did. In any case I did not even know that the witness Gisevius was

present at that moment. At any rate, it was not intended for him. Moreover, I was speaking to Dr. Dix aside.

THE PRESIDENT: So that I may understand what you are saying: You say you had told Dr. Dix the substance of the conversation you had had with the Defendant Göring, and said that Göring would withdraw his objection to the facts being given if the Defendant Schacht wanted them to be given. Is that right?

DR. STAHMER: No, I only said that Göring did not care what was said about himself; he merely wanted the deceased Blomberg to be spared, and he did not want things concerning Blomberg’s marriage to be discussed. If Schacht did not prevent that—I was speaking only of Schacht—then he, Göring, in his turn, would have no consideration for Schacht—would no longer have any consideration for Schacht. That is what I told Dr. Dix for reasons of personal etiquette.

THE PRESIDENT: Wait, wait, I can’t hear you. Yes.

DR. STAHMER: As I said, that is what I told Dr. Dix, and that finished the conversation. And I made it quite clear to Dr. Dix that I told him that only as one colleague to another.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. That is all you wish to say?

DR. STAHMER: Yes.

DR. DIX: I remember the facts, I believe, correctly and reliably, as follows: This morning I was in the room of the Defense Counsel speaking to the witness Dr. Gisevius. I believe my colleague, Professor Kraus, was also taking part in the conversation. Then my colleague, Stahmer, approached me and said he would like to speak to me. I replied that at the moment I was having an important and urgent conversation with Gisevius, and asked whether it could wait. Stahmer said “no,” and that he must speak to me at once. I then took my colleague Stahmer aside, probably five or six paces from the group with whom I had been speaking. My colleague Stahmer told me the following—it is quite possible, I don’t remember the actual words he used, that he started by saying that he was telling me this for professional reasons, as one colleague to another. If he says so now, I am sure that it is so. Anyhow I don’t remember that any longer. He said to me, “Listen, Göring has an idea that Gisevius will attack him as much as he can. If he attacks the dead Blomberg, however, then Göring will disclose everything against Schacht—and he knows lots of things about Schacht which may not be pleasant for Schacht. He, Göring, had been very reticent in his testimony; but if anything should be said against the dead Blomberg, then he would have to reveal things against Schacht.”

That was what he meant—that he would bring things up against Schacht. That was the conversation. I cannot say with absolute certainty whether my colleague told me I should call Gisevius’ attention to it. If he says he did not say so, then it is certainly true, and I believe him; but I could only interpret that information to mean that I should notify Gisevius of this development promised by Göring. I therefore thought—and did not have the slightest doubt—that I was voicing Göring’s intention, and that I was acting as Dr. Stahmer wished, and that that was the purpose of the whole thing. What else could be the reason for Dr. Stahmer’s telling me at that moment, immediately before my discussion with Gisevius, even while I was in conversation with Gisevius, that he could not wait, that I must break off my conversation? Why should he inform me at that time, unless he meant that the mischief hinted at and threatened by Göring might possibly be avoided—in other words, that the witness Gisevius, on whom everything depended, should think twice before making his statement? I did not have the slightest doubt that what Stahmer meant by his words to me was that I should convey them to Gisevius. As I said, even if Stahmer had not asked me—and he was certainly speaking the truth when he said he did not ask me to take action—I would have replied, if I had been questioned before he made this statement, and that probably with an equally good conscience, that he had asked me to pass it on to Gisevius. But I will not maintain that he actually used those words. Anyway, it is absolutely certain that this conversation did take place, and it was in the firm belief that I was acting as Dr. Stahmer and Göring intended that I went straight to Gisevius. He was standing only five or six steps away from me, or even nearer. I think I understood him to say, when I addressed him, that he had heard parts of it. I don’t know whether I understood him correctly. I then informed him of the gist of this conversation. That is what happened early this morning.

DR. STAHMER: May I say the following: It goes without saying, that I neither asked Dr. Dix to pass it on to Gisevius, nor did I count upon his doing so; but I surmised that Gisevius would be examined this morning, and that Dr. Dix would question the witness concerning the circumstances of Blomberg’s marriage. That is what I had been told previously—namely, that Dr. Dix intended to put this question to the witness. Therefore, I called Dr. Dix’s attention to it, assuming that he would abstain from such a question concerning Blomberg’s marriage. That was not intended for the witness in any way, and I know definitely that I said to Dr. Dix that I was telling him this merely as one colleague to another, and he thanked me for it. He said, “Thank you very much.” At any rate, if he had said to me, “I am going to tell the witness,” I would have said immediately, “For heaven’s sake; that is information intended only for you personally.” Indeed, I am really surprised that Dr. Dix has in this manner abused the confidence which I placed in him.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, we have heard the facts, and we do not think we need hear anything more about it beyond considering the question as to whether the witness is to go on with his evidence.

Witness, has the explanation which has been given by Dr. Stahmer and Dr. Dix sufficiently covered the matters with which you were proposing to deal with reference to Field Marshal Von Blomberg? Is there anything further that you need say about it?

GISEVIUS: I beg your pardon. Perhaps I did not quite understand the question.

Concerning Blomberg, at this point I did not want to say anything further; I merely wanted, on the first occasion that Blomberg’s name came up, to make it clear that the whole thing gave me the feeling that I was under pressure. I was standing so near that I could not help hearing what Dr. Stahmer said, and the manner in which Dr. Dix told me about it—for I had heard at least half of it—could not be understood in any other way than to mean that Dr. Dix in a very loyal manner was instructing me, a witness for the Defendant Schacht, to be rather reticent in my testimony on a point which I consider very important. That point will come up later and has nothing whatsoever to do with the marriage of Herr Von Blomberg. It has to do with the part which the Defendant Göring played in it, and I know quite well why Göring does not want me to speak about that affair. To my thinking, it is the most corrupt thing Göring ever did, and Göring is just using the cloak of chivalry by pretending that he wants to protect a dead man, whereas he really wants to prevent me from testifying in full on an important point—that is, the Fritsch crisis.

THE PRESIDENT: [_Turning to Dr. Pannenbecker._] The Tribunal will hear the evidence then, whatever evidence you wish the witness to give.

GISEVIUS: I beg your pardon. What I have to say in connection with the Blomberg case is finished. I merely wanted to protest at the first opportunity when the name was mentioned.

THE PRESIDENT: Well then, counsel will continue his examination and you will give such evidence as is relevant when you are examined or cross-examined by Dr. Dix on behalf of the Defendant Schacht.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, after the events of 30 June 1934, had the position of the Gestapo become so strong that no measures against it had any chance of succeeding?

GISEVIUS: I must answer this in the negative. The Secret State Police doubtlessly gained in power after 30 June, but because of the many excesses committed on 30 June, the opposition in the various ministries against the Secret State Police had become so strong that through collective action the majority of ministers could have used the events of 30 June to eliminate the Secret State Police. I personally made repeated efforts in that direction. With the knowledge of the Defendant Frick I went to see the Minister of Justice Gürtner and begged him many times to use the large number of illegal murders as a reason for action against the Secret State Police. I personally went to Von Reichenau also, who was Chief of the Armed Forces Offices at that time, and told him the same thing. I know that my friend Oster brought the files concerning this matter to the knowledge of Blomberg, and I wish to testify here that, in spite of the excesses of the 30 of June, it would have been quite possible at that time to return to law and order.

DR. PANNENBECKER: After that, what did the Reich Minister of the Interior do—that is, what did Frick do to steer the Secret State Police to a course of legality?

GISEVIUS: We started a struggle against the Secret State Police and tried at least to prevent Himmler from getting into the Reich Ministry of the Interior. Shortly before Göring had relinquished the Ministry of the Interior to Frick, he had made Himmler Chief of the Secret State Police in Prussia. Himmler, starting from that basis of power, had attempted to assume police power in the other Länder of the Reich. Frick tried to prevent that by taking the stand that he, as Reich Minister of the Interior, had an equal voice in appointing police functionaries in the Reich. At the same time, we tried to prevent an increase in the numbers of the Secret State Police by systematically refusing all requests by the Gestapo to increase its body of officials. Unfortunately here also, as always, Himmler found ways and means to overcome this. He went to the finance ministers of the individual states and told them that he needed funds for the guard troops of the concentration camps, for the so-called “Death’s-Head” units, and he drew up a scale whereby five SS men were to guard one prisoner. With these funds Himmler financed his Secret State Police, as, of course it rested with him how many men he wanted to imprison.

In other ways too, we in the Reich Ministry of the Interior attempted by all possible means to block the way of the Gestapo; but unfortunately, the numerous requests we sent to the Gestapo remained unanswered. Again it was Göring who forbade Himmler to answer and who protected Himmler when he refused to give any information in reply to our inquiries.

Finally, a last effort was made during my term of office in the Reich Ministry of the Interior. We tried to paralyze the Secret State Police at least to some extent by introducing into protective custody the right of supervision and complaint. If we could have achieved the right of review of all cases of protective custody, we would also have been able to get an insight into the individual actions of the Gestapo. A law was formulated, and this law was first submitted to the Ministerial Council of Prussia, the largest of the states. Again it was the Defendant Göring who, by all available means, opposed the passing of such a law. A very stormy cabinet meeting on the matter ended with my being asked to leave the Ministry of the Interior.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I have shown you a memorandum...

THE PRESIDENT: This will be a convenient time to break off.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, the Tribunal wishes me to say that it anticipates that you will put any questions which you think necessary with reference to the alleged intimidation of the witness when you come to cross-examine.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, Sir; thank you.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I should like to talk about the efforts which were made by the Ministry of the Interior to stop the arbitrary methods of the Gestapo, particularly with reference to the concentration camps. I therefore ask you to look at a memorandum which originates from the Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior. It is Document 775-PS, which I submitted this morning as Exhibit Frick-9 when I presented the evidence for Frick. It is Number 34 in the document book. Do you know that memorandum?

GISEVIUS: No, I don’t. It appears that this memorandum was drawn up after I had left the Ministry of the Interior. I assume this from the fact that in this memorandum the Reich Minister of the Interior appears to have already given up the fight, since he writes that as a matter of principle it should be made clear who bears the responsibility, and, if necessary, the responsibility for all the consequences must now—and I quote—“be borne by the Reichsführer SS who, in fact, has already claimed for himself the leadership of the Political Police in the Reich.”

At the time when I was at the Reich Ministry of the Interior, we tried particularly to prevent this from happening—namely, that Himmler should take over the Political Police. This is evidently a memorandum written about 6 months later when the terror had become still greater. The facts which are quoted here are known to me.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Can you say anything about this? Does it not deal with the Pünder case and the case of Esterwege, Oldenburg?

GISEVIUS: The Esterwege case can be told most briefly. It is one of many.

So far as I can recollect, an SA or local group leader was arrested by the Gestapo because he got excited about the conditions in the Papenburg concentration camp. This was not the first time either. I don’t know why the Defendant Frick picked on this particular case. Nevertheless, one day Daluege showed me one of those customary handwritten slips sent by Frick to Himmler. Frick had written to Himmler in the margin in large green letters that an SA man or local group leader, or whatever he was, had been arrested illegally, that this man must be released at once, and that if Himmler did that sort of thing again he, Frick, would institute criminal proceedings against Himmler for illegal detention.

I remember this story very well, because it was somewhat peculiar—considering the police conditions which existed at the time—that Himmler should be threatened by Frick with criminal proceedings, and Daluege made some sneering remarks to me regarding Frick’s action.

That is the one case.

THE PRESIDENT: What was the date?

GISEVIUS: This must have happened in the spring of 1935, I should say in March or April.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, do you know how Himmler reacted to that threat of criminal proceedings?

GISEVIUS: Yes. There was a second case. That is this Pünder affair which is mentioned here. He reacted similarly to both, and therefore it might be better if I first relate the Pünder affair in this connection. It concerned a Berlin attorney, who was a lawyer of high standing and legal adviser to the Swedish Embassy. The widow of the Ministerial Director Klausner, who had been murdered on 30 June, approached Pünder, as she wanted to sue the life insurance companies for payment of her annuity. But as Klausner had allegedly committed suicide on that day, no director of any insurance company dared pay the money to the widow. Consequently, the attorney had to sue. But the Nazis had made a law according to which all such awkward cases—awkward for the Nazis—were not to be tried in court: they were to be taken to a so-called Spruchkammer in the Reich Ministry of the Interior. If I am not mistaken, this law was called “Law for the Settlement of Civilian Claims.” They were never at a loss for fine-sounding names and titles at that time. This law forced the attorney to submit his claim to the court first. He was apprehensive. He went to the Ministry of the Interior and told the State Secretary, “If I comply with the law and sue, I shall be arrested.” The State Secretary in the Ministry of the Interior forced him to sue. Thereupon the very wise attorney went to the Ministry of Justice and told State Secretary Freisler that he did not want to sue as he would certainly be arrested by the Gestapo. The Secretary in the Ministry of Justice informed him that he would have to send in a claim in any case, but that nothing would happen as the courts had been instructed to pass such cases on without comment to the Spruchkammer in the Ministry of the Interior. Thereupon, the attorney sued and the Gestapo promptly arrested him for slander because he had stated that the Ministerial Director Klausner had not met his death by suicide. This was for us a classical example of what we had come to in Germany as far as protective custody was concerned.

I had taken the liberty of selecting this case from among hundreds, or I should say thousands of similar cases and of suggesting to Frick that this matter should be brought to the notice not only of Göring, but of Hitler as well this time. Then I sat down and drafted a letter or a report from Frick to Hitler, which also went to the Ministry of Justice. There were more than five pages, and I discussed from every angle the facts concerning Ministerial Director Klausner’s suicide, with the assistance of the SS, and the ensuing lawsuit. This report to Hitler concluded with Frick’s remark that the time had now come to have the problem of protective custody settled by the Reich and by lawful means.

And now I answer your question regarding what happened. It roughly coincided with Frick’s letter to Himmler regarding deprivation of liberty. Himmler took these two letters to a meeting of Reichsleiter, that is, the so-called ministers of the movement, and he put the question to them, whether it was proper to allow one Reichsleiter, namely Frick, to write such letters to another Reichsleiter, that is, to Himmler. These worthy gentlemen answered this question in the negative and reprimanded Frick. Then Himmler went to the meeting of the Prussian cabinet where the protective custody law, which I mentioned, was being discussed.

Perhaps I may draw your attention to the fact that at that time it was a rare thing for Himmler to be allowed to attend a meeting of Prussian ministers. There was a time in Germany—and it was quite a long period—when Himmler was not the powerful man which he afterwards became because the bourgeois ministers and the generals were cowards and gave way to him. Thus, it was a rare thing for Himmler to be allowed to attend a meeting of the Prussian Ministerial Council at all, and that particular meeting ended by my being discharged from the Ministry of the Interior.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I should like to quote to you two sentences from the memorandum which I have just shown to you—that is, 775-PS—and ask you to tell me whether the facts are stated correctly. I quote:

“In this connection, I draw your attention to the case of the attorney Pünder, who was taken into protective custody together with his colleagues, merely because, after making inquiry at the Reich Ministry of the Interior and at our ministry, he had filed a suit, which he was obliged to do under a Reich law.”

GISEVIUS: Yes, that is correct.

DR. PANNENBECKER: And then the other sentence. I quote:

“I mention here only the case of a teacher and Kreisleiter at Esterwege who was kept in protective custody for 8 days because...”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, where is that sentence which you have just read?

DR. PANNENBECKER: In the Frick Document Book under Number 34, second sentence.

THE PRESIDENT: Which page?

DR. PANNENBECKER: In my Document Book it is Page 80.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking of Paragraph 3 on Page 70?

DR. PANNENBECKER: No, Mr. President, I have just discovered that this particular sentence in the document has not been translated. Perhaps I may read one more sentence which apparently has been translated. It can be found in Paragraph 3 of the same document.

“I mention here only the case of a teacher and Kreisleiter at Esterwege who was kept in protective custody for 8 days because, as it turned out afterwards, he had sent a correct report to the head of his district concerning abuses by the SS.”

GISEVIUS: Yes, that corresponds to the facts.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, did you yourself have any support from Frick for your personal protection?

GISEVIUS: Yes. At that time, of course, I was such a suspect in the eyes of the Secret State Police that all sorts of evil designs were being made against me. Frick gave an order, therefore, that I should be protected in my home by the local police. A direct telephone from my home to the police station was installed, and I had only to pick up the receiver and someone at least would know in case I had surprise visitors. Furthermore, the Gestapo used their usual methods against me by accusing me of criminal acts. Apparently the files were taken to Hitler in the Reich Chancellery, and Frick intervened, and it was soon discovered that this concerned a namesake of mine! Frick said quite openly on the telephone that these fellows—as he put it—had once more lied to the Führer. This was the signal for the Gestapo, who were, of course, listening in on this telephone conversation, that they could no longer use these methods.

Then we advanced one step further through Heydrich. He was so kind as to inform me by telephone that I probably had forgotten that he could pursue his personal and political opponents to their very graves. I made an official report of that threat to Frick, and Frick, either personally or through Daluege, intervened with Heydrich, and there is no doubt that he thereby rendered me a considerable service, for Heydrich never liked it very much when his murderous intentions were talked about openly.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, would then, at least a minister of the Reich have no cause for alarm about his own personal safety if he tried to fight against the terror of the Gestapo and Himmler?

GISEVIUS: If you ask me that now, I must say that Schacht was the only one who was put into a concentration camp. But it is true that we all asked ourselves just how long it would take for a Reich Minister to be sent to a concentration camp. As regards Frick, he told me confidentially, as far back as 1934, that the Reich Governor of Bavaria had given him reliable information, according to which he was to be murdered while taking a holiday in the country, in Bavaria, and he asked me whether I could find out any details. At that time I went with my friend Nebe to Bavaria by car, and we made a secret investigation which, at any rate, proved that such plans had been discussed. But, as I said, Frick survived.

DR. PANNENBECKER: I have no further questions.

DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): May I ask you to decide on the following question? I have called Gisevius. He is a witness called by me, and this is, therefore, not a subsequent question which I am putting, but I am examining him as my witness. I am of the opinion, therefore, that it is right and expedient that I should now follow up the examination by my colleague Pannenbecker, and that my other colleagues who also want to put questions follow the two of us. I ask the Tribunal to decide on this question.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you the only defendants’ counsel who asked for this witness to be called on behalf of your client?

DR. DIX: I called him.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know; but are you the only defendants’ counsel who asked to call him?

DR. DIX: I believe, Sir, I am the only one who has called him.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Dix, you may examine him next.

DR. DIX: Dr. Gisevius, Dr. Pannenbecker has already mentioned the fact that you have published a book entitled _To the Bitter End_. I have submitted quotations from that book to the Tribunal as evidence, and they have been accepted as documentary evidence by the Tribunal. For this reason I now ask you: Are the contents of that book historically true; did you write it only from memory, or is it based on notes which you made at the time?

GISEVIUS: I can say here to the best of my knowledge, and with a good conscience, that the contents of the book are historically true. In Germany I always made personal notes as far as it was possible. I have said here that my dead friend Oster had in the War Ministry a considerable collection of documents to which I had access at all times. In writing about any important matter in which I made reference to friends in the opposition group, I never did so without having first consulted them many times about it. And since 1938 I have been in Switzerland, first as a visitor and later on for professional reasons, and there I was able to continue my notes undisturbed. The volume which has been submitted to the Tribunal was practically completed in 1941, and in 1942 had already been shown to several friends of mine abroad.

THE PRESIDENT: If he says that the book is true, that is enough.

DR. DIX: Since when have you known the Defendant Schacht?

GISEVIUS: I have known the Defendant Schacht since the end of 1934.

DR. DIX: On what occasion and in what circumstances did you meet him?

GISEVIUS: I met him when I worked in the Reich Ministry of the Interior and was collecting material against the Gestapo. I was consulted by various parties, who either feared trouble with the Gestapo or who had had trouble. Thus, one day Schacht, who was then Minister for Economy, sent a man to me whom he trusted—it was his plenipotentiary Herbert Göring—to ask me whether I would help Schacht. He, Schacht, had for some time felt that he was being watched by Himmler and the Gestapo and lately had had good reason to suspect that an informer, or at least a microphone, had been installed in his own house. I was asked whether I could help in this case. I agreed to do so and, with a microphone expert from the Reich post administration, on the following morning I visited Schacht’s ministerial residence. We went with the microphone expert from room to room and—did not have to search very long. It had been done very badly by the Gestapo. They had mounted the microphone all too visibly and, moreover, had engaged a domestic servant to spy on Schacht. She had a listening device attached to the house telephone installed in her own bedroom, which was easy to discover, and so we were able to unmask the whole thing. It was on that occasion that I first spoke to Schacht.

DR. DIX: And what was the subject of your conversation? Did you at that time already speak about political matters to him?

GISEVIUS: We spoke about the matters and the somewhat peculiar situation which had brought us together. Schacht knew that I was very active in opposing the Gestapo, and I, for my part, was aware that Schacht was known for his utterances against the SS and the Gestapo on numberless occasions. Many middle class people in Germany placed their hopes in him as the only strong minister who could protect them if need be. Particularly the industrialists and business men, who were very important at the time, hoped for, and often found his support. So that it was quite natural that immediately during the first conversation I told him everything that was troubling me.

The main problem at that time was the removal of the Gestapo and the removal of the Nazi regime. Therefore our conversation was highly political, and Schacht listened to everything with an open mind, which made it possible for me to tell him everything.

DR. DIX: And what did he say?

GISEVIUS: I told Schacht that we were inevitably drifting towards radicalism, and that it was doubtful whether, the way things were going, the end of the present course would not be inflation, and, that being so, whether it would not be better if he himself were to bring about that inflation. That would enable him to know beforehand the exact date of such a crisis, and together with the generals and anti-radical ministers make timely arrangements to meet the situation when it became really serious. I said to him, “You should bring about that inflation; you yourself will then be able to determine the course of events instead of allowing others to take things out of your hands.” He replied, “You see, that is the difference which separates us: You want the crash, and I do not want it.”

DR. DIX: From that, one might draw the conclusion that at that time Schacht still believed that the crash could be averted. What reasons did he give for this view?

