 319,659 240,514 Indiana . . . . . . . . 199,788 196,363 784 197,147 153,576 Illinois . . . . . . . 244,496 259,092 55 259,147 214,133 Michigan . . . . . . . 95,007 87,364 2,008 89,372 80,111 Wisconsin . . . . . . . 109,080 91,327 5,097 96,424 79,260 Minnesota . . . . . . . 26,326 24,020 1,032 25,052 19,693 Iowa . . . . . . . . . 79,521 76,242 67 76,309 68,630 Missouri . . . . . . . 122,496 109,111 109,111 86,530 Kentucky . . . . . . . 100,782 75,760 3,265 79,025 70,832 Kansas . . . . . . . . 12,931 20,149 2 20,151 18,706 Tennessee . . . . . . . 1,560 31,092 31,092 26,394 Arkansas . . . . . . . 780 8,289 8,289 7,863 North Carolina . . . . 1,560 3,156 3,156 3,156 California . . . . . . 15,725 15,725 15,725 Nevada . . . . . . . . 1,080 1,080 1,080 Oregon . . . . . . . . 1,810 1,810 1,810 Washington Territory . 964 964 964 Nebraska Territory . . 3,157 3,157 2,175 Colorado Territory . . 4,903 4,903 3,697 Dakota Territory . . . 206 206 206 New-Mexico Territory . 6,561 6,561 4,432 Alabama . . . . . . . . 2,576 2,576 1,611 Florida . . . . . . . . 1,290 1,290 1,290 Louisiana . . . . . . . 5,224 5,224 4,654 Mississippi . . . . . . 545 545 545 Texas . . . . . . . . . 1,965 1,965 1,632 Indian Nation . . . . . 3,530 3,530 3,530 Colored Troops* . . . . 93,441 93,441 91,789

Total . . . . . . . .2,763,670 2,772,408 86,724 2,859,132 2,320,272

* Colored troops organized at various stations in the States in rebellion, embracing all not specifically credited to States, and which cannot be so assigned.

Reduced to Periods of Service only, the Following Aggregates for the Different Periods in the Army and Navy appear:--

Periods of Enlistment. Number.

60 days . . . . . . . . 2,045 3 months . . . . . . . 108,416 100 days . . . . . . . 85,807 4 months . . . . . . . 42 6 months . . . . . . . 26,118 8 months . . . . . . . 373 9 months . . . . . . . 89,899 1 year . . . . . . . . 393,706 2 years . . . . . . . . 44,400 3 years . . . . . . . . 2,028,630 4 years . . . . . . . . 1,042

Aggregate enlistments . 2,780,478

The Number of Indivials who served during the War is estimated as follows:--

Number who died during the war . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304,360 Number who were discharged for disability . . . . . . . . . . . 285,545 Deserters (less those arrested and 25 per cent. additional) . . 128,352 One-third of those serving terms of less than one year (estimated that two-thirds thereof re-enlisted) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104,134 One-half of those serving more than one year and less than two years (estimated that one-half re-enlisted) . . . . . . . . . . . . 224,053 Number in the service May 1, 1865 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,000,516 Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,046,969 Add number in regular army at commencement of war . . . . . . 16,422

Aggregate number of different individuals who served during the war 2,063,391

There are no records which give with accuracy the number of men in the Confederate Army. The general aggregate for the four years is, upon the best authority attainable, placed at one million one hundred thousand men (1,100,000). The maximum number of men on the Confederate Army rolls at any one time is estimated at five hundred thousand. The irregular manner in which the men were conscripted during the last two years of the war, taken in connection with the loss of records, makes it impossible to give accurate statements of the numbers furnished by the several States.

REGULAR ARMY.

The following table shows the actual strength of the regular army of the United States at different periods, from 1789 to 1883 (retired officers not included).

