Chapter III, requisitions not followed by payment.

Apart from that which they managed to buy with the help of crowns which were deposited in their accounts under the pretext of the maintenance of the army of occupation and of clearing, the Germans appropriated an important quantity of things without having paid for them in any seemingly regular manner.

It was in this way that they appropriated supplies from the Danish Army and Navy—lorries, horses, means of transport, furniture, clothing, the amount of which to date has not been evaluated but might be estimated at about 850 million crowns. Many requisitions and secret or even apparent purchases have not yet been estimated exactly.

The same report, submitted under Document Number RF-115, contains, on the part of the Danish Government, an approximate and provisional estimate of the damages sustained by Denmark and of the German plunder, which amounts to 11,600 million crowns.

The information which we have to date does not permit me to give any more particulars concerning Denmark. I will, therefore, if the Tribunal will permit me, begin with the particular case of Norway.

The economic plundering of Norway.

The German troops had only arrived in Norway when Hitler declared, on 18 April 1940, that the economic exploitation of that country should be proceeded with, and for that reason Norway must be considered as an enemy state.

The information which we have on the economic plundering of Norway is rather brief; but it is, nevertheless, sufficient to estimate the German activity in this country during the entire period of the occupation.

Norway was subjected to a regime of most severe rationing. As soon as they entered the country, the Germans tried—and this was contrary to the most elementary principles of International Law—to draw from Norway the maximum resources possible.

In a document discovered by the United States Army, Document Number ECH-34, which I submit as Exhibit Number RF-118, a document which consists of the _Journal de Marche_ of the economy and armament service in Norway, written in April 1940, we have excerpts of the directives relative to administration and economy in the occupied territories.

Here are some excerpts from this document:

“Directive of Armament Economy:

“Norwegian industry, to the extent to which it does not directly supply the population, is, in its essential branches, of particular importance for the German war industry. That is why its production must be put, as soon as possible, at the disposal of the German armament industry, if this has not already been done. This production consists mainly of intermediate products, which require a certain amount of time to be turned into useful products, and of raw materials which—such as aluminum, for example—can be used while we wait for our own factories, which are being built, to be in a position to produce.

“In this connection, above all, the following industrial branches must be taken into consideration:

“Mining plants for the production of copper, zinc, nickel, titanium, wolfram, molybdenum, silver, pyrites.

“Furnaces for the production of alumina, aluminum, copper, nickel, zinc.

“Chemical industries for the production of explosives, synthetic nitrogen, calcium nitrate, superphosphate, calcium carbide, and sodium products.

“Armament industries, naval dockyards, power stations, especially those which are supplying electric current to the above-named industries.

“The production capacities of these industries must be maintained at the highest possible level for the duration of the occupation.

“A certain measure of assistance by the Reich will, at times, be necessary to overcome industrial bottlenecks which are to be expected on account of the cutting off of English and overseas imports.

“Of particular importance is the guaranteeing of raw material industries which to a considerable part depend on overseas imports.

“For the moment it may be left undecided whether a future supply of bauxite from the German stocks is necessary for utilizing the capacities of the aluminum plants.”

As soon as the troops entered Norway, Germany issued notes of the Reichskreditkasse which were legal tender only in Norway and which could not be used in Germany. As in the other occupied countries, this was a means of pressure to obtain financial advantages, which were supposedly freely given by the brutally enslaved countries.

The Germans did their best to become masters of the means of payment and of Norwegian credit by the two methods which have become classic: Imposition of a veritable war tribute, on the pretext of the maintenance of the army of occupation, and also the working of a system of clearing to their profit.

German seizure of the means of payment.

First, indemnities for the maintenance of the army of occupation.

At the beginning of the occupation, the Germans used for their purchases notes of the Reichskreditkasse. The Norwegian holders of this paper money used to change it at the Bank of Norway, but this financial institution could not obtain from the Reichskreditkasse any real equivalent. In July 1940 the Bank of Norway had to absorb 135 million Reichsmark from the Reichskreditkasse. To avoid losing control over monetary circulation, the Bank of Norway was obliged to put the Norwegian notes at the disposal of the Germans, who drew checks on the Reichskreditkasse which the Bank of Norway was obliged to discount.

