Volume XII, Chapter XIV; R. Davey, _The Sultan and His Subjects

(London, 1897); V. Cardashian, _The Ottoman Empire of the Twentieth Century_ (Albany, N. Y., 1908).

[3] The texts of the various treaties of capitulation may be found in G. E. Noradounghian (ed.), _Recueil d’actes internationaux de l’Empire ottoman, 1300–1902_ (4 volumes, Paris, 1897–1903), Volume I, documents numbers 153, 170, 196, 201, etc., _ad lib._, Volume II, numbers 499, 593, etc., _ad lib._; also _Recueil des traités de la Porte ottomane avec les puissances étrangères, 1536–1901_ (10 volumes, Paris, 1864–1901), _passim_; E. A. Van Dyck, _Report on the Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire_, Forty-seventh Congress, Special Session, Senate Executive Document No. 3, First Session, Senate Executive Document No. 87 (Washington, 1881–1882); G. Pelissie du Rausas, _Le régime des capitulations dans l’Empire ottoman_ (2 volumes, Paris, 1902–1905); A. R. von Overbeck, _Die Kapitulationen des osmanischen Reiches_ (Breslau, 1917); W. Lehman, _Die Kapitulationen_ (Weimar, 1917); P. M. Brown, _Foreigners in Turkey, Their Juridical Status_ (Princeton, 1914).

[4] For an account of the establishment, functions, and operation of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, _cf._ George Young (ed.), _Corps de droit ottoman—Recueil des codes, lois, réglements, ordonnances, et actes les plus importants du droit intérieur, et d’études sur le droit coutumier de l’Empire ottoman_ (7 volumes, Oxford, 1905–1906), Volume V, Chapter LXXXV; A. Heidborn, _Manuel de droit public et administratif de l’Empire ottoman_ (2 volumes, Vienna, 1912), Volume II; C. Morawitz, _Les finances de Turquie_ (Paris, 1902); A. du Velay, _Essai sur l’histoire financière de la Turquie_ (Paris, 1903), Parts V and VI; L. Delaygue, _Essai sur les finances ottomanes_ (Paris, 1911).

[5] There were a few factories erected in Turkey by foreign capitalists, notably those of the Oriental Carpet Manufacturers, Ltd., the American Tobacco Company, and the _Deutsche-Levantischen Baumwollgesellschaft_. In general, however, the factory and the factory town were not common phenomena in Asiatic Turkey. An interesting account of the effects of the Industrial Revolution upon economic conditions in Turkey is that of Talcott Williams, _Turkey a World Problem of Today_ (Garden City, 1921), pp. 268 _et seq._; W. S. Monroe, _Turkey and the Turks: an Account of the Lands, Peoples and Institutions of the Ottoman Empire_ (London, 1909), Chapter X; M. J. Garnett, _Turkish Life in Town and Country_ (London, 1904).

[6] J. E. Spurr (ed.), _Political and Commercial Geology_ (New York, 1921), pp. 109, 115–116, 172–173, 184–185; _Anatolia_, No. 17 in a series of handbooks published by the Historical Section of the Foreign Office (London, 1920), pp. 88–90.

[7] Spurr, _op. cit._, pp. 358–359; _Armenia and Kurdistan_, No. 62 of the Foreign Office Handbooks, p. 60; L. Dominian, “The Mineral Wealth of Asia Minor,” in _The Near East_, May 26, 1916, p. 91; E. Banse, _Auf den Spuren der Bagdadbahn_ (Weimar, 1913), pp. 140–145; L. de Launay, _La Géologie et les richesses minerales de l’Asie_ (Paris, 1911); R. Fitzner, _Anatolien, Wirtschaftsgeographie_ (Berlin, 1902); P. Rohrbach, _Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung Westasiens_ (Halle, 1902); G. Carles, _La Turquie économique_ (Paris, 1906); E. Mygind, “Anatolien und seine wirtschaftliche Bedeutung,” in _Die Balkan Revue_, Volume 4 (1917), pp. 1–6.

[8] L. Dominian, “Fuel in Turkey: an Analysis of Coal Deposits,” in _The Near East_, June 23, 1916, pp. 186–187; J. Kirsopp, “The Coal Resources of the Near East,” _ibid._, October 10, 1919, pp. 393–394.

[9] F. Maunsell, “The Mesopotamian Petroleum Field,” in the _Geographical Journal_, Volume IX (1897), pp. 523–532; L. Dominian, “Fuel in Turkey: Petroleum,” in _The Near East_, July 14, 1917; _Mesopotamia_, No. 63 of the Foreign Office Handbooks, pp. 34, 85–86; _Syria and Palestine_, No. 60 of the Foreign Office Handbooks, p. 111.

[10] _Parliamentary Papers_, 1921, Cmd. 675; _The Near East_, October 26, 1917, p. 516.

[11] _Die Bagdadbahn_ (1903), pp. 26–28.

[12] _Parliamentary Papers_, 1921, Cmd. 675. For some reason or other this option was allowed to lapse.

[13] H. Woodhouse, “American Oil Claims in Turkey,” in _Current History_ (New York), Volume XV (1922), pp. 953–959.

