Part 2

As no regimental hospitals were contemplated by the War Department, and none were permitted in Camp Hamilton, men sick enough to require treatment in bed were removed to the division hospital. On arriving there their clothing was removed and carefully disinfected, labeled and packed away, and if their cases were of doubtful character they were sent to the detention ward until the nature of their disease could be determined, when they were disposed of accordingly.

At 2 P. M. daily a medical officer of each regiment reported at the division hospital, and with the medical officer in charge of the wards, visited the sick of his regiment and decided whether they should be returned to duty or not. This had a very good effect, as it brought the medical officers of the regiment into daily contact with the sick of their own regiments, which was a great comfort to them, and besides kept the medical officers fully informed of their condition.

As far as possible the sick of the different regiments were kept together, and no one except the regimental and company commanders, the medical officers, chaplains, and immediate relatives of the sick were allowed to visit them. This restriction was rendered necessary by the danger of infection in typhoid cases, and to prevent the excitement and noise caused by visitors.

I am aware that many of the requirements and restrictions ordered at that time were considered harsh and unnecessary and gave rise to some bad feeling and grumbling, but as they had the unqualified approval of the medical staff, I had no hesitation in enforcing them. That they were fully justified was clearly shown by the results.

Within a short time after our arrival in Lexington the number of sick increased so rapidly that the division hospital was filled to overflowing. But in the course of five or six weeks, and as a consequence of our strenuous efforts, the number began to diminish, until finally, and before the Division moved to Georgia in November, not a single case remained in the Division outside of the hospitals, and no new cases were ever reported to me while the Division remained in service.

Of the part taken by the Eighth Massachusetts in this heroic struggle, a great deal might be written by way of commendation. It is probably sufficient to say that Colonel Pew and his officers appeared to realize fully the gravity of the situation, and relying on the good discipline and high order of intelligence of the rank and file, had but little difficulty in carrying out the sanitary regulations of the camp, thus preserving the lives of many of the men.

Before leaving this subject, and at the risk of exhausting your patience, I can not refrain from giving you a word of warning. Of all the diseases which infest sedentary camps, such as those established in the United States and Cuba during the recent war, none is more insidious or deadly in its effects than typhoid fever.

It would be very unusual indeed for a regiment of the National Guard or of Volunteers to assemble in camp at any time without bringing with it at least one case of undeveloped typhoid fever. Now, a week may elapse before such a case is discovered and reported, and in the meantime the man who has it may have given it to a dozen other men through fecal and urinary discharges, and through carelessness in using the sink in washing his hands and bathing, and in keeping his clothing absolutely free from that kind of pollution. Hence the importance of personal cleanliness and the strictest enforcement of all the sanitary rules which may be established.

In a camp of regular soldiers thoroughly instructed in the duties of sentinels, and not afraid to enforce their orders, this is not difficult, but among volunteers where guard duty is often not understood, or is looked upon with disfavor, and but little sense of individual responsibility, it is a very difficult matter, and such camps may speedily and easily become hot beds for the spread of typhoid and other diseases.

Bear this in mind and resolve that should the exigencies of the military service ever require you to go into camp again, you will not only keep yourselves clean, but will insist on a clean camp, clean kitchens and sinks, clean food and mess kits, and that you will mercilessly punish all infractions of sanitary rules, as well as the sentinels or other guards who knowingly permit them.

I remained in command of the Second Division until November 16th, when I was relieved, and on the 21st assumed command of the Second Brigade at Americus. Although I knew the Eighth Massachusetts quite well, I now determined to know it thoroughly, and on November 28th, commenced an inspection of the regiment by battalion, and in order that every officer and enlisted man might attend, it was ordered that no guard or other detail would be furnished by the battalion under inspection.

I began with the First Battalion of the Eighth Massachusetts and wound up with the Third Battalion, giving each just such a critical inspection as was prescribed for regulars. In other words, I made a careful examination of the arms and equipments, clothing, camp and garrison equipage, mess books, records and drills of each company, battalion and regiment.

Target practice was resumed as soon as the Brigade was settled in camp, and each regiment was given the most careful and detailed instruction in outpost duties and those of the advanced guard. An effort was also made to instruct the Brigade in the principles of a front and flank attack, beginning at short distances, which were extended finally to 3000 yards over obstructed ground, the enemy's position being indicated, and as far as possible the exercises made as realistic as possible.

The month spent at Americus was full of professional interest and profit, and caused me to realize more fully the very great advantage of a brigade camp over larger ones, and how much better it would have been at the outset to have fully equipped each regiment in its State camp, to then have assembled it with other regiments in a brigade camp--preferably in the same State--commanded by a thoroughly competent and active general officer, there to receive the preliminary instruction so easily given under such circumstances, and so next to impossible in the camp of a Division of an army corps.

