Volume 37 (1914), pp. 272–281; F. H. Skrine, _The Expansion of Russia

(Cambridge, 1904), _passim_.

[7] Bohler, _loc. cit._, pp. 294–295; Gervais-Courtellemont, “La question du chemin de fer de Bagdad,” in _Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, Volume 23 (1907), pp. 499–507.

[8] Baron S. A. Korff, _Russia’s Foreign Relations during the Last Half Century_ (New York, 1922), pp. 133–134.

[9] Rohrbach, _Die Bagdadbahn_, pp. 10–13; Imbert, _loc. cit._, p. 678. Enthusiastic Turks believed that, with adequate rail communications, Erzerum might be transformed into a Turkish Belfort. _Cf._ Mazel, _op. cit._, p. 37. Had the Bagdad Railway and the projected railways of northern Anatolia been completed before the outbreak of the Great War, the Turks could have made a more effective defence in the Caucasus campaign of the Grand Duke Nicholas in 1916.

[10] For a general statement of the attitude of Russia and the Balkan States to the Bagdad Railway _cf._ Alexandre Ilitch, _Le chemin de fer de Bagdad, ou l’expansion de l’Allemagne en Orient_ (Brussels, Paris, Leipzig, 1913), pp. 100–107, 121–123.

[11] Bohler, _loc. cit._, pp. 273–289; _cf._, also, P. Rohrbach, _German World Policies_, pp. 223–224.

[12] _Supra_, pp. 59–60.

[13] Chéradame, _op. cit._, pp. 267 _et seq._; _The Times_, August 10, 1899; K. Helfferich, _Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges_, p. 124.

[14] _Journal Officiel, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des Députés_, March 25, 1902, p. 1468.

[15] According to M. Deschanel, this was sophistry. The French Government, if it was not guilty of an error of commission, certainly was guilty of a sin of omission. It was the opinion of M. Deschanel that the French Ambassador at Constantinople should have done something to put the French Government on record as opposed to the Bagdad Railway. M. Deschanel was not certain, however, that the French Ministry had not consented to the participation of French capital in the plan. “How can one imagine,” he said, “that an institution such as the Ottoman Bank became involved in an enterprise of such great political and military importance without the approval of our Foreign Office?... How is it that the Ottoman Bank is a party to this enterprise, and how is it that the Board of Directors for the first section of the line has French representatives, when only a word from the Government could have prevented it?” _Ibid._, November 20, 1903, p. 2798.

[16] _Ibid._, March 25, 1902, pp. 1468 _et seq._

[17] Victor Bérard, “Le Discours du Chancelier,” in the _Revue de Paris_, December 15, 1906.

[18] The _Revue Bleue_, April 6, 1907, p. 429; _Syria and Palestine_, p. 126. Many of the claims that the Bagdad Railway jeopardized French prosperity were purely fantastic. It was maintained that the opening of the great Mesopotamian granary would cripple French agriculture, already seriously handicapped by the competition of the new world. To this was added the suggestion that development of cotton-growing in Turkey would stifle the infant efforts at the cultivation of cotton in the French colonies. It is incredible that Mesopotamian grain and cotton would have interfered with the flourishing prosperity of the French peasantry; in any event, any such danger was at least a generation removed. France raised high tariff barriers against foreign competition in the home market for agricultural products; she was not an exporter of grain.

[19] _Journal Officiel, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des Députés_, March 25, 1902, pp. 1467 _et seq._

[20] _Cf._, M. Montbel, “Les puissances coloniales devant l’Islam,” in _Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, Volume 37 (1914), pp. 348–362.

[21] _Journal Officiel, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des Députés_, November 20, 1905, p. 2798. The italics are mine.

[22] _Revue des deux mondes_, Volume 149 (1898), p. 29.

[23] Sources of the treaties granting special privileges to France are sighted in Note 3, Chapter II. Regarding the origins and nature of the French protectorate over Roman Catholic missions see the article “Capitulations” in the _Encyclopedia Britannica_, previously cited; J. Brucker, “The Protectorate of Missionaries in the Near East,” in the _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Volume XII, pp. 488–492; A. Schopoff, _Les Réformes et la Protection des Chrétiens en Turquie, 1673–1904_ (Paris, 1904); _Livre de propagande de l’alliance française, 1883–1893_ (Paris, 1894), especially pp. 35 _et seq._; Viscomte Aviau de Piolant, _La défense des intérêts catholiques en Terre Sainte et en Asie Mineure_ (Paris, 1886).

[24] _Syria and Palestine_, pp. 43–45, 54–55; L. Bréhier, “Turkish Empire—Missions,” in _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Volume XV, pp. 101–102; J. Atalla, “Les solutions de la question syrienne,” in _Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, Volume 24 (1907), p. 472.