GISEVIUS: I think that at the time the word “crash” was too strong for him. Schacht was thinking along the traditional lines of former governments, but he saw that here and there a change had come about—especially since Brüning’s time—by emergency laws and certain dictatorial measures. But as far as I could see at the time, and during all our subsequent conversations, uppermost in his mind was still the idea of a Reich government which met and passed resolutions, where the majority of ministers were bourgeois, and where at a given moment—which might be sooner or later—one might steer a radically changed course.

DR. DIX: What was his attitude towards Hitler at that time?

GISEVIUS: It was quite clear to me that at that time he still thought very highly of Hitler. I might almost say that at that time Hitler was to him a man of irreproachable integrity.

THE PRESIDENT: What time are you speaking of?

GISEVIUS: I am now speaking of the time of my first meetings with Schacht, at the end of 1934 and the beginning of 1935.

DR. DIX: What was your profession at that time? Where were you? Where did you work?

GISEVIUS: I had succeeded in leaving the Reich Ministry of the Interior in the meantime and had been transferred to the Reich Criminal Office, which was in the process of being formed. When we realized that the Gestapo were extending their power, we believed we could establish some sort of police apparatus side by side with the Gestapo—that is, purely criminal police. My friend Nebe had been made Chief of the Reich Criminal Department to build up a police apparatus there which would enable us to resist the Gestapo if need be. The Ministry of the Interior gave me the task of organizing and sent me to this government office about to be formed, to give advice for its establishment.

DR. DIX: We now slowly approach the year 1936—the year of the Olympic Games. Did you have a special assignment there?

GISEVIUS: Yes. At the beginning of 1936 it was decided to make me Chief of Staff of the police at the Central Police Department on the occasion of the Olympic Games in Berlin. That was an entirely nonpolitical and technical affair. Count Helldorf, who was then Commissioner of the Police, thought that because of my connections with the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice this would be useful. But I was quickly removed from this position. Heydrich discovered it and intervened.

DR. DIX: Your book contains a letter from Heydrich, which I do not propose to read in its entirety. It is addressed to Count Helldorf and calls his attention to the fact that, during the time of your office at the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, you always put every possible difficulty in the way of the Secret State Police, and that relations with you had been extremely unpleasant. He continues:

“I fear that his participation in the police preparations for the Olympic Games, even in this sphere, would not promote co-operation with the Secret State Police, and it should, therefore, be considered whether Gisevius should not be replaced by another suitable official. Heil Hitler. Yours, Heydrich.”

Is that the letter which affected your position?

GISEVIUS: Yes. That was the reason why I was also dismissed from that job. I had to wait only a few more weeks and Himmler became the Chief of Police in the Reich. And on the very day that Himmler became the Reich Police Chief I was definitely removed from any kind of police service.

DR. DIX: And where did you go?

GISEVIUS: After my discharge from the police service I was sent to the government in Münster, where I was assigned to the price control office.

DR. DIX: Could you, while in the price control office in Münster, continue your political work in any way and make the necessary contacts?

GISEVIUS: Yes. I had plenty of opportunity to make official journeys. I made a thorough study not only of prices, but also of the political situation, in the Rhineland and in Westphalia, and went to Berlin nearly every week so as to keep in touch with my friends.

DR. DIX: Were you in touch with Schacht?

GISEVIUS: From that time on I met him very nearly every week.

DR. DIX: Did you, from Münster, make contacts with other persons in prominent positions to further the work you were doing?

GISEVIUS: Yes. One of the reasons why I went to Münster was that the president of the province, Freiherr Von Luening, was a man of the old school—clean, correct, a professional civil servant, and politically a man who upheld law and order. He, too, ended on the gallows after 20 July 1944. I also got into touch in Düsseldorf with Regierungspräsident State Secretary Schmidt, and immediately upon my arrival in Münster I did everything to get into touch with the commanding general there, Von Kluge, who later became Field Marshal. In this I succeeded. There, too, I tried at once to continue my old political discussions.

DR. DIX: We shall revert to General Kluge later on. I now ask you this: At that time when you were working in Münster, did you perceive a change in Schacht’s attitude towards the regime, and in his attitude towards Hitler, as distinct from what you described to the Tribunal as existing in 1934?

GISEVIUS: Yes. By a steady process Schacht withdrew himself further and further from the Nazis. If I were asked to describe the phases, I would say that in the beginning—that is to say, in 1935—he was of the opinion that the Gestapo only was the main evil and that Hitler was the man who was the statesman—or could at least become the statesman—and that Göring was the conservative strong man whose services one ought to use, and could use, to oppose the terror of the Gestapo and the State by establishing orderly conditions. I contradicted Schacht vehemently regarding his views about the Defendant Göring. I warned him. I told him that in my opinion Göring was the worst of all, precisely because he was hiding under the middle class, conservative cloak. I implored him not to effect his economic policy with Göring, since this could only come to a bad end.

Schacht—for whom much may be said, but not that he is a good psychologist—denied this emphatically. Only then in the course of 1936 he began to realize more and more that Göring was not supporting him against the Party, but that Göring supported the radical elements against him, only then did Schacht’s attitude begin to change gradually, and he came to regard not only Himmler but also Göring as a great danger. For him Hitler was still the one man with whom one could create policy, provided the majority of the cabinet could succeed in bringing him over to the side of law and order.

DR. DIX: Are you now talking approximately of the time when Schacht was handing over the foreign currency control to Göring?

GISEVIUS: Yes. That was the moment when I warned him and, as I said, he became apprehensive about Göring and realized that Göring was not supporting him against the radical elements. That was the time I meant.

DR. DIX: By handing over the foreign currency control to Göring he showed a negative, a yielding attitude. But now that he was gradually changing his views, did he not have any positive ideas as to how to bring about a change?

GISEVIUS: Yes. He was entirely taken up with the idea, like many other people in Germany at that time—I might almost say the majority of the people in Germany—the idea that everything depended on strengthening the middle class influence in the cabinet, and above all, and as a prerequisite, that the Reich Ministry of War, headed by Blomberg, should be brought over to the side of the middle class ministers. Schacht had, if you want to put it like that, the very constructive idea that one must concentrate on the fight for Blomberg. That was precisely where I agreed with him for it was the same battle which I, with my friend Oster, had tried to fight in my small department, and in a far more modest way.

DR. DIX: Had he already done anything to achieve that end at that time?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. DIX: As a cue I mention the steps taken by Dreyse, the Vice President of the Reichsbank.

GISEVIUS: Yes. First of all, he tried to establish close contact with the competent expert in the Ministry of War, General Thomas, who later on became Chief of the Army Economic Staff. Thomas was a man who, right from the beginning, was skeptical about National Socialism, or even opposed it. As by a miracle, he later on emerged from the concentration camp alive.

Schacht at that time began to fight for Blomberg through Thomas. I took part in that fight because Schacht used me as an intermediary through Oster, and I was also informed about these connections through Herbert Göring. Moreover, I learned about these things from many discussions with Thomas. I can testify here that, even at that time, it was extraordinarily difficult to establish connection between Schacht and Blomberg, and I was naïve enough to tell Schacht repeatedly simply to telephone Blomberg and ask him for an interview. Schacht replied that Blomberg would certainly be evasive and that the only way was to prepare the meeting via Oster and Thomas. This was done.

I know how much we expected from the many discussions Schacht had with Blomberg. I was, of course, not present as a witness, but we discussed these conferences in great detail at the time. I took notes and was very pleased when I found that these recollections of mine tallied absolutely with the recollections of Thomas, whose handwritten notes I have in my possession. Thomas was repeatedly reprimanded by Blomberg and was told not to bother him with these qualms on Schacht’s part. He was told that Schacht was querulous, and that he, Thomas, should...

THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to go into all this detail, Dr. Dix?

DR. DIX: Yes, I believe, Your Lordship, that it will be necessary. This change from a convinced follower of Hitler to a resolute opponent and revolutionary, even a conspirator, is of course so complicated a psychological process that I believe that I cannot spare the Tribunal the details of that development. I shall certainly be economical with nonessential matters, but I should be grateful if the witness could be given a certain amount of freedom during this part of the testimony, as he is the only witness I have on this subject.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal thinks that you can give the essence of the matter without giving it in this great detail. You must try, at any rate, to give as little unnecessary detail as possible.

DR. DIX: I shall be glad to do that.

Well, then, Dr. Gisevius, you have heard the wish of the Tribunal and you will no doubt bring out only the essential facts.

Is there any other essential fact in the affair of Blomberg via Thomas that you wish to state, or can we conclude that chapter?

GISEVIUS: No, I shall now try to give a brief description of the other channels which were tried. I do not know how much the Tribunal wishes to hear about it, but I will say that Schacht tried to approach Baron Von Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. As, however, he was very difficult to approach, he sent his Reichsbank vice president, Dreyse, to establish the contact. We also made one big attempt to approach Fritsch and Blomberg through General Von Kluge.

DR. DIX: And, briefly, what was the object of that step? What were the generals supposed to do—I mean these generals mentioned by you?

GISEVIUS: This step had as its object to make it clear to Blomberg that things were taking a more and more extreme turn, that the economy of the country had deteriorated, and that the Gestapo terror must be stopped by all possible means.

DR. DIX: So that at the time there were only misgivings about the economy and the terror which reigned—not about the danger of war, not yet?

GISEVIUS: No, only the fear of extremism.

DR. DIX: We now turn to 1937. You know that was the year of Schacht’s dismissal as Reich Minister of Economy. Did Schacht say anything to you as to why he remained in office as President of the Reichsbank?

GISEVIUS: Yes. I witnessed in detail the struggle for his release as Reich Minister of Economy. On the one side there was his attempt to be released from the Ministry, and I think I am right in saying that this was not so easy. Schacht told Lammers one day that if he did not receive the official notification of his release by a certain date, he would consider himself dismissed and inform the press accordingly. On that occasion scores of people implored Schacht not to resign. Throughout those years, whenever a man wanted to resign from his post, there was always the question whether his successor might not steer an even more radical course. Schacht was implored not to leave, lest radicalism should gain the upper hand in the economic field also. I only mention here the name of Ley, as head of the labor front. Schacht replied that he could not bear the responsibility, but that he hoped he would be able as President of the Reichsbank to keep one foot in, as he expressed it. He imagined that he would be able to have a general view of the overall economic situation and that through the Reichsbank he would be able to conserve certain economic-political measures. I can testify that many men, who later became members of the opposition, implored Schacht to take that line and to keep at least one foot in.

DR. DIX: Was that decision of his not influenced by his attitude to, and his judgment concerning some of the generals particularly Colonel General Fritsch?

GISEVIUS: Yes, that is quite right. One of the greatest disasters was the fact that so many people in Germany imagined that Fritsch was a strong man. I remember that not only high-ranking officers but also high ministerial officials told me over and over again that there was no need to worry: Fritsch was on the march; Fritsch was only waiting for the right moment; Fritsch would one fine day bring about a revolt and end the terror. General Von Kluge, for instance, told me this as a fact—and he was a close friend of Fritsch. And so we all lived in the completely mistaken belief—as I can now say—that one day the great revolt would come of the Armed Forces against the SS. But instead of this, the exact opposite occurred, namely, the bloodless revolt of the SS, the famous Fritsch crisis, the result of which was that not only Fritsch was relieved of his post but that the entire Armed Forces leadership was beheaded, politically speaking, which meant that now all our hope...

DR. DIX: Forgive me if I interrupt you, but we shall come to the Fritsch crisis later, which was in 1938...

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. DIX: I should like now to finish speaking about Schacht’s efforts and actions in 1937 and to ask you—it is mentioned in your book—whether some unsuccessful attempt to approach General Von Kluge and a journey by Schacht to Münster did not play a part?

GISEVIUS: Yes. I thought that I was supposed to be brief about that. Although Schacht made a great effort to get in touch with Fritsch, it was not possible to arrange a conversation in Berlin. It was secretly arranged that they should meet in Münster, as General Von Kluge was too scared to meet Schacht publicly at the time. There was a lot of beating about the bush, the net result was that the two gentlemen did not meet. It was not possible to bring together a Reich minister and a commanding general. It was all most depressing.

DR. DIX: Where were you at the time? What were you doing? Were you still at Münster, or was there a change?

GISEVIUS: I was still in Münster at that time, but in the middle of 1937 Schacht wanted me to return to Berlin. The greater his disappointment, the more he was inclined to take seriously my warnings against an increasing radicalism and an SS revolt.

By the autumn of 1937 things in Germany had reached such a point that everybody in the opposition group felt that evil plans were being made. We thought at that time that there would be another day of blood like 30 June, and we were trying to protect ourselves. It was Schacht who got in touch with Canaris through Oster and expressed the wish that I should be brought back to Berlin in one way or another. At that time there was no government office which would have given me a post. I had no other choice but to take a long leave from the civil service, alleging that I wanted to devote myself to economic studies. Schacht, in agreement with Canaris and Oster, arranged for me to be given such a post in a Bremen factory, but I was not allowed to show myself there, and so I came to Berlin to place myself completely at the disposal of my friends for future happenings.

DR. DIX: Your Lordship, we are now coming to January 1938 and the Fritsch crisis. I do not think that it would be helpful to interrupt that part of the witness’ testimony. If I may, I would suggest that Your Lordship now adjourn the session, or else we would have to go on at least another half hour.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, we’ll adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 25 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]

ONE HUNDRED AND FOURTEENTH DAY Thursday, 25 April 1946

_Morning Session_

DR. DIX: Dr. Gisevius! Yesterday we got as far as the year 1938. You had returned to Berlin to a fictitious position which Schacht had arranged for you and you were now in continuous contact with your political confidants, Schacht, Oster, Canaris, and Nebe. You testified last that within your circle, at that time, you all had the impression that a coup was imminent.

Now, we really come to the so-called Fritsch crisis; in my opinion the decisive, inner-political first step toward the war. Will you please describe the entire course and the background of that crisis, especially bearing in mind the fact that while that crisis was taking place the march into Austria was made and always remembering, of course, Schacht’s position and activities which are the main concern.

GISEVIUS: First, I shall describe the course of the crisis as such; and it is correct that all my friends considered it the first decisive step toward the war. I shall assemble the facts one by one. I consider it advisable, in order not to confuse the picture, to leave Schacht out for the time being, because the facts as such are extensive enough. Furthermore, I will not indicate in the beginning the source of our information or describe my own experiences; rather I shall wait until I am questioned on those subjects.

On 12 January 1938 the German public was surprised by the report that Field Marshal Von Blomberg, at that time Reich Minister for War, had married. No details about his wife nor any photographs were published. A few days later one single picture appeared, a photograph of the Marshal and his new wife in front of the monkey cage at the Leipzig Zoo. Malicious rumors about the past life of the Marshal’s wife began to circulate in Berlin. A few days later there appeared on the desk of the Police Commissioner in Berlin a thick file which contained the following information: Marshal Von Blomberg’s wife had been a previously convicted prostitute who had been registered as a prostitute in the files of seven large German cities; she was in the Berlin criminal files. I myself have seen the fingerprints and the pictures. She had also been sentenced by the Berlin courts for distributing indecent pictures. The Commissioner of the Police in Berlin was obliged to submit this file, by official channels, to the Chief of the Police, Himmler.

DR. DIX: Excuse me, please; who was the Commissioner of the Police in Berlin at that time?

GISEVIUS: The Commissioner of the Police in Berlin was Count Helldorf. Count Helldorf realized that if that material were transmitted to the Reichsführer SS it would place the Wehrmacht in a very embarrassing position. Himmler would then have in his possession the material he needed to ruin Blomberg’s reputation and career, and strike a blow at the leadership of the Armed Forces. Helldorf took this file to the closest collaborator of Marshal Blomberg, the then Chief of the Armed Forces Department, Keitel, who at that time had just become related to Marshal Blomberg through the marriage of their respective children. Marshal Keitel, or Generaloberst Keitel as he was at that time, looked through the file carefully and demanded that Police Commissioner Helldorf should hush up the entire scandal and suppress the file.

DR. DIX: Perhaps you will tell the Tribunal the source of your information.

GISEVIUS: I got my information from Count Helldorf, who described the entire affair to me, and from Nebe, Oberregierungsrat of the police headquarters in Berlin at that time, and later Reich Criminal Director.

Keitel refused to let Blomberg bear any of the consequences. He refused to inform the Chief of the General Staff Beck, or the Chief of the Army Generaloberst Von Fritsch. He sent Count Helldorf to Göring with the file. Helldorf submitted the entire file to Defendant Göring. Göring asserted he knew nothing about the various sections of the criminal records and the previous sentences of Von Blomberg’s wife. Nevertheless in that first conversation, and in later discussions, he admitted that he already knew the following:

First, that Marshal Blomberg had already asked Göring several months ago whether it was permissible to have an affair with a woman of low birth, and shortly thereafter he had asked Göring whether he would help him to obtain a dispensation to marry this lady “with a past” as he put it. Later Blomberg came again and told Göring that this lady of his choice unfortunately had another lover and he must ask Göring to help him, Blomberg, to get rid of that lover.

DR. DIX: Excuse me. Göring told that to Helldorf and you learned it from Helldorf?

GISEVIUS: Yes, that is what Göring said, and in the further course of the investigation we learned of it from other sources too. Göring then got rid of that lover by giving him foreign currency and sending him off to South America. In spite of that, Göring did not inform Hitler of this incident. He even went with Hitler, as a witness, to the wedding of Marshal Blomberg on 12 January. I should like to point out here...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal would wish to know how you suggest that these matters, which appear to be personal, are relevant to the charges and in what way they affect the Defendant Schacht or the Defendant Göring or the Defendant Frick?

DR. DIX: I am here only to serve the interests, the rightful interests, of the Defendant Schacht. It is necessary to present that crisis in all its horribleness in order to conceive what an effect, what a revolutionary effect, it had on Schacht and his circle as far as the regime was concerned, I have already said earlier that the Fritsch crisis was the turning point in the transformation of Schacht from a follower and, to a certain extent, an admirer of Hitler to a deadly enemy who had designs on his life. The Tribunal cannot understand this revulsion if the Tribunal does not receive the same impression as Schacht had at that time. Indeed, I in no way desire to wash dirty linen here unnecessarily. My decision to put these questions and to ask the witness to describe the Fritsch crisis in full detail is only motivated by the fact that the further development of Schacht, and of the Fritsch crisis, or let us say, the Oster-Canaris circle to which Schacht belonged, cannot be understood if one does not realize the monstrous circumstances of that crisis. In the face of these facts, however disagreeable, one must decide to bring these sometimes very personal matters to the attention of the Tribunal. Unfortunately I cannot dispense with it in my defense. It is the alpha and omega of my defense.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If the Tribunal please, it might be helpful at this time to know our position in reference to this line of testimony, if it is to be considered whether admissible or not now.

I should desire, if this incident were not brought out, to bring it out upon cross-examination upon several aspects. One is that it shows the background of the incident of yesterday, which I think is important in appraising the truthfulness of testimony in this case.

Another thing is that it bears upon the conspiracy to seize power. There were certain men in Germany that these conspirators had to get rid of. Some of them they could kill safely. Some of them, as we see from the Röhm Purge, when they went to killing they aroused some opposition. They had to strike down by other means, and the means they used against Fritsch and Blomberg show the conspiracy to seize power and to get rid of the men who might stand in the way of aggressive warfare.

It will appear, I think, that Fritsch and Blomberg were among the reliants of the German people in allowing these Nazis to get as far as they did, believing that here at least were two men who would guard their interests; and the method by which those men were stricken down and removed from the scene we would consider an important part of the conspiracy story, and I would ask to go into it on cross-examination.

That might perhaps be material to the Court in deciding whether it should proceed now.

DR. DIX: May I add one more thing?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Dix.

The Tribunal thinks, in view of what you have said and what Mr. Justice Jackson has said, that your examination must continue and you will no doubt try to confine it as much as you can to the political aspects of the matter.

DR. DIX: Of course. But the personal matters are of such political importance in this case that they cannot be omitted.

Well then, Dr. Gisevius, you understand the difficulties of the situation. We want only to give evidence, and not to bring in anything sensational as an end in itself. However, when it is necessary to speak on such subjects in order to explain the development to the Tribunal, I ask you to speak quite frankly.

GISEVIUS: I ask the Tribunal also to realize my difficulties. I myself do not like speaking about these things.

I must add that Göring was the only head of the Investigation Department. That was the institution which took overall telephone control in the Third Reich. This Investigation Department was not satisfied, as has been described here, with merely tapping telephone conversations and decoding messages; but it had its own intelligence service, all the way down to its own employees, for obtaining information. It was, therefore, also quite possible to obtain confidential information about Marshal Von Blomberg’s wife. When Helldorf gave the file to Göring, Göring considered himself compelled to give that file to Hitler. Hitler had a nervous breakdown and decided to dismiss Marshal Blomberg immediately. Hitler’s first thought, as he told the generals later at a public meeting, was to appoint Generaloberst Von Fritsch as Blomberg’s successor. The moment he made his decision known, Göring and Himmler reminded him that it could not be done as according to a file of the year 1935 Fritsch was badly incriminated.

DR. DIX: Excuse me, Doctor. What is the source of your information regarding this conversation between Hitler and the generals and also Göring’s statement?

GISEVIUS: Several generals who took part in that meeting told me about it, and I have said already that in the course of events, which I have yet to describe, Hitler himself made many statements. We also had in our possession until 20 July the original documents of the Supreme Court-Martial which convened later.

The file of 1935, which was submitted to Hitler in January 1938, referred to the fact that in 1934 the Gestapo conceived the idea of prosecuting, among other enemies of the state, homosexuals as criminals. In the search for evidence the Gestapo visited the penitentiaries and asked convicted inmates, who had blackmailed homosexuals, for evidence and for the names of homosexuals. One of the inmates reported a terrible story, which was really so horrible that I will not repeat it here. It will suffice to say that this prisoner believed the man in question had been a certain Herr Von Fritsch or Frisch. The prisoner could not remember the correct name. The Gestapo then turned over these files to Hitler in 1935. Hitler was indignant about the contents. Talking to the generals, he said he did not want to know about such a disgusting affair. Hitler ordered the files to be burned immediately.

