Volume 6, Page 125, Number 21-b, is translated in our Document 2464-PS

and I invite the Court’s judicial notice of that communiqué.

That communiqué announced a reorganization of the Austrian Cabinet, including, most significantly, the appointment of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart to the position of Minister of Security and Interior, where he would have control of the police. In addition, announcement was made of a general political amnesty to Nazis convicted of crimes.

Two days later another concession was divulged.

I invite the Court’s judicial notice to our Document 2469-PS, a translation of the official German and Austrian communiqué concerning the so-called equal rights of Austrian National Socialists in Austria, 18 February 1938, _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page 128; Number 21-d.

That communiqué announced that pursuant to the Berchtesgaden conference, the Austrian National Socialists would be taken into the Fatherland Front, the single legal political party of Austria.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you tell us what exhibit numbers those two documents were?

MR. ALDERMAN: I am sorry, Sir; Document 2469-PS.

THE PRESIDENT: We haven’t had that yet. We have had 2461-PS, which is exhibit what?

MR. ALDERMAN: Well, I hadn’t read it in. I was asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this as an official communiqué.

THE PRESIDENT: You are not going to give it an exhibit number?

MR. ALDERMAN: No, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Nor 2469?

MR. ALDERMAN: No, Sir.

In actual fact, great pressure was put on Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden. The fact that pressure was exerted, and pressure of a military nature involving the threat of the use of troops, can be sufficiently established from captured German documents.

I have our Document 1544-PS, a captured German document, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-71.

This document consists of the Defendant Von Papen’s own notes on his last meeting with Schuschnigg, on February 26, 1938. I quote the last two paragraphs of these notes. This is Von Papen speaking, in his own notes:

“I then introduced into the conversation the widespread opinion that he”—that is, Schuschnigg—“had acted under ‘brutal pressure’ in Berchtesgaden. I myself had been present and been able to state that he had always and at every point had complete freedom of decision. The Chancellor replied that he had actually been under considerable moral pressure; he could not deny that. He had made notes on the talk which, bore that out. I reminded him that despite this talk he had not seen his way clear to make any concessions, and I asked him whether without the pressure he would have been ready to make the concessions he made late in the evening. He answered: ‘To be honest, no.’”

And then Von Papen says:

“It appears to me of importance to record this statement.

“In parting I asked the Chancellor never to deceive himself that Austria could have maintained her status with the help of non-German, European combinations. This question could be decided only according to the interests of the German people. He asserted that he held the same conviction and would act accordingly.”

Thus we have, through the words of Von Papen, Schuschnigg’s contemporary statement to Papen of the pressure which had been exerted upon him as recorded by Von Papen in an original, contemporaneous entry.

For diplomatic purposes, Papen, who had been at Berchtesgaden, kept up the pretense that there had been no pressure applied.

But the Defendant General Jodl, writing the account of current events in his diary, was much more candid. We are fortunate in having General Jodl’s handwritten diary in German script which I can’t read. It is our Document 1780-PS, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-72.

I may say that General Jodl, in interrogations, has admitted that this is his genuine diary in his handwriting.

This diary discloses not only the pressure at Berchtesgaden, but also the fact that for some days thereafter Defendant Keitel and Admiral Canaris worked out a scheme for shamming military pressure in order, obviously, to coerce President Miklas of Austria into ratifying the agreement. It started from Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden. It will be noted that the approval of President Miklas was needed to ratify the Berchtesgaden agreement; that is, with respect to naming Seyss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior and Security.

And so the Nazi conspirators kept up the military pressure with threats of invasion for some days after the Berchtesgaden conference in order to produce the desired effect on President Miklas.

I quote from General Jodl’s diary, the entries for February 11, February 13, and February 14, 1938. The entry of 11 February:

“In the evening and on 12 February General K.”—Keitel—“with General Von Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol.

“13 February: In the afternoon General K.”—Keitel—“asks Admiral C.”—Canaris—“and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Führer’s order is to the effect that military pressure, by shamming military action, should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Führer by telephone for approval.

“14 February: At 2:40 o’clock the agreement of the Führer arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence Office VII and initiates the different measures.

“The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations.”

The proposal for deceptive maneuvers reported on by Defendant Jodl are set forth in Document 1775-PS, a captured German document, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-73.

The proposals are signed by the Defendant Keitel. Underneath his signature appears a note that the Führer approved the proposal. In the original document that note is handwritten in pencil.

The rumors which Keitel proposed for the intimidation of Austria make very interesting reading. I quote the first three paragraphs of the suggested order:

“1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments.