[25] _Bulletin de la Chambre de Commerce française de Constantinople_, June 30, 1897, pp. 112–113, November 30, 1897, p. 149.

[26] Brucker, _loc. cit._, p. 490.

[27] It should be added that the Treaty also stipulated that “the acquired rights of France are explicitly reserved, and there shall be no interference with the _statu quo_ in the Holy Places.” E. Hertslet, _The Map of Europe by Treaty_, Volume IV (London, 1891), p. 2797.

[28] _Revue des deux mondes_, Volume 149, (1898), pp. 24–25; Brucker, _loc. cit._, p. 491.

[29] _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Volume XII, p. 491. The rôle of the Italians in this controversy is of considerable interest. The desire of the Italian Government to assert its right to protect its own citizens abroad was a manifestation of the Italian nationalism which brought about the establishment of the Kingdom; at the same time it was an expression of that anti-Clerical tendency which characterized Italian politics from the days of Cavour to the outbreak of the Great War. Undoubtedly, also, there was an economic side to the question. It will be recalled that Italian trade with the Ottoman Empire grew more rapidly than that of any other power after the opening of the twentieth century. (_Supra_, pp. 105–106.) This growth was due, in no small degree, to the earlier rise of Italian missionary activity in Turkey. This growth of missions and schools, as well as of commercial establishments, was irritating to patriotic Frenchmen. _Cf._ two articles by René Pinon, “Les écoles d’Orient,” in _Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, Volume 24 (1907), pp. 415–435, 487–517. Italian missionaries, charged M. Pinon, were encouraged in every way to ignore the French protectorate, appealing only to Italian diplomatic and consular representatives. “Official Italy, Catholic and papal Italy, free-mason Italy and clerical Italy, all are working together in a common great patriotic effort for the spread of the Italian language and the rise of the national power” (p. 500). Annoying as this is, says M. Pinon, it should be “a singular lesson for certain Frenchmen!” That there was no love lost on the Italian side of the controversy may be gathered from an analysis of the Italian press comments which appeared in _Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, Volume 37 (1914), p. 495.

[30] Brucker, _loc. cit._, p. 491. Inasmuch as the protectorate of Catholic missions involved a considerable responsibility for France, one may ask why the French Government should have been so solicitous that no other nation be allowed to share the burden. The answer is suggested by the _Catholic Encyclopedia_, which states that the system of religious protectorates is almost invariably subject to the abuse that “the protectors will seek payment for their services by trammeling the spiritual direction of the mission or by demanding political services in return.” Volume XII, p. 492.

[31] _Supra_, pp. 134–135.

[32] _Revue des deux mondes_, Volume 149 (1898), p. 39. The “pro-German party” was said to consist of Cardinals Ledochowski, Hohenlohe, Galimberti, and Kapp. _Ibid._, pp. 11–12; Reinsch, _op. cit._, p. 269.

[33] _Revue des deux mondes_, Volume 149 (1898), pp. 36–40. On this whole subject see, also, C. Lagier, _Byzance et Stamboul: nos droits françaises et nos missions en Orient_ (Paris, 1905); Hilaire Capuchin, _La France Catholique en Orient durant les trois-derniers siècles_ (Paris, 1902); A. Schopoff, _Les Réformes et la Protection des Chrétiens en Turquie_ (Paris, 1904).

[34] G. Saint-Yves, _Les Chemins de fer françaises dans la Turquie d’Asie_ (Paris, 1914).

[35] The French and Belgian banks principally interested were: the Imperial Ottoman Bank, the _Banque de l’Union Parisienne_, and the _Banque Internationale de Bruxelles_. _Cf._ article “Ou en est la question du chemin de fer de Bagdad,” in _Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, Volume 24 (1907), pp. 167–171; E. Letailleur, _Les capitalistes français contre la France_ (Paris, 1916), pp. 72–110. M. Rouvier visited Turkey in 1901, at the request of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, to suggest improvements in the fiscal system of the Empire. (_Corps de droit ottoman_, Volume IV, p. 110.) It was at this time, probably, that he learned enough of the Bagdad Railway to persuade him of the wisdom of investing in its securities.

[36] Gervais-Courtellemont, _loc. cit._, p. 507; Imbert, _loc. cit._, p. 682.

[37] Gervais-Courtellemont, _loc. cit._, p. 507; Bohler, _loc. cit._, p. 294.

[38] Bohler, _loc. cit._, pp. 293–295.

[39] Mazel, _op. cit._, pp. 315–322.

[40] K. Helfferich, _Die deutsche Türkenpolitik_, p. 18.

[41] “La politique extérieure de l’Allemagne,” in _Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, Volume 23 (1907), pp. 340–341.

[42] _Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 1 Session_,