The debit account of the Bank of Norway, following the German levies, amounted to:

1,450 million crowns at the end of 1940; 3,000 million crowns at the end of 1941; 6,300 million crowns at the end of 1942; 8,700 million crowns at the end of 1943; 11,676 million crowns at the liberation of the country.

All the Norwegian protests were in vain in the face of German extortions. The constant threat of the new issuing of notes of the Reichskreditkasse as instruments of obligatory payment beside the Norwegian currency obliged the local financial authorities to accept the system of levies on account, without actual cover, which was less dangerous than the issuing of paper money over the circulation of which the Norwegian administration had no power of control.

This may be seen in particular from a secret letter sent on 17 June 1941 by General Von Falkenhorst, Commander-in-Chief in Norway, to the Reich Commissioner, Reichsleiter Terbeven, a copy of which was found not long ago in Norway and which I submit to the Tribunal as Document Number RF-119. In this document, after having stated that one could not reduce the expenses of the Wehrmacht in Norway, Von Falkenhorst writes:

“I am, however, of the opinion that the problem cannot be solved at all in this manner. The only remedy is to abandon completely the actual monetary system by introducing Reich currency. But of course this does not come into my domain. I regret, therefore, that I am not able to propose any other remedies to you, although I am fully conscious of the seriousness of the situation in which you find yourself.”

To the indemnities for the alleged maintenance of the army of occupation must be added a sum of 3,600 million crowns paid by the Norwegian Treasury for the billeting of German troops. This information comes to us from a report from the Norwegian Government, which I submit as Document Number RF-120.

From the sum of approximately 12,000 million crowns levied for the alleged maintenance of the occupation troops, a large part was used for other purposes; for the police and propaganda, in particular, the occupation spent 900 million crowns. This comes from a second report of the Norwegian Government, which I submit as Document Number RF-121.

Secondly, clearing.

The clearing agreement of 1937 for the barter of goods between Norway and Germany remained in force during the occupation but it was the Bank of Norway which had to advance the necessary funds for the Norwegian exporters. The Germans also concluded clearing agreements in the name of Norway with other occupied countries, neutral countries, and with Italy.

At the liberation, the credit balance of Norwegian clearing amounted to 90 million crowns but this balance does not show the actual situation. In fact:

1) The imports destined to the German military needs in Norway were handled through clearing in a very improper manner;

2) For certain goods especially (pelts, furs, and fish) the Germans had demanded that exportation should be made to the Reich. Then they sold these products again in other countries, especially Italy as far as fish was concerned;

3) The Germans, who controlled the fixing of prices, systematically raised the price of all products imported into Norway which, moreover, were used for the greater part for the military needs of the occupation. On the other hand, they systematically lowered the prices of the products exported from Norway.

In spite of all their efforts and sacrifices, and owing to the fraudulent operations of the occupiers, the Norwegian authorities could not prevent a very dangerous inflation.

From the report of the Norwegian Government, which I submitted under Document Number RF-120 a few moments ago, it is seen that the paper currency which in April 1940 amounted to 712 million crowns, rose progressively to reach, on 7 May 1945, 3,039 million crowns. An inflation of this extent, resulting from the activities of the occupiers, enables us to measure the impoverishment of the country. The same report indicates that the Germans did not manage to seize the gold of the Norwegian Bank, as that had been hidden in good time.

Let us now, Gentlemen, examine the levies in kind.

The Germans proceeded, in Norway, to make numerous requisitions which were or were not followed by so-called regular payments. According to the report of the Norwegian Government, here is the list of requisitioned goods: Meat, 30,000 tons; dairy products and eggs, 61,000 tons; fish, 26,000 tons; fruit and vegetables, 68,000 tons; potatoes, 500,000 tons; beverages and vinegar, 112,000 tons; fats, 10,000 tons; wheat and flour, 3,000 tons; other foodstuffs, 5,000 tons; hay and straw, 300,000 tons; other fodder, 13,000 tons; soap, 8,000 tons.

But this list which I have just read to the Tribunal includes only the official purchases, which were made with Norwegian currency and paid for through clearing; it does not include the illicit purchases.

At present, it is not yet possible to make estimates. As an example, we can say, however, that the export of fish, most of which went to Germany, for 1 year only (1942) came to about 202,400 tons, whereas the official requisitions during the whole occupation amounted only to 26,000 tons.

As in other occupied territories, the Germans forced the continuation of work under threat of arrest.

Most of the Norwegian merchant fleet escaped from the Germans; nevertheless, they requisitioned all the ships they could, especially most of the fishing boats.

Even if the occupier could not seize all railway rolling stock, trams, as well as about 30,000 motor vehicles, were transported to Germany.

If we refer to the report of 10 October 1944 of the German Economic Service, which I submitted under Exhibit RF-116 (Document Number EC-86), we will see that the writer of the report himself estimates that the effort demanded from Norway was beyond her possibilities; and he writes:

“. . . Norwegian economy is especially heavily burdened by the demands of the occupation Forces. For this reason the cost of occupation had to be limited to cover only a part of the expenses of the Wehrmacht. . . .”

After having mentioned that the cost of occupation which had been collected up to January 1943 amounted to 7,535 million crowns, which corroborates the data given by the Norwegian Government, the writer of the German report says:

“This sum of more than 5,000 million Reichsmark is, indeed, very high for Norway. Much richer countries, as for example, Belgium, pay hardly more, and Denmark does not even supply half of this sum. These large payments can only be made possible by German additions. It is, therefore, not surprising that the German-Norwegian trade is in Germany’s favor—that is, it is subsidized. Norway, owing to her very small population, can hardly put labor at the disposal of the German war economy. She is, therefore, one of the few countries which owe us certain amounts in clearing.”

Further on, the writer adds:

“. . . If we deduct approximately 140 million Reichsmark from the expenses of the occupation and the various credits calculated above, we have Norwegian payments to the still considerable amount of approximately 4,900 million Reichsmark.”

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps that would be a good time to break off.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

M. GERTHOFFER: I had the honor, this morning, of relating to you how the occupiers were able to exact great quantities of the means of payment from Norway. We shall now see, from the first data which have been given us, the use to which the occupiers put these means of payment.

The Germans seized, as in the other occupied countries, considerable private property on some pretext or other—property belonging to Jews, Freemasons, or Scout associations. It has been impossible, so far, to make a very exact evaluation of this spoliation. We can therefore only give some indication from memory. According to the report of the Norwegian Government, submitted under Document Number RF-121, in 1941 the Germans seized all the radio sets. . .

THE PRESIDENT: Have you any evidence to support the facts you are stating now?

M. GERTHOFFER: This is based on information contained in the report of the Norwegian Government which I have submitted under Document Number RF-121.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

M. GERTHOFFER: According to that report, in 1941 the Germans seized almost all the radio sets belonging to private individuals. The value of these radio sets is approximately 120 million kroner. The Germans imposed heavy fines on the Norwegian communities under the most varied pretexts, notably Allied bombing raids and acts of sabotage.

In the report presented under Document Number RF-121 the Norwegian Government gives two or three examples of these collective fines: on 4 March 1941, after a raid on Lofoten, the population of the small community of Ostvagoy had to pay 100,000 kroner. Communities also had to support German families and families of “Quislings.”

On 25 September 1942, after a British raid on Oslo, one hundred citizens were obliged to pay 3,500,000 kroner. In January 1941 Trondheim, Stavanger, and Vest-Opland had to pay 60,000, 50,000, and 100,000 kroner, respectively. In September 1941 the municipality of Stavanger was obliged to pay 2 million kroner for an alleged sabotage of telegraph lines. In August 1941 Rogaland had to pay 500,000 kroner, and Aalesund had to pay 100,000 kroner.

It can thus be stated in principle that, by various procedures which differed hardly from those employed in other countries, the Germans during the occupation of Norway not only exhausted all the financial resources of that country but placed it considerably in debt.

It has not been possible to furnish a detailed account of German extortions, whether made after requisitions, followed or not by indemnities, or by purchase, apparently conducted by mutual agreement fictitiously settled with those very means of payment extorted from Norway.

In the report which I have submitted under Document Number RF-121, the Norwegian Government tabulated the damages and losses suffered by its country. I shall give a summary of this table to the Tribunal.

The Norwegian Government estimates that the damages suffered by industry and commerce amount to a total of 440 million kroner, of which the Germans have paid, fictitiously of course, only 7 million kroner; merchant vessels to the value of 1,733 million kroner, for which Germany has made no settlement; damage to ports and installations amounts to 74 million kroner, for which Germany has settled fictitiously only to the extent of 1 million kroner; for railroads, canals, airports, and their installations, the spoliation represents the sum of 947 million, for which Germany has fictitiously paid 490 million kroner; roads and bridges, 199 million kroner, for which the settlement amounts to 67 million; spoliation of agriculture reached 242 million kroner, of which only 46 million have been settled; personal property, 239 million, of which nothing has been settled; various requisitions, not included in the preceding categories, amount to 1,566 million kroner, for which the occupier, fictitiously, has settled up to the amount of 1,154 million kroner. The Norwegian Government estimates that the years of man-labor applied to the German war effort represent a sum of 226 million kroner. It estimates, on the other hand, that the years of man-labor lost to the national economy by deportation to Germany and forced labor by the order of Germany amounts to 3,122 million kroner. Forced payments to German institutions amount to 11,054 million kroner, for which Germany has made no settlement whatsoever. The grand total, according to the Norwegian Government, is 21,086 million kroner, which represents 4,700 million dollars.

Norway suffered particularly during the German occupation. Indeed, though her resources are considerable, notably timber from the forests, minerals such as nickel, wolfram, molybdenum, zinc, copper, and aluminum, nevertheless Norway must import indispensable food products for feeding her population.

As the Germans had absolute control over maritime traffic, nothing could come into Norway without their consent. They could therefore, by pressure, as they had to do in France by means of the line of demarcation between the two zones, impose their demands more easily. The rations, as fixed by the occupiers, were insufficient to insure the subsistence of the Norwegian population. The continued undernourishment over a period of years resulted in very serious consequences: Disease multiplied, mortality likewise increased, and the future of the population has been jeopardized by the physical deficiencies of its younger element.

These are the few observations which I had to make on the subject of Norway. I shall, if the Tribunal will permit, now deal with the part which relates to the Netherlands.

Economic pillage of the Netherlands.

In invading the Netherlands in contravention of all the principles of the law of nations, the Germans installed themselves in a country abundantly provided with the most varied wealth, in a country in which the inhabitants were the best nourished of Europe and which, in proportion to the population, was one of the wealthiest in the world. The gold reserve of Holland exceeded the amount of bills in circulation. Four years later when the Allies liberated that country, they found the population afflicted by a veritable famine; and apart from the destruction resulting from military operations, a country almost entirely ruined by the spoliation of the occupation.

The dishonest intentions of Germany appear in a secret report by Seyss-Inquart on his governorship. This report, dating from 29 May to 19 July 1940, was discovered by the United States Army. It has been registered under the number Document 997-PS, and I submit it to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-122. These are the chief extracts from this report:

“It was clear that with the occupation of the Netherlands a large number of economic and also police measures had to be taken, the first ones of which were for the purpose of reducing the consumption of the population in order to obtain supplies for the Reich, on the one hand, and to secure a just distribution of the remaining supplies, on the other hand. With regard to the task assigned, endeavors had to be made for all these measures to bear the signature of Dutchmen. The Reich Commissioner therefore authorized the Secretaries General to take all the necessary measures through legal channels.

“In fact, to date, nearly all orders concerning the seizure of supplies and their distribution to the population and all decrees regarding restrictions on the moulding of public opinion have been issued. But agreements concerning the transport of extraordinarily large supplies to the Reich have also been made, all of which bear the signatures of the Dutch Secretaries General or the competent economic leaders, so that all of these measures have the character of being voluntary. It should be mentioned in this connection that the Secretaries General were told in the first conference that loyal co-operation was expected of them, but that they were entitled to resign if something should be ordered which they felt they could not endorse. Up to date none of the Secretaries General have made use of this privilege, so that one may reasonably conclude that they have complied with all requests of their own free will.

“The seizure and distribution of food supplies and textiles have been almost completed. At least all the appropriate orders have been issued and are being executed.

“A series of instructions concerning the reorientation of agriculture have been issued and are being executed. The essential point is to use the available fodder in such a way that as large a stock as possible of horned cattle, about 80 percent, will be carried over into the next farming season, at the expense of the disproportionately high stock of chickens and hogs. Rules and restrictions have been introduced in the organization of traffic, and the rationing of gasoline was applied on the same lines as in the Reich.

“Restriction of the right to give notice at work, as well as to cancel leases, has been issued in order to curb the liberal and capitalistic habits of the Dutch employers and to avoid unrest. In the same way the terms for repayment of debts have been extended under certain circumstances. . . .

“. . . the ordinance concerning registration and control of enemy property, as well as confiscation of the property of persons who show hostility to the Reich and to Germans, were issued in the name of the Reich Commissioner. On the basis of this ordinance an administrator has already been appointed for the property of the royal family.

“Stocks of raw materials have been seized and, with the consent of the General Field Marshal, distributed in such a way that the Dutch have enough raw materials to maintain their economy for half a year, so that they receive the same allocation quotas as obtain in the Reich. The same principle of equal treatment is being used in the supply of food, et cetera. This enabled us to secure considerable supplies of raw materials for the Reich, as for instance 70,000 tons of industrial fats, which is about half the amount which the Reich is lacking. Legislation concerning exchange has been introduced on the same pattern as in the Reich.

“Finally we succeeded in causing the Dutch Government to supply all the amounts which the Reich and the German administration in the Netherlands need, so that these expenses do not burden the Reich budget in any way.

“Sums of guilders have been made available to redeem the occupation marks to the amount of about 36 million; an additional 100 million for the purposes of the occupation army, especially for extension of the airports; 50 million for the purchase of raw materials to be shipped to the Reich, so far as they are not booty; and amounts to guarantee the unrestricted transfer of the savings of the Dutch workers brought into the Reich, to their families, _et cetera_. Finally, the rate of exchange of the occupation marks, set at first by the Army High Command in the proportion of 1 guilder to 1.50 Reichsmark, has been reduced to the correct proportion of 1 guilder to 1.33 Reichsmark.

“Above all, however, it was possible to obtain the consent of the President of the Bank of The Netherlands, Trip, to a measure suggested by Commissioner General Fischböck and approved by the General Field Marshal, namely the unrestricted mutual obligation of accepting each other’s currency. That means that the Bank of The Netherlands is bound to accept any amount of Reichsmark offered to it by the Reich Bank and in return to supply Dutch guilders at the rate of 1.33, that is, 1 Reichsmark equals 75 cents. The Reich Bank alone has control in these matters, not the Bank of The Netherlands, which will be notified only of individual transactions.

“This ruling goes far beyond all pertinent rulings hitherto made with the political economies of neighboring countries, including the Protectorate, and actually represents the first step towards a currency union. In consideration of the significance of the agreement, which already affects the independence of the Dutch State, it is of special weight that the President of the Bank, Trip, who is very well-known in western banking and financial circles, signed this agreement of his own free will in the above sense.”

As you will see from the explanations which I shall have the honor of submitting to you, it was chiefly in the Netherlands that the Germans used all their ingenuity in extorting the means of payment. This spoliation will form the subject of the first chapter.

We shall then examine the use made by the occupiers of these means of payment. In a second chapter we shall discuss the black market; in a third, we shall consider the acquisition made in a manner only outwardly regular; a fourth chapter will be devoted to various kinds of spoliation. Finally, we shall touch upon the chief consequences to the Netherlands of this economic pillage.