“2. Spread false but quite credible news which may lead to the conclusion of military preparations against Austria:

“(a) Through V-men”—V-Männer—“in Austria.

“(b) Through our customs personnel”—staff—“at the frontier.

“(c) Through travelling agents.

“3. Such news could be:

“(a) Furloughs are supposed to have been barred in the sector of the VII A.K.

“(b) Rolling stock is being assembled in Munich, Augsburg, and Regensburg.

“(c) Major General Muff, the Military Attaché in Vienna, has been called for a conference to Berlin. As a matter of fact, this is the case.”

—That reminds me of a lawyer from my own home town who used to argue a matter at great length, and then he would end up by saying, “and, incidentally, it is the truth.”

“(d) The police stations located at the frontier of Austria have called up reinforcements.

“(e) Custom officials report about the imminent maneuvers of the Mountain Brigade”—Gebirgsbrigade—“in the region of Freilassing, Reichenhall, and Berchtesgaden.”

The total pattern of intimidation and rumor was effective, for in due course, as, we have already seen from the communiqués referred to, President Miklas verified the Berchtesgaden Agreement which foreshadowed National Socialist Austria and then the events culminating in the actual German invasion on 12 March 1938.

Mr. President, would this be a convenient moment for a recess?

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had reached the subject of the events culminating in the German invasion of Austria on 12 March 1938, and first under that, the plebiscite and the preparations for both German and Austrian National Socialists.

The day after his appointment as Minister of the Interior of Austria, Seyss-Inquart flew to Berlin for a conference with Hitler. I invite the Court to take judicial notice of the official German communiqué covering that visit of Seyss-Inquart to Hitler, as it appears in the _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_, Volume 6, I, Page 128, Number 21-c, a copy of which will be found in our Document 2484-PS.

On March 9, 1938, 3 weeks after Seyss-Inquart had been put in charge of the police of Austria and was in a position to direct their handling of the National Socialists in Austria—3 weeks after the Nazis began to exploit their new prestige and position with their quota of further victories—Schuschnigg made an important announcement.

On March 9, 1938, Schuschnigg announced that he would hold a plebiscite throughout Austria the following Sunday, March 13, 1938. The question to be submitted in the plebiscite was: “Are you for an independent and social, a Christian, German, and united Austria?” A “yes” answer to this question was certainly compatible with the agreement made by the German Government on 11 July 1936 and carried forward at Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938. Moreover, for a long while the Nazis had been demanding a plebiscite on the question of Anschluss, but the Nazis apparently appreciated the likelihood of a strong “yes” vote on the question put by Schuschnigg in the plebiscite, and they could not tolerate the possibility of such a vote of confidence in the Schuschnigg Government.

In any case, as events showed, they took this occasion to overturn the Austrian Government. Although the plebiscite was not announced until the evening of 9 March, the Nazi organization received word about it earlier in that day. It was determined by the Nazis that they had to ask Hitler what to do about the situation (that is, the Austrian Nazis), and that they would prepare a letter of protest against the plebiscite from Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and that, pending Hitler’s approval, Seyss-Inquart would pretend to negotiate with Schuschnigg about details of the plebiscite.

This information is all contained in the report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissioner Bürckel, transmitted as I have already pointed out to Seyss-Inquart, and which has already been received in evidence—our Document 812-PS, Exhibit USA-61.

I quote briefly from Page 7 of the English text, the paragraph beginning on Page 11 of the German original:

“The Landesleitung received word about the planned plebiscite through illegal information services, on 9 March 1938 at 10 a.m. At the session which was called immediately afterwards, Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this for only a few hours, but that he could not talk about it because he had given his word to keep silent on this subject. But during the talks he made us understand that the illegal information we received was based on truth, and that in view of the new situation, he had been cooperating with the Landesleitung from the very first moment. Klausner, Jury, Rainer, Globocnik, and Seyss-Inquart were present at the first talks which were held at 10 a.m. There it was decided that:

“First, the Führer had to be informed immediately; secondly, the opportunity for the Führer to intervene must be given to him by way of an official declaration made by Minister Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must negotiate with the Government until clear instructions and orders were received from the Führer. Seyss-Inquart and Rainer together composed a letter to Schuschnigg, and only one copy of it was brought to the Führer by Globocnik, who flew to him on the afternoon of 9 March 1938.

“Negotiations with the Government were not successful. Therefore, they were stopped by Seyss-Inquart in accordance with the instructions he received from the Führer. . . . On 10 March all the preparations for future revolutionary actions already had been made . . . and the necessary orders given to all unit leaders . . . . During the night of the 10 to 11, Globocnik returned from the Führer with the announcement that the Führer gave the Party freedom of action . . . and that he would back it in everything it did.”

—That means the Austrian Nazi Party.

Next, Germany’s actual preparations for the invasion and the use of force.

When news of the plebiscite reached Berlin, it started a tremendous amount of activity. Hitler, as history knows, was determined not to tolerate the plebiscite. Accordingly, he called his military advisers and ordered the preparation of the march into Austria.

On the diplomatic side he started a letter to Mussolini indicating why he was going to march into Austria, and in the absence of the Defendant Ribbentrop (who was temporarily detained in London), the Defendant Von Neurath took over the affairs of the Foreign Office again.

The terse and somewhat disconnected notes in General Jodl’s diary give a vivid account of the activities in Berlin. I quote from the entry of 10 March:

“By surprise and without consulting his Ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation. The Führer is determined not to tolerate it.

“This same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Göring. General Von Reichenau is called back from the Cairo Olympic Committee. General Von Schobert is ordered to come as well as Minister Glaise-Horstenau, who is with the district leader, Gauleiter Bürckel, in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 9:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o’clock. I follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General Von Viebahn, to give him all drafts. ‘Prepare Case Otto.’

“1300 hours, General K.”—which I think plainly means Keitel—“informs Chief of Operational Staff and Admiral Canaris, Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the Foreign Office. Führer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini and the reasons are developed which forced the Führer to take action.

“1830 hours, mobilization order is given to the Commander of the 8th Army (Corps Area 3), 7th and 13th Army Corps, without Reserve Army.” (Document Number 1780-PS, Exhibit USA-72).

Now, it is to be noted that Defendant Von Neurath was at this critical hour acting as Foreign Minister. The previous February the Defendant Ribbentrop had become Foreign Minister, and Von Neurath had become President of the Secret Cabinet Council. But in this critical hour of foreign policy the Defendant Ribbentrop was in London handling the diplomatic consequences of the Austrian transaction. As Foreign Minister in this hour of aggression, involving mobilization and movement of troops, use of force and threats to eliminate the independence of a neighboring country, the Defendant Von Neurath resumed his former position in the Nazi conspiracy.

I now offer in evidence our Document C-102 as Exhibit USA-74, a captured German document, top secret, the directive of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces, 11 March 1938. This directive by Hitler, initialed by the Defendants Jodl and Keitel, stated Hitler’s mixed political and military intentions. I quote Paragraphs 1, 4, and 5 of the directive. First the caption, “The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces” with some initials; “referring to Operation Otto; 30 copies.” This is the 11th copy; top secret:

“1. If other measures prove unsuccessful I intend to invade Austria with armed forces to establish constitutional conditions and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German population.

“4. The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action on 12 March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours. I reserve the right to give permission for crossing and flying over the frontier and to decide the actual moment for invasion.

“5. The behavior of the troops must give the impression that we do not want to wage war against our Austrian brother; it is in our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out without any violence, but in the form of a peaceful entry welcomed by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken ruthlessly by force of arms.”

I also offer in evidence captured German Document C-103 as Exhibit USA-75. This was an implementing directive issued by the Defendant Jodl, and it provided as follows:

“Top secret; 11 March 1938; 40 copies, sixth copy.

“Special Instruction Number 1 to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces Number 427/38,”—with some symbols.—

“Directive for policy toward Czechoslovakian and Italian troops or militia units on Austrian soil.

“1. If Czechoslovakian troops or militia units are encountered in Austria they are to be regarded as hostile.

“2. The Italians are everywhere to be treated as friends, especially as Mussolini has declared himself disinterested in the solution of the Austrian question. The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, by order, Jodl.”

Next, the actual events of 11 March 1938 in Austria are available to us in two separate accounts. Although these accounts differ in some minor details, such as precise words used and precise times when they were used, they afford each other almost complete corroboration. We think it appropriate for this Tribunal to have before it a relatively full account of the way in which the German Government on 11 March 1938 deprived Austria of her sovereignty. First I shall give the report of the day’s events in Austria as given by the Austrian Nazis. I refer to Document 812-PS, Exhibit USA-61, a report from Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissioner Bürckel, and I shall read from Page 8 of the English version. For the benefit of the German interpreter I am starting following a tabulation: First case, second case, third case, and following the sentence, “Dr. Seyss-Inquart took part in these talks with the Gauleiter.”

“On Friday, 11 March, the Minister Glaise-Horstenau arrived in Vienna after a visit with the Führer. After talks with Seyss-Inquart he went to see the Chancellor. At 11:30 a.m. the Landesleitung had a meeting at which Klausner, Rainer, Globocnik, Jury, Seyss-Inquart, Glaise-Horstenau, Fischböck, and Mühlmann participated. Dr. Seyss-Inquart reported on his talks with Dr. Schuschnigg which had ended in a rejection of the proposal of the two ministers.

“In regard to Rainer’s proposal, Von Klausner ordered that the Government be presented with an ultimatum, expiring at 1400 hours, signed by legal political ‘front’ men, including both Ministers and also State Councillors Fishböck and Jury, for the establishment of a voting date in 3 weeks and a free and secret ballot in accordance with the constitution.

“On the basis of written evidence which Glaise-Horstenau had brought with him, a leaflet, to be printed in millions of copies, and a telegram to the Führer calling for help were prepared.

“Klausner placed the leadership of the final political actions in the hands of Rainer and Globocnik. Schuschnigg called a session of all ministers for 2 p.m. Rainer agreed with Seyss-Inquart that Rainer would send the telegram to the Führer and the statement to the population at 3 p.m. and at the same time he would start all necessary actions to take over power unless he received news from the session of the Ministers’ Council before that time. During this time all measures had been prepared. At 2:30 Seyss-Inquart telephoned Rainer and informed him that Schuschnigg had been unable to take the pressure and had recalled the plebiscite but that he refused to call a new plebiscite and had ordered the strongest police measures for maintaining order. Rainer asked whether the two Ministers had resigned, and Seyss-Inquart answered, ‘No.’ Rainer informed the Reichskanzlei through the German Embassy, and received an answer from Göring through the same channels, that the Führer will not consent to partial solutions and that Schuschnigg must resign. Seyss-Inquart was informed of this by Globocnik and Mühlmann. Talks were held between Seyss-Inquart and Schuschnigg. Schuschnigg resigned. Seyss-Inquart asked Rainer what measures the Party wished taken. Rainer’s answer: Reestablishment of the Government by Seyss-Inquart, legalization of the Party, and calling up of the SS and SA as auxiliaries to the police force. Seyss-Inquart promised to have these measures carried out, but very soon the announcement followed that everything might be threatened by the resistance of Miklas, the President. Meanwhile word arrived from the German Embassy that the Führer expected the establishment of a government under Seyss-Inquart with a national majority, the legalization of the Party, and permission for the Legion”—that is the Austrian Legion in Germany—“to return, all within the specified time of 7:30 p.m.; otherwise German troops would cross the border at 8 p.m. At 5 p.m. Rainer and Globocnik, accompanied by Mühlmann, went to the Chancellor’s office to carry out this errand.

“Situation: Miklas negotiated with Ender for the creation of a government which included Blacks, Reds, and National Socialists, and proposed the post of Vice-Chancellor to Seyss-Inquart. The latter rejected it and told Rainer that he was not able to negotiate by himself because he was personally involved, and therefore a weak and unfavorable political situation for the cause might result. Rainer negotiated with Zernatto. Director of the Cabinet Hüber, Guido Schmidt, Glaise-Horstenau, Legation Councillor Stein, Military Attaché General Muff, and the Gruppenführer Keppler,”—whose name I told you would reappear significantly—“who had arrived in the meantime, were already negotiating. At 7 p.m. Seyss-Inquart entered the negotiations again. Situation at 7:30 p.m.: Stubborn refusal of Miklas to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor; appeal to the world in case of a German invasion.

“Gruppenführer Keppler explained that the Führer did not yet have an urgent reason for the invasion. This reason must first be created. The situation in Vienna and in the country is most dangerous. It is feared that street fights will break out any moment because Rainer ordered the entire Party to demonstrate at 3 o’clock. Rainer proposed storming and seizing the Chancellor’s palace in order to force the reconstruction of the Government. The proposal was rejected by Keppler but was carried out by Rainer after he discussed it with Globocnik. After 8 p.m. the SA and the SS marched in and occupied the Government buildings and all important positions in the city of Vienna. At 8:30 p.m. Rainer, with the approval of Klausner, ordered all Gauleiter of Austria to take over power in all eight gaue of Austria, with the help of the SS and SA and with instructions that all Government representatives who try to resist, should be told that this action was taken on order of Chancellor Seyss-Inquart.