Officers. Date. | Men. Total. 1780-90 . . 50 672 722 1795 . . . 212 3,228 3,440 1800 . . . 248 3,803 4,051 1805 . . . 196 2,534 2,730 1810 . . . 466 6,488 6,954 July, 1812 . . . 301 6,385 6,686* Feb., 1813 . . . 1,476 17,560 19,036* Sept. 1814 . . . 2,395 35,791 38,186* Feb., 1815 . . . 2,396 31,028 33,424* Dec., 1820 . . . 712 8,230 8,942 1825 . . . 562 5,157 5,719 1830 . . . 627 5,324 5,951 1835 . . . 680 6,471 7,151 1840 . . . 733 9,837 10,570 1845 . . . 826 7,523 8,349 1850 . . . 948 9,815 10,763 1855 . . . 1,042 14,710 15,752 1860 . . . 1,108 15,250 16,367 1861 . . . 1,004 15,418 16,422 1862 . . . 1,720 21,450 23,170 1863 . . . 1,844 22,915 24,759 1864 . . . 1,813 19,791 21,604 1865 . . . 1,605 20,765 22,310 1866 . . . 2,020 31,470 33,490 1867 . . . 2,853 53,962 56,815 1868 . . . 2,835 48,081 50,916 1869 . . . 2,700 34,074 36,774 1870 . . . 2,541 34,534 37,075 1871 . . . 2,105 26,848 28,953 1872 . . . 2,104 26,071 28,175 1873 . . . 2,076 26,576 28,652 1874 . . . 2,080 26,364 28,444 1875 . . . 2,068 23,250 25,318 1876 . . . 2,151 26,129 28,250 1877 . . . 2,178 21,767 23,945 1878 . . . 2,153 23,365 25,818 1879 . . . 2,127 24,262 26,389 1880 . . . 2,152 24,259 26,411 1881 . . . 2,181 22,994 25,175 1882 . . . 2,162 23,024 25,186 1883 . . . 2,143 23,335 25,478

* Second war with Great Britain

The following summary shows the total numbers of soldiers serving in the various wars in which the United States was engaged prior to the Rebellion.

Soldiers of the War of the Revolution, 1775 to 1783 . . 289,715 Indian War, General Wayne, 1794 . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,843 Indian War, 1811 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 650 War with Great Britain, 1812 to 1815, number of soldiers, sailors and marines serving 12 months or more . . . . 63,179 Number of militia serving 6 months or more . 66,325 " " " " 3 " " " . 125,643 " " " " 1 month " " . 125,307 " " " " less than 1 month . 147,200 ------- 527,654 Number of soldiers serving in Seminole War, 1817-18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,911 Black-Hawk War, 1831-32 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,031 South-western disturbances, 1836 . . . . . . . . . . 2,803 Cherokee Country disturbances, 1836-37 . . . . . . . 3,926 Creek disturbances, 1836-37 . . . . . . . . . . . . 13,418 Florida War, 1836-42 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41,122 Number of soldiers and sailors serving in Mexican War, 1846-47 . . . 105,454 Number of soldiers serving in New-York frontier disturbances, 1838-39 . . . . . . . 1,128 Arostook disturbances, 1838-39, 2 regiments . . . . . 1,430

APPENDIX Q.

The following table exhibits the school age, population, and enrollment of the States and Territories in 1881, with salaries paid to teachers, and total expenditure for schools.

