c. Selections from the Argumentation of the Defense

_EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR DEFENDANT BRACK_[151]

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The treatment of the question of responsibility for euthanasia in this room encounters great difficulties insofar as there is not only considerable ignorance of certain peculiarities of the German position in constitutional matters, but above all a great difference between the thinking of continental European and of transatlantic jurists on matters of constitutional statutory law. Law and morals have for centuries been sharply differentiated on the European continent in juristic and above all in legislative thinking in contrast to the states across the ocean. This historical fact must be taken into consideration, for only then can the realization be reached that in a question of _German_ constitutional law only that development can be decisive which legal training has had in Germany in deviations from the constitutional law of the Weimar Republic, since the Enabling Act of 24 March 1933 and the Head of the State Law of 1 August 1934.

With these laws Hitler was given all authority as head of the state and chief of the government, in full recognition of the Fuehrer principle which had been in operation for over a year, with approval by the plebiscite of 19 August 1934.

From this time on Hitler incorporated the will of the people, and the resulting functions. He had thus become the Supreme Legislator of the Reich. A concluding resolution of the Reichstag was only the confirmation of his primary declaration of his will.

Among the independent promulgations of laws, which were represented as direct emanations of his authority, the declarations of Hitler’s will which were at first called “decrees” and later uniformly “Fuehrer decrees” assumed the most important role. In them the distinction, still customary under the Weimar constitution, between legislative and executive is overcome, as Hitler proclaimed in his Reichstag speech of 30 January 1937 in the words: “There is only one legislative power and one executive.”

Therefore the decrees united material law with organizational measures and administrative directives, especially insofar as they were addressed only to a group of persons gathered together in a certain community. Proclamation in the Reich Law Gazette [Reichsgesetzblatt], countersigned by the competent departmental minister, and later the competent chancellery chief, no longer played a decisive role in 1937. The Fuehrer principle was already in full operation at this time. It no longer tolerated the dependence of the authority to promulgate original laws which was granted to the Fuehrer by the plebiscite of 1934 on the observance of formal regulations. The only decisive thing that remained was the fact of the proclamation of the will of the Fuehrer, not its form. Hitler’s Decree of 1 September 1939 concerning euthanasia, addressed to Brandt and Bouhler, was therefore in form a legally quite acceptable act of government of the head of the state.

My conclusions from the examination of the development in legal history of the Fuehrer principle in the Third Reich agrees with the testimony of the witnesses Lammers,[152] Engert, and Best. This testimony is underlined by the standpoint of the Reich Minister of Justice Guertner and by Schlegelberger as representatives of supreme Reich authorities, as transmitted to us by Lammers and Engert. Finally, it is affirmed by University Professor Dr. Hermann Jahrreiss, who a few days ago dealt with the questions arising in this connection in great detail and exhaustively in the Justice Case before Military Tribunal III.[153] I may ask the Tribunal in judging this legal question to consider these statements.

Brack was convinced of the legality of this decree on the basis not only of juridical but also other effective indications of much more significant independent steps taken by Hitler in domestic and foreign policy.

Brack’s conviction, that of a nonjurist, of the legality of the Fuehrer Decree, based on the explanations and information of his juristic associates and the concurring or at least nondissenting statements of the highest representatives of the Reich justice authorities at the meeting of General Public Prosecutors on 23 April 1941, can therefore not be doubted. (_Brack 36, Brack Ex. 36._)

Even if one denies the legal validity to the Hitler Decree, though I regard it as valid, Brack committed a legal error at least as far as the particular legal position of Hitler within the state is concerned, under which decree otherwise illegal activities are to be excused. This legal error is sufficient to abolish his guilt or at least the grave guilt of deliberate intent. According to the German law valid at the time, at any rate, this is the case. According to that, a so-called error outside of criminal law—which is indeed the error about the legal validity of the decree of 1 September 1939—excludes the unlawful character which is an essential of the term “deliberate intent”.

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_EXTRACTS FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR DEFENDANT FISCHER_[154]

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_Acts committed under orders and in relation to a specific military position_

The defendant Fischer participated in the experiments for testing the effect of sulfanilamide upon orders of his medical and military superior Karl Gebhardt. It is recognized in the penal code of all civilized nations that action upon orders represents a reason of exemption from guilt, even if the order itself is contrary to law, but binding for the subordinate. In examining this legal question, one proceeds from the principle that the court disregards the reasons of justification and exemption from guilt put forward by me in the case of the defendant Karl Gebhardt and considers that both the order given to the defendant Karl Gebhardt himself, as also the passing on of this order to the defendant Fritz Fischer, are contrary to law.