The Eighth Massachusetts and Twelfth New York were fairly well equipped when I joined them in the Park, but the First South Carolina regiment was without arms, equipment or uniforms. The men ate with their fingers for several weeks, and relied on such crude dishes as could be improvised from tomato-cans, etc. I have no doubt that much of the complaint made by this regiment about the rations, was chiefly due to this.

The Eighth Massachusetts in two detachments left Americus January 6th and 8th, and arrived in Matanzas January 10th and 13th and went into camp near Fort San Severino on the west side of the bay.

On the 12th of January the last of the fifteen thousand Spanish soldiers under Generals Merina and Molina, composing the garrison of Matanzas, sailed away, and about 8 o'clock in the evening, General Bettancourt and his detachment of insurgent troops marched into the city, which went wild with excitement. The First Battalion Eighth Massachusetts and Twelfth New York were held in readiness that night lest there should be any hostile demonstration towards the Spanish residents of the city. It turned out that the natives were so intent on celebrating the departure of the Spanish troops that no attention was paid to anything else, and apart from that the night passed quietly.

On January 12th Major-General J. H. Wilson relieved me from command of the Department of Matanzas, and on the following day I was assigned to command the District of Matanzas with headquarters in the city. Up to this time I had been interested chiefly in arranging for the evacuation of the Spaniards, in caring for the troops, and getting them settled in camp.

On January 5th a bureau of street cleaning and sanitation had been established as the result of a careful inspection of the city, and the prevalence of yellow fever during the preceding month. Six deaths had occurred, and we were all somewhat solicitous about the future. Two cases occurred, one a civilian who died, the other a soldier, who recovered.

As a precautionary measure the old yellow fever hospital was burned and a new one of canvas erected near the district hospital. I then gave my attention to the very serious and delicate duties connected with the administration of the District and City of Matanzas, in accordance with the laws of war, and the orders of the President.

Although by virtue of the military occupation of Cuba martial law prevailed, it was the President's wish that as far as possible the inhabitants might be secured in their persons, and property, and in all their private rights and relations as long as they performed their duties, and that they be protected in their homes, their employments, and in the free exercise of their religion. That as far as possible the municipal laws such as related to the private rights of persons and property, and provided for the punishment of crime, should be continued in force, to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation.

The frame work of municipal government in Cuba was excellent, far better in some respects than our own, but Spaniards filled nearly all the insular, provincial and municipal offices and municipal government was under the direct supervision of the provincial and insular governments. Nevertheless, the municipal organization was complete, excellent of its kind, and ample for the government of the city and district, and I determined at the outset to instil into the local authorities a proper sense of their responsibilities and authority as the agent of a free and liberal government, and to require them to perform all their duties, using the troops only when necessary to aid their efforts to maintain law and order and to prevent any disorderly conduct on the part of the officers or men. To this end a provost marshal with a suitable guard was appointed and Fort San Severino was converted into a military prison.

The scope of this article will not admit of a detailed account of all that was done for the people and City of Matanzas during our stay there. It is probably sufficient to say that we cleaned and disinfected the city and established a system of sanitation so thorough that a recent traveler through the island told me that Matanzas was the cleanest and healthiest city in Cuba, and that there had been no case of yellow fever there since we left. To accomplish this a certain number of our officers and non-commissioned officers and men associated with the various city officials, who were, however, required to take the lead, the officers acting as advisers and assistants when necessary.

Matanzas was suffering at that time from the effects of the reconcentration ordered by General Weyler, and the population has been increased from about 25,000 to 40,000, chiefly refugees. As soon as it could be done these people were returned to their old homes, or provided with homes elsewhere. In the meantime, they, together with all other indigent poor, to the number of 19,373, were fed by the United States Government. Prior to this many--chiefly children--died of starvation, and many more would have followed but for the timely arrival of the troops.

Some idea of what was done by the Army for the people of Matanzas may be gathered from the vital statistics of the city. During the year 1897 there were 6,729 recorded deaths, and in 1898, 5,972, or an average of 6,350 or over 500 deaths per month. In April, 1899, the last report rendered before we left showed a total of 68 deaths, quite a perceptible decrease in four months. I have enlarged somewhat on this subject because the results of our efforts were so gratifying, and because the Eighth Massachusetts took an important part in this work, especially Chaplain George D. Sanders.

Another most useful and special service rendered by the Eighth was a settlement of the first strike ever inaugurated in Matanzas. Labor unions and strikes were unknown before American occupation, but it was not long before labor union delegates from the States arrived in Havana, and soon unions were formed and rumors of strikes reached Matanzas, to be followed later by two delegates who organized a union and started a strike for shorter hours and higher pay among the employees of the railway and the stevedores engaged in loading the annual sugar crop, then arriving in vast quantities. As a large number of the native workmen did not care to strike, those who did immediately began the kind of intimidation usually resorted to in this country, and several were assaulted and more threatened, and the situation became serious.

At this point the manager of the road appealed to me for protection and I sent two companies of the Eighth to the freight yards to see that protection was given. I gave no instructions but relied on the experience and good sense of the officers and men, and they ended the strike to my entire satisfaction. No doubt they can recall the circumstances, and the very effective measures resorted to.

That they were good and sufficient may be inferred from the fact that no one ever complained of them, except the two delegates, and they were told they could go to jail or leave town, which latter they did by the first available train, and peace and contentment prevailed thereafter to the end.

On the 20th of January commenced the festivities to celebrate the evacuation of Cuba by the Spaniards, and on February 22nd another fiesta was held in honor of General Maximo Gomez, at that time the idol of the Cubans. Upon both occasions the entire population thronged the streets and the greatest excitement prevailed. General Gomez remained in Matanzas three days, and with his departure the city settled down into its usual calm.

Thanks to the tact and excellent conduct of the troops, nothing occurred to disturb the festivities; the crowds were handled with great skill and with due regard to their susceptibilities and their first taste of personal liberty--not only as individuals but as a community. And to the very great honor of the troops it may be said that this was ever the rule in dealing with the residents of the city, no complaint of misconduct, public or private, having ever been made to me.

The Eighth Massachusetts was especially fortunate in gaining the good will of the Cubans, and when it left Matanzas was the recipient of a letter of enthusiastic commendation from the mayor of the city. A copy of the letter was sent to me, and the very complimentary expressions of the mayor were neither exaggerated nor unmerited. The regiment deserved a great deal from the people of Matanzas, and it was very gratifying to me to know that they appreciated your services.

I regret that in this brief sketch I have not been able to go more into detail concerning the duties, the trials and successful achievements of the Eighth Massachusetts during the Spanish War. It is sufficient for me to say as your brigade and division commander, that while we were together, a day rarely passed that I did not ride through your camp, turn out the guard and take a general look around, and on every Sunday make a careful inspection, and it gives me the greatest pleasure to say that in point of efficiency the regiment had few equals, and no superiors, among the volunteer regiments which came under my observation.

Proper esprit de corps and a high sense of duty pervaded the regiment, due in great measure to the excellent example of Colonel Pew and his field officers, Lieutenant-Colonels Bailey and Stopford and Majors Eldredge and Graves. During the summer of 1907 I visited the regiment in camp at South Framingham and was glad to note that the instruction and the experience of the war had not been forgotten.

In conclusion I beg to remind you that while all military efforts should be directed towards the preparation of soldiers for the great tests of the battlefield, because so much may depend on the result, there are other tests which if successfully borne, entitle soldiers to as much credit as good conduct under fire, although they may not bring them as much renown.

Among disciplined soldiers it is the exception to find one who does not behave well under fire, but it by no means follows that the bravest will not falter in their duty if beset in a sedentary camp with plague, pestilence or famine. It is not as much of a strain on the nerves to see a soldier killed in battle as to see him die of an epidemic disease, nor do I believe it is as hard for the soldier. When a soldier goes under fire, he is facing the very contingency for which he enlisted and for which he has been trained. He knows he may be shot and wounded or killed, but his duty lies unequivocally before him and appeals directly to his pride and to his manhood in a way disease can never do. Who will say then that the men who fought the battle of San Juan deserved more credit than those who died from typhoid fever while acting as volunteer nurses to their comrades or in the discharge of other duties, when by getting a furlough or running away they could have avoided all risk. The excitement of battle and the example of brave men have made a hero of many a man who but for that would have run away.

But in a typhoid fever camp death lurks everywhere and there is no stimulating excitement to strengthen those who have to face it.

Therefore the highest honors should not be given solely to those soldiers who are so fortunate as to do their duty under fire, but to those as well who do their duty where-ever they may be, regardless of consequences, and in all the circumstances which may attend them.

Do not therefore complain, as I have heard some of you do, or tinge your recollections of the war with regret, because you did not take part in the only battle that was fought, but, hoping for better luck next time, find supreme satisfaction in the reflection that you did your whole duty in places where death was quite as imminent as on San Juan Hill, and that no other regiment, regular or volunteer, could have done more.

J. P. SANGER, _Major General, U. S. A., Retired_.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] NOTE--In 1898, the Park proper contained 5530.4 acres, of which 2032.8 acres were cleared and 3506.6 wooded. Troops on the march may camp or bivouac in the woods with but little risk to the health of the men, but in a sedentary camp the tents must be in the open.

[2] NOTE--The records of the War Department show that in August there were 1568 cases of typhoid in the Division and General Hospitals; there were probably as many more in the regiments.

_The Call to Arms_

Between February 15th, when the U. S. S. Maine was destroyed in the harbor of Havana, and March 28th, 1898, when Congress received the report of the Naval Board of Inquiry, declaring the Maine to have been destroyed by an exterior explosion, public opinion in the United States was crystalizing in favor of declaring war with Spain and recognizing the independence of Cuba.

On March 16th a meeting of the officers of the Eighth Regiment Infantry, M. V. M., was held in the Headquarters of the regiment at Salem. The officers, with one exception, authorized the Colonel to tender their services as part of any quota Massachusetts might be called upon to furnish. Company commanders were directed to interview each member of their companies and report to the Adjutant the number of men ready to volunteer. The reports of the various company commanders, show that by April 1st, all but eleven men had authorized the Colonel to tender their services. It is said that the Eighth was the first National Guard Regiment in the country ready, after a careful canvass of its officers and men, to volunteer.

On March 29th resolutions declaring war with Spain were introduced into both houses of Congress. Congress had appropriated $50,000,000 for national defence, and the Legislature of Massachusetts followed with an appropriation of $500,000 to equip troops.

War was coming and troops were to be needed. This much was certain, but no one could tell how the necessary troops would be raised. It was rumored that the military advisors of the government were divided in their councils, and that some favored the retention of the Militia for local defence, and the organization of new regiments of volunteers to fill the expected call. For weeks the Adjutant was ready to tender the services of the Eighth as a militia, or volunteer regiment, whichever way the call came. The tension was so great that on April 22nd the following letter was sent to the Governor:--

"Headquarters Eighth Regiment Infantry. Massachusetts Volunteer Militia, Salem, Mass., April 22, 1898.

MAJ. GEN. SAMUEL DALTON, Adjutant General, State of Massachusetts, State House, Boston, Mass.

Sir:--

I have the honor to represent to the Commander-in-Chief that the officers and men of the Eighth Regiment are willing and anxious to respond to any call for volunteers, and I hereby tender the services of the Regiment, if agreeable to the wishes of the Commander-in-Chief, to form a part of any quota that Massachusetts may be called upon to furnish.

Very respectfully, Your obedient servant, WILLIAM A. PEW, JR. Colonel."

The above letter was acknowledged by the following communication:--

"Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Executive Department, Boston, Mass, April 22, 1898.

COL. WILLIAM A. PEW, JR., Headquarters Eighth Regiment Infantry, M. V. M., Salem, Mass.

My dear Sir:--

I have this moment had placed in my hands your letter of April 22nd addressed to Maj. Gen. Samuel Dalton, expressing to the Commander-in-Chief the willingness and desire of the officers and men of the Eighth Regiment to respond to any call for volunteers and tendering the services of the Regiment, if agreeable to the wishes of the Commander-in-Chief, to form a part of any quota that Massachusetts may be called upon to furnish.

I appreciate highly the zeal and patriotism of your offer, which will be placed upon file for future reference.

Very truly yours, ROGER WOLCOTT."

On April 23rd the President called for one hundred twenty-five thousand volunteers, and on April 25th war was declared with Spain. During the evening of the 25th, Governor Wolcott was notified by a telegram from the Secretary of War, that the Massachusetts quota, under the call of the President, would be four regiments of infantry, and three batteries of heavy artillery. Nothing was yet decided how these regiments should be raised.

The infantry organizations in Massachusetts Militia were at this time five line regiments and two corps of cadets. This information as to the Massachusetts quota increased the suspense, as it was apparent, that even if militia regiments were accepted, all could not go. About this time the newspapers published statements from the Governor, which were construed to mean, the state militia would be used for local defence, as there was much talk of a descent upon the Massachusetts coast by Cevera's fleet, which was then rendezvouing at the Cape Verde Islands.

The suspense of the militia was not relieved until late in the afternoon of April 27th, when the Governor received a letter from the Secretary of War, requesting him to furnish four regiments of infantry to serve for the period of two years unless sooner discharged. In his letter the Secretary of War expressed a desire that as far as practicable, the National Guard be given preference.