School Age. | School Population. STATES. | | No. Enrolled in Public Schools. | | | Aggregate Salaries Paid to Teachers. | | | | Total Expenditure. Alabama . . . . . . . . . 7-21 422,739 176,289 $384,769 $410,690 Arkansas . . . . . . . . 6-21 272,841 98,744 388,412 California . . . . . . . 5-17 211,237 163,855 2,346,056 3,047,605 Colorado . . . . . . . . 6-21 40,804 26,000 557,151 Connecticut . . . . . . . 4-16 143,745 119,381 1,025,323 1,476,691 Delaware . . . . . . . . 6-21 37,285 29,122 138,819 207,281 Florida . . . . . . . . . 4-21 88,677 39,315 97,115 114,895 Georgia . . . . . . . . . 6-18 461,016 244,197 498,533 Illinois . . . . . . . . 6-21 1,002,222 701,627 4,722,349 7,858,414 Indiana . . . . . . . . . 6-21 714,343 503,855 3,057,110 4,528,754 Iowa . . . . . . . . . . 5-21 594,730 431,513 3,040,716 5,129,819 Kansas . . . . . . . . . 5-21 348,179 249,034 1,167,620 1,976,397 Kentucky . . . . . . . . 6-20 553,638 238,440 1,248,524 Louisiana . . . . . . . . 6-18 271,414 62,370 374,127 441,484 Maine . . . . . . . . . . 4-21 213,927 150,067 965,697 1,089,414 Maryland . . . . . . . . 5-20 319,201 158,909 1,162,429 1,604,580 Massachusetts . . . . . . 5-15 312,680 325,239 4,130,714 5,776,542 Michigan . . . . . . . . 5-20 518,294 371,743 2,114,567 3,418,233 Minnesota . . . . . . . . 5-21 300,923 177,278 993,997 1,466,492 Mississippi . . . . . . . 5-21 419,963 237,288 644,352 757,758 Missouri . . . . . . . . 6-20 723,484 476,376 2,218,637 3,152,178 Nebraska . . . . . . . . 5-21 152,824 100,776 627,717 1,165,103 Nevada . . . . . . . . . 6-18 10,533 8,329 59,194 140,419 New Hampshire . . . . . . 5-15 60,899 63,235 408,554 577,022 New Jersey . . . . . . . 5-18 335,631 203,542 1,510,830 1,914,447 New York . . . . . . . . 5-21 1,662,122 1,021,282 7,775,505 10,923,402 North Carolina . . . . . 6-21 468,072 240,710 342,212 409,659 Ohio . . . . . . . . . . 6-21 1,063,337 744,758 5,151,448 8,133,622 Oregon . . . . . . . . . 4-20 61,641 34,498 234,818 318,331 Pennsylvania . . . . . . 6-21 1,422,377 931,749 4,677,017 7,994,705 Rhode Island . . . . . . 5-16 53,077 44,920 408,993 549,937 South Carolina . . . . . 6-16 262,279 133,458 309,855 345,634 Tennessee . . . . . . . . 6-21 545,875 283,468 529,618 638,009 Texas . . . . . . . . . . 8-14 230,527 186,786 674,869 753,346 Vermont . . . . . . . . . 5-20 99,463 74,646 366,448 447,252 Virginia . . . . . . . . 5-21 556,665 239,046 823,310 1,100,239 West Virginia . . . . . . 6-21 213,191 145,203 539,648 761,250 Wisconsin . . . . . . . . 4-20 491,358 300,122 1,618,283 2,279,103 Total for States . . . 15,661,213 9,737,176 $54,642,716 $83,601,327

School Age. | School Population. TERRITORIES. | | No. Enrolled in Public Schools. | | | Aggregate Salaries Paid to Teachers. | | | | Total Expenditure. Arizona . . . . . . . . . 6-21 9,571 3,844 $44,628 Dakota . . . . . . . . . 5-21 38,815 25,451 314,484 District of Columbia . . 6-18 43,558 27,299 $295,668 527,312 Idaho . . . . . . . . . . 5-21 7,520 6,080 38,174 44,840 Montana . . . . . . . . . 4-21 9,895 5,112 52,781 55,781 New Mexico . . . . . . . 7-18 29,255 4,755 28,002 28,973 Utah . . . . . . . . . . 6-18 42,353 26,772 113,768 199,264 Washington . . . . . . . 4-21 23,899 14,754 94,019 114,379 Wyoming . . . . . . . . . 7-21 4,112 2,907 25,894 28,504 Indian: Cherokees . . . . . . . 3,715 3,048 52,500 Chickasaws . . . . . . 900 650 33,550 Choctaws . . . . . . . 2,600 1,460 31,700 Creeks . . . . . . . . 1,700 799 26,909 Seminoles . . . . . . . 400 226 7,500 Total for Territories . . 218,293 123,157 $648,306 $1,510,115 Total for States . . . . 15,661,213 9,737,176 54,642,716 83,601,327

Grand total . . . . . . . 15,879,506 9,860,333 $55,291,022 $85,111,442

APPENDIX R.

The following table gives some interesting and important statistics respecting colleges in the United States.