The adherence to a binding order, even though it be contrary to law, on the part of the subordinate creates for him a _reason of exemption from guilt and, therefore, renders him also exempt from punishment_. This question is disputed only insofar as some consider the action of the subordinate not only excused but even “justified.” Further examination of this question at issue seems, however, not necessary in these proceedings, since the result is the same in both cases, namely, the perpetrator’s exemption from punishment.

The _decisive question_ in the case on hand therefore is whether and to what extent the “order” for the sulfanilamide experiments was _binding_ for the persons carrying it out.

In view of the fact that, in principle, the law in force at the time is applicable, as the defendants lived under this law and it was binding for them, the question is, therefore, to be examined within the framework of Article 47 of the German Military Penal Code. According to this provision, a subordinate who obeys is liable to be “punished as an accessory if it is known to him that the order given by the superior concerned an act which has for its purpose to commit a general or military crime or offense.”

However, it is not correct, as is sometimes accepted, that Article 47 of the German Military Code itself settles the question in how far military orders are either binding or not binding. This is a question of public and administrative law. But it must always concern an “order regarding service matters,” the same as in other military conditions, that is to say, something which “pertains to military service.” These assumptions are immediately present both in the case of the defendant Karl Gebhardt and in that of the defendant Fritz Fischer. Both were medical officers of the Waffen SS, therefore a unit of the German Wehrmacht in which especially the principle of obedience was strongly pronounced. Karl Gebhardt was Fritz Fischer’s immediate superior; in matters of duty, his order to assist with the medical experiments to be undertaken was a binding order for the young medical officer Fischer.

In the investigation of the legal questions resulting from these circumstances, we will separate the case of the defendant Karl Gebhardt, where the “order” was issued from a very high authority, namely, from the Head of the State and the Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht, from the case of the defendant Fritz Fischer, in which there is a question of an especially close relationship to his immediate military superior. Later, I will return especially to the general questions of public law concerning the command of the Fuehrer.

The evidence has shown that the order for testing the effectiveness of sulfanilamide emanated from the highest authority, namely, from the Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht personally. The reasons of justification of the probable acceptance of the wartime state of emergency and the balancing of interests, as discussed fully already in the investigation of the case of the defendant Karl Gebhardt, gain importance independently first in the person of the defendant Fritz Fischer. But they have influence, of course, on the legality or illegality of the order. The investigation of this question has shown that the given order as such was _legal_. Even if one would not want to take this for granted, however, for a subordinate even an illegal order of _a binding_ nature is of moment.

Article 47 of the German Military Penal Code, as already observed, lets the punishment of the subordinate stand, if “it was known” to the latter that the order of the superior “concerned an act which had for its purpose to commit a general or military crime or offense.” In all other cases the punishment touches _only_ the commanding superior.

Just as in most military courts of other armies, the judicial practice concerning Article 47 of the German Military Penal Code also shows the tendency to a vast limitation of the penal responsibility of the subordinate. That this tendency has grown from the purpose “of guaranteeing the performance of the duty of obedience obligatory to the subordinate, in the interest of military discipline and the Wehrmacht’s constant readiness for battle,” changes nothing in the fact as such. Here it is a matter of evaluating the _legal position at the time the act was committed_.

Article 47 of the German Military Penal Code establishes a penal responsibility on the part of the subordinate only if it was _known_ to him that the order concerned an act _the purpose_ of which was a crime or an offense. German judicial practice demands in addition a _definite knowledge_ on the part of the acting subordinate; accordingly, cases of mere doubt (conditional intent) or mere obligation to know (negligence) are expressly excluded. Neither is the idea satisfactory that the performance of the order resulted objectively in the committing of a crime or an offense. On the contrary, the superior must have _intended_ this and this fact must have been _known_ to the subordinate.

In applying these principles, there cannot be any doubt that these suppositions were not fulfilled either in the case of the defendant Karl Gebhardt, or in the case of the defendant Fritz Fischer—to say nothing at all of the defendant Herta Oberheuser. Both of these defendants regarded the order given them by the Head of the State as a measure of war which was conditioned by special circumstances caused by the war itself, and by means of which a question should be answered which was of decisive importance not only for the wounded, but beyond that, should furnish a contribution in the struggle for the foundations of life of the German people and for the existence of the Reich. Both defendants were convinced at that time that the order given them should have any other _purpose_ but the committing of a punishable act.

Then, in regard to the particular position of the defendant Fritz Fischer, the meaning of an order of the _immediate military superior_ is to be investigated. At the beginning of the experiments, the defendant Fritz Fischer had the rank of a first lieutenant. He took part in the experiments at the direct command of his military and medical superior who held the rank of general. In view of the surpassing authority of the defendant Karl Gebhardt, as surgeon and Chief of the Hohenlychen Clinic and in view of his high military position, a refusal was completely out of the question.

On principle, no other points of view but those already discussed apply here either. Whether the order is a direct or an indirect one offers no reason for difference. In the case of the defendant Fritz Fischer, however, the following is still to be considered: whether it _was known, etc._, to the subordinate is always to be especially examined according to the _special circumstances of the moment_. At the same time, of course, a decisive part is played by the fact that the order for these experiments was given to the defendant Fritz Fischer, not by a military superior who would not have been in a position or duly qualified to give an _expert_ decision of this question, but by a person who not only occupied a high military rank, but beyond that had just that particular experience in the sphere in which the experiments were to be carried out. The defendant Karl Gebhardt was not only a recognized and leading German surgeon, but he had also as consulting surgeon to the Waffen SS and as chief of a surgical reserve combat unit acquired special experience in the sphere of combat surgery and in the treatment of the bacteriological infection of wounds. The reason for this order given to the defendant Fritz Fischer by his chief must have affected him all the more convincingly, as it coincided exactly with the experience which the defendant Fritz Fischer himself had gained as medical officer with the First SS Armored Division in Russia.

In addition, there was the special framework in which all this took place. Fritz Fischer had been released from the combat unit on account of serious illness and had been ordered to the Hohenlychen Clinic. He was under the immediate impression of hard experience at the front. In Hohenlychen he found himself in a clinic which operated in peacetime conditions under the energetic direction of a man extraordinarily gifted in organizational and scientific matters. Every building, every installation of this recognized model institute, the numerous clinical innovations and modern methods of treatment, every one of the many successful treatments of Hohenlychen was inseparably bound up with the name of the chief physician Karl Gebhardt and gave unconditional and unlimited value to his word and his authority in his entire environment.

For all these reasons, the defendant Fritz Fischer could have had no doubt at all but that the performance of the order given him was from the medical standpoint a requisite and permissible war measure. Precisely the open carrying-out of the individual experimental measures, with the exclusion of every duty of secrecy, as well as the report of the results which was provided for in advance and also executed before a critical forum of the highest military physicians, were especially suited to nip in the bud any distrust of the justification of these experiments in the mind of the defendant Fritz Fischer.

* * * * *

As Fritz Fischer strictly adhered to the part-orders given to him and did not show any initiative of his own, it excludes him moreover from any responsibility concerning questions which were outside his sphere of action. It is impossible to make Fritz Fischer responsible for questions connected with the legal and medical preparation of the directives for the experiments and the cosmetic after-treatment. Apart from this viewpoint, the special conditions of _public law_ which existed in Germany at the time of the action ought to be mentioned. They were explained by Professor Jahrreiss in his opening speech before the International Military Tribunal in the proceedings against Hermann Goering and others.[155] Professor Jahrreiss thereby represented the following point of view:

“State orders, whether they lay down rules or decide individual cases, can always be measured against the existing written and unwritten law, but also against the rules of international law, morals, and religion. Someone, even if only the conscience of the person giving the orders, is always asking: Has the person giving the order ordered something which he had no right to order? Or has he formed and published his order by an inadmissible procedure? But an unavoidable problem for all governmental systems lies in this: Should or can it grant the members of its hierarchy, its officials and officers, the right—or even impose on them the duty—to examine at any time any order which demands obedience from them, to determine whether it is lawful, and to decide accordingly whether to obey or refuse? _No governmental system which has appeared in history to date has given an affirmative answer to this question._ Only certain members of the hierarchy were ever granted this right; and they were not granted it without limits. This was also the case, for instance, under the extremely democratic constitution of the German Reich during the Weimar Republic and is so today under the occupation rule of the four great powers over Germany.

“_In as far as such a right of examinations is not granted to members of the hierarchy, the order has legal force for them._

“All constitutional law, that of modern states as well, knows acts of state which must be respected by the authorities even when they are defective. Certain acts of laying down rules, certain decisions on individual cases which have received legal force, are valid even when the person giving the order has exceeded his competence or has made a mistake in form.

“If only because the process of going back to a still higher order must finally come to an end, orders must exist under every government that are binding on the members of the hierarchy under all circumstances and are therefore law where the officials are concerned, even if outsiders may see that they are defective as regard content or form * * *.

“* * * The result of the development in the Reich of Hitler was at any rate that Hitler became the supreme legislator as well as the supreme author of individual orders. It was not least of all under the impression of the surprising successes, or what were considered successes in Germany and abroad, above all during the course of this war, that he became this. Perhaps the German people are—even though with great differences between north and south, west and east—particularly easily subjected to actual power, particularly easily led by orders, particularly used to the idea of a superior. Thus the whole process may have been made easier.

“Finally the only thing that was not quite clear was Hitler’s relationship to the judiciary. For, even in Hitler-Germany, it was not possible to kill the idea that it was essential to allow justice to be exercised by independent courts, at least in matters which concern the wide masses in their everyday life. Up to the highest group of Party officials—this has been shown by some of the speeches of the Reich Justice Leader, the defendant Dr. Frank, which were submitted here—there was resistance, which was actually not very successful, when justice in civil and ordinary criminal cases was also to be forced into the “_sic jubeo_” of the one man. But, apart from the judiciary, which was actually also tottering, absolute monocracy was complete. The Reichstag’s pompous declaration about Hitler’s legal position, dated 26 April 1942, was actually only the statement of what had become practice long before.

“The Fuehrer’s orders were law already a considerable time before this Second World War.

“In this state order of his, the German Reich was treated as a partner by the other states, and this in the whole field of politics. In this connection I do not wish to stress the way (so impressive to the German people and so fatal to all opposition) in which this took place in 1936 at the Olympic Games, a show which Hitler could not order the delegations of foreign nations to attend, as he ordered Germans to the Nuernberg Party Rally in the case of his state-shows. I should like rather only to point out that the governments of the greatest nations in the world considered the word of this “almighty” man the final decision, incontestably valid for every German, and based their decisions on major questions on the fact that Hitler’s order was incontestably valid. To mention only the most striking cases, this fact was relied upon when the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, after the Munich Conference, displayed the famous peace paper when he landed at Croydon. This fact was adhered to when people went to war against the Reich as the barbarous despotism of this one man.

“No political system has yet pleased all people who live under it or who feel its effects abroad. The German political system in the Hitler era displeased a particularly large and ever-increasing number of people at home and abroad.

“But that does not in any way alter the fact that it existed, not lastly because of the recognition from abroad and because of its effectiveness, which caused a British Prime Minister to make the now world-famous statement at a critical period, that democracies need two years longer than the totalitarian governments to attain a certain goal. Only one who has lived as if expelled from among his own people, amidst blindly believing masses who idolized this man as infallible, knows how firmly Hitler’s power was anchored in the anonymous and innumerable following who believed him capable only of doing what was good and right. They did not know him personally, he was for them what propaganda made of him, but this he was so uncompromisingly that everybody who saw him from close-to and saw otherwise, knew clearly that resistance was absolutely useless and, in the eyes of other people, was not even martyrdom.

“Would it therefore not be a self-contradictory proceeding if _both_ the following assertions were to be realized at the same time in the rules of this trial? * * *

“* * * The functionaries had neither the right nor the duty to examine the orders of the monocrat to determine their legality. For them these orders could not be illegal at all, with one exception which will be discussed later—an exception which, if carefully examined, is seen to be only an apparent one—namely with the exception of cases in which the monocrat placed himself, according to the indisputable values of our times, outside every human order, and in which a real question of right or wrong was not put at all and thus a real examination was not demanded.

“Hitler’s will was the ultimate authority for their considerations on what to do and what not to do. The Fuehrer’s order cut off every discussion. Therefore, a person who, as a functionary of the hierarchy refers to an order of the Fuehrer’s, is not trying to provide a ground for being exempted from punishment for an illegal action, but he denies the assertion that his conduct is illegal; for the order which he complied with was legally unassailable.

“Only a person who has understood this can have a conception of the difficult inner struggles which so many German officials had to fight out in these years in face of many a decree or resolution of Hitler’s. For them such cases were not a question of a conflict between right and wrong: Disputes about legality sank into insignificance. For them the problem was one of legitimacy; as time went on, human and divine law opposed each other ever more strongly and more frequently.

“Therefore, whatever the Charter understands by the orders which it sets aside as a ground for exemption from punishment, can the Fuehrer’s order be meant by this? Can it come within the meaning of this rule? Must one not accept this order for what it was according to the interior German constitution as it had developed, a constitution which had been explicitly or implicitly recognized by the community of states? * * *

“* * * The one supreme will became, quite simply, technically indispensable. It became the mechanical connecting link for the whole. A functionary who met with objections or even resistance to one of his orders from other functionaries only needed to refer to an order of the Fuehrer’s to get his way. For this reason many, very many, among those Germans who felt Hitler’s regime to be intolerable, who indeed hated him like the devil, looked ahead only with the greatest anxiety to the time when this man would disappear from the scene; for what would happen when this connecting link disappeared? It was a vicious circle.

“I repeat: _An order of the Fuehrer’s was binding—and indeed legally binding—on the person to whom it was given, even if the directive was contrary to international law or to other traditional values._”

So much for the statements of Professor Jahrreiss before the International Military Tribunal. The development presented here seems to be particularly relevant for the case of the defendant Fischer, since he himself in the witness box described his attitude towards the Fuehrer’s command in a way which, because of his very youth, his idealistic conception of life and duty and his manly confession, was particularly convincing.

It is true that in the face of all this, reference will be made to Article 8 of the Charter for the International Military Tribunal which reads: “The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.”

Accordingly, Law No. 10 of the Control Council, Article II, paragraph 4 reads—

“(_b_) The fact that any person acted pursuant to the orders of his government or of a superior does not free him from responsibility for a crime, but may be considered in mitigation.”

In the face of this objection the following is to be pointed out:

At the time of their actions the defendants were subject to _German_ law according to which the degree of their responsibility was determined and, even today, must justly be referred back to _that moment_. The following should be emphasized, however, in case the Tribunal should not apply the legal provisions in force at the time of the act, but should base its judgment on Law No. 10 of the Control Council, though it represents a manifest violation of the prohibition of retroactive application of penal laws.

Even from the above-named provision of the Law of the Control Council, the principle cannot be derived that every command of a superior should, under the aspect of Penal Law, be _irrelevant_ under all circumstances. This also applies to the problem of the exemption from responsibility and exemption from penalty. The provision only states that the existence of such a command _in itself_ does not exempt one from the responsibility for a crime; it does not, however, preclude by any means that in connection with other facts it may be relevant for this problem as well.

_The guiding legal_ aspect underlying these deliberations is contained in the concept of the so-called conflict of duties which has been repeatedly mentioned before. This aspect does not coincide _eo ipso_ with the “_objective_” principle of balancing interests, as discussed in examining the case of the defendant Karl Gebhardt. In addition one must insist on consideration of the “_subjective_” position of the person committing the act.

In other words, in order to arrive at a _just_ appreciation of the case, the _personal situation of the person committing the act at the moment of its being committed_ will have to be weighed up as well. This applies particularly to the personal situation into which the person committing the act has been put by reason of a higher command which is binding for him and influences him. _Besides_ the general “objective” principles of balancing interests, such a special “subjective” state of coercion can and must therefore be considered in his favor also. A “command” can, therefore, according to the concrete situation, shift the boundaries of culpability further in his favor.

Reinhardt Frank, the great German criminologist, has with regard to the problem of the so-called conflict of duties established the maxim, “In as far as the conflict of duties has not been expressly regulated the maxim should prevail that the higher, the more significant, the more important duty is to be fulfilled at the expense of the less high one and that, therefore, omission to fulfill the latter one is not contrary to law.”

With good reason it has always been emphasized that in such a situation of conflict of diversified duties the decision is, in the end, not to be found in positive law, but it is of an _ethical nature_. That is why, in such a situation, a certain leeway must be left to the personal conscience; it is not possible here to arrive at everything through the coarse means of an outward penal provision. This completely “personal” character of genuine ethical conflicts has also been fully recognized and emphasized in the authoritative philosophical literature. Nicholai Hartmann, Ethics (2d Edition, 1935, pp. 421-422) says for instance, with regard to genuine conflicts of values:

“It is a fateful error to believe that such problems can be solved on principle in theory. There are border-line cases in which the conflict in conscience is grave enough to require a different solution according to the particular ethos of the person. For it lies in the very nature of such conflicts that values are balanced, and that it is not possible to emerge from them without becoming guilty. Accordingly, a man in this situation cannot help making a decision. A person faced with this serious conflict, incurring such a measure of responsibility, ought to decide this—

“_To follow the dictates of his conscience to the best of his ability, that is, according to his own live sense of the level of values and accept the consequences._”

No further argument should be needed for demonstrating that just from an _ethical_ point of view measuring of such _personal_ decisions by standards of _penal law_ is out of the question.

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