Now, in January 1938, Göring and Himmler reminded Hitler of these files; and it was left to Heydrich’s cleverness to submit to Hitler again these files, which had allegedly been burned in 1935 and which had been completed, in the meantime, by extensive investigations. Hitler believed, as he said to the generals at the time, that after having been so disappointed in Blomberg, many nasty things could be expected from Fritsch also. The Defendant Göring offered to bring the convict from the prison to Hitler and the Reich Chancellery. At Karinhall, Göring had previously threatened this convict with death if he did not abide by his statements.

DR. DIX: How do you know that?

GISEVIUS: That was mentioned at the Supreme Court-Martial. Then Fritsch was summoned to the Reich Chancellery and Hitler told him of the accusations which had been made against him. Fritsch, a gentleman through and through, had received a confidential warning from Hitler’s adjutant; but it had been so vague that Fritsch came to the Reich Chancellery extremely alarmed. He had no idea of what Hitler was accusing him. Indignantly he denied the crime he had allegedly committed. In the presence of Göring, he gave Hitler his word of honor that all the accusations were false. But Hitler went to the nearest door, opened it, and the convict entered, raised his arm, pointed to Fritsch and said, “That is he.”

Fritsch was speechless. He was only able to ask that a judicial investigation should be made. Hitler demanded his immediate resignation; and on condition that Fritsch left in silence, he agreed to allow the matter to rest where it was. Fritsch appealed to Beck, the Chief of the General Staff. Chief of the General Staff Beck intervened with Hitler. A hard struggle ensued for a judicial investigation of these terrible accusations against Fritsch. That struggle lasted about a week. There were dramatic disputes in the Reich Chancellery. At the end came the famous 4 February when the generals, who until that day—that is to say, 10 days after the dismissal of Blomberg and the relief of Fritsch—were completely unaware of the fact that both their superiors were no longer in office, were ordered to come to Berlin. Hitler personally presented the files to the generals in such a way that they also were completely confused and said they were satisfied that the affair should be investigated by the courts. At the same time Hitler surprised the generals...

DR. DIX: You know of this only through the participants of that meeting?

GISEVIUS: From the participants of the meeting, yes.

At the same time Hitler surprised the generals with the announcement that they had a new Commander-in-Chief, Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch. Some of the generals had, in the meantime, been relieved of their posts; and also on the evening previous to that announcement, a report appeared in the newspapers according to which Hitler, under the pretense of drawing together the reins of government, had dismissed the Foreign Minister, Von Neurath, effected a change in the Ministry of Economics, relieved a number of diplomats of their posts, and then, as an appendix to that report, announced a change in the War Ministry and in the leadership of the Army.

Then a new struggle arose, which lasted several weeks, regarding the convening of the court-martial which should decide as to the reinstatement of Generaloberst Von Fritsch. This was for all of us the moment when we believed we would be able to prove before a German supreme court the methods the Gestapo used to rid themselves of their political adversaries. This was a unique opportunity of being able to question witnesses under oath regarding the manner in which the entire intrigue had been contrived. Therefore we set to work to prepare for our parts in this trial.

DR. DIX: What do you mean by “we” in this case?

GISEVIUS: There was above all one man, who as an honest lawyer and judge was himself a participator of this Supreme Court-Martial. This was the Judge Advocate General at that time, and later Chief Judge of the Army, Ministerial Director Dr. Sack. This man believed that he owed it to the spirit of law to contribute in every possible way toward exposing these matters. This he did, but he also paid with his life after 20 July.

In the course of this investigation the judges of this Supreme Court-Martial questioned the Gestapo witnesses. They investigated the records of the Gestapo; they made local investigations; and, with the aid of the criminologist Nebe, it was not long before they discovered definitely that the entire affair had concerned a double; it was not Generaloberst Von Fritsch but a retired Captain Von Frisch who had been pensioned long before.

In the course of that investigation the judges established another fact; they were able to prove that the Gestapo had been in the residence of this double Von Frisch as early as 15 January and had questioned his housekeeper. May I compare the two dates once more. On 15 January the Gestapo had proof that Fritsch was not guilty. On 24 January the Defendant Göring brings the convict and witness for the prosecution into the Reich Chancellery in order to incriminate Fritsch, the Generaloberst. We believed that here indeed we were confronted with a plot of incredible proportions, and we believed that now even the skeptical general must see that it was not only in the lower ranks of the Gestapo that there was scheming and contriving, invisible and secret, without the knowledge of any of the ministers or of the Reich Chancellery and which would compel any man of honor and justice to intervene. This was the reason why we now formed into a larger group and why we saw that we now no longer needed to collect material about the Gestapo in secret. That, precisely, was the great difficulty we had had to deal with. We heard a great deal; but if we had passed on that evidence, we would in every case have exposed to the terror of the Gestapo those men who had given us the evidence.

Now we could proceed legally, and so we started our efforts to persuade Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch to submit the necessary evidence to the Supreme Court-Martial.

DR. DIX: Whom do you mean by “we”?

GISEVIUS: At that time there was a group, among whom I must mention Dr. Schacht, who was then extremely active and who went to Admiral Raeder, to Brauchitsch, to Rundstedt, and to Gürtner, and tried to explain everywhere that the great crisis had now arisen; that we now had to act; that it was now the task of the generals to rid us of this regime of terror.

But I must mention one more name in that connection. In 1936 Schacht had already introduced me to Dr. Goerdeler. I had the honor of traveling the same road with that brave man from then on until 20 July. And now I have mentioned here for the first time, in this room where so many terrible things are made known, the name of a German who was a brave and fearless fighter for freedom, justice, and decency and who, I believe, will one day be an example, and not only to Germany, to prove that one can also do one’s duty faithfully until death, even under the terror of the Gestapo.

This Dr. Goerdeler, who had always been a fearless and untiring fighter, had in those days unequaled courage. Like Dr. Schacht he went from one ministry to another, from one general to the next, and he also believed that now the hour had come when we could achieve a united front of decent people led by the generals. Brauchitsch did not refuse then. He did not refuse to act at Goerdeler’s request. In fact he assured Goerdeler of his co-operation in a revolt with almost religious fervor.

And as a witness I may mention that Brauchitsch also solemnly assured me that he would now use this opportunity to fight against the Gestapo. However, Brauchitsch made one condition, and that condition was accepted by the generals as a whole. Brauchitsch said, “Hitler is still such a popular man; we are afraid of the Hitler myth. We want to give to the German people and to the world the final proof by means of the Supreme Court-Martial and its verdict.” Therefore Brauchitsch postponed his action until the day when the verdict of the Supreme Court-Martial should be given.

The Supreme Court-Martial met. It began its session. The session was suddenly interrupted under dramatic circumstances. I must add that Hitler appointed the Defendant Göring as president of that Supreme Court-Martial. And now the Supreme Court-Martial, under the chairmanship of Göring, convened. I know from Nebe that Göring during the preceding days had had consultations with Himmler and Heydrich. I know that Heydrich said to Nebe, “this Supreme Court-Martial will be the end of my career.”

DR. DIX: Did Nebe tell you that?

GISEVIUS: Yes, on the same day. The Supreme Court-Martial would be the great danger for the Gestapo. And now the Supreme Court-Martial sat for several hours and was adjourned under dramatic circumstances, for that was the day chosen for the German armies to march into Austria. Even at that time we knew without any doubt why the chairman of that court-martial was so unusually interested in having the troops on that day receive the order to march, not to a goal within but outside the Reich. Not until one week later could the Supreme Court-Martial reconvene, and then Hitler was triumphant. The generals had their first “campaign of flowers” behind them, a plebiscite had been proclaimed, the jubilation was great, and the confusion among the generals was still greater. So that court-martial was dissolved. Fritsch’s innocence was definitely established, but Brauchitsch said that as a result of the changed psychological atmosphere created by the annexation of Austria, he could no longer take the responsibility for a revolt.

That is roughly the story of how the War Ministry was practically denuded of its leading men, and how the generals were thrown into unequaled confusion. From that time on we took the steep downward path to radicalism.

DR. DIX: Perhaps I may ask the Tribunal to be permitted to read in this connection one sentence from a document which I will submit as Exhibit Number Schacht-15. My document book is still in the process of translation, but I hope that it will be here on the day of the hearing of Schacht. There is only one sentence which is of interest in this connection. It is from the biannual report of the General Staff...

THE PRESIDENT: Have the documents been submitted to the Prosecution and to the Tribunal at all?

DR. DIX: The documents have been discussed with the Prosecution twice in detail, once with regard to the question of translation, and then on the question of their admissibility as evidence; and Mr. Dodd discussed them in open court. I am firmly convinced that the Prosecution is thoroughly acquainted with the document. It is only one sentence and I do not believe that the Prosecution would object to the reading of this one sentence, since otherwise the connection with the documentary evidence might be obscured. I will introduce a document now and then, wherever it seems practical. This is only one sentence from the biannual report of the General Staff of the United States...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I do not know what this document is, Your Honor. I should like to know because we may want to ask some questions about it. I do not want to delay Dr. Dix, but I do not have a copy of it and I do not know just what it is yet.

DR. DIX: I just wanted to shorten the proceedings; but as I see that difficulties may arise, and that a long discussion may be needed, I will omit it, and will present it later with my documentary evidence. It would not serve my purpose otherwise.

[_Turning to the witness._] For the additional information of the Court, perhaps you will describe the position of the chairman in German court-martial proceedings; that the control of the examination is in his hands—that, as a matter of fact, the entire case is in his hands.

GISEVIUS: Dr. Dix, I do not doubt that you could describe the authority of such a chairman better and more clearly from the legal point of view. I would, however, like to say the following:

I read the minutes of that session, for it is one of those documents which we thought we would one day submit to the public. This, too, I hope we will find again. From the minutes it can be seen that the Defendant Göring, as president, determined the tenor of the entire proceedings and of the questions.

He questioned the witnesses for the prosecution, and he took care that no other questions were put which might have proved embarrassing. I must say, from these voluminous minutes, that Göring knew how to cloak the true facts by the manner in which he led the proceedings.

DR. DIX: In my introductory words at the beginning of the session, I called the Fritsch crisis the first decisive inner-political step of the war; and you, Doctor, have adopted that term. After concluding the description of the Fritsch crisis, will you give the reason for the views you adopted, and what the effect was upon your group in this connection, especially upon Schacht?

GISEVIUS: I must point out again that until this Fritsch crisis it had been difficult in the ranks of the German opposition to consider even the possibility of war. That was due to the fact that in Germany the opposition groups were so sure of the strength of the Army, and of the leading men, that they believed it sufficed to have a man of honor, like Fritsch, at the head of the German Army. It seemed inconceivable that Fritsch would tolerate a sliding into terror or into war. Only a few persons had pointed out that it was in the nature of every revolution some day to go beyond the frontiers of a nation. We believed from history that this theory should be pointed out as a danger threatening the National Socialist revolution, and therefore we repeatedly warned those who were convinced that they were faced with a revolution, not only with a dictatorship, that one day those revolutionaries would resort to war as a last recourse. As it became more evident in the course of the Fritsch crisis that radicalism was predominant, a large circle became aware that the danger of war could no longer be ignored.

DR. DIX: And did the Defendant Schacht also belong to that circle?

GISEVIUS: Yes. During those days of the Fritsch crisis, Schacht said, as did many others: “That means war,” and that was also said plainly to the then Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Von Brauchitsch.

DR. DIX: Now the question arises why Schacht had previously financed the rearmament program, at least in the beginning?

GISEVIUS: Schacht always told me that he had financed the rearmament program for purposes of defense. Schacht was convinced for many years that such a large nation in the center of Europe should at least have means of defense. I may point out that at that time large groups of the German people were possessed of the idea that there was a possible danger of attack from the East. You must not forget the type of propaganda with which the German people were inundated at that time, and that the reasons given for this particular danger from the East were based upon Polish aspirations concerning East Prussia.

DR. DIX: Did Schacht also discuss with you at that time the fact that this rearmament was serving his political purposes, as through it he might be able to start discussions on general disarmament again?

GISEVIUS: I beg your pardon. Unfortunately I forgot to emphasize this point myself. Schacht was of the opinion that all means should be used to bring about discussions on rearmament again. He had an idea that very soon—I think he had held that opinion since 1935—the attention of opponent countries should be drawn to German rearmament; and then Hitler, because his rearmament was now known, would be forced to resume discussions at the disarmament conference.

DR. DIX: Was that which you have just said the subject of your conversation with Schacht at that time, or is that your judgment now?

GISEVIUS: No, I remember this conversation very well, because I thought Hitler’s inclinations lay in other directions than in attending a disarmament conference. I thought Hitler to be of an entirely different mentality, and was somewhat surprised that Schacht considered it possible that Hitler might harbor such thoughts.

DR. DIX: Did you have the impression from your conversations with Schacht that he was informed in detail of the type, speed, and extent of the rearmament?

GISEVIUS: I well remember how often Schacht asked me and friends of mine whether we could not help him to get information about the extent of rearmament by inquiring at the Reich War Ministry. I have already described yesterday the efforts he made to get details through Oster and Thomas.

DR. DIX: Could you tell the Tribunal whether Schacht made any attempt to limit armament expenses, and thus limit the extent and speed of the rearmament; and, if so, when he made these efforts?

GISEVIUS: To my knowledge, he started to attempt this as early as 1936. In the heated debates about Schacht’s resignation as Minister of Economics in 1937, his efforts in this direction played a very important part. I recall that practically every conversation was concerned with that point.

DR. DIX: Now, it is said—and quite understandably also by the Prosecution—that the reasons Schacht gave, even in official reports and so on, for the necessity of these limitations were primarily of a financial-technical nature, that is to say, he spoke as an anxious economic leader and an anxious president of the Reichsbank and not as an anxious patriot afraid that his country might be plunged into war.

Do you know of any discussions with Schacht, of which you can remember anything, concerning the foregoing which might be useful to the Tribunal?

GISEVIUS: In all these preliminary discussions there were dozens of drafts of the communications Schacht wrote. They were discussed in friendly circles. To mention but one example, Schacht repeatedly discussed these drafts also with Goerdeler. It was always one question that was concerned: What could one say, so that such a letter should not be considered a provocation but would serve rather to draw the other non-Party ministers, and particularly the War Minister Blomberg, to Schacht’s side? That was just the difficulty, for how could such ministers as Blomberg, Neurath, or Schwerin-Krosigk, who were much more loyal to Hitler, be persuaded to join Schacht rather than to say that Schacht had once again provoked Hitler and Göring with his notoriously sharp tongue. All these letters can only be understood by their tactical reasons which, as I have said, had been discussed in detail with the leading men of the opposition.

DR. DIX: Now, after the Fritsch crisis, how did the political conspiracy between you and your friends and Schacht take form?

GISEVIUS: I want to deal with that word “conspiracy.” While up to that moment our activity could only be called more or less oppositional, now a conspiracy did indeed begin; and there appeared in the foreground a man who was later to play an important part as head of that conspiracy. The Chief of the General Staff at that time, Generaloberst Beck, believed that the time had come for a German general to give the alarm both inside and outside the country. I believe it is important for the Tribunal to know also the ultimate reason which prompted Beck to take that step.

The Chief of the General Staff was present when Hitler, in May 1938, made a speech to the generals at Jüterbog. That speech was intended to reinstate Fritsch. A few words were said about Fritsch, but more was said—and for the first time quite openly before a large group of German generals—about Hitler’s intention to engulf Czechoslovakia in a war. Beck heard that speech; and he was indignant that he, as Chief of the General Staff, should hear of such an intention for the first time in such an assembly without having been informed or consulted previously. During that same meeting, Beck sent a letter to Brauchitsch asking him for an immediate interview. Brauchitsch refused and deliberately kept Beck waiting for several weeks. Beck became impatient and wrote a comprehensive memorandum in which as Chief of the General Staff he protested against the fact that the German people were being drawn into war. At the end of that memorandum Beck announced his resignation, and here I believe is the opportunity to say a word about this Chief of the General Staff.

DR. DIX: One moment, Doctor. Will you tell us the source of your knowledge of what Beck thought, and the negotiations between Beck and Brauchitsch?

GISEVIUS: Beck confided in me, and during the latter years I worked in very close collaboration with him, and I was by his side until the last hour of his life on 20 July. I can testify here—and it is important for the Tribunal to know this—that Beck struggled again and again with the problem as to what a chief of the General Staff should do when he realized that events were driving toward a war. Therefore I owe to his memory, and to my oath here, not to conceal the fact that Beck took the consequences of being the only German general to relinquish his post voluntarily, in order to show that there is a limit beyond which even generals in leading positions may not go; but at the sacrifice of their position and their life, must resign and accept no further orders. Beck was of the opinion that the General Staff was not only an organization of war technicians; he saw in the German General Staff the conscience of the German Army, and he trained his staff accordingly. He suffered immensely during the later years of his life because men whom he had trained in that spirit did not follow the dictates of their conscience. I owe it to this man to say that he was a man of inflexible character.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think we might get on to what Beck actually did.

DR. DIX: Yes, Your Honor, but...

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps it would be a convenient time to break off. What I mean is, the witness said that Beck protested in a memorandum and offered to resign, and that was some minutes ago, and since then he was talking and had not told us what Beck actually did.

DR. DIX: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will not sit in open session on Saturday morning, but will be sitting in closed session.

DR. DIX: [_Turning to the witness._] You were saying that Generaloberst Beck carried out his decision to tender his resignation after the speech at Jüterbog. What did he do then?

GISEVIUS: Hitler and Brauchitsch urgently pressed him to remain in office, but Beck refused and insisted upon resigning. Thereupon Hitler and Brauchitsch urged Beck at least not to make his resignation public, and they asked him if he would not formally defer his resignation for a few months. Beck, who had not yet gone the way of high treason, thought that he should comply with this request. Later he most deeply regretted this loyal attitude. The fact is that as early as the end of May or the beginning of June his successor, General Halder, took over the office of Chief of General Staff; and from that moment Beck was actually no longer in charge.

DR. DIX: May I ask you once more, from what observations, and conversations with whom, do you base the knowledge of these facts?

GISEVIUS: From constant discussions I had with Beck, Oster, Goerdeler, Schacht, and an entire group of people at that time; later, the question why Beck did not make his retirement public depressed him to such an extent that it was a continual subject of discussions between him and me up to the end.

DR. DIX: That was Beck’s resignation; but then the problem of the possible resignation of Schacht was probably also brought up in deliberations. To your knowledge, and from your observation, was the question of the necessity or the opportuneness of Schacht’s resignation discussed between Schacht and Beck?

GISEVIUS: Yes, it was discussed in great detail.

It was Beck’s opinion that his resignation alone might not be sufficiently effective. He approached Schacht therefore and asked him whether he would not join him, Beck, and resign also. This subject was discussed in great detail, on the one hand between Beck and Schacht personally, and on the other between Oster and myself, who were the two intermediaries. During these conferences, I must confess that I, too, was of the opinion that Schacht should resign under all circumstances; and I also advised him to that effect. It was Oster’s opinion, however, that Schacht must definitely remain in office and he asked him to do so; in order to influence the generals Schacht was needed as an official with a ministerial title. In retrospect I must say here that my advice to Schacht was wrong. The events which I have yet to describe have proved how important it was to Oster and others that Schacht should remain in office.

DR. DIX: That, of course, was a serious question for Schacht’s own conscience. You have informed the Tribunal of your opinions and of Oster’s opinions. Did Schacht discuss his scruples with you, and the pros and cons of his deliberations in making his final decision?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I don’t object to the defendants trying their case in their own way, but I do think we are passing beyond the limits of profitable inquiry here. Schacht is present; he is the man who can tell us about his conscience, and I know of no way that another witness can do so, and I think it is not a question to which the answer would have competent value, and I object respectfully.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think you had better tell us what Schacht did—not tell us—but get from the witness what Schacht did.

DR. DIX: If I may, I should like to make a brief remark. It is true, of course, as Mr. Justice Jackson said, that Schacht knows his own reasons best and can tell them to the Tribunal. On a question as difficult as this, however, the justification of which is even subject to argument—the Prosecution apparently is inclined to consider the train of thought which led to Schacht’s decision to be unacceptable—it appears to me, at least on the basis of our rules for evidence, that it is relevant for the Tribunal to hear from an eye-and-ear witness what the considerations were and whether they really were such at the time, or whether Schacht, now in the defendants’ dock, is _ex post facto_, devising some explanation, as every defendant is more or less suspected of doing.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the witness can tell us what Schacht said and what Schacht did, but not what Schacht thought.

DR. DIX: Certainly. Your Lordship, I only want him to tell us what Schacht said to the witness at that time about his opinion.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need any further discussion about it. The witness has heard what I have said and you can ask him what Schacht said, and what Schacht did; but not what Schacht thought.

DR. DIX: Very well then, what did Schacht say to you regarding the reasons for his resignation?

GISEVIUS: Schacht told me at the time that after all we had experienced the generals could not be relied upon ever really to revolt. For that reason, as a politician, he considered it his duty to think of some possibility other than a revolt for bringing about a change in conditions in Germany. For that reason he evolved a plan which he explained to me at the time. Schacht said to me, “I have got Hitler by the throat.” He meant by that, as he explained to me in great detail, that now the day was approaching where the debts which had been incurred by the Reich Minister of Finance, and thus by the Reich Cabinet, would have to be repaid to the Reichsbank. Schacht doubted whether the Minister of Finance, Schwerin-Krosigk, would be prepared without further ado to carry out the moral and legal obligation of repaying the credits which had been extended.

Schacht thought that that was the moment in which he should come out with his resignation, with a joint step by the Reichsbank Directorate; and he hoped that, given that situation, the other ministers of the Reich would join him, the majority of whom were still democratic at the time.

That is what he meant when he said to me, “I have still one more arrow I can shoot, and that is the moment when not even a Neurath, a Gürtner, a Seldte can refuse to follow me.”