[14] _Report of the Department of Agriculture in Mesopotamia, 1920_ (Bagdad, 1921); _The Cultivation of Cotton in Mesopotamia_ (Bagdad, 1922); “Cotton Growing in Mesopotamia,” in the _Bulletin of the Imperial Institute_, Volume 18 (1920), pp. 73–82.

[15] Rohrbach, _op. cit._, pp. 30–46.

[16] Quoted in _The Near East_, October 6, 1916, pp. 545–546. For an elaboration of the views of Sir William Willcocks see the following of his books and articles: _The Recreation of Chaldea_ (Cairo, 1903); _The Irrigation of Mesopotamia_ (London, 1905, and Constantinople, 1911); “Mesopotamia, Past, Present and Future,” in the _Geographical Journal_, January, 1910, pp. 1–18. For further works on the economic resources of Turkey-in-Asia consult, also, the following: K. H. Müller, _Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung der Bagdadbahn_ (Hamburg, 1917); L. Blanckenhorn, _Syrien und die deutsche Arbeit_ (Weimar, 1916); L. Schulmann, _Zur türkischen Agrarfrage_ (Weimar, 1916); A. Ruppin, _Syrien als Wirtschaftsgebiet_ (Berlin, 1917).

[17] W. von Pressel, _Les chemins de fer en Turquie d’Asie_ (Zurich, 1902), pp. 4–5, 52–59, etc. _ad lib._ For statements of the importance of von Pressel in the development of railways in Turkey _cf._ André Chéradame, _La question d’Orient: la Macédoine, le chemin de fer de Bagdad_ (Paris, 1903), pp. 25 _et seq._; C. A. Schaefer, _Die Entwicklung der Bagdadbahnpolitik_ (Weimar, 1916), p. 13.

[18] _Corps de droit ottoman_, Volume IV, pp. 62–64.

[19] Sir H. P. Caillard, Article “Turkey” in the _Encyclopedia Britannica_, eleventh edition, Volume 27, p. 439; _Reports of the Ottoman Public Debt_ (London, 1884 _et seq._), _passim._

[20] In Turkey all Mussulmans over 20 years of age were liable to military service for a period of 20 years, 4 of which were with the colors in the regular army. Residents in the outlying territories, notably the Arabs and the Kurds, constantly avoided military service and went unpunished because of the inability of the Government to send punitive expeditions into these regions. Railways would have produced satisfactory bases of operations for such expeditions and would have shortened their lines of communication. _The Statesman’s Year Book_, 1903, pp. 1168–1170.

[21] The Hedjaz Railway was a great national enterprise which indicated the strength of Moslem feeling in Turkey and which proved the desire of the Ottoman Government to construct national railways as far as capital and technical skill could be obtained. So far as Abdul Hamid was concerned, the railway was an attempt to gain prestige for his claim to the Caliphate, as well as a move to strengthen his political position in Syria and the Hedjaz. In April, 1900, the Sultan announced to the Faithful his determination to construct a railway from Damascus to the holy cities of Medina and Mecca. An appeal was issued to Mohammedans the world over for funds to carry out the work. The Sultan headed the list with a subscription of about a quarter of a million dollars, and by 1904 over three and a half million dollars had been collected. The only compulsory contributions were the levies of 10% on the salary of every official in the civil and military service of the empire. It is estimated that the contributions eventually amounted to almost fifteen million dollars. The engineers in charge of the construction were Italians, although the great bulk of the work was done by the army and the peasantry. Nearly seven hundred thousand persons were employed on the construction work at one time or another, the non-Moslems being replaced as quickly as Mussulmans could be trained to take their places. On August 31, 1908, the thirty-second anniversary of the accession of Abdul Hamid, the railway was completed to Medina, where construction was halted temporarily because of the Young Turk Revolution and the international complications which followed it. _Corps de droit ottoman_, Volume IV, pp. 242–244; A. Hamilton, _Problems of the Middle East_ (London, 1909), pp. 273–292; _Annual Register_, 1908, pp. 328–329.

[22] Quoted by Hamilton, _op. cit._, pp. 274–275.

[23] _Via_ the Bagdad Railway and the Syrian system Turkish troops could have been transported to a point less than 200 miles from Suez. A successful attack on the Canal, of course, would have severed British communications with the East. In addition, it would have given the Sultan an opportunity to attack, and assert his suzerainty over, Egypt. Dr. Rohrbach made a great point of this alleged menace to the British position in Egypt. _Cf._ _Die Bagdadbahn_, pp. 18–19; _German World Policies_, pp. 165–167. This program, however, would have been an altogether too ambitious one for the military strength of the Ottoman Empire, which had such far-flung frontiers to defend. In any event, British statesmen seemed to realize that the Sinai Peninsula was a formidable natural defence against an attack on the Suez Canal and that such an expedition would be merely a pin-prick in the imperial flesh. _Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords_, fifth series, Volume 7 (1911), pp. 601 _et seq._ The termination in a fiasco of the Turkish drive of 1914–1915 against the Canal confirmed this prophecy.

[24] _Infra_, p. 83; Kurt Wiedenfeld, _Die deutsch-türkische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen_ (Leipzig, 1915), p. 23; _Report of the Bagdad Railway Company_, 1908, pp. 4–5.

[25] _Cf._, _e.g._, K. Helfferich, _Die deutsche Türkenpolitik_, p. 22.

[26] _Persia and the Persian Question_, Volume I, p. 634.