Part 4

Haskin formed a tunneling company and began work with the sinking of a shaft in Hoboken on the New Jersey side. In a month it was halted because of an injunction by, curiously, the D L & W Railroad, who feared for their vast investment in terminal and marine facilities. Not until November of 1879 was the injunction lifted and work again commenced. The shaft was completed and an air lock located in one wall from which the tunnel proper was to be carried forward. It was Haskin's plan to use no shield, relying solely on the pressure of compressed air to maintain the work faces and prevent the entry of water. The air was admitted in late December, and the first large-scale pneumatic tunneling operation launched. A single 26-foot, double-track bore was at first undertaken, but a work face of such diameter proved unmanageable and two oval tubes 18 feet high by 16 feet wide were substituted, each to carry a single track. Work went forward with reasonable facility, considering the lack of precedent. A temporary entrance was formed of sheet-iron rings from the air lock down to the tunnel grade, at which point the permanent work of the north tube was started. Immediately behind the excavation at the face, a lining of thin wrought-iron plates was built up, to provide form for the 2-foot, permanent brick lining that followed. The three stages are shown in the model in about their proper relationship of progress. The work is shown passing beneath an old timber-crib bulkhead, used for stabilizing the shoreline.

The silt of the riverbed was about the consistency of putty and under good conditions formed a secure barrier between the excavation and the river above. It was easily excavated, and for removal was mixed with water and blown out through a pipe into the shaft by the higher pressure in the tunnel. About half was left in the bore for removal later. The basic scheme was workable, but in operation an extreme precision was required in regulating the air pressure in the work area.[5] It was soon found that there existed an 11-psi difference between the pressure of water on the top and the bottom of the working face, due to the 22-foot height of the unlined opening. Thus, it was impossible to maintain perfect pneumatic balance of the external pressure over the entire face. It was necessary to strike an average with the result that some water entered at the bottom of the face where the water pressure was greatest, and some air leaked out at the top where the water pressure was below the air pressure. Constant attention was essential: several men did nothing but watch the behavior of the leaks and adjusted the pressure as the ground density changed with advance. Air was supplied by several steam-driven compressors at the surface.

The air lock permitted passage back and forth of men and supplies between the atmosphere and the work area, without disturbing the pressure differential. This principle is demonstrated by an animated model set into the main model, to the left of the shaft (fig. 39). The variation of pressure within the lock chamber to match the atmosphere or the pressurized area, depending on the direction of passage, is clearly shown by simplified valves and gauges, and by the use of light in varying color density. In the Haskin tunnel, 5 to 10 minutes were taken to pass the miners through the lock so as to avoid too abrupt a physiological change.

Despite caution, a blowout occurred in July 1880 due to air leakage not at the face, but around the temporary entrance. One door of the air lock jammed and twenty men drowned, resulting in an inquiry which brought forth much of the distrust with which Haskin was regarded by the engineering profession. His ability and qualifications were subjected to the bitterest attack in and by the technical press. There is some indication that, although the project began with a staff of competent engineers, they were alienated by Haskin in the course of work and at least one withdrew. Haskin's remarks in his own defense indicate that some of the denunciation was undoubtedly justified. And yet, despite this reaction, the fundamental merit of the pneumatic tunneling method had been demonstrated by Haskin and was immediately recognized and freely acknowledged. It was apparent at the same time, however, that air by itself did not provide a sufficiently reliable support for large-area tunnel works in unstable ground, and this remains the only major subaqueous tunnel work driven with air alone.

After the accident, work continued under Haskin until 1882 when funds ran out. About 1600 feet of the north tube and 600 feet of the south tube had been completed. Greathead resumed operations with a shield for a British company in 1889, but exhaustion of funds again caused stoppage in 1891. The tunnel was finally completed in 1904, and is now in use as part of the Hudson and Manhattan rapid-transit system, never providing the sought-after rail link. A splendid document of the Haskin portion of the work is S. D. V. Burr's _Tunneling Under the Hudson River_ published in 1885. It is based entirely upon firsthand material and contains drawings of most of the work, including the auxiliary apparatus. It is interesting to note that electric illumination (arc, not incandescent, lights) and telephones were used, unquestionably the first employment of either in tunnel work.

THE ST. CLAIR TUNNEL

The final model of the soft-ground series reflects, as did the Hoosac Tunnel model for hard-rock tunneling, final emergence into the modern period. Although the St. Clair Tunnel was completed over 70 years ago, it typifies in its method of construction, the basic procedures of subaqueous work in the present day. The Thames Tunnel of Brunel, and Haskin's efforts beneath the Hudson, had clearly shown that by themselves, both the shield and pneumatic systems of driving through fluid ground were defective in practice for tunnels of large area. Note that the earliest successful works by each method had been of very small area, so that the influence of adverse conditions was greatly diminished.

The first man to perceive and seize upon the benefits to be gained by combining the two systems was, most fittingly, Greathead. Although he had projected the technique earlier, in driving the underground City and South London Railway in 1886, he brought together for the first time the three fundamental elements essential for the practical tunneling of soft, water-bearing ground: compressed-air support of the work during construction, the movable shield, and cast-iron, permanent lining. The marriage was a happy one indeed; the limitations of each system were almost perfectly overcome by the qualities of the others.

The conditions prevailing in 1882 at the Sarnia, Ontario, terminal of the Grand Trunk Railway, both operational and physical, were almost precisely the same as those which inspired the undertaking of the Hudson River Tunnel. The heavy traffic at this vital U.S.--Canada rail interchange was ferried inconveniently across the wide St. Clair River, and the bank and river conditions precluded construction of a bridge. A tunnel was projected by the railway in that year, the time when Haskin's tribulations were at their height. Perhaps because of this lack of precedent for a work of such size, nothing was done immediately. In 1884 the railway organized a tunnel company; in 1886 test borings were made in the riverbed and small exploratory drifts were started across from both banks by normal methods of mine timbering. The natural gas, quicksand, and water encountered soon stopped the work.

It was at this time that the railway's president visited Greathead's City and South London workings. The obvious answer to the St. Clair problem lay in the successful conduct of this subway. Joseph Hobson, chief engineer of the Grand Trunk and of the tunnel project, in designing a shield, is said to have searched for drawings of the shields used in the Broadway and Tower Subways of 1868-9, but unable to locate any, he relied to a limited extent on the small drawings of those in Drinker's volume. There is no explanation as to why he did not have drawings of the City and South London shield at that moment in use, unless one considers the rather unlikely possibility that Greathead maintained its design in secrecy.

The Hobson shield followed Greathead's as closely as any other, in having a diaphragm with closable doors, but a modification of Beach's sharpened horizontal shelves was also used. However, these functioned more as working platforms than supports for the earth. The machine was 21-1/2 feet in diameter, an unprecedented size and almost twice that of Greathead's current one. It was driven by 24 hydraulic rams. Throughout the entire preliminary consideration of the project there was a marked sense of caution that amounted to what seems an almost total lack of confidence in success. Commencement of the work from vertical shafts was planned so that if the tunnel itself failed, no expenditure would have been made for approach work. In April 1888, the shafts were started near both riverbanks, but before reaching proper depth the almost fluid clay and silt flowed up faster than it could be excavated and this plan was abandoned. After this second inauspicious start, long open approach cuts were made and the work finally began. The portals were established in the cuts, several thousand feet back from each bank and there the tunneling itself began. The portions under the shore were driven without air. When the banks were reached, brick bulkheads containing air locks were built across the opening and the section beneath the river, about 3,710 feet long, driven under air pressure of 10 to 28 pounds above atmosphere. For most of the way, the clay was firm and there was little air leakage. It was found that horses could not survive in the compressed air, and so mules were used under the river.

In the firm clay, excavation was carried on several feet in front of the shield, as shown in the model (fig. 42). About twelve miners worked at the face. However, in certain strata the clay encountered was so fluid that the shield could be simply driven forward by the rams, causing the muck to flow in at the door openings without excavation. After each advance, the rams were retracted and a ring of iron lining segments built up, as in the Tower Subway. Here, for the first time, an "erector arm" was used for placing the segments, which weighed about half a ton. In all respects, the work advanced with wonderful facility and lack of operational difficulty. Considering the large area, no subaqueous tunnel had ever been driven with such speed. The average monthly progress for the American and Canadian headings totaled 455 feet, and at top efficiency 10 rings or a length of 15.3 feet could be set in a 24-hour day in each heading. The 6,000 feet of tunnel was driven in just a year; the two shields met vis-a-vis in August of 1890.

The transition was complete. The work had been closely followed by the technical journals and the reports of its successful accomplishment thus were brought to the attention of the entire civil engineering profession. As the first major subaqueous tunnel completed in America and the first in the world of a size able to accommodate full-scale rail traffic, the St. Clair Tunnel served to dispel the doubts surrounding such work, and established the pattern for a mode of tunneling which has since changed only in matters of detail.

Of the eight models, only this one was built under the positive guidance of original documents. In the possession of the Canadian National Railways are drawings not only of all elements of the shield and lining, but of much of the auxiliary apparatus used in construction. Such materials rarely survive, and do so in this case only because of the foresight of the railway which, to avoid paying a high profit margin to a private contractor as compensation for the risk and uncertainty involved, carried the contract itself and, therefore, preserved all original drawing records.

While the engineering of tunnels has been comprehensively treated in this paper from the historical standpoint, it is well to still reflect that the advances made in tunneling have not perceptibly removed the elements of uncertainty but have only provided more positive and effective means of countering their forces. Still to be faced are the surprises of hidden streams, geologic faults, shifts of strata, unstable materials, and areas of extreme pressure and temperature.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

AGRICOLA, GEORGIUS. _De re Metallica._ [English transl. H. C. and L. H. Hoover (_The Mining Magazine_, London, 1912).] Basel: Froben, 1556.

BEACH, ALFRED ELY. _The pneumatic dispatch._ New York: The American News Company, 1868.

BEAMISH, RICHARD. _A memoir of the life of Sir Marc Isambard Brunel._ London: Longmans, Green, Longmans and Roberts, 1862.

BURR, S. D. V. _Tunneling under the Hudson River._ New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1885.

COPPERTHWAITE, WILLIAM CHARLES. _Tunnel shields and the use of compressed air in subaqueous works._ New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1906.

DRINKER, HENRY STURGESS. _Tunneling, explosive compounds and rock drills._ New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1878.

LATROBE, BENJAMIN H. Report on the Hoosac Tunnel (Baltimore, October 1, 1862). Pp. 125-139, app. 2, in _Report of the commissioners upon the Troy and Greenfield Railroad and Hoosac Tunnel_. Boston, 1863.

LAW, HENRY. A memoir of the Thames Tunnel. _Weale's Quarterly Papers on Engineering_ (London, 1845-46), vol. 3, pp. 1-25 and vol. 5, pp. 1-86.

The pneumatic tunnel under Broadway, N.Y. _Scientific American_ (March 5, 1870), pp. 154-156.

_Report of the commissioners upon the Troy and Greenfield Railroad and Hoosac Tunnel to his excellency the governor and the honorable the executive council of the state of Massachusetts, February 28, 1863._ Boston, 1863.

STORROW, CHARLES S. Report on European tunnels (Boston, November 28, 1862). Pp. 5-122, app. 1, in _Report of the commissioners upon the Troy and Greenfield Railroad and Hoosac Tunnel...._ Boston, 1863.

The St. Clair Tunnel. _Engineering News_ (in series running October 4 to December 27, 1890).

FOOTNOTES

[1] There are two important secondary techniques for opening subterranean and subaqueous ways, neither a method truly of tunneling. One of these, of ancient origin, used mainly in the construction of shallow subways and utility ways, is the "cut and cover" system, whereby an open trench is excavated and then roofed over. The result is, in effect, a tunnel. The concept of the other method was propounded in the early 19th century but only used practically in recent years. This is the "trench" method, a sort of subaqueous equivalent of cut and cover. A trench is dredged in the bed of a body of water, into which prefabricated sections of large diameter tube are lowered, in a continuous line. The joints are then sealed by divers, the trench is backfilled over the tube, the ends are brought up to dryland portals, the water is pumped out, and a subterranean passage results. The Chesapeake Bay Bridge Tunnel (1960-1964) is a recent major work of this character.

[2] In 1952 a successful machine was developed on this plan, with hardened rollers on a revolving cutting head for disintegrating the rock. The idea is basically sound, possessing advantages in certain situations over conventional drilling and blasting systems.

[3] In 1807 the noted Cornish engineer Trevithick commenced a small timbered drift beneath the Thames, 5 feet by 3 feet, as an exploratory passage for a larger vehicular tunnel. Due to the small frontal area, he was able to successfully probe about 1000 feet, but the river then broke in and halted the work. Mine tunnels had also reached beneath the Irish Sea and various rivers in the coal regions of Newcastle, but these were so far below the surface as to be in perfectly solid ground and can hardly be considered subaqueous workings.

[4] Unlike the Brunel tunnel, this was driven from both ends simultaneously, the total overall progress thus being 3 feet per shift rather than 18 inches. A top speed of 9 feet per day could be advanced by each shield under ideal conditions.

[5] Ideally, the pressure of air within the work area of a pneumatically driven tunnel should just balance the hydrostatic head of the water without, which is a function of its total height above the opening. If the air pressure is not high enough, water will, of course, enter, and if very low, there is danger of complete collapse of the unsupported ground areas. If too high, the air pressure will overcome that due to the water and the air will force its way out through the ground, through increasingly larger openings, until it all rushes out suddenly in a "blowout." The pressurized atmosphere gone, the water then is able to pour in through the same opening, flooding the workings.

INDEX

Agricola, Georgius, 215, 216

Barlow, Peter W., 221, 227 Beach, Alfred Ely, 224, 227-229, 231, 237 Brunel, Marc Isambard (the elder), 204, 205, 217, 218, 221, 224, 229, 231, 236 Burleigh, Charles, 212, 213 Burleigh Rock Drill Company, 212 Burr, S. D. V., 236

Cochrane, Sir Thomas, 231, 232 Copperthwaite, William Charles, 224

Doane, Thomas, 210, 212, 213, 215 Drinker, Henry S., 224, 237

Greathead, James Henry, 204, 218, 221, 224, 229, 231, 235-237 Gwynn, Stuart, 210

Haskin, DeWitt C., 204, 232, 234-236 Haupt, Herman, 204, 209, 210 Hobson, Joseph, 237

Latrobe, Benjamin H., 208, 209 Law, Henry, 218

Mowbray, George W., 213, 215

Nobel, Alfred B., 213

Putnam Machine Works, 212

Shanley, Walter, 212 Shanley Bros., 215 Sommeiller, Germain, 210 Storrow, Charles S., 210

Tweed, William Marcy (Boss), 229

Weale, John, 218

* * * * *

Transcriber's Notes

All obvious typographical errors corrected. Formatting inconsistancies and spelling were standardized. Paragraphs split by illustrations were rejoined. The text in the reproduced handbill for the Thames Tunnel was transcribed with a slight modification to the figure description portion. The Index was extracted from the full publication Index.