No. Universities and Colleges. | No. Instructors in Preparatory Department. | | No. Students in Preparatory Department. STATES | | | No. Instructors in Collegiate Department. AND | | | | No. Students in Collegiate Department. TERRITORIES. | | | | | No. Volumes in College Libraries. | | | | | | Value of Grounds, Buildings, and Apparatus. | | | | | | | Income from Productive Funds. | | | | | | | | Receipts for the last Year from Tuition Fees. Alabama . . . . . 3 2 20 18 314 8,200 $300,000 $24,600 $8,000 Arkansas . . . . . 4 10 564 28 271 2,286 114,000 1,000 8,300 California . . . . 11 36 1,178 131 602 47,750 1,380,200 105,116 91,014 Colorado . . . . . 3 2 113 23 45 11,000 230,000 1,282 366 Connecticut . . . 3 62 959 148,155 472,884 120,776 114,128 Delaware . . . . . 1 8 54 6,000 75,000 4,980 500 Georgia . . . . . 6 2 70 54 554 30,100 652,300 43,493 10,650 Illinois . . . . . 28 58 2,901 224 1,887 130,630 2,511,550 95,229 116,844 Indiana . . . . . 15 58 1,793 128 1,329 76,591 1,298,000 50,029 29,646 Iowa . . . . . . . 18 46 1,697 168 1,614 51,022 789,000 51,382 42,568 Kansas . . . . . . 8 21 889 75 431 24,178 523,000 5,500 5,400 Kentucky . . . . . 14 18 594 97 1,178 45,076 673,000 38,443 37,060 Louisiana . . . . 9 22 1,022 68 174 57,995 837,000 15,100 21,060 Maine . . . . . . 3 3 45 32 422 59,371 863,500 39,000 22,000 Maryland . . . . . 11 18 325 160 1,385 49,922 892,500 181,734 45,705 Massachusetts . . 7 7 192 151 1,865 292,626 1,250,000 276,131 166,851 Michigan . . . . . 9 22 1,361 114 1,166 59,690 1,344,942 89,290 75,351 Minnesota . . . . 5 1 279 44 408 21,600 421,196 50,900 8,340 Mississippi . . . 3 7 557 21 320 8,400 446,000 32,643 8,275 Missouri . . . . . 16 37 1,101 196 1,605 108,315 1,127,220 63,005 135,294 Nebraska . . . . . 5 11 360 16 216 8,000 205,000 2,359 682 Nevada . . . . . . 1 1 40 New Hampshire . . 1 15 247 54,000 125,000 25,000 16,000 New Jersey . . . . 4 73 677 60,600 1,150,000 86,615 20,770 New York . . . . . 27 113 2,662 426 3,495 294,437 7,480,540 472,413 462,059 North Carolina . . 9 8 616 69 590 31,250 549,000 10,000 37,096 Ohio . . . . . . . 36 120 3,726 284 2,612 286,411 3,156,744 180,661 101,775 Oregon . . . . . . 8 21 785 38 458 9,420 257,000 20,600 15,950 Pennsylvania . . . 27 70 1,877 288 2,367 163,718 4,744,850 239,499 250,105 Rhode Island . . . 1 18 251 53,000 36,999 30,869 South Carolina . . 8 8 358 42 304 17,450 340,000 22,869 5,194 Tennessee . . . . 19 33 1,122 148 1,876 51,708 1,498,250 80,475 39,720 Texas . . . . . . 9 18 1,075 58 540 10,411 335,000 775 55,150 Vermont . . . . . 2 18 93 33,000 440,000 16,328 6,082 Virginia . . . . . 8 6 73 69 889 102,000 1,558,000 22,200 20,540 West Virginia . . 4 7 134 32 201 5,800 295,000 8,469 5,592 Wisconsin . . . . 8 15 786 88 658 48,765 890,300 101,556 56,702 Dist. of Columbia 5 9 359 43 222 47,411 900,000 1,957 1,165 Utah . . . . . . . 1 3 202 3 2,735 30,000 3,147 Washington . . . . 2 7 83 11 90 3,200 100,000 500 4,500

Total . . . . . 362 820 28,959 3,541 32,459 2,522,223 $40,255,976 $2,618,008 $2,080,450

STATISTICS RESPECTING SCHOOLS OF SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES.