Part I, Page 1203; _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1934, Part I, Page 295; and

_Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1935, Part I, Page 198.

THE PRESIDENT: Are they found here in the document book?

LT. BRYSON: They’re not in the document book, Sir.

I asked only that judicial notice be taken of them as published laws of Germany.

These measures enabled Schacht to embark upon what he himself has termed a “daring credit policy,” including the secret financing of a vast amount of armaments through the so-called ‘mefo’ bill, a description of which appears in the transcript for 23 November at Page 295 (Volume II, Page 232). I offer in evidence Document Number EC-436, Exhibit Number USA-620, consisting of a statement, dated 2 November 1945, by Emil Puhl, a director of the Reichsbank during Schacht’s presidency, and quote the second paragraph thereof as follows:

“In the early part of 1935 the need for financing an accelerated rearmament program arose. Dr. Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, after considering various techniques of financing, proposed the use of mefo bills to provide a substantial portion of the funds needed for the rearmament program. This method had as one of its primary advantages the fact that secrecy would be possible during the first years of the rearmament program; and figures indicating the extent of rearmament, that would have become public through the use of other methods, could be kept secret through the use of mefo bills.”

The extent of the credit expansion and the importance of mefo financing may be seen from Document Number EC-419, which I now offer as Exhibit Number USA-621 and which consists of a letter from Finance Minister Von Krosigk to Hitler, under date of 1 September 1938. I quote the following figures from the middle of the first page:

“The Reich debt accumulated as follows:

“As of 31 December 1932: Funded debt, 10,400 millions of Reichsmark; short-term debt, 2,100 millions of Reichsmark; debt not published in the budget (trade and mefo bills of exchange), 0.

“As of 30 June 1938: Funded debt, 19,000 million Reichsmark; short-term debt, 3,500 million Reichsmark; and debt not published in the budget (trade and mefo bills of exchange), 13,300 million Reichsmark.

“Total: as of 31 December 1932, 12,500 million Reichsmark; as of 30 June 1938, 35,800 million Reichsmark.”

The Reich debt thus tripled. . .

THE PRESIDENT: Would you read the next section, beginning with the words “Provisions were made to cover. . .”?

LT. BRYSON: “Provisions were made to cover the armament expenditures for the year 1938 (the same amount as in 1937) as follows:

“Five thousand millions from the budget, that is, taxes; 4,000 millions from loans; 2,000 millions from 6-month treasury notes, which means postponement of payment until 1939; total: 11,000 millions.”

The Reich debt thus tripled under Schacht’s management. More than one-third of the total was financed secretly and through the instrumentality of the Reichsbank by mefo and trade bills. It is clear that this amount of financing outside the normal public issues represented armament debt. I read further from Document EC-436, at the beginning of the last long paragraph:

“These mefo bills were used exclusively for financing rearmament; and when in March 1938 a new finance program discontinuing the use of mefo bills was announced by Dr. Schacht, there was a total volume outstanding of 12,000 million marks of mefo bills which had been issued to finance rearmament.”

The character of Schacht’s credit policy and the fact that it was ruthlessly dedicated to the creation of armaments plainly appear from his own speech delivered on 29 November 1938.

I offer it in evidence as Document Number EC-611, Exhibit Number USA-622; and I quote from Page 6 at the beginning of the last paragraph:

“It is possible that no bank of issue in peacetime carried on such a daring credit policy as the Reichsbank since the seizure of power by National Socialism. With the aid of this credit policy, however, Germany created an armament second to none; and this armament in turn made possible the results of our policy.”

Beyond the field of finance Schacht assumed totalitarian control over the German economy generally in order to marshal it behind the rearmament program.

He acquired great power over industry as a result of the Nazi reorganization of German industry along military lines and in accordance with the so-called Leadership Principle. On this point I refer the Tribunal to the transcript for 23 November at Pages 287-290 (Volume II, Pages 227-228); and to the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1934, Part I, Page 1194, of which the Tribunal is asked to take judicial notice.

Schacht also exercised broad powers as a member of the Reich Defense Council, which was secretly established on 4 April 1933 and the function of which was preparation for war. The Tribunal is referred to the transcript for 23 November, Page 290 (Volume II, Pages 228-229). I also offer in evidence as Document Number EC-128, Exhibit Number USA-623, a report under date of 30 September 1934, showing the functions of the Ministry of Economics in this respect. The report reveals concentration upon all the familiar wartime economic problems, including stockpiling, production of scarce goods, removal of industry to secure areas, fuel and power supply for war production, machine tools, control of wartime priorities, rationing, price control, civilian supply, and so on. I wish to read into the Record merely an excerpt showing the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Economics, beginning near the top of Page 2 of Document Number EC-128:

“With the establishment of the Reich Defense Council and its permanent committee the Reich Ministry of Economics has been given the task of making economic preparation for war. There should really be no need to explain the tremendous importance of this task. Everyone remembers vividly how terribly the lack of any economic preparation for war hit us during the World War.”

Finally, in 1934, Schacht acquired sweeping powers under legislation which authorized him, as Minister of Economics, to take any measure deemed necessary for the development of the German economy. In this connection reference is made to the Reichsgesetzblatt, 1934, Part I, Page 565, of which the Tribunal is asked to take judicial notice.

The so-called “New Plan” devised by Schacht was announced in the fall of 1934 shortly after he became Minister of Economics. In this connection the Tribunal is referred to the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1934, Part I, Page 816 and the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1935, Part I, Page 105, with the request that judicial notice be taken thereof. The New Plan was Schacht’s basic program for obtaining the necessary foreign-produced raw materials and foreign exchange required to sustain the rearmament program.

With respect to the details of the New Plan, I offer in evidence Document Number EC-437, Exhibit Number USA-624, consisting of an affidavit of Emil Puhl, dated 7 November 1945. The entire text is pertinent. Therefore, permission is requested to submit the affidavit without reading therefrom, on condition that French and Russian translations be prepared and filed.

THE PRESIDENT: And German ones supplied, too.

LT. BRYSON: We will supply copies. I wish to say that the original is in English, but the affidavit has already been translated into German.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

LT. BRYSON: This affidavit by a co-worker of Schacht describes in detail the many ingenious and often ruthless devices he used, including negotiating “stand-still” agreements, forcing payment in Reichsmark of interest and amortization on debts incurred in foreign currency, using scrip and funding bonds for the same purpose, suspending service on foreign-held debts, blocking foreign-held marks, freezing foreign claims in Germany, eliminating unessential foreign expenditures, requisitioning German-held foreign exchange, subsidizing exports, issuing restricted marks, bartering under clearing agreements, licensing imports, and controlling all foreign exchange transactions to the end of favoring raw materials for armaments.

The Tribunal is also asked to take judicial notice of _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1934, Page 997; _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1933, Part I, Page 349; and _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1937, Part I, Page 600, relating to the clearing bank, the conversion bank, and the maturity of foreign loans, all of which decrees are mentioned in the affidavit.

Schacht even went so far as to invest foreign-held Reichsmark on deposit in German banks in rearmament notes, thus, as he put it, financing rearmament with the assets of his political opponents. Without reading therefrom, I refer your Honors to Document Number 1168-PS, Exhibit USA-37, being a memorandum from Schacht to Hitler, dated 3 May 1935, which already appears in the transcript on Pages 412 and 413 (Volume II, Pages 312, 313). Moreover, Schacht even resorted to capital punishment to prevent the loss of foreign exchange when frightened capital began to flee from the country. In this connection reference is made to the Law against Economic Sabotage, found in 1936 _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 999, of which the Tribunal is asked to take judicial notice.

Schacht took particular pride in the results which were accomplished under the stringent controls which he instituted under his New Plan. I refer the Tribunal to Document Number EC-611, in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-622, consisting of Schacht’s speech in Berlin on 29 November 1938. I wish to read into the Record an excerpt from the top of Page 10:

“If there is anything remarkable about the New Plan, it is again only the fact that German organization under National Socialist leadership succeeded in conjuring up in a very short time the whole apparatus of supervision of imports, direction of exports, and promotion of exports. The success of the New Plan can be proved by means of a few figures. Calculated according to quantity, the import of finished products was cut down by 63 percent between 1934 and 1937. On the other hand, the import of ores was increased by 132 percent, of petroleum by 116, of grain by 102, and of rubber by 71 percent.”

While President of the Reichsbank and Minister of Economics, Schacht acquired still another key position, that of Plenipotentiary General for War Economy.

He received this appointment from Hitler pursuant to the unpublished Reich Defense Law secretly enacted on 21 May 1935. This law is in evidence as Document Number 2261-PS, Exhibit Number USA-24, consisting of a letter from Von Blomberg dated 24 June 1935 to the chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Forces, together with copies of the Reich Defense Law and the Cabinet’s memorandum relating thereto. Pertinent comments on and excerpts from this document appear in the transcript for 23 November, at Pages 278 and 292 (Volume II, Pages 220-229). I will simply state therefore that by virtue of this appointment Schacht was put in complete charge of economic planning and preparation for war in peacetime, except for certain direct armament production under control of the War Ministry. Upon the outbreak of war he was to be the economic czar of Germany with complete control over the activities of a number of key Reich ministries.

Schacht appointed Wohlthat as his deputy and organized a staff to carry out his directives. In this connection I offer in evidence excerpts from a pre-trial interrogation of Schacht under date 17 October 1945. This document is Exhibit Number USA-616 (Document 3729-PS). I wish to read into the Record a question and answer found at the bottom of Page 40 of the document book:

“Q: ‘Let me ask you a general question then: Do you take the responsibility as Plenipotentiary General for War Economy for the writings that were made and the actions that were done by Wohlthat and his assistants?’

“A: ‘I have to.’”

I also offer in evidence Document Number EC-258, Exhibit Number USA-625, consisting of a status report issued in December 1937 under the signature of Schacht’s deputy, Wohlthat. The report is entitled, “The Preparation of the Economic Mobilization by the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy.” Schacht had withdrawn from office immediately prior to the preparation of this report, and it plainly is a recapitulation of his accomplishments while in office. Since the entire text is relevant, we ask permission to submit the document without reading therefrom on condition that translations into French and Russian be later filed with the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think this is consistent with the rule laid down by the Tribunal, which was that the translations in the French and Russian languages should be submitted at the same time. You are now suggesting that you can submit translations at a later stage.

LT. BRYSON: Well, if Your Honor pleases, in any event I did not plan to read from the document at this time and Defense Counsel do have the German original.

THE PRESIDENT: I was not speaking of the Defense Counsel so much as of the members of the Tribunal.

LT. BRYSON: We have the Russian translation in process now and it was delayed and we were unable to get it here at this time, but the delay will be very short and the document is of critical importance to our case.

THE PRESIDENT: How long will it be before it is ready?

LT. BRYSON: I wouldn’t like to say precisely, Sir, but perhaps within 4 or 5 days.

THE PRESIDENT: What do you propose to do now, because it is a very complicated and long document, is it not?

LT. BRYSON: It is and it shows. . .

THE PRESIDENT: Were you proposing to summarize it?

LT. BRYSON: I was proposing to summarize it, Sir, now.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if you would summarize it now and only be permitted to put it in at the stage when you have the translation ready, you may summarize it now.

LT. BRYSON: I will summarize it now, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Will it take long to summarize?

LT. BRYSON: Not very long, Sir; no.

THE PRESIDENT: You see, it is 5 o’clock.

LT. BRYSON: I think there will be time to summarize it, and then we will stop.

This document discloses that before his resignation Schacht had worked out in amazing detail his plans and preparations for the management of the economy in the forthcoming war. For example, 180,000 industrial plants in 300 industries had been surveyed with respect to usefulness for war purposes; economic plans for the production of 200 basic materials had been worked out; a system for the letting of war contracts had been devised; allocations of coal, motor fuel, and power had been determined; 248 million Reichsmark had been spent on storage facilities alone; evacuation plans for war materials and skilled workers from military zones had been worked out; 80 million wartime ration cards had already been printed and distributed to local areas; and a card index on the skills of some 22 million workers had been prepared.

That concludes the summary, Your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 11 January 1946 at 1000 hours._]

THIRTY-SECOND DAY Friday, 11 January 1946

_Morning Session_

LT. BRYSON: If the Tribunal please, before picking up our line of proof against the Defendant Schacht, I would like to supply a point of information.

Yesterday the President of the Tribunal inquired with respect to Document Number EC-457, Exhibit Number USA-619. The question raised by the Tribunal was with respect to the words “in retirement” in the letterhead used by Schacht in writing to Hitler in 1932. This is the letter in which Schacht expressed his belief in the truth of the Nazi movement and in which he said that Hitler could always count upon him as a reliable assistant.

The letterhead has printed upon it “The President of the Reichsbank” and after that phrase there is typed the letters “a. D.”, and I understand that those letters are an abbreviation for a German phrase meaning “in retirement” and that it is customary, or it was customary, in Germany for retired officials to continue to use their titles with the letters “a. D.”

THE PRESIDENT: I see.

LT. BRYSON: Yesterday we had just about completed our proof with respect to the contribution of the Defendant Schacht to the preparation for war, and I wish to submit one more document on this point. This is Document Number EC-451, Exhibit Number USA-626. It consists of a statement by George S. Messersmith, United States Consul General in Berlin, 1930 to 1934. I will quote therefrom, beginning with the second sentence of the fourth paragraph:

“It was his”—Schacht’s—“financial ability that enabled the Nazi regime in the early days to find the financial basis for the tremendous armament program and which made it possible to carry it through. If it had not been for his efforts, and this is not a personal observation of mine only but I believe was shared and is shared by every observer at the time, the Nazi regime would have been unable to maintain itself in power and to establish its control over Germany, much less to create the enormous war machine which was necessary for its objectives in Europe and later throughout the world.

“The increased industrial activity in Germany incident to rearmament made great imports of raw materials necessary, while at the same time exports were decreasing. Yet by Schacht’s resourcefulness, his complete financial ruthlessness, and his absolute cynicism, Schacht was able to maintain and to establish the situation for the Nazis. Unquestionably, without this complete lending of his capacities to the Nazi Government and all of its ambitions, it would have been impossible for Hitler and the Nazis to develop an armed force sufficient to permit Germany to launch an aggressive war.”

We turn now. . .

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Lieutenant Bryson, I am not sure that that gives a full or quite fair interpretation of the document. Don’t you think perhaps you ought to read the paragraph before?

LT. BRYSON: The preceding paragraph, Sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

LT. BRYSON: “Dr. Schacht always attempted to play both sides of the fence. He told me, and I know he told both other American representatives in Berlin and various British representatives, that he disapproved of practically everything that the Nazis were doing. I recall on several occasions his saying, after the Nazi Party came into power, that if the Nazis were not stopped, they were going to ruin Germany and the rest of the world with it. I recall distinctly that he emphasized to me that the Nazis were inevitably going to plunge Europe into war.”

If the Court please, I would like to read also from the last paragraph:

“In my opinion Schacht was in no sense a captive of the Nazis. He was not compelled to devote his time and his capacities to their interest. His situation was such that he would most likely have been able either to work on much less restrained scale or to abstain from activity entirely. He continued to lend his services to the Nazi Government out of opportunism.”

We turn now to the third part of our case against Schacht. The evidence is clear that he willingly contributed his efforts to the Nazi conspiracy, knowing full well its aggressive designs. The Tribunal will recall our proof that Schacht was converted to the Nazi philosophy in 1931 and helped Hitler come to power in 1933. We will now prove, first, that Schacht personally favored aggression and, second, that in any event he knew Hitler’s aggressive intentions.

There is ample evidence to justify the conclusion that Schacht rearmed Germany in order to see fulfilled his strong belief in aggressive expansion as an instrument of German national policy. Schacht had long been a German nationalist and expansionist. He spoke against the Treaty of Versailles at Stuttgart as early as 1927. I offer in evidence Document EC-415, Exhibit Number USA-627, consisting of a collection of excerpts from speeches by Schacht. I quote from the top of Page 2: “The Versailles Dictate cannot be an eternal document, because not only its economic but also its spiritual and moral premises are wrong.”

It is common knowledge that he strongly favored acquisition of colonial territory by Germany. However, he also favored acquisition of contiguous territory in Europe. On 16 April 1929 at the Paris conference in connection with reparations, he said. . .

THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to read the passage that follows that at a later stage?

LT. BRYSON: At a later stage, if you please, Sir, in connection with another point.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well; go on.

LT. BRYSON: On 16 April 1929, at the Paris conference in connection with reparations, he said:

“Germany can as a whole pay only if the Corridor and Upper Silesia will be handed back to Germany from Polish possession and if, besides, somewhere on the earth, colonial territory will be made available to Germany.”

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What are you quoting from?

LT. BRYSON: I offer in evidence Exhibit Number USA-628 (Document 3726-PS), consisting of excerpts from a pre-trial interrogation of Schacht on 24 August 1945. You will find it in the document book at the back, labelled “Interrogation of 24 August”. At the top of the first page of the interrogation this statement was quoted to Schacht, and his reply contains an admission of having made the statement. In his reply he said:

“That Germany could not pay at the time after I made the statement has been proved, and that Germany will not be able to pay after this war will be proved in the future.”

I wish to point out that this is the very territory which was the subject of the armed aggression in September 1939.

In 1935 Schacht stated flatly that Germany would, if necessary, acquire colonies by force. I offer in evidence Document EC-450, designated as Exhibit Number USA-629. This document consists of an affidavit of S. R. Fuller, Jr., together with a transcript of his conversation with Schacht at the American Embassy in Berlin on 23 September 1935. I wish to read from Page 6 of the document where there appears a statement by Schacht in the lower half of the page.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of the conversation?

LT. BRYSON: The conversation occurred on 23 September 1935. The page number of this document is at the bottom, and I quote from Page 6:

“Schacht: ‘Colonies are necessary to Germany. We shall get them through negotiation, if possible; but if not, we shall take them.’”

In July 1936, when the rearmament program was well under way, Schacht again publicly spoke of the Versailles Treaty. This time his language contained an explicit threat of war. I refer the Tribunal again to Document EC-415, which I have previously introduced in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-627, consisting of a collection of speeches by Schacht. I wish to read from the paragraph beginning in the middle of the first page:

“But the memory of war weighs undiminished upon the peoples’ mind. That is because, deeper than material wounds, moral wounds are smarting, inflicted by the so-called peace treaties. Material loss can be made up through labor, but the moral wrong which has been inflicted upon the conquered peoples in the peace dictates, leaves a burning scar on the peoples’ conscience. The spirit of Versailles has perpetuated the fury of war; and there will not be a true peace, progress, or reconstruction until the world desists from this spirit. The German people will not tire of pronouncing this warning.”

Later in the same year Schacht publicly advocated the doctrine of Lebensraum for the German people. I quote again from Document EC-415, Exhibit Number USA-627, being an excerpt from Schacht’s speech at Frankfurt on 9 December 1936, on the second page, the last paragraph:

“Germany has too little living space for her population. She has made every effort, and certainly greater efforts than any other nation, to extract from her own existing small space whatever is necessary for the securing of her livelihood. However, in spite of all these efforts, the space does not suffice.”

In January 1937 Schacht, in a conversation with Ambassador Davies, at least by inference threatened a breach of the peace in demanding a colonial cession. I offer in evidence Document L-111, being Exhibit Number USA-630, and consisting of excerpts from a report under date of 20 January 1937, by Ambassador Davies to the Secretary of State. I wish to read therefrom, beginning with the second sentence of the second paragraph:

“He”—meaning Schacht—“stated the following:

“That the present condition of the German people was intolerable, desperate, and unendurable; that he had been authorized by his Government to submit proposals to France and England which would: (1) Guarantee European peace, (2) secure present European international boundaries, (3) reduce armaments, (4) establish a new form of a workable league of nations, and (5) abolish sanctions with new machinery for joint administration; all based upon a colonial cession that would provide for Germany an outlet for population, a source for foodstuffs, fats, and raw materials.”

In December 1937 Ambassador Dodd noted in his diary that Schacht would be willing to risk war for the sake of new territory in Europe. I refer the Tribunal to Document EC-461, consisting of excerpts from Ambassador Dodd’s diary.

THE PRESIDENT: The proposal contained in Document L-111 was for cession of colonies, was it not?

LT. BRYSON: It was, Sir.

I turn now to Document EC-461, consisting of excerpts from Ambassador Dodd’s diary. The entire diary has previously been received in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-58. I quote some notes on a conversation with Schacht on 21 December 1937, beginning near the bottom of the second page of Document EC-461, in the last paragraph:

“Schacht meant what the army chiefs of 1914 meant when they invaded Belgium, expecting to conquer France in 6 weeks; that is, domination and annexation of neighboring little countries, especially north and east. Much as he dislikes Hitler’s dictatorship, he, like most other eminent Germans, wishes annexation without war if possible; with war if the United States will keep hands off.”

THE PRESIDENT: There is another passage in that book, that diary. I am not sure; it probably is not the same date, but it is on the first page of the exhibit, I think—the third paragraph.

LT. BRYSON: The third paragraph.

THE PRESIDENT: Is it at a different time?

LT. BRYSON: It is a different time, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: September the 19th of what year?

LT. BRYSON: We will check that in the complete volume here, and I think in a minute I will be able to supply the date. In the meantime would you like me to read it, Sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think you had better read it.

LT. BRYSON: “He then acknowledged that the Hitler Party is absolutely committed to war; and the people, too, are ready and willing. Only a few government officials are aware of the dangers and are opposed. He concluded, ‘But we shall postpone it 10 years. Then it may be we can avoid war.’”

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think you should read the next paragraph, too.

LT. BRYSON: “I reminded him of his Bad Eilsen speech some 2 weeks ago and said, ‘I agree with you about commercial and financial matters in the main. But why do you not, when you speak before the public, tell the German people they must abandon a war attitude?’ He replied, ‘I dare not say that. I can speak only on my special subjects.’”

THE PRESIDENT: And the next one.

LT. BRYSON: And the next one:

“How, then, can German people ever learn the real dangers of war, if nobody ever presents that side of the question? He once more emphasized his opposition to war and added that he had used his influence with Hitler—‘a very great man’, he interjected—to prevent war. I said, ‘The German papers printed what I said at Bremen about commercial relations between our countries, but not a word about the terrible effects and barbarism of war.’ He acknowledged that and talked very disapprovingly of the Propaganda Ministry which suppresses everything it dislikes. He added, as I was leaving ‘You know a party comes into office by propaganda and then cannot disavow it or stop it.’”

The date of his conversation was in September 1934.

THE PRESIDENT: It is a pity that those years are not stated in the document. It is rather misleading as it is.

LT. BRYSON: If the Court please, the exhibit which is in evidence will show the dates.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I am not blaming you; but it is misleading, because it looks like September the 19th and December the 21st, and as there were 3 years’ interval between, it makes a difference. That is right, isn’t it?

LT. BRYSON: Yes, that is right. I am sorry the excerpt simply shows the page numbers from the exhibit, and not the dates.

Schacht admittedly strained all the resources of Germany to build up a Wehrmacht which would provide Hitler with an instrument of realization of his desire for Lebensraum. In this connection I offer in evidence Document Number EC-369, Exhibit Number USA-631, consisting of a memorandum from the Reichsbank Directorate, signed by Schacht, to Hitler, dated 7 January 1939. I wish to read the last paragraph of the first page:

“From the beginning the Reichsbank has been aware of the fact that a successful foreign policy can be attained only by the reconstruction of the German Armed Forces. It—the Reichsbank—therefore assumed to a very great extent the responsibility of financing the rearmament in spite of the inherent dangers to the currency. The justification thereof was the necessity, which pushed all other considerations into the background, to carry through the armament at once, out of nothing and furthermore under camouflage, which made a respect-commanding foreign policy possible.”

It is clear that the “successful foreign policy” which Schacht thus attributed to rearmament included the Austrian and Czechoslovakian acquisitions. I offer in evidence Document EC-297(a), Exhibit Number USA-632, being a speech of Schacht’s in Vienna after the Anschluss in March 1938. I quote from the third page and the second full paragraph:

“Thank God, these things could not after all hinder the great German people on their way, for Adolf Hitler has created a communion of German will and German thought. He bolstered it with the newly strengthened Wehrmacht and finally gave the external form to the internal union between Germany and Austria.”

With respect to the Sudetenland I refer the Tribunal to Document EC-611, already in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-622, being a speech by Schacht; EC-611—but I will not read it, Sir—being a speech by Schacht on 29 November 1938, shortly after the Munich settlement. I have earlier read the pertinent remark attributing Hitler’s success at that conference to the rearmament made possible by Schacht’s financial and economic measures.

This line of proof shows that Schacht entertained an aggressive philosophy with respect to territorial expansion and justifies the conclusion that he allied himself with Hitler because of their common viewpoint.

We turn now to prove that, whether or not Schacht wanted war, he at least knew Hitler planned military aggression for which he was creating the means. He had numerous discussions with Hitler from 1933 to 1937. He knew that Hitler was intent upon expansion to the east, which would mean war, and that Hitler felt he must present the German people with a military victory. I offer in evidence Exhibit Number USA-633 (Document 3727-PS), consisting of an excerpt from a pre-trial interrogation of Schacht on 13 October 1945, and I read from the second page at the end of the second question:

“Q: ‘What was there in what he’”—meaning Hitler—“‘said that led you to believe he was intending to move towards the east?’

“A: ‘That is in _Mein Kampf_. He never spoke to me about that, but it was in _Mein Kampf_.’

“Q: ‘In other words, as a man who read it, you understood that Hitler’s expansion policy was directed to the east?’

“A: ‘To the east.’

“Q: ‘And you thought that it would be better to try to divert Hitler from any such intention and to urge upon him a colonial policy instead?’

“A: ‘Quite.’”

I also offer in evidence Document EC-458, Exhibit Number USA-634, consisting of an affidavit of Major Edmund Tilley under date of 21 November 1945, with respect to an interview of Schacht on 9 July 1945. I read the second paragraph:

“During the course of the discussion Schacht stated to me that he had had numerous talks with Hitler from 1933 to 1937. Schacht stated that from these talks he had formed the impression that in order to make his hold and government secure, the Führer felt that he must present the German people with a military victory.”

As early as 1934, Schacht stated his belief that the Nazis would bring war to Europe. I refer the Tribunal to Document EC-451, which I have already submitted in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-626, consisting of an affidavit under date of 15 November 1945 by Messersmith, American Consul General in Berlin, 1930 to 1934. I wish to read from the first page, third paragraph, last sentence.

THE PRESIDENT: You have read it already.

LT. BRYSON: If the Court please, there is a little more there which we have not read, which I should like to read.

THE PRESIDENT: You read the whole paragraph. At our invitation you read from the third paragraph down to the bottom of the page.

LT. BRYSON: I should like to read the first sentence of the fourth paragraph on Page 1.

THE PRESIDENT: All right.

LT. BRYSON: “While making these protestations he nevertheless showed by his acts that he was thoroughly an instrument of the whole Nazi program and ambitions and that he was lending all his extraordinary knowledge and resourcefulness toward the accomplishment of that program.”

THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Bryson, speaking for myself and for some other members of the Tribunal, we think it is a far better way to deal with a document, to deal with it, if possible, once and for all, and not to be coming back to it. It not only wastes time by the fact that the Tribunal have got to turn back and forth, back and forth, to the document; but you get a much fairer idea of the document if it is dealt with once and for all, although it may cover more than one subject. I say that although it may be impossible for you to do that now in consonance with the preparations that you have made; but those who follow you may be able to alter their course. If it is possible, when you get a document with a variety or a number of paragraphs in it which you want to quote, you should quote them all at the same time. Do you follow what I mean?

LT. BRYSON: I follow you, Your Honor. We have so organized our materials that we have directed our evidence to specific points, and since the points are separated, we had to separate our quotations.

THE PRESIDENT: I realize that it may be difficult for you.

LT. BRYSON: In September of 1934 Ambassador Dodd made a record in his diary of a conversation with Sir Eric Phipps at the British Embassy in Berlin. If the Court please, I will pass over this document, because in response to a question from the Tribunal, I read an excerpt from the document which covers the same point that I was about to direct myself toward.

I had just pointed out that Schacht has acknowledged to Ambassador Dodd in September 1934 his knowledge of the war purposes of the Nazi Party; and we had already shown that in 1935 Schacht had stated that Germany would, if necessary, acquire colonies by force. He must then have known to what length Hitler was prepared to go.

After attending a meeting of the Reich ministers on 27 May 1936 in Berlin, Schacht must have known that Hitler was contemplating war. Your Honors may recall, as has been earlier shown, that at this meeting the Defendant Göring, who was very close to Hitler, stated that all measures are to be considered from the standpoint of an assured waging of war and that waiting for new methods is no longer appropriate. I refer the Tribunal to Document 1301-PS, from which I will not read, as the quotation is already in evidence in Exhibit Number USA-123.

On 31 August 1936 the War Minister, Von Blomberg, sent to Schacht a copy of Von Blomberg’s letter to the Defendant Göring. I refer the Tribunal again to 1301-PS, previously submitted in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-123, and read from the middle of Page 19 of the document. The page numbers, if the Court please, on this document are found in the upper lefthand corner:

“According to an order of the Führer the setting up of all Air Force units is to be completed on 1 April 1937. Therefore considerable expenditures have to be made in 1936, which at the time when the budget for 1936 was made were planned for later years only.”

This intensification of the air force program certainly revealed to Schacht the closeness to war which Hitler must have felt.

I also offer in evidence Document EC-416, Exhibit USA-635, consisting of minutes of the Cabinet meeting of 4 September 1936 which Schacht attended. I read the statement by Göring found at the top of Page 2 of this document:

“The Führer and Reichskanzler has given a memorandum to the Colonel General and the Reich War Minister which represents a general instruction for the execution of this task.

“It starts from the basic thought that the show-down with Russia is inevitable.”

Schacht thus knew that Hitler expected war with Russia. He also knew of Hitler’s ambitions towards the east. It must have been plain to him, therefore, that such a war would result from Russian opposition to German military expansion in that direction; that is, Schacht must have known that it would be a war of German aggression.

In January 1937, the Tribunal will recall, Schacht stated to Ambassador Davies in Berlin that he had “been authorized by his government” to submit certain proposals to France and England which, in fact, amounted to a bid for colonies under threat of war. If Schacht was acting under instructions from Hitler, he was necessarily familiar with Hitler’s aggressive intentions at that time.

In November of 1937 Schacht knew Hitler was determined to acquire Austria and at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia and that Hitler also had designs on the Polish Corridor. I refer the Tribunal to Document L-151, already in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-70, this being a letter containing a memorandum of a conversation between Schacht and Ambassador Bullitt, dated 23 November 1937. I quote the last paragraph on Page 2:

“Hitler was determined to have Austria eventually attached to Germany and to obtain at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia. At the present moment he was not vitally concerned about the Polish Corridor, and in his”—Schacht’s—“opinion it might be possible to maintain the Corridor, provided Danzig were permitted to join East Prussia and provided some sort of a bridge could be built across the Corridor uniting Danzig and East Prussia with Germany.”

To digress for just a moment, Schacht here was really speaking for himself as well as for Hitler. We have seen from his speech of 29 March 1938 in Vienna his enthusiasm for the Anschluss after the event. He was even working hard for its achievement. In this connection I refer the Tribunal to Pages 506 and 507 of the transcript (Volume II, Page 373) for evidence of Schacht’s having subsidized the Nazis’ preliminary agitation in Austria.

In addition to the foregoing direct evidence, the Tribunal is asked to take into consideration the fact that to such a man as Schacht the events of the period certainly bespoke Hitler’s intention. Schacht was a close collaborator of Hitler and a member of the Cabinet during the period of the Nazi agitation in Austria, the introduction of conscription, the march into the Rhineland, the overthrow of the Republican Government in Spain, the ultimate conquest of Austria, and the acquisition of the Sudetenland by a show of force. During this period the Reich’s debt tripled under the stress of mounting armaments, the expenditures from 750,000,000 Reichsmarks in 1932 to 11,000,000,000 Reichsmarks in 1937, and 14,000,000,000 Reichsmarks in 1938. During the entire period 35,000,000,000 Reichsmarks were spent on armaments. It was a period in which the burning European foreign policy issue was the satisfaction of Germany’s repeated demands for additional territory. Hitler, committed to a policy of expansion, was taking great risks in foreign policy and laying the greatest stress upon utmost speed in preparation for war.

Certainly, in this setting Schacht did not proceed in ignorance of the fact that he was assisting Hitler and Germany along the road toward armed aggression.

We turn now to our last line of proof with respect to Schacht’s loss of power in the Hitler regime. In November 1937, Schacht resigned his offices as Minister of Economics and General Plenipotentiary for the War Economy. At that time he accepted appointment as Minister without Portfolio and he also continued as President of the Reichsbank.

Our evidence will show: (a) This change in position was no more than a clash between two power-seeking personalities, Göring and Schacht, in which Göring, being closer to Hitler, won out; (b) their policy differences were concerned only with the method of rearming; and (c) Schacht’s loss of power in no sense implies an unwillingness to assist armed aggression.

There was an issue of policy between Göring and Schacht, but it was concerned only with the method and not the desirability of war preparations. Schacht emphasized foreign trade as a necessary source of rearmament material during the transitory period until Germany should be ready to strike. Göring was a proponent of complete self-sufficiency. Hitler supported Göring; and Schacht, his pride wounded and bitterly resenting Göring’s intrusion in the economic field, finally stepped out.

I refer the Tribunal to Document 1301-PS, previously submitted in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-123, containing notes of a conversation between Schacht and Thomas on 2 September 1936. These are found on Page 21 of the document, from which I quote:

“President Schacht called me to him at 1300 hours today and requested me to forward the following to the Minister of War: Schacht returned from the Führer with the greatest anxiety, since he could not agree to the economic program planned by the Führer.

“The Führer wants to speak at the Party convention about economic policy and wants to emphasize there that we now want to get free from foreign countries with all our energy by production in Germany.

“Schacht requests urgently that the Reich Minister of War warn the Führer from this step.”

And three paragraphs farther down:

“If we now shout out abroad our decision to make ourselves economically independent, then we cut our own throats, because we can no longer survive the necessary transitory period.”

Nevertheless, Hitler announced the Four Year Plan of self-sufficiency a few days later in Nuremberg, and against Schacht’s wishes Göring was named Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan.

At this point I refer the Tribunal again to the interrogation of Schacht on 16 October 1945, being Exhibit Number USA-636; and I wish to read beginning near the bottom of Page 9 of the document:

“Q: ‘And the Four Year Plan came in when?’

“A: ‘It was announced in September ’36, on the Party Day.’

“Q: ‘Do you say that from the time that the Four Year Plan came in in September 1936, you were ready to rid yourself of your economic duty?’

“A: ‘No. At that time I thought that I might maintain my position even against Göring.’

“Q: ‘Yes, in what sense?’

“A: ‘That he would not interfere with affairs which I had to manage in my ministry.’

“Q: ‘As a matter of fact, his appointment was not met with favor by you?’

“A: ‘I would not have ever appointed a man like Göring who didn’t understand a bit about all these things.’”

Schacht and Göring immediately became embroiled in a conflict of jurisdiction. On 26 November 1936 Göring issued a directive regarding raw and synthetic material production. I offer in evidence Document EC-243, Exhibit Number USA-637, consisting of a copy of this directive. It shows that Göring’s Office for Raw and Synthetic Materials pre-empted control over large economic areas previously in the hands of Schacht. As an example, I will quote from Paragraph V of the directive on Page 4 of the document:

“The planning and determination of objectives, as well as the control over the execution of the tasks which must be accomplished within the framework of the Four Year Plan, are the responsibility of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials, which supersedes the authorities which have heretofore been in charge of these tasks.”

On 11 December 1936 Schacht found it necessary to order all supervisory offices in the Ministry of Economics to accept instructions from him alone. I offer in evidence Document EC-376, Exhibit Number USA-638, consisting of a circular letter from Schacht to all supervisory offices under date of 11 December 1936, and I quote from the second paragraph:

“The supervisory offices are obliged to accept instructions from me alone. They must answer all official inquiries for any information of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials in order to give any information at any time to the fullest extent.”

And a little further down:

“. . . I herewith authorize the supervisory offices to take the necessary measures for themselves. In case doubts should result from requests of the above offices and these doubts cannot be cleared by oral negotiations with the experts of these offices, I should be informed immediately. I will then order in each case the necessary steps to be taken.”

The military sided with Schacht, who had rearmed them so well. I offer in evidence Document EC-420, Exhibit Number USA-639, consisting of a draft of a memorandum by the Military Economic Staff, dated 19 December 1936. I wish to read from Paragraph 1:

“(1) The direction of war economy in the civilian sector in case of war can be handled only by the person who in peacetime has borne the sole responsibility for the preparations for war.

“Upon recognizing this fact a year and a half ago Reichsbank President Dr. Schacht was appointed Plenipotentiary General for War Economy and an operations staff was attached to his office.”

And then Paragraph Number 2:

“(2) The Military Economy Staff does not deem it compatible with the principle laid down in Number 1, Paragraph 1, if the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy is now placed under the Minister President General Göring’s command.”

In January 1937 the _Military Weekly Gazette_ published an article warmly praising Schacht’s achievements in rearmament. Without reading it I offer in evidence Document EC-383, Exhibit Number USA-640, containing this article, a pertinent quotation from which already appears in the transcript for 23 November at Page 296 (Volume II, Page 233).

Shortly thereafter Schacht attempted to force a show-down with Göring by temporarily refusing to act in his capacity as Plenipotentiary. I offer in evidence Document EC-244, Exhibit Number 641, consisting of a letter from Von Blomberg, the Minister of War, to Hitler under date of February 22, 1937. I read the second paragraph of this letter as follows:

“The President of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht, has notified me that he is not acting in his capacity as Plenipotentiary for the time being, since in his opinion there exist discrepancies regarding the powers conferred upon him and those of Colonel General Göring. Because of this the preparatory mobilization steps in the economic field are delayed.”

Schacht obviously was using his importance to the war preparations as a lever.

THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Bryson, does the Defendant Schacht admit in his interrogation that the reason for his giving up his office was the difference of opinion between him and the Defendant Göring?

LT. BRYSON: He does, Sir, and the Defendant Göring so states in his interrogation.

THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to go into the details of their quarrel?

LT. BRYSON: If the Court will be satisfied that this was the cause of Schacht’s resignation. . .

THE PRESIDENT: If they both say so. . .

LT. BRYSON: . . . and that the cause was not his unwillingness to go along with the aggressive intentions of the Nazis at that time, I shall be perfectly satisfied to confine our evidence to the interrogations of Schacht and Göring.

THE PRESIDENT: Does he suggest that in his interrogation?—that that might have been the reason?

LT. BRYSON: I will find out, Sir, but our case against Schacht is premised upon conspiracy.

THE PRESIDENT: If the Defendant Schacht wants to set up such a case as that, you could apply to be heard in rebuttal.

LT. BRYSON: Well, we shall be satisfied then to eliminate a number of our items of evidence, including the controversy between Göring and Schacht, and satisfy ourselves with the interrogations.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

LT. BRYSON: If the Court please, we are almost at the time of the break. Perhaps during the break we can arrange our evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we will adjourn now for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): We agree that the question of the disagreement between the Defendants Göring and Schacht need not be discussed further at this time. But we shall come back to and deal in detail with the question as to how far these disagreements had any bearing on the plan for an aggressive war.

LT. BRYSON: If the Tribunal please, we have eliminated part of our proof. I would simply like to put in a letter from Göring and an interrogation of Schacht which will finish up the question of the disagreement.

Under date of 5 August 1937 Schacht wrote a critical letter to Göring, who replied with a 24-page letter on 22 August 1937. Göring’s letter reviews their many differences in detail. I offer it as Document EC-493, Exhibit Number USA-642, and I wish to read simply one statement found in the middle of Page 13:

“In conclusion I should like to refer to remarks which you made in a paragraph of your letter entitled ‘The Four Year Plan’ about your general attitude toward my work in regard to the economic policy. I know and I am pleased that at the beginning of the Four Year Plan you promised me your most loyal support and co-operation and that you repeatedly renewed this promise even after the first differences of opinion had occurred and had been removed in exhaustive discussions. I deplore all the more having the impression recently, which is confirmed by your letter, that you are increasingly antagonistic toward my work in the Four Year Plan. This explains the fact that our collaboration has gradually become less close. . . .”

Schacht and Göring were reconciled by written agreement on 7 July 1937 but subsequently again fell into disagreement, and Hitler finally accepted Schacht’s resignation as Minister of Economics on 26 November 1937, simultaneously appointing him Minister without Portfolio, and later Schacht’s resignation was extended to his position as Plenipotentiary for War Economy. Without reading it, I offer in evidence Document EC-494, Exhibit Number USA-643, as proof of this fact.

Now, finally, I wish to refer the Tribunal to the interrogation of Schacht, under date of 16 October 1945, Document 3728-PS, Exhibit Number USA-636, and I wish to read from Page 12 of the document near the bottom:

“A: ‘It may amuse you if I tell you that the last conversation’”—this is Schacht speaking—“‘that I had with Göring on these topics was in November 1937, when Luther for 2 months had endeavored to unite Göring and myself and to induce me to co-operate further with Göring and maintain my position as Minister of Economics. Then I had a last talk with Göring; and at the end of this talk Göring said, “But I must have the right to give orders to you.” Then I said, “Not to me, but to my successor.” I have never taken orders from Göring; and I would never have done it because he was a fool in economics, and I knew something about it, at least.’

“Q: ‘Well, I gather that was a culminating, progressive personal business between you and Göring. That seems perfectly obvious.’

“A: ‘Certainly.’”

In all this abundant and consistent evidence there is not the slightest suggestion that Schacht’s withdrawal from these two posts represented a break with Hitler on the ground of contemplated military aggression. Indeed, Hitler was gratified that Schacht would still be active in the Government as President of the Reichsbank and as Minister without Portfolio. I offer in evidence Document L-104, Exhibit Number USA-644, consisting of a letter to the United States Secretary of State from Ambassador Dodd, under date of 29 November 1937, enclosing a translation of Hitler’s letter of 26 November 1937 to Schacht. I quote the last two sentences of Hitler’s letter, found on Page 2 of the document:

“If I accede to your wish it is with the expression of deepest gratitude for your so excellent achievements and in the happy consciousness that, as President of the Reichsbank Directorate you will make available for the German people and me for many years more your outstanding knowledge and ability and your untiring energy. Delighted at the fact that in the future, also, you are willing to be my personal adviser, I appoint you as of today a Reich Minister.”

Schacht did continue, obviously still in full agreement with Hitler’s aggressive purpose. He was still President of the Reichsbank at the time of the taking of Austria in March 1938. In fact, the Reichsbank took over the Austrian National Bank. On this point I refer the Tribunal to _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Part I, Page 254, and ask that judicial notice be taken thereof. Further, Schacht even participated in the planning of the absorption of Austria. In this connection I introduce into evidence Document EC-421, Exhibit Number USA-645, consisting of excerpts from minutes of a meeting of the staff of General Thomas on 11 March 1938 at 1500 hours. I quote therefrom as follows:

“Lieutenant Colonel Hünerm reads directive of the Führer of 11 March concerning the ‘Action Otto’ and informs us that ‘The Economy War Service Law’ has been put in force. He then reads Directives 1 and 2 and gives special orders to troops for crossing the Austrian borders. According to that, at Schacht’s suggestion, no requisitions should be made but everything ought to be paid for at the rate of 2 schillings to 1 Reichsmark.”

On the conversion of the Austrian schilling the Tribunal is asked also to take judicial notice of _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Part I, Page 405.

The Tribunal, of course, is already familiar with the public approval by Schacht of the Anschluss in his Vienna speech of 21 March 1938, and Your Honors will also recall Schacht’s pride in Hitler’s use of the rearmed Wehrmacht at Munich, as expressed in his speech of 29 November 1938. Both speeches were subsequent to his resignation in November 1937.

We come now to the removal of Schacht from the presidency of the Reichsbank in January 1939. The reason for this development is quite clear. Schacht lost confidence in the credit capacity of the Reich and was paralyzed, with the fear of a financial collapse. He felt that the maximum level of production had been reached, so that an increase in banknote circulation would only cheapen money and bring on inflation. In this attitude he ceased to be useful to Hitler, who was about to strike and wished to tap every ounce of available Government credit for military purposes.

I refer the Tribunal to Document EC-369, which I have previously submitted in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-631. This document is a memorandum from the Reichsbank directorate to Hitler, under date of 7 January 1939, in which Schacht reviews in detail his fears of inflation. The seriousness of the situation may be seen generally from the entire text. I wish to quote several of the more crucial statements, one from the last paragraph on Page 3, the second sentence:

“We are, however, faced with the fact that approximately 3 billion Reichsmark of such drafts cannot now be paid, though they will be due in 1939.”

I quote from the upper half of Page 4:

“Exclusive of the Reichsbank there are approximately 6 billion Reichsmark mefo drafts which can be discounted against cash payment at any time at the Reichsbank, which fact represents a continuous danger to the currency.”

And I quote finally from the concluding paragraph of the memorandum:

“We are convinced that the effects on the currency caused by the policy of the last 10 months can be mended and that the danger of inflation again can be eliminated by strict maintenance of a balanced budget. The Führer and Reich Chancellor himself has publicly rejected, again and again, an inflation as foolish and fruitless.

“We therefore ask for the following measures:

“(1) The Reich as well as all the other public offices must not incur expenditures or assume guaranties and obligations that cannot be covered by taxes or by those funds which can be raised through loans without disturbing the long-term investment market.

“(2) In order to carry out these measures effectively, full financial control over all public expenditures must be restored to the Reich Minister of Finance.

“(3) The price and wage control must be rendered effective. The existing mismanagement must be eliminated.

“(4) The use of the money and investment market must be at the sole discretion of the Reichsbank.”

It is clear that Schacht’s fear was genuine and is a complete explanation for his departure from the scene. He had good reason to be afraid. In fact, the Finance Minister had already recognized the situation in September 1938. I refer the Tribunal to Document EC-419, Exhibit Number USA-621, which I have already submitted in evidence and which consists of a letter under date of 1 September 1938 from Krosigk to Hitler, in which Krosigk warns of an impending financial crisis. I quote from the bottom of Page 2.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that not really cumulative of what you have already read?

LT. BRYSON: We will be glad to skip it, Sir. It is cumulative.

Schacht was not only afraid of a financial crisis, but he was afraid that he personally would be held responsible for it. I offer in evidence an affidavit of Emil Puhl, a director of the Reichsbank and co-worker of Schacht, dated 8 November 1945, designated as Document EC-438, Exhibit Number USA-646, and I read therefrom, beginning at the bottom of the second page:

“When Schacht saw that the risky situation which he had sponsored was becoming insoluble, he was more and more eager to get out. This desire to get out of a bad situation was for a long time the ‘Leitmotiv’ of Schacht’s conversation with the directors of the bank.”

In the end Schacht escaped by deliberately stimulating his dismissal from the Presidency of the Reichsbank. I offer in evidence Document 3731-PS, Exhibit Number USA-647, consisting of excerpts from an interrogation of Von Krosigk under date of 24 September 1945, and I wish to read several statements beginning at the very bottom of the second page:

“I asked Mr. Schacht to finance for the Reich for the ultimo of the month the sum of 100 or 200 millions. It was this quite customary procedure which we had used for years, and we used to give back this money after a couple of days. Schacht this time refused and said that he was not willing to finance a penny because he wanted, as he said, that it should be made clear to Hitler that the Reich was bankrupt. I tried to explain that this was not the proper ground to discuss the whole question of financing because the question of financing very small sums for a few days during ultimo never would bring Hitler to the conviction that the whole financing was impossible. As far as I remember now, it was Funk who told Hitler something about this conversation; then Hitler asked Schacht to call upon him. I do not know what they said but the result certainly was the dismissal of Schacht.”

THE PRESIDENT: Just give me the reference again to that document that you were reading from.

LT. BRYSON: This is the interrogation of Von Krosigk under date of 24 September 1945. I wish to read further, continuing on Page 3:

“Q: ‘Now did Schacht ever say anything to you to the effect that he wanted to resign because he was in opposition to the continuance of the rearmament program?’

“A: ‘No, he never said it in this specific form, but in some conversations he certainly spoke about it several times in his own way when he had encounters with Göring . . . therefore I did not take these things very seriously.’

“Q: ‘Well, let me put it this way, and please think carefully about this. Did Schacht ever say that he wanted to resign because he realized that the extent of the rearmament program was such as to lead him to the conclusion that it was in preparation for war rather than for defense?’

“A: ‘No, he never did.’

“Q: ‘Was Schacht ever quoted to you to this effect by any of your colleagues or by anybody else?’

“A: ‘No.’

“Q: ‘Now, after Keitel took over the position of Chief of the Wehrmacht were there still meetings between Schacht and yourself with Keitel in place of Blomberg?’

“A: ‘Yes.’

“Q: ‘Did Schacht ever say anything at these meetings to indicate that except for the technical question of the financing through the Reichsbank directly he was opposed to a further program of rearmament or opposed to the budget of the Wehrmacht?’

“A: ‘No, I do not think he ever did.’”

The Defendant Göring has also confirmed this testimony. I refer the Tribunal to the interrogation of Göring under date of 17 October 1945, this being Document 3730-PS, Exhibit Number USA-648. I read from the interrogation of Göring on 17 October 1945, from the lower half of the third page:

“Q: ‘I want to ask you this specifically. Was Schacht dismissed from the Reichsbank by Hitler for refusing to participate any further in the rearmament program?'

“A: ‘No, because of his utterly impossible attitude in this matter regarding this advance, which had no connection with the rearmament program.’”

Hitler dismissed Schacht from the Reichsbank on 20 January 1939. Without reading, I offer in evidence Document EC-398, Exhibit Number USA-649, consisting merely of a brief note from Hitler to Schacht announcing his dismissal.

From all of the foregoing it is clear that Schacht’s dismissal in no sense reflected a parting of the ways with Hitler on account of proposed aggression. This fact may also be seen from Document EC-397, Exhibit Number USA-650, consisting of Hitler’s letter to Schacht under date of 19 January 1939, the text of which I wish to read:

“At the occasion of your recall from office as President of the Reichsbank Directorate I take the opportunity of expressing to you my most sincere and warmest gratitude for the services which you have rendered repeatedly to Germany and to me personally in this capacity during long and difficult years. Your name, above all, will always be connected with the first epoch of the national rearmament. I am happy to be able to avail myself of your services for the solution of new tasks in your position as Reich Minister.”

In fact, Schacht continued as Minister without Portfolio until January 1943.

I wish to conclude by saying that the evidence shows: First, Schacht’s work was indispensable to Hitler’s rise to power and to the rearmament of Germany; second, Schacht personally was favorably disposed towards aggression and knew Hitler intended to and would break the peace; and, third, Schacht retired from the scene for reasons wholly unrelated to the imminence of illegal aggression.

As long as he remained in power, Schacht was working as eagerly for the preparation of aggressive war as any of his colleagues. He was beyond any doubt most effective and valuable in this connection. His assistance in the earlier phase of the conspiracy made their later crimes possible. His withdrawal from the scene reflected no moral feeling against the use of aggressive warfare as an instrument of national policy. He personally struggled to retain his position. By the time he lost it he had already completed his task in the conspiracy, namely, to provide Hitler and his colleagues with the physical means and economic planning necessary to launch and maintain the aggression. We do not believe that, having prepared the Wehrmacht for assault upon the world, he should now be permitted to find refuge in his loss of power before the blow was struck.

This concludes our case against the Defendant Schacht, and Lieutenant Meltzer follows me with the presentation of the American case against the Defendant Funk.

LIEUTENANT (j. g.) BERNHARD D. MELTZER (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United States): May it please the Tribunal, the documents bearing upon Defendant Funk’s responsibility have been assembled in a document book marked “HH,” which has been filed with the Tribunal and has also been made available to Defense Counsel. The same is true of the brief. The documents have been arranged in the book in the order of their presentation. Moreover, to facilitate reference, the pages of the document book have been numbered consecutively in red. I wish to acknowledge the invaluable collaboration of Mr. Sidney Jacoby, who sits to my right, in the selection and analysis of these documents.

We propose to submit evidence concerning five phases of Defendant Funk’s participation in the conspiracy:

First, his contribution to the Nazi seizure of power; second, his role in the Propaganda Ministry and in the related agencies and his responsibility for the activities of that ministry; third, his responsibility for the unrelenting elimination of Jews, first from the so-called cultural professions and then from the entire German economy; fourth, his collaboration in the paramount Nazi task to which all other tasks were subordinated—preparation for aggressive war; and finally, we propose to mention briefly the evidence concerning his active participation in the waging of aggressive war.

We turn now to the evidence showing that Defendant Funk actively promoted the conspirators’ accession to power and their consolidation of control over Germany. Soon after he joined the Nazi Party in 1931 Defendant Funk began to hold important positions, first within the Party itself and then within the Nazi Government. Funk’s positions have, in the main, been listed in Document Number 3533-PS, which is a statement signed by both Defendant Funk and his counsel. This document has been made available in the four working languages of these proceedings, and a copy in the appropriate language should be available in each of Your Honors’ document books. It is accordingly requested that this document, which is Exhibit Number USA-651, be received into evidence without the necessity of its being read in its entirety.

Your Honors will observe that there are some deletions and reservations after some of the items listed in Document Number 3533-PS. These were inserted by Defendant Funk. The words which he wished deleted are enclosed in parentheses. His comments are underscored and followed by asterisks.

We wished to avoid troubling the Tribunal with a detailed discussion of all these contested points. Accordingly, we collected in Document 3563-PS relevant excerpts from certain German publications. This document has also been made available in the four working languages. Moreover, we submit that the Tribunal can properly take judicial notice of the publications referred to in the document. However, in order to facilitate reference, we request that it be received in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-652.

In connection with Item “b” on the top of Page 1 of Document Number 3533-PS—Your Honors will find that on Page 1 of the document—Your Honors will observe that Defendant Funk has in effect denied that he was Hitler’s personal economic adviser in the 1930’s. However, the excerpts from the four German publications set forth on Pages 1 and 2 of Document Number 3563-PS directly contradict this denial.

We submit that it will be clear from the documents just referred to that Defendant Funk, soon after he joined the Party, began to operate as one of the Nazi inner circle. Moreover, as a Party economic theorist during its critical days in 1932, he made a significant contribution to its drive for mass support by drafting its economic slogans. In this connection I would refer to Document 3505-PS, which is a biography entitled, in the English translation, _Walter Funk—A Life for Economy_. This biography was written by one Oestreich in German and published by the Central Publishing House of the Nazi Party. I offer this document in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-653. I wish to quote now from Page 1 of the translation of this document, the center of the page. The corresponding page of the German document is Page 81:

“In 1931 he”—that is, Funk—“became a member of the Reichstag. A document of his activity at the time is the ‘Economic Construction Program of the NSDAP’ which was formulated by him in the second half of the year 1932. It received the approval of Adolf Hitler and was declared binding for all Gau leaders, speakers on the subject, and Gau advisers on the subject and others of the Party.”

Thus Defendant Funk’s slogans became the economic gospel for the Party organizers and spellbinders.

Defendant Funk, however, was much more than one of the Nazi Party’s economic theorists; he was also involved in the highly practical work of soliciting campaign contributions for the Party. As liaison man between the Party and the large German industrialists he helped place the industrialists’ financial and political support behind Hitler. Defendant Funk, in an interrogation conducted on 4 June 1945, admitted that he helped finance the highly critical campaign of 1932. I offer in evidence Document Number 2828-PS as Exhibit Number USA-654, and I quote from the bottom of Page 43. . .

THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Meltzer, isn’t this really all cumulative and detailed evidence to support what the Defendant Funk has already agreed with reference to his office? On Page 1 you have there the admission that he was a member of the Nazi Party, chief of the division of the Central Nazi Party, chairman of the committee of the Nazi Party on economic policy, and then it goes on from A to U with views of the various offices which he held and which he admits, he held. But surely to go into the details of those positions is unnecessary.

LT. MELTZER: If Your Honor pleases, the admission of the various positions listed do not, in our judgment, indicate in any way Defendant Funk’s participation in the fund-raising for the Nazi Party.

THE PRESIDENT: The fund-raising?

LT. MELTZER: The fund-raising. Now, it is a possible inference from those positions that he did engage in the solicitation of campaign contributions. However, it did seem to us relevant to mention most briefly direct evidence of that aspect of his activity.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, if you say there is nothing in these offices which covered the matter you are going to deal with; well and good.

LT. MELTZER: Defendant Funk, in an interrogation conducted on 4 June 1945, admitted, as I said a minute ago, that he helped to finance this highly critical campaign.

THE PRESIDENT: You see, Lieutenant Meltzer, the heading that you have so conveniently given to us is that he contributed to the seizure of power. Well now, nearly every one of the headings A to U on Page 1, which he admits, is evidence that he contributed to seizure of power. Is it your object to propose that he also helped to raise funds? The contribution to the seizure of power is not in itself a crime; it is only a step.

LT. MELTZER: Very well, Your Honor. There is one aspect, however, of his activity in that regard which I should like to mention; that is, in connection with his fund-raising activities, he was present at a meeting in Berlin early in 1933.

I am referring to the document which records what went on in that meeting in order to point out that in the course of the meeting Hitler and Göring submitted an exposition of certain basic elements of the Nazi program. The reference to this meeting is found in Document 2828-PS, which Your Honors will find on Page 28 of the document book. I wish to quote the following question and answer:

“Q: ‘About 1933, we have been informed, certain industrialists attended a meeting in the home of Göring before the election in March. Do you know anything about this?’

“A: ‘I was at the meeting. Money was not demanded by Göring but by Schacht. Hitler left the room, then Schacht made a speech asking for money for the election. I was there as an impartial observer, since I was friendly with the industrialists.’”

The character and importance of Funk’s work with the large industrialists is emphasized in the biography of Funk, which I referred to earlier, and I will simply invite Your Honors’ attention to the relevant pages of that book, which are 83 and 84.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t understand why you read that passage. If you wanted to show that he was at the meeting, it would be merely sufficient to say that he was at the meeting. I don’t think those two sentences that you read help us in the very least.

LT. MELTZER: If the Tribunal please, those two sentences do not refer to the meeting. Those two sentences refer to the biography which sums up the Defendant Funk’s general contribution to the Nazi accession to power and I thought it might be of interest to the Tribunal to see the attitude of a German writer on this aspect of the defendant’s career.

THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me you referred to the meeting.

LT. MELTZER: I was referring Your Honors to Pages 32 and 33 of the document book, and to clarify this point may I read briefly from the biography:

“No less important than Funk’s accomplishments in the programmatic field in the years 1931 and 1932 was his activity at that time as the Führer’s liaison man to the leading men of the German industry, trade, commerce, and finance. On the basis of his past work his personal relations to the German economic leaders were broad and far-reaching. He was now able to enlist them in the service of Adolf Hitler and not only to answer their questions authoritatively but to convince them and win their backing for the Party. At that time that was terribly important work; every success achieved meant a moral, political, and economic strengthening of the vitality of the Party and contributed toward destroying the prejudice that National Socialism is merely a party of class hatred and class struggle.”

THE PRESIDENT: Again, I don’t see that that has helped the Tribunal in the least.

LT. MELTZER: After Funk had helped Hitler become Chancellor, as Press Chief of the German Government, he participated in the early Cabinet meetings, in the course of which the conspirators planned the strategy by which they would secure the passage of the Presidential Emergency Decree, which was passed on 24 March 1933. Funk’s presence at these meetings is revealed by Document 2962-PS which has already been received in evidence and by Document Number 2963-PS, offered as Exhibit Number USA-656. Your Honors will recall that this decree marked the real seizure of political power in Germany.

Soon after this the Defendant Funk assumed an important role in the Ministry of Propaganda. The record shows that the Ministry became one of the most important and vicious of Nazi institutions and that propaganda was fundamental to the achievement of the Nazi program within Germany and outside of Germany. We do not propose to review those matters to you but rather to present evidence showing, as we have said, that the Defendant Funk took a significant part in the propaganda operations.

The Ministry was established on 13 March 1933, with Goebbels as Chief and Defendant Funk as undersecretary, second in command.

As undersecretary Defendant Funk was not only Goebbels’ chief aide but was also the organizer of the large and complex propaganda machine. I wish to offer in evidence Document Number 3501-PS, which will be found on Page 47 of your document book as Exhibit Number USA-657. This document is an affidavit signed on 19 December 1945 by Max Amann, who held the position of Reich Leader of the Press and President of the Reich Press Chamber. I should like to read the second sentence of the first paragraph and the entire second paragraph:

“In carrying out my duties and responsibilities I became familiar with the operation and the organization of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda and Enlightenment. Funk was the soul of the Ministry, and without him Goebbels could not have built it up. Goebbels once stated to me that Funk was his ‘most efficient man.’ Funk exercised comprehensive control over all of the media of expression in Germany; over the press, the theater, radio, and music. As Press Chief of the Government and later as undersecretary of the Ministry, Funk held daily meetings with the Führer and a daily press conference in the course of which he issued the directives governing the materials to be published by the German press.”

In addition to his position as undersecretary, Funk had many other important jobs in the Propaganda Ministry and in its subordinate agencies. These positions have already been listed in Document 3533-PS. I wish, however, to refer in particular to Funk’s position as vice-president of the Reich Chamber of Culture. This position was, of course, related to his functions in the Propaganda Ministry.

In his dual capacity he directly promoted two vital and related Nazi policies. The first was the regimentation of all creative activities in the interests of Nazi political and military objectives. The second was the complete elimination of Jews and dissidents from the so-called cultural professions. A full discussion of the methods by which these policies were effectuated has been included in the brief which was submitted as part of Document Book E. Accordingly, we will not go into that matter now unless the Tribunal wishes us.

In view of the Defendant Funk’s major role in the Propaganda Ministry, it is natural to find Nazi writers stressing his responsibility for the Nazi perversion of culture. In this connection, I will simply invite the Tribunal’s attention to Pages 94 and 95 of Oestreich’s biography, which has already been referred to.

After Defendant Funk left the Ministry of Propaganda and became Minister of Economics in 1938, he continued to advance the anti-Jewish program. For example, on 14 June 1938 he signed a decree providing for the registration of Jewish enterprises. This decree, which became the foundation for the ruthless economic persecution which followed, is found in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1938, Part I, Page 627. It is requested that the Tribunal take judicial notice of this reference to the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ and all subsequent references. May I add that the brief on Defendant Funk gives the document numbers of translations of decrees and other German publications of which the Tribunal will be requested to take judicial notice.

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?

LT. MELTZER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT: Before we do so, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, I see that one of the counsel, Colonel Phillimore, I think, is proposing to call certain witnesses. The Tribunal would like to know who those witnesses are and what subject their evidence is going to deal with.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would the Tribunal like to know now? I would like to let them know, if it is convenient.

THE PRESIDENT: If you could, it would be convenient now.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. The first witness is Korvettenkapitän Moehle, who was a captain on Defendant Dönitz’ staff; and he will prove the passing on the Dönitz order of 17 September 1942. I think that is the main point that he deals with. I think he deals also with the destruction of some rescue ships, but that is the main point.

The second witness is Lieutenant Heisig. He will deal primarily with lectures of the Defendant Dönitz in which he advocated the destruction of the crews of merchant ships. That is the general effect of the evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Meltzer, are you intending to call any witnesses this afternoon?

LT. MELTZER: No, Sir. There is another member of the Prosecution, Sir, who I believe is intending to call a witness—Mr. Dodd.

THE PRESIDENT: In connection with the case against Funk?

LT. MELTZER: No, Your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT: Or in connection with the case against somebody else?

LT. MELTZER: Yes, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Who is it in connection with, Raeder?

LT. MELTZER: I believe Mr. Dodd might offer. . .

THE PRESIDENT: Raeder, is it?

LT. MELTZER: No, Sir. Mr. Dodd might offer a better explanation than I on the purpose of calling the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd?

MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): Yes, Sir. Your Honor, the witness is offered in connection with the Defendants Rosenberg, Funk, Frick, Sauckel, and Kaltenbrunner.

THE PRESIDENT: I see. The evidence relates to concentration camps, does it?

MR. DODD: It does, Your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT: I see.

MR. DODD: This witness would have been called at the time that we presented the other proof, except for the fact that he was before the military court at Dachau at that time and was not available.

THE PRESIDENT: I see; thank you.

LT. MELTZER: May it please the Tribunal, before we adjourned we were dealing with Defendant Funk’s role in the economic persecution of the Jews. As Your Honors will recall, in November of 1938 the death of Vom Rath in Paris was exploited by the Nazis as a pretext for intensifying the persecution of the Jews. The new policy was directed at the complete elimination of the Jews from the economic life of Germany. The evidence we will offer will show that Defendant Funk took a significant part in both the formulation and execution of that policy. In this connection I would refer the Tribunal to Document Number 1816-PS which is already in the Record. This document is a report of the meeting on the Jewish question. It will be found, Your Honor, on Page 52 of the document book. This meeting was held under Göring’s chairmanship on 12 November 1938. In opening the meeting, Defendant Göring stated—and I quote now from Page 1, Paragraph 1, of the translation; the corresponding page of the German document is also Page 1:

“. . . today’s meeting is of a decisive nature. I have received a letter written by the chief of staff of the Führer’s Deputy, Bormann, on the Führer’s orders directing that the Jewish question be now, once and for all, co-ordinated and solved one way or another.”

Defendant Funk came to this meeting well prepared. He had a law already drafted which he submitted with the following explanation—I quote again from Document 1816-PS, Page 15:

“I have prepared a law for this case which provides that as from 1 January 1939 Jews shall be prohibited from operating retail stores and mail-order establishments as well as independent workshops. They shall be further prohibited from hiring employees for that purpose or offering any goods on the market. Wherever a Jewish shop is operated, it is to be closed by the police. From 1 January 1939 a Jew can no longer operate a business in the sense of the law for the regulation of national labor of 20 January 1934.”

I believe we may omit the rest. It is all in the same tenor.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

LT. MELTZER: The substance of Defendant Funk’s draft law promptly found its way into the _Reichsgesetzblatt_. On 12 November 1938 Defendant Göring signed a decree entitled, and I quote, “. . . for the Elimination of Jews from German Economic Life,” and in Section 4 he authorized Defendant Funk to implement the provisions of the decree by issuing the necessary rules and regulations. An examination of the provisions of this decree, which is set forth in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Part I, Page 1580, will reveal how well it deserved its title “. . . for the Elimination of the Jews from German Economic Life.”

Soon after the passage of the decree of 12 November, Defendant Funk delivered a speech on the Jewish question. He made it clear that the program of economic persecution was part of the larger program of extermination and he boasted of the fact that the new program insured the complete elimination of Jews from the German economy. I offer into evidence Document Number 3545-PS as Exhibit USA-659. This document, which is found on Page 76 of the document book, is a certified photostatic copy of Page 2 of the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ of 17 November 1938. I quote a very brief portion of that speech:

“State and economy constitute a single unit. They must be directed according to the same principles. The best proof of this is given by the most recent development of the Jewish problem in Germany. One cannot exclude the Jews from political life and yet let them live and work in the economic sphere.”

I shall omit the rest, with the request that the Tribunal take judicial notice of this reprint from the German newspaper, the _Frankfurter Zeitung_.

I wish, however, to refer to only one more decree, signed by Defendant Funk himself. On the 3rd of December 1938 he signed a decree which imposed additional and drastic economic disabilities upon the Jews and subjected their property to confiscation and forced liquidation. This decree is set forth in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ 1938, Part I, Page 1709. Defendant Funk himself has admitted and deplored his responsibility for the economic persecution of the Jews. I offer into evidence Document Number 3544-PS, as Exhibit USA-660. This document, which is the last document in connection with this phase of the case, is an interrogation of Defendant Funk dated 22 October 1945. Your Honors will find it on Pages 102 and 103 of the document book. I wish to quote from Pages 26 to 27 of the interrogation. The corresponding page of the German translation is Page 21. Although I propose to quote enough to place Defendant Funk’s statements in their proper context, I do not, of course, intend to give any credence to his attempts at self-justification:

“Q: ‘All the decrees excluding the Jews from industry were yours, were they not?’”

Now, omitting the first nine lines of the reply:

“A: ‘As far as my participation in this Jewish affair is concerned, that was my responsibility, and I regretted later on that I ever participated. The Party had always brought pressure to bear on me to make me agree to the confiscation of Jewish property, and I refused repeatedly. But later on, when the anti-Jewish measures and the brutality against Jews were being carried out with full force, something legal had to be done to prevent the looting and confiscation of the whole of Jewish property.’

“Q: ‘You knew that the looting and all that was done at the instigation of the Party, didn’t you?’

“Here Defendant Funk wept and answered:

“‘That is when I should have resigned, in 1938. I am guilty. I am guilty. I admit that I am a guilty party here.’”

In the Propaganda Ministry, Defendant Funk, as we have seen, helped solidify the German people in favor of war. When he moved on to his position as Minister of Economics, and to other positions which will appear, he used his talents even more directly for the conspirators’ main task: preparation for war. Immediately before Defendant Funk took over the Ministry of Economics from Defendant Schacht in 1938, there was a major reorganization of that ministry’s functions which integrated it with the Four Year Plan as the supreme command of the German military economy. This reorganization was effected by a decree, dated 4 February 1938, signed by Göring as Commissioner of the Four Year Plan. This decree is set forth in an official monthly bulletin issued by Göring and entitled, in the English translation, _The Four Year Plan_, Volume II, 1938, Page 105. It is requested that the Tribunal take judicial notice of this publication.

At this point I would simply note that that decree makes it clear that Defendant Funk assumed a critical role in the task of economic mobilization during a decisive period. Indeed, in 1938 he was directly charged with the task of preparing the German economy for war. By a secret decree he was made Plenipotentiary General for Economics and assumed the duties which once had been discharged by Defendant Schacht. In this connection I refer to Document 2194-PS, which has already been placed in evidence. This document, which is found on Page 111 of Your Honors’ document books, consists of a letter dated 6 September 1939, and that letter transmitted a copy of the Reich Defense Law of 4 September 1938. It is this enclosure that we wish to deal with now. I wish to quote from Page 4 of the translation, Paragraphs 2 to 4:

“It is the task of the GBW”—that is the Plenipotentiary General for Economics—“to put all economic forces into the service of the Reich defense and to safeguard economically the life of the German nation. To him are subordinated: the Reich Minister of Economics, the Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture, the Reich Minister of Labor. . .” and so on.—“He is furthermore responsible for directing the financing of the Reich defense within the realm of the Reich Finance Ministry and the Reichsbank.”

To quote one more paragraph:

“The GBW must fulfill the demands of the OKW which are of essential importance for the Armed Forces and must ensure the economic conditions necessary for the production of the armament industry directly managed by the OKW, according to the requirements of the latter.”

This law, in essence, re-enacted the provisions previously passed in the Reich Defense Law of 1935, and I will not trouble the Tribunal with further reading. I do wish to note, however, that the law was, at the specific direction of Hitler, kept secret and that it was signed by Defendant Funk, among others, as Plenipotentiary General for Economics. Your Honors will find Defendant Funk’s signature on the next to the last page of the document, and I invite your attention to the names of his co-signers.

Defendant Funk, in a speech which he delivered on 14 October 1939, explained how, as Plenipotentiary General for Economics, he had for a year and a half prior to the launching of the aggression against Poland, advanced Germany’s economic preparations for war. I offer into evidence Document Number 3324-PS as Exhibit USA-661. This document is a German book by Berndt and Von Wedel entitled, in the English translation, _Germany in the Fight_. That book reprints the defendant’s speech. I quote now from Page 2 of the translation of Document Number 3324-PS, which is found on Page 116 of the document book. The translation of this speech is somewhat awkward, and with the Tribunal’s permission I would rephrase it somewhat without changing its substance in the slightest.

“Although all economic and financial departments were harnessed to the task of the Four Year Plan under the leadership of General Field Marshal Göring, Germany’s economic preparation for war was also secretly advanced in another sector for well over a year, namely, through the formation of a national guiding apparatus for special war economy tasks which would have to be accomplished the moment that war became a fact. For this work all economic departments were combined into one administrative authority, the Plenipotentiary General for Economics, to which position the Führer appointed me one and a half years ago.”

THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of that?

LT. MELTZER: The date of that speech, Sir, is 14 October 1939.

In his dual capacity as Plenipotentiary General for Economics and Minister of Economics, Defendant Funk was naturally advised of the requirements which the conspirators’ program of aggression imposed on the German economy. In this connection I would invite the Tribunal’s attention to Document Number 1301-PS, which is already in evidence. As Your Honors will recall, this document is a top secret report of the conference held in Defendant Göring’s office on 14 October 1938. Your Honors will find it on Page 142 of the document book. I shall simply summarize the relevant portions of this document.

During the conference Göring referred to the world situation and to Hitler’s directive to organize a gigantic armament program. He thereupon directed the Ministry of Economics to increase exports in order to obtain the foreign exchange necessary for stepping up armament. He added, as Your Honors will recall, that the Luftwaffe must be increased five-fold, that the Navy should arm more quickly, and that the Army should accelerate the production of weapons for attack. Defendant Göring’s words directed at Funk, among others, were the words of a man already at war; and his emphasis on quintupling the Air Force and on weapons for attack was that of a man waging aggressive war.

After Schacht’s departure Funk was a key figure in the preparation of plans to finance the war. This was natural, since Defendant Funk after 1939 occupied three positions crucial to war finance. Two we have already named: Minister of Economics and Plenipotentiary General for Economics. In addition, he was President of the Reichsbank.

Funk’s role in war financing is illustrated by Document Number 3562-PS, which I now offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-662. This document was found in the captured files of the Reich Ministry of Economics. It consists, in part, of a letter from the Plenipotentiary General for Economics, signed on his behalf by Dr. Posse. The letter is dated 1 June 1939 and encloses the minutes of a conference concerning the financing of the war which was held under the chairmanship of Funk’s undersecretary in the Ministry of Economics, Dr. Landfried. A copy of the document which I have offered into evidence bears a marginal note on Page 1 in the bottom lefthand corner, dated 5 June, stating, and I quote: “To be shown to the Minister,”—that is, Funk—“for his information.”

During the course of the meeting, which was attended by 12 officials, five of whom were directly responsible to Defendant Funk in his various capacities, the conferees discussed a memorandum regarding war finance which had been prepared by the Plenipotentiary General for Economics on May 9, 1939. I wish to quote briefly from Page 2 of the English translation, which is found on Page 153 of Your Honors’ document book:

“Then a report was made of the contents of the ‘Notes on the question of Internal Financing of War’ of 9 May of this year, in which the figures given to me by the Reich Minister of Finance were also discussed. It was pointed out that the Plenipotentiary General for Economics is primarily interested in introducing into the legislation for war finance the idea of financing war expenditures by future revenues to be expected after the war.”

And, if I may quote another brief excerpt from this important memorandum, which is found on Page 2 of the English translation, Page 153 of your document books:

“State Secretary Neumann first submitted for discussion the question of whether, in case of war, production would be able to meet, to the extent supposed, the demands of the Armed Forces, especially if the demands of the Armed Forces, as stated in the above report, should increase to approximately 14,000 millions in the first 3 months of war. He stated that if the production potential of the present Reich territory is taken as a basis he doubts the possibility of such an increase.”

It is plain then that Defendant Funk exercised comprehensive authority over large areas of the German economy whose proper organization and direction were critical to effective war preparation. The once powerful military machine which rested on the foundation of thorough economic preparation was a tribute to the contribution which Defendant Funk had made to Nazi aggression.

And Funk made this contribution with full knowledge of the plans for military aggression. A compelling inference of such knowledge would arise from the combination of several factors: From Funk’s long and intimate association with the Nazi inner circle; from the very nature of his official functions; from the war-dominated setting of Nazi Germany; from the fact that force and the threat of force had become the primary and the open instruments of German foreign policy. And the final element in weighing the question of Defendant Funk’s knowledge is, of course, the fact that, at the same time that Defendant Funk was making economic preparation, specific plans for aggression were being formulated—plans which were carried out and plans which could be effectively carried out only if they were synchronized with the complementary economic measures.

The conclusion concerning Defendant Funk’s knowledge is reinforced beyond any question by considering, in the light of the factors described above, the more specific and direct evidence which has already been placed into the Record. We have seen from Document 1760-PS that Defendant Funk had told Mr. Messersmith that the absorption of Austria by Germany was a political and economic necessity, and that it would be achieved by whatever means were necessary. We have already referred to Document Number 1301-PS, in which Defendant Göring laid down directives which could be understood only as directives to prepare the economic basis for aggression. And Document Number 3562-PS has revealed that Defendant Funk was making detailed plans for financing the war, that is, of course, a particular war, the war against Poland. In this connection I wish to refer to another vital piece of evidence which has already been introduced in the Record. It is the letter dated 25 August 1939 which Defendant Funk wrote to Hitler. In that letter, as Your Honors will recall, Defendant Funk expressed his gratitude at being able to experience those world-shaking times and to contribute to those tremendous events. And he thanked Hitler for approving his proposals designed to prepare the German economy for the war.

Moreover, the Record contains evidence showing that Defendant Funk, both personally and through his representatives, participated in the economic planning which preceded the military aggression against the Soviet Union. I would refer the Tribunal to Document 1039-PS, which revealed that in April of 1941 Defendant Rosenberg, who had been appointed deputy for the centralized treatment of problems related to the occupation of the Eastern territories, that is, the Soviet Union, discussed with Defendant Funk the economic problems which would arise when the plans for aggression in the East matured. And Document 1039-PS also reveals that Defendant Funk appointed one Dr. Schlotterer as his deputy to collaborate with Rosenberg in connection with the exploitation of the Eastern territories and that Schlotterer met with Defendant Rosenberg almost daily.

It is clear, then, that Defendant Funk participated in every phase of the conspirators’ program, from their seizure of power to their final defeat. Throughout he worked effectively, if sometimes more quietly than others, on behalf of the Nazi program, a program which from the very beginning he knew contemplated the use of ruthless terror and force within Germany and, if necessary, outside of Germany. He bears, we submit, a special, a direct, and a heavy responsibility for the commission of Crimes against Humanity, Crimes against Peace, and War Crimes. The Record makes it clear, if we may summarize the evidence, that by virtue of his activities in the Ministry of Propaganda and in the Ministry of Economics he is responsible for stimulating and engaging in the unrelenting persecution of the Jews and other minorities, for psychologically mobilizing the German people for aggressive war, and for weakening the willingness and capacity of the conspirators’ intended victims to resist aggression. It is also clear, we submit, that Defendant Funk, with full knowledge of the conspirators’ purposes, in his capacity as Minister of Economics, President of the Reichsbank, and Plenipotentiary General for Economics, actively participated in the mobilization of the German economy for aggression. In these capacities and as a member of the Ministerial Council for Defense and the Central Planning Board he also participated in the waging of aggressive war. Moreover, by virtue of his membership in the Central Planning Board, which, as Your Honors will recall from Mr. Dodd’s presentation, formulated and directed the program for the enslavement, the exploitation, and degradation of millions of foreign workers, Defendant Funk also shares special responsibility for the Nazi slave-labor program.

The French Prosecution, I am informed, will deal with this matter in greater detail. Moreover, the French and Soviet Prosecution will submit evidence showing that Defendant Funk actively participated in the program for the criminal looting of the resources of occupied territories.

MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, we would like to call at this time the witness, Dr. Franz Blaha.

[_The witness, Blaha, took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT [_To the witness_]: Is your name Franz Blaha?

DR. FRANZ BLAHA (Witness) [_In Czech._]: Dr. Franz Blaha.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath: “I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the truth, the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

THE PRESIDENT: You can sit down if you wish.

MR. DODD: You are Dr. Franz Blaha, a native and a citizen of Czechoslovakia, are you not?

BLAHA: [_In Czech._] Yes.

MR. DODD: I understand that you are able to speak German, and for technical reasons I suggest that we conduct this examination in German, although I know your native tongue is Czech; is that right?

BLAHA: [_In Czech._] In the interest of the case I am willing to testify in German for the following reasons: 1. For the past 7 years, which are the subject of my testimony, I have lived exclusively in German surroundings; 2. A large number of special and technical expressions relating to life in and about the concentration camps are purely German inventions, and no appropriate equivalent for them in any other language can be found.

MR. DODD: Dr. Blaha, by education and training and profession you are a doctor of medicine?

BLAHA: [_In German._] Yes.

MR. DODD: And in 1939 you were the head of a hospital in Czechoslovakia?

BLAHA: Yes.

MR. DODD: You were arrested, were you not, by the Germans in 1939 after they occupied Czechoslovakia?

BLAHA: Yes.

MR. DODD: And were you confined in various prisons between 1939 and 1941?

BLAHA: Yes.

MR. DODD: From 1941 to April of 1945 you were confined at Dachau Concentration Camp?

BLAHA: Yes, until the end.

MR. DODD: When that camp was liberated by the Allied Forces?

BLAHA: Yes.

MR. DODD: You executed an affidavit in Nuremberg on the 9th day of January of this year, did you not?

BLAHA: Yes.

MR. DODD: This affidavit, if it please the Tribunal, bears the Document Number 3249-PS, and I wish to offer it at this time. It is Exhibit USA-663. I feel that we can reduce the extent of this interrogation by approximately three-fourths through the submission of this affidavit and I should like to read it. It will take much less time to read this affidavit than it would to go through it in question and answer form and it covers a large part of what we expect to elicit from this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MR. DODD: I wouldn’t have read it if we had had time to have a Russian and French translation, but unfortunately that wasn’t possible in the few days we had.

“I, Franz Blaha, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows:

“1. I studied medicine in Prague, Vienna, Strasbourg, and Paris and received my diploma in 1920. From 1920 to 1926 I was a clinical assistant. In 1926 I became chief physician of the Iglau Hospital in Moravia, Czechoslovakia. I held this position until 1939 when the Germans entered Czechoslovakia and I was seized as a hostage and held a prisoner for co-operating with the Czech Government. I was sent as a prisoner to the Dachau Concentration Camp in April 1941 and remained there until the liberation of the camp in April 1945. Until July 1941 I worked in a punishment company. After that I was sent to the hospital and subjected to the experiments in typhoid being conducted by Dr. Muermelstadt. After that I was to be made the subject of an experimental operation and succeeded in avoiding this only by admitting that I was a physician. If this had been known before, I would have suffered, because intellectuals were treated very harshly in the punishment company. In October 1941 I was sent to work in the herb plantation and later in the laboratory for processing herbs. In June 1942 I was taken into the hospital as a surgeon. Shortly afterwards I was directed to perform a stomach operation on 20 healthy prisoners. Because I would not do this I was transferred to the autopsy room where I stayed until April 1945. While there I performed approximately 7,000 autopsies. In all, 12,000 autopsies were performed under my direction.

“2. From the middle of 1941 to the end of 1942 some 500 operations on healthy prisoners were performed. These were for the instructions of the SS medical students and doctors and included operations on the stomach, gall bladder, and throat. These were performed by students and doctors of only 2 years’ training, although they were very dangerous and difficult. Ordinarily they would not have been done except by surgeons with at least 4 years’ surgical practice. Many prisoners died on the operating table and many others from later complications. I performed autopsies on all of these bodies. The doctors who supervised these operations were Lang, Muermelstadt, Wolter, Ramsauer, and Kahr. Standartenführer Dr. Lolling frequently witnessed these operations.

“3. During my time at Dachau I was familiar with many kinds of medical experiments carried on there on human victims. These persons were never volunteers but were forced to submit to such acts. Malaria experiments on about 1,200 people were conducted by Dr. Klaus Schilling between 1941 and 1945. Schilling was personally ordered by Himmler to conduct these experiments. The victims were either bitten by mosquitoes or given injections of malaria sporozoites taken from mosquitoes. Different kinds of treatment were applied including quinine, pyrifer, neosalvarsan, antipyrin, pyramidon, and a drug called 2516 Behring. I performed autopsies on the bodies of people who died from these malaria experiments. Thirty to 40 died from the malaria itself. Three hundred to four hundred died later from diseases which were fatal because of the physical condition resulting from the malaria attacks. In addition there were deaths resulting from poisoning due to overdoses of neosalvarsan and pyramidon. Dr. Schilling was present at my autopsies on the bodies of his patients.

“4. In 1942 and 1943 experiments on human beings were conducted by Dr. Sigmund Rascher to determine the effects of changing air pressure. As many as 25 persons were put at one time into a specially constructed van in which pressure could be increased or decreased as required. The purpose was to find out the effects on human beings of high altitude and of rapid descents by parachute. Through a window in the van I have seen the people lying on the floor of the van. Most of the prisoners used died from these experiments, from internal hemorrhage of the lungs or brain. The survivors coughed blood when taken out. It was my job to take the bodies out and as soon as they were found to be dead to send the internal organs to Munich for study. About 400 to 500 prisoners were experimented on. The survivors were sent to invalid blocks and liquidated shortly afterwards. Only a few escaped.

“5. Rascher also conducted experiments on the effect of cold water on human beings. This was done to find a way for reviving airmen who had fallen into the ocean. The subject was placed in ice-cold water and kept there until he was unconscious. Blood was taken from his neck and tested each time his body temperature dropped one degree. This drop was determined by a rectal thermometer. Urine was also periodically tested. Some men stood it as long as 24 to 36 hours. The lowest body temperature reached was 19 degrees centigrade, but most men died at 25 or 26 degrees. When the men were removed from the ice water attempts were made to revive them by artificial sunshine, with hot water, by electro-therapy, or by animal warmth. For this last experiment prostitutes were used and the body of the unconscious man was placed between the bodies of two women. Himmler was present at one such experiment. I could see him from one of the windows in the street between the blocks. I have personally been present at some of these cold water experiments when Rascher was absent, and I have seen notes and diagrams on them in Rascher’s laboratory. About 300 persons were used in these experiments. The majority died. Of those who survived, many became mentally deranged. Those who did not die were sent to invalid blocks and were killed just as were the victims of the air pressure experiments. I know only two who survived, a Yugoslav and a Pole, both of whom are mental cases.

“6. Liver puncture experiments were performed by Dr. Brachtl on healthy people and on people who had diseases of the stomach and gall bladder. For this purpose a needle was jabbed into the liver of a person and a small piece of the liver was extracted. No anaesthetic was used. The experiment is very painful and often had serious results, as the stomach or large blood vessels were often punctured, resulting in hemorrhage. Many persons died of these tests for which Polish, Russian, Czech, and German prisoners were employed. Altogether about 175 people were subjected to these experiments.

“7. Phlegmone experiments were conducted by Dr. Schütz, Dr. Babor, Dr. Kieselwetter and Professor Lauer. Forty healthy men were used at a time, of which twenty were given intramuscular and twenty intravenous injections of pus from diseased persons. All treatment was forbidden for 3 days, by which time serious inflammation and in many cases general blood poisoning had occurred. Then each group was divided again into groups of 10. Half were given chemical treatment with liquid and special pills every 10 minutes for 24 hours. The remainder were treated with sulfanamide and surgery. In some cases all the limbs were amputated. My autopsy also showed that the chemical treatment had been harmful and had even caused perforations of the stomach wall. For these experiments Polish, Czech, and Dutch priests were ordinarily used. Pain was intense in such experiments. Most of the 600 to 800 persons who were used finally died. Most of the others became permanent invalids and were later killed.

“8. In the fall of 1944 there were 60 to 80 persons who were subjected to salt water experiments. They were locked in a room and for 5 days were given nothing for food but salt water. During this time their urine, blood, and excrement were tested. None of these prisoners died, possibly because they received smuggled food from other prisoners. Hungarians and Gypsies were used for these experiments.

“9. It was common practice to remove the skin from dead prisoners. I was commanded to do this on many occasions. Dr. Rascher and Dr. Wolter in particular asked for this human skin from human backs and chests. It was chemically treated and placed in the sun to dry. After that it was cut into various sizes for use as saddles, riding breeches, gloves, house slippers, and ladies’ handbags. Tattooed skin was especially valued by SS men. Russians, Poles, and other inmates were used in this way, but it was forbidden to cut out the skin of a German. This skin had to be from healthy prisoners and free from defects. Sometimes we did not have enough bodies with good skin and Rascher would say, ‘All right, you will get the bodies.’ The next day we would receive 20 or 30 bodies of young people. They would have been shot in the neck or struck on the head so that the skin would be uninjured. Also we frequently got requests for the skulls or skeletons of prisoners. In those cases we boiled the skull or the body. Then the soft parts were removed and the bones were bleached and dried and reassembled. In the case of skulls it was important to have a good set of teeth. When we got an order for skulls from Oranienburg the SS men would say, ‘We will try to get you some with good teeth.’ So it was dangerous to have good skin or good teeth.

“10. Transports arrived frequently in Dachau from Struthof, Belsen, Auschwitz, Mauthausen and other camps. Many of these were 10 to 14 days on the way without water or food. On one transport which arrived in November 1942 I found evidence of cannibalism. The living persons had eaten the flesh from the dead bodies. Another transport arrived from Compiègne in France. Professor Limousin of Clermont-Ferrand who was later my assistant told me that there had been 2,000 persons on this transport when it started. There was food available but no water. Eight hundred died on the way and were thrown out. When it arrived after 12 days, more than 500 persons were dead on the train. Of the remainder most died shortly after arrival. I investigated this transport because the International Red Cross complained, and the SS men wanted a report that the deaths had been caused by fighting and rioting on the way. I dissected a number of bodies and found that they had died from suffocation and lack of water. It was mid-summer and 120 people had been packed into each car.

“11. In 1941 and 1942 we had in the camp what we called invalid transports. These were made up of people who were sick or for some reason incapable of working. We called them ‘Himmelfahrt Commandos.’ About 100 or 120 were ordered each week to go to the shower baths. There four people gave injections of phenol, evipan, or benzine, which soon caused death. After 1943 these invalids were sent to other camps for liquidation. I know that they were killed, because I saw the records and they were marked with a cross and the date that they left, which was the way that deaths were ordinarily recorded. This was shown on both the card index of the Camp Dachau and the records in the registry office of Dachau. One thousand to two thousand went away every 3 months, so there were about five thousand sent to death in this way in 1943, and the same in 1944. In April 1945 a Jewish transport was loaded at Dachau and was left standing on the railroad siding. The station was destroyed by bombing, and they could not leave. So they were just left there to die of starvation. They were not allowed to get off. When the camp was liberated they were all dead.

“12. Many executions by gas or shooting or injections took place right in the camp. The gas chamber was completed in 1944, and I was called by Dr. Rascher to examine the first victims. Of the eight or nine persons in the chamber there were three still alive, and the remainder appeared to be dead. Their eyes were red, and their faces were swollen. Many prisoners were later killed in this way. Afterwards they were removed to the crematorium where I had to examine their teeth for gold. Teeth containing gold were extracted. Many prisoners who were sick were killed by injections while in the hospital. Some prisoners killed in the hospital came through to the autopsy room with no name or number on the tag which was usually tied to their big toe. Instead the tag said ‘Do not dissect’. I performed autopsies on some of these and found that they were perfectly healthy but had died from injections. Sometimes prisoners were killed only because they had dysentery or vomited and gave the nurses too much trouble. Mental patients were liquidated by being led to the gas chamber and injected there or shot. Shooting was a common method of execution. Prisoners could be shot just outside the crematorium and carried in. I have seen people pushed into the ovens while they were still breathing and making sounds, although if they were too much alive they were usually hit on the head first.

“13. The principal executions about which I know from having examined the victims or supervised such examinations are as follows:

“In 1942 there were 5,000 to 6,000 Russians held in a separate camp inside Dachau. They were taken on foot to the military rifle range near the camp in groups of 500 or 600 and shot. Such groups left the camp about three times a week. At night we used to go out to bring the bodies back in carts and then examine them. In February 1944 about 40 Russian students arrived from Moosburg. I knew a few of the boys in the hospital. I examined their bodies after they were shot outside the crematory. In September 1944 a group of 94 high-ranking Russian officers were shot, including two military doctors who had been working with me in the hospital. I examined their bodies. In April 1945, a number of prominent people were shot who had been kept in the bunker. They included two French generals, whose names I cannot remember; but I recognized them from their uniform. I examined them after they were shot. In 1944 and 1945 a number of women were killed by hanging, shooting, and injections. I examined them and found that in many cases they were pregnant. In 1945, just before the camp was liberated, all ‘Nacht und Nebel’ prisoners were executed. These were prisoners who were forbidden to have any contact with the outside world. They were kept in a special enclosure and were not allowed to send or receive any mail. There were 30 or 40, many of whom were sick. These were carried to the crematory on stretchers. I examined them and found they had all been shot in the neck.

“14. From 1941 on the camp was more and more overcrowded. In 1943 the hospital for prisoners was already overcrowded. In 1944 and in 1945 it was impossible to maintain any sort of sanitary conditions. Rooms which held 300 or 400 persons in 1942 were filled with 1,000 in 1943, and in the first quarter of 1945 with 2,000 or more. The rooms could not be cleaned because they were too crowded and there was no cleaning material. Baths were available only once a month. Latrine facilities were completely inadequate. Medicine was almost nonexistent. But I found after the camp was liberated that there was plenty of medicine in the SS hospital for all the camp, if it had been given to us for use. New arrivals at the camp were lined up out of doors for hours at a time. Sometimes they stood there from morning until night. It did not matter whether this was in the winter or in the summer. This occurred all through 1943, 1944, and the first quarter of 1945. I could see these formations from the window of the autopsy room. Many of the people who had to stand in the cold in this way became ill with pneumonia and died. I had several acquaintances who were killed in this manner during 1944 and 1945.

“In October 1944 a transport of Hungarians brought spotted fever into the camp, and an epidemic began. I examined many of the corpses from this transport and reported the situation to Dr. Hintermayer but was forbidden, on penalty of being shot, to mention that there was an epidemic in the camp. He said that it was sabotage, and that I was trying to have the camp quarantined so that the prisoners would not have to work in the armaments industry. No preventive measures were taken at all. New healthy arrivals were put into blocks where an epidemic was already present. Also infected persons were put into these blocks. The 30th block, for instance, died out completely three times. Only at Christmas, when the epidemic spread into the SS camp, was a quarantine established. Nevertheless, transports continued to arrive. We had 200 to 300 new typhus cases a day and about 100 deaths from typhus daily. In all we had 28,000 cases and 15,000 deaths. Apart from those that died from the disease my autopsies showed that many deaths were caused solely by malnutrition. Such deaths occurred in all the years from 1941 to 1945. They were mostly Italians, Russians, and Frenchmen. These people were just starved to death. At the time of death they weighed 50 to 60 pounds. Autopsies showed their internal organs had often shrunk to one-third of their normal size.

“The facts stated above are true. This declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion. After reading over the statement I have signed and executed the same at Nuremberg, Germany, this 9th day of January 1946.”[1]

—Signed—“Dr. Franz Blaha.

“Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of January 1946 at Nuremberg, Germany. 2d Lieutenant Daniel F. Margolies.”

MR. DODD: [_Continuing the interrogation._] Dr. Blaha, will you state whether or not visitors came to the camp of Dachau while you were there?

BLAHA: Very many visitors came to our camp so that it sometimes seemed to us that we were not confined in a camp but in an exhibition or a zoo. At times there was a visit or an excursion almost every day from schools, from different military, medical, and other institutions, and also many members of the Police, the SS, and the Armed Forces; also. . .

THE PRESIDENT: Will you pause so as to give the interpreter’s words time to come through; do you understand?

BLAHA: Yes. Also some State personalities came to the camp. Regular inspections were made month by month by the Inspector General of Concentration Camps, Obergruppenführer Pohl; also by SS Reichsführer Professor Grawitz, Inspector of Experimental Stations; Standartenführer Dr. Lolling; and other personalities.

MR. DODD: The presiding Justice has suggested that you pause, and it would be helpful if you paused in the making of your answers so that the interpreters can complete their interpretation.

BLAHA: Yes.

MR. DODD: Are you able to state how long these visits lasted on an average?

BLAHA: That depended on the sort of visits being made. Some were inside for half an hour to an hour, some for 3 or 4 hours.

MR. DODD: Were there prominent Government people who visited the camp at any time while you were there?

BLAHA: While I was there many personalities came to our camp: Reichsführer Himmler came to Dachau several times and also was present at the experiments. I was present myself on these occasions. Other personalities also were there. I myself have seen three ministers of state, and from political prisoners who were Germans and therefore knew these people I heard that several other personages visited the camp. I also twice saw high-ranking Italian officers and once a Japanese officer.

MR. DODD: Do you remember the names of any of these prominent Government people, or do you remember more particularly who any of them were?

BLAHA: Besides Himmler there was Bormann; also Gauleiter Wagner; Gauleiter Giesler; State Ministers Frick, Rosenberg, Funk, Sauckel; also the General of Police Daluege; and others.

MR. DODD: Did these people whom you have just named take tours around the camp while you were there?

BLAHA: Generally the tour through the camp was so arranged that the visitors were first taken to the kitchen, then to the laundry, then to the hospital, that is, usually to the surgical station, then to the malaria station of Professor Schilling and the experimental station of Dr. Rascher. Then they proceeded to a few “blocks,” particularly those of the German prisoners and sometimes they also visited the chapel, which, however, had been fitted up inside for German clergy only. Sometimes, too, various personalities were presented and introduced to the visitors. It was so arranged that always, first of all, a “green” professional criminal was selected and introduced as a murderer; then the Mayor of Vienna, Dr. Schmitz, was usually presented as the second one; then a high-ranking Czech officer; then a homosexual; a Gypsy; a Catholic bishop or other Polish priest of high rank; then a university professor, in this order, so that the visitors always found it entertaining.

MR. DODD: Now did I understand you to name Kaltenbrunner as one of those visitors there or not?

BLAHA: Yes, Kaltenbrunner was also present. He was there together with General Daluege. That was, I believe, in the year 1943. I was also interested in General Daluege because it was he who, after Heydrich’s death, had become Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, and I wanted to see him.

MR. DODD: Did you see Kaltenbrunner there yourself?

BLAHA: Yes. He was pointed out to me. I had not seen him previously.

MR. DODD: Did I understand you mentioned the name Frick as one of those whom you saw there?

BLAHA: Yes, it was in the year of 1944, the first half of 1944.

MR. DODD: Where did you see him? Where in the camp did you see him?

BLAHA: I saw him from the hospital window as he was entering with his staff, with several people.

MR. DODD: Do you see the man whom you saw there that day, by the name of Frick, in this courtroom now?

BLAHA: Yes, the fourth man from the right in the first row.

MR. DODD: I understand you also named the name Rosenberg as one of those whom you saw there?

BLAHA: I can recall that it was shortly after my arrival in the concentration camp at Dachau that there was a visit and it was then that my German comrades pointed Rosenberg out to me.

MR. DODD: Do you see that man in this courtroom now?

BLAHA: Yes. He is the second farther to the left in the first row.

MR. DODD: I also understood you to name Sauckel as one of those who were present in the camp.

BLAHA: Yes, but I did not see him personally; I merely heard that he had also visited certain factories and armament plants; and that was in 1943, I believe.

MR. DODD: Was it general knowledge in the camp at that time that a man named Sauckel visited the camp, and particularly the munition plant?

BLAHA: Yes, that was general knowledge in the camp.

MR. DODD: I also understood you to name one of those who visited this camp as Funk.

BLAHA: Yes. He was also present at a visit, and I can remember that it was on the occasion of a state conference of the Axis Powers in Salzburg or Reichenhall. It was the custom on such occasions, when there was a Party convention or a celebration in Munich, Berchtesgaden, or Salzburg, for several personalities to come from the celebrations to Dachau for a visit. That was also the case with Funk.

MR. DODD: Did you personally see Funk there?

BLAHA: No, I did not see Funk personally; I merely heard that he was there.

MR. DODD: Was that general knowledge in the camp at that time?

BLAHA: Yes. We knew beforehand that he was to come.

MR. DODD: Were there any visits after the end of the year 1944, or in the months of 1945?

BLAHA: There were some visits still, but very few, because there was a typhus epidemic in the camp at that time and quarantine was imposed.

MR. DODD: Doctor, you are now director of a hospital in Prague, are you not?

BLAHA: Yes.

MR. DODD: I have no further questions to ask of the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any other counsel for the Prosecution wish to ask any questions? Colonel Pokrovsky? [_Colonel Pokrovsky indicated assent._] We will adjourn for a 10-minute recess.

[1] The last paragraph of this affidavit appears in the English translation signed by Dr. Blaha but not in the original German version.

[_A recess was taken._]

COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): I would like permission to ask this witness several questions.

[_Turning to the witness_]: Tell us, witness, do you know what was the particular purpose of the concentration camp at Dachau; was it really, so to speak, a concentration camp of extermination?

BLAHA: Until the year 1943 it was really an extermination camp. After 1943 a good many factories and munition plants were established, also inside the camp, particularly after the bombardments started, and then it became more of a work camp. But as far as the results are concerned there was no difference, because the prisoners had to work so hard while going hungry that they died from hunger and exhaustion instead of from beatings.

COL. POKROVSKY: Must I understand you this way, that, in fact, both before 1943 and after 1943 Dachau was a camp of extermination and that there were different ways of extermination?

BLAHA: That is so.

COL. POKROVSKY: How many, according to your own observations, went through this camp of extermination, Dachau; how many internees came originally from the U.S.S.R., how many passed through the camp?

BLAHA: I cannot state that exactly, only approximately. First, after November 1941, there were exclusively Russian prisoners of war in uniform. They had separate camps and were liquidated within a few months. In the summer of 1942, those who remained of these—I believe there were 12,000 prisoners of war—were transported to Mauthausen; and, as I learned from the people who came from Mauthausen to Dachau, they were liquidated in gas chambers.

Then, after the Russian prisoners of war, Russian children were brought to Dachau. There were, I believe, 2,000 boys, 6 to 17 years old. They were kept in one or two special blocks. They were assigned to particularly brutal people, the “greens,” who beat them at every step. These young boys also. . .

COL. POKROVSKY: What do you mean when you refer to the “greens”?

BLAHA: Those were the so-called professional criminals. They beat these young boys and gave them the hardest work. They worked particularly in the plantations where they had to pull ploughs, sowing machines, and street rollers instead of horses and motors being used. Also in all transport Kommandos Russian children were used exclusively. At least 70 percent of them died of tuberculosis, I believe, and those who remained were then sent to a special camp in the Tyrol in 1943 or the beginning of 1944.

Then after the children, several thousand so-called Eastern Workers were killed. These were civilians who were removed from the Eastern territories to Germany and then because of so-called work-sabotage were put into concentration camps. In addition there were many Russian officers and intellectuals.

COL. POKROVSKY: I would like to ask you to be more exact in your answers in regard to those people whom you call “greens.” Did I correctly understand you when you said that those criminals had the task of supervising those internees arriving at the camp?

BLAHA: Yes.

COL. POKROVSKY: And these professional criminals were given complete charge of the children, and they beat and ill-treated these children of Soviet citizens and put them to work far beyond their strength, so that they became tubercular?

BLAHA: Yes.

COL. POKROVSKY: What do you know about the executions of the citizens of the U.S.S.R. which were carried out in this camp?

BLAHA: I believe I am not far from the truth when I say that of all those executed, at least 75 percent were Russians, and that women as well as men were brought to Dachau from outside to be executed.

COL. POKROVSKY: Can you give us more details in regard to the execution of 94 high field and staff officers of the Red Army, which you already spoke about in reply to the question of my colleague? Who were these officers, and what rank did they hold? What were the reasons for their execution? Do you know anything at all about it?

BLAHA: In the summer or late spring of 1944 high-ranking Russian officers—generals, colonels, and majors—were sent to Dachau. During the following weeks they were examined by the political department; that is to say, after each interrogation they were brought to the camp hospital in a completely battered condition. I myself saw and knew well some who for weeks had to lie on their bellies, and we had to remove by surgical operation parts of their skin and muscles which had become mortified. Many succumbed to these methods of investigation. The others, 94 people in number, were then brought to the crematory in the beginning of September 1944 on orders from the RSHA in Berlin and there, while on their knees, shot through the neck.

In addition, in the winter and spring of 1945 several Russian officers were brought from solitary confinement to the crematory and there either hanged or shot.

COL. POKROVSKY: I would like to ask you the same kind of question about the execution of the 40 Russian students. It is possible for you to give us a few details about the execution?

BLAHA: Yes, those Russian students and intellectuals—I can recall that a doctor was also among them—were brought from the Moosburg Camp to Dachau, and after 1 month they were all executed. That was in March of 1944.

COL. POKROVSKY: Do you happen to know what the reason was for their execution?

BLAHA: The order for it came from Berlin. We did not get to know the reason, because I saw the bodies only after the execution and the reason was read aloud before the execution took place.

COL. POKROVSKY: This execution produced the impression that it was one of the stages of the general plan for extermination of the people who entered Dachau?

BLAHA: Yes. It was easy to see that these executions, these transports of invalids, and the way epidemics were dealt with, were all part of the general plan for extermination; and particularly, and this I must emphasize, it was the Russian prisoners who were always treated the worst of all.

COL. POKROVSKY: Would you be so kind as to say what is known to you in regard to those internees who were in the “Nacht und Nebel” (night and fog) category? Were there many of these internees? Do you know the reason why they were sent to the concentration camp?

BLAHA: Many so-called Nacht und Nebel prisoners came to the concentration camp. The people so designated were mostly from the western countries of Europe, particularly Frenchmen, Belgians, and Dutchmen. The Russian people—and this was also the case with the Czechs and also in my own case—frequently had the designation “return undesirable.” This actually meant the same. Shortly before the liberation many of these people were executed on the order of the camp commander, that is, shot in front of the crematory. Many of these people, particularly the French and Russians, were serious cases of typhus and with a temperature of 40 degrees were carried on stretchers to the rifle range.

COL. POKROVSKY: It seems to me that you mentioned something about a considerable number of prisoners who died of starvation. Could you tell me how large that number was—the number of people who died of starvation?

BLAHA: I believe that two-thirds of the entire population of the camp suffered from severe malnutrition and that at least 25 percent of the dead had literally died of starvation. It was called in German “Hungertyphus.” Apart from that, tuberculosis was the most widespread disease in the camp and it spread also because of malnutrition. Most of its victims were Russians.

COL. POKROVSKY: It seems to me that you said, answering the question of my colleague, that the majority of those who died of starvation and exhaustion were French, Russians, and Italians. How do you account for the fact that in just these categories of internees more people died than in other categories?

BLAHA: Yes.

COL. POKROVSKY: How do you explain that especially Russians, French, and Italians made up the largest number of those people who died from starvation? Was there any difference in the feeding of internees of the different nationalities, or was there some other reason?

BLAHA: It was like this: The others, the Germans, Poles, and Czechs, who had already been in the camp for some time, had had time, if I may say so, to adjust themselves to camp conditions, physically I mean. The Russian deteriorated rapidly. The same was true of the French and the Italians. Moreover, these nationals for the most part arrived from other camps suffering from malnutrition so that they then soon fell easy prey to the other epidemics and diseases. Also, the Germans, Poles, and many others who worked in the armaments industry had since the year 1943 been able to get parcels from home. That, of course, was not the case with citizens of Soviet Russia, France, or Italy.

COL. POKROVSKY: Can you answer the question about what Rosenberg, Kaltenbrunner, Sauckel, or Funk saw when they were in the Dachau Concentration Camp? Do you know what they saw and what was shown them?

BLAHA: I had no opportunity of seeing what happened during these visits. Only on very rare occasions did one have the opportunity of seeing these visitors from the window and observing where they went. I seldom had the opportunity to be present as I was in the case of Himmler’s visits and those of Obergruppenführer Pohl and once on the occasion of Gauleiter Giesler’s visit, when they were shown the experiments or the patients in the hospital. As to the others I do not know what they individually saw and did in the camp.

COL. POKROVSKY: Perhaps you had an opportunity of observing the length of the visit of those people in the camp, whether the visit was short—just for a few moments—or whether they stayed there a long time. I have in mind Rosenberg, Kaltenbrunner, Sauckel, and Funk.

BLAHA: That varied. Many visitors were there for half an hour, many, as I said before, spent as many as 3 hours there. We were always able to observe that quite well because at those times no work could be done, nor was food distributed. We did not carry on our work in the hospital and had to wait until the signal was given to us that the visitors had left the camp. Apart from that I had no means of knowing how long these visits in the camp lasted in the individual cases.

COL. POKROVSKY: Can you recall the visit of Kaltenbrunner, Rosenberg, Funk, and Sauckel? On the basis of what you said just now could you state whether they were brief visits or whether those people stayed there for several hours? Did you understand my question or not?

BLAHA: Unfortunately, I cannot make a statement on that because, as I said, the visits took place so frequently that I have difficulty, after all these years, in recalling whether they lasted for a short or longer time. Many visits, for instance, from schools—from the military and police schools—lasted a whole day.

COL. POKROVSKY: Thank you. I have no further questions of this witness at this stage of the sitting.

M. CHARLES DUBOST (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): You alluded to a convoy of deported French people who came from Compiègne, of whom only 1,200 survivors arrived. Were there any other convoys?

BLAHA: Yes. There were transports, particularly from Bordeaux, Lyon, and Compiègne, all in the first half of 1944.

M. DUBOST: Were all the transports carried out under the same conditions?

BLAHA: The conditions under which these transports were made were, if not the same, at any rate very similar.

M. DUBOST: Each time you were able to see on arrival that there were numerous victims?

BLAHA: Yes.

M. DUBOST: What were the causes of death?

BLAHA: The deaths were caused by the fact that too many people were packed into the cars, which were then locked, and that they did not get anything to eat or drink for several days. Usually they starved or suffocated. Many of those who survived were brought to the camp hospital, and of these a large number died from various complications and diseases.

M. DUBOST: Did you make autopsies on the people who died while en route?

BLAHA: Yes, particularly for the transport from Compiègne my services were demanded because the rumor was spread that the French Maquis and Fascists had attacked and killed each other in the cars. I had to inspect these corpses, but in no case did I find any signs of violence. Moreover, I took 10 corpses as a test, dissected them thoroughly and sent special reports on them to Berlin. All these people had died of suffocation. I was also able to note during the autopsy that these were prominent people of France. I could tell from their identity papers and uniforms that they were high-ranking French officers, priests, deputies, and well-nourished people who had been taken direct from civilian life to the cars and sent to Dachau.

M. DUBOST: After the reports which you sent to Berlin did the conditions under which the transports were made remain the same?

BLAHA: Nothing happened, as usual. Always long reports were written but conditions did not improve at all.

M. DUBOST: You indicated that some French generals had been put to death shortly before the liberation of the camp. Do you know the names of these generals?

BLAHA: Unfortunately I have forgotten these names. I can remember only what I was told by the prisoners who were kept in the bunkers with them—that they were the prominent personalities from Germany and other countries: Pastor Niemöller was there, also a French prince, Schuschnigg was there too, and members of the French Government and many others. I was told that one of the generals who had been shot was a close relative of General De Gaulle. Unfortunately I have forgotten his name.

M. DUBOST: If I understood you correctly, these generals were prisoners of war who had been transported to this concentration camp?

BLAHA: These two generals were not in the concentration camp. They were kept, along with the other prominent personalities, in the so-called “Kommandantur-Arrest,” that is, in the bunker separated from the camp. On various occasions when they needed medical attention I came into contact with them, but that was very seldom. Otherwise they did not come into contact with the other prisoners at all.

M. DUBOST: Did they belong to the category of deported people whose “return was undesirable” or were they in the Nacht und Nebel category?

BLAHA: I do not know. It was 2 days previously that all the others who were kept in the bunker were sent by special transport to the Tyrol. That was, I believe, a week or 8 days before the liberation.

M. DUBOST: You indicated that numerous visitors, German military men, students, political men, often toured the camp. Can you say if any ordinary people, like workers or farmers, knew what was going on in this camp?

BLAHA: In my opinion, the people who lived in the neighborhood of Munich must have known of all these things, because the prisoners went every day to various factories in Munich and the neighborhood; and at work they frequently came into contact with the civilian workers. Moreover, the various suppliers and consumers often entered the fields and the factories of the German armament works and they saw what was done to the prisoners and what they looked like.

M. DUBOST: Can you say in what way the French were treated?

BLAHA: Well, if I said that the Russians were treated worst of all, the French were the second in order. Of course, there were differences in the treatment of individual persons. The Nacht und Nebel prisoners were treated quite differently; likewise the prominent political personalities and the intellectuals. That was so for all nationalities. And the workers and peasants also were treated differently.

M. DUBOST: If I understood correctly, the treatment reserved for the French intellectuals was particularly rigorous. Do you remember the treatment inflicted on some French intellectuals and can you tell us their names?

BLAHA: I had many comrades among the physicians and university professors who worked with me in the hospital. Unfortunately a large number of them died of typhus. Most of the French, in fact, died of typhus. I remember best of all Professor Limousin. He arrived in very poor condition with the transport from Compiègne. I took him into my department as assistant pathologist. Then I also knew the Bishop of Clermont-Ferrand. There were other physicians and university professors whom I knew. I remember Professor Roche, Dr. Lemartin, and many others—I have forgotten their names.

M. DUBOST: In the course of the conversations which you had with Dr. Rascher were you informed of the purpose of these experiments?

BLAHA: I didn’t understand the question, excuse me please. . .

M. DUBOST: Were you informed of the purpose of the medical and biological experiments made by Dr. Rascher in the camp?

BLAHA: Well, Dr. Rascher made exclusively so-called Air Force experiments in the camp. He was a major in the Air Force and was assigned to investigate the conditions to which parachutists were subjected and, secondly, the conditions of those people who had to make an emergency landing on the sea or had fallen into the sea. According to scientific standards, insofar as I can judge, this was all to no purpose. Like all the other experiments, it was simply useless murder; and it is amazing that learned university professors and physicians, particularly, were capable of carrying out these experiments according to plan. These experiments were much worse than all the liquidations and executions, because all the victims of these experiments simply had their suffering prolonged, as various medicines such as vitamins, hormones, tonics, and injections, which were not available for the ordinary patients, were provided for these patients so that the experiments might last longer and give those people more time to observe their victims.

M. DUBOST: I am speaking now of the experiments of Dr. Rascher only. Had he received the order to make these experiments or did he make them on his own initiative?

BLAHA: These experiments were made on Himmler’s direct orders; also, Dr. Rascher had close relations with Himmler and was like a relative of his. He visited Himmler very often and Himmler visited Dr. Rascher several times.

M. DUBOST: Have you any information as to the kind of physicians who were making these experiments? Were they always SS men or were they members of medical faculties of universities who, however, did not belong to the SS?

BLAHA: That varied. For example, the malaria station was under the direction of Professor Klaus Schilling of the Koch Institute in Berlin. The Phlegmone station also had several university professors. The surgical station was manned solely by SS doctors. In the Air Force station there were exclusively SS and military doctors. It differed. Dr. Bleibeck from Vienna conducted the experiments with sea water.

M. DUBOST: Were the experiments for the Luftwaffe made on the order of Himmler only?

BLAHA: Himmler.

M. DUBOST: Do you know—this is the last question—how many Frenchmen passed through this camp?

BLAHA: I believe at least eight or ten thousand people arrived at the camp. Furthermore, I know very well that, particularly during the last period, several thousand French prisoners marched on foot from the western camps, especially from Natzweiler, Struthof, _et cetera_, and that only very small remnants of these ever reached Dachau.

M. DUBOST: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell us to what branches of the German service those who were employed at the camp belonged?

BLAHA: If I understood you correctly, the highest authority on everything going on in the camp was the so-called Security Main Office in Berlin. All demands and directives came from Berlin; also the experimental stations received a definite quota of subjects for the experiments and the numbers were fixed by Berlin. If the doctors making the experiments needed a larger number, new requests had to be sent to Berlin.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but what I want to know is to what branch of the service the men belonged who were employed in the camp.

BLAHA: They were all SS men and most of them from the SD. During the last days, at the very end, a few members of the Armed Forces were there as guards but the men in charge were entirely SS men.

THE PRESIDENT: Were there any of the Gestapo there?

BLAHA: Yes, that was the so-called political department, which was directed by the chief of the Munich Gestapo. It had control of all the interrogations and regulations, and it proposed the executions, transports, and transports of invalids. Also, all the people who were provided for the experiments had to be approved by the political department.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to cross-examine the witness?

DR. SAUTER: Witness, you told us that at one time the Defendant Funk also was at Dachau, and you informed us, if I understood you correctly, that this happened on the occasion of some celebration or state conference between the Axis Powers. Please think back a little and tell us when that was approximately. Perhaps—just a moment—perhaps you could tell us the year, maybe also the season, and perhaps you could also state which political celebration it was.

BLAHA: As far as Funk is concerned, I can remember that it was, I believe, a conference of finance ministers. The papers had announced that it would take place and we were informed beforehand that some of the ministers would come to Dachau. Such a visit was actually made a few days afterwards, and it was said that Minister Funk was among the visitors. It was, I believe, during the first half of the year 1944. I cannot say that with absolute certainty.

DR. SAUTER: You mean to say: during the first half of 1944, on the occasion of a conference of finance ministers?

BLAHA: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: Where did that conference take place?

BLAHA: If I remember correctly—I didn’t write that down, of course—that was either in Salzburg or Reichenhall or Berchtesgaden, somewhere in the neighborhood of Munich, I believe.

DR. SAUTER: From whom did you learn at that time that on the next day, or the day after, high-ranking visitors would arrive?

BLAHA: We always received an order to prepare for such a visit. Elaborate preparations were always made; everything was cleaned up; everything had to be in order, as you will understand; and those people whose presence might be undesirable or those who, in a certain sense, might be dangerous, had to disappear. Thus, whenever such high-ranking visitors were announced we always received an order from the camp headquarters 1 or 2 days beforehand; and, also these visitors were always accompanied by the camp commander.

DR. SAUTER: By the camp commander? Now, if you know that the Defendant Funk was there and people talked about it, then I think they would have mentioned also what other persons were present at this visit made by the Defendant Funk.

BLAHA: I cannot remember. There were always several important persons.

DR. SAUTER: The rest do not interest me. I am interested only in knowing whether or not at that particular visit, which was said to have been made by Funk, word was passed around the camp that such and such personalities were with him?

BLAHA: I cannot remember that now.

DR. SAUTER: You cannot remember. Can you remember afterwards, perhaps on the next day or the day after, something was said perhaps by people who had seen the visitors?

BLAHA: Yes, we always discussed that, but now I can no longer remember which personalities were mentioned.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, I am not interested in any other visit, but in this specific visit, as long as I do not say anything to the contrary. In this case I should like to know whether or not anything at all was said later on about the persons who were there with Funk.

BLAHA: That I do not know; there were so many visits. For instance, after one visit, the very next day already another visit would be announced.

DR. SAUTER: Now, you do also remember the visit that Funk made. Well, if other finance ministers were there, one would think that you would recall these other persons also.

BLAHA: I cannot remember that. It may be that the people with whom I talked did not know who these other persons were.

DR. SAUTER: Do you know why, or to put it differently, which departments of the camp were visited on the occasion when Funk was supposed to have made this visit. At any rate he did not come to you.

BLAHA: No; he did not come to the pathological department.

DR. SAUTER: He did not. But you were also prepared?

BLAHA: Yes. All departments had always to be prepared, even if no visitors came. It also happened at times that a visit was announced, and then, for one reason or another, nothing came of it.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, as regards these observations of yours that you have related to us today, have you been interrogated in regard to them many times already?

BLAHA: I was interrogated on these matters for the first time before the military court at Dachau.

DR. SAUTER: Did you also at that time say that Funk had been there? I repeat, did you before the military court at Dachau say anything to the effect that Funk had been present?

BLAHA: Yes, I said the same thing before the court at Dachau.

DR. SAUTER: About Funk?

BLAHA: Also about Funk.

DR. SAUTER: But is it true, Witness? I ask again whether it is really true, because you are here as a witness under oath.

BLAHA: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: You were interrogated also the day before yesterday?

BLAHA: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: Did you, at that time, also make these statements about Funk?

BLAHA: I said the same thing at the interrogation conducted by the Prosecution.

DR. SAUTER: Is that also in the record which I believe you signed?

BLAHA: I signed no record.

DR. SAUTER: You signed no record?

BLAHA: No; I simply signed what was read by the Prosecution.

DR. SAUTER: Well, that is a record.

BLAHA: Yes, but in that record there is no mention of these visits.

DR. SAUTER: Why then didn’t you mention these visits the day before yesterday?

BLAHA: I was asked about it orally, and the prosecutor told me that these matters would be taken up orally in the courtroom.

DR. SAUTER: Were you then also told where the defendants sit in the courtroom?

BLAHA: No. Before the military court I was shown all the pictures. . .

DR. SAUTER: Aha!

BLAHA: And I was asked to identify to the court the various people. I identified the three of whom I said today that I had seen them in person. Funk and others I did not name.

DR. SAUTER: You did not name Funk?

BLAHA: I did not say that I had personally seen him or that I could identify him.

DR. SAUTER: But when the pictures were shown to you did you see the defendants in the pictures?

BLAHA: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: Now, if I understand you correctly, you knew today where, for instance, Funk or Frick or anyone else was sitting?

BLAHA: Funk I do not know personally, because I did not see him at that time.

DR. SAUTER: Were you not told when the pictures were shown to you at Dachau, “This is Funk; look at him; do you know him”?

BLAHA: No; that was done quite differently.

DR. SAUTER: How?

BLAHA: All the pictures were shown to me and I was asked to say which of these individuals I had seen at the Dachau camp. Of these people I named these three. There was no further discussion whatsoever in regard to the other pictures.

DR. SAUTER: Well, Dr. Blaha, when your hearing started and you were questioned by the President or by the prosecutor, you made a statement, I believe, in the Czech language.

BLAHA: No.

DR. SAUTER: What then?

BLAHA: In the German language.

DR. SAUTER: No; everyone heard that that was not German, but it was obviously Czech.

BLAHA: The first sentence only.

DR. SAUTER: The first sentences? Well, now, as it will in any case come into the court transcript for practical purposes, I ask you to state and to repeat quite literally, giving the true sense, that which you said then, because we are interested in that from the point of view of the Defense.

BLAHA: I believe that it was included in the transcript because an English translation was added to my statement.

DR. SAUTER: No, I do not believe that Czech is being translated. But anyhow please repeat it. We did not hear it.

BLAHA: Yes. I said that I was ready, since it is technically impossible to use my native Czech tongue in the hearing, to give my testimony in German, because I have lived in German surroundings through all these events which occurred during the last 7 years and which are now the subject of this Trial. Moreover, the special and new expressions referring to life in the camp can be found only in German, and in no other dictionary can one find such suitable and expressive terms as in the German language.

DR. SAUTER: Then, Mr. President, I have no further questions. Thank you.

DR. THOMA: Witness, were the inmates of the Concentration Camp Dachau bound to secrecy?

BLAHA: No. Of course, if someone was discharged from the camp by the Gestapo—those cases were few and far between, particularly in the case of the Germans, who were then drafted—one had to sign a so-called pledge of secrecy.

DR. THOMA: Could the inmates of the camp, those inside the camp, who worked on farms, _et cetera_, talk to the other workers about conditions in the camp?

BLAHA: Yes, there were opportunities, because the people worked in the same rooms and factories with other workers—civilian workers. That was the case in the German armament industry, in the fields, and in all factories in Munich and the surroundings.

DR. THOMA: If I understood you correctly, you said previously that visitors, people who delivered things, and customers, also had an opportunity of observing these conditions in the camp without difficulty.

BLAHA: Yes. Many of these people had access everywhere, in the fields as well as in the various factories, and could observe what life was like in these places.

DR. THOMA: And what did they see there in the way of atrocities and ill-treatment, and so forth?

BLAHA: I believe they saw how the people worked, what they looked like and what was produced there. For instance, I can remember one example of what they saw quite well. At that time I was working in the fields. We were pulling a heavy street roller, 16 men, and a group of girls passed who were on an excursion. When they passed, their leader said very loudly, so that we all could hear it, “Look, those people are so lazy that rather than harness up a team of horses they pull it themselves.” That was supposed to be a joke.

DR. THOMA: Witness, when did you first have occasion, after your liberation from the concentration camp, to tell outside people about those horrible atrocities which you related to us today?

BLAHA: I did not understand that; please repeat.

DR. THOMA: When did you first have an opportunity, after your discharge or liberation from the concentration camp, of telling an outsider about these horrible atrocities?

BLAHA: Immediately after the liberation. I was at that time, as chief physician of the concentration camp, interrogated by the American investigating corps; and it was to this corps that I told this story for the first time, and I also gave them various proofs—diagrams, and the medical records which I had saved from being burnt.

DR. THOMA: That prosecutor believed the information you gave without further ado?

BLAHA: Yes.

DR. THOMA: Witness, you said that the Defendant Rosenberg was pointed out to you in the Concentration Camp Dachau shortly after you arrived there.

BLAHA: Yes.

DR. THOMA: When was that?

BLAHA: In the year 1941; first half of 1941.

DR. THOMA: First half?

BLAHA: I believe so, yes.

DR. THOMA: Can you perhaps remember the month?

BLAHA: I cannot remember. I arrived in April; I believe it was between April and July or something like that.

DR. THOMA: From April to July 1941?

BLAHA: I believe so.

DR. THOMA: Was Rosenberg at that time in uniform?

BLAHA: He was in uniform.

DR. THOMA: In what uniform?

BLAHA: I believe it was an SS uniform.

DR. THOMA: SS uniform?

BLAHA: It was a—I cannot say that very precisely—but he was in uniform.

DR. THOMA: All right, you remember _prima facie_ that it was an SS uniform, that is, a black uniform?

BLAHA: No, at that time the SS no longer wore the black uniform, because after the beginning of the war they wore field uniforms and other similar uniforms.

DR. THOMA: Then, you assume it was a gray uniform?

BLAHA: Something like that; whether it was gray or yellow or brown I don’t remember any more.

DR. THOMA: That is just the point: whether it was gray, brown, or yellow. Was it a field uniform?

BLAHA: I do not know because from 1939 I was in the concentration camp, and I am not at all familiar with the various German uniforms, ranks, and branches of the Army, and so forth.

DR. THOMA: But you just said that during the war they changed the uniform.

BLAHA: Yes, the men in the Gestapo also changed theirs. When I was arrested in 1939, all Gestapo personnel wore this black uniform. Then, after the war broke out most of them wore either green or gray uniforms.

DR. THOMA: May I ask you again: Did Rosenberg wear a wartime uniform or a peacetime uniform?

BLAHA: I believe it was a wartime uniform.

DR. THOMA: Wartime uniform? The Defendant Rosenberg was pointed out to you by another comrade, wasn’t he?

BLAHA: Yes.

DR. THOMA: At what distance?

BLAHA: Well, he was just going down the camp street. That was perhaps 30 or 40 degrees.

DR. THOMA: Thirty or forty metres you mean?

BLAHA: Well, 30 metres; 30 paces I wanted to say, 30 or 40 paces.

DR. THOMA: And had you previously seen photographs of Rosenberg? Did you already have an idea of what Rosenberg looked like?

BLAHA: Yes.

DR. THOMA: And when this comrade showed you Rosenberg, was it then necessary for him to say, “This is Rosenberg”? Didn’t you recognize him already from having seen him in the photographs which you had previously. . .

BLAHA: I cannot remember that. But when he showed him to me I remembered that I knew him already from the various pictures in the newspapers.

DR. THOMA: May I ask you to describe the incident precisely? How it happened; where you were standing; where Rosenberg came from; and who was in his company.

BLAHA: Who was in his company? I knew only the camp commander.

DR. THOMA: Who was the camp commander at that time?

BLAHA: Pierkowski was camp commander, Sturmbannführer Pierkowski.

DR. THOMA: Do you know whether he is still alive?

BLAHA: No, I don’t.

DR. THOMA: The camp commander?

BLAHA: Pierkowski. Then the Lagerführer Ziel and Hoffmann, I knew them.

DR. THOMA: Now were you in your room and looking out of the window?

BLAHA: No, we were in one of the so-called “block” streets. This led into another street along which the visitors passed.

DR. THOMA: And what was said to you?

BLAHA: “Look, there goes Rosenberg.”

DR. THOMA: Was Rosenberg alone?

BLAHA: No, he was with the other persons.

DR. THOMA: That is to say, only with the camp commander?

BLAHA: No, there were many other people with him.

DR. THOMA: That is to say, he had an escort, a staff?

BLAHA: Yes.

DR. THOMA: Members of Rosenberg’s staff?

BLAHA: I don’t know whether that was Rosenberg’s staff, but there were a number of persons.

DR. THOMA: A number of persons? Witness, the Defendant Rosenberg assures me most definitely that he has never been to the concentration camp at Dachau. Is it possible that there has been a mistake?

BLAHA: I believe I am not mistaken. Besides the German in question knew Rosenberg very well, I believe.

DR. THOMA: How do you know that?

BLAHA: Because he told me so definitely. Otherwise, I have no way of knowing that.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma.

DR. THOMA: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: You will forgive me if I point out to you that this is intended to be an expeditious trial and that it is not right to take up too much time upon small points like this.

DR. THOMA: My Lord, I ask your permission to remark that the question of whether or not Rosenberg was in the concentration camp is of decisive importance. I thank you.

DR. OTTO PANNENBECKER (Counsel for Defendant Frick): The Defendant Frick states that he has never been in Dachau Camp. Therefore, in order to clarify the facts I should like to ask the following questions:

Witness, at what distance do you believe you saw Frick?

BLAHA: I saw him from the window as he passed with a number of people.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Did you know Frick before?

BLAHA: Yes, from pictures.

DR. PANNENBECKER: From pictures? Did you recognize him yourself or did some friend tell you that it was Frick?

BLAHA: A number of us saw him and I looked at him particularly, because at that time he was already Protector of Bohemia and Moravia. For that reason I had a personal interest in recognizing him.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Did Frick wear a uniform?

BLAHA: I do not believe so.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Did you recognize anybody who was with him, anyone from his staff or from the camp command?

BLAHA: I did not know his staff. From the camp command there was Camp Commander Weiter. Camp Commander Weiter, and his adjutant, Otto.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Could you name anyone of your comrades who also recognized him?

BLAHA: There were many comrades of mine who at that time were standing at the window. Unfortunately, I cannot say who they were, because, as you will understand, life in the concentration camp was so full of incidents that one could not record these things accurately in one’s memory. One remembers only the more important events.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Did you recognize him at once of your own accord when he passed by, or had it been mentioned previously that Frick was expected?

BLAHA: No, it was not mentioned then. We simply heard that a high-ranking visitor was expected, and we were waiting for this high-ranking visitor. We were not told beforehand who it would be.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Did you recognize Frick immediately when you came into the courtroom, or did you know beforehand that he was sitting in the fourth seat here?

BLAHA: No, I recognized him easily, because I have already seen him many times in various pictures, and because he is a well-known person in Bohemia and Moravia.

DR. PANNENBECKER: You believe then that there can be no question of any error.

BLAHA: I don’t think so.

DR. PANNENBECKER: May I then ask the Court whether Frick himself may take the stand to testify that he has never seen Dachau Camp? I want to make this motion now so that, if necessary, the witness might be confronted with Frick.

THE PRESIDENT: Counsel for the defendants will understand that they will have the opportunity, when it comes to their time to present their cases, to call all the defendants, but they will not have an opportunity of calling them now. They will have to wait until the case for the Prosecution is over and they will then have an opportunity, each of them, to call the defendant for whom they appear, if they wish to.

DR. PANNENBECKER: I simply thought, that as the witness is available now. . .

[_Dr. Kubuschok approached the lectern._]

THE PRESIDENT: It is now 5:00 o’clock and unless you are going to be very short . . . are you going to be very short?

DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for the Reich Cabinet): Yes, Sir.

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, you said that when prominent visitors came to the camp, for instance, Reich ministers, extensive preparations were made beforehand. You also said that undesirable persons were removed. Maybe you could supplement that statement. I am interested to know what the purpose of these preparations was.

BLAHA: I meant that everything had to be in order. In our infirmary all the patients had to lie in bed quietly, everything was washed and prepared; the instruments were polished, as is usually the case for high-ranking visitors. We were not allowed to do anything—no operations; no bandages nor food were given out before the visit had terminated.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Could you perhaps tell me which undesirable persons were to be removed, as you said before?

BLAHA: Well, the Russians especially were always kept strictly in their blocks. It was said that they were afraid of possible demonstrations, assassinations, _et cetera_.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were prisoners kept out of sight because they showed outward signs of ill-treatment?

BLAHA: It goes without saying that before the visitors nobody was struck, beaten, hanged, or executed.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: To sum up, the purpose of these preparations was to prevent the guests from seeing the concentration camp as it really was.

BLAHA: From seeing the cruelties.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: The Court will not sit in open session tomorrow, Saturday, and will only sit in the morning on Monday, because there is work to be done in the closed session tomorrow and on Monday afternoon. I thought it would be convenient for counsel to know that.

The Court will now adjourn.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 14 January 1946 at 1000 hours._]

THIRTY-THIRD DAY Monday, 14 January 1946

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: Would you have the witness brought in? I think one of the defendants’ counsel was about to cross-examine him.

[_The witness, Blaha, took the stand._]

HERR LUDWIG BABEL (Counsel for the SS and SD): I would like to put to the witness a few practical questions which I think necessary both for a better understanding of the earlier testimony of the witness and for my own information.

The witness was in the concentration camp from 1941 to 1945 and should be well informed on conditions as they were. His memory, as is evident from his previous statements, seems to be excellent.

[_Turning to the witness._]

Do you know how the proportion of political and criminal inmates changed during the various periods? What were the approximate figures of political and criminal inmates in Dachau?

BLAHA: In Dachau it varied. There were political prisoners, professional criminals, and the so-called black or asocial elements. I am, of course, speaking only of the German prisoners; the inmates of other nations were all political prisoners. Only the German inmates were divided into red, green, and black prisoners. The great majority of Germans were political prisoners.

HERR BABEL: Can you indicate the approximate proportion? A quarter, a half, or three-quarters?

BLAHA: I am sorry, I didn’t hear you.

HERR BABEL: Can you give figures? How many were political prisoners—half, three-quarters, or how many? Can you give an approximate number?

BLAHA: I would say that of 5,000 German prisoners, 3,000 were political and 2,000 were green and black prisoners.

HERR BABEL: Was that the proportion during the whole 4- or 5-year period?

BLAHA: It changed; because many died, some Germans left, many were drafted, and there were many new arrivals. In the last years there were more and more political prisoners, because many of the green prisoners were drafted to the front.

HERR BABEL: What approximately was the total number in 1941, 1943, and 1945?

BLAHA: Do you mean the total number of prisoners?

HERR BABEL: Yes, the total number.

BLAHA: We had 8,000 to 9,000 in 1941; in 1943 there were 15,000 to 20,000; and between the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945 we had more than 70,000 or 80,000.

HERR BABEL: Another question: You mentioned that at first you worked in the plantations. What did you mean by plantations?

BLAHA: The plantations were a large estate of the SS, in which spices, medical herbs, and things of that sort were raised.

HERR BABEL: Was this plantation inside the camp?

BLAHA: No, it was in the near vicinity of the camp, not a part of it.

HERR BABEL: You also mentioned work in armament factories. I gathered from your testimony that these armament factories were partially within and partially outside the camp. Is that correct?

BLAHA: Yes, at first these so-called German armament works were only outside the camp. Then, as a result of the bombings, some sections were moved into the interior of the concentration camp.

HERR BABEL: What was the number of camp guards in 1941?

BLAHA: For actual guard duty usually three SS companies were in the camp, but at Dachau there were in addition a large garrison of SS and a Kommandantur. Guards were taken from other SS formations from time to time, when it was necessary. It varied and depended on how many guards were needed. For regular duty there were usually three companies.

HERR BABEL: Were the prisoners in the armament factories guarded during working hours?

BLAHA: Yes. Every labor detachment had a commander selected from the guard companies and, in addition, these so-called guards, who went with the detachment to their place of work and then brought the prisoners back to the camp.

HERR BABEL: While you were at the camp, did you witness any ill-treatment on the part of these guards in the course of their daily activities?

BLAHA: Yes; a great deal.

HERR BABEL: Often?

BLAHA: Yes.

HERR BABEL: For what reasons?

BLAHA: The reasons varied, depending on the nature of the guards or the commanders.

HERR BABEL: But you said you were occupied, indeed according to your statements, very much occupied.

BLAHA: Yes.

HERR BABEL: How then did you have an opportunity of observing such ill-treatment?

BLAHA: I performed many autopsies on people either shot or beaten to death at their work, and made official reports on the cause of death.

HERR BABEL: You said they were shot. Did you see such incidents yourself?

BLAHA: No.

HERR BABEL: Then, how do you know that?

BLAHA: The bodies were brought to me from the place of work, and it was my duty to ascertain the cause of death; that the men had been beaten to death, for example, that the skull or ribs had been fractured, that the man had died of internal hemorrhage, or that he had been shot; I had to make an official report on the cause of death. Sometimes, but this was rare, when an investigation was conducted, I was called in as witness.

HERR BABEL: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, do you wish to re-examine the witness?

MR. DODD: I have no further questions to ask the witness at this time.

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the prosecuting staff want to re-examine? Colonel Pokrovsky?

COLONEL POKROVSKY: At this stage of the Trial I have no further questions to ask the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can go.

[_The witness left the stand._]

MR. DODD: I should like to ask the Tribunal at this time to take judicial notice of the findings and the sentences imposed by the Military Court at Dachau, Germany, on the 13th day of December 1945. The findings were dated the 12th and the sentences on the 13th. I have here a certified copy of the findings and the sentences, Document Number 3590-PS, which I should like to offer as Exhibit Number USA-664.

THE PRESIDENT: Have copies of this been given to the defendants?

MR. DODD: Yes. They have been sent to the defendants’ counsel information room.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MR. DODD: I have one other matter that I should like to take up very briefly before the Tribunal this morning. It is concerned with a matter that arose after I had left the courtroom to return to the United States.

On the 13th of December we offered in evidence Document Number 3421-PS, and Exhibit Numbers USA-252 and 254. They were, respectively, the Court will recall, sections of human skin taken from human bodies and preserved; and a human head, the head of a human being, which had been preserved. On the 14th day of December, according to the Record, counsel for the Defendant Kaltenbrunner addressed the Tribunal and complained that the affidavit, which was offered, of one Pfaffenberger, failed to state that the camp commandant at Buchenwald, one Koch, along with his wife, was condemned to death for having committed precisely these atrocities, this business of tanning the skin and preserving the head. And in the course of the discussion before the Tribunal the Record reveals that counsel for the Defendant Bormann, in addressing the Tribunal, stated that it was highly probable that the Prosecution knew that the German authorities had objected to this camp commandant Koch and, in fact, knew that he had been tried and sentenced for doing precisely these things. And there was some intimation, we feel, that the Prosecution, having this knowledge, withheld it from the Tribunal. Now, I wish to say that we had no knowledge at all about this man Koch at the time that we offered the proof; didn’t know anything about him except that he had been the commandant, according to the affidavit. But, subsequent to this objection we had an investigation made, and we have found that he was tried in 1944, indeed, by an SS court, but not for having tanned human skin nor having preserved a human head but for having embezzled some money, for what—as the judge who tried him tells us—was a charge of general corruption and for having murdered someone with whom he had some personal difficulties. Indeed, the judge, a Dr. Morgen, tells us that he saw the tattooed human skin and he saw a human head in Commandant Koch’s office and that he saw a lampshade there made out of human skin. But there were no charges at the time that he was tried for having done these things.

I would also point out to the Tribunal that, we say, the testimony of Dr. Blaha sheds further light on whether or not these exhibits, Numbers USA-252 and 254, were isolated instances of that atrocious kind of conduct. We have not been able to locate the affiant. We have made an effort to do so, but we have not been able to locate him thus far.

THE PRESIDENT: Locate whom?

MR. DODD: The affiant Pfaffenberger, the one whose affidavit was offered.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Mr. Dodd.

DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): The statement just made is undoubtedly significant, but it would be of importance to have the documents which served to convict the commandant and his wife at the time. Kaltenbrunner told me that it was known in the whole SS that the commandant Koch and his wife had been taken to account also—I emphasize “also”—on account of these things and that it was known in the SS that one of the factors determining the severity of the sentences imposed had been this proved inhuman behavior.

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. As you were the counsel who made the allegation that the commandant Koch had been put to death for his inhuman treatment, it would seem that you are the party to produce the judgment.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I never had the verdict in my hand. I depended on the information which Kaltenbrunner gave me personally and orally.

THE PRESIDENT: It was you who made the assertion. I don’t care where you got it from. You made the assertion; therefore it is for you to produce the document.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.

COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE: (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal: Briefs and document books have been handed in. The documents in the document book are in the order in which I shall refer to them, and the references to them in the briefs are also in that order. On the first page of the brief is set out the extract from Appendix A of the Indictment, which deals with the criminality of this defendant.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you dealing first of all with Raeder or with Dönitz?

COL. PHILLIMORE: With Dönitz. My learned friend, Major Elwyn Jones, will deal with Raeder immediately after. Reading at Page 1 of the brief. . .

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, may I proceed?

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Briefs and document books have been handed in. The documents are in the document book in the order in which I shall refer to them, and the references in the brief to the documents are in that same order. On the first page of the brief is set out the extract from the Indictment as Appendix A, which deals with the allegations against this defendant. It sets out the positions he held and charges him, first, with promoting the preparations for war, set forth in Count One; second, with participating in the military planning and preparation for wars of aggression and wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances, set forth in Count One and Two of the Indictment; and thirdly, with authorizing, directing, and participating in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment, including particularly the crimes against persons and property on the High Seas.

Now, if at any place I appear to trespass on Count Three, it is with the consent and courtesy of the Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic.

My Lord, on the second page of the brief are set out first the positions held by the Defendant Dönitz; and the document in question is the first document in the document book, 2887-PS, which has already been put in as Exhibit Number USA-12. The Tribunal will see that after his appointment in 1935 as Commander of the Weddigen U-boat Flotilla—that was, in fact, the first flotilla to be formed after the end of the World War in 1918—the defendant, who was in effect then Commander of U-boats, rose steadily in rank as the U-boat arm expanded, until he became an admiral. And then on the 30th of January 1943, he was appointed Grossadmiral and succeeded the Defendant Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, retaining his command of the U-boat arm. Then on the 1st of May 1945, he succeeded Hitler as head of Germany.

My Lord, as appears from a number of documents which I shall put in evidence, the defendant was awarded the following decorations: On the 18th of September 1939 the Cluster of the Iron Cross, first class, for the U-boat successes in the Baltic during the Polish campaign. This award was followed on the 21st of April 1940 by the high award of the Knight’s Cross to the Iron Cross, while on the 7th of April 1943 he received personally from Hitler the Oak Leaf to the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross, as the 223rd recipient, for his services in building up the German Navy and, in particular, his services for the offensive U-boat arm for the coming war, which were outstanding. And now I put in the next document in the document book, D-436, which becomes Exhibit GB-183. That is an extract from the official publication _Das Archiv_ on the defendant’s promotion to vice admiral. It is dated the 27th of September 1940, and I read the last two sentences:

“In 4 years of untiring and, in the fullest sense of the word, uninterrupted work of training, he succeeds in developing the young U-boat armed personnel and material till it is a weapon of a striking power unexpected even by the experts. More than 3 million gross tons of enemy shipping sunk in only 1 year, achieved with only a few boats, speak better than words of the merits of this man.”

The next document in the document book, 1463-PS, which I put in as Exhibit GB-184, is an extract from the diary for the German Navy, 1944 edition, and it serves to emphasize the contents of that last document. My Lord, I won’t read from it. The relevant passage is on Page 2, and if I might summarize that, it describes in detail the defendant’s work in building up the U-boat arm, his ceaseless work in training night and day to close the gap of 17 years during which no training had taken place, his responsibility for new improvements, and for devising the “pack” tactics which were later to become so famous. And then his position is summarized further at the top of Page 3. If I might read the last two sentences of the first paragraph on that page:

“In spite of the fact that his duties took on immeasurable proportions since the beginning of the huge U-boat construction program, the chief was what he always was and always will be: leader and inspiration to all the forces under him.”

And then the last sentence of that paragraph:

“In spite of all his duties, he never lost touch with his men; and he showed a masterly understanding in adjusting himself to the changing fortunes of war.”

It was not, however, only his ability as a naval officer which won the defendant these high honors: his promotion to succeed the Defendant Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the personal position he acquired as one of Hitler’s principal advisers, and finally, earlier candidates, such as Göring, having betrayed Hitler’s trust or finding the position less attractive than they had anticipated, the doubtful honor of becoming Hitler’s successor. These he owed to his fanatical adherence to Hitler and to the Party, to his belief in the Nazi ideology with which he sought to indoctrinate the Navy and the German people, and to his masterly understanding in adjusting himself to the changing fortunes of war, referred to in the diary and which the Tribunal may think, when I have referred them to the document, may be regarded as synonymous with the capacity for utter ruthlessness. His attitude to the Nazi Party and its creed is shown by his public utterances.

I turn to the next document in the document book, D-443, which I put in to become Exhibit GB-185. It is an extract from a speech made by the defendant at a meeting of commanders of the Navy in Weimar on the 17th of December 1943. It was subsequently circulated by the defendant as a top secret document for senior officers only and by the hand of officers only. My Lord, if I might read:

“I am a firm adherent of the idea of ideological education. For what is it in the main? Doing his duty is a matter of course for the soldier. But the full value, the whole weight of duty done, is only present when the heart and spiritual conviction have a voice in the matter. Doing his duty is then quite different from what it would be if I only carried out my task literally, obediently, and faithfully. It is therefore necessary for the soldier to support the execution of his duty with all his mental, all his spiritual energy; and for this his conviction, his ideology are indispensable. It is therefore necessary for us to train the soldier uniformly, comprehensively, that he may be adjusted ideologically to our Germany. Every dualism, every dissension in this connection, or every divergence or unpreparedness imply a weakness in all circumstances. He in whom this grows and thrives in unison is superior to the other. Then indeed the whole importance, the whole weight of his conviction comes into play. It is also nonsense to say that the soldier or the officer must have no politics. The soldier embodies the state in which he lives, he is the representative, the articulate exponent of his state. He must therefore stand with his whole weight behind this state.

“We must travel this road out of our deepest conviction. The Russian travels along it. We can only maintain ourselves in this war if we take part in it, with holy zeal, with all our fanaticism. . . .

“I alone cannot do this, but it can be done only with the aid of the man who holds the production of Europe in his hand—with Minister Speer. My ambition is to have as many warships for the Navy as possible so as to be able to fight and to strike. It does not matter to me who builds them.”

My Lord, that last sentence is of importance in connection with a later document. The Tribunal will see when I come to it that the defendant was not above employing concentration camp labor for this purpose.

I put in the next document in the document book, D-640, which becomes Exhibit GB-186. It is an extract from a speech on the same subject by the defendant as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to the Commanders on the 15th of February 1944. My Lord, it is cumulative except that I think the last two sentences add, if I might read them:

“From the very start the whole of the officer corps must be so indoctrinated that it feels itself co-responsible for the National Socialist State in its entirety. The officer is the exponent of the State, the idle chatter that the officer is non-political is sheer nonsense.”

Now, the next document is 2878-PS, which I put in to become Exhibit GB-187. It consists of three extracts from speeches. The first is from a speech made by the defendant to the German Navy and the German people on Heroes’ Day, the 12th of March 1944.

“German men and women!

“. . . What would have become of our country today, if the Führer had not united us under National Socialism! Split into parties, beset with the spreading poison of Jewry and vulnerable to it, and lacking, as a defense, our present uncompromising ideology, we would long since have succumbed to the burdens of this war and been subject to the merciless destruction of our adversaries. . . .”

My Lord, the next extract is from a speech to the Navy on the 21st of July 1944. It again shows the defendant’s fanaticism. It is perhaps worth reading the first sentence:

“Men of the Navy! Holy wrath and unlimited anger fill our hearts because of the criminal attempt which was to have cost the life of our beloved Führer. Providence wished it otherwise, watched over and protected our Führer, and did not abandon our German fatherland in the fight for its destiny.”

And then he goes on to deal with the fate which should be meted out to these traitors.

The third extract deals with the introduction of the German salute into the Armed Forces. I don’t think I need read it, but as the members of the Tribunal will see, it was the Defendant Keitel and this defendant who were responsible for the alteration of the salute in the German forces and the adoption of the Nazi salute—together with Göring. . . Pardon, I should have said: the Defendants Göring, Keitel, and Dönitz.

The next document is a monitored report of the speech made on the German wireless by this defendant, announcing the death of Hitler and his own succession. It is Document D-444. I put it in to become Exhibit GB-188, and I read a portion of it. The time is 2226—marked on the document. I read therefrom:

“It has been reported from the Führer’s headquarters that our Führer Adolf Hitler has died this afternoon in his battle headquarters at the Reich Chancellery, fallen for Germany, fighting to the last breath against Bolshevism.

“On the 30th of April the Führer nominated Grossadmiral Dönitz to be his successor. The Grossadmiral and Führer’s successor will speak to the German nation.”

And then, the first paragraph of the speech:

“German men and women, soldiers of the German Armed Forces. Our Führer Adolf Hitler is dead. The German people bow in deepest sorrow and respect. Early he had recognized the terrible danger of Bolshevism and had dedicated his life to the fight against it. His fight having ended, he died a hero’s death in the capital of the German Reich, after having led an unmistakably straight and steady life.”

Then, that document also contains an order of the day issued by the defendant, which is very much to the same effect.

Apart from his services in building up the U-boat arm, there is ample evidence that the defendant as officer commanding U-boats took part in the planning and execution of aggressive war against Poland, Norway, and Denmark. The next document in the document book, C-126(c), has already been put in as Exhibit GB-45. It is a memorandum by the Defendant Raeder, dated the 16th of May 1939, and I will call the attention of the Tribunal to the distribution. The sixth copy went to the Führer der Unterseeboote, that is to say, to the Defendant Dönitz. The document is a directive for the invasion of Poland, Fall Weiss, and I won’t read it. It has already been read.

The next document, C-126(e), on the second page of that same document, has also been put in as Exhibit GB-45. It again is a memorandum from the Defendant Raeder’s headquarters, dated the 2d of August 1939. It is addressed to the fleet, and then Flag Officer U-boats—that is, of course, the defendant . . . and it is merely a covering letter for operational directions for the employment of U-boats which are to be sent out into the Atlantic by way of precaution in the event the intention of carrying out Fall Weiss should remain unchanged. The second sentence is important:

“Flag Officer U-boats is handing in his operation orders to SKL”—that is the Seekriegsleitung, the German Admiralty—“by 12 August. A decision on the sailings of U-boats for the Atlantic will probably be made in the middle of August.”

The next document, C-172, I put in as Exhibit GB-189. It consists of the defendant’s own operational instructions to his U-boats for the operation Fall Weiss. It is signed by him. It is not dated, but it is clear from the subject matter that its date must be before the 16th of July 1939. I don’t think the substance of the document adds. It is purely an operational instruction, giving effect to the document already put in, C-126(c), the directive by Raeder.

My Lord, the next document, C-122, has already been put in as Exhibit GB-82. It is an extract from the War Diary of the naval war staff of the German Admiralty, dated the 3rd of October 1939, and records the fact that the chief of the naval war staff has called for views on the possibility of taking operational bases in Norway. It has already been read and I would merely call the Tribunal’s attention to the passage in brackets, in the paragraph marked “d”:

“Flag Officer U-boats already considers such harbors extremely useful as equipment and supply bases for Atlantic U-boats to call at temporarily.”

The next document, C-5, has already been put in as Exhibit GB-83. This is from the defendant, as Flag Officer U-boats, addressed to the Supreme Command of the Navy, the naval war staff. It is dated the 9th of October 1939, and it sets out the defendant’s view on the advantages of Trondheim and Narvik as bases. The document proposes the establishment of a base at Trondheim with Narvik as an alternative.

Now the next document, C-151, has already been put in as Exhibit GB-91. It is the defendant’s operation order to his U-boats for the occupation of Denmark and Norway, and the operation order, which is top secret, dated the 30th of March 1940, is termed “Hartmut.” The members of the Tribunal will remember that the document, in the last paragraph, said:

“The naval force will, as they enter the harbor, fly the British flag until the troops have landed, except presumably at Narvik.”

The preparations for war against England are perhaps best shown by the disposition of the U-boats under his command on the 3rd of September 1939, when war broke out between Germany and the Western Allies. The locations of the sinkings in the following week, including that of the _Athenia_ which will be dealt with by my learned friend, Major Elwyn Jones, provide corroboration. On that, I would put in two charts; I put them in as Document D-652, and they become Exhibit GB-190.

My Lord, I have copies here for the members of the Tribunal. They have been prepared by the Admiralty. There are two charts. The first sets out the disposition of the submarines on the 3rd of September 1939. There is a certification attached to the chart, in the top left-hand corner, which I should read:

“This chart has been constructed from a study of the orders issued by Dönitz between 21 August 1939 and 3 September 1939 and subsequently captured. The chart shows the approximate disposition of submarines ordered for the 3rd of September 1939 but it cannot be guaranteed accurate in every detail as the files of captured orders are clearly not complete and also some of the submarines shown apparently had received orders at sea on or about 3 September to move to new operational areas. The documents from which this chart was constructed are held by the British Admiralty in London.”

My Lord, there are two points I would make on that first chart. First, it will be apparent to members of the Tribunal that U-boats which were in those positions on the 3rd of September 1939 had left Kiel some considerable time before. The other point which I would make is important in connection with my learned friend Major Elwyn Jones’ case against the Defendant Raeder, and that is the location of the U-boat U-30. The members of the Tribunal may care to bear it in mind while looking at the charts now.

The second chart sets out the sinkings during the first week of the war, and the location of the sinking of the _Athenia_ will be noted. There is a short certification in the left-hand corner of the Tribunal’s copies:

“This chart has been constructed from the official records of the British Admiralty in London. It shows the positions of the sinkings of the British merchant vessels lost by enemy action in the 7 days commencing the 3rd of September 1939.”

My Lord, I turn to the defendant’s participation in War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.

The course of the war waged against neutral and Allied merchant shipping by the U-boats followed under the defendant’s direction a course of consistently increasing ruthlessness. The defendant displayed his masterly understanding in adjusting himself to the changing fortunes of war. From the very early days, merchant ships, both Allied and neutral, were sunk without warning; and when operational danger zones had been announced by the German Admiralty, these sinkings continued to take place both within and without those zones. With some exceptions in the early days of the war, no regard was taken for the safety of the crews or passengers of sunk merchant ships, and the announcement claiming a total blockade of the British Isles merely served to confirm the established situation under which U-boat warfare was being conducted without regard to the established rules of international warfare or the requirements of humanity.

The course of the war at sea during the first 18 months is summarized by two official British reports made at a time when those who compiled them were ignorant of some of the actual orders issued which have since come to hand.

My Lord, I turn to the next document in the document book. It is Document D-641(a), which I put in to become Exhibit GB-191. It is an extract from an official report of the British Foreign Office concerning German attacks on merchant shipping during the period 3 September 1939 to September 1940, that is to say, the first year of the war, and it was made shortly after September 1940.

My Lord, if I might quote from the second paragraph on the first page:

“During the first 12 months of the war, 2,081,062 tons of Allied shipping comprising 508 ships have been lost by enemy action. In addition, 769,213 tons of neutral shipping, comprising 253 ships, have also been lost. Nearly all these merchant ships have been sunk by submarine, mine, aircraft, or surface craft, and the great majority of them were sunk while engaged on their lawful trading voyages. 2,836 Allied merchant seamen have lost their lives in these ships. . . .

“In the last war the practice of the central powers was so remote from the recognized procedure that it was thought necessary to set forth once again the rules of warfare in particular as applied to submarines. This was done in the Treaty of London, 1930; and in 1936 Germany acceded to the rules. The rules laid down:

“(1) In action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules of international law to which surface vessels are subjected.

“(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being summoned or of active resistance to visit and search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew, and ships’ papers in a place of safety. For this purpose, the ship’s boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured in the existing sea and weather conditions by the proximity of land or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board.”

Then, the next paragraph:

“At the beginning of the present war, Germany issued a prize ordinance for the regulation of sea warfare and the guidance of her naval officers. Article 74 of this ordinance embodies the submarine rules of the London Treaty. Article 72, however, provides that captured enemy vessels may be destroyed if it seems inexpedient or unsafe to bring them into port, and Article 73 (i) and (ii) makes the same provision with regard to neutral vessels which are captured for sailing under enemy convoy, for forcible resistance, or for giving assistance to the enemy. These provisions are certainly not in accordance with the traditional British view but the important point is that, even in these cases, the prize ordinance envisages the capture of the merchantman before its destruction. In other words, if the Germans adhered to the rules set out in their own prize ordinance, we might have argued the rather fine legal point with them, but we should have no quarrel with them, either on the broader legal issue or on the humanitarian one. In the event, however, it is only too clear that almost from the beginning of the war the Germans abandoned their own principles and waged war with steadily increasing disregard for international law, and for what is, after all, the ultimate sanction of all law, the protection of human life and property from arbitrary and ruthless attacks.”

I pass to the third paragraph on the next page which sets out two instances:

“On the 30th of September 1939 came the first sinking of a neutral ship by a submarine without warning and with loss of life. This was the Danish ship _Vendia_ bound for the Clyde in ballast. The submarine fired two shots and shortly after torpedoed the ship. The torpedo was fired when the master had already signaled that he would submit to the submarine’s orders and before there had been an opportunity to abandon ship. By November submarines were beginning to sink neutral vessels without warning as a regular thing. On the 12th November the Norwegian _Arne Kjode_ was torpedoed in the North Sea without any warning at all. This was a tanker bound from one neutral port to another. The master and four of the crew lost their lives and the remainder were picked up after many hours in open boats. Henceforward, in addition to the failure to establish the nature of the cargo, another element is noticeable, namely an increasing recklessness as to the fate of the crew.”

And then dealing with attacks on Allied merchant vessels, certain figures are given: Ships sunk 241, recorded attacks 221, illegal attacks 112. At least 79 of these 112 ships were torpedoed without warning.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then they were not illegally sunk, however?

COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, Sir.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): According to this document, the Germans have been given the benefit of the doubt.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Oh, yes, I should have read that sentence; I am obliged to Your Honor.

I pass to the second report, Document D-641(b). It is part of the same document and is put in as Exhibit GB-191. It is a report covering the next 6 months from September 1, 1940. . .

THE PRESIDENT: Are you not reading Page 3?

COL. PHILLIMORE: If Your Lordship pleases, I have read a great deal of the report and there are passages that I had not considered important.

THE PRESIDENT: I haven’t myself read it, but I think. . .

COL. PHILLIMORE: If I might read the first two paragraphs on Page 3:

“By the middle of October submarines were sinking merchant vessels without any regard to the safety of the crews. Yet 4 months later the Germans were still officially claiming that they were acting in accordance with their prize ordinance. Their own semi-official commentators, however, had made the position clear. As regards neutrals, Berlin officials had early in February stated that any neutral ship that is either voluntarily or under compulsion bound for an enemy port—including contraband control harbors—thereby loses its neutrality and must be considered hostile. At the end of February the cat was let out of the bag by a statement that a neutral ship which obtained a navicert from a British consul in order to avoid putting into a British contraband control base was liable to be sunk by German submarines, even if it was bound from one neutral port to another. As regards Allied ships, in the middle of November 1939 a Berlin warning was issued against the arming of British vessels. By that date a score of British merchantmen had been illegally attacked by gunfire or torpedo from submarines, and after the date some 15 more unarmed Allied vessels were torpedoed without warning. It is clear therefore that not only was the arming fully justified as a defensive measure but also that neither before nor after this German threat did the German submarines discriminate between armed and unarmed vessels.”

The last paragraph is merely a summing-up; it does not add.

Turning to D-641(b), which is a similar report covering the next 6 months, if I might read the first five paragraphs of Page 1:

“On the 30th January 1941 Hitler proclaimed: ‘Every ship, with or without convoy, which appears before our torpedo tubes is going to be torpedoed. On the face of it, this announcement appears to be uncompromising; and the only qualification provided by the context is that the threats immediately preceding it are specifically addressed to the peoples of the American Continent. German commentators, however, subsequently tried to water it down by contending that Hitler was referring only to ships which attempted to enter the area within which the German ‘total blockade’ is alleged to be in force.

“From one point of view it probably matters little what exactly was Hitler’s meaning, since the only conclusion that can be reached after a study of the facts of enemy warfare on merchant shipping is that enemy action in this field is never limited by the principles which are proclaimed by enemy spokesmen, but solely by the opportunities or lack of them which exist at any given time.”

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, isn’t this document you are now reading really legal argument?

COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, some of it is. The difficulty is to leave those parts and take in the facts.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

COL. PHILLIMORE: The third paragraph, if I might leave the rest of the second, is as follows:

“The effect of the German ‘total blockade’ is to prohibit neutral ships from entering an enormous stretch of sea round Britain (the area extends to about 500 miles west of Ireland, and from the latitude of Bordeaux to that of the Faroe Islands), upon pain of having their ships sunk without warning and their crews killed. As a matter of fact, at least 32 neutral ships, exclusive of those sailing in British convoys, have been sunk by enemy action since the declaration of the ‘total blockade.’”

The last sentence in the following paragraph about the sinking of ships without warning:

“Yet though information is lacking in very many cases, details are available to prove that, during the period under review, at least 38 Allied merchant ships exclusive of those in convoys have been torpedoed without warning in or near the ‘total blockade’ area.

“That the Germans themselves have no exaggerated regard for the area is proved by the fact that of the 38 ships referred to at least 16 were torpedoed outside the limits of the war zone.”

My Lord, the next page deals with a specific case illustrating the matter set out above. It is in the first paragraph of that page, the third sentence:

“The sinking of the _City of Benares_ on the 17th September 1940 is a good example of this. The _City of Benares_ was an 11,000-ton liner with 191 passengers on board, including nearly 100 children. She was torpedoed without warning just outside the ‘war zone,’ with the loss of 258 lives, including 77 children. It was blowing a gale, with hail and rain squalls and a very rough sea when the torpedo struck her at about 10 p. m. In the darkness and owing to the prevailing weather conditions, at least four of the 12 boats lowered were capsized. Others were swamped and many people were washed right off. In one boat alone 16 people, including 11 children, died from exposure; in another 22 died, including 15 children; in a third 21 died. The point to be emphasized is not the unusual brutality of this attack but rather that such results are inevitable when a belligerent disregards the rules of sea warfare as the Germans have done and are doing.”

I think the rest of that paragraph is not important.

I turn to the next document, 641(c), which is part of Exhibit GB-191.

THE PRESIDENT: It is clear, I suppose, from that statement of facts that there was no warning whatever given?

COL. PHILLIMORE: No, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: We think that you should read the next paragraph too.

COL. PHILLIMORE: If Your Lordship pleases.

“There are hundreds of similar stories, stories of voyages for days in open boats in Atlantic gales, of men in the water clinging for hours to a raft and gradually dropping off one by one, of crews being machine-gunned as they tried to lower their boats or as they drifted away in them, of seamen being blown to pieces by shells and torpedoes and bombs. The enemy must know that such things are the inevitable result of the type of warfare he has chosen to employ.”

My Lord, the rest is very much to the same general effect.

The document, 641(c), is merely a certificate giving the total sinkings by U-boats during the war (1939 to 1945) as 2,775 British, Allied, and neutral ships totalling 14,572,435 gross registered tons.

My Lord, it is perhaps worth considering one example not quoted in the above reports of the ruthless nature of the actions conducted by the defendant’s U-boat commanders, particularly as both British and German versions of the sinkings are available. I turn to the next document, “The sinking of S. S. _Sheaf Mead_.” That is Document D-644, which I put in as Exhibit GB-192. If I might read the opening paragraph:

“The British S. S. _Sheaf Mead_ was torpedoed without warning on 27 May 1940. . .”

THE PRESIDENT: This is the German account, is it not?

COL. PHILLIMORE: This is actually in the form of a British report. It includes the German account in the shape of a complete extract from the log.

THE PRESIDENT: It bears the words, “top secret”?

COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, My Lord, this was at the time a top secret document. That was some while ago.

“The British S. S. _Sheaf Mead_ was torpedoed without warning on 27 May 1940, with the loss of 31 of the crew. The commander of the U-boat responsible is reported to have behaved in an exceptionally callous manner towards the men clinging to upturned boats and pieces of wood. It was thought that this man was Kapitänleutnant Öhrn of _U-37_: The following extract from his log for 27 May 1940 leaves no doubt on the matter and speaks for itself as to his behaviour.”

Again turning to the relevant extract from the log, on the second page, the time is marked on the document as 1554.

“Surface. Stern is underwater.”—referring to the ship which has been torpedoed—“Stern is underwater. Bows rise higher. The boats are now on the water. Lucky for them. A picture of complete order. They lie at some distance. The bows rear up quite high. Two men appear from somewhere in the forward part of the ship. They leap and rush with great bounds along the deck down the stern. The stern disappears. A boat capsizes. Then a boiler explosion. Two men fly through the air, limbs outstretched. Bursting and crushing. Then all is over. A large heap of wreckage floats up. We approach it to identify the name. The crew have saved themselves on wreckage and capsized boats. We fish out a buoy. No name on it. I ask a man on the raft. He says, hardly turning his head, ‘Nix Name.’ A young boy in the water calls, ‘Help, help, please!’ The others are very composed. They look damp and somewhat tired. An expression of cold hatred is on their faces. On to the old course. After washing the paint off the buoy, the name comes to light: Greatafield, Glasgow, 5,006 gross registered tons.”

“On to the old course” means merely that the U-boat makes off.

Then the next page of that document contains an extract from the report of the chief engineer of the _Sheaf Mead_. The relevant paragraphs are the first and the last:

“When I came to the surface I found myself on the port side, that is, nearest to the submarine, which was only about 5 yards away. The submarine captain asked the steward the name of the ship, which he told him, and the enemy picked up one of our lifebuoys, but this had the name Greatafield on it, as this was the name of our ship before it was changed to _Sheaf Mead_ last January.”

In the last paragraph:

“She had cut-away bows, but I did notice a net-cutter. Two men stood at the side with boat-hooks to keep us off.

“They cruised around for half an hour, taking photographs of us in the water. Otherwise they just watched us, but said nothing. Then she submerged and went off, without offering us any assistance whatever.”

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any suggestion in the German report that any warning was given?

COL. PHILLIMORE: No, My Lord. It is quite clear, indeed, that it was not.

Under the time 1414 there is a description of the sighting of the ship and the difficulty in identifying; and then at the top of the page:

“The distance apart is narrowing. The steamship draws in quickly, but the position is still 40-50. I cannot see the stern yet. Tube ready. Shall I or not? The gunnery crews are also prepared. On the ship’s side a yellow cross in a small, square, dark blue ground. Swedish? Presumably not. I raise the periscope a little. Hurrah, a gun at the stern, an A/A gun or something similar. Fire! It cannot miss. . .”—and then the sinking.

Now that it is possible to examine some of the actual documents by which the defendant and his fellow conspirators issued their orders in disregard of international law, you may think the compilers of the above reports understated the case. These orders cover not only the period referred to in the reports, but also the subsequent course of the war. It is interesting to note in them the steps by which the defendants progressed. At first they were content with breaching the rules of international law to the extent of sinking merchant ships, including neutral ships, without warning where there was a reasonable prospect of being able to do so without discovery. The facts already quoted show that the question of whether ships were defensively armed or outside the declared operational areas was in practice immaterial.

I go to the next document in the document book, C-191, which I put in as Exhibit GB-193. That is a memorandum by the German naval war staff, dated 22 September 1939. It sets out:

“Flag Officer U-boats intends to give permission to U-boats to sink without warning any vessels sailing without lights.”

Reading from the third sentence:

“In practice there is no opportunity for attacking at night, as the U-boat cannot identify a target which is a shadow in a way that entirely obviates mistakes being made. If the political situation is such that even possible mistakes must be ruled out, U-boats must be forbidden to make any attacks at night in waters where French and English naval forces or merchant ships may be situated. On the other hand, in sea areas where only English units are to be expected, the measures desired by Flag Officer U-boats can be carried out; permission to take this step is not to be given in writing, but need merely be based on the unspoken approval of the Naval Operations Staff.

“U-boat commanders should be informed by word of mouth, and the sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in the War Diary as due to possible confusion with a warship or an auxiliary cruiser. In the meanwhile, U-boats in the English Channel have received instructions to attack all vessels sailing without lights.”

Now I go to the next document, C-21, which I put in as Exhibit GB-194. My Lord, this document consists of a series of extracts from the War Diary of the German naval war staff of the German Admiralty. The second extract, at Page 5, relates a conference with the head of the naval war staff, report of the 2 January 1940, and then reading:

“1) Report by Ia”—that is the Staff Officer Operations on the naval war staff. . .

THE PRESIDENT: Shouldn’t you read above that, Paragraph 1/b?

COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, if Your Lordship pleases. It is important. The others are much to the same effect. If I might read it:

“Report by Ia.”—This is one report by Ia on the directive of Armed Forces High Command of 30 December.

“According to this, the Führer, on report of Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, has decided: (a) Greek merchant vessels are to be treated as enemy vessels in the zone blockaded by U.S.A. and Britain; (b) in the Bristol Channel all ships may be attacked without warning. For external consumption these attacks should be given out as hits by mines. Both measures may be taken with immediate effect.”

The next extract, a report by Ia, that is, the Staff Officer Operations on the naval war staff on the directive of Armed Forces High Command, dated 30 December:

“Referring to intensified measures in naval and air warfare in connection with ‘Fall Gelb’.

“In consequence of this directive, the Navy is authorized, simultaneously with the general intensification of the war, to sink by U-boats, without any warning, all ships in those waters near the enemy coasts in which mines can be employed. In this case, for external consumption, pretence should be made that mines are being used. The behaviour of, and use of weapons by, U-boats should be adapted to this purpose.”

And then the third extract, dated 6 January 1940:

“. . . pursuant to the Führer’s consent on principle (see minutes of report of Commander-in-Chief Navy of 30 December) to authorize firing without warning while maintaining the pretence of mine hits in certain parts of the American blockade zone. . . .”

Well, then the order is given to Flag Officer U-boats carrying out that decision.

The next extract, dated the 18th of January 1940, adds to some extent, and if I may read it:

“The High Command of the Armed Forces has issued the following directive dated 17th of January, cancelling the previous order concerning intensified measures of warfare against merchantmen.

“The Navy is authorized, with immediate effect, to sink by U-boats without warning all ships in those waters near the enemy coasts in which the use of mines is possible.”—My Lord, that is an extension of the area.—“U-boats must adapt their behavior and employment of weapons to the pretence, which is to be maintained in these cases, that the hits were caused by mines. Ships of the United States, Italy, Japan, and Russia are exempted from these attacks.”

Well, then there is a note emphasizing the point about maintaining the pretense of mine hits and the last extract is, I think, purely cumulative.

The next document, C-118, I put in as Exhibit GB-195. This is an extract from the B.d.U. War Diary, that is to say the defendant’s war diary. It is dated the 18th of July 1941, and it consists of a further extension of that order by the cutting down of the protected categories.

“Supplementary to the order forbidding, for the time being, attacks on U.S. warships and merchant vessels in the operational area of the North Atlantic, the Führer has ordered the following:

“1. Attacks on U.S. merchant vessels sailing in British or U.S. convoys, or independently are authorized in the original operational area which corresponds in its dimensions to the U.S. blockade zone and which does not include the sea-route U.S. to Iceland.”

As the members of the Tribunal will have seen from these orders, at one date the ships of a particular neutral under certain conditions could be sunk while those of another could not. It would be easy to put before the Tribunal a mass of orders and instances to show that the attitude to be adopted toward ships of particular neutrals changed at various times. The point is that the defendant conducted the U-boat war against neutrals with complete cynicism and opportunism. It all depended on the political relationship of Germany toward a particular country at a particular time whether her ships were sunk or not.

My Lord, I turn to the next document in the document book, D-642, which I put in as Exhibit GB-196. My Lord, this is a series of orders; the first, I should say, of a series of orders leading up to the issue of an order which enjoined the U-boat commanders not merely to abstain from rescuing crews, which is the purpose of this order, not merely to give them no assistance but deliberately to annihilate them.

My Lord, in the course of my proof of this matter, I shall call two witnesses. The first witness will give the Court an account of a speech made by the defendant at the time that he issued the order describing the policy, or his policy toward the recovery of Allied troops: that it must be stopped at all costs.

The second witness is the officer who actually briefed crews on the order.

My Lord, this document is an extract from the standing orders of the U-boat command, an extract from Standing Order Number 154, and it is signed by the defendant:

“Paragraph e) Do not pick up men or take them with you. Do not worry about the merchant ship’s boats. Weather conditions and distance from land play no part. Have a care only for your own ship and strive only to attain your next success as soon as possible. We must be harsh in this war. The enemy began the war in order to destroy us, so nothing else matters.”

THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of that?

COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, that order, the copy we have, is not dated, but a later order, Number 173, which was issued concurrently with an operational order, is dated the 2d of May 1940. The Tribunal may take it, it is earlier than the 2d of May 1940. My Lord, that is a secret order.

THE PRESIDENT: Earlier than May 1940?

COL. PHILLIMORE: Earlier than May 1940.

It was, however, in 1942, when the United States entered the war with its enormous shipbuilding capacity, that the change thus brought about necessitated a further adjustment in the methods adopted by the U-boats and of the defendant; and the defendant was guilty of an order which intended not merely the sinking of merchant ships, not merely the abstention from rescue of the crews, but their deliberate extermination.

My Lord, the next document in the document book shows the course of events, Document D-423, and I put it in as Exhibit GB-197. It is a record of a conversation between Hitler and the Japanese Ambassador Oshima, in the presence of the Defendant Ribbentrop, on the 3 of January 1942.

“The Führer, using a map, explains to the Japanese Ambassador the present position of marine warfare in the Atlantic, emphasizing that what he considers his most important task is to get the U-boat warfare going in full swing. The U-boats are being re-organized. Firstly, he had recalled all U-boats operating in the Atlantic. As mentioned before, they would now be posted outside United States ports. Later, they would be off Freetown and the larger boats even as far down as Capetown.”

And then, after further details:

“After having given further explanations on the map, the Führer pointed out that, however many ships the United States built, one of their main problems would be the lack of personnel. For that reason even merchant ships would be sunk without warning with the intention of killing as many of the crew as possible. Once it gets around that most of the seamen are lost in the sinkings, the Americans would soon have difficulties in enlisting new people. The training of sea-going personnel takes a very long time. We are fighting for our existence and our attitude cannot be ruled by any humane feelings. For this reason he must give the order that in case foreign seamen could not be taken prisoner, which is in most cases not possible on the sea, U-boats were to surface after torpedoing and shoot up the lifeboats.

“Ambassador Oshima heartily agreed with the Führer’s comments, and said that the Japanese, too, are forced to follow these methods.”

My Lord, the next document, D-446, I put in as Exhibit GB-198. I do not propose to read it. It is an extract from B. d. U. War Diary of the 16th of September 1942; and it is part of the story in the sense that it was on the following day that the order I complain of was issued, and the Defense will, no doubt, wish to rely on it. It records an attack on a U-boat which was rescuing survivors, chiefly the Italian survivors of the Allied liner _Laconia_, when it was attacked by an Allied aircraft.

My Lord, the next document, D-630, I put in as Exhibit GB-199. It contains four documents. The first is a top secret order, sent to all commanding officers of U-boats from the defendant’s headquarters, dated 17th of September 1942:

“1. No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of ships sunk; and this includes picking up persons in the water and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats and handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter to the rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews.

“2. Orders for bringing in captains and chief engineers still apply.

“3. Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements will be of importance to your boat.

“4. Be harsh, having in mind that the enemy takes no regard of women and children in his bombing attacks on German cities.”

Now, My Lord, that is, of course, a very carefully worded order. Its intentions are made very clear by the next document on that same page, which is an extract from the defendant’s war diary; and I should say there, as appears from the copy handed in to the Court, the war diary is personally signed by the Defendant Dönitz. It is the war diary entry for the 17th of September 1942:

“The attention of all commanding officers is again drawn”—and I would draw the Tribunal’s attention to the word “again”—“to the fact that all efforts to rescue members of the crews of ships which have been sunk contradict the most primitive demands for the conduct of warfare for annihilating enemy ships and their crews. Orders concerning the bringing in of the captains and chief engineers still stand.”

The last two documents on that page consist of a telegram from the commander of the U-boat _Schacht_ to the defendant’s headquarters and the reply. _Schacht_ had been taking part in the rescue of survivors from the _Laconia_. The telegram from _Schacht_, dated the 17th of September 1942, reads:

“163 Italians handed over to _Annamite_. Navigating officer of _Laconia_ and another English officer on board.”

And then it goes on setting out the position of English and Polish survivors in boats.

The reply sent on the 20th:

“Action as in wireless telegram message of 17th of September was wrong. Boat was detailed to rescue Italian allies and not for the rescue of English and Poles.”

It is a small point, but of course “detailed” means before the bombing incident had ever occurred.

And then as for the next document, D-663, that was issued later and may not yet have been inserted in the Tribunal’s Document Book; D-663 I put in as Exhibit GB-200. My Lord, this is an extract from an operation order, “Operation Order Atlantic Number 56,” dated the 7th of October 1943, and the copy put in is part of sailing orders to a U-boat. As I shall prove through the second witness, although the date of this order is the 7th of October 1943, in fact it is only a reproduction of an order issued very much earlier, in the autumn of 1942.

“Rescue ships: A so-called rescue ship is generally attached to every convoy, a special ship of up to 3,000 gross registered tons, which is intended for the picking up of survivors after U-boat attacks. These ships are for the most part equipped with a shipborne aircraft and large motorboats, are strongly armed with depth charge throwers, and are very maneuverable, so that they are often taken for U-boat traps by the commander.”

And then, the last sentence:

“In view of the desired destruction of ships’ crews, their sinking is of great value.”

If I might just sum up those documents, it would appear from the War Diary entry of the 17th of September that orders on the lines discussed between Hitler and Oshima were, in fact, issued, but we have not captured them. It may be they were issued orally and that the defendant awaited a suitable opportunity before confirming them. The incident of the bombing of the U-boats detailed to rescue the Italian survivors from the _Laconia_ afforded the opportunity and the order to all commanders was issued. Its intent is very clear when you consider it in the light of the War Diary entry. The wording is, of course, extremely careful but to any officer of experience its intention was obvious and he would know that deliberate action to annihilate survivors would be approved under that order.

You will be told that this order, although perhaps unfortunately phrased, was merely intended to stop a commander from jeopardizing his ship by attempting a rescue, which had become increasingly dangerous, as a result of the extended coverage of the ocean by Allied aircraft; and that the notorious action of the U-boat Commander Eck in sinking the Greek steamer _Peleus_ and then machine-gunning the crew on their rafts in the water, was an exception; and that, although it may be true that a copy of the order was on board, this action was taken solely, as he himself swore, on his own initiative.

I would make the point to the Tribunal that if the intention of this order was to stop the rescue attempts in the interests of the preservation of the U-boat, first of all it would have been done by calling attention to Standing Order 154.

Second, this very fact would have been prominently stated in the order. Drastic orders of this nature are not drafted by experienced staff officers without the greatest care and an eye to their possible capture by the enemy.

Third, if it was necessary to avoid the risks attendant on standing by or surfacing, not only would this have been stated but there would have been no question of taking any prisoners at all except possibly in circumstances where virtually no risk in surfacing was to be apprehended.

Fourth, the final sentence of the first paragraph would have read very differently.

And fifth, if, in fact—and the Prosecution do not for one moment accept it—the defendant did not mean to enjoin murder, his order was so worded that he cannot escape the responsibility which attaches to such a document.

My Lord, I would call my first witness, Peter Heisig.

[_The witness, Peter Josef Heisig, took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?

PETER JOSEF HEISIG (Witness): My name is Peter Josef Heisig.

THE PRESIDENT: Say this: “I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold nothing and add nothing.”

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

COL. PHILLIMORE: Peter Josef Heisig, are you an Oberleutnant zur See in Germany?

HEISIG: I am Oberleutnant zur See in the German Navy.

COL. PHILLIMORE: And were you captured on the 27th of December 1944, and now held as a prisoner of war?

HEISIG: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Did you swear an affidavit on the 27th of November 1945?

HEISIG: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: And is that your signature? [_Document D-566 was submitted to the witness._]

My Lord, that is the Document D-566.

HEISIG: That is the document I signed.

COL. PHILLIMORE: I put that in as Exhibit GB-201.

[_Turning to the witness._] Will you take your mind back to the autumn of 1942? What rank did you hold at that time?

HEISIG: I was senior midshipman at the 2d U-boat Training Division.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Were you attending a course there?

HEISIG: I took part in the training course for U-boat officers of the watch.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you remember the last day of the course?

HEISIG: On the last day of the course, Grossadmiral Dönitz, who was then Commander-in-Chief of the U-boats, reviewed the 2d U-boat Training Division.

COL. PHILLIMORE: And what happened at the end of this tour?

HEISIG: At the end of his visit—not at the end but rather during his visit—Grossadmiral Dönitz made a speech before the officers of the 2d U-boat Training Division.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Can you fix the date of his visit?

HEISIG: I remember the approximate date; it must have been at the end of September or the beginning of October 1942.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, will you give the Tribunal—speaking slowly—an account of what Admiral Dönitz said in his speech?

HEISIG: Grossadmiral Dönitz said in his speech that the successes of the U-boats had declined. The strength of enemy air control was responsible for that decline. New antiaircraft guns had been developed which would in future make it possible for the U-boats to fight off enemy aircraft. Hitler had personally given him the assurance that U-boats would be equipped with these antiaircraft guns before all other branches of the Armed Forces. It could be expected therefore that the successes of former times would be reached again within a few months. After speaking about his good relations with Hitler, Grossadmiral Dönitz discussed the German armament program.

A question by an officer regarding a newspaper article which stated that the Allied countries were building more than a million tons of merchant shipping every month, Admiral Dönitz answered by saying that he doubted the credibility of this estimate and said it was based on an announcement by President Roosevelt. He then spoke briefly about President Roosevelt, about the American production program and armament potential, and added that the Allies had great difficulty in manning their ships. Allied seamen considered the route across the Atlantic dangerous, because German U-boats were sinking Allied ships in great numbers. Many of the Allied seamen had been torpedoed more than once; these facts spread and make the seamen reluctant to go to sea again. Some of them were even trying to shirk a crossing of the Atlantic, so that the Allied authorities were compelled, if it became necessary, to retain the men aboard by force of law. Such indications were favorable to the Germans. From the facts that, firstly, the Allies were building very many new merchant ships and, secondly, that the Allies were having considerable difficulties in manning these newly built ships, Admiral Dönitz concluded that the question of personnel was a very grave matter for the Allies. The losses in men affected the Allies especially seriously, because they had few reserves and also because. . .

COL. PHILLIMORE: I don’t want to interrupt you, but did he say anything about rescues at all? You have told us about the Allied losses and how serious they were.

HEISIG: Yes, he mentioned rescues, but I would like to speak about that later.

Grossadmiral Dönitz said that the losses of the Allies affected them very seriously, because they had no reserves and also because the training of new seamen required a very long time. He could not, therefore, understand it, if submarines were still. . .

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, just a moment. I don’t think we want to hear the whole of Admiral Dönitz’ speech. We want to hear the material part of it.

COL. PHILLIMORE [_to the witness._]: Now, you have dealt with the question of losses. Will you come to the crucial part of the speech, at the end, and deal with that? What did the Grand Admiral go on to say?

DR. THOMA: The testimony of the witness does not concern me directly, but I have an objection to raise. According to German law and according to the German Code of Criminal Procedure, the witness must say everything he knows about a matter. If he is asked about a speech of Grossadmiral Dönitz, he must not, at least according to German law, relate only those parts which, in the opinion of the Prosecution, are unfavorable to the defendant. I believe this principle should also apply in these proceedings, whenever a witness is questioned.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is not bound by German law. I have already said that the Tribunal does not desire to hear from this witness all of Admiral Dönitz’ speech.

It will be open to any of the counsel for the defendants to cross-examine this witness. Your intervention is therefore entirely unnecessary.

COL. PHILLIMORE [_to the witness._]: Now, will you deal with the crucial parts of the Grand Admiral’s speech?

HEISIG: Grossadmiral Dönitz continued, saying approximately that under the circumstances he could not understand how German U-boats could still rescue the crews of the merchant ships they had sunk, thereby endangering their own ships. By doing that, they were working for the enemy, since these rescued crews would sail again on new ships.

The stage had now been reached in which total war had to be waged also at sea. The crews of ships, like the ships themselves, were a target for the U-boats; thus it would be impossible for the Allies to man their newly-built ships; and moreover it could then be expected that in America and the other Allied countries a strike would break out, for already a part of the seamen did not want to go back to sea.

These results could be expected if our tactics would render the war at sea more vigorous. If any of us consider this war or these tactics harsh we should also remember that our wives and our families at home are being bombed.

That, in its main points, was the speech of Grossadmiral Dönitz.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, about how many officers were present and heard that speech?

HEISIG: I have no experience in fixing the number of people present at large indoor gatherings. I can only give you a rough estimate: approximately 120 officers.

COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, the witness is available for cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the United States prosecutor wish to ask any question?

[_There was no response._]

The Soviet prosecutor?

[_There was no response._]

The French prosecutor?

[_There was no response._]

Now, any of the defendants’ counsel may cross-examine the witness.

FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz): I represent Grossadmiral Dönitz.

THE PRESIDENT: Counsel will understand that what I said to Dr. Thoma was not intended to interfere with your cross-examination; it was only intended to save time. The Tribunal did not desire to hear unimportant passages in the Defendant Dönitz’ speech. Therefore, they did not want to hear them from this witness. However, you are at liberty to ask any questions that you please.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Oberleutnant Heisig, did you yourself take part in an action against the enemy?

HEISIG: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: On which boat were you, and who was your commander?

HEISIG: I was on U-877, under Kapitänleutnant Finkeisen.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Please repeat your answer.

HEISIG: I served on U-877 in an action against the enemy, and the commander was Kapitänleutnant Finkeisen.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you successful in action against enemy ships?

HEISIG: The boat was sunk on its way to the area of operations.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Before you were able to sink an enemy ship?

HEISIG: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How was the boat sunk?

HEISIG: By depth charges. Two Canadian frigates sighted the U-boat and destroyed it through depth charges.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Your testimony today differs in an essential point from the statement you made on the 27th of November. How did you come to make this statement of the 27th of November?

HEISIG: I made the statement in defense of my comrades who were put before a military court in Hamburg and sentenced to death for the murder of shipwrecked sailors.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Your statement begins by saying that you had received reports that German sailors were being accused of murder and that you therefore considered it your duty to depose the following affidavit.

What reports had you received, and when?

HEISIG: At the beginning of the Hamburg proceedings against Kapitänleutnant Eck and his officers I was a prisoner of war in Great Britain; there I heard on the radio and read in newspapers that these officers were to be tried. Since I knew one of the accused officers, Leutnant August Hoffmann, very well and had spoken with him on this subject on two or three occasions, I considered it to be my duty to come to his assistance and to his defense.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you not told in your interrogation on the 27th of November that the death sentence against Eck and Hoffmann had already been confirmed?

HEISIG: That—I don’t remember whether it was on the 27th of November, I only remember that I was told here that the death sentence had been carried out. I no longer remember the date, as I was interrogated several times.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Since you have knowledge of the circumstances, do you maintain that the speech of Grossadmiral Dönitz mentioned in any way that fire should be opened on shipwrecked sailors?

HEISIG: No; we gathered that from his words; and from his reference to the bombing war, we gathered that total war had now to be waged against ships and crews. That is what we understood, and I talked about it to my comrades on the way back to the Hansa.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Speak slowly, please.

HEISIG: We were convinced that Admiral Dönitz meant that. He did not express it clearly.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you speak about this point with any of your superiors at the school?

HEISIG: I left the school on the same day. But I can remember that one of my superiors, whose name to my regret I do not recall—nor do I recall the occasion—once spoke to us about this subject and advised us that, if possible, only officers should be on the bridge ready to annihilate shipwrecked sailors, should the possibility arise, or should it be necessary.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: One of your superiors told you that?

HEISIG: Yes, but I cannot remember in which connection and where. I received a lot of advice from my superiors on many things.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was it at the school?

HEISIG: No; I left the U-boat Training Division on the same day.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you instructed at the school in the standing orders of war?

HEISIG: Yes; we were instructed in the standing orders of war.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did these standing orders mention anywhere that shipwrecked sailors were to be fired on or their rescue apparatus destroyed?

HEISIG: The standing orders did not mention that. But—I think one can assume this from an innuendo of Captain Rollmann, who was then officers’ company commander—a short time before that, some teletype message had arrived containing an order prohibiting rescue measures and demanding that sea warfare should be fought with more radical, more drastic means.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you think that the prohibition of rescue measures is identical with the shooting of shipwrecked sailors?

HEISIG: We came to this. . .

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Please, answer my question. Do you think these two things are identical?

HEISIG: No.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, I am afraid the Tribunal will have to adjourn now; and I have an announcement to make. You may cross-examine tomorrow.

DR. THOMA: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: As I have already said, the Tribunal will not sit in open session this afternoon.

The announcement that I have to make is in connection with the organizations which are alleged to be criminal under Article 9 of the Charter, and this is the announcement:

The Tribunal has been giving careful consideration to the duty imposed upon it by Article 9 of the Charter.

It is difficult to determine the manner in which the representatives of the named organizations shall be permitted to appear in accordance with Article 9, without considering the exact nature of the case presented for the Prosecution.

For this reason, the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that, at this stage of the Trial, with many thousands of applications being made, the case for the Prosecution should be defined with more precision than appears in the Indictment.

In these circumstances, therefore, it is the intention of the Tribunal to invite argument from the Counsel for the Prosecution and for the Defense, at the conclusion of the case by all prosecutors, in regard to the questions hereinafter set forth.

The questions which need further consideration are as follows:

1. The Charter does not define a criminal organization, and it is therefore necessary to examine the tests of criminality which must be applied and to decide the nature of the evidence to be admitted.

Many of the applicants who have made requests to be heard assert that they were conscripted into the organization, or that they were ignorant of the criminal purposes of the organization, or that they were innocent of any unlawful acts.

It will be necessary to decide whether such evidence ought to be received to rebut the charge of the criminal character of the organization, or whether such evidence ought more properly to be received at the subsequent trials under Article 10 of the Charter, when the organizations have been declared criminal, if the Tribunal so decides.

2. The question of the precise time within which the named organization is said to have been criminal is vital to the decision of the Tribunal.

The Tribunal desires to know from the Prosecution at this stage whether it is intended to adhere to the limits of time set out in the Indictment.

3. The Tribunal desires to know whether, in the light of the evidence, any class of persons included within the named organizations should be excluded from the scope of the declaration, and which, if any.

In the indictment of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the Prosecution have reserved the right to request that Politische Leiter of subordinate grades or ranks, or of other types or classes, be exempted from further proceedings without prejudice to other proceedings or actions against them.

Is it the intention of the Prosecution to make any such request? If so, it should be done now.

4. The Tribunal would be glad if the Prosecution would also:

(a) Summarize in respect of each named organization the elements which in their opinion justify the charge of being a criminal organization.

(b) Indicate what acts on the part of individual defendants, indicted in this Trial—in the sense used in Article 9 of the Charter—justify declaring the groups or organizations of which they are members to be criminal organizations.

(c) Submit in writing a summary of proposed findings of fact as to each organization, with respect to which a finding of criminality is asked.

The Tribunal hopes it is not necessary to say to the Prosecution that it is not seeking to interfere with the undoubted right of the Prosecution to present its case in its own way, in the light of the full knowledge of all the documents and facts which it possesses, but the duty of the Tribunal under Article 9 of the Charter makes it essential at this time to have the case clearly and precisely defined.

This announcement will be communicated to the Chief Prosecutors and to Defense Counsel in writing.

The Tribunal will adjourn until 10 o’clock tomorrow morning.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 15 January 1946 at 1000 hours._]

THIRTY-FOURTH DAY Tuesday, 15 January 1946

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other Counsel for the Defense wish to cross-examine this witness? [_Referring to Peter Josef Heisig, interrogated the previous day._]

[_There was no response._]

Then, Colonel Phillimore, do you wish to re-examine?

COL. PHILLIMORE: No, My Lord; I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can go.

[_The witness left the stand._]

COL. PHILLIMORE: Before I call my second witness, Karl Heinz Moehle, an affidavit by him is the next document in the document book.

[_Karl Heinz Moehle took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?

KARL HEINZ MOEHLE (Witness): Karl Heinz Moehle.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath: “I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: You can sit down, if you wish.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Karl Heinz Moehle, you held the rank of Korvettenkapitän in the German Navy?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir.

COL. PHILLIMORE: You served in the German Navy since 1930?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you tell the Tribunal what decorations you hold?

MOEHLE: I received the Submarine War Medal; the Iron Cross, Second Class; the Iron Cross, First Class; the Knight’s Cross; the War Service Cross, First and Second Class; and the German Cross in Silver.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Did you swear to an affidavit covering a statement you have made on the 21st of July 1945?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir; I made such a statement.

COL. PHILLIMORE: I show you that document and ask you to say whether that is your affidavit.

[_Document 382-PS was submitted to the witness._]

MOEHLE: Yes, this is my affidavit.

COL. PHILLIMORE: I put that document in, which is 382-PS, and it becomes Exhibit GB-202.

[_Turning to the witness._] In the autumn of 1942 were you head of the 5th U-boat Flotilla?

MOEHLE: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Were you stationed at Kiel?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir.

COL. PHILLIMORE: How long did you hold that appointment altogether?

MOEHLE: For 4 years.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Was that from June 1941 until the capitulation?

MOEHLE: That is correct.

COL. PHILLIMORE: What were your duties as commander of that flotilla?

MOEHLE: My main duties as Flotilla Commander consisted of the fitting out of U-boats which were to be sent to the front from home bases, and giving them the orders of the U-boat command.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Had you any special responsibility to U-boat commanders in respect of the orders?

MOEHLE? Yes, Sir; it was my responsibility to see that outgoing U-boats were provided with the new orders of the U-boat command.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Had you any responsibility in explaining the orders?

MOEHLE: The orders of the U-boat command were always very clear and unambiguous. If there were any ambiguities I used to have these ambiguities cleared up myself at the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of U-boats.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Did you personally see commanders before they went out on patrol?

MOEHLE: Yes, each commander before leaving for an operational cruise went through a so-called commander’s briefing.

COL. PHILLIMORE: I will go back, if I may, for two or three questions. Did you personally see commanders before they went out on patrol?

MOEHLE: Yes, each commander before sailing on a mission went through a briefing session at my office.

COL. PHILLIMORE: And what did that briefing session consist of? Were there any questions on the orders?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir, all experiences of previous patrols and any questions of the ship’s equipment were discussed with the commander at that session. Also, the commanders had an opportunity at the briefing to clarify any uncertainties, which might have existed in their minds, by asking questions.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Apart from your briefing sessions, did commanders also go to Admiral Dönitz’ headquarters for briefing?

MOEHLE: As far as that was possible it was done, especially from the moment when the Commander-in-Chief of U-boats had transferred his office from Paris to Berlin.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you remember an order in the autumn of 1942 dealing with lifeboats?

MOEHLE: Yes. In September 1942 I received a wireless message addressed to all commanders at sea, and it dealt with that question.

COL. PHILLIMORE: I show you this document.

My Lord, that is the exhibit I have already put in as GB-199.

THE PRESIDENT: What other number has it?

COL. PHILLIMORE: It is Document D-630.

[_Turning to the witness._] Is that the order you are referring to?

MOEHLE: Yes, that is the order.

COL. PHILLIMORE: From the time when you were captured until last Friday had you seen that order?

MOEHLE: No, Sir.

COL. PHILLIMORE: It follows, I think, that the account of the order in your statement was given from recollection?

MOEHLE: Yes, only from recollection.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, after you got that order did you go to Admiral Dönitz’ headquarters?

MOEHLE: Yes, at my first visit to headquarters after receipt of the order, I personally discussed it with Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch who was a specialist on the staff of the U-boat command.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you tell the Tribunal what was said at that meeting?

MOEHLE: At that meeting I asked Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch how the ambiguity contained in that order—or I might say, lack of clarity—should be understood. He explained the order by two illustrations.

The first example was that of a U-boat in the outer Bay of Biscay. It was sailing on patrol when it sighted a rubber dinghy carrying survivors of a British plane. The fact that it was on an outgoing mission, that is, being fully equipped, made it impossible to take the crew of the plane on board, although, especially at that time, it appeared especially desirable to bring back specialists in navigation from shot-down aircraft crews to get useful information from them. The commander of the U-boat made a wide circle around this rubber boat and continued on his mission. When he returned from his mission he reported this case to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of U-boats. The staff officers reproached him, saying that, if he were unable to bring these navigation specialists back with him, the right thing to do would have been to attack that crew, for it was to be expected that, in less than 24 hours at the latest, the dinghy would be rescued by British reconnaissance forces, and they. . .

COL. PHILLIMORE: I don’t quite get what you said would have been the correct action to take. You were saying the correct thing to do would have been. . .

MOEHLE: The right thing to do would have been to attack the air crew as it was not possible to bring back the crew or these specialists, for it could be expected that that crew would be found and rescued within a short time by British reconnaissance forces, and in given circumstances might again destroy one or two German U-boats.

The second example. . .

COL. PHILLIMORE: Did he give you any second example?

MOEHLE: Yes, the second example I am going to recount now.

Example 2. During the first month of the U-boat warfare against the United States a great quantity of tonnage—I do not recollect the exact figure—had been sunk in the shallow waters off the American coast. In these sinkings the greater part of the crews were rescued, because of the close proximity of land. That was exceedingly regrettable, as to merchant shipping not only tonnage but also crews belong, and in the meantime these crews were again able to man newly-built ships.

COL. PHILLIMORE: You have told us about the ambiguity of the order. Are you familiar with the way Admiral Dönitz worded his orders?

MOEHLE: I do not quite understand the question.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Are you familiar with the way Admiral Dönitz normally worded his orders?

MOEHLE: Yes. In my opinion, the order need only have read like this: It is pointed out anew that rescue measures have to be discontinued for reasons of safety for the submarines. This is how, I think, the order should have been worded—if only rescue measures had been forbidden. All. . .

COL. PHILLIMORE: Are you saying that if it had been intended only to prohibit rescue measures it would have been sufficient to refer to the previous order?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir; that would have been enough.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Was that previous order also marked “top secret”?

MOEHLE: I do not remember that exactly.

COL. PHILLIMORE: What was the propaganda at the time with regard to crews?

MOEHLE: The propaganda at that time was to the effect that the enemy was having great difficulty in finding sufficient crews for his merchant marine and. . .

THE PRESIDENT: The question as to the propaganda at that time is too general a question for him to answer.

COL. PHILLIMORE: If Your Honor pleases, I don’t press it.

[_Turning to the witness._] From your knowledge of the way orders were worded, can you tell the Tribunal what you understood this order to mean?

MOEHLE: The order meant, in my own opinion, that although rescue measures remained prohibited, on the other hand it was desirable in the case of sinkings of merchantmen that there should be no survivors.

COL. PHILLIMORE: And was it because you understood this to be the meaning that you went to Admiral Dönitz’ headquarters?

MOEHLE: I did not go to the headquarters of the U-boat command on account of this order alone; these visits took place at frequent intervals in order to discuss other questions also and to have the opportunity of keeping constantly in touch with the views and opinions of the U-boat command, as I had to transmit them to the commanders.

COL. PHILLIMORE: How did you brief commanders on this order?

MOEHLE: At these briefing sessions I read the wording of the wireless message to the commanders without making any comment. In a very few instances some commanders asked me about the meaning of the order. In such cases I gave them the two examples that headquarters had given to me. However, I added, “U-boat command cannot give you such an order officially; everybody has to handle this according to his own conscience.”

COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you remember an order about rescue ships?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Can you say what the date of that order was?

MOEHLE: I do not remember the exact date, but I think it must have been about the same as the order of September 1942.

COL. PHILLIMORE: May the witness see the Document D-663 which I put in yesterday?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: It is the German copy of the document that I am showing him; the original is being held.

[_Document D-663 was submitted to the witness._]

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir; I recognize that order.

COL. PHILLIMORE: You will note that the date on that document is the 7th of October 1943.

MOEHLE: Yes, this order is laid down there in the general Operational Order Atlantic Number 56. According to my recollection, this order was already contained in the previous effective Operational Order Number 54, that is in a wireless message containing practical experiences and instructions. I cannot remember exactly. The date is October 1943.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, is that order in the index here?

COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, My Lord, that is the Document D-663, which I put in yesterday as Exhibit GB-200. If it is omitted from the index, Your Lordship will remember it is the document which, as I explained yesterday, we just received.

THE PRESIDENT: Where does it come in?

COL. PHILLIMORE: It comes in after D-630.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes. Thank you.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Your Lordship will remember the order; it deals with rescue ships attached to convoys, and it was on the last sentence that I relied.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I only wanted to get the words of it.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, Sir. My Lord, also I have the original here now and if it is thought necessary the witness can see it, but he has seen a copy.

[_Turning to the witness._] Do you remember an order about entries in logs?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir. At the time, the exact date I do not remember, it had been ordered that sinkings and other acts which were in contradiction to international conventions should not be entered in the log but should be reported orally after return to the home port.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Would you care to say why it is that you are giving evidence in this case?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir; because when I was taken prisoner it was claimed that I was the author of these orders, and I do not want to have this charge connected with my name.

COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, the witness is available for examination by my colleagues and for cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: Does any counsel for any defendant wish to ask the witness any questions?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Lieutenant Commander Moehle, since when have you been in the U-boat arm?

MOEHLE: Since the end of 1936.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know Grossadmiral Dönitz personally?

MOEHLE: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Since when?

MOEHLE: Since October 1937.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you see him here in this room?

MOEHLE: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Where?

MOEHLE: To the left in the rear.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know Grossadmiral Dönitz as an admiral to whom none of his flotilla chiefs and commanders could speak?

MOEHLE: No.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Or was the opposite the case?

MOEHLE: He could be approached by everybody at any time.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Have you yourself been a commander of a U-boat?

MOEHLE: Yes, on nine operations.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: For how long?

MOEHLE: From the beginning of the war until April 1941.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How many ships did you sink?

MOEHLE: Twenty ships.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: After sinking ships, did you destroy the rescue equipment or fire at the survivors?

MOEHLE: No.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you have an order to do that?

MOEHLE: No.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Had the danger passed for a U-boat after the attack on a merchantman?

MOEHLE: No; the danger to the U-boat does not end when the attack is over.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Why not?

MOEHLE: Because in most instances when a ship is sunk, the ship is in a position to send SOS messages and give its position, and thus bring striking forces to attack the U-boat at the last minute.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Is there a maxim in the U-boat arm that fighting comes before rescuing?

MOEHLE: I never heard of that rule put in that way.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Prior to the order of September 1942 did you know of any other orders by which rescue work was prohibited if it entailed danger to the U-boat?

MOEHLE: Yes, but I do not know when and where this order was laid down. It had been ordered that, as a matter of principle, the safety of one’s own boat takes precedence.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was this ordered only once, or in several instances?

MOEHLE: That I cannot say.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know that the order of September 1942 was given in consequence of an incident in which German U-boats, contrary to orders, had undertaken rescue measures?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And the U-boats were then attacked by Allied aircraft?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: A minute ago you classified the order of September 1942 as ambiguous, did you not?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You interpreted it to the commanders in the sense that the order should include the destruction of rescue facilities and of the shipwrecked crew?

MOEHLE: No, not quite; I gave the two examples to the commanders only if they made an inquiry and I passed them on in the same way as I had received them from the Commander-in-Chief Submarine Fleet and they themselves could draw that conclusion from these two examples.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In which sentence of the order do you see a hidden invitation to kill survivors or to destroy the rescue facilities?

MOEHLE: In the sentence. . .

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Just a second, I shall read to you each sentence of the order separately.

MOEHLE: Very well.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I read from the Document D-630:

“1. No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of ships sunk, and this includes picking up persons in the water and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats, and handing over food and water. These are absolutely forbidden.”

Do you see it in this sentence?

MOEHLE: No.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: “Rescue measures contradict the most primitive demands of warfare that crews and ships should be destroyed.”

Do you see that in this sentence?

MOEHLE: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Does that sentence contain anything as to the destruction of shipwrecked persons?

MOEHLE: No, of crews.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: At the end of the order is the phrase “Be harsh.” Did you hear that phrase there for the first time?

MOEHLE: No.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was this phrase used by Commander-in-Chief of U-boats to get the commanders to be severe themselves and to their crews?

MOEHLE: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you discuss the order with Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch?

MOEHLE: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you remember that exactly?

MOEHLE: As far as I can rely upon my recollection after such a long time.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Where did that conversation take place?

MOEHLE: At the staff headquarters of the U-boat command, probably in Paris.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What position did Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch occupy at the time?

MOEHLE: As far as I can remember, he was the man in charge of the Enemy Convoys Department, but I could not say that with any certainty.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was the superior officer of Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch, Commander Hessler?

MOEHLE: Superior officer? I would not say so, because Commander Hessler was on the same level as Kuppisch, a departmental chief.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch’s superior Admiral Goth?

MOEHLE: Yes, in his capacity of Chief of Staff.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you speak to Commander Hessler or Admiral Goth or with the Grossadmiral himself with regard to the interpretation to be given to the order of September?

MOEHLE: Whether I spoke to Commander Hessler, I do not remember, but in any case not to Admiral Goth or the Grossadmiral himself.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: You said Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch had told you about the opinion which was prevalent in the staff of the U-boat command.

MOEHLE: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: With regard to the attitude towards the aviators in the Bay of Biscay, did he tell you that it was the opinion of the Grossadmiral himself?

MOEHLE: I do not remember that. It is too far back. When explanations were given at staff meetings of the U-boat command and an opinion was expressed by a responsible departmental chief, we flotilla leaders naturally took this to be the official opinion of the Commander-in-Chief of the U-boat arm. Admiral Goth personally or the Commander-in-Chief of the U-boat arm was only approached in cases where the departmental chiefs refused to commit themselves definitely or to assume the responsibility for an answer.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you not get to know that the story of the airmen who had been shot down in the Bay of Biscay was in actual fact just the opposite. . .

MOEHLE: I do not understand.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I continue: That the commander was reprimanded because he did not bring home these flyers even if it meant breaking off his operation.

MOEHLE: No, I do not know that.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Lieutenant Commander Kuppisch tell you in connection with that second example you mentioned, that the shipwrecked or their rescue equipment off the American coast should have been destroyed?

MOEHLE: No; he only said it was regrettable that the crews had been rescued.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: And you concluded from that that it was desired to have the shipwrecked killed?

MOEHLE: I did not draw any conclusions at all from that for I passed on these examples without any commentary.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know the standing orders of the U-boat command?

MOEHLE: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do they contain the guiding principles of U-boat warfare?

MOEHLE: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Is there any order in the standing orders directing or advising the killing of shipwrecked persons or the destruction of rescue facilities?

MOEHLE: As far as I know, no.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What grade of secrecy was attached to these standing orders?

MOEHLE: As far as I remember, top secret.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you remember that in Standing Order 511 the following was ordered. . .

Mr. President, I read from an order which I shall submit in evidence later on. I cannot do it now because I have not yet the original.

“Standing Order of the U-boat Command Number 511; 20 May 1943; taking on board of officers of sunken ships.

“1. As far as accommodation facilities on board permit, captains and chief engineers of sunken ships are to be brought in. The enemy tries to thwart this intention and has issued the following order: (a) masters are not allowed to identify themselves when questioned, but should if possible use sailors selected especially for this purpose; (b) crew has to state that masters and chief engineers remained on board.

“If in spite of energetic questioning it is not possible to find the masters or the chief engineers, then other ships’ officers should be taken aboard.

“2. Masters and officers of neutral ships, which, according to Standing Order Number 101, can be sunk (for instance, Swedish ships outside Göteborg traffic), are not to be brought in because internment of these officers would violate international law.

“3. In case ship officers cannot be taken prisoner, other white members of the crew should be taken along as far as accommodation facilities and further operations of the craft permit, for the purpose of interrogation for military and propaganda purposes.

“4. In case of the sinking of a single cruising destroyer, corvette, or escort vessel, try at all costs to take prisoners, if that can be done without endangering the boat. Interrogation of the prisoners at transit camps . . . can produce valuable hints as to antisubmarine tactics, devices, and weapons used by the enemy; the same applies to air crews of shot-down planes.”

[_Turning to the witness._] Do you know that order?

MOEHLE: Yes. The order seems familiar to me.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know the order 513?

“Standing Order of U-boat Command; 1 June 1944; taking along of prisoners.

“1. Statements of prisoners are the safest and best source of information regarding enemy tactics, weapons, location appliances and methods. Prisoners from planes and destroyers may be of the greatest importance to us; therefore, as far as possible and without endangering the boat, the utmost is to be done to take such prisoners.

“2. As prisoners are extremely willing to talk when captured, interrogate them at once on board. It is of special interest to know the manner of locating U-boats by aircraft, whether by radar or by passive location methods; for instance, by ascertaining, through electricity or heat, the location of the boat. Report prisoners taken as soon as possible in order to hand them over to returning boats.”

Do you know that order?

MOEHLE: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you not notice and try to clarify a contradiction between these orders concerning the rescue of air crews in every case and the story you passed on about the destruction of air crews?

MOEHLE: No; because in the order of September 1942 it also says that the order about the bringing in of ships’ captains and chief engineers remains in force.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you hear of any instance where a U-boat brought in captains and chief engineers but shot the rest of the crew?

MOEHLE: No.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you consider it at all possible that such an order can be given—that is, that part of the crew should be rescued and the rest of the crew should be killed?

MOEHLE: No, Sir. One cannot make such an order.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you ever hear of any case where a U-boat commander, on the basis of your briefings, destroyed rescue equipment or killed shipwrecked persons?

MOEHLE: No.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was it permitted to attack neutral vessels outside the fixed blockade zones?

MOEHLE: Only in cases where they were not marked as neutrals according to regulations.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was the Commander of the U-boat fleet particularly severe in enforcing this order for the protection of neutral ships?

MOEHLE: As I know of no such cases, I cannot say anything on that subject.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know that the commanders were threatened with court-martial if they did not obey the orders given for the protection of neutrals?

MOEHLE: Yes; I remember one case which happened in the Caribbean Sea.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you remember an order of 1944 directing that neutral ships be stopped and searched?

MOEHLE: Yes, it was ordered, but I do not remember the date, that particular Spanish and Portuguese ships in the North Atlantic should be stopped and searched.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you pass on that order to the commanders?

MOEHLE: As far as I recollect, this order was given in writing and was contained in one of the official sets of orders. I passed on orders to commanders only when they were not contained in a set of orders.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In passing that order on, did you make an addition as to whether that order should be executed or not?

MOEHLE: Yes, I remember that I said—when that order came by radio and the commanders did not know of it yet—that they should be exceedingly careful, when stopping neutrals, as there was always the danger that also a neutral ship might disclose the position of the U-boat by radio. Owing to the air superiority of the enemy in the North Atlantic, it would always be safer or better not to be compelled to stop these ships.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Had you orders from the Commander of the U-boat fleet to make this additional remark?

MOEHLE: As far as I remember, one of the departmental chiefs in the U-boat command—I assume it was Commander Hessler—told me or took particular care to point out that any stopping of ships, even neutrals, involved considerable danger to the U-boat.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Because of the air patrol?

MOEHLE: Because of the air patrol.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Your attention has been called to the order concerning the so-called rescue ships.

MOEHLE: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you remember that?

MOEHLE: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these “rescue ships” recognized under international law as hospital ships, with appropriate markings?

MOEHLE: As far as I know, they were not.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What orders existed that hospital ships should be protected?

MOEHLE: Where these orders were laid down—whether in writing I do not remember—I only know that the Commander of the U-boats fleet frequently reminded the commanders of the absolute inviolability of hospital ships.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Do you know of any case in which a hospital ship was attacked by a U-boat?

MOEHLE: No; I don’t know of such a case.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: If the Commander of the U-boat fleet had been interested in destroying helpless human beings in violation of international law, the destruction of hospital ships would have been an excellent means, don’t you think?

MOEHLE: Without any doubt.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other Defense Counsel wish to cross-examine this witness?

[_No response._]

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you ever save any of the survivors of the vessels that you torpedoed?

MOEHLE: I have not been in a position to do that due to the military situation.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You mean to say it was dangerous to your boat to do it?

MOEHLE: Not only that. A great number of the ships which I sunk were in a convoy or else there was a rough sea, so that it was impossible to undertake any rescue measures owing to navigation conditions.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, do you want to re-examine?

COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I have about three questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

COL. PHILLIMORE: [_Turning to the witness._] When you were a U-boat commander yourself, what was the order with regard to rescue?

MOEHLE: At the beginning of the war we had been told that the safety of one’s own boat was the decisive thing, and that the boat should not be endangered by rescue measures. Whether these orders already existed in writing at the outbreak of the war I do not remember.

COL. PHILLIMORE: When you got this order of the 17th of September 1942, did you take it merely as prohibiting rescue or as going further?

MOEHLE: When I received that order I noticed that it was not entirely clear, as orders of the B. d. U. normally were. One could see an ambiguity in it.

COL. PHILLIMORE: You have not answered my question. Did you take the order to mean that a U-boat commander should merely abstain from rescue measures, or as something further?

MOEHLE: I took the order to mean that something further was implied, only it was not actually ordered but was considered desirable.

COL. PHILLIMORE: The instance you were given about the Bay of Biscay, had you any knowledge of the facts of that incident?

MOEHLE: No, the circumstances of that case are not known to me.

COL. PHILLIMORE: What were the actual words you used when you passed that order on to commanders?

MOEHLE: I told the commanders in so many words: We are now approaching a very delicate and difficult chapter; it is the question of the treatment of lifeboats. The Commander of the U-boat fleet issued the following radio message in September 1942—I then read the radio message of September 1942 in full. For most of those present the chapter was closed; no commander had any questions to ask. Explanations were not given unless questions were asked. In some few instances the commanders asked, “How should this order be interpreted?” Then as a means of interpretation I gave the two examples which had been related to me at the U-boat command and added, “Officially such a thing cannot be ordered; everybody has to reconcile that with his own conscience.”

COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you remember any comment being made by commanding officers after you had read the order?

MOEHLE: Yes, Sir. Several commanders, following the reading of this radio message said, without making any further comment, “That is very clear, but damned hard.”

COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I would now put before the Tribunal two cases where that order of the 17th of September 1942 was apparently put into effect. The first case is set out at the next document in the document book, which is D-645. My Lord, I put that document in and it becomes Exhibit GB-203. It is a report of the sinking of a steam trawler, a fishing trawler, the _Noreen Mary_, which was sunk by _U-247_ on the 5th of July 1944. The first page of the document contains an extract from the log of the U-boat. The time reference 1943 on the document is followed by an account of the firing of two torpedoes which missed, and then, at 2055 hours, the log reads:

“Surfaced. Fishing Vessels. . . .”—bearings given of three ships—“Engaged the nearest. She stops after 3 minutes.”

Then there is an account of a shot fired as the trawler lay stopped, and then, the final entry:

“Sunk by flak, with shots into her side. Sank by the stern.”

The Tribunal will notice there is no mention in the log of any action against the torpedoed or the shipwrecked seamen.

THE PRESIDENT: Why is it entered as 5. 7. 1943?

COL. PHILLIMORE: It is a typing error. I should have pointed it out.

My Lord, the next page of the document is a comment on the action by the U-boat command, and the last line reads:

“Recognized success: Fishing vessel _Noreen Mary_ sunk by flak.”

And then there is an affidavit by James MacAlister, who was a deckhand on board the _Noreen Mary_ at the time of the sinking. My Lord, reading the last paragraph on the first page of the affidavit. He has dealt earlier with having seen the torpedo tracks, which missed the trawler. The last paragraph reads:

“At 2110 hours, while we were still trawling, the submarine surfaced on our starboard beam, about 50 yards to the northeast of us, and without any warning immediately opened fire on the ship with a machine gun. We were 18 miles west from Cape Wrath, on a northwesterly course, making 3 knots. The weather was fine and clear, sunny, with good visibility. The sea was smooth, with light airs.”

My Lord, then there is an account of the firing in the next, paragraph, and then, if I might read from the second paragraph, on Page 2.

THE PRESIDENT: Why not read the first?

COL. PHILLIMORE: If Your Lordship pleases:

“When the submarine surfaced I saw men climbing out of the conning tower. The skipper thought at first the submarine was British, but when she opened fire he immediately slackened the brake to take the weight off gear”—that is, the trawl—“and increased to full speed, which was about 10 knots. The submarine chased us, firing her machine gun, and with the first rounds killed two or three men, including the skipper, who were on deck and had not had time to take cover. The submarine then started using a heavier gun from her conning tower, the first shot from which burst the boiler, enveloping everything in steam and stopping the ship.

“By now the crew had taken cover, but in spite of this all but four were killed. The submarine then commenced to circle round ahead of the vessel, and passed down her port side with both guns firing continuously. We were listing slowly to port all the time but did not catch fire.

“The mate and I attempted to release the lifeboat, which was aft, but the mate was killed whilst doing so, so I abandoned the attempt. I then went below into the pantry, which was below the waterline, for shelter. The ship was listing more and more port, until finally at 2210 she rolled right over and sank, and the only four men left alive on board were thrown into the sea. I do not know where the other three men had taken cover during this time, as I did not hear or see them until they were in the water.

“I swam around until I came across the broken bow of our lifeboat which was upside down, and managed to scramble on top of it. Even now the submarine did not submerge, but deliberately steamed in my direction and when only 60 to 70 yards away fired directly at me with a short burst from the machine gun. As their intention was quite obvious, I fell into the water and remained there until the submarine ceased firing and submerged, after which I climbed back on to the bottom of the boat. The submarine had been firing her guns for a full hour.”

My Lord, then the affidavit goes on to describe the deponent and others attempting to rescue themselves and to help each other, and then they were picked up by another trawler.

The last paragraph on that page:

“Whilst on board the _Lady Madeleine_ the second engineer and I had our wounds dressed. I learned later that the second engineer had 48 shrapnel wounds, also a piece of steel wire 2½ inches long embedded in his body.”

And there is a sentence on which I don’t rely, and the last sentence:

“I had 14 shrapnel wounds.”

My Lord, and then the last two paragraphs of the affidavit:

“This is my fourth wartime experience, having served in the whalers _Sylvester_ (mined) and _New Seville_ (torpedoed), and the trawler _Ocean Tide_, which ran ashore.

“As a result of this attack by U-boat, the casualties were six killed . . . two missing . . . two injured. . . .”

My Lord, the next document, D-647, I put in as Exhibit GB-204. My Lord, this is an extract from a statement given by the second officer of the ship _Antonico_, torpedoed, set afire, and sunk, on the 28th of September 1942, on the coast of French Guiana. The Tribunal will observe that the date of the incident is some 11 days after the issue of the order. My Lord, I would read from the words “that the witness saw the dead,” slightly more than halfway down on the first page. An account has been given of the attack on the ship, which by then was on fire:

“. . . that the witness saw the dead on the deck of the _Antonico_ as he and his crew tried to swing out their lifeboat; that the attack was fulminant, lasting almost 20 minutes; and that the witness already in the lifeboat tried to get away from the side of the _Antonico_ in order to avoid being dragged down by the same _Antonico_ and also because she was the aggressor’s target; that the night was dark, and it was thus difficult to see the submarine, but that the fire aboard the _Antonico_ lit up the locality in which she was submerging, facilitating the enemy to see the two lifeboats trying to get away; that the enemy ruthlessly machine-gunned the defenseless sailors in Number 2 lifeboat, in which the witness found himself, and killed the Second Pilot Arnaldo de Andrade de Lima, and wounded three of the crew; that the witness gave orders to his company to throw themselves overboard to save themselves from the bullets: in so doing, they were protected and out of sight behind the lifeboat, which was already filled with water; even so the lifeboat continued to be attacked. At that time the witness and his companions were about 20 meters in distance from the submarine. . . .”

My Lord, I haven’t got the U-boat’s log in that case, but you may think that, in view of the order with regard to entries in logs, namely that anything compromising should not be put in, it would be no more helpful than in the case of the previous incident.

My Lord, the next Document, D-646(a), I put in as Exhibit GB-205. It is a monitored account of a talk by a German naval war reporter on the long wave propaganda service from Friesland. The broadcast was in English, and the date is the 11th of March 1943. It is, if I may quote:

“Santa Lucia, in the West Indies, was an ideal setting for romance, but nowadays it was dangerous to sail in these waters—dangerous for the British and Americans and for all the colored people who were at their beck and call. Recently a U-boat operating in these waters sighted an enemy windjammer. Streams of tracer bullets were poured into the sails and most of the Negro crew leaped overboard. Knowing that this might be a decoy ship, the submarine steamed close, within 20 yards, when hand grenades were hurled into the rigging. The remainder of the Negroes then leaped into the sea. The windjammer sank. There remained only wreckage, lifeboats packed with men, and sailors swimming. The sharks in the distance licked their teeth in expectation. Such was the fate of those who sailed for Britain and America.”

My Lord, the next page of the document I don’t propose to read. It is an extract from the log of the U-boat believed to have sunk this ship. It was, in fact, the _C. S. Flight_.

My Lord, I read that because, in my submission, it shows that it was the policy of the enemy at the start to seek to terrorize crews, and it is a part with the order with regard to rescue ships and with the order on the destruction of seamen.

If I might say so, in view of the cross-examination, the Prosecution do not complain of rescue ships being attacked. They are not entitled to protection. The point of the order was that they were to be given priority in attack, and the order, therefore, is closely allied with the order of the 17th of September 1942. In view of the Allied building program, it had become imperative to prevent the ships being manned.

My Lord, I pass to the period after the defendant had succeeded the Defendant Raeder. My Lord, the next document is 2098-PS. It has been referred to but not, I think, put in. I put it in formally as Exhibit GB-206. My Lord, I won’t read it. It merely sets out that the Defendant Raeder should have the equivalent rank of a minister of the Reich, and I ask the Tribunal to infer that on succeeding Raeder the Defendant Dönitz would presumably have succeeded to that right.

THE PRESIDENT: This is from 1938 onward?

COL. PHILLIMORE: From 1938 onward.

The next document, D-648, I put in as Exhibit GB-207. It is an affidavit by an official, or rather it is an official report certified by an official of the British Admiralty. The certificate is on the last page, and it sets out the number of meetings, the dates of the meetings and those present, on the occasion of meetings between the Defendant Dönitz or his representative with Hitler from the time that he succeeded Raeder until the end. The certificate states:

“. . . I have compiled from them”—that is, from captured documents—“the attached list of occasions on which Admiral Dönitz attended conferences at Hitler’s headquarters. The list of other senior officials who attended the same conferences is added when this information was contained in the captured documents concerned. I certify that the list is a true extract from the collective documents which I have examined, and which are in the possession of the British Admiralty, London.”

My Lord, I won’t go through the list. I would merely call the Tribunal’s attention to the fact that either Admiral Dönitz or his deputy, Konteradmiral Voss, was present at each of these meetings; and that amongst those who were also constantly there were the Defendants Speer, Keitel, Jodl, Ribbentrop, and Göring, and also Himmler or his lieutenants, Fegelein or Kaltenbrunner.

My Lord, the inference which I ask the Tribunal to draw from the document is that from the time that he succeeded Raeder, this defendant was one of the rulers of the Reich and was undoubtedly aware of all decisions, major decisions of policy.

My Lord, I pass to the next document, C-178. That has already been put in as Exhibit Number USA-544. It is an internal memorandum of the naval war staff, written by the division dealing with international law to another division, and the subject is the order with regard to the shooting of Commandos, of the 18th of October 1942, with which the Tribunal are, I think, familiar.

The point of the document is that some doubt appeared to have arisen in some quarters with regard to the understanding of the order, and in the last sentence of the memorandum it is suggested:

“As far as the Navy is concerned, it remains to be seen whether or not this case should be used to make sure, after a conference with the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, that all departments concerned have an entirely clear conception regarding the treatment of members of Commando units.”

My Lord, whether that conference took place or not I do not know. The document is dated some 11 days after this defendant had taken over from the Defendant Raeder.

But the next document in the book, D-649, which I put in as Exhibit GB-208, is an instance of the Navy in July of that year—July 1943—handing over to the SD for shooting Norwegian and British naval personnel whom the Navy decided came under the terms of the order. My Lord, it is an affidavit by a British barrister-at-law who served as judge advocate at the trial of the members of the SD who executed the order.

Paragraph 1 sets out that the deponent was judge advocate at the trial of 10 members of the SD by a military court held at the law courts, Oslo, Norway, which sat on Thursday, 29 November 1945, and concluded its sitting on Tuesday, 4 December 1945.

My Lord, the next paragraph sets out who convened the court and the names of the prosecuting and defending counsel, and the third paragraph states:

“The accused were charged with committing a war crime, in that they at Ulven, Norway, in or about the month of July 1943, in violation of the laws and usages of war, were concerned in the killing of. . .”

Then there follow the names of six personnel of the Norwegian Navy, including one officer, and one leading telegraphist of the Royal Navy, prisoners of war. I might read from Paragraph 4:

“There was evidence before the court which was not challenged by the Defense that Motor Torpedo Boat Number 345 set out from Lerwick in the Shetlands on a naval operation for the purpose of making torpedo attacks on German shipping off the Norwegian coast, and for the purpose of laying mines in the same area. The persons mentioned in the charge were all the crew of the torpedo boat.”

Paragraph 5:

“The Defense did not challenge that each member of the crew was wearing uniform at the time of capture, and there was abundant evidence from many persons, several of whom were German, that they were wearing uniform at all times after their capture.”

Paragraph 6:

“On 27th July 1943, the torpedo boat reached the island of Aspo off the Norwegian coast, north of Bergen. On the following day the whole of the crew were captured and were taken on board a German naval vessel which was under the command of Admiral Von Schrader, the admiral of the west coast. The crew were taken to the Bergenhus where they had arrived by 11 p. m. on 28th July. The crew were there interrogated by Lieutenant H. P. K. W. Fanger, a naval lieutenant of the Reserve, on the orders of Korvettenkapitän Egon Drascher, both of the German Naval Intelligence Service. This interrogation was carried out upon the orders of the staff of the admiral of the west coast. Lieutenant Fanger reported to the officer in charge of the intelligence branch at Bergen that in his opinion all the members of the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, and that officer in turn reported both orally and in writing to the Sea Commander Bergen, and in writing to the admiral of the west coast.

“7. The interrogation by the naval intelligence branch was concluded in the early hours of 29th July, and almost immediately all the members of the crew were handed over on the immediate orders of the Sea Commander Bergen, to Obersturmbannführer of the SD Hans Wilhelm Blomberg, who was at that time Kommandeur of the Sicherheitspolizei at Bergen. This followed a meeting between Blomberg and Admiral Von Schrader, at which a copy of the Führer Order of 18 October 1942 was shown to Blomberg. This order dealt with the classes of persons who were to be excluded from the protection of the Geneva Convention and were not to be treated as prisoners of war, but when captured were to be handed over to the SD. Admiral Von Schrader told Blomberg that the crew of this torpedo boat were to be handed over, in accordance with the Führer Order, to the SD.

“9. The SD then conducted their own interrogation. . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: You can summarize the rest, can’t you?

COL. PHILLIMORE: If Your Lordship pleases.

My Lord, Paragraph 9 described the interrogation by officials of the SD, and that these officials took the same views as the naval intelligence officers, that the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war; that despite this they were taken out and shot by an execution squad composed of members of the SD. Then there is a description of the disposal of the bodies.

My Lord, the last paragraph is perhaps important in connection with the case against the Defendant Keitel.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, read it.

COL. PHILLIMORE: “11. It appeared from the evidence that in March or April, 1945, an order from the Führer headquarters, signed by Keitel, was transmitted to the German authorities in Norway. The substance of the order was that members of the crew of Commando raids who fell into German captivity were from that date to be treated as ordinary prisoners of war. This order referred specifically to the Führer Order referred to above.”

The member of the Tribunal will of course have noted the date; it was time to put their affairs in order.

My Lord, the next document, C-158, I put in as Exhibit GB-209. It consists of two extracts from minutes of conferences on the 19th and 20th of February 1945, conferences between the Defendant Dönitz and Hitler. If I might read the first and last sentence from the first paragraph of the first extract:

“The Führer is considering whether or not Germany should renounce the Geneva Convention.”

That is of course the 1929 prisoners-of-war convention. And the last sentence:

“The Führer orders the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to consider the pros and cons of this step and to state his opinion as soon as possible.”

Then the second extract—the Defendant Dönitz states his opinion in the presence of the Defendant Jodl and the representative of the Defendant Ribbentrop. It is the last two sentences on which I rely:

“. . . On the contrary, the disadvantages”—that is, the disadvantages of renouncing the convention—“outweigh the advantages. Even from a general standpoint it appears to the Commander-in-Chief that this measure would bring no advantage. It would be better to carry out the measures considered necessary without warning, and at all costs to save face with the outer world.”

My Lord, it is no small matter, that document, when one reflects that it was to that convention that we owe the fact that upwards of 165,000 British and 65,000 to 70,000 American prisoners of war were duly recovered at the end of the war. And to advocate breaching that convention, preferably without saying so, is not a matter to be treated lightly.

My Lord, the next document, C-171; I put in as Exhibit GB-210. It is another extract from the minutes of a meeting between the Defendant Dönitz and Hitler, on the 1st of July 1944. The extract is signed by the defendant:

“Regarding the general strike in Copenhagen, the Führer says that the only weapon to deal with terror is terror. Court-martial proceedings create martyrs. History shows that the names of such men are on everybody’s lips, whereas there is silence with regard to the many thousands who have lost their lives in similar circumstances without court-martial proceedings.”

My Lord, the next document, C-195, I put in as Exhibit GB-211. It is a memorandum signed by the defendant, dated late in 1944. There is no specific date on the document, but it is late in 1944—in December, I think, of 1944. The distribution on the third page includes Hitler, Keitel, Jodl, Speer, and the Supreme Command of the Air Force.

My Lord, if I might read the second paragraph. He is dealing with the review of German shipping losses:

“Furthermore, I propose reinforcing the shipyard working parties by prisoners from the concentration camps, and as a special measure for relieving the present shortage of coppersmiths, especially in U-boat construction, I propose to divert coppersmiths from the reduced construction of locomotives to shipbuilding.”

Then he goes on to deal with sabotage, and the last two paragraphs on that page are:

“Since, elsewhere, measures for exacting atonement taken against whole working parties amongst whom sabotage occurred, have proved successful, and, for example, the shipyard sabotage in France was completely suppressed, possibly similar measures for the Scandinavian countries will come under consideration.”

THE PRESIDENT: Do you need to read any more than that?

COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, no. The last sentence of the document in the next page is Item 2 of the summing-up:

“12,000 concentration camp prisoners will be employed in the shipyards as additional labor (Security Service agrees to this)”—that is the SD.

My Lord, this man was one of the rulers of Germany, and in my submission, that document alone is sufficient to condemn him. It was not for nothing that at these meetings Himmler and his lieutenants, Fegelein and Kaltenbrunner, were present.

My Lord, they were not there to discuss U-boats or the use of battleships. It is clear, in my submission, from this document that this defendant knew all about concentration camps and concentration camp labor, and as one of the rulers of Germany he must bear his full share of that responsibility.

My Lord, I pass to the last document, D-650, which I put in as Exhibit GB-212.

My Lord, this contains the orders issued by the defendant in April. The document, in my submission, shows the defendant’s fanatical adherence to the Nazi creed, and his preparedness even at that stage to continue a hopeless war at the expense of human life and with the certainty of increased destruction and misery to the men, women, and children of his country. I read the last paragraph on the second page:

“I therefore demand of the commanding officers of the Navy: . . . that they clearly and unambiguously follow the path of military duty, whatever may happen. I demand of them that they stamp out ruthlessly all signs and tendencies among the men which endanger the following of this path.”

Then he refers to an order.

“I demand from senior commanders that they should take just as ruthless action against any commander who does not do his military duty. If a commander does not think he has the moral strength to occupy his position as a leader in this sense, he must report this immediately. He will then be used as a soldier in this fateful struggle in some position in which he is not burdened with any task as a leader.”

And then the last paragraph on that page, from a further order of 19th of April, he gives an example of the type of under-officer who should be promoted.

“An example: In a prison camp of the auxiliary cruiser _Cormoran_, in Australia, a petty officer acting as camp senior officer, had all communists who made themselves noticeable among the inmates of the camp systematically done away with in such a way that the guards did not notice this. This petty officer is sure of my full recognition for his decision and his execution. After his return, I shall promote him with all means, as he has shown that he is fitted to be a leader.”

My Lord, of course the point is not whether the facts were true or not, but the type of order that he was issuing. My Lord, if I might just sum up, the defendant was no plain sailor, playing the part of a service officer, loyally obedient to the orders of the government of the day; he was an extreme Nazi who did his utmost to indoctrinate the Navy and the German people with the Nazi creed. It is no coincidence that it was he who was chosen to succeed Hitler; not Göring, not Ribbentrop, not Goebbels, not Himmler. He played a big part in fashioning the U-boat fleet, one of the most deadly weapons of aggressive war. He helped to plan and execute aggressive war, and we cannot doubt that he knew well that these wars were in deliberate violation of treaties. He was ready to stoop to any ruse where he thought he would not be found out: Breaches of the Geneva Convention or of neutrality, where he might hope to maintain that sinking was due to a mine. He was ready to order, and did order, the murder of helpless survivors of sunken ships, an action only paralleled by that of his Japanese ally.

My Lord, there can be few countries where widows or parents do not mourn for men of the merchant navies whose destruction was due to the callous brutality with which, at the orders of this man, the German U-boats did their work.

My Lord, my learned friend, Major Elwyn Jones, now deals with the Defendant Raeder.

MAJOR F. ELWYN JONES (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal, it is my duty to present to the Tribunal the evidence against the creator of the Nazi Navy, the Defendant Raeder. The allegations against him are set out in Appendix A of the Indictment at Pages 33 and 34 (Volume I, Page 78), and the Tribunal will see that the Defendant Raeder is charged with promoting and participating in the planning of the Nazi wars of aggression; with executing those plans; and with authorizing, directing, and participating in Nazi War Crimes, particularly war crimes arising out of sea warfare.

At the outset the Tribunal may find it convenient to look at Document 2888-PS, which is already before the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USA-13, which the Tribunal will find at Page 96 of the document book. That is a document which sets out the offices and positions held by the Defendant Raeder. The Tribunal will see that he was born in 1876 and joined the German Navy in 1894. By 1918 he had become commander of the cruiser _Köln_. In 1928 he became an admiral, chief of naval command, and head of the German Navy. In 1935 he became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. In 1936, on Hitler’s 47th birthday, he became general admiral, a creation of Hitler’s. In 1937 he received the high Nazi honor of the Golden Badge of Honor of the Nazi Party. In 1938 he became a member of the Secret Cabinet Council. And in 1939 he reached the empyrean of Grossadmiral, a rank created by Hitler, who presented Raeder with a marshal’s baton. In 1943 he became Admiral Inspector of the German Navy, which, as the Tribunal will shortly see, was a kind of retirement into oblivion, because from January 1943 on, as the Tribunal has heard, Dönitz was the effective commander of the German Navy.

In these eventful years of Raeder’s command of the German Navy from 1928 to 1943 he played a vital role. I would like in the first instance to draw the Tribunal’s attention to Raeder’s part in building up the German Navy as an instrument of war to implement the Nazis’ general plan of aggression.

The Tribunal is by now familiar with the steps by which the small navy permitted to Germany under the Treaty of Versailles was enormously expanded under the guidance of Raeder. I will do no more than to remind the Tribunal of some of the milestones upon Raeder’s road to Nazi mastery of the seas, which mercifully he was unable to attain.

With regard to the story of Germany’s secret rearmament in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, I would refer the Court to the Document C-156, which is already before the Court as Exhibit Number USA-41 and which the Tribunal will find at Page 26 of the document book. That document, as the Tribunal will remember, was _A History of the Fight of the German Navy against Versailles, 1919 to 1935_, which was published secretly by the German Admiralty in 1937. The Tribunal will remember that that history shows that before the Nazis came to power the German Admiralty was deceiving not only the governments of other countries, but its own legislature and at one stage its own Government. Their secret measures of rearmament ranged from experimental U-boat and S-boat building to the creation of secret intelligence and finance organizations. I only propose to trouble the Tribunal with a reference to the last paragraph at Page 33 of the document book, which refers to the role of Raeder in this development. It is an extract from Page 75 of this Document C-156, and it reads:

“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral . . . Raeder, had received hereby a far-reaching independence in the building and development of the Navy. This was only hampered insofar as the previous concealment of rearmament had to be continued in consideration of the Versailles Treaty.”

As an illustration of Raeder’s concealment of rearmament, I would remind the Tribunal of the Document C-141, Exhibit Number USA-47, which is at Page 22 of the document book. In that document Raeder states that:

“In view of Germany’s treaty obligations and the disarmament conference, steps must be taken to prevent the first S-boat half-flotilla—which in a few months will comprise new S-boats of the same type—from appearing openly as a formation of torpedo-carrying boats, as it was not intended to count these S-boats against the number of torpedo-carrying boats allowed us.”

The next document, C-135, which will be Exhibit Number GB-213, and which is at Page 20 of the document book, is of unusual interest because it suggests that even in 1930 the intention ultimately to attack Poland was already current in German military circles. This document is an extract from the history of war organization and of the scheme for mobilization. The German text of this document is headed “850/38,” which suggests that the document was written in the year 1938. The extracts read:

“Since under the Treaty of Versailles all preparations for mobilization were forbidden, these were at first confined to a very small body of collaborators and were at first only of a theoretical nature. Nevertheless, there existed at that time . . . an ‘Assembling Order,’ and ‘Instructions for Assembling,’ the forerunners of the present-day scheme for mobilization, also an assembling organization and adaptable instructions for assembling which were drawn up for each ‘A-year’ (cover-name for mobilization year).

“As stated, the ‘Assembling Organization’ at that time was to be judged purely theoretically, for they had no positive basis in the form of men and materials. They provided nevertheless a valuable foundation for the establishment of a war organization as our ultimate aim.”

Paragraph 2:

“The crises between Germany and Poland, which were becoming increasingly acute, compelled us, instead of making theoretical preparation for war, to prepare in a practical manner for a purely German-Polish conflict.

“The strategic idea of a rapid forcing of the Polish base of Gdynia was made a basis; and the fleet on active service was to be reinforced by the auxiliary forces which would be indispensable to attain this strategic end; and the essential coastal and flak batteries, especially those in Pillau and Swinemünde, were to be taken over. Thus in 1930 the Reinforcement Plan was evolved.”

If the Tribunal turns over the page to Paragraph 3, to the second paragraph:

“Hitler had made a clear political request to build up for him in 5 years, that is to say, by the 1st of April 1938, armed forces which he could place in the balance as an instrument of political power.”

Now that entry is a pointer to the fact that the Nazi seizure of power in 1933 was a signal to Raeder to go full speed ahead on rearmament. The detailed story of this development has already been told by my American colleague, Mr. Alderman; and I would simply refer the Court in the first place to the Document C-189, Exhibit Number USA-44, which is at Page 66 of the document book. In that document Raeder tells Hitler, in June 1934, that the German Fleet must be developed to oppose England and that therefore from 1936 on the big ships must be armed with big guns to match the British _King George_ class of battleship. It further, in the last paragraph, refers to Hitler’s demand that the construction of U-boats should be kept completely secret, especially in view of the Saar plebiscite. In November 1934 Raeder had a further talk with Hitler on the financing of naval rearmament, and on that occasion Hitler told him that in case of need he would get Doctor Ley to put 120 to 150 million from the Labor Front at the disposal of the Navy. The reference to that is the Document C-190, Exhibit Number USA-45, at Page 67 of the document book. The Tribunal may think that that proposed fraud upon the German working people was a characteristic Nazi manifestation.

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?

MAJOR JONES: If Your Lordship pleases.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

MAJOR JONES: May it please the Tribunal, the next document which I desire to draw to the Tribunal’s attention is the Document C-23, Exhibit Number USA-49, at Page 3 of the document book, which states that the true displacement of certain German battleships exceeded by 20 percent the displacement reported to the British. That, I submit, is typical of Raeder’s use of deceit.

The next document to which I wish to refer briefly is C-166, Exhibit Number USA-48, Page 36 of the document book. It is another such deceitful document, which orders that auxiliary cruisers, which were being secretly constructed, should be referred to as “transport ships.”

Then there is the Document C-29, Exhibit Number USA-46, at Page 8 of the document book, which is signed by Raeder and deals with the support given by the German Navy to the German armament industry, and, I submit, is an illustration of Raeder’s concern with the broader aspects of Nazi policy and of the close link between Nazi politicians, German service chiefs, and German armament manufacturers.

THE PRESIDENT: Has that been put in before?

MAJOR JONES: That has been put in before, My Lord, as Exhibit Number USA-46.

A final commentary on the post-1939 naval rearmament is the Document C-155, at Page 24 of the document book, which is a new document and will be Exhibit GB-214 and is a letter from Raeder to the German Navy, dated 11 June 1940. The original, which is now submitted to the Tribunal, shows the very wide distribution of this letter. There is provision in the distribution list for 467 copies. This letter of Raeder’s is a letter both of self-justification and of apology. The extracts read:

“The most outstanding of the numerous subjects of discussion in the Officers Corps are, for the time being, the torpedo positions and the problem whether the naval building program, up to autumn 1939, envisaged the possibility of the outbreak of war as early as 1939, or whether the emphasis ought not to have been laid, from the first, on the construction of U-boats. . . .

“If the opinion is voiced in the Officers Corps that the entire naval building program has been wrongly directed and if, from the first, the emphasis should have been on the U-boat weapon and after its consolidation on the large ships, I must emphasize the following matters:

“The building up of the fleet was directed according to the political demands, which were decided by the Führer. The Führer hoped, until the last moment, to be able to put off the threatening conflict with England until 1944-45. At that time the Navy would have had available a fleet with a powerful U-boat superiority and a much more favorable ratio as regards strength in all other types of ships, particularly those designed for warfare on the High Seas.

“The development of events forced the Navy, contrary to the expectation even of the Führer, into a war which it had to accept while still in the initial stage of its rearmament. The result is that those who represent the opinion that the emphasis should have been laid from the start on the building of the U-boat arm appear to be right. I leave undiscussed how far this development, quite apart from difficulties of personnel, training, and dockyards, could have been appreciably improved in any way in view of the political limits of the Anglo-German Naval Treaty. I leave also undiscussed, how the early and necessary creation of an effective air force slowed down the desirable development of the other branches of the forces. I indicate, however, with pride, the admirable and, in spite of the political restraints in the years of the Weimar Republic, far-reaching preparation for U-boat construction, which made the immensely rapid construction of the U-boat arm, both as regards equipment and personnel, possible immediately after the assumption of power. . . .”

There is here, the Tribunal sees, no trace of reluctance in co-operating with the Nazi program. On the contrary, the evidence points to the fact that Raeder welcomed and became one of the pillars of Nazi power. And it will now be my purpose to develop the relationship between Raeder, the Navy, and the Nazi Party.

The Prosecution’s submission is that Raeder, more than anyone else, was responsible for securing the unquestioned allegiance of the German Navy to the Nazi movement, an allegiance which Dönitz was to make even more firm and fanatical.

Raeder’s approval of Hitler was shown particularly clearly on the 2d of August 1934, the day of Hindenburg’s death, when he and all the men under him swore a new oath of loyalty with considerable ceremony, this time to Adolf Hitler and no longer to the fatherland. The oath is found in the Document D-481 at Page 101 of the document book. That will be Exhibit GB-215, and it may be of interest to the Court to see what the new oath was. The last paragraph reads:

“The service oath of the soldiers of the armed forces:

“‘I swear this holy oath by God that I will implicitly obey the Leader of the German Reich and people, Adolf Hitler, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and that, as a brave soldier, I will be willing to stake my life at any time for this oath.’”

The Tribunal will see that for his fatherland Raeder substituted a Führer.

I am not proposing to take the Tribunal’s time with reiterating the steps by which the German Navy was progressively drawn into the closest alliance with the Nazi Party. I would remind the Court of facts of history, like the incorporation of the swastika into the ensign under which the German Fleet sailed and the wearing of the swastika on the uniform of naval officers and men, which are facts which speak for themselves.

The Nazis for their part, were not ungrateful for Raeder’s obeisance and collaboration. His services in rebuilding the German Navy were widely recognized by Nazi propagandists and by the Nazi press. On his 66th birthday, the chief Party organ, the _Völkischer Beobachter_, published a special article about him, to which I desire to draw the Tribunal’s attention. It is at Page 100 of the document book; it is Document D-448, Exhibit GB-216. It is a valuable summing-up of Raeder’s contribution to Nazi development:

“It was to Raeder’s credit”—writes the _Völkischer Beobachter_—“to have already built up by that time a powerful striking force from the numerically small fleet, despite the fetters of Versailles.

“With the assumption of power, National Socialism began the most fruitful period in the reconstruction of the German fleet.

“The Führer openly expressed his recognition of Raeder’s faithful services and unstinted co-operation, by appointing him Grossadmiral on the 20th of April 1936.”

THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it necessary to read the entire document?

MAJOR JONES: I was going to turn to the last paragraph but one, My Lord, which I think is helpful.

“As a soldier and a seaman, the Grossadmiral has proved himself to be the Führer’s first and foremost naval collaborator.”

This, in my submission, is a summing-up of his status and position in Nazi Germany.

I now propose to deal with Raeder’s personal part in the Nazi conspiracy. The evidence indicates that Raeder, from the time of the Nazi seizure of power, became increasingly involved in responsibility for the general policies of the Nazi State.

Long before he was promoted to General-Admiral in 1936, he had become a member of the very secret Reich Defense Council, joining it when it was founded on the 4th of April 1933. And thus, at an early date, he was involved, both militarily and politically, in the Nazi conspiracy. The relevant document upon that is Document EC-177, Exhibit Number USA-390, at Page 68 of the document book, which I would remind the Tribunal contains the classic Nazi directive: “Matters communicated orally cannot be proven; they can be denied by us in Geneva.”

On the 4th of February 1938 Raeder was appointed to be a member of a newly-formed secret advisory council for foreign affairs; and the authority for that statement is Document 2031-PS at Page 88 of the document book, which will be Exhibit GB-217.

Three weeks after this a decree of Hitler’s stated that, as well as being equal in rank with a cabinet minister, Raeder was also to take part in the sessions of the Cabinet. That has already been established in Document 2098-PS, which was submitted as Exhibit GB-206.

In my submission, therefore, it is thus clear that Raeder’s responsibility for the political decisions of the Nazi State was steadily developed from 1933 to 1938 and that in the course of time he had become a member of all the main political advisory bodies. He was, indeed, very much a member of the inner councils of the conspirators and, I submit, must carry with them the responsibility for the acts that led to the German invasion of Poland in 1939 and the outbreak of war.

As an illustration, I would remind the Tribunal that Raeder was present at two of the key meetings at which Hitler openly declared his intention of attacking neighboring countries. I refer the Tribunal to Document 386-PS, which is Exhibit Number USA-25 and is found at Page 81 of the document book, which the Tribunal will remember is the record of Hitler’s conference at the Reich Chancellery on the 5th of November 1937 about matters which were said to be too important to discuss in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet. The document, which Mr. Alderman submitted, establishes conclusively that the Nazis premeditated their Crimes against Peace.

Then there was the other conference of Hitler’s on the 23rd of May 1939, the minutes of which are found in the Document L-79, Exhibit Number USA-27, at Page 74 of the document book. That, the Tribunal will remember, was the conference at which Hitler confirmed his intention to make a deliberate attack upon Poland at the first opportunity, well knowing that this must cause widespread war in Europe.

Now, those two were key conferences. At many, many others Raeder was also present to place his knowledge and his professional skill at the service of the Nazi war machine.

His active promotion of the military planning and preparation for the Polish campaign is by now well-known to the Tribunal, and I am not proposing to reiterate that evidence again. Once the war did start, however, the Defendant Raeder showed himself to be a master of the most typical of the conspirators’ techniques, namely that of deceit on a grand scale. There are few better examples of this allegation than that of his handling of the case of the _Athenia_.

The _Athenia_, as the Tribunal will be aware, was a passenger liner which was sunk in the evening of the 3rd of September 1939, when she was outward bound to America, about a hundred lives being lost.

On the 23rd of October 1939 the Nazi Party paper, the _Völkischer Beobachter_, published in screaming headlines the story, “Churchill Sank the _Athenia_.” I would refer the Court to Document 3260-PS, at Page 97 of the document book, which will be Exhibit GB-218. And I would like the Tribunal to look for a moment at the copy of the _Völkischer Beobachter_ here, and see the scale with which this deliberate lie was perpetrated. I have a photostat of the relevant page of the _Völkischer Beobachter_ for that day. That is the third page and the Tribunal will see on this front page, with the big red underlining, there are the words, “Now We Indict Churchill.”

The extract from the _Völkischer Beobachter_, which is at Page 97 of the document book, reads as follows:

“Churchill Sank the _Athenia_. The above picture”—and the Tribunal will see it is a fine picture of this fine ship—“shows the proud _Athenia_, the ocean giant, which was sunk by Churchill’s crime. One can clearly see the big radio equipment on board the ship. But nowhere was an SOS heard from the ship. Why was the _Athenia_ silent? Because her captain was not allowed to tell the world anything. He very prudently refrained from telling the world that Winston Churchill attempted to sink the ship through the explosion of a time bomb. He knew it well, but he had to keep silent. Nearly 1,500 people would have lost their lives if Churchill’s original plan had resulted as the criminal wanted. Yes, he longingly hoped that the 100 Americans on board the ship would find death in the waves so that the anger of the American people, who were deceived by him, should be directed against Germany, as the presumed author of the deed. It was fortunate that the majority escaped the fate intended for them by Churchill. Our picture on the right shows two wounded passengers. They were rescued by the freighter _City of Flint_, and as can be seen here, turned over to the American coast guard boat _Gibb_ for further medical treatment. They are an unspoken accusation against the criminal Churchill. Both they and the shades of those who lost their lives call him before the tribunal of the world and ask the British people, ‘How long will the office, one of the richest in tradition known to Great Britain’s history, be held by a murderer?’”

Now, in view of the maliciousness of this _Völkischer Beobachter_ announcement and in fairness to the men of the British Merchant Navy, I think it is proper that I should say, that contrary to the allegation in this Nazi sheet, the _Athenia_ of course made repeated wireless distress signals which were in fact intercepted and answered by His Majesty’s ship _Electra_, in escort, as well as by the Norwegian steamship _Knut Nelson_ and the yacht _Southern Cross_.

I shall submit evidence to the Tribunal to establish that, in fact, the _Athenia_ was sunk by the German U-boat _U-30_. So unjustifiable was the torpedoing of the _Athenia_, however, that the German Navy embarked upon a course of falsification of their records and on other dishonest measures, in the hope of hiding this guilty secret. And for their part, as the Tribunal has seen, the Nazi propagandists indulged in their favorite falsehood of seeking to shift the responsibility to the British.

The captain of the _U-30_, Oberleutnant Lemp, was later killed in action; but some of the original crew of the _U-30_ have survived to tell the tale, and they are now prisoners of war. And so that the truth of this episode may be placed beyond a peradventure, I submit to the Tribunal an affidavit by a member of the crew of the _U-30_, as to the sinking of the _Athenia_ and as to one aspect of the attempt to conceal the true facts.

I refer to Document C-654, Exhibit GB-219, at Page 106 of the document book. The affidavit reads:

“I, Adolf Schmidt, Official Number N 1043-33T, of the German Navy and former member of the crew of the _U-30_, do solemnly declare that:

“1. I am now confined to Camp No. 133, Lethbridge, Alberta.

“2. That on the first day of war, 3 September 1939, a ship of approximately 10,000 tons was torpedoed in the late hours of the evening by the _U-30_.

“3. That after the ship was torpedoed and we surfaced again, approximately half an hour after the explosion, the commandant called me to the tower in order to show me the torpedoed ship.

“4. That I have seen the ship with my very eyes, but that I do not think that the ship could see our U-boat at that time on account of the position of the moon.

“5. That only a few members of the crew had an opportunity to go to the tower in order to see the torpedoed ship.

“6. That apart from myself, Oberleutnant Hinsch was in the tower when I saw the steamer after the attack.

“7. That I observed that the ship was listing.

“8. That no warning shot was fired before the torpedo was launched.

“9. That I myself observed much commotion on board the torpedoed ship.

“10. That I believe that the ship had only one smoke stack.

“11. That in the attack on this steamer one or two torpedoes were fired which did not explode but that I myself heard the explosion of the torpedo which hit the steamer.

“12. That Oberleutnant Lemp waited until darkness before surfacing.

“13. That I was severely wounded by aircraft 14 September 1939.

“14. That Oberleutnant Lemp, shortly before my disembarkation in Reykjavik 19 September 1939, visited me in the forenoon in the petty officers’ quarters where I was lying severely wounded.

“15. That Oberleutnant Lemp then had the petty officers’ quarters cleared in order to be alone with me.

“16. That Oberleutnant Lemp then showed me a declaration under oath according to which I had to bind myself to mention nothing concerning the incidents of 3 September 1939 on board the _U-30_.

“17. That this declaration under oath had approximately the following wording:

“‘I, the undersigned, swear hereby that I shall shroud in secrecy all happenings of 3 September 1939 on board the _U-30_, regardless whether foe or friend, and that I shall erase from my memory all happenings of this day.’

“18. That I have signed this declaration under oath, which was drawn up by the commandant in his own handwriting, with my left hand very illegibly.

“19. That later on in Iceland when I heard about the sinking of the _Athenia_ the idea came into my mind that the _U-30_ on the 3 September 1939 might have sunk the _Athenia_, especially since the captain caused me to sign the above-mentioned declaration.

“20. That up to today I have never spoken to anyone concerning these events.

“21. That due to the termination of the war I consider myself freed from my oath.”

Dönitz’ part in the _Athenia_ episode is described in an affidavit which he has sworn, which is Document D-638, Exhibit GB-220, at Page 102 of the document book. The affidavit was sworn in English, and I invite the Tribunal to look at it and observe the addition in Dönitz’ handwriting of four words at the end of the affidavit, the significance of which will be seen in a moment.

The Defendant Dönitz states:

“_U-30_ returned to harbor about mid-September. I met the captain, Oberleutnant Lemp, on the lockside at Wilhelmshaven, as the boat was entering harbor, and he asked permission to speak to me in private. I noticed immediately that he was looking very unhappy and he told me at once that he thought he was responsible for the sinking of the _Athenia_ in the North Channel area. In accordance with my previous instructions he had been keeping a sharp lookout for possible armed merchant cruisers in the approaches to the British Isles, and had torpedoed a ship he afterwards identified as the _Athenia_ from wireless broadcasts, under the impression that she was an armed merchant cruiser on patrol. I had never specified in my instructions any particular type of ship as armed merchant cruiser nor mentioned any names of ships. I dispatched Lemp at once by air to report to the SKL at Berlin; in the meantime, I ordered complete secrecy as a provisional measure. Later in the same day or early on the following day, I received a verbal order from Kapitän zur See Fricke”—who was head of the operations division of the naval war staff—“that:

“Firstly, the affair was to be kept a total secret.

“Secondly, the OKM considered that a court-martial was not necessary as they were satisfied that the captain had acted in good faith.

“Thirdly, political explanations would be handled by the OKM.

“I had had no part whatsoever in the political events in which the Führer claimed that no U-boat had sunk the _Athenia_.

“After Lemp returned to Wilhelmshaven from Berlin, I interrogated him thoroughly on the sinking and formed the impression that, although he had taken reasonable care, he had still not taken sufficient precaution to establish fully the identity of the ship before attacking. I had previously given very strict orders that all merchant vessels and neutrals were to be treated according to naval prize law before the occurrence of this incident. I accordingly placed him under cabin arrest, as I felt certain that a court-martial would only acquit him and would entail unnecessary publicity”—and then Dönitz had added the words “and loss of time.”

It is right, I think, that I should add the Dönitz’ suggestion that the captain of the _U-30_ sank the _Athenia_ in mistake for a merchant cruiser must be considered in the light of a document which Colonel Phillimore submitted—the Document C-191, Exhibit GB-193, dated the 22 of September 1939—in this period, which contained Dönitz’ order that “the sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in the War Diary as due to possible confusion with a warship or an auxiliary cruiser.”

Now, the _U-30_ returned to Wilhelmshaven on 27 September 1939. I submit another fraudulent naval document, Document D-659, Page 110 of the document book, which will be Exhibit GB-221, which is an extract from the War Diary of the chief of U-boats, and it is an extract for the 27th of September 1939. The Tribunal will see that it reads:

“_U-30_ comes in. She had sunk: S. S. _Blairlogies_; S. S. _Fanad Head_.”

There is no reference at all, of course, to the sinking of the _Athenia_.

But perhaps the most elaborate forgery in connection with this episode was the forgery of the log book of the _U-30_, which was responsible for sinking the _Athenia_; and I now submit that original log book to the Tribunal as Document D-662, which will be Exhibit GB-222, and an extract from the first and relevant page of it is found at Page 111 of the document book. I would like the Tribunal to examine the original, if you will be good enough to do so, because the Prosecution’s submission is that the first page of that log book is a forgery, but a forgery which shows a curiously un-German carelessness about detail. The Tribunal will see that the first page of the text is a clear substitute for pages that have been removed. The dates in the first column of that page are in Arabic numerals. On the second and more authentic looking page, and throughout the other pages of the log book, they are in Roman numerals.

The Tribunal will also see that all reference to the action of the sinking of the _Athenia_ on the 3rd of September is omitted. The entries are translated on Page 111 of the document book for the Court’s assistance.

The log book shows that the position at 1400 hours, of the _U-30_ on the 3rd of September, is given as AL 0278, which the Tribunal will notice is one of the very few positions quoted at all upon that page, and which was, in fact, some 200 miles west of the position where the _Athenia_ was sunk. The course due south, which is recorded in the log book, and the speed of 10 knots—those entries are obviously designed to suggest that the _U-30_ was well clear of the _Athenia’s_ position on the 3rd of September.

Finally, and most curiously, the Tribunal will observe that Lemp’s own signature upon the page dealing with the 3rd of September differs from the other signatures in the text. Page 1 shows Lemp’s signature with a Roman “p” as the final letter of his name. On the other signatures, there is a script “p,” and the inference I submit is that either the signature is a forgery or it was made up by Lemp at some other, and probably considerably later date.

Now, in my submission, the whole of this _Athenia_ story establishes that the German Navy under Raeder embarked upon deliberate fraud. Even before receiving Lemp’s reports, the German Admiralty had repeatedly denied the possibility that a German U-boat could be in the area concerned. The charts which showed the disposition of U-boats and the position of sinking of the _Athenia_, which Colonel Phillimore introduced, have shown the utter dishonesty of these announcements; and my submission upon this matter is this: Raeder, as head of the German Navy, knew all the facts. Censorship and information control in Nazi Germany were so complete that Raeder, as head of the Navy, must have been party to the falsification published in the _Völkischer Beobachter_, which was a wholly dishonorable attempt by the Nazi conspirators to save their faces with their own people and to uphold the myth of an infallible Führer backed by an impeccable war machine.

The Tribunal has seen that truth mattered little in Nazi propaganda, and it would appear that Raeder’s camouflage was not confined to painting his ships or sailing them under the British flag, as he did in attacking Norway and Denmark. With regard to that last matter—the invasion of Norway and Denmark—I think it is hardly necessary that I should remind the Tribunal of Raeder’s leading part in that perfidious Nazi assault, the evidence as to which has already been presented. I think I need only add Raeder’s proud comment upon those brutal invasions, which is contained in his letter in Document C-155 at Page 25 of the document book, which is already before the Tribunal as Exhibit GB-214. That document, which is a letter of Raeder’s to the Navy, part of which I have already read, states: “The operations of the Navy in the occupation of Norway will for all time remain the grand contribution of the Navy to this war.”

Now, with the occupation of Norway and of much of Western Europe safely completed, the Tribunal has seen that Hitler turned his eyes towards Russia. Now, in fairness to Raeder, it is right that I should say that Raeder himself was against the attack on Russia and tried his best to dissuade Hitler from embarking upon it. The documents show, however, that Raeder approached the problem with complete cynicism. He did not object to the aggressive war on Russia because of its illegality, its immorality, its inhumanity. His only objection to it was its untimeliness. He wanted to finish England first before going further afield.

The story of Raeder’s part in the deliberations upon the war against Russia is told in the Document C-170, at Page 37 of the document book, which has already been submitted as Exhibit Number USA-136. That document consists of extracts from a German compilation of official naval notes by the German naval war staff.

The first entry, at Page 47 of the document book, which bore the date of 26 September 1940, which is at Page 11 of Document C-170, showed that Raeder was advocating to Hitler an aggressive Mediterranean policy in which, of course, the Navy would play a paramount role, as opposed to a continental land policy. The entry reads:

“Naval Supreme Commander with the Führer. Naval Supreme Commander presents his opinion about the situation: The Suez Canal must be captured with German assistance. From Suez, advance through Palestine and Syria; then Turkey in our power. The Russian problem will then assume a different appearance. Russia is fundamentally frightened of Germany. It is questionable whether action against Russia from the north will then be still necessary.”

The next entry at Page 48 of the document book, for the 14th of November:

“Naval Supreme Commander with the Führer. Führer is ‘still inclined’ to instigate the conflict with Russia. Naval Supreme Commander recommends putting it off until the time after the victory over England, since there is heavy strain on German forces and the end of warfare is not in sight.”

Then there is the entry on Page 50 for 27 December 1940:

“Naval Supreme Commander with the Führer. Naval Supreme Commander emphasizes again that strict concentration of our entire war effort against England as our main enemy is the most urgent need of the hour. On the one hand, England has gained strength by the unfortunate Italian conduct of the war in the eastern Mediterranean and by the increasing American support. On the other hand, however, she can be hit mortally by a strangulation of her ocean traffic which is already taking effect. What is being done for submarine and naval air force construction is much too little. Our entire war potential must work for the conduct of the war against England; thus for the Navy and Air Force, every dispersion of strength prolongs the war and endangers the final success. Naval Supreme Commander voices serious objections against Russia campaign before the defeat of England.”

At Page 52 of the document book, on the 18th of February 1941, there is the entry:

“Chief of Naval Operations (SKL) insists on the occupation of Malta even before Barbarossa.”

On the next page, on the 23rd of February, there is this interesting entry:

“Instruction from Supreme Command, Armed Forces (OKW) that seizure of Malta ‘is contemplated for the fall of 1941 after the execution of Barbarossa’”—which the Tribunal may think is a sublime example of wishful thinking.

The next entry, for the 19th of March 1941, which is at Page 54 of the document book, shows that by March of 1941 Raeder had begun to consider what prospects of naval action the Russian aggression had to offer. There is the entry:

“In case of Barbarossa, Supreme Naval Commander describes the occupation of Murmansk as an urgent request of the Navy; Chief of Supreme Command Armed Forces considers compliance very difficult. . . .”

In the meantime, the entries in this document show that Mussolini, the flunky of Nazism, was crying out for a more active Nazi Mediterranean policy. I refer the Court to Page 57 of the document book, the entry for the 30th of May. The word “Duce” is omitted from the first line, and the entry should read:

“Duce demands urgently decisive offensive Egypt-Suez for fall 1941; 12 divisions needed for that. ‘This stroke would be more deadly to the British Empire than the capture of London’; Chief, Naval Operations, agrees completely. . . .”

And then, finally, the entry for the 6th of June, indicating strategic views of Raeder and the German Navy at this stage, reads as follows. It is at Page 58 of the document book:

“Supreme Naval Commander with the Führer. Memorandum of the Chief, Naval Operations: ‘Observation of the strategic situation in the eastern Mediterranean after the Balkan campaign and the occupation of Crete and further conduct of the war.’”

A few sentences below:

“The memorandum points with impressive clarity to the decisive aims of the war in the Near East. Their advancement has moved into grasping distance by the successes in the Aegean area and the memorandum emphasizes that the offensive utilization of the present favorable situation must take place with the greatest acceleration and energy, before England has again strengthened her position in the Near East with help from the United States of America. The memorandum realizes the unalterable fact that the campaign against Russia would be opened very shortly; but demands, however, that the undertaking Barbarossa ‘which, because of the magnitude of its aims, naturally stands in the foreground of the operational plans of the armed forces leadership,’ must under no circumstances ‘lead to an abandonment, diminishing, or delay of the conduct of the war in the eastern Mediterranean.’”

So that Raeder was, throughout, seeking an active role for his Navy in the Nazi war plans.

Now, once Hitler had decided to attack Russia, Raeder sought a role for his Navy in the campaign against Russia; and the first naval operational plan against Russia was a particularly perfidious one. I refer the Tribunal to the Document C-170 which I have just been reading from, at Page 59 of the document book. There the Tribunal will see an entry for the 15th of June 1941:

“On the proposal of Chief Naval Operations . . . use of arms against Russian submarines south of the northern boundary of the Öland warning area is permitted immediately; ruthless destruction is to be aimed at.”

The Defendant Keitel provided a characteristically dishonest pretext for this action in his letter, the Document C-38, which is at Page 11 of the document book and which will be Exhibit GB-223. The Tribunal sees that Keitel’s letter is dated the 15th of June 1941:

“Subject: Offensive action against enemy submarines in the Baltic Sea.

“To: High Command of the Navy—OKM (SKL).

“Offensive action against submarines south of the line Memel-southern tip of Öland is authorized if the boats cannot be definitely identified as Swedish during the approach by German naval forces.

“The reason to be given up to B-day is that our naval forces believed to be dealing with penetrating British submarines.”

Now, that was on the 15th of June 1941, and the Tribunal will remember that the Nazi attack on Russia did not take place until the 22d of June of 1941. In the meantime Raeder was urging Hitler, as early as the 18th of March 1941, to enlarge the scope of the world war by inducing Japan to seize Singapore. The relevant document is C-152, Exhibit GB-122, at Page 23 of the document book. There is just one paragraph which I would like to be permitted to read. The document describes the audience of Raeder with Hitler on the 18th of March and the entries in it, in fact, represent Raeder’s own views:

“Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, since the opportunity will never again be as favorable (whole English fleet contained; unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war against Japan; inferiority of U.S. fleet _vis-à-vis_ the Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she will carry it out only if Germany proceeds to land in England. Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).

“Japan wishes, if possible, to avoid war against the U.S.A. She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible.”

The Japanese, of course, as events proved, had different ideas from that.

By the 20th of April 1941, the evidence is that Hitler had agreed with this proposition of Raeder’s of inducing the Japanese to take offensive action against Singapore. I refer the Tribunal again to the Document C-170 and to an entry at Page 56 of the document book, for the 20th of April 1941. A few sentences from that read:

“Naval Supreme Commander with Führer. Navy Supreme Commander asks about result of Matsuoka’s visit and evaluation of Japanese-Russian pact. . . . Führer has informed Matsuoka ‘that Russia will not be touched if she behaves in a friendly manner according to the treaty. Otherwise, he reserves action for himself.’ Japan-Russia pact has been concluded in agreement with Germany and is to prevent Japan from advancing against Vladivostok and to cause her to attack Singapore.”

Now an interesting commentary upon this document is found in the Document C-66, at Page 13 of the document book. The Document C-66 has already been exhibited as GB-81. I would refer the Court to Paragraph 3 at Page 13 of the document book. At that time the Führer was firmly resolved on a surprise attack on Russia, regardless of what was the Russian attitude to Germany. This, according to reports coming in, was frequently changing; and there follows this interesting sentence: “The communication to Matsuoka was designed entirely as a camouflage measure and to ensure surprise.”

The Axis partners were not even honest with each other, and this, I submit, is typical of the kind of jungle diplomacy with which Raeder associated himself.

I now, with the Tribunal’s permission, turn from the field of diplomacy to the final aspect of the case against Raeder, namely, to crimes at sea.

The Prosecution’s submission is that Raeder throughout his career showed a complete disregard for any international rule or usage of war which conflicted in the slightest with his intention of carrying through the Nazi program of conquest. I propose to submit to the Tribunal only a few examples of Raeder’s flouting of the laws and customs of civilized states.

Raeder has himself summarized his attitude in the most admirable fashion in the Document UK-65, which the Tribunal will find at Page 98 of the document book, and which will be Exhibit GB-224. Now that Document UK-65 is a very long memorandum compiled by Raeder and the German naval war staff on the 15th of October 1939—that is to say, only a few weeks after the war started. And it is a memorandum on the subject of the intensification of the war at sea, and I desire to draw the Tribunal’s attention to the bottom paragraph at Page 98 of the document book. It is headed, “Possibilities of Future Naval Warfare”:

“I. Military requirements for the decisive struggle against Great Britain:

“Our naval strategy will have to employ all the military means at our disposal as expeditiously as possible. Military success can be most confidently expected if we attack British sea communications wherever they are accessible to us, with the greatest ruthlessness; the final aim of such attacks is to cut off all imports into and exports from Britain. We should try to consider the interests of neutrals in so far as this is possible without detriment to military requirements. It is desirable to base all military measures taken on existing international law; however, measures which are considered necessary from a military point of view, provided a decisive success can be expected from them, will have to be carried out, even if they are not covered by existing international law. In principle, therefore, any means of warfare which is effective in breaking enemy resistance should be based on some legal conception”—the nature of which is not specified—“even if that entails the creation of a new code of naval warfare.

“The supreme war council . . . will have to decide what measures of military and legal nature are to be taken. Once it has been decided to conduct economic warfare in its most ruthless form, in fulfillment of military requirements, this decision is to be adhered to under all circumstances. Under no circumstances may such a decision for the most ruthless form of economic warfare, once it has been made, be dropped or released under political pressure from neutral powers; that is what happened in the World War to our own detriment. Every protest by neutral powers must be turned down. Even threats of further countries, particularly of the United States, coming into the war, which can be expected with certainty should the war last a long time, must not lead to a relaxation in the form of economic warfare once embarked upon. The more ruthlessly economic warfare is waged, the earlier will it show results and the sooner will the war come to an end. The economic effect of such military measures on our own war economy must be fully recognized and compensated through immediate reorientation of German war economy and the re-drafting of the respective agreements with neutral states; for”—these are the final words—“for this, strong political and economic pressure must be employed if necessary.”

I submit that those comments are most revealing; and the general submission of the Prosecution is that as an active member of the inner council of the Nazi State right up to 1943, Raeder, holding such ideas as these, must share responsibility for the many War Crimes committed by his confederates and their underlings in the course of the war.

But quite apart from this over-all responsibility of Raeder, there are certain crimes which the Prosecution submits were essentially initiated and passed down the naval chain of command by Raeder himself.

I refer to the Document C-27, at Page 7 of the document book, which will be Exhibit GB-225. Those are minutes of a meeting between Hitler and Raeder on the 30th of December 1939. I will read with the Court’s approval the second paragraph beginning:

“The Chief of the Naval Operations Staff requests that full power be given to the Naval Operations Staff in making any intensification suited to the situation and to the means of war. The Führer agrees in principle to the sinking without warning of Greek ships in the American prohibited area and of neutral ships in those sections of the American prohibited area in which the fiction of mine danger can be upheld, e.g., the Bristol Channel.”

At this time, of course, as the Tribunal knows, Greek ships were also neutral and I submit that this is yet another demonstration of the fact that Raeder was a man without principle.

This incitement to crime was, in my submission, a typical group effort, because in the Document C-12, which is at Page 1 of the document book, the Tribunal will see that a directive to the effect of those naval views was issued on the 30th of December 1939 by the OKW, being signed by the Defendant Jodl. And that Document C-12 will be Exhibit GB-226. It is an interesting document. It is dated the 30th of December 1939, and it reads:

“On the 30th of December 1939, according to a report of the Supreme Commander of the Navy, the Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces decided that:

“1) Greek merchant ships in the area declared by England and the U.S.A. to be a barred zone are to be treated as enemy vessels.

“2) In the Bristol Channel all shipping may be attacked without warning—where the impression of a mining incident can be created.

“Both measures are authorized to come into effect immediately.”

Another example of the callous attitude of the German Navy, when it was under Raeder’s command, towards neutral shipping, is found in an entry in Jodl’s diary. . .

THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps you should read the pencil note, oughtn’t you?

MAJOR JONES: The pencil note on the Document C-12 reads:

“Add to 1): Attack must be carried out without being seen. The denial of the sinking of these steamships, in case the expected protests are made, must be possible.”

As I was saying, My Lord, another example of the callous attitude of Raeder’s Navy towards neutral shipping is found in an entry in Jodl’s diary for the 16th of June 1942, at Page 112 of the document book, which is Document 1807-PS, and will be Exhibit GB-227. This extract from Jodl’s Diary is dated the 16th of June 1942 and it reads:

“The Operational Staff of the Navy (SKL) applied on the 29th May for permission to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. The SKL considers that a sudden blow against the Brazilian warships and merchant ships is expedient at this juncture because defense measures are still incomplete, because there is the possibility of achieving surprise, and because Brazil is actually fighting Germany at sea.”

This, the Tribunal will see, was a plan for a kind of Brazilian “Pearl Harbor” because the Tribunal will recollect that war did not in effect break out between Germany and Brazil until the 22d of August 1942.

Raeder himself also caused the Navy to participate in War Crimes ordered by other conspirators, and I shall give one example only of that.

On the 28th of October 1942, as the Document C-179, Exhibit USA-543, at Page 63 of the document book shows, the head of the operations division of the naval war staff promulgated to naval commands Hitler’s notorious order of the 18th of October 1942 with regard to the shooting of Commandos which in my submission amounted to denying the protection of the Geneva Convention to captured Commandos.

The Tribunal will remember the document is dated the 28th of October 1942, and it reads:

“Enclosed please find a Führer order regarding annihilation of terror and sabotage units.

“This order must not be distributed in writing to officers below the rank of a flotilla leader or a section commander. After verbal notification to subordinate sections such officers must hand this order over to the next higher section which is responsible for its withdrawal and destruction.”

What clearer indication could there be than the nature of these instructions as to the naval command’s appreciation of the wrongfulness of the murders Hitler ordered?

THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now for 10 minutes?

[_A recess was taken._]

MAJOR JONES: I have drawn the Tribunal’s attention to the circulation of Hitler’s order to shoot Commandos. I now draw the Tribunal’s attention to an example of the execution of that order by the German Navy during the period when Raeder was its commander.

My learned friend Mr. Roberts has already given the Tribunal an account of a Commando operation of December 1942, which had as its objective an attack on shipping in Bordeaux harbor. The Tribunal will recollect that the Wehrmacht account he quoted, Document UK-57, Exhibit GB-164, stated that six of the 10 participants in that commando raid were arrested and that all were shot on the 23 March 1943. In connection with that episode the Prosecution has a further document throwing more light on this Bordeaux incident and showing how much more expeditiously the Navy under Raeder had implemented Hitler’s order on this particular occasion. I draw the Court’s attention to Document C-176, at Page 61 of the document book, Exhibit GB-228.

That document consists of extracts from the war diary of Admiral Bachmann, who was the German flag officer in charge of western France. The first entry, at Page 61, is dated 10 December 1942 and reads:

“About 1015. Telephone call from personal representative of the Commander of the SD in Paris, SS Obersturmführer Dr. Schmidt, to flag lieutenant, requesting postponement of the shooting, as interrogation had not been concluded. . . .

“After consultation with the Chief of Operations Staff, the SD had been directed to get approval direct from headquarters.

“1820. SD, Bordeaux, requested Superior SD Office at Führer’s headquarters to postpone the shooting for 3 days. Interrogations continued for the time being.”

The next day, 11 December 1942:

“Shooting of two English prisoners was carried out by a unit (strength 1/16 men) attached to the harbor command, Bordeaux, in the presence of an officer of the SD on order of the Führer.”

Then there is a note in green pencil in the margin opposite this entry which reads:

“SD should have done this. Phone flag officer in charge in future cases.”

The Tribunal will therefore see from this Document C-176, that the first two gallant men to be shot as a result of the Bordeaux operation were actually put to death by a naval firing party on the 11th of December 1942. They were Sergeant Wallace and Marine Ewart, who had the misfortune to be captured on the 8th of December in the preliminary stages of the operation.

Of interest is the comment of the naval war staff upon this shooting, which is found in Document D-658.

THE PRESIDENT: What do the last two lines in Document C-176 about the operation being “particularly favored” mean?

MAJOR JONES: “The operation was particularly favored by the weather conditions and the dark night”—that presumably, My Lord, is a reference to the operation of the marine Commandos in successfully blowing up a number of German ships in Bordeaux harbor. Alternately, I am advised by the naval officer who is assisting me, that it probably is a reference to the conditions prevailing at the time of the shooting of the two men.

THE PRESIDENT: I should have thought so.

MAJOR JONES: I stand corrected by the representative of the British Navy upon my interpretation of the matter.

THE PRESIDENT: Doesn’t it indicate that naval men had done it?

MAJOR JONES: The shooting was in fact, as the entry of 11 December shows, carried out by a naval party—by units belonging to the naval officer in charge of Bordeaux.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MAJOR JONES: I was seeking to draw the Tribunal’s attention to the comment of the naval war staff upon that shooting, which is in Document D-658, at Page 109, Exhibit GB-229. It reads:

“The Naval Commander, west France, reports that during the course of the day explosives with magnets to stick on, mapping material dealing with the mouth of the Gironde, aerial photographs of the port installations at Bordeaux, camouflage material, and food and water for several days were found. Attempts to salvage the canoe were unsuccessful. The Naval Commander west France has ordered that both soldiers be shot immediately for attempted sabotage, if their interrogation, which has begun, confirms what has so far been discovered; their execution has, however, been postponed in order to obtain more information.

“According to a Wehrmacht report, both soldiers have meanwhile been shot. The measure would be in accordance with the Führer’s special order but is nevertheless something new in international law, since the soldiers were in uniform.”

I submit that that last sentence shows very clearly that the Naval High Command under Raeder accepted allegiance to the Nazi conspiracy as of greater importance than any question of moral principle or of professional honor and integrity. This operation of the shooting of those two Commandos was, as I submit, not an act of war, but a murder of two gallant men; and it is upon this somber note that it is my duty to summarize this part of the Prosecution’s case against the Defendant Raeder.

The Prosecution’s submission is that he was not just a military puppet carrying out political orders. The Tribunal has seen that, before the Nazis came, he had worked actively to rebuild the German Navy behind the back of the Reichstag. When the Nazis seized power, he unreservedly joined forces with them. He was the prime mover in transferring the loyalty of the German Navy to the Nazi Party. He was as much a member of the inner councils of the Nazis as possibly any other defendant. And he was a member of their main political advisory bodies.

He was well aware of their aggressive designs and I submit he assisted in their realization not only as a military technician, but also as a mendacious politician. And he furthered, as I have submitted, their brutal methods of warfare. And yet of all these conspirators Raeder was one of the first to fall from his high position. It is in fact true that the extension of war beyond the boundaries of Poland came as a disappointment to him. His vision of a Nazi armada mastering the Atlantic reckoned without Ribbentrop’s diplomacy and Hitler’s ideas of strategy.

I would draw the Tribunal’s attention to Document C-161, at Page 35 of the document book, which is an extract, Exhibit GB-230, from a memorandum of Raeder, dated 10 January 1943, just before his retirement, entitled, “The Importance of German Surface Forces for Conducting the War by the Powers Signatory to the Three Power Pact.” The material entry reads:

“. . . it was planned by the leaders of the National Socialist Reich to give the German Navy by 1944-45 such a strength that it would be possible to strike at the British vital arteries in the Atlantic with sufficient ships, fighting power, and range.

“In 1939, the war having begun 5 years earlier, the construction of these forces was still in its initial stages. . . .”

The Tribunal will see from that document how completely Raeder was cheated in his ambitious plans by miscalculation as to when his high seas fleet would be required. The Tribunal has seen that Raeder made a great effort to recover some of his lost glory with his attack on an inoffensive Norway. He made many efforts to liven up the war at sea, both at the expense of neutrals and also of the customs and laws of the sea. But his further schemes, however, were disregarded by his fellow conspirators, and in January 1943, Raeder retired, and thereafter he was a leader in name only.

I invite the Court’s attention to the Document D-655, at Page 108 of the document book, Exhibit GB-231, which is a record in Raeder’s handwriting of his interview with Hitler on the 6th of January 1943, which led to Raeder’s retirement. I am only proposing to read the fifth paragraph, in which Raeder records:

“. . . if the Führer was anxious to demonstrate that the parting was of the friendliest character and wished that the name Raeder should continue to be associated with the Navy, particularly abroad, it would perhaps be possible to make an appointment to the Inspector General, giving appropriate publicity in the press, _et cetera_. But a new Commander-in-Chief of the Navy with full responsibility for this office must be appointed. The position of Inspector General, or whatever it was decided to call it, must be purely nominal.

“The Führer”—the record reads—“accepted this suggestion with alacrity. The Inspector General could perhaps carry out special tasks for him, make tours of inspection, _et cetera_. The name of Raeder was still to be associated with the Navy. After Commander-in-Chief of the Navy had repeated his request, the Führer definitely agreed to 30th January as his release date. He would like to think over the details.”

This was Raeder’s twilight, and indeed a very different occasion from the period of his ascendancy in 1939, when on the 12th of March Raeder spoke on the occasion of the German Heroes’ Day. I now refer the Court to the final document on Raeder, an account of that speech in March 1939, which is at Page 103 of the document book, in the Document D-653, Exhibit GB-232. The first paragraph reads:

“Throughout Germany celebrations took place on the occasion of Hero Commemoration Day. . . . These celebrations were combined for the first time with the celebration of the freedom to rearm. . . . The day’s chief event was the traditional ceremony held in the Berlin State Opera House in Unter den Linden.”

In the presence of Hitler and representatives of the Party and Armed Forces, General-Admiral Raeder made a speech, extracts from which are given below.

I turn to Page 2 of the record, Page 104 of the document book, to about the 15th line:

“National Socialism”—says Raeder—“which originates from the spirit of the German fighting soldier, has been chosen by the German people as its ideology. The German people follow the symbols of its regeneration with as much great love as fanatical passion. The German people has had practical experience of National Socialism and it has not been imposed, as so many helpless critics abroad believe. The Führer has shown his people that in the National Socialist solidarity of the people lies the great and invincible source of strength, whose dynamic power ensures not only peace at home but also enables us to release all the Nation’s creative powers.”

There follow eulogies of Hitler, and a few sentences below:

“This is the reason for the clear and unsparing summons to fight Bolshevism and international Jewry, the nation-destroying activities of which our own people have sufficiently suffered. Therefore, the alliance with all like-minded nations who, like Germany, are not willing to allow their strength, dedicated to construction and peaceful work at home, to be disrupted by alien ideologies and by parasites of a foreign race.”

Then a few sentences on:

“If later on we instruct in the technical handling of weapons, this task demands that the young soldier should also be taught National Socialist ideology and the problems of life. This part of the task, which becomes for us both a duty of honor and a demand which cannot be refused, can and will be carried out if we stand shoulder to shoulder and in sincere comradeship to the Party and its organizations. . . .”

The next sentence:

“The Armed Forces and the Party thus became more and more united in attitude and spirit.”

And then just two sentences on the next page:

“Germany is the protector of all Germans within and beyond our frontiers. The shots fired at Almeria are proof of that.”

That refers, of course, to the bombardment of the Spanish town of Almeria, carried out by a German naval squadron on the 31 May 1937 during the course of the Spanish Civil War.

There are further references to the Führer and his leadership, and then a final sentence of the first paragraph of Page 3:

“They all planted into a younger generation the great tradition of death for a holy cause, knowing that with their blood they will lead the way towards the freedom of their dreams.”

My submission is that that speech of Raeder’s is the final proof of his deep personal involvement in the Nazi conspiracy. There is the mixture of heroics and fatalism that led millions of Germans to slaughter. There are boasts of violence used on the people of Almeria. There is the lip service to peace by a man who planned conquest. “Armed Forces and the Party have become more and more united in attitude and spirit”—there is the authentic Nazi voice. There is the assertion of racialism. Finally, there is the anti-Semitic gesture, Raeder’s contribution to the outlook that produced Belsen. Imbued with these ideas he became an active participant on both the political and military level in the Nazi conspiracy to wage wars of aggression and to wage them ruthlessly.

MR. RALPH G. ALBRECHT (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): May it please the Tribunal, the United States will continue with the presentation, showing the individual responsibility of the Defendant Von Schirach. It will be made by Captain Sprecher.

CAPTAIN DREXEL A. SPRECHER (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United States): May it please the Tribunal, it is my responsibility to present the individual responsibility of the Defendant Schirach for Crimes against the Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity as they concern directly the Common Plan or Conspiracy.

The Prosecution contends that the Defendant Schirach is guilty of having exercised a leading part in the Nazi conspiracy from 1925 until the Nazi downfall.

The conspiratorial acts and the criminality of the Defendant Schirach may be grouped for purposes of convenience into three principal phases: (1) His early support of the conspirators over the period 1925-1929; (2) his leadership and direction of German youth over the period 1929-1945; (3) his leadership of the Reichsgau Vienna as chief representative of the Nazi Party and the Nazi State in Vienna for the period July 1940 to 1945. The presentation will take up each of these principal phases after a brief listing of all the principal positions which Schirach held.

In presenting first a listing of the positions held by Schirach, it is not intended immediately to describe the functions of each of these positions. Insofar as a description of the functions of any particular position is still felt necessary at this stage of the Trial, it will be given later during the discussion of Schirach’s conspiratorial acts as Nazi Youth Leader and as Nazi official in Vienna.

For the consideration of the Tribunal, we have submitted a brief on this subject. The document book contains English translations of 29 documents. Although we feel that we have reduced the number of documents to the minimum, the document book is still large. But Schirach’s subversion of German youth is a large subject, even apart from any of his other acts. Most of these documents are from German publications, of which the Tribunal can take judicial notice. Therefore, in most cases, it is intended only to paraphrase these documents, unless the Tribunal in particular instances will indicate that they like fuller treatment.

Before passing to the proof I want to express my appreciation, particularly to Major Hartley Murray, Lieutenant Fred Niebergall at my right, and Mr. Norbert Heilpern for their assistance in research, analysis, translation, and organization of these materials.

Schirach agrees he held the following positions. They are found in two affidavits, an affidavit of certificate and one affidavit of report dated December 1945, which is Document 3302-PS, document book, Page 110.

I want to offer that affidavit as Exhibit Number USA-665. The certificate, which I will rely on for only one point, is Document 2973-PS. It is already in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-14.

Turning first to Document 3302-PS: This affidavit shows that Schirach was a member of the Party from 1925 to 1945; that he was a leader of the National Socialist Student League from 1929 to 1931; that he was leader of the Hitler Youth Organization from 1931 to 1940. In 1931 and 1932 Schirach was Reich Youth Leader on the staff of the SA Supreme Command, where at that time all Nazi youth organizations were centralized. Also, Schirach was Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP from 1931 to 1940.

In 1932 Schirach became an independent Reich Leader (Reichsleiter), in the Party. Upon acquiring this relatively independent position, he no longer remained on the staff of the SA Supreme Command, since Nazi youth affairs thereafter, with the creation of the Reich Youth Leadership, were directly subordinate to Hitler with Schirach at the helm. We had that kind of condition existing in the Party where, under the Leadership Principle, at the pinnacle you had one man, Schirach, and you no longer had the youth affairs underneath the SA. However, within the SA, Schirach retained the rank and the title of a Gruppenführer throughout the period from 1931 to 1941, and in that year, 1941, he was elevated to the rank of an SA Obergruppenführer, a rank which Schirach continued to hold in the SA until the collapse.

Schirach was Reich Leader of Youth Education in the NSDAP from 1932 until the collapse. In other words, from before the Nazis came to state power until the final downfall, this defendant held the high position of a Reichsleiter, a Reich Leader, inside the Party.

Now, in addition to these positions in the Party, Schirach held the following positions in the Nazi State:

Reich Youth Leader, 1933 to 1940; Reich governor (Reichsstatthalter) of the Reichsgau Vienna, 1940 to 1945; Reich Defense Commissioner of Vienna, 1940 to 1945.

Now, although Schirach gave up some of his positions with respect to the leadership of German youth in 1940 when he accepted these positions in Vienna, he still continued to hold after that time the Party position of Reich Leader for Youth Education in the NSDAP. Moreover, he was given a very special position: Deputy to the Führer for the Inspection of the Hitler Youth, the organization which he, of course, had led until 1940. He continued in these last two positions until the downfall.

The certificate, Document 2973-PS, the only thing I rely on there in this particular presentation, is to show that Schirach was a member of the Reichstag from 1932 to 1945.

We next take up acts showing that Schirach actively promoted the NSDAP and its affiliated youth organizations before the Nazis seized power. Schirach was an intimate and a servile follower of Hitler from the year 1925. In that year, when he was only 18 years old, Schirach joined the Nazi conspirators by becoming a member of the Party. Upon special request of Hitler, he went to Munich to study Party affairs. He became active in converting students to National Socialism. I am paraphrasing there, Your Honors, from Paragraph 2 of Schirach’s own affidavit, Document 3302-PS, Exhibit Number USA-665, found at Page 110 of the document book.

Now, this was the start of conspiratorial activities which Schirach thereafter continued for two decades in a spirit of unbending loyalty to Hitler and to the principles of National Socialism. Hitler’s early personal attentions to this defendant bore fruit for the conspirators, and we find Schirach’s stature in the Party circles rapidly growing through these early years.

In 1929 Schirach was made national leader of the entire National Socialist German Students League. He retained this position for 2 years until 1931. Document 3464-PS, document book, Page 121, is an extract from the 1936 edition of the Party manual, Exhibit Number USA-666, which I would like to offer in evidence. This makes it clear that the purpose of the Nazi Students League was the ideological and political conversion of students in universities and technical schools to National Socialism.

After 1931 Schirach devoted his full time to Party work. Schirach was elected a Nazi member of the Reichstag in 1932, and therefore he played his part in the unparliamentary conduct of the Nazi Reichstag members during the last months of the existence of the Reichstag as an independent instrument of government.

Some of the best evidence concerning Schirach’s support of the conspiracy in its early stages comes from Schirach’s own words in his book _The Hitler Youth_. Excerpts from this book are found in Document Number 1458-PS, document book, Page 1. It is offered in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-667. Now, since this book, Your Honors, covers many years and many topics, I shall be required to refer to it occasionally later on.

An example of Schirach’s servile loyalty to Hitler during the early years is found at Page 17 of this book, Page 12 of your document book. There he writes of his early years of Party activity as follows:

“We were not yet able to account for our conception in detail. We simply believed. And when Hitler’s book _Mein Kampf_ was published, it was our bible, which we almost learned by heart in order to answer the questions of the doubters and superior critics. Almost everyone who today is leading youth in a responsible position joined us in those years.”

Before 1933 Schirach moved throughout Germany, leading demonstrations, summoning German youth to membership in the Hitler Youth. When the Hitler Youth and the wearing of its uniform were forbidden by law, Schirach continued his activities by illegal means. Of this period he himself writes, at Page 26 of his book on _The Hitler Youth_, Pages 16 and 17 of your document book, as follows:

“At this time the HJ (the Hitler Jugend) gained its best human material. Whoever came to us during this illegal time, boy or girl, risked everything. . . . With pistols in our pockets we drove through the Ruhr district while stones came flying after us. We jumped every time we heard a bell ring, because we lived in constant fear of arrests and expected our houses to be searched.”

At Page 27 of the same book, Page 18 of Your Honors’ document book, Schirach indicates that in the early intra-Party fight between Hitler and Strasser, Schirach clung steadfastly to the Hitler clique, and then, in discussing Strasser, he exchanged his confidence only with Hitler and the Defendant Streicher. It is hardly necessary to argue that such an intimate of the Führer, himself, was advised from the beginning of the general purposes, plans, and methods of the conspiracy.

As an interesting sidelight, I believe a number of those conferences, you will note, took place in Schirach’s apartment in Munich, and that Hitler used to come there occasionally.

Schirach was the leading Nazi conspirator in destroying all independent youth organizations and in building the Nazi youth movement. In connection with this point, the attention of the Tribunal is invited to the brief of the United States Chief of Counsel entitled “The Reshaping of Education, Training of Youth,” which was written for the United States Chief of Counsel by Major Hartley Murray, and to the documents cited therein under the section headed “b.” “The Nazi conspirators supplemented the school system by training youth through the Hitler Jugend.” These documents were offered in evidence in Document Book D in the earlier phase of this Trial. The attention of the Tribunal is also called to the motion picture _The Nazi Plan_, which was shown before the Tribunal on the 11th of December, insofar as that film involved the Defendant Schirach and his Hitler Youth organization. Occasions when Schirach’s activities are shown in this film are noted in Document Number 3054-PS, the index and the guide to this film, which is already in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-167.

It was the task of Schirach to perpetuate the Nazi regime through generations by poisoning the minds of youth with Nazi ideology and preparing youth for aggressive war. This poisoning will long outlive the defendant. Indeed, one of the principal purposes of this exposure must be to bring to those German youths who survived the Nazi-created catastrophe a true picture of this man whom Nazi propaganda presented as a great youth hero; a man against whom the living breath of free criticism and the truth itself could make no answer before German youth or before the German people, for more than 10 years.

Again, from Schirach’s own hand in his book, _The Hitler Youth_, we have crystal-clear evidence concerning the methods and the tactics employed by this defendant in his destruction of independent youth organizations and their incorporation into the Hitler Youth. At Page 32, Pages 19 and 20 of Your Honors’ document book, Schirach states that in 1933 the new Cabinet ministers were too overburdened to solve the youth question by their own initiative; that therefore he, Schirach, then leader of the Hitler Youth, commissioned one of his confederates to lead 50 members of the Berlin Hitler Youth in a surprise raid on the Reich Committee of German Youth Organizations. This raid resulted in destroying the Reich Committee and its absorption within the Hitler Youth. This raid was closely followed by a second surprise raid of like success upon the Youth Hostels Organization, Page 33, _The Hitler Youth_, found at Pages 20 and 21 of the document book.

Now, after these successful showings of force and terror, Schirach’s star climbed higher. He was appointed Youth Leader of the German Reich in June 1931 in a solemn ceremony before Hitler. Concerning his next steps, Schirach writes at Pages 35 and 36 of his book, Page 22 of the document book, as follows:

“The first thing I did was to dissolve the Greater German League. Since I headed all German youth organizations and I had the right to decide on their leadership, I did not hesitate for a moment to take this step which was for the Hitler Youth the elimination of an unbearable state of affairs.”

Schirach accomplished the dissolution and destruction of most youth organizations by orders which he issued and signed as Youth Leader of the German Reich. This is shown by the order contained in Document Number 2229-PS, your document book, Page 65, which is offered in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-668.

By this one order of Schirach nine youth organizations were dissolved, including the Boy Scout movement.

The Protestant and Catholic youth organizations were the last to be destroyed and absorbed by the Hitler Youth. Schirach accomplished the absorption of the Protestant youth organization by agreement with the Hitler-appointed Reich Bishop Ludwig Müller, Page 38 of _The Hitler Youth_, Page 24 of the document book. Schirach’s objective in forcing all German youth into the Hitler Youth was finally accomplished in December 1936 by the basic law on the Hitler Youth. Document Number 1392-PS is a decree, 1936, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 993, of which, of course, the Tribunal may take judicial notice. This law declared in part, and Your Honors, I read from this because it shows so clearly the nature of what was to happen and what was already happening to German youth under Schirach.

THE PRESIDENT: Is it set out in the document book?

CAPT. SPRECHER: Yes, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: What page?

CAPT. SPRECHER: It is Document Number 1392-PS. It is at Page 6 of your document book:

“The future of the German nation depends on its youth, and German youth will have to be prepared for its future duties. . . . All of the German youth in the Reich is organized within the Hitler Youth. . . . The German youth, besides being reared within the family and school, shall be educated physically, intellectually, and morally in the spirit of National Socialism to serve the people and the community through the Hitler Youth. . . . The task of educating the German youth through the Hitler Youth is being entrusted to the Reich Leader of German Youth in the NSDAP. . . .”

The first executive order on this basic law concerning the Hitler Youth was issued on the 25th of March 1939. If you refer to Page 40 of your document book, this decree, 1939, _Reichsgesetzblatt_, Part I, Page 709, among other points confirms the exclusive nature of Schirach’s responsibility concerning German youth. I will quote only one sentence:

“The Youth Leader of the German Reich is solely competent for all missions of the physical, ideological, and moral education of the entire German youth outside home and school.”

THE PRESIDENT: Captain Sprecher, I think you have told us enough now to satisfy us that Von Schirach was in charge, of the ideological education of German youth and completely in charge of it.

CAPT. SPRECHER: Yes, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: And we don’t desire to hear any more of it.

CAPT. SPRECHER: I understand.

In exercising his far-reaching control over German youth, Schirach naturally relied on the common techniques of the Nazi conspirators, including the Leadership Principle, the nature of which has already been established before this Tribunal. The Tribunal will find a galling glorification and explanation of the Leadership Principle as it was applied to German youth, in Schirach’s book, _The Hitler Youth_, at Page 68, translated at Page 32 of the document book. I won’t read from that.

In his affidavit, Document Number 3302-PS, Paragraph 5, Schirach states, “It was my task to educate the youth in the aims, ideology, and directives of the NSDAP, and beyond this to direct and to shape them.”

Naturally, Schirach established and directed an elaborate propaganda apparatus to accomplish a thorough-going poisoning of the minds of German youth. Document Number 3349-PS, your document book Page 114, is offered in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-666.

This is an excerpt from Pages 452 and 453 of the 1936 edition of the Party manual. This document will show that the Reich Youth Leadership (Reichsjugendführung) of the NSDAP prepared and published numerous periodicals ranging from a daily press service to monthly magazines. This document also shows that the propaganda office of the Hitler Youth maintained, through liaison agents, a political and ideological connection with the propaganda office of the NSDAP and with the Propaganda Ministry, both of which, of course, were headed by the conspirator Goebbels.

Schirach shares with the conspirator Dr. Robert Ley, Reich Organizationsleiter of the NSDAP, the responsibility for the establishment and general administration of the Adolf Hitler Schools. This is shown by a joint statement of Ley and Schirach in the year 1937, which is found in the document book at Page 100. It is our Document 2653-PS, offered in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-669. This document shows that these Adolf Hitler Schools were open free of charge to outstanding and proved members of the Young Folk, the junior section of the Hitler Youth organization. It further shows that the object of these schools was the building of youthful leadership for the Nazi Party and the Nazi State apparatus.

Schirach extended his education of German Youth into the field of law and the legal profession even though these fields were principally under the control of the Defendant Frank. Proof is found in Document Number 3459-PS, Page 120 of the document book. This is a one-page extract from an account of the Congress of German Law in 1939. It is offered as Exhibit Number USA-670. This document shows that beyond purely technical education in law it was considered by the conspirators to be the task of the Party to exercise influence upon the ideological conceptions of the Young Law Guardians League. This league was a junior organization of the National Socialist Law Guardians League, a Nazi-controlled organization of lawyers.

Now, at this Congress to which the document refers, an official of the youth law guardians declared that ignorance of the simplest legal principles could best be fought within the Hitler Youth and that, therefore, the legal education program of the Hitler Youth was to receive the broadest support.

Obergebietsführer Arthur Axmann, the subordinate of Schirach at that time and who in 1940 was to succeed him as leader of the Hitler Youth, was at that time, namely, May 1939, appointed the chairman of a youth legal committee for the establishment of the Youth Law. He was appointed by the Defendant Frank.

THE PRESIDENT: Captain Sprecher, I don’t think I made it quite clear that the Tribunal is not really interested in these details by which the Defendant Von Schirach acquired his power over the German Youth. You have told us sufficient to establish in our minds, so far at any rate, that he managed to get absolute command over the German youth. The only thing that seems to me to be material, at the present stage, is whether or not you can show us any direct evidence that the Defendant Schirach was a party to the aggressive aims of the Reich leaders, or to any War Crimes or to any Crimes against Humanity. Unless you can show us that, your address to us is really not useful to us at this stage.

CAPT. SPRECHER: I plan to take up directly, Your Honor, the question of the militarization of youth. I did want to make one reference at this point to the relation of the Hitler Youth to the League for Germans Abroad, if that is satisfactory to Your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that may bear on the aggressive aims of the Reich leaders.

CAPT. SPRECHER: Schirach extended the influence of the Hitler Youth beyond the borders of Germany by means of co-operation between the Hitler Youth and the League for Germans Abroad, the VDA. This is proved by an agreement made in 1933 between Schirach and leaders of the VDA which is contained in Document L-360(h), document book Page 3. This is offered in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-671.

Now, Schirach discusses in his book, _The Hitler Youth_, under the chapter heading, “Work Abroad”—that is Chapter 4 of the book, Pages 34 to 38 of the document book—some of the connections of the Hitler Youth with such Nazi ideas as Lebensraum, colonial policy as an ideological weapon.

I won’t read from that, since it also covers to a certain extent. . .

THE PRESIDENT: Did it talk about Lebensraum?

CAPT. SPRECHER: It actually used the word Lebensraum. At Page 36 of the document book there is reference made to the Ostraum, space in the East. . .

THE PRESIDENT: I thought the document you were dealing with was L-360 on Page 3.

CAPT. SPRECHER: I am sorry. I had gone on from there, to speak about Schirach’s book, Document 1458-PS, and I had mentioned that at Pages 34 to 38 of the document book there were references concerning the Nazi ideas of colonial policy and Lebensraum, and that this book by Schirach indicated that the Hitler Youth was charged with spreading those ideas.

He uses the word “Ostraum” in speaking of space in the East, and he discusses German youth organizations abroad and the German schools in these countries. And then I wish particularly to point out on Page 37 the following sentence:

“It will be taken into consideration concerning this schooling that the guiding line of German population policy which aims at the utilization of the space in the East will not be violated.”

Now, the conspirators devoted a great deal of energy to the perpetuation of their scheme of things by selecting and training successors for Nazi leadership, selecting and training and acquiring active Nazis for the rank and file of the NSDAP and its affiliated organizations, including the SA and the SS which are alleged here to be criminal organizations.

A number of orders issued by the Party Chancellery under the heading, “Successor Problems,” show the dominant part assumed by Schirach and his Hitler Youth in this field. Our Document Number 3348-PS, “Selections from Volume I of the Decrees, Regulations, and Announcements of the Party Chancellery,” already marked in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-410, contains some of these orders, which I won’t take the time to read. But they are all contained on one page, Page 113, of your document book.

Only Hitler Youth members who distinguished themselves were to be admitted to the Party. Nazi leaders were directed to absorb full-time Hitler Youth leaders into their staffs so as to offer them practical experience and thus secure necessary successors for the Leadership Corps which is also alleged as a criminal organization. This pivotal and central function of the Hitler Youth in the domination of German life by the Party is also shown at Pages 80 and 81 of the 1938 Party manual, Exhibit Number USA-430, found at Page 74 of the document book.

THE PRESIDENT: That last page, Page 113, does that refer to any of the matters to which I drew your attention? It is simply the organization of the youth; it has nothing to do with any criminal aims.

CAPT. SPRECHER: Your Honor, it certainly is the contention of the Prosecution that any man who took an active part in furnishing for these criminal organizations young members committed a crime.

THE PRESIDENT: I quite understand that, and that is why I told you that we were satisfied that so far you had shown that he had acquired absolute control over and was the leader of the German youth. The only thing we want to hear about at this stage is whether he was a party to the schemes for aggressive war, to War Crimes, or to Crimes against Humanity. That is what we want to hear, and we don’t want to hear anything else.

CAPT. SPRECHER: Your Honors, may I pass, then, to the connection of Hitler Youth to the SS. Document 2396-PS, which is found at Page 69 of the document book and which is offered as Exhibit Number USA-673, has a quotation in it concerning the Streifendienst of the Hitler Youth; the Streifendienst being the patrol service, a type of self-police organization of the Hitler Youth. The quotation which I intend to read will indicate how this organization became the principal supplier of the SS.

Are Your Honors interested in having me read that quotation concerning the Hitler Youth as the main source of the SS?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, perhaps; I haven’t read it.

CAPT. SPRECHER: This document is an agreement between Schirach and Himmler. It was concluded in October 1938. It bears, I think, partial quoting:

“Organization of the Streifendienst.

“1. Since the Streifendienst in the Hitler Youth has to perform tasks similar to those which the SS perform for the whole movement, it is organized as a special unit for the purpose of securing recruits for the General SS. However, as much as possible, recruits for the SS Special Troops, for the SS Death’s Head Units, and for the officer-candidate schools, should also be taken from these formations.”

I am skipping down now to 4a, which is underlined in red in your book:

“The selection of Streifendienst members is made according to the principles of racial selection of the Schutzstaffel. The competent officials of the SS, primarily unit leaders, race authorities, and SS physicians, will be consulted for the admission tests.”

Skipping to 5:

“To insure from the beginning a good understanding between Reich Youth Leadership and Reich SS leadership, a liaison officer will be ordered from the Reich Youth Leadership to the SS Main Office starting 1 October 1938. The appointment of other leaders to the higher SS sections is a subject for a future agreement.”

Then, going down to what I think is the most striking quotation, Your Honor, 6:

“After the organization is completed, the SS takes its replacement primarily from these Streifendienst members. Admission of youths of German blood who are not members of the Hitler Youth is then possible only after information and advice of the competent Bannführer.”

Now, the Bannführer referred to there was the local leader of the Hitler Jugend; and without his consent no one could go into the SS in the future after that agreement was made, which was in October 1938.

Now, the second agreement which Schirach made with Himmler was made in December 1938. It is found in our document book, Number 2567-PS, Page 98. It is offered in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-674. It states that the Farm Service of the Hitler Youth “is, according to education and aim, particularly well suited as a recruiting agency for the SS, General SS, and the armed section of the SS, SS Special Troops, and SS Death’s Head battalions.”

The agreement concludes by stating that Farm Service members of the Hitler Youth who pass the SS admission tests will be taken over by the SS immediately after leaving the Hitler Youth Farm Service.

I might point out to Your Honors that this meant that after that time any Hitler Youth member who was in the Farm Service was obliged to go into the SS.

And now, to come directly to the point you have been inquiring about, Your Honor:

Throughout the 6 years of Nazi political control over Germany before the launching of aggressive war, Schirach was actively engaged in militarizing German youth. From the beginning, the Hitler Youth was set up along military lines with uniforms, ranks and titles. It was regimented and led in military fashion under the Leadership Principle.

If Your Honors will take any edition whatsoever of the _Organization Book_, the Party manual, and turn to the tables, beginning with Table 54, and leaf through the book, you will see the very striking insignia of the Hitler Youth and how much it compares to what the normal military insignia were. You will further notice that one of the most prominent insignia is an “S” of the same type that the Nazis used with respect to the SS. You will notice that part of the uniform was a long knife.

THE PRESIDENT: Isn’t that all a part of what they are pleased to call the Nazi ideology? I mean, the Führer Principle, military training?

CAPT. SPRECHER: There is a relation between all of these things, perhaps, and the Leadership Principle, because the Leadership Principle dominated absolutely every aspect of German life. However, Your Honors, I suggest that showing to you, in this graphic means, the similarity between the uniform of the Hitler Youth and military uniforms has some bearing upon the preparation for aggressive wars, about which I am further to speak in just a moment.

Now, Document 2654-PS, found at Page 102 of your document book, is a whole book given over to just this question of the organization and the insignia of the Hitler Youth.

The Tribunal will see how the Hitler Youth was divided into branches or divisions which were very similar to military divisions.

That document is offered as Exhibit Number USA-675. I will refer no further to it.

Now, in a speech in February 1938, when the conspirators had already dropped some of the camouflage which surrounded their earlier military preparations for the wars which we have recently suffered, Hitler discussed the military training of the Hitler Youth in the _Völkischer Beobachter_ of the 21st of February 1938. This is our Document 2454-PS, found at Page 97 of the document book. It is offered as Exhibit Number USA-676.

Hitler there said that thousands of German boys had received specialized training through the Hitler Youth in naval, aviation, and motorized groups and that over 7,000 instructors had trained more than 1 million Hitler Youth members in rifle shooting. That was February 1938, shortly before the Anschluss. Note the progress of military training within the Hitler Youth between then and August 1939, just 1 month before the invasion of Poland.

At that time the Defendant Schirach and the Defendant Keitel, as Chief of the High Command, entered into another one of those informative agreements, which many of these defendants liked to make among themselves. It is Document Number 2398-PS, your document book Page 72. It is offered as Exhibit Number USA-677. It is taken from _Das Archiv_ which, in introducing the actual agreement, declared that this agreement was “the result of close co-operation” between Schirach and Keitel. The agreement itself states, in part:

“While it is exclusively the task of the Hitler Youth to attend to the training of their units in this direction, it is suitable, in the sense of a uniformed training corresponding to the demands of the Wehrmacht, to support the leadership of the Hitler Youth for their responsible task as trainers and educators in all fields of training for defense by special courses.”

And then, skipping down towards the end, you will note this quotation within the agreement: “A great number of courses are in progress.”

Your Honor, if I may take about 5 minutes, I can finish this one section on the aggressive war phase.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

CAPT. SPRECHER: Whereas Hitler, in February 1938, mentioned that 7,000 Hitler Youth leaders were engaged in training German youngsters in rifle shooting, Schirach and Keitel, in their agreement of August 1939, note the following:

“. . . 30,000 Hitler Youth leaders are already being trained annually in field service. The agreement with the Wehrmacht gives the possibility of roughly doubling that number. The billeting and messing of the Hitler Youth leaders is done, according to the regulations for execution already published, in the barracks, drill grounds, _et cetera_, of the Wehrmacht, at a daily cost of 25 Pfennig.”

Just as Schirach dealt with the head of the SS in obtaining zealous recruits for organized banditry and the commission of atrocities, so also he dealt with the head of the Wehrmacht in furnishing young men as human grist for the mill of aggressive war.

The training of German youths runs through the Nazi conspiracy as an important central thread. It is one of the manifestations of Nazism which has shocked the entire civilized world. The principal responsibility for the planning and execution of the Nazi Youth policy falls upon this defendant.

I wish to take merely one sentence from his own affidavit, Paragraph 5, Document Number 3302-PS, so that there can be no doubt before this Tribunal or before the world, indeed, as to this defendant’s own feeling of responsibility: “I feel myself responsible for the policy of the youth movement in the Party and later within the Reich.” I underline the phrase “_I feel myself responsible_.”

Your Honor, that is a convenient breaking point before coming to a discussion of Schirach’s connection to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 16 January 1946 at 1000 hours._]

THIRTY-FIFTH DAY Wednesday, 16 January 1946

_Morning Session_

CAPT. SPRECHER: May it please the Tribunal, I now pass to activities which involve Schirach in the commission of Crimes against Humanity as they bear directly on Count One. The presentation of all specific acts will deal with the Reichsgau Vienna; but first allow me to refer back to two important points in the previous proof, which will show that Schirach bears responsibility for War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity which bring in the whole of Europe. Through his agreements with Himmler he provided, through the Hitler Youth, many if not most of the SS men who administered, in the main, the concentration camps and whose War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity throughout Europe generally are notorious.

Nor should we pass to further specific acts of Schirach without mentioning one more thing: that he cannot escape responsibility for implanting in youth the Nazi ideology generally, with its tenets of a master race, sub-human peoples, and Lebensraum and world domination. For such notions were the psychological prerequisites for the instigation and for the tolerance of the atrocities which zealous Nazis committed throughout Germany and the occupied countries.

To present Schirach’s responsibilities for crimes committed within the Reichsgau Vienna, where Schirach was Gau leader and Reich governor from July 1940 until the downfall, the general basic functions of these two offices must be held in mind.

The first document I refer to is Document Number 1893-PS. This is an extract from the Party manual of 1943 and therefore catches Schirach in midstream in his activities in the Reichsgau Vienna. That is Page 42 of the document book, and Pages 70, 71, 75, 98, 136, and 140b of the Party manual, extracts from each of those pages appearing in your document book.

The following highlights concerning the Gau leader’s functions will appear, and I propose only to paraphrase. Since Your Honor may take judicial notice of the Party manual, you may check at your leisure unless you wish me to read from any one of these specific orders. These orders make it appear that the Gau leader was the highest representative of Hitler in his Gau, that he was the bearer of sovereignty—the top Hoheitsträger—and that he had sovereign political rights. Beyond that, he was responsible for the entire political situation in his Gau. He could call—and we believe this is important—he could call upon SA and SS leaders as “needed in the execution of a political mission.” Beyond that he was obliged to meet at least once a month with the leaders of the affiliated Party organizations within his Gau, and this, of course, included the SS.

Now, the position of the Reich Governor in Vienna is somewhat special. After the Anschluss the State of Austria was abolished, and Austria was divided into seven Reich Gaue. The most important of these Gaue was the Reichsgau Vienna, of which Schirach was Governor. Reference to any statistical manual of the Reich at this time will establish that at that time Vienna had a population of over 2 million people. Therefore it was certainly one of the principal cities of the Reich. The Tribunal is asked to take judicial notice of the decree, 1939 _Reichsgesetzblatt_,