Volume 23, p. 628.

[34] Herr Scheidemann, in an eloquent speech to the Reichstag, March 30, 1911, pleaded with the German Government to be sympathetic with the position in which Great Britain found herself. No nation with the imperial responsibilities of Great Britain could afford to neglect to take precautionary steps against the possibility of the Bagdad Railway being used as a weapon of offense against Egypt, the Suez Canal, and India. “Complications upon complications,” he said, “are certain to arise as a result of the construction of the Bagdad Railway. But we expect of our Government, at the very least, that in the course of protecting the legitimate German economic interests which are involved in the Bagdad Railway, it will leave no stone unturned to prevent the development of Anglo-German hostility over the matter. We want to do everything possible to effect a thorough understanding with England. Only by such a policy can we hope to quiet the fears of British imperialists that the Railway is a menace to the Empire.” _Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 2 Session_, Volume 266 (1911), pp. 5980c-5984b.

[35] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, fifth series, Volume 21 (1911), pp. 241–242.

[36] _Cf._ H. N. Brailsford, _The War of Steel and Gold_, Chapter III, “The Egyptian Model.”

[37] _Supra_, pp. 181–182.

[38] André Tardieu, _France and the Alliances_ (New York, 1908), p. 46. For M. Tardieu’s analysis of the causes of the growing Anglo-German hostility, _cf._ pp. 48–57. It was in the latter part of April, 1903, that the Bagdad Railway negotiations fell through. In May, Edward VII paid an official visit to Paris; in October, an arbitration agreement was signed by France and Great Britain. The following spring the treaties constituting the Entente Cordiale were executed. Sir Thomas Barclay, _Thirty Years’ Reminiscences_ (London, 1906), pp. 175 _et seq._ For the text of these agreements _cf._ _Parliamentary Papers_,