“With this the revolution broke out, and this resulted in the complete occupation of Austria within 3 hours and the taking over of all important posts by the Party.

“The seizure of power was the work of the Party supported by the Führer’s threat of invasion and the legal standing of Seyss-Inquart in the Government. The national result in the form of the taking over of the Government by Seyss-Inquart was due to the actual seizure of power by the Party on one hand, and the political efficiency of Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his territory on the other; but both factors may be considered only in relation to the Führer’s decision on 9 March 1938 to solve the Austrian problem under any circumstances and the orders consequently issued by the Führer.”

We have at hand another document which permits us virtually to live again through the events of March 11, 1938, and to live through them in most lively and interesting fashion. Thanks to the efficiency of the Defendant Göring and his Luftwaffe organization we have a highly interesting document, obviously an official document from the Luftwaffe headquarters headed as usual “Geheime Reichssache” (top secret). The letterhead is stamped “Reichsluftfahrtministerium Forschungsamt”. If I can get the significance of the German, Forschungsamt means the Research Department of Göring’s Air Ministry. The document is in a characteristic German folder and on the back it says, “Gespräche Fall Österreich” (Conversations about the Austria Case) and the paper cover on the inside has German script writing, which in time, I will ask the interpreter to read; but it looks to me as if it is “Privat, Geheime Archive,” which is Secret Archive, Berlin, “Gespräche Fall Österreich” (Case Austria). I offer that set of documents in the original file as they were found in the Air Ministry, identified as our 2949-PS. I offer them as Exhibit USA-76, and, offering them, I am reminded of Job’s outcry, “Oh, that mine enemy would write a book!”

The covering letter in that file, signed by some member of this research organization within the Air Ministry, and addressed to the Defendant Göring, states in substance—well, I will read the English translation. It starts; “To the General Field Marshal. Enclosed I submit, as ordered, the copies of your telephone conversations.”

Evidently the defendant wanted to keep a record of important telephone conversations which he had with important persons regarding the Case Austria, and had the transcriptions provided by his Research Department. Most of the conversations transcribed and recorded in the volume I have offered, were conducted by the Defendant Göring, although at least one interesting one was conducted by Hitler. For purposes of convenience our staff has marked these telephone calls in pencil with an identifying letter running from “A” through “Z” and then to “AA.” Eleven of these conversations have been determined by a screening process to be relevant to the evidence of this particular time. All the conversations which have been translated have been mimeographed and are included in the document books handed to the defendants. The original binder contains, of course, the complete set of conversations. A very extensive and interesting account of events with which we are much concerned can be developed from quotations from these translated conversations.

I turn now to copies of the telephone conversations. The first group in Part A of the binder took place between Field Marshal Göring, who was identified by the letter “F” for Field Marshal, and Seyss-Inquart, who was identified as “S”. The transcript prepared by the Research Institute of the Air Ministry is in part in the language of these two persons and is in part a summary of the actual conversations. I quote from Part A of this binder, and because of the corroborated nature of this transcript and its obvious authenticity, I propose to quote this conversation in full.

“F”—hereafter I shall use Göring and Seyss-Inquart—

“F: ‘How do you do, doctor? My brother-in-law, is he with you?’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘No.’”

Thereupon the conversation took approximately the following turn:

“Göring: ‘How are things with you? Have you resigned or do you have any news?’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘The Chancellor has cancelled the elections for Sunday, and therefore he has put S’”—Seyss-Inquart—“‘and the other gentlemen in a difficult situation. Besides having called off the elections, extensive precautionary measures are being ordered; among others, curfew at 8 p.m.’

“Göring replied that in his opinion the measures taken by Chancellor Schuschnigg were not satisfactory in any respect. At this moment he could not commit himself officially. Göring will take a clear stand very shortly. In calling off the elections he could see a postponement only, not a change of the present situation which had been brought about by the behavior of the Chancellor Schuschnigg in breaking the Berchtesgaden agreement.

“Thereafter a conversation took place between Göring and the Führer. Afterwards Göring again telephoned Seyss-Inquart. This conversation was held at 15:05.

“Göring told Seyss-Inquart that Berlin did not agree whatsoever with the decision made by Chancellor Schuschnigg since he did not enjoy any more the confidence of our Government because he had broken the Berchtesgaden Agreement, and therefore further confidence in his future actions did not exist. Consequently the national Ministers, Seyss-Inquart, and the others are being requested immediately to hand in their resignations to the Chancellor, and also to ask the Chancellor to resign. Göring added that if after a period of 1 hour no report had come through, the assumption would be made that Seyss-Inquart would no more be in a position to telephone. That would mean that the gentlemen had handed in their resignations. Seyss-Inquart was then told to send the telegram to the Führer as agreed upon. As a matter of course, an immediate commission by the Federal President for Seyss-Inquart to form a new cabinet would follow Schuschnigg’s resignation.”

Thus you see that at 2:45 p.m. Göring told Seyss-Inquart over the telephone that it was not enough for Schuschnigg to cancel the elections; and 20 minutes later he telephoned Seyss-Inquart to state that Schuschnigg must resign. That is your second ultimatum. When informed about an hour later that Schuschnigg had resigned he pointed out that in addition it was necessary to have Seyss-Inquart at the head of the Cabinet. Shall I go into another one of these?

THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better adjourn now until 2 o’clock.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, an hour later, following the conversation between Göring and Seyss-Inquart with which I dealt this morning, the Defendant Göring telephoned to Dombrowski in the German Legation in Vienna. I have reference to the telephone conversation marked “TT” on Page 2, Part C, of Document 2949-PS. In that conversation, in the first place, the Defendant Göring showed concern that the Nazi Party and all of its organizations should be definitely legalized promptly. I quote from Page 2 of the transcript:

“Göring: ‘Now to go on, the Party has definitely been legalized?’

“Dombrowski: ‘But that is—it is not necessary even to discuss that?’

“Göring: ‘With all of its organizations.’

“Dombrowski: ‘With all of its organizations within this country.’

“Göring: ‘In uniform?’

“Dombrowski: ‘In uniform.’

“Göring: ‘Good.’

“Dombrowski calls attention to the fact that the SA and SS have already been on duty for one-half hour, which means everything is all right.”

In addition, Göring stated that the Cabinet—the Austrian Cabinet—must be formed by 7:30 p.m. and he transmitted instructions to be delivered to Seyss-Inquart as to who should be appointed to the Cabinet. I quote from Page 3 of the English text of the transcript of the conversation:

“Göring: ‘Yes, and by 7:30 he also must talk with the Führer, and as to the Cabinet, Keppler will bring you the names. One thing I have forgotten: Fischböck must have the Department of Economy and Commerce.’

“Dombrowski: ‘That is understood.’

“Göring: ‘Kaltenbrunner is to have the Department of Security and Bahr is to have the Armed Forces. The Austrian Army is to be taken by Seyss-Inquart himself and you know all about the Justice Department.’

“Dombrowski: ‘Yes, yes.’

“Göring: ‘Give me the name.’

“Dombrowski: ‘Well, your brother-in-law, isn’t that right?’”

—That is Hüber, the brother-in-law of the Defendant Göring.—

“Göring: ‘Yes.’

“Dombrowski: ‘Yes.’

“Göring: ‘That’s right, and then also Fischböck.’”

And about 20 minutes later, at 5:26 p.m., Göring was faced with the news that Miklas, the President, was refusing to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor, and he issued instructions as to the ultimatum that was to be delivered to Miklas. I quote from the telephone conversation between Göring and Seyss-Inquart, in Part E of the folder, the part marked with capital R, Pages 1 and 2:

“Göring: ‘Now remember the following: You go immediately, together with Lieutenant General Muff, and tell the Federal President that if the conditions which are known to you are not accepted immediately, the troops who are already stationed at and advancing to the frontier, will march in tonight along the whole line, and Austria will cease to exist. Lieutenant General Muff should go with you and demand to be admitted for conference immediately. Please inform us immediately about Miklas’ position. Tell him there is no time now for any joke. Just through the false report we received before, action was delayed, but now the situation is such that tonight the invasion will begin from all the corners of Austria. The invasion will be stopped and the troops will be held at the border only if we are informed by 7:30 that Miklas has entrusted you with the Federal Chancellorship.’”

—There follows in the transcript a sentence which is broken up.—“‘M.’”—I suppose that means Lieutenant General Muff.—“‘does not matter whatever it might be, the immediate restoration of the Party with all its organizations.’”

—There is again an interruption in the transcript.—“‘And then call out all the National Socialists all over the country. They should now be in the streets; so remember, report must be given by 7:30. Lieutenant General Muff is supposed to come along with you. I shall inform him immediately. If Miklas could not understand it in 4 hours, we shall make him understand it now in 4 minutes.’”

An hour later, at 6:28 p.m., Göring had an extensively interrupted telephone conversation with Keppler and Muff and Seyss-Inquart. When he told Keppler that Miklas had refused to appoint Seyss-Inquart, Göring said—I read from Part H, about a third of the way down on the page:

“Göring: ‘Well, then Seyss-Inquart has to dismiss him. Just go upstairs again and just tell him plainly that S. I.’”—Seyss-Inquart—“‘shall call on the National Socialist guard, and in 5 minutes the troops will march in by my order.’”

After an interruption, Seyss-Inquart came to the telephone and informed the Defendant Göring that Miklas was still sticking to his old viewpoint, although a new person had gone in to talk to him, and there might be definite word in about 10 minutes. The conversation proceeded as follows—I quote from Page 2 of Part H, beginning about the middle of the page:

“Göring: ‘Listen, so I shall wait a few more minutes, till he comes back; then you inform me via Blitz conversation in the Reich Chancery as usual, but it has to be done fast. I can hardly justify it as a matter of fact. I am not entitled to do so; if it cannot be done, then you have to take over the power. All right?’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘But if he threatens?’

“Göring: ‘Yes.’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘Well, I see; then we shall be ready.’

“Göring: ‘Call me via Blitz.’”

In other words, Göring and Seyss-Inquart had agreed on a plan for Seyss-Inquart to take over power if Miklas remained obdurate. The plan which was already discussed involved the use of both the National Socialist forces in Austria and the German troops who had been crossing the borders. Later that night Göring and Seyss-Inquart had another conversation at about 11 o’clock. This was after the ultimatum had expired. Seyss-Inquart informed Göring that Miklas was still refusing to name Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. The conversation then proceeded as follows, and I quote from Part I of this folder:

“Göring: ‘OK’”—What’s the German word for OK? Schön.—“‘I shall give the order to march in and then you make sure that you get the power. Notify the leading people about the following which I shall tell you now. Everyone who offers resistance or organizes resistance will immediately be subjected to our court martial, the court martial of our invading troops. Is that clear?’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes.’

“Göring: ‘Including leading personalities; it does not make any difference.’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes, they have given the order not to offer any resistance.’

“Göring: ‘Yes, it does not matter; the Federal President did not authorize you, and that also can be considered as resistance.’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes.’

“Göring: ‘Well, now you are officially authorized.’

“Seyss-Inquart: ‘Yes.’

“Göring: ‘Well, good luck, Heil Hitler.’”

I am sorry; that conversation took place at 8 o’clock, instead of 11. I meant to say 8 o’clock. It is quite interesting to me that when the Defendant Göring was planning to invade a peaceful neighboring state, he planned to try what he referred to as major war criminals before German court martial, the leading personalities.

So much for the conversation with respect to the plan of action for taking over power. Something else very significant was sent on that subject over the telephone, at least so far as those transcripts indicate. But there was another historical event which was discussed over the telephone. I refer to the famous telegram which Seyss-Inquart sent to the German Government requesting the German Government to send troops into Austria to help Seyss-Inquart put down disorder. A conversation held at 8:48 that night between Göring and Keppler proceeded as follows—I read from Page 1 of Part L:

“Göring: ‘Well, I do not know yet. Listen, the main thing is that if Inquart takes over all powers of Government he keeps the radio stations occupied.’

“Keppler: ‘Well, we represent the Government now.’

“Göring: ‘Yes, that’s it. You are the Government. Listen carefully. The following telegram should be sent here by Seyss-Inquart. Take the notes: The provisional Austrian Government which, after the dismissal of the Schuschnigg Government, considered it its task to establish peace and order in Austria, sends to the German Government the urgent request for support in its task of preventing bloodshed. For this purpose, it asks the German Government to send German troops as soon as possible.’

“Keppler: ‘Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets but everything is quiet. Everything has collapsed with the professional groups.’”

Now let us talk about sending German troops to put down disorder. The SA and the SS were marching in the streets, but everything was quiet. And a few minutes later, the conversation continued thus, reading from Page 2 of Part L:

“Göring: ‘Then our troops will cross the border today.’

“Keppler: ‘Yes.’

“Göring: ‘Well, and he should send the telegram as soon as possible.’

“Keppler: ‘Well, send the telegram to Seyss-Inquart in the office of the Federal Chancellor.’

“Göring: ‘Please show him the text of the telegram and do tell him that we are asking him—well, he does not even need to send the telegram. All he needs to do is to say, “Agreed.”’

“Keppler: ‘Yes.’

“Göring: ‘He should call me at the Führer’s or at my place. Well, good luck. Heil Hitler.’”

Well, of course, he did not need to send the telegram because Göring wrote the telegram. He already had it. It must be recalled that in the first conversation, Part A, held at 3:05 p.m., Göring had requested Seyss-Inquart to send the telegram agreed upon, but now the matter was so urgent that Göring dictated the exact wording of the telegram over the telephone. And an hour later, at 9:54 p.m. a conversation between Dr. Dietrich in Berlin and Keppler in Vienna went on as follows, reading from Part M:

“Dietrich: ‘I need the telegram urgently.’

“Keppler: ‘Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart agrees.’

“Dietrich: ‘This is marvelous. Thank you.’

“Keppler: ‘Listen to the radio. News will be given.’

“Dietrich: ‘Where?’

“Keppler: ‘From Vienna.’

“Dietrich: ‘So Seyss-Inquart agrees?’

“Keppler: ‘Jawohl.’”

Next the actual order to invade Austria. Communications with Austria were now suspended but the German military machine had been set in motion. To demonstrate that, I now offer in evidence captured Document C-182, offered as Exhibit USA-77, a directive of 11 March 1938 at 2045 hours, from the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. This directive, initialed by General Jodl and signed by Hitler, orders the invasion of Austria in view of its failure to comply with the German ultimatum. The directive reads:

“Top secret; Berlin, 11 March 1938, 2045 hours; Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, OKW,”—with other symbols—“35 copies, 6th copy. C-in-C Navy”—pencil note—“has been informed. Re: Operation Otto. Directive No. 2.

“1) The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian Government have not been fulfilled.

“2) The Austrian Armed Forces have been ordered to withdraw before the entry of German troops and to avoid fighting. The Austrian Government has ceased to function of its own accord.

“3) To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the entry of the German Armed Forces into Austria will commence, according to Directive No. 1, at daybreak on 12.3.

“I expect the set objectives to be reached by exerting all forces to the full as quickly as possible.”

Signed Adolf Hitler; initialed by Jodl and by a name that looks like Warlimont.

And then some interesting communications with Rome to avoid possibility of disaster from that source. At the very time that Hitler and Göring had embarked on this military undertaking, they still had a question mark in their minds, and that was Italy. Italy had massed on the Italian border in 1934 on the occasion of July 25, 1934—the Putsch. Italy had traditionally been the political protector of Austria.

With what a sigh of relief did Hitler hear at 10:25 p.m. that night from Prince Phillipp von Hessen, his Ambassador at Rome, that he had just come back from the Palazzo Venezia, and Mussolini had accepted the whole thing in a very friendly manner. The situation can really be grasped by the rereading of the conversation. The record of the conversation shows the excitement under which Hitler was operating when he spoke over the telephone. It is a short conversation, and I shall read the first half of it from Part N of the transcript of 2949-PS. I am afraid your title Part N may be blurred on the mimeographed copy. “H” is Hessen and “F” is the Führer.

“Hessen: ‘I have just come back from Palazzo Venezia. Il Duce accepted the whole thing in a very friendly manner. He sends you his regards. He had been informed from Austria; Schuschnigg gave him the news. He had then said it would be a complete impossibility; it would be a bluff; such a thing could not be done. So he was told that it was unfortunately arranged thus, and it could not be changed any more. Then Mussolini said that Austria would be immaterial to him.’

“Hitler: ‘Then please tell Mussolini I will never forget him for this.’

“Hessen: ‘Yes.’

“Hitler: ‘Never, never, never, whatever happens. I am still ready to make a quite different agreement with him.’

“Hessen: ‘Yes, I told him that, too.’

“Hitler: ‘As soon as the Austrian affair has been settled, I shall be ready to go with him through thick and thin; nothing matters.’

“Hessen: ‘Yes, my Führer.’

“Hitler: ‘Listen, I shall make any agreement, I am no longer in fear of the terrible position which would have existed militarily in case we had gotten into a conflict. You may tell him that I do thank him ever so much, never, never shall I forget that.’

“Hessen: ‘Yes, my Führer.’

“Hitler: ‘I will never forget it, whatever will happen. If he should ever need any help or be in any danger, he can be convinced that I shall stick to him whatever might happen, even if the whole world were against him.’

“Hessen: ‘Yes, my Führer.’

The Tribunal will recall the reference in Jodl’s diary to the letter which Hitler had sent to Mussolini. It is dated March 11. It may be found in the official publication _Dokumente der Deutschen Politik_,