I answered Schacht at that time that I doubted whether there would ever be such a meeting of the Cabinet. In my opinion, the steps which would be taken to dispose of him would be much more brutal. Schacht did not believe me, and above all he told me he would be certain of achieving one thing; these matters would have to be discussed in the Cabinet, and then he would cause a situation in Germany as alarming as the one which existed in February 1938 at the time of the Fritsch crisis. He therefore expected a radical reformation of the cabinet which would provide the proper psychological atmosphere for the generals to intervene.

DR. DIX: You said at the beginning that Schacht had said or hinted that he could not absolutely rely on the generals to bring about a revolt. Which generals was he referring to, and what did he mean?

GISEVIUS: Schacht meant at the time the first revolutionary situation which had arisen in Germany, during the months of May to September 1938, when we drifted into the Czechoslovakia war crisis. Beck had assured us at the time of his resignation—by us I mean Goerdeler, Schacht and other politicians—that he would leave to us a successor who was more energetic than himself, and who was firmly determined to precipitate a revolt if Hitler should decide upon war. That man whom Beck trusted, and to whom he introduced us, was General Halder. As a matter of fact, on taking office, General Halder immediately took steps to start discussions on the subject with Schacht, Goerdeler, Oster, and our entire group. A few days after he took over his office he sent for Oster and informed him that he considered that things were drifting toward war, and that he would then undertake an overthrow of the Government. He asked Oster what he, for his part, intended to do to bring civilians into the plot.

DR. DIX: Who were the civilians in question, apart from Goerdeler and Schacht?

GISEVIUS: Halder put that question to Oster, and under the circumstances at that time, when we were still a very small circle, Oster replied that to the best of his knowledge there were only two civilians with whom Halder could have preliminary political conversations; one was Goerdeler, the other, Schacht.

Halder refused to speak personally to a man as suspect as Goerdeler. He gave as his reason the fact that it was too dangerous for him to receive now a man whom he did not yet know, whereas he could find some official reason for having a conference with Schacht. Halder asked Oster to act as intermediary for such a conference with Schacht.

Oster approached Schacht through me. Schacht was willing. A meeting was to be arranged at a third person’s place. I warned Schacht and said to him, “Have Halder come to your house, so that you are quite sure of the matter.”

Halder then visited Schacht personally at the end of July 1938 at his residence; and he informed him that matters had reached a stage where war was imminent and that he, Halder, would then bring about a revolt, and he asked Schacht whether he was prepared to aid him politically in a leading position.

That is what Schacht told me at the time, and Halder told it to Oster.

DR. DIX: And Oster told it to you?

GISEVIUS: Yes, as I continually acted as an intermediary in these discussions. Schacht replied, as he assured me directly after Halder’s visit, that he was prepared to do anything if the generals were to decide to remove Hitler.

The following morning, Halder sent for Oster. He told him of this conversation, and he asked Oster whether police preparations had now been made for this revolt. Oster suggested that Halder should talk to me personally about these matters. I had a long talk in the darkness with Halder about this revolt. I believe that it is important for me to state here what Halder told me of his intentions at that time. First Halder assured me that, in contrast to many other generals, he had no doubt that Hitler wanted war. Halder described Hitler to me as being bloodthirsty and referred to the blood bath of 30 June. However, Halder told me that it was, unfortunately, terribly difficult to explain Hitler’s real intentions to the generals, particularly to the junior officers corps, because the saying which was influencing the officers corps was ostensibly that it was all just a colossal bluff, that the Army could be absolutely certain that Hitler did not want to start a war, but rather that he was merely preparing a diplomatic maneuver of blackmail on a large scale.

For that reason, Halder believed that it was absolutely necessary to prove, even to the last captain, that Hitler was not bluffing at all but had actually given the order for war. Halder therefore decided at the time that for the sake of informing the German nation and the officers he would even risk the outbreak of war. But even then Halder feared the Hitler myth; and he therefore suggested to me that the day after the outbreak of war Hitler should be killed by means of a bomb; and the German people should be made to believe, as far as possible, that Hitler had been killed by an enemy bombing attack on the Führer’s train. I replied to Halder at the time that perhaps I was still too young, but I could not understand why he did not want to tell the German people, at least afterwards, what the generals had done.

Then for a few weeks there was no news from Halder. The press campaign against Czechoslovakia assumed an ever more threatening character and we felt that now it would be only a few days, or perhaps weeks, before war would break out. At that very moment Schacht decided to visit Halder again and to remind him of his promise. I thought it best that a witness should be present during that conversation and therefore I accompanied Schacht. It did not appear to me that Halder was any too pleased at the presence of a witness. Halder once again declared his firm intention of effecting a revolt; but again he wished to wait until the German nation had received proof of Hitler’s warlike intentions by means of a definite order for war. Schacht pointed out to Halder the tremendous danger of such an experiment. He made it clear to Halder that a war could not be started simply to destroy the Hitler legend in the eyes of the German people.

In a detailed and very excited conversation Halder then declared that he was prepared to start the revolt, not after the official outbreak of the war, but at the very moment that Hitler gave the army the final order to march.

We asked Halder whether he would then still be able to control the situation or whether Hitler might not surprise him with some lightning stroke. Halder replied literally, “No, he cannot deceive me. I have designed my General Staff plans in such a way that I am bound to know it 48 hours in advance.” I think that is important, because during the subsequent course of events the period of time between the order to march and the actual march itself was considerably shortened.

Halder assured us that besides the preparations in Berlin he had an armored division ready in Thuringia under the command of General Von Höppner, which might possibly have to halt the Leibstandarte, which was in Munich, on the march to Berlin.

Although Halder had told us all this, Schacht and I had a somewhat bitter aftertaste of that conference. Halder had told Schacht that he, Schacht, seemed to be urging him to effect this revolt prematurely; and Schacht and I were of the opinion that Halder might abandon us at the last moment. We informed Oster immediately of the bad impression we had had, and we told Oster that something absolutely must be done to win over another general in case Halder should not act at the last minute. Oster agreed and these are the preliminary events which led to the later General Field Marshal Von Witzleben first coming into our circle of conspirators.

DR. DIX: Who won Von Witzleben over?

GISEVIUS: Schacht did.

DR. DIX: Who did?

GISEVIUS: Schacht won Witzleben over. Oster visited Witzleben and told him everything that had happened. Thereupon Witzleben sent for me, and I told him that in my opinion the police situation was such that he, as commanding general of the Berlin Army Corps, could confidently risk a revolt. Witzleben asked me the question which every general put to us at that time: Whether a diplomatic incident in the East would really lead to war or whether it was not true, as Hitler and Ribbentrop had repeatedly told the generals in confidence, that there was a tacit agreement with the Western Powers giving Germany a free hand in the East. Witzleben said that if such an agreement really existed, then, of course, he could not revolt. I told Witzleben that Schacht with his excellent knowledge of the Anglo-Saxon mentality could no doubt give him comprehensive information about that.

A meeting between Schacht and Witzleben was arranged. Witzleben brought with him his divisional general, Von Brockdorff, who was to carry out the revolt in detail. Witzleben, Brockdorff, and I drove together to Schacht’s country house for a conference which lasted for hours. The final result was that Witzleben was convinced by Schacht that the Western Powers would under no circumstances allow Germany to move into the Eastern territories and that now Hitler’s policy of surprise had come to an end. Witzleben decided that he, on his part and independently of Halder, would make all preparations which would be necessary if he should have to act.

He issued me false papers and gave me a position at his district headquarters so that there, under his personal protection, I could make all the necessary police and political preparations. He delegated General Von Brockdorff, and he and I visited all the points in Berlin which Brockdorff was to occupy with his Potsdam Division. Frau Strünck was at the wheel and traveling ostensibly as tourists we settled exactly what had to be done.

DR. DIX: That is the witness Strünck. Please excuse me.

GISEVIUS: I believe I owe you a brief explanation as to why Witzleben’s co-operation was absolutely necessary. It was not so easy to find a general who had the actual authority to order his troops to march. For instance, there were some generals in the provinces who could not give their troops the order to march.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, is it necessary to go into the matter in such detail as to why General Witzleben should be brought in?

DR. DIX: The reasons why Witzleben was needed are perhaps not essential for our case. We can therefore drop this subject.

Will you please tell me, Dr. Gisevius, whether Schacht was kept constantly informed of these military and police preparations which you have described?

GISEVIUS: Schacht was kept informed about all these matters. We met in the evening in the residence of Von Witzleben and I showed everything that I had worked out in writing during the day. It was then discussed in full detail.

DR. DIX: Apart from these military and police measures, which you have mentioned, were there any political measures?

GISEVIUS: Yes, of course. We had to decide carefully what the German nation was to be told in such a case from the point of view of internal politics, just as there were certain preparations which had to be made regarding the external.

DR. DIX: What do you mean by external—foreign politics?

GISEVIUS: Yes, of course, foreign politics.

DR. DIX: Why of course? Was the Foreign Office included or what is meant by foreign politics in this case?

GISEVIUS: It is very difficult to give an explanation, because the co-operation with foreign countries during the time of war, or immediately before a war, is a matter which is very difficult to discuss as we are touching upon a very controversial subject. If I am to talk about it, then it is at least as important for me to state the reasons which led these people to carry on such discussions with foreign countries, as it is to give times and dates.

DR. DIX: I am sure that the Tribunal will permit you to do so. I think that the Tribunal will permit that the motives...

THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal thinks you are going into too great detail over these matters. If the Tribunal is prepared to accept this witness’ evidence as true, it shows that Schacht was negotiating with him and General Witzleben at this time with a view to prevent the war. I say, if the Tribunal accepts it; and that seems to be a matter you will not prove with the details of these negotiations, which seem to me not very important.

DR. DIX: Yes, but in my opinion the gravity and intensity of the activities of these conspirators should be substantiated in detail. In my opinion it is not sufficient that these plans...

THE PRESIDENT: But you have touched upon them since 10 o’clock this morning.

DR. DIX: Your Lordship, I am now proceeding in connection with Schacht’s point of view, as to whether a survey, a political survey of Schacht’s part...

THE PRESIDENT: I am told that you said last night that you would be half an hour longer. Do you remember saying that? Perhaps it was a mistranslation.

DR. DIX: Oh no, that is quite a misunderstanding. I said that if I were to touch upon the Fritsch crisis and complete it, it would take another half hour—that is, the Fritsch crisis alone. Gentlemen of the Tribunal, the position is this: We are now hearing the story of the political opposition, in which Schacht played a leading role. If the Defendant Göring and others had time for days to describe the entire course of events from their point of view, I think that justice demands that those men, represented in this courtroom by the Defendant Schacht, who fought against that system under most dreadful conditions of terror, should also be permitted to tell in detail the story of their opposition movement.

I would, therefore, ask the Tribunal—and I am not in favor of the superfluous—to give me permission to allow the witness to make a few more remarks on the measures taken by the group of conspirators, Beck, Schacht, Canaris, and others, which he has already touched upon. I beg the Tribunal to realize that I consider it of the greatest importance; and I assume, Your Lordship, that if it is not done now, the Prosecution will take the matter up during cross-examination. Moreover, I believe that as it is now being told in sequence, it will take less time than if we were to wait for the cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not propose to tell you how you are to prove your case, but hopes that you will deal with it as shortly as possible and without unnecessary details.

DR. DIX: Please be sure of that.

Well then, Witness; you had mentioned foreign political measures, and you were about to talk of the motives which caused some of you to enter into relations with foreign countries for the support of your opposition movement. Will you please continue with that?

GISEVIUS: I should like simply to confine myself to the statement that from that time on there were very detailed and weighty discussions with foreign countries in order to try everything possible to prevent the outbreak of war or at least to shorten it or keep it from spreading. However, as long as I am not in a position to speak of the motives of such a delicate matter—in connection with which people like us would be accused of high treason, in Germany, at least—as long as that is the case, I shall not say more than the fact that these conversations took place.

DR. DIX: I did not understand that the Tribunal would prevent you from explaining your motives. You may state them therefore.

GISEVIUS: I owe it to my conscience and above all to those who participated and are now dead, to state here that those matters which I have described weighed very heavily upon their consciences. We knew that we would be accused of conspiring with foreign countries.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal, of course, knows that these matters were not conducted without danger; but we are not really here for the purpose of considering people who have, unfortunately, lost their lives. We are considering the case of the Defendant Schacht at the moment.

DR. DIX: I think the intention of the witness has been misunderstood. He does not wish to speak about those men who lost their lives, and he does not want to speak of the dangers; he wishes rather to speak of the conflicts of conscience suffered by those who planned and undertook those steps. I think that that privilege should be granted the witness if he is to speak of this very delicate matter here in public. I would, therefore, beg you to allow it; otherwise the witness will confine himself to general indications which will not be sufficient for my defense, and I assume that the Prosecution will ask about these things in the cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you try and get him to come to the point? We, of course, can’t tell what he wants to talk about. We can only tell about what he does talk about.

DR. DIX: Well, then, you will describe briefly the considerations which swayed those who entered into those foreign relations, and also describe the character of those relations.

GISEVIUS: Mr. President, it was not merely a question of conscience. I was concerned with the fact that there are relatives still alive today who might become the subject of unjust accusations; and that is why I had to say, with reference to those conferences abroad which I shall describe, that even our intimate circle of friends did not agree in all respects as to what measures were to be permitted. One wanted to go further, while another held back. I owe it to the memory of the dead Admiral Canaris, for instance, to rectify many erroneous press announcements and state that he refused to conspire with foreign countries. I must guard against the possibility that anything I say now might be applied to men whom I have mentioned earlier. That is why I wanted to make this statement, and at the same time I wanted to say that our friends who did these things rejected the accusation of high treason, because we felt that we were morally obliged to take these steps.

DR. DIX: Well then, what happened?

GISEVIUS: The following happened: Immediately after Hitler announced his intention to invade Czechoslovakia, friends tried to keep the British Government informed, from the first intention to the final decision. The chain of attempts began with the journey of Goerdeler in the spring of 1938 to London, where he gave information concerning the existence of an opposition group which was resolved to go to any lengths. In the name of this group the British Government was continuously informed of what was happening and that it was absolutely necessary to make it clear, to the German people and to the generals, that every step across the Czech border would constitute for the Western Powers a reason for war. When the crisis neared its climax and when our preparations for a revolt had been completed to the last detail, we took a step unusual in form and substance. We informed the British Government that the pending diplomatic negotiations would not, as Hitler asserted, deal with the question of the Sudeten countries but that Hitler’s intention was to invade the whole of Czechoslovakia and that, if the British Government on its side were to remain firm, we could give the assurance that there would be no war.

Those were, at the time, our attempts to obtain a certain amount of assistance from abroad in our fight for the psychological preparation of a revolt.

DR. DIX: We now come to September of 1938 and the crisis which led to the Munich Conference. What were the activities of your group of conspirators at that time?

GISEVIUS: The more the crisis moved towards the Munich conference, the more we tried to convince Halder that he should start the revolt at once. As Halder was somewhat uncertain, Witzleben prepared everything in detail. I shall now describe only the last two dramatic days. On 27 September it was clear that Hitler wanted to go to the utmost extremity. In order to make the German people war-minded he ordered a parade of the Berlin army through Berlin. Witzleben had to execute the order. The parade had entirely the opposite effect. The population, which assumed that the troops were marching to war, showed their open displeasure. The troops, instead of jubilation, saw clenched fists; and Hitler, who was watching the parade from the window of the Reich Chancellery, had a fit of rage. He stepped back from the window and said, “With such people I cannot wage war.” Witzleben came home indignant and said that he would have liked to have had the guns unlimbered in front of the Reich Chancellery. On the next morning...

DR. DIX: One moment, Witzleben told you that he would have liked to have had the guns unlimbered in front of the Chancellery?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. DIX: And what is the source of your knowledge regarding Hitler’s remark when he stepped back from the balcony?

GISEVIUS: Several people from the Reich Chancellery told us that.

DR. DIX: Well then, go on.

GISEVIUS: The following morning—that was the 28th—we believed that the opportunity had now come to carry out the revolt. That morning we also learned that Hitler had rejected the final offer from the British Prime Minister, Chamberlain, and had sent the intermediary, Wilson, back with a refusal. Witzleben got that letter and took it to Halder. He believed that proof of Hitler’s desire for war had now been produced, and Halder agreed. Halder went to see Brauchitsch while Witzleben waited in Halder’s room. After a few moments Halder came back and said that Brauchitsch now had also realized that the moment for action had arrived and that he merely wanted to go over to the Reich Chancellery to make quite sure that Witzleben and Halder’s account was correct. Brauchitsch went to the Reich Chancellery after Witzleben had told him over the telephone that everything was prepared; and it was that noon hour of 28 September when suddenly, and contrary to expectations, Mussolini’s intervention in the Reich Chancellery took place, and Hitler, impressed by Mussolini’s step, agreed to go to Munich; so that actually at the last moment the revolt was eliminated.

DR. DIX: You mean through Munich, don’t you?

GISEVIUS: Of course.

DR. DIX: And now the Munich conference was over. How did matters stand in your group of conspirators?

GISEVIUS: We were extremely depressed. We were convinced that now Hitler would soon go to the utmost lengths. We did not doubt that Munich was the signal for a world war. Some of our friends wondered if we should emigrate, and that was discussed with Goerdeler and Schacht. Goerdeler, with this idea in mind, wrote a letter to a political friend in America and asked particularly whether the opposition people should now emigrate. Goerdeler said,

“Otherwise to be able to continue our political work at all in Germany in the future there is only one other possibility, and that is to employ the methods of Talleyrand.”

We decided to persevere, and then events followed in quick succession from the Jewish pogroms to the conquest of Prague.

DR. DIX: But before we come to Prague, Witness, you mentioned the Jewish pogroms; and obviously you mean November 1938. Do you know or can you recollect what Schacht’s reaction was to those events?

GISEVIUS: Schacht was indignant about the Jewish pogroms, and he said so in a public speech before the personnel of the Reichsbank.

DR. DIX: I shall submit that speech later as documentary evidence. And then how did things go on from there? We have come to the end of 1938. Were there new political events on the horizon which had a stimulating effect on your group of conspirators?

GISEVIUS: First of all, there was Schacht’s sudden dismissal from the Reichsbank Directorate. Schacht’s desire for a consultation of the Cabinet on this matter did not materialize and our hopes of bringing about a cabinet crisis were vain. Thus our opposition group had no connecting point and we had to wait and see what would happen after the conquest of Prague.

DR. DIX: One moment; you mentioned Schacht’s dismissal from his position as President of the Reichsbank. Can you tell us anything about this, about the circumstances leading to it and the effect it had on Schacht, and so on?

GISEVIUS: I saw how the various letters and memoranda of the Reichsbank Directorate were drafted, and how they were progressively toned down, and how Schacht was then dismissed. A few minutes after the letter of dismissal arrived from Hitler, Schacht read it to me; and he was indignant at the contents. He repeated to me the passage in which Hitler praised him for his participation in the German rearmament program; and Schacht said, “And now he wants me to undertake to go on working with him openly, and uphold his war policy.”

DR. DIX: But then Schacht remained as a Minister without Portfolio. Was the problem as to whether he should do so or whether he could act differently ever discussed between you and Schacht at the time?

GISEVIUS: Yes, but as far as I know it was the same type of discussion which took place whenever he was to resign. He talked to Lammers, and I assume that Lammers gave him the customary reply.

DR. DIX: In other words, he thought he had to remain, that he was forced to remain?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. DIX: Now, you have made several attempts to speak about Prague, but I interrupted you. Will you please describe the effects upon your group of conspirators, as far as Schacht was concerned?

GISEVIUS: Since December our group had definite proof that Hitler would attack Prague in March. This new action was cynically called the “March whirlwind.” As it was quite openly discussed in Berlin circles, we hoped that news of this action would also reach the British and French Embassies. We were firmly convinced that this time results would not be achieved by surprise; but Halder had already adopted a different view. He thought that Hitler had been given free passage to Prague by the Western Powers. He refused to have preliminary conferences and wanted to wait and see whether this Prague action could be achieved without a fight. And that is what happened.

DR. DIX: In which direction? You have already spoken about the steps with the British and French Embassies.

GISEVIUS: No, there were no steps taken with regard to the British and French Embassies.

DR. DIX: Do you want to say anything further about it? Have you anything to add?

GISEVIUS: No, I have said that we did not take any steps.

DR. DIX: Now, then, Prague is over; and I believe that you and Schacht went to Switzerland together on behalf of your group. Is that correct?

GISEVIUS: Not only together with Schacht but also with Goerdeler. We were of the opinion that Schacht in Germany—excuse me—that Prague would have incredible psychological effects in Germany. As far as foreign countries were concerned, Prague was the signal that no peace and no treaty could be kept with Hitler. Inside Germany unfortunately we were forced to see that the generals and the people were now convinced that this Hitler could do whatever he wished; nobody would stop him; he was protected by Providence. This alarmed us. On one side we saw that the Western Powers would no longer put up with these things; and on the other side we saw that within Germany the illusion was growing that the Western Powers would not go to war. We could see that a war could be prevented only if the Western Powers would tell not only the Foreign Minister, not only Hitler, but by every means of propaganda tell the German nation that any further step towards the East would mean war. It appeared to us that the only possibility was to warn the generals and to get them to revolt, and that was the subject of the talks which Schacht, Goerdeler, and I conducted in Switzerland, immediately after Prague.

DR. DIX: With whom?

GISEVIUS: We met a man who had excellent connections with the British and French Governments. This man made very exact reports at least to the French Government. I can testify to this because later after Paris was conquered, I was able to find a copy of his report among Daladier’s secret papers. We told this man very clearly that in autumn at the latest, the fight for Danzig would start. We told him that, as good Germans, we were without doubt of the opinion that Danzig was a German city and that some day that point would have to be peacefully discussed; but we also warned him against having conferences now regarding Danzig alone because Hitler did not want only Danzig but the whole of Poland, not the whole of Poland but the Ukraine, and that that was the reason why the propaganda of foreign countries should make it abundantly clear to Germany that the limit had now been reached and that the Western Powers would intervene. We said that only then would a revolt be possible for us.

DR. DIX: And did this man who had your confidence make a report in the way you stipulated?

GISEVIUS: Yes, he did; and I must say that very soon public statements on the part of the British, either on the radio or in the press or in the House of Commons, began to remove these doubts among the German generals and the German people. From that time on everything which could be done was done by the British to alarm the German generals.

DR. DIX: Did not Schacht meet his friend Montagu Norman in Switzerland at that time and talk with him in the same vein? Do you know? Were you there?

GISEVIUS: Yes. We thought that the opportunity for Schacht to talk to a close friend of the British Prime Minister, Chamberlain, should not be allowed to pass; and Schacht had very detailed discussions with Montagu Norman, so as to describe to him the psychological atmosphere in Germany after Prague and to persuade him that the British Government should now undertake the necessary clarifications.

DR. DIX: Was not your slogan in reports to foreign countries at the time: “You must play off the Nazis against Germans”?

GISEVIUS: Yes, it was the tenor of all our discussions. We wanted it made clear to the German people that the Western Powers were not against Germany, but only against this Nazi policy of surprise and against the Nazi methods of terror, within the country as well as without.

DR. DIX: And now, having come back from Switzerland, what happened next, particularly with reference to Schacht?

GISEVIUS: We saw that things in Germany were rapidly drifting toward the August crisis and that the generals could not be dissuaded from the view that Hitler was only bluffing and that there would be another Munich or another Prague. And now began all those desperate efforts which we made in order to influence the leading generals, and particularly Keitel, to prevent the decisive order being given to march against Poland.

DR. DIX: Let us come back to Schacht’s return from the Swiss journey in spring of 1939. You know that Schacht left Germany then and made a journey to India?

GISEVIUS: He went to India and hoped to stay there as long as possible in order to go to China. But on the way Hitler’s order prohibiting him from setting foot on Chinese soil reached him, and he had to return. As far as I remember, he came back a few days before the outbreak of war.

DR. DIX: You said China; did Schacht have sympathies with Chiang-Kai-Chek in spite of the pact with Japan?

GISEVIUS: Yes. He sympathized greatly with the Chinese Government, as did our entire circle. We all had quite a number of good and dear Chinese friends with whom we attempted to keep in touch in spite of the Japanese pact.

DR. DIX: About when did Schacht come back from India?

GISEVIUS: I think it was the beginning of August; but I cannot...

DR. DIX: Now matters were rapidly heading toward war. Did Schacht, before the outbreak of war, take any steps to prevent its outbreak?

GISEVIUS: He took a great number of steps, but they cannot be described individually as that would create the impression that Schacht alone was taking these steps. Actually the situation was such that a large group of people were now in the struggle, and each one took those steps which were most suited to him, and each one informed the group of what he had done and what would be advisable for another to do. For that reason I am afraid that it would present a completely erroneous picture if I were to describe individually, and only with respect to Schacht, all those desperate efforts made from August 1939 until the attack on Holland and Belgium.

DR. DIX: The Tribunal has taken cognizance of the fact that Schacht was not acting alone; but here we are dealing with Schacht’s case, and I should like to ask you, therefore, to confine yourself to the description of Schacht’s efforts.

GISEVIUS: In that case I must state first that Schacht knew of all these other matters and was in a certain sense also an accomplice. Of Schacht himself I can only say at this particular moment that he was co-author of the Thomas memorandum addressed to General Keitel, or the two memoranda, in which Schacht, together with our group, pointed out the dangers of war to Keitel. Further, I can say that, through Thomas and Canaris, Schacht took steps to intervene with Brauchitsch and Halder. But I would like to emphasize expressly that all the steps taken by Beck and Goerdeler were taken with the full knowledge of Schacht and also with his participation. This was a very important undertaking.

DR. DIX: A collective action? Does not Schacht’s attempt at the very last moment, at the end of August, to make representations to Brauchitsch through Canaris at headquarters play a part in this?

GISEVIUS: Yes. After General Thomas had failed with both his memoranda and after he had failed to persuade Keitel to receive Goerdeler or Schacht, Schacht tried to approach Brauchitsch or Halder. For that purpose Thomas paid frequent visits to General Halder, and it was typical that during those critical days he could not get past the anteroom of General Halder’s office, past General Von Stülpnagel. Halder was not “at home,” and just said that he did not want to see Schacht. Thereupon we took a further step on that dramatic 25 August, the day on which Hitler had already once given the order to march. As soon as the news reached us that Hitler had given Halder the order to march, Schacht and I first got into touch with Thomas; and then, together with Thomas, we went to Admiral Canaris so that both Thomas and Canaris should accompany Schacht when he went unannounced to the headquarters in Zossen in order to confront Brauchitsch and Halder with his presence. Schacht intended to point out to Brauchitsch and Halder that, in accordance with the existing constitution, the Reich Cabinet must be consulted before waging war. Brauchitsch and Halder would be guilty of a breach of oath if, without the knowledge of the competent political authorities, they obeyed an order for war. That was roughly what Schacht intended to say to explain his step. When Thomas and Schacht arrived at Bendlerstrasse, Thomas went to Canaris. It was about 6 o’clock or...

DR. DIX: The OKW is situated in Bendlerstrasse. The Tribunal should know that Bendlerstrasse meant the OKW or the OKH.

GISEVIUS: When we arrived at the OKW and were waiting at a corner of the street, Canaris sent Oster to us. That was the moment when Hitler between 6 and 7 o’clock suddenly ordered Halder to withdraw his order to march. The Tribunal will no doubt remember that Hitler, influenced by the renewed intervention of Mussolini, suddenly withdrew the order to march which had already been given. Unfortunately, Canaris and Thomas and all our friends were now under the impression that this withdrawal of an order to march was an incredible loss of prestige for Hitler. Oster thought that never before in the history of warfare had a supreme commander withdrawn such a decisive order in the throes of a nervous breakdown. And Canaris said to me, “Now the peace of Europe is saved for 50 years, because Hitler has now lost the respect of the generals.” And, unfortunately, in the face of this psychological change, we all felt that we could look forward to the following days in a quiet frame of mind. So, when 3 days later, Hitler nevertheless gave the decisive order to march, it came as a complete surprise for our group as well. Oster called me to the OKW; Schacht accompanied me. We asked Canaris again whether he could not arrange another meeting with Brauchitsch and Halder, but Canaris said to me, “It is too late now.” He had tears in his eyes and added, “That is the end of Germany.”

DR. DIX: Your Lordship, we now come to the war, and I think that perhaps we had better deal with the war after lunch.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

DR. DIX: Dr. Gisevius, before the noon recess we had just come to the outbreak of the war, and so that your subsequent testimony may be understood, I must ask you first in what capacity you served during the war.

GISEVIUS: On the day of the outbreak of war I was called to Security Intelligence by General Oster by means of a forged order. However, as it was a regulation that all officers or other members of the intelligence service had to be examined by the Gestapo, and as I would never have received permission to be a member of the intelligence, they simply gave me a forged mobilization order. Then I was at the disposal of Oster and Canaris without doing any direct service.

DR. DIX: And after the outbreak of war what were the activities of your group of conspirators, the members of which you have already mentioned? Who took over the leadership, who participated, and what was done?

GISEVIUS: Immediately after the outbreak of the war Generaloberst Beck was at the head of all oppositional movements which could exist in Germany at all, with the exception of the Communists with whom we had no contact at that time. We were of the opinion that only a general could be the leader during war, and Beck stood so far above purely military matters that he was the suitable man to unify all groups from the left to the right. Beck chose Dr. Goerdeler as his closest collaborator.

DR. DIX: Consequently the only civilians who worked with this group of conspirators were Schacht and Goerdeler as before?

GISEVIUS: No, on the contrary; all the opposition groups, who had so far had merely loose connections with each other, were now drawn together under the pressure of war. This was especially so with the left opposition movements, which had been greatly reduced in the early years as all their leaders had been interned. These left groups especially now came in with us. In this connection I shall merely mention Leuschner and Dr. Karl Muehlendorf. However, I must also mention the Christian Trade Unions, and Dr. Habermann, and Dr. Jacob Kaiser. Further I must mention the Catholic circles, the leaders of the Confessional Church, and individual political men such as Ambassador Von Hassell, State Secretary Planck, Minister Popitz, and many, many others.

DR. DIX: What was the attitude of these left circles, especially concerning the question of a revolt, the forceful removal of Hitler or even an attempt on his life? Did they also consider the possibility of an attempt at assassination, which later was actually suggested in your group?

GISEVIUS: No, the left circles were very much under the impression that the “stab in the back” legend had done much harm in Germany; and the left circles thought that they ought not to expose themselves again to the danger of having it said later that Hitler or the German Army had not been defeated on the battlefield. The left-wing had long been of the opinion that no matter how bitter an experience it might be for them, it must now be proved absolutely to the German people that militarism was committing suicide in Germany.

DR. DIX: I have already submitted to the Tribunal, a letter which you, Doctor, smuggled to Switzerland for Schacht at about this time—the end of 1939. It is a letter to the former president of the International Bank at Basel, later president of the First National Bank of New York; a man of influence, who probably had access to President Roosevelt.

In anticipation of the documentary evidence pertaining hereto I had originally intended to read this letter to the Tribunal now. However, in discussing the admissibility of evidence I informed the Tribunal of most of the essential points, and as Mr. Justice Jackson could not yet have the Schacht Document Book in hand, and as he remarked previously that he did not like me to produce documentary evidence at this point, I will not carry out my original intention to read this letter in its entirety. I will come back to it when I present my documentary evidence. Just to refresh the witness’ memory about this letter, I will give the underlying reasons for it. Schacht suggested to President Fraser that now the moment...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I make no objection to the use of the letter from Schacht to Leon Fraser as one banker writing to another. If you want to claim that Mr. Fraser was influential with President Roosevelt, I should want you to prove it; but I have no objection to the letter.

DR. DIX: The letter is dated 14 January 1946. I will not read it in its entirety, for there are six long pages. Its contents are...

THE PRESIDENT: What date was it?

DR. DIX: I had the wrong letter. The 16 October 1939. It will be Exhibit Number 31 in my document book. He writes that now would be an excellent time to give peace to the world with President Roosevelt—that would be a victory, also a German victory...

THE PRESIDENT: Is the letter from Schacht?

DR. DIX: From Schacht to Fraser.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you have proof for the letter?

DR. DIX: If the Tribunal prefers, Schacht can also deal with the letter. In that case I will only ask the witness whether it is true that he smuggled this letter into Switzerland.

[_Turning to the witness._] Please answer the question, Witness.

GISEVIUS: Yes. I took this letter to Switzerland and mailed it there.

DR. DIX: Very well. What did your group do to bring about peace, or prevent the war from spreading? Did you undertake further activities in foreign politics in that direction in your opposition group, that is, your group of conspirators?

GISEVIUS: The main thing for us was with all possible means to prevent the war from spreading. It could only spread toward Holland and Belgium or Norway. We recognized clearly that if a step was taken in this direction, the consequences, not only for Germany, but for the whole of Europe would be tremendous. Therefore, we wanted to prevent war in the West by all means.

Immediately after the Polish Campaign Hitler decided to move his troops from the East to the West, and to launch the attack by violating the neutrality of Holland and Belgium.

We believed that if we could succeed in preventing this attack in November we would in the coming winter months gain enough time to convince the individual generals, above all Brauchitsch and Halder and the leaders of the army groups, that they must at least oppose the expansion of the war.

Brauchitsch and Halder evaded the question and said it was now too late, that the enemy would fight Germany to the end and destroy her. We did not share this opinion. We believed a peace with honor was still possible, and by honor I mean that we would of course eliminate the Nazi hierarchy to the last man. In order to prove to the generals that the foreign powers did not wish to destroy the German people, but wanted only to protect themselves against the Nazi terror, we took all possible steps abroad. The first attempt in that direction, or a small part of that attempt, was the letter written by Schacht to Fraser, the object of which was to point out that certain domestic political developments were imminent and that if we could gain time, that is, if we could come through the winter, we could perhaps persuade the generals to undertake a revolt.

DR. DIX: Thank you. May I interrupt you for a moment? I would like to call the attention of the Tribunal now to the fact that the witness is referring to a passage, to a suggestion, contained in the letter. This letter is in English. I have no German translation, and I must therefore read this sentence in English. “My feeling is that the earlier discussions be opened, the easier it will be to influence the development of certain existing conditions.” The question is now...

Now, I would like to ask you: What did Dr. Schacht mean by the “certain existing conditions” that were to be influenced? Did he mean your efforts?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I must interpose an objection. I am not sure whether you have misunderstood it. I think that what Schacht meant is not a question to be addressed to this witness. I shall have no objection to Dr. Schacht telling us what he meant by his cryptic language, but I don’t think that this witness can interpret what Schacht meant unless he has some information apart from anything that now appears. I don’t want to be over technical about this, but it does seem to me that this is the sort of question which should be reserved for Dr. Schacht himself.

DR. DIX: Mr. Justice Jackson, of course, is right, but this witness said that he smuggled the letter into Switzerland, and I assume that he discussed the contents of the letter with Schacht and was therefore in a position to explain the cryptic words.

THE PRESIDENT: He didn’t say this yet; he hasn’t said he ever saw the letter except the outside of it. He hasn’t said he ever saw the letter.

DR. DIX: Will you please tell us whether you saw the letter and knew its contents?

GISEVIUS: I am sorry that I did not so clearly at once, but I helped in drafting the letter. I was there when the letter was drafted and written.

DR. DIX: Then I believe Justice Jackson will withdraw his objection.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes.

DR. DIX: Will you please answer my question; what is meant by those cryptic words?

GISEVIUS: We wanted to suggest that we, in Germany, were interested in forcing certain developments and that we now expected an encouraging word from the other side. I do not, however, want any misunderstanding to arise here. In this letter it also states very clearly that President Roosevelt had in the meantime been disappointed many times by the German side, so that we had to beg, to urge him to take such a step. It is a fact that President Roosevelt had taken various steps for peace.

DR. DIX: Let us go on now. If I give you the cue “Vatican Action”?...

GISEVIUS: In addition to this attempt to enter into discussions with America, we believed we should ask for a statement from the British Government. Again it was our aim solely to...

THE PRESIDENT: Is the original of this letter still available or is this only given from memory?

DR. DIX: The original copy, yes; that is, a copy signed by Schacht is here. It was kept during the war in Switzerland and was brought back to us from Switzerland by this witness.

[_Turning to the witness._] Now, let us go on to the “Vatican Action.”

GISEVIUS: We tried in every possible way to prove to General Halder and General Olbricht that their theory was wrong, that there could be no longer a question of dealing with a decent German government. We believed that we should now follow a particularly important and safe road. The Holy Father made personal efforts in these matters, as the British Government had, with justification, become uncertain whether there really existed in Germany a trustworthy group of men with whom talks could be undertaken. I remember that shortly afterwards the Venlo incident took place when, with the excuse that there was a German opposition group, officials of the English Secret Service were kidnapped at the Dutch border. Therefore, we were anxious to prove that there was a group here which was honestly trying to do its best and which, if the occasion arose, would stand by its word under all circumstances. I believe that we kept our word regarding the things we proposed to do, while we said quite frankly that we could not bring about this revolt as we had said previously we hoped to do.

These negotiations began in October—November 1939. They were only concluded later in the spring, and if I am asked I will continue.

DR. DIX: Yes, please describe the conclusion.

GISEVIUS: I believe I must add first that, during November of 1939, General Halder actually had intended a revolt, but that these intentions for a revolt again came to naught because at the very last minute Hitler called off the western offensive. Strengthened by the attitude of Halder at that time, we believed that we should continue these discussions at the Vatican. We reached what you might call a gentleman’s agreement, on the grounds of which I believe that I am entitled to state that we could give the generals unequivocal proof that in the event of the overthrow of the Hitler regime, an agreement could be reached with a decent civil German government.

DR. DIX: Did you read the documents yourself, Doctor?

GISEVIUS: These were oral discussions which were then written down in a comprehensive report. This report was read by the Ambassador Von Hassell and by Dr. Schacht before it was given to Halder by General Thomas. Halder was so taken aback by the contents that he gave this comprehensive report to Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch. Brauchitsch was enraged and threatened to arrest the intermediary, General Thomas, and thus this action which had every prospect of success, failed.

DR. DIX: Doctor, you have testified...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the last notes that I have got down in my notebook are these: “That we knew that if Holland, Belgium, and the other countries were attacked, it would have very grave consequences and we therefore negotiated with Halder and Brauchitsch and they weren’t prepared to help us to stop the war at that time. We wanted peace with honor, eliminating politics. We took all possible steps.” Well, now, since I took these notes down, I think we spent nearly 10 minutes in details, which are utterly irrelevant, about further negotiations. If they took all possible steps, what is the point of giving us these details about it?

DR. DIX: Yes, Your Lordship, if a witness is called in a matter of such importance, where he as well as the defendants’ counsel must always take into account that people who are of a different opinion may say “these are just generalities, we want facts and particulars,” then I cannot forego having the witness testify at least in broad outline that, for example, a detailed action had been undertaken through His Holiness in the Vatican. If he merely says that the result of this action was a comprehensive report, if with Halder and Brauchitsch the above mentioned...

THE PRESIDENT: I agree with you that the one sentence about some negotiations with the Vatican may have been properly given, but all the rest of it were unnecessary details.

DR. DIX: Anyway we have already concluded this chapter, Your Lordship.

[_Turning to the witness._] You have already testified that the revolt which was planned for November did not occur because the western offensive did not take place. Therefore, we need not pursue this subject any further. I would merely like to ask you at this point: Did your group of conspirators remain inactive during the winter, and particularly during the spring, or were further plans followed and acted upon?

GISEVIUS: Constant attempts were made to influence all generals within our reach. Besides Halder and Brauchitsch we tried to reach the generals of the armored divisions in the West. I remember, for instance, there was a discussion between Schacht and General Hoeppner.

DR. DIX: Hoeppner?

GISEVIUS: Hoeppner. We also tried to influence Field Marshal Rundstedt, Bock, and Leeb. Here, too, General Thomas and Admiral Canaris were the intermediaries.

DR. DIX: And how did the generals react?

GISEVIUS: When everything was ready, they would not start.

DR. DIX: Now, we come to the summer of 1941. Hitler is in Paris. The aerial offensive against England is imminent. Tell us about your group of conspirators and their activity during this period and the period following.

GISEVIUS: After the fall of Paris, our group had no influence at all for months. Hitler’s success deluded everyone, and it took much effort on our part, through all channels available, to try at least to prevent the bombardment of England. Here again the group made united efforts and we tried, through General Thomas and Admiral Canaris and others, to prevent this evil.

DR. DIX: Do I understand you correctly, when you use the word “group” you mean the group which was led by Beck, in which Schacht collaborated?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. DIX: Now, at that time did Schacht have several talks, or one talk, along the same line in Switzerland?

GISEVIUS: That was a little later. We have now come to the year 1941, and on this trip to Switzerland Schacht tried to urge that a peace conference should be held as soon as possible. We knew that Hitler was thinking about the attack on Russia, and we believed that we should do everything to avert at least this disaster. With this thought in mind Schacht’s discussions in Switzerland were conducted. I myself took part in arranging a dinner in Basel with the president of the B. I. Z., Mr. McKittrick, an American, and I was present when Schacht tried to express at least the opinion that everything possible must now be done to initiate negotiations.

DR. DIX: In this connection I would respectfully like to remind the Tribunal of the article in the _Basler Nachrichten_, of which I presented the essential contents when we discussed the admissibility of the document. It deals with a similar conversation between Schacht and an American economist. That is the same trip which the witness is now discussing. I will take the liberty of referring to this article later, when presenting documentary evidences.

[_Turning to the witness._] Now, the war continued. Do you have anything to say about Russia; about the imminent war with Russia?

GISEVIUS: I can say only that Schacht knew of all the many attempts which we undertook to avert this catastrophe.

DR. DIX: Now let us go further to the time of Stalingrad. What was done by your group of conspirators after this critical period of the war?

GISEVIUS: When we did not succeed in persuading the victorious generals to engineer a revolt, we then tried at least to win them over to one when they had obviously come up against their great catastrophe. This catastrophe, which found its first visible signs in Stalingrad, had been predicted in all its details by Generaloberst Beck since December of 1942. We immediately made all preparations so that at the moment, which could be forecast with almost mathematical exactitude, when the army of Paulus, completely defeated, would have to capitulate, then at least a military revolt could be organized. I myself was called back from Switzerland and participated in all discussions and preparations. I can only testify that this time a great many preparations were made. Contact was also made with the field marshals in the East, with Witzleben in the West but again, things turned out differently, for Field Marshal Paulus capitulated instead of giving us the cue at which Kluge, according to plan, was to start the revolt in the East.

DR. DIX: This was the time of the so-called Schlaberndorff attempt?

GISEVIUS: No, a little later.

DR. DIX: Now I shall interpose another question. Until now you have always described the group led by Generaloberst Beck and supported by Schacht, Goerdeler, _et cetera_, as a revolt movement, that is, a group which wanted to overthrow the government. Did you not now more and more aim at an assassination?

GISEVIUS: Yes, from the moment when the generals again deserted us, we realized that a revolt was not to be hoped for, and from that moment on we took all the steps we could to instigate an assassination.

DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces): Mr. President, I must object at this point to the testimony of the witness. The witness, Dr. Gisevius, by his testimony has incriminated the group which I represent. However, some of this testimony is so general that it cannot be referred to as fact. Furthermore, he has just testified that the field marshals in the East had “deserted” the group of conspirators. These statements are opinions which the witness is giving, but they are not facts, to which the witness must limit his testimony, and therefore I ask—Mr. President, I have not yet finished. I wanted to conclude with the request for a resolution by the Court that the testimony given by the witness, where he asserted that the generals had “deserted” the group of conspirators, be stricken from the record.

DR. DIX: May I please reply briefly? I cannot agree with the opinion of my esteemed colleague Dr. Laternser that the statement “the generals deserted us” was not a statement of fact...

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need to hear further argument upon it. It certainly won’t be stricken from the record until we have had time to consider it, and Dr. Laternser will have his opportunity of examining this witness, and he can then elucidate any evidence he wants to.

DR. LATERNSER: But, Mr. President, if I make the motion for the reason that the witness is giving testimony which is beyond his scope as a witness, and that he is giving his opinion, then to that extent it is inadmissible testimony which would have to be stricken from the record.

THE PRESIDENT: If you mean that the evidence is hearsay, that will be perfectly obvious to the Tribunal, and doesn’t make the evidence inadmissible, and you will be able to cross-examine him about it.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have been misunderstood. I did not say, and I am not basing my request to strike the testimony from the record on the allegation that the witness made statements from hearsay; but I say that it is not a statement of fact, but an opinion which the witness is giving when he says that “the generals in the East deserted the group of conspirators.”

DR. DIX: May I answer briefly to that? If I try to influence a group of generals to organize a revolt and if they do not do so, that is a fact and I can state this fact with the words, “They deserted us.” Naturally I can also say, “They did not revolt,” but that is merely a matter of expression. Both are facts and not an opinion. He is not appraising the behavior of the generals in an ethical, military, or political sense, he is merely pointing out, “They were not willing.”

THE PRESIDENT: Go on.

DR. DIX: [_Turning to the witness._] If I recall correctly, you were just about to tell us that now the policy of the conspirators’ group changed from a revolt to an assassination. Is that correct?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. DIX: Do you wish to state anything further?

GISEVIUS: You had asked me about the first step in this direction after Generaloberst Beck had given up all hope of being able to win over another general to a revolt. It was said at that time that there was now nothing left for us but to free Germany, Europe, and the world from the tyrant by a bomb attack. Immediately after this decision, preparations were started. Oster spoke to Lahousen and Lahousen furnished the bombs from his arsenal. The bombs were taken to the headquarters of Kluge at Smolensk, and with every possible means we tried to bring about the assassination, which was unsuccessful only because at a time when Hitler was visiting the front, the bomb which had been put in his airplane did not explode. This was in the spring of 1943.

DR. DIX: Now, an event took place in the Abwehr OKW, which as a result of further developments, strongly affected Schacht’s further attitude and also your remaining in Germany. Will you please describe that?

GISEVIUS: Gradually even Himmler could not fail to see what was happening in the OKW, and at the urgent request of SS General Schellenberg a thorough investigation of the Canaris group was now started. A special commissioner was appointed and on the first day of this investigation Oster was relieved of his post and a number of his collaborators were arrested. A short time afterwards Canaris was also dismissed from his post. I myself could no longer remain in Germany and thus this group, which until now had in a certain sense been the directorate of all the conspiracies, was eliminated.

DR. DIX: During that time, that is January 1943, Schacht was also relieved of his position as Reich Minister without Portfolio. Did you meet Schacht after that time?

GISEVIUS: Yes. By chance I was in Berlin on the day this letter of dismissal arrived. It was an unusually sharp letter and I remember that that night I was asked to the country house of Schacht, and as the letter had simply stated that Schacht was to be dismissed, we wondered whether he was also going to be arrested.

DR. DIX: I would like to remind the Tribunal that I read this letter into the record when Lammers was examined and showed it to him. This letter—I mean Schacht’s letter of dismissal signed by Lammers—has already been read into the record and is probably contained in my document book.

[_Turning to the witness._] You were in Switzerland at that time, but on 20 July you were in Berlin. How did that happen?

THE PRESIDENT: You mean the 20th of July 1944?

DR. DIX: Yes, the well-known day of the 20th of July. We are rapidly approaching the end now.

GISEVIUS: A few months after the elimination of the Canaris-Oster circle we formed a new group around General Olbricht. At that time Colonel Count Von Stauffenberg also joined us. He replaced Oster in all activities, and when after several months, and after many unsuccessful attempts and discussions, the time finally arrived in July 1944, I returned secretly to Berlin in order to participate in the events.

DR. DIX: But you had no direct connection with Schacht at this attempted assassination?

GISEVIUS: No; I, personally, was in Berlin secretly and saw only Goerdeler, Beck, and Stauffenberg; and it was agreed expressly at this time that no other civilian except Goerdeler, Leuschner, and myself were to be informed of the matter. We hoped thus to protect lives by not burdening anyone unnecessarily with this knowledge.

DR. DIX: Now I come to my last question.

You know that Schacht had after all held high government positions under the Hitler regime. You, Doctor, as is shown by your testimony today were an arch enemy of the Hitler regime. Despite that you had, as can also be seen from your testimony today, special confidence in Schacht. How do you explain this fact which at first sight seems to be contradictory in itself?

GISEVIUS: My answer can, of course, only express a personal opinion and I will formulate it as briefly as possible. However, I would like to emphasize that the problem of Schacht was confusing not only to me but to my friends as well; Schacht was always a problem and a puzzle to us. Perhaps it was due to the contradictory nature of this man that he kept his position in the Hitler government for so long. He undoubtedly entered the Hitler regime for patriotic reasons, and I would like to testify here that the moment his disappointment became obvious he decided for the same patriotic reasons to join the opposition. Despite Schacht’s many contradictions and the puzzles he gave us to solve, my friends and I were strongly attracted to Schacht because of his exceptional personal courage and the fact that he was undoubtedly a man of strong moral character, and he did not think only of Germany but also of the ideals of humanity. That is why we went with him, why we considered him one of us; and, if you ask me personally, I can say that the doubts which I often had about him were completely dispelled during the dramatic events of 1938 and 1939. At that time he really fought, and I will never forget that. It is a pleasure for me to be able to testify to this here.

DR. DIX: Your Lordship, I am now through with the questioning of this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants counsel want to ask questions of the witness?

HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for SA): Witness, yesterday you said that you were a member of the Stahlhelm. When and for how long were you a member?

GISEVIUS: I entered the Stahlhelm in 1929, I believe, and left that organization in 1933.

HERR BÖHM: You know the mentality of the members of the Stahlhelm. You know that, almost without exception, they were people who had served in the first World War, and I would like to ask you now whether the internal and foreign political goals of the Stahlhelm were to be reached by its members in a legal or in a revolutionary manner?

GISEVIUS: To my knowledge the Stahlhelm always favored the legal way.

HERR BÖHM: Yes. Was the fight of the Stahlhelm against the Treaty of Versailles which every organization with national tendencies took up, to be carried on by legal or revolutionary means, or means of force?

GISEVIUS: It is very hard for me to answer for the entire Stahlhelm, but I can only say that I, and the members of the Stahlhelm organization with whom I was acquainted, knew that the Stahlhelm wanted to take the legal way.

HERR BÖHM: Is it correct to say that in the year 1932 and 1933 hundreds of thousands, regardless of party and race, entered the Stahlhelm organization?

GISEVIUS: That is correct. The more critical matters became in Germany, the more people went to the right. I myself having experienced this growth of the Stahlhelm as an official speaker at public meetings, from 1929 to 1933, I would describe it in this way: That those who did not want to join the NSDAP and the SA, deliberately entered the Stahlhelm so that within the German rightist movement there would be a counterbalance against the rising “brown” tide. That was the underlying reason of our recruitment for the Stahlhelm at that time.

HERR BÖHM: You know, of course, that in the year 1933 the Stahlhelm organization as a whole was taken into the SA. Was it possible at that time for the individual member of the Stahlhelm to say “no,” or to protest against being taken over into the SA?

GISEVIUS: That was possible, of course, as everything was possible also in the Third Reich.

HERR BÖHM: What would have been the possible consequences of such a step?

GISEVIUS: The possible consequences would have been a violent discussion with the regional Party leaders or SA leaders. At that time I was no longer a member of the Stahlhelm and I can merely say that it undoubtedly must have been very difficult for many people, particularly those living in the country, to refuse being transferred to the SA. After they had been betrayed by their leader, Minister Seldte, or as it was said at that time “sold” to the SA, refusal to transfer to the SA was naturally a sign of open distrust toward National Socialism.

HERR BÖHM: I gather from my correspondence with the former members of the Stahlhelm, that these people who, as former members of the Stahlhelm, were taken into the SA, remained a foreign body in it and were in constant opposition to the NSDAP and the SA. Is that correct?

GISEVIUS: As I myself no longer belonged to that organization, I can only say that I assume that those members of the Stahlhelm felt very uneasy in their new surroundings.

HERR BÖHM: Do you know whether the members of the Stahlhelm, before 1934 and from 1934, participated in Crimes against Peace, against the Jews, against the Church, and so forth?

GISEVIUS: No, I know nothing about that.

HERR BÖHM: Now I would also like to question you about the SA as far as you are able to give information. Yesterday at least you expressed yourself freely with regard to the SA leaders. I would like to ask you, in replying to a question I shall now ask, to confine yourself to a circle of SA members which lies between the simple SA man and the Standartenführer or the Brigadeführer. Could you tell from the attitude and activity of the ordinary SA man and that of the Standartenführer or Brigadeführer—and I do not go beyond that limit because I well remember the statements you made yesterday concerning the Gruppenführer or Obergruppenführer—that these people intended to commit Crimes against Peace?

GISEVIUS: It is, of course, very difficult to answer such a general question. If you ask me about the majority of these SA men, I can only say no.

HERR BÖHM: Witness, did you notice that SA men were arrested and that SA men were also put into concentration camps?

GISEVIUS: I saw that many times. In 1933, 1934, and 1935, that was in the years when it was my official duty to deal with these matters, many SA men were arrested by the Gestapo, beaten to death, or at least tortured, and put into concentration camps.

HERR BÖHM: Could a man, who was in the SA, or anyone outside for that matter, judge the SA as a whole from the activity of its members, or from individual cases, and gather that the SA intended to commit Crimes against Peace?

GISEVIUS: No. When I consider what efforts even we in the High Command of the Wehrmacht had to make to try and discover whether or not Hitler was planning a war, I naturally cannot attribute to a simple SA man knowledge of something which we ourselves did not know for certain.

HERR BÖHM: The Prosecution asserted that the SA incited the youth and the German people to war. Did you observe anything of that nature? You were a member of the Gestapo and such activities could not have escaped your notice.

GISEVIUS: That is another extremely general question, and I do not know to what extent certain songs, and other things, can be considered a preparation for war. At any rate I cannot imagine that the mass of the SA was of a different frame of mind than the mass of the German people in the years up to 1938, and the general trend of opinion beyond a doubt was that the mere thought of war was absolute madness.

HERR BÖHM: Was there anything that made you think that the SA intended to commit Crimes against Peace, or that they had committed such crimes?

GISEVIUS: As far as the ordinary SA man is concerned, I must say “no” again, and I say the same for the mass of the SA. I could not say to what extent the higher leaders were involved in plotting all the horrible things we have heard about here, but the majority undoubtedly did not know of such things and were not trained for them.

HERR BÖHM: Witness, it cannot be denied that mistakes were made by a number of SA men, and criminal acts were committed for which these people certainly should be punished.

You know the SA and know what took place during the revolutionary period and afterwards. Are you in a position to estimate or to give a proportional figure as to what percentage of the numerous members of the SA conducted themselves in a punishable manner? I call your attention to the fact that up to, perhaps 1932 or 1933, the SA...

THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment, Dr. Böhm. The Tribunal doesn’t think that is a proper question to put to a witness, what percentage of a group of this sort, of hundreds of thousands of men, take a certain view.

HERR BÖHM: However the explanation of this question would be very important for my case, Mr. President. Here is a witness who was outside the SA, who as a member of the Gestapo was perhaps one of the few people who could look into the activities of the SA, and actually did look into them, and he will certainly be believed by the Tribunal. He knew fairly well what criminal procedures were carried out and also—and that is what I want to say—the number of members of the SA, and he is one of the few who are in a position to testify on this matter. I believe that if the witness is in a position to testify hereto, the testimony given by him will be of great importance to the Tribunal also.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already ruled that not only this witness, but other witnesses, are not in a position to give such evidence, and the question is denied.

HERR BÖHM: Witness, do you know of cases in which SA members worked in opposition to the SA?

GISEVIUS: I answered that question when I said that quite a number of SA members were arrested by the Gestapo.

HERR BÖHM: Yes. Do you know what criminal proceedings were taken against the members of the SA, and possibly how many?

GISEVIUS: Far too few, I am sorry to say, if you put it that way.

HERR BÖHM: Yes.

GISEVIUS: Unfortunately there were many who committed misdeeds in the SA and who went scot-free. I am sorry that I must answer in this way.

HERR BÖHM: Certainly. And in what relation do they stand to the entire SA?

GISEVIUS: Now we have come again to the question...

THE PRESIDENT: That is the same question over again.

HERR BÖHM: Do you know under what circumstances one could resign from the SA?

GISEVIUS: In the same manner as one could resign from all organizations of the Party. That was, of course, a brave decision to make.

HERR BÖHM: Thank you. I have no further question.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in replying to a question of my colleague Dr. Dix, you told the Tribunal that after the defeat at Stalingrad a military revolt was to be organized. You testified on this point that discussions had already taken place, that preparations had been made, and that the execution of the military revolt was prevented because the field marshals in the East had deserted the group of conspirators.

I ask you now to give us more details on this question so that I can understand why you came to the conclusion that the field marshals had deserted the conspiracy group.

GISEVIUS: From the outbreak of the war Generaloberst Beck tried to contact one field marshal after another. He wrote letters and he sent messengers to them. I particularly remember the correspondence with General Field Marshal Von Manstein, and I saw with my own eyes General Von Manstein’s answer of the year 1942. To Beck’s strictly military explanations that the war had been lost and why, Manstein could reply only: A war is not lost until one considers it as lost.

Beck said that with an answer like that from a field marshal strategic questions could certainly not be raised. Several months later another attempt was made to win General Field Marshal Von Manstein. General Von Tresckow, also a victim of the 20th of July, went to the headquarters of Manstein. Oberstleutnant Count Von der Schulenburg also went to the headquarters of Manstein, but we did not succeed in winning Herr Von Manstein to our side.

At the time of Stalingrad we contacted Field Marshal Von Kluge, and he, in his turn, contacted Manstein. This time discussions reached a point when Kluge definitely assured us that he would win over Field Marshal Von Manstein at a discussion definitely fixed to take place in the Führer’s headquarters. Because of the importance of that day, a special telephone line was laid by the General of the Signal Corps, Fellgiebel, between the headquarters and General Olbricht at the OKW in Berlin. I myself was present when this telephone conversation took place. Even today I can still see that paper which said, in plain language, that Manstein, contrary to his previous assurances, had allowed himself to be persuaded by Hitler to remain in office. And even Kluge expressed himself as satisfied at the time with very small military strategic concessions. This was a bitter disappointment to us, and, therefore, I would like to repeat again what Beck said at that time: “We were deserted.”

DR. LATERNSER: What further preparations had been made in this special connection?

GISEVIUS: We had made definite agreements with Field Marshal Von Witzleben. Witzleben was the Commander-in-Chief in the West, and therefore he was very important for starting or protecting a revolt in the West. We had made further definite agreements with the Military Governor of Belgium, Generaloberst Von Falkenhausen. In addition, as on 20 July 1944, we had assembled a certain contingent of armored troops in the vicinity of Berlin. Furthermore, those commanders of the troops who were to participate in the action had been assembled in the OKW.

DR. LATERNSER: All this happened after Stalingrad?

GISEVIUS: At the time of the Stalingrad revolt.

DR. LATERNSER: Please continue.

GISEVIUS: We had made all other political preparations which were necessary. It is difficult for me to tell here the entire story of the revolts against the Third Reich.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes. What were the reasons why this intended military revolt was not carried through?

GISEVIUS: What was that?

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, what were the reasons why this revolt, which was intended by the group of conspirators, was not carried through?

GISEVIUS: Contrary to all expectations, Field Marshal Paulus capitulated. This, as is known, was the first wholesale capitulation of generals; whereas we had expected that Paulus with his generals would issue, before his capitulation, a proclamation to the German people and to the East Front, in which the strategy of Hitler and the sacrifice of the Stalingrad army would be branded in suitable words. When this cue had been given, Kluge was to declare that in future he would take no further military orders from Hitler. We hoped with this plan to circumvent the problem of the military oath which kept troubling us more and more; the field marshals one after the other were to refuse military obedience to Hitler, whereupon Beck was to take over the supreme military command in Berlin.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you just mentioned the military oath. Do you know whether Blomberg and Generaloberst Beck opposed, or tried to oppose, the pledge the Armed Forces took to Hitler?

GISEVIUS: I know only that Beck up to the last day of his life considered the day he gave his pledge to Hitler as the blackest day of his existence, and he gave me an exact description of how completely taken unawares he had felt at the rendering of the oath. He told me that he had been summoned to a military roll call; and that suddenly it was announced that an oath of allegiance was to be given to the new head of State; that unexpectedly a new form of oath was to be used. Beck could never rid himself of the awful thought that at that time he perhaps should not have given his oath. He told me that while he was on his way home, he said to a comrade, “This is the blackest day of my life.”

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in your testimony, you also mentioned that between the Polish campaign and the Western campaign, or with the beginning of the Western campaign, a further military Putsch was to be attempted, and that this Putsch failed because Halder and Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch shirked it. You used the term “shirked” previously in your testimony. Now I ask you to tell me on the basis of what facts did you arrive at this opinion that both these generals shirked...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I do not raise an objection that this is harmful to us if we have plenty of time, but this evidence as to these Putsche, and threatened Putsche, and rumored Putsche, was all admissible here in our view only as bearing on the attitude of the Defendant Schacht. We are not trying these generals for being in a Putsch or not being in a Putsch. For all purposes it is just as well as they should not be in a Putsch. I do not know what purposes this can have in doing it over again. I call the Tribunal’s attention for the limited purpose for which this historical matter was admitted, and suggest that it is serving no purpose in this connection to review it.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the answer to that, Dr. Laternser?

DR. LATERNSER: Since the witness has talked about this matter and testified that Halder as well as Brauchitsch shirked, and I cannot establish whether the opinion expressed by this witness with “shirked” is correct on the basis of the facts, I think I am obliged to clarify this point. In a general sense I would like to add further that the Prosecution is also justified in going into this point. I refer to the contention of the French Prosecutor in which he stated that in the light of all these circumstances it was beyond comprehension why Halder, as well as the entire German nation, did not rise as one man against the regime. Therefore, if I start from the viewpoint of the Prosecution, then my question on this point, as I have just put it, is undoubtedly of importance, and I, therefore, ask that this question be permitted.

THE PRESIDENT: The charge against the High Command is that they were a criminal organization within the meaning of the Charter; that is to say that they planned an aggressive war, or that they committed War Crimes or Crimes against Humanity in connection with an aggressive war. Well, whether or not they took part, or were planning to take part in a Putsch to stop the war does not seem very material to any of those questions.

DR. LATERNSER: I agree with you entirely on this point, Mr. President, that it cannot actually be considered of special importance; but on the other hand...

THE PRESIDENT: I did not say that it was not of special importance. I say that it was not material to the relevancy. The Tribunal does not think that any of these questions are relevant.

DR. LATERNSER: Then I will withdraw my question. I have one final question.

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, can you tell me the names of those generals who participated on the 20th of July?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, what has that got to do with any charge against the High Command?

DR. LATERNSER: The General Staff is accused of having participated in a conspiracy. The question...

THE PRESIDENT: We are not here to consider the honor of the High Command. We are here to consider whether or not they are a criminal organization within the meaning of the Charter, and that is the only question with which we are going to deal as far as you are concerned.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the General Staff and the OKW are accused of having participated in a conspiracy. If I prove, as I am trying to do with this question, that on the contrary, instead of participating in a conspiracy, part of the General Staff took part in an action against the regime, then the answer to this question on this point indicates that precisely the opposite was the case; and, for that reason, I ask that the question be permitted.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think what the General Staff did in July 1944, when the circumstances were entirely different to what they were in September 1939, has any relevancy to the question whether they took part, either before or in September 1939.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, if I put myself in the place of the Prosecution, I must assume that the Prosecution assumes that the conspiracy continued. It cannot be inferred, from testimony by the Prosecution or from anything that has been submitted, that the conspiracy was to have stopped at a certain period of time. So that the answer to this question would be of importance, I believe of decisive importance. I would like to supplement my statement, Mr. President...

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Laternser.

DR. LATERNSER: I would like to add that it is precisely for the members of the group I represent that the period of time between 1938 and May 1940 is considered decisive.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean the group changed; therefore, they might be different in 1944?

DR. LATERNSER: I wish to add that a particularly large number of the members of this group only joined it in the course of 1944 because of their official positions, and I do consider this point important.

THE PRESIDENT: All right.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, my question was: Can you give me the names of those generals who participated in the attempted assassination of the 20th of July 1944?

GISEVIUS: Generaloberst Beck, General Field Marshal Von Witzleben, General Olbricht, General Hoeppner.

DR. LATERNSER: One question: General Hoeppner was previously commander-in-chief of an armored army?

GISEVIUS: I believe so; General Von Haase, and certainly a large number of other generals whom I cannot enumerate offhand. Here I have mentioned only the names of those who were at Bendlerstrasse that afternoon.

DR. LATERNSER: One question, Witness: Do you know whether Field Marshal Rommel also participated on the 20th of July 1944?

GISEVIUS: I cannot answer by merely saying “yes,” for it is a fact that Rommel, as well as Field Marshal Von Kluge, did participate. However, it would give a wrong picture if Field Marshal Rommel were suddenly to appear in the category of those who fought against Hitler. Herr Rommel, as a typical Party general, sought to join us very late, and it gave us a very painful impression when suddenly Herr Rommel in the face of his own military catastrophe, proposed to us to have Hitler assassinated, and then, if possible, Göring and Himmler as well. And, even then, he did not want to join in at the first opportunity, but wanted to stay somewhat in the background in order to allow us to profit by his popularity later on. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to know whether these gentlemen, when they joined our group, came as the fallen might, as people who wished to save their pensions, or as people who, from the beginning, stood for decency and honor.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you yourself ever speak to Field Marshal Rommel about this?

GISEVIUS: No. I never considered it worth while to make his acquaintance.

DR. LATERNSER: A further question: Did officers of the General Staff participate in the 20th of July?

GISEVIUS: Yes, a great number.

DR. LATERNSER: About how many would you say?

GISEVIUS: I cannot give you the number, for at that time I was not informed of how many of the General Staff Stauffenberg had on his side. I do not doubt that Stauffenberg, Colonel Hansen, and several other stout-hearted men had discovered a number of clean, courageous officers among the General Staff, and that they could count on the support of very many decent members of the General Staff, but whom they naturally could not initiate into their plans beforehand.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, that will be sufficient for this point. Another question has occurred to me. You mentioned General Von Tresckow previously. Did you know General Von Tresckow personally?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you know anything about the fact that, after he learned that the commissar decree had been issued, General Von Tresckow remonstrated with Rundstedt and that these remonstrances contributed to the fact that the commissar decree was not passed on in General Field Marshal Von Rundstedt’s sector?

GISEVIUS: Tresckow belonged to our group for many years. There was no action which made us so ashamed as this one, and from the very start he courageously called the attention of his superiors to the inadmissibility of such terrible decrees. I remember how at that time we learned of the famous commissar decree at first through hearsay, and we immediately sent a courier to Tresckow to inform him simply of the intention of such an outrage, and how after the decree had been published, Tresckow, at a given signal, remonstrated with General Field Marshal Von Rundstedt in the way you described.

THE PRESIDENT: You said a while ago that you were just going to ask your last question.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I am sorry I could not keep to that. A number of questions arose from the testimony of the witness, but this was my last question.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any questions of the witness?

[_There was no response._]

Then do the Prosecution desire to cross-examine?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal, I have a few questions to put to you, Dr. Gisevius, and if you will answer them as nearly as possible, “yes” or “no,” as you are capable of giving a truthful answer, you will save a great deal of time.

The Tribunal perhaps should know your relations with the Prosecution. Is it not a fact that within 2 months of the surrender of Germany I met you at Wiesbaden, and you related to me your experiences in the conspiracy that you have related here?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were later brought here, and after coming here were interrogated by the Prosecution as well as by the counsel for Frick and for Schacht?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, your attitude and viewpoint are, as I understand you, those of a German who felt that loyalty to the German people required continuous opposition to the Nazi regime. Is that a correct statement of your position?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you had a very large experience in police matters in Germany.

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If your Putsche or other moves to obtain power in Germany were successful, it was planned that you would be in charge of the police in the reorganization, was it not?

GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Either as Minister of the Interior or as Police Commissioner, whatever it might be called.

GISEVIUS: Yes, certainly.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you represented the belief that it was not necessary to govern Germany with concentration camps and with Gestapo methods; is that correct?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you found all of the ways of presenting your viewpoint to the German people cut off by the Gestapo methods which were used by the Nazi regime; is that a fact?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So that there was no way open to you to obtain any change in German policy except through revolt or assassination, or means of that kind?

GISEVIUS: No. I am convinced that until 1937 or the beginning of 1938 the position could have been changed in Germany by a majority of votes in the Reich Cabinet or through pressure by the Armed Forces.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then you fix 1937 as the time when it ceased to be possible by peaceful means to effect a change in Germany; is that correct?

GISEVIUS: That is how I would judge it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, it was not until after 1937 that Schacht joined your group; is that not a fact?

GISEVIUS: Yes, as I said, the group was not formed until 1937, 1938; but Schacht had already introduced me to Goerdeler in 1936, and Schacht and Oster had known each other since 1936. And naturally Schacht had also known a large number of other members of the group for a long time.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But Schacht did not become convinced, as I understand your statement to us, until after 1937—until the Putsch affair—that he wouldn’t be able to handle Hitler in some peaceful way; is that not correct?

GISEVIUS: In what manner? In a peaceful manner or...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In a peaceful manner.

GISEVIUS: Yes, until the end of 1937 Schacht believed that it ought to be possible to remove Hitler legally.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But by the end of 1937, as you now say, the possibility of a peaceful removal of Hitler had become impossible in fact?

GISEVIUS: Yes, that is what we thought.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes; now, there was, as I understand your view in going to the general—there was no power in Germany that could stop or deal with the Gestapo, except the Army.

GISEVIUS: Yes. I would answer that question in the affirmative.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, in addition to the Gestapo, this Nazi regime also had a private army in the SS, did they not? And, for a period, in the SA?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And if you were to combat successfully the Nazi regime, you had to have manpower which only the Army had; is that right?

GISEVIUS: Yes, only people who could be found in the Army; but at the same time we also attempted to influence certain people in the Police, and we needed all the decent officials in the ministries, and the broad masses of the people altogether.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But the Wehrmacht was the source of power capable of dealing with the SS and the Gestapo if the generals had been willing?

GISEVIUS: That was our conviction.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that is the reason you kept seeking the help of the generals and felt let down when they wouldn’t give you their assistance finally?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there came a time when everybody connected with your group knew that the war was lost.

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that was before these plots on Hitler’s life, and it was apparent before the Schlaberndorff plot and before the July 20th plot, that the war was lost, was it not?

GISEVIUS: I should like to make it quite clear that there was no one in our group who did not already know, even when the war started, that Hitler would never win this war.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But it became very much more apparent as time went on, not only that the war could not be won by Germany, but that Germany was going to be physically destroyed as a result of the war; is that not true?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yet, under the system which the Nazi regime had installed, you had no way of changing the course of events in Germany except by assassination or a revolt; is that true?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And so you resorted to those extreme measures, knowing that Hitler could never make peace with the Allies; is that true?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And your purpose in this was to save Germany the last destroying blows, which unfortunately she received, from the point of view of the Germans; is that not a fact?

GISEVIUS: I should like to say that actually since the beginning of the war, we no longer thought only of Germany. I think that I may say that we bore a heavy share of responsibility towards Germany and towards the world.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, what you were endeavoring to do was to get the war to an end, since you had not been able to stop its commencement, were you not?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that was impossible as long as Hitler was at the head of the government and this group of men behind him?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there was another plot on Hitler’s life that you haven’t mentioned. Was there not a bomb that was later found to have been a communist bomb?

GISEVIUS: This happened on 9 November 1939, in the Bürgerbräukeller, in Munich. It was a brave Communist who acted independently.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, at none of these times when Hitler’s life was endangered, by a strange coincidence, was Göring or Himmler ever present; is that not true?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you attach any importance to that fact?

GISEVIUS: We sometimes regretted it. For instance, the attempt at assassination would perhaps have succeeded, if Göring and Himmler had been with Hitler on 17 July. But as the years went by, the members of this clique separated to such an extent, and protected themselves so much that they could hardly be found together anywhere. Göring, too, was gradually so absorbed in his transactions and art collections at Karinhall that he was hardly ever to be found at a serious conference.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the assassination of Hitler would have accomplished nothing from your point of view if the Number 2 man had stepped into Hitler’s place, would it?

GISEVIUS: That was a debatable problem for a long time, because Brauchitsch, for instance, imagined that we could create a transitional regime with Göring. Our group always refused to come together with that man even for an hour.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How did you plan—if you were successful—to deal with the other defendants here, with the exception of the Defendant Schacht, all of whom, I understand, you regard as a part of the Nazi government?

GISEVIUS: These gentlemen would have been behind lock and key in an extremely short time, and I think they would not have had to wait long for their sentences.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, does that apply to every man in this dock with the exception of Schacht?

GISEVIUS: Yes, every man.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, you recognized them, your group recognized them all as parts and important parts of the Nazi regime—a Nazi conspiracy. Is that a fact?

GISEVIUS: I should not like to commit myself to the words “Nazi conspiracy.” We considered them the men responsible for all the unspeakable misery which that government had brought to Germany and the world.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like to ask you a few questions about the Gestapo. You had testified generally in reference to the crimes which were committed by that organization and I ask you to state whether that included the torturing and burning to death of a large number of persons?

GISEVIUS: The question does not seem to have come through correctly.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am asking you as to the crimes committed by the Gestapo, and I am asking if it included the torturing and burning to death of thousands of persons?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did it involve the unlawful detention of thousands of innocent people?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The throwing of them into concentration camps where they were tortured and beaten and killed?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the Gestapo engage in wholesale confiscation of property?

GISEVIUS: Yes, to a very large extent; they called it “property of persons hostile to the State.”

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did it practice extortion against Jews and against others?

GISEVIUS: In masses and by the million.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the Gestapo hinder and molest the public officials, who were too prominent to be murdered, until they resigned or were driven from office?

GISEVIUS: The Gestapo used every means, from murder to the extortion which has just been described.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the question arises here as to whether the members of the Gestapo knew what the Gestapo was doing; and will you please tell the Tribunal what the situation was as to the membership in that organization and its knowledge of its program?

GISEVIUS: I have already stated at the beginning of my testimony that from the first or second day every member of the Gestapo really could not help seeing and knowing what took place in that institution.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there were some people who were taken into the Gestapo at the beginning, who were transferred from other branches of the civil service, were they not; who were in a sense involuntary members of the Gestapo?

GISEVIUS: Yes; these members were eliminated in the course of the first year as being politically unreliable.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the transfer took place at the time Göring set up the Gestapo, did it not?

THE PRESIDENT: What did the witness mean by “eliminated”?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think eliminated from the Gestapo.

GISEVIUS: Gradually they were released from the service of the Gestapo.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, after the purge of the 30th of June 1934, were special pains taken to see that no one was permitted in the organization who was not in sympathy with its program?

GISEVIUS: These attempts started after 1 April 1934, when Himmler and Heydrich took over affairs. Actually, from that date, no official was allowed into the Gestapo any longer unless Himmler and Heydrich considered that he held the opinions which they desired. It may be that during the first months some officials, who had not yet been screened by the SS, may have got in. The Gestapo was, of course, a large organization and it naturally took quite a time until the SS had educated and trained their own criminal officials.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: However, did there come a time, and if so, will you fix it as nearly as possible, after which every member of the Gestapo must have known the criminal program of that organization?

GISEVIUS: For many years I have considered that question myself and discussed it with Nebe and my friends. The reply entails very great responsibility, and in the knowledge of that responsibility I would say that from the beginning of 1935, at the latest, everyone must have known what sort of organization he was joining and the type of orders he might have to expect.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have testified as to the investigations which you made when you were connected with the police administration and you mentioned the Reichstag fire but you did not tell us what your findings were when you investigated that. Will you please tell us?

GISEVIUS: To speak briefly and to begin with the facts, we ascertained that Hitler in a general way had expressed a wish for a large-scale propaganda campaign. Goebbels undertook to prepare the necessary proposals and it was Goebbels who first thought of setting the Reichstag on fire. Goebbels discussed this with the leader of the Berlin SA Brigade, Karl Ernst, and he suggested in detail how it should be done.

A certain chemical, known to every maker of fireworks, was chosen. After spraying it, it ignites after a certain time—hours or minutes. In order to get inside the Reichstag, one had to go through the corridor leading from the palace of the Reichstag President to the Reichstag itself. Ten reliable SA men were provided, and then Göring was informed of all the details of the plan, so that by chance he did not make an election speech on that particular evening, but at such a late hour would still be sitting at his desk in the Ministry of the Interior in Berlin.

Göring—and he gave assurances that he would do so—was to put the police on wrong trails in the first confusion. From the very beginning it was intended that the Communists should be accused of this crime, and the 10 SA men who had to carry out the crime were instructed accordingly.

That is, in a few words, the story of the events. To tell you how we got hold of the details, I have only to add that one of these 10 who had to spray the chemical was a notorious criminal. Six months later he was dismissed from the SA, and when he did not receive the reward which he had been promised he decided to tell what he knew to the Reich Court sitting in Leipzig at the time. He was taken before an examining magistrate who made a record of his statement, but the Gestapo heard of it and the letter to the Reich Court was intercepted and destroyed. The SA man, named Rail, who betrayed the plan, was murdered in a vile manner with the knowledge of the Defendant Göring, by order of Gestapo chief Diels. Through the finding of the body, we picked up the threads of the whole story.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What happened to the 10 SA men who carried out the Reichstag fire? Are any of them alive now?

GISEVIUS: As far as we are aware none of them are still alive. Most of them were murdered on 30 June under the pretext of the Röhm revolt. Only one, a certain Heini Gewaehr, was taken over by the police as a police officer, and we tracked him down as well. He was killed in the war, while a police officer on the Eastern Front.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you testified that you also investigated, with the entire affair of Röhm, the murders that followed the Röhm affair. Didn’t you so testify?

GISEVIUS: I cannot actually say that we carried out the investigation, as we, of the Ministry of the Interior, had really been excluded from the entire affair. However, matters were such that after 30 June, all the appeals for help, and all the complaints of the people who were affected reached us in the Ministry of the Interior; and during 30 June, through the continual radio messages, incidental visits to Göring’s palace, and the information received from Nebe, we discovered all the details.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, about how many people were killed in that purge?

GISEVIUS: We have never been able to establish the number exactly, but I estimate that no more than 150 to 200 persons lost their lives, which, at that time, was an enormous figure.

I myself with Minister of Justice Gürtner checked the list of the number of the dead which had been given him by Hitler and Göring, and we ascertained that the list which contained the names of 77 dead, who had allegedly been justly killed, was exceeded by nearly double that number only by those names which we had received through the prosecuting authorities, or through the appeals for help coming from relatives to the Ministry of the Interior.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did you ascertain who selected the men who were killed in that purge?

GISEVIUS: To begin with we ascertained that Himmler, Heydrich, and Göring had compiled exact lists of those to be murdered; for I myself heard in Göring’s palace—and it was confirmed by Daluege who was present, and also by Nebe who was present from the very first second—that not one of those who were killed was mentioned by name; instead they just said: “Number so and so is now gone,” or, “Number so and so is still missing,” and “It will soon be Number so and so’s turn.”

There is, however, no doubt that Heydrich and Himmler also had a special list. On that special list there were several Catholics, Klausner, and others. I cannot, for instance, say here under oath whether Schleicher was murdered by order of Göring, or whether he was a man who was on Heydrich’s and Himmler’s special list.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, was the Defendant Frick fully informed as to the facts which you knew about the illegal conduct of the Gestapo?

GISEVIUS: Yes. I had to submit to him all the material that arrived which was important, and I have already described that we reported all these matters to the Secret State Police or to the Ministries of the Interior of the Länder. Naturally I could submit only the most important of these things to Frick personally. I estimate that I received several hundred such complaints daily, but the most important had to be submitted to Frick, because he had to sign them personally; for Göring always complained as soon as he saw that such a young official signed reports and appeals to the Ministry and to himself.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, was Frick informed of your conclusions about the Röhm purge?

GISEVIUS: Yes, because on the Sunday, while the murders were continuing, I spoke to Frick about the murder of Strasser, Klausner, Schleicher and the many other murders; and Frick was particularly disgusted at the murder of Strasser, because he considered that an act of personal revenge by Göring and Himmler. Likewise, Frick was extremely indignant about the murders of Klausner, Bose, Edgar Jung, and the many other innocent men who were murdered.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But when Frick signed the decree, along with Hitler, declaring these murders legitimate and ordering no prosecutions on account of those murders, Frick knew exactly what had happened from you; is that the fact?

GISEVIUS: He knew it from me, and he had seen it for himself. The story of the 30th of June was undoubtedly known to Frick.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did Frick ever talk with you about Himmler and Heydrich as being bad and dangerous, cruel persons?

GISEVIUS: On that Sunday, the 1st of July, Frick said to me, “If Hitler does not very soon do to the SS and Himmler what he has done to the SA today, he will experience far worse things with the SS than he has experienced now with the SA.”

I was greatly struck by that prediction at the time, and by the fact that Frick should speak so openly to me.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But notwithstanding the estimate he made of those men as dangerous persons, did he not thereafter appoint them both in his Ministry of Interior?

GISEVIUS: Well, of course, they were actually appointed by Hitler. However, I can only say that when I took leave of Frick, at the time I left the Ministry of the Interior in May 1935, Frick told me literally that the constant difficulties he had had because of me had taught him from now on to take Party members only in his Ministry, and as far as possible those who had the Golden Party Emblem. He said that it was possible that in the course of events he might even be forced to allow Himmler into his Ministry, but in no case would he accept the murderer Heydrich. Those were the last words I exchanged with Frick.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Both were put in charge of matters that were under his legal control, were they not?

GISEVIUS: Yes, they became members of the Reich Ministry of the Interior and Frick remained their superior.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you say that those were the last words which you exchanged with the Defendant Frick?

GISEVIUS: Yes. That was in 1935 and I have not met him or talked to him since.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, after 1934 Frick was the Minister in charge of the running and controlling of concentration camps, was he not, Dr. Gisevius?

GISEVIUS: In my opinion the Reich Minister of the Interior was responsible from the beginning for all police matters in the Reich and therefore also for the concentration camps, and I do not believe that one can say he had that responsibility only since 1934.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I am willing to accept your amendment to my question. I ask that you be shown Document Number 3751-PS of the United States, which has not yet been offered in evidence.

[_The document was submitted to the witness._]

Now, this purports to be a communication from Dr. Gürtner, the Minister of Justice, to the Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior. That would be from your friend Dr. Gürtner to Frick, would it not?

GISEVIUS: I believe I heard you say “friend.” During the time he acted as Minister, Gürtner did not conduct himself in such a way that I could consider him my friend.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well then, tell us about Gürtner. Tell us about Gürtner’s position in this situation because we have a communication here apparently from him.

GISEVIUS: Gürtner?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes.

GISEVIUS: At that time Gürtner without doubt made many attempts to expose the cruelty in the camps and to initiate criminal proceedings. In individual cases Gürtner did make many attempts; but after the 30th of June he signed that law which legalized all those dreadful things, and also in other respects Gürtner never acted consistently with his views. But this document which you submit to me was just such an attempt by Gürtner and the many decent officials in the Ministry of Justice to bring the question of the Gestapo terror to discussion. As far as I recollect this is one of those letters which we discussed unofficially beforehand in order to provoke an answer, so to say.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I now desire to read some parts of this into the record. It becomes Exhibit USA-828. I will offer it as such.

Will you kindly follow the German text and see if I correctly quote:

“My dear Reich Minister!

“Enclosed you will find a copy of a report of the Inspector of the Secret State Police, dated 28 March 1935.

“This report gives me an occasion to state my fundamental attitude towards the question of corporal punishment for internees. The numerous instances of ill-treatment which have come to the knowledge of the authorities of justice point to three different reasons for such ill-treatment of prisoners:

“1. Beating as a disciplinary punishment in concentration camps.

“2. Ill-treatment, mostly of political internees, in order to make them talk.

“3. Ill-treatment of internees arising out of sheer wantonness or for sadistic motives.”

I think I will not take the Tribunal’s time to read his comment on Number 1 or Number 2. About Number 3, you will find in the German text:

“The experience of the first revolutionary years has shown that the persons who are charged to administer the beatings generally lose all sense of the purpose and meaning of their action after a short time, and permit themselves to be governed by personal feelings of revenge, or sadistic tendencies. Thus members of the guard detail of the former concentration camp at Bredow, near Stettin, completely stripped a prostitute who had an argument with one of them and beat her with whips and cowhides in such a fashion that the woman 2 months later still showed two open and infected wounds.”

I shall not go into the dimensions; they are not important.

“In the concentration camp at Kemna near Wuppertal, prisoners were locked up in a narrow clothing locker and were then tortured by blowing in cigarette smoke, upsetting the locker, _et cetera_. In some cases the prisoners were first given salt herring to eat, in order to produce an especially strong and torturing thirst.

“In the Hohnstein Concentration Camp in Saxony, prisoners had to stand under a dripping apparatus especially constructed for this purpose, until the drops of water, which fell down at even intervals, caused seriously infected wounds on their scalps.

“In a concentration camp in Hamburg four prisoners were lashed in the form of a cross to a grating for days, once without interruption for 3 days and nights, once for 5 days and nights and fed so meagerly with dry bread that they almost died of hunger.

“These few examples show a degree of cruelty which is such an insult to every German feeling, that it is impossible to consider any extenuating circumstances.

“In conclusion, I should like to present my opinion about these three points to you, my dear Herr Reich Minister, in your capacity as departmental minister competent for the establishment of protective custody, and the camps for protective custody.”

And he goes on to make certain recommendations for action by the Minister. I do not know whether the Tribunal cares to have more of this read.

Was any improvement in conditions noted after the receipt of that communication by Frick?

GISEVIUS: The letter was received just at the time I left the Ministry of the Interior. I should like to say only one thing concerning this letter: What is described therein is really only a fraction of what we knew. I helped prepare this letter in that I spoke to the officials concerned in the Ministry of Justice. The Minister of Justice could bring up only those matters which had by chance become known legally through some criminal record. But there can be no doubt that this communication was merely a motive, and the cause of a very bold letter from Heydrich to Göring, dated 28 March 1935, in which he disputed the right of the Minister of Justice to prosecute cases of ill-treatment. The letter, therefore does not add anything new to my descriptions, and no doubt all have been convinced that these conditions, which started at that time, never ceased but became worse as time went on.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there came a time when Heydrich was assassinated in Prague, was there not?

GISEVIUS: Yes, some very brave Czechs were able to do what we unfortunately could not achieve. That will always be to their glory.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I suppose the Czechs expected, and did you expect that the assassination of Heydrich would result in some improvement in this condition?

GISEVIUS: We doubted—we, Canaris, Oster, Nebe, and the others of the group—whether it was possible at all for an even worse man to be found to succeed such a monster as Heydrich, and to that extent we really did think that the Gestapo terror would now subside, and that perhaps we would return to a certain amount of honesty and integrity, or that at least the cruelties might be lessened.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then came Kaltenbrunner. Did you notice any improvement after the appointment of Kaltenbrunner? Tell us about that.

GISEVIUS: Kaltenbrunner came and things became worse from day to day. More and more we learned that perhaps the impulsive actions of a murderer like Heydrich were not so bad as the cold, legal logic of a lawyer who took over the administration of such a dangerous instrument as the Gestapo.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Can you tell us whether Kaltenbrunner took an even more sadistic attitude than Himmler and Schellenberg had done? Were you informed about that?

GISEVIUS: Yes. I know that Heydrich, in a certain sense, really had something akin to a bad conscience when he committed his crimes. At any rate, he did not like it when those things were discussed openly in Gestapo circles. Nebe, who as Chief of the Criminal Police had the same rank as the Chief of the Gestapo, Müller, always told me that Heydrich took care to conceal his crimes.

With the entry of Kaltenbrunner into that organization, this practice ceased. All those things were now openly discussed among the department chiefs of the Gestapo. By now the war had started, of course. These gentlemen lunched together, and Nebe often came to me from such luncheons so completely exhausted that he had a nervous breakdown. On two occasions Nebe had to be sent on long sick leave because he simply could not stand the open cynicism with which mass murder, and the technique of mass murder, were discussed.

I remind you only of the gruesome chapter of the installation of the first gas chambers, which was discussed in detail in this circle, as were the experiments as to how one could remove the Jews most quickly and most thoroughly. These were the most horrible descriptions I have ever heard in my life. It is, of course, so much worse when you hear them first-hand from someone who is still under the direct impression of such discussions—and who because of this is almost at the point of physical and mental collapse, than when you hear of them now from documents. Nebe became so ill that actually as early as 20 July he suffered from a persecution mania and was a mere human wreck after everything he had gone through.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was it the custom to have daily dinner conferences of the chiefs of the Main Security Office, those who happened to be in town?

GISEVIUS: Daily conferences; everything was discussed at luncheon. This was of particular importance to us, because we heard details of the methods used by the Gestapo in the fight against our group.

To prove what I say, I can state here that, for instance, the order issued for the arrest of Goerdeler on 17 July was decided upon during such a luncheon conference, and Nebe warned us at once. That is the reason why Goerdeler was able to escape, at least for some time, and why we were able to know to what extent the Gestapo were aware of our plot.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who were the regular attendants at those luncheon conferences?

GISEVIUS: Kaltenbrunner presided. Then there were Gestapo Müller, Schellenberg, Ohlendorf, and Nebe.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And do you know whether, at those meetings, the new kinds of torture and the technique of killing by gas, and other measures in the concentration camps, were discussed?

GISEVIUS: Yes. That was discussed in great detail, and sometimes I received the description only a few minutes later.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, what is the situation with reference to the information of the Foreign Office about the conduct of the Gestapo? Will you tell us what was done to inform the Foreign Office from time to time of the crimes that the Gestapo were committing?

GISEVIUS: The Foreign Office, particularly during the earlier years, was continually kept informed, as nearly every day some foreigner was half beaten to death or robbed, and then the diplomatic missions would come with their complaints, and these complaints were sent to the Ministry of the Interior by the Foreign Office. These went through my office and sometimes I had four or five such notes a day from the Foreign Office regarding excesses by the Gestapo; and I can testify that in the course of years there were no crimes by the Gestapo which were not set forth in these notes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you make certain reports to the Foreign Office which were so dispatched that you are reasonably certain they would reach Neurath?

GISEVIUS: Ribbentrop was not yet the Foreign Minister at that time...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No, Neurath.

GISEVIUS: I very often discussed these matters personally with the officials of the Foreign Office, because they were of a particularly difficult nature, and because the officials of the Foreign Office were very indignant, I asked them repeatedly to put these matters before the Minister through the official channels. In addition, I gave as much material as I could to one of the closest collaborators of the Foreign Minister at that time, the Chief of Protocol, “Minister” Von Bülow-Schwante; and according to the information I received from Bülow-Schwante, he very often submitted that material to Neurath.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, were certain of the collaborators close collaborators of Von Papen? Was Von Papen subject to action by the Gestapo?

GISEVIUS: To start with, the entire group around Von Papen was continuously under surveillance by the Gestapo because in the earlier years there was an impression among great masses of people that Von Papen was a special advocate for decency and right. A large group collected around Von Papen and that, of course, was most carefully watched by the Gestapo. As the complaints, which Von Papen received by the score, were carefully compiled in his office, and as no doubt Von Papen quite often took these papers either to Göring or to the Hindenburg palace, the closest collaborators of Von Papen were especially suspected by the Gestapo. So it was that on 30 June 1934 Oberregierungsrat Von Bose, the closest collaborator of Von Papen, was shot dead in the doorway of Von Papen’s office. The two other colleagues of Von Papen were imprisoned, and the man who wrote Von Papen’s radio speeches, Edgar Jung, was arrested weeks before the 30th of June; and on the morning of 1 July, he was found murdered in a ditch along the highway near Oranienburg.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did Von Papen continue in office after that?

GISEVIUS: I have never heard that he resigned; and I know that very soon after the Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss was murdered, he was sent to Vienna as Hitler’s ambassador.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he ever make any protests that you know of?

GISEVIUS: I personally heard of none at the time, although, we were naturally extremely eager to hear which minister would protest. However, no letter from Papen arrived at the Ministry of the Interior.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were some of his collaborators murdered after the Anschluss in Austria?

GISEVIUS: On the day of the Anschluss, when the SS entered Austria, Von Papen’s closest collaborator, Legation Counsellor Freiherr von Ketteler, was kidnapped by the Gestapo. We searched for him for weeks, until 3 or 4 weeks later his body was washed up on the banks of the Danube.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After that did Papen continue to serve as a part of the Hitler Government and accept further offices from Hitler’s hands?

GISEVIUS: He was no longer a member of the Government at the time. Immediately after the march into Austria Von Papen was disposed of by being made envoy. However, it was not long before he continued his activities as Ambassador at Ankara.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Does the Tribunal desire to rise at this point?

THE PRESIDENT: You would like a little more time, wouldn’t you, with this witness?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It will take a little more time, Your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. We will adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 26 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]

ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH DAY Friday, 26 April 1946

_Morning Session_

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal:

Dr. Gisevius, yesterday you made some reference to Herbert Göring in saying that Schacht had sent word to you about the Gestapo microphones in Schacht’s house. Will you tell us who Herbert Göring was in relation to the defendant?

GISEVIUS: Herbert Göring was a cousin of the Defendant Göring. I had known him for many years. Herbert, as well as his brothers and sisters, warned me already years ago about the disaster which would overtake Germany if at any time a man like their cousin Hermann Göring should get a position of even the smallest responsibility. They acquainted me with the many characteristics of the defendant which all of us had come to know in the meantime, starting with his vanity, and continuing with his love of ostentation, his lack of responsibility, his lack of scruples, even to the extent of walking over the dead. In this way I already had some idea what to expect of the defendant.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, during the period when you were making these investigations and having these early conversations with Schacht, and up until about 1937, you, as I understand it, were very critical of Schacht because he had helped the Nazis to power and continued to support them. Is that true?

GISEVIUS: I did not understand how an intelligent man, and one who was as capable in economics as he was, could enter into such a close relationship with Hitler. I was all the more bewildered because, on the other hand, this man Schacht, from the very first day and in a thousand small ways resisted the Nazis, and the German public took pleasure in many sharp and humorous remarks which he made about the Nazis. Great was my bewilderment, until I actually met the man Schacht. And then...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: During this period Schacht did have great influence with the German people, did he not, particularly with German people of responsibility and power?

GISEVIUS: He had great influence to the extent that many Germans hoped to find a proponent of decency and justice in him, since they heard that he undertook many steps in that direction. I remember his activity in the Ministry of Economics, where officials who were not Party members...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think we have covered that, and I am anxious to get along with this, if I may interrupt you.

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: During this period you reported to Dr. Schacht fully concerning your findings about the criminal activities of the Gestapo, did you not?

GISEVIUS: Yes; from time to time I spoke more frankly, and it is obvious that I...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he took the position, as I understand you, that Hitler and Göring did not know about these things.

GISEVIUS: Yes. He was of the opinion that Hitler did not know anything about such terrible things, and that Göring knew at most only a part.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he stood by Göring until 1937, when Göring pushed him out of the economics office, did he not?

GISEVIUS: I believe that was at the end of 1936. I may be wrong. I believe it would be more correct to say that he looked for support from Göring and hoped that Göring would protect him from the Party and the Gestapo.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, Schacht did not heed warnings about Göring until late 1936 or 1937?

GISEVIUS: That is correct.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And during this period there would be no doubt, would there, that Schacht was the dominant economic figure in the rearmament program until he was superseded by Göring with the Four Year Plan?

GISEVIUS: I do not know whether everything went through like that exactly. He was, of course, as Minister of Economics, the leading man in German economy, not only for rearmament but for all questions of German economy; rearmament was just one of them.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now Schacht believed, and as I understand it, you too believed during all this period that under German constitutional law no war could be declared except by authority of the Reich Cabinet. Is that correct?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, from the point of view of the German Constitution, the war was illegal, by German law, as declared and carried out by Hitler, in your view.

GISEVIUS: According to our firm conviction, yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think we found out yesterday the position you were to have if there was a successful overthrow of the Hitler regime. Schacht was under consideration for Chancellor, was he not, if that movement was successful?

GISEVIUS: No. It is only correct as to the first offer that Halder made in August of 1938, or perhaps July 1938, when he visited Schacht for the first time. At that time, according to the information which I received, Halder asked Schacht whether, in the case of an overthrow, he would be ready to take over a position like that. Schacht replied that he would be ready for anything if the generals would eliminate the Nazi regime and Hitler.

As early as the year 1939 individual opponents formed a group, and at the last, when Beck was the acknowledged head of all conspirators from the left to the right wing, Goerdeler emerged in the foreground together with Beck as the leading candidate for the position of Reich Chancellor, so that after that time we need speak only of Goerdeler in that regard.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I want to ask you some questions about the Defendant Keitel. Of course, we have heard that Hitler was the actual head of the state, but I want to ask you whether Keitel occupied a position of real leadership and power in the Reich.

GISEVIUS: Keitel occupied one of the most influential positions in the Third Reich. I would like to say at this point that I was a very close friend of four of the closest collaborators of Keitel. One was the Chief of the Ordnance Office in the OKW, the murdered General Olbricht; the second was the Chief of the Counterintelligence Service, Admiral Canaris, who was also murdered; the third was the Chief of the Army Legal Department, Ministerial Director Sack—he was also murdered—and finally there was the chief of the armament economy department, General Thomas, who escaped being murdered as though by a miracle. A close friendship, I might say, bound me to these men, and thus from these men I found out exactly what tremendous influence Keitel had over the OKW and in all Army matters, and thereby what influence he wielded in representing the Army in the eyes of the German people.

It may be that Keitel did not influence Hitler to a great extent. But I must testify here to the fact that Keitel influenced the OKW and the Army all the more. Keitel decided which documents were to be transmitted to Hitler. It was not possible for Admiral Canaris or one of the other gentlemen I mentioned to submit an urgent report to Hitler of his own accord. Keitel took it over, and what he did not like he did not transmit, or he gave these men the official order to abstain from making such a report. Also, Keitel repeatedly threatened these men, telling them that they were to limit themselves exclusively to their own specialized sectors, and that he would not protect them with respect to any political utterance which was critical of the Party and the Gestapo, of the persecution of the Jews, the murders in Russia, or the anti-Church campaign, and, as he said later, he would not hesitate to dismiss these gentlemen from the Wehrmacht and turn them over to the Gestapo. I have read the notes in regard to this which Admiral Canaris made in his diary. I have read the notes of General Oster in regard to this from the conferences of commanders in the OKW. I have talked with the Chief Judge of the Army, Dr. Sack, about this, and it is my strong wish to testify here that Field Marshal Keitel, who should have protected his officers, repeatedly threatened them with the Gestapo. He put these men under pressure, and these gentlemen considered that a special insult.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, whether Keitel could control Hitler or not, he did have a very large control of the entire OKW underneath him. Is that not true?

GISEVIUS: Did you say Hitler? No, Keitel.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Whether Keitel could control Hitler or not he did control and command the entire OKW underneath him?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, whatever Hitler’s own inclinations may have been, these men in this dock formed a ring around him which kept out information from your group as to what was going on unless they wanted Hitler to hear it, isn’t that a fact?

GISEVIUS: Yes. I believe that I should cite two more examples which I consider especially significant. First of all, every means was tried to persuade Keitel to warn Hitler, before the invasion of Belgium and Holland, and to tell him, that is Hitler, that the information which had been submitted by Keitel regarding the alleged violation of neutrality by the Dutch and Belgians was wrong. The counterintelligence was to produce these reports which would incriminate the Dutch and Belgians. Admiral Canaris at that time refused to sign these reports. I ask that this be verified. He told Keitel repeatedly that these reports, which were supposedly produced by the OKW, were wrong. That is one example when Keitel did not transmit to Hitler what he should have transmitted. The second was that Keitel was asked by Canaris and Thomas to submit to Hitler the details of the murders in Poland and Russia. Admiral Canaris and his friends were anxious to prevent even the beginning of these mass murders and to inform Keitel while the first preparations by the Gestapo were being made for these infamous actions. We received the documents, through Nebe and others. Keitel was informed as to this in detail, and here again he did not resist at the beginning; and he who did not stop the Gestapo at the beginning can not be surprised if in the end a millionfold injustice was the upshot.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, I think you put your question, “Did not these men in the dock form a ring which prevented you getting to Hitler,” and the question was answered rather as though it applied only to Keitel. If you intended to put it with reference to all defendants, I think it ought to be cleared up.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think that is true.

[_Turning to the witness._] Each of the defendants who held ministerial positions of any kind controlled the reports which should go to Hitler from that particular ministry, did he not?

GISEVIUS: As far as this general question is concerned, I must reply cautiously, for, first of all, it was a close clan which put a cordon of silence around Hitler. A man like Von Papen or Von Neurath cannot be included in this group, for it was obvious that Von Papen and Von Neurath, and perhaps one or the other of the defendants, did not have the possibility, or much later no longer had the possibility, of having regular access to Hitler, for besides Von Neurath, Hitler already had his Ribbentrop for a long time. Thus I can only say that a certain group, which is surely well known, composed the close circle of which I am speaking.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like you to identify those of the defendants who had access to Hitler and those who were able to prevent access to Hitler by their subordinates. That would apply, would it not, to Göring, Ribbentrop, Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Frick, and to Schacht—during the period until he broke with them, as you have testified—and to Dönitz, Raeder, Sauckel, and Speer?

GISEVIUS: You mentioned a few too many and some are missing. Take the Defendant Jodl, for instance. I would like to call your attention to the strange influence which this defendant had and the position he had with regard to controlling access to Hitler. I believe my testimony shows that Schacht, on the other hand, did not control access to Hitler, but that he could only be glad about each open and decent report which got through to Hitler from his and other ministries. As far as the defendant Frick is concerned, I do not believe that he was necessarily in a position to control access to Hitler. I believe the problem of Frick centers in the matter of responsibility.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Should I have included Funk in the group that had access to Hitler?

GISEVIUS: Funk, without a doubt, had access to Hitler for a long time, and for his part Funk had of course the responsibility to see that affairs in the Ministry of Economics and in the Reichsbank were conducted in the way Hitler desired. Without a doubt Funk put his surpassingly expert knowledge at the service of Hitler.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you prepare or participate in preparing reports which were sent to Keitel as to the criminal activities of the Gestapo?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did others participate with you in the preparation of those reports?

GISEVIUS: Yes, it was the work of a group. We gathered reports about plans and preparations of the Gestapo, and we gathered material about the first infamous acts, so that some courageous men at the front, officers of the General Staff and of the Army, went to the scene, prepared reports, made photographs, and this material came then to both Canaris and Oster. Then the problem arose: how can we bring this material to Keitel? It was generally known that officers, even highly placed officers like Canaris and Thomas, were forbidden to report on political matters. The difficulty was, therefore, not to have Canaris and the others come under the suspicion that they were dealing with politics; we employed the roundabout method of preparing so-called counterintelligence agents’ reports from foreign countries or from occupied countries; and with the pretext that different agents from all countries were here reporting about these outrages, or that agents traveling through or in foreign countries had found such infamous photographs we then submitted these reports to Field Marshal Keitel.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did Canaris and Oster participate in submitting those reports to Keitel?

GISEVIUS: Yes. Without Canaris and Oster the working out and the gathering of this material would have been inconceivable.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what positions did Canaris and Oster hold with reference to Keitel at this time when these reports were being submitted?

GISEVIUS: Canaris was the senior officer of the OKW. Formally he even had to represent Keitel when Keitel was absent. Keitel was only concerned that someone else should take his place at such times, usually his Party general, Reinecke; and Oster, as the representative, Chief of Staff for Canaris, was also in close association with Canaris. Keitel could not have wished for closer contact with reality and truth than through this connection with the Chief of his Wehrmacht Counterintelligence Service.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So these reports which were sent to Keitel came from the highest men in his own organization under himself?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, what did they report to Keitel? Let me ask you if they reported to him that there was a systematic program of murder of the insane going on.

GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. On these subjects, too, records were completed in detail including the despairing reports of the directors of the lunatic asylums. I recall this exactly because here, too, we had great difficulties in giving a reason for these reports, and we actually put them through as reports of foreign doctors who had heard of these things with indignation.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he report to him the persecution and murder of the Jews and the program of extermination of the Jews that was being carried out?

GISEVIUS: From the first Jewish pogroms in 1938 on Keitel was minutely informed of each new action against the Jews, particularly about the establishment of the first gas chamber, or rather, the establishment of the first mass graves in the East, up to the erection of the murder factories later.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did these reports mention the atrocities that were committed in Poland against the Poles?

GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed, here I would say again that the atrocities in Poland, too, started with isolated murders which were so horrible that we were still able to report on single cases, and could add the names of the responsible SS leaders. Here, too, Keitel was spared nothing of the terrible truth.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did that condition of informing Keitel also prevail as to the atrocities against nationals in other occupied countries?

GISEVIUS: Yes. First of all I must of course mention the atrocities in Russia, because I must emphasize that Keitel now certainly, on the basis of the Polish atrocities, had been warned sufficiently as to what was at hand in Russia. And I remember how the preparation of these orders, such as the order for the shooting of commissars and the Night and Fog Decree, was continued for weeks in the OKW, so that, as soon as the preparation of these orders was begun, we begged Canaris and Oster to present a petition to Keitel. But I would like to add that I do not doubt that other courageous men also presented a petition to Keitel in this connection. Since I belonged to a certain group, the impression might be created that only in this group were there persons who were interested in these problems, and I would be withholding vital information if I did not add that even in the High Command of the OKW and in the General Staff there were excellent men who did everything to reach Keitel through their separate channels, and that there were also brave men in many ministries who tried to reach every officer whom they saw in order to plead with him to order a stop to this injustice.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the reports to Keitel mention the forced enslavement of millions of foreign workers and their deportation or importation into Germany?

GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And those enslaved laborers are the displaced persons, largely, of this day—that are plaguing Germany today, are they not?

GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. In this connection I would also like to say that in our reports it was already mentioned just what responsibility the Wehrmacht would have to bear if these ill-treated people should be free some day. We had an idea of what was to come, and those who made the reports at that time can understand what has now taken place.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the reports to Keitel report the persecution of the churches in the occupied countries?

GISEVIUS: Yes, they did. I would like to cite as a special example how we even once sent leading churchmen to Norway in the guise of agents. They established contact with Bishop Bergraf, and brought back very detailed reports of what Bishop Bergraf thought about the persecution of the churches in Norway and other countries. I can still see this report before me because Keitel also wrote one of his well-known National Socialist Party phrases on this document.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, these reports consisted both of information furnished by Canaris and Oster and of the reports coming in from the field under this plan?

GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I want to ask you a few questions about the SA and the SS organizations. In your book, which you have been asked about, I think you have characterized the SA as a private army of the Nazi organization. Is that a correct characterization?

GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: During the early part of the struggle for power the SA constituted a private army for carrying out the orders of the Nazi Party, did it not?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They took in a good many people in the SA, and it got pretty large, and there came a time when there was some danger it would get away from them; wasn’t there?

GISEVIUS: Yes, that is correct.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the murder of Röhm and his associates was a struggle for power, was it not, between Göring and Himmler and the Nazi crowd associated with them on one hand and Röhm and his associates on the other?

GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After the murder of Röhm, this SA organization, which was very big at the time, rather lost importance, didn’t it?

GISEVIUS: Yes, completely.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the SS, which was a smaller and more compact organization, came in to take its place as a private army, didn’t it?

GISEVIUS: Yes, as the decisive private army.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, let’s go back to the SA during the period before the struggle for power resulting in the Röhm purge. What part did the SA play in the battle for power, the seizure of power?

GISEVIUS: As is said in the song, “It cleared the streets for the Brown Battalions,” and without a doubt the SA played a dominant role in the so-called seizure of power. Without the SA Hitler would undoubtedly never have come to power.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, let’s take up their methods. Perhaps I can shorten this by quoting from your book. I think you say that:

“Whoever had not entirely made up his mind, had it made up for him unequivocally by the SA. Their methods were primitive, therefore all the more effective. For instance, one learned the new Hitler salute very quickly when, on the sidewalks, beside every marching SA column—and where were there no parades in those days—a few stalwart SA men went along giving pedestrians a crack on the head right and left if they failed to perform the correct gesture at least three steps ahead of the SA flag. And these Storm Troopers acted the same way in all things.”

Is that a correct account of their activities and influence?

GISEVIUS: I hope so.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you know so, don’t you?

GISEVIUS: Yes, yes, of course, for it is my own description, I cannot criticize it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, but you saw these things yourself, did you not? You were in Germany at that time?

GISEVIUS: Yes, certainly.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You see, it is very difficult for us, with all the documents we have, Doctor, to get the picture of the day to day events, and you were there and we were not.

Now, let me make another question:

“The chronicle of that private army is colorful and stirring. It teemed with beer hall brawls, street fights, knifings, shootings, and fist fights, altogether a mad rough and tumble affair, where naturally there was no question of crises of leadership or of mutinies. In this brotherhood of the wild men of German nationalism there was undoubtedly much idealism, but at the same time the SA was the repository for political derelicts. The failures of all classes found refuge there. The discontents, the disinherited, the desperados streamed to it wholesale. The core, the paid permanent group, and particularly the leaders, were recruited, as time went on, more and more from the riffraff of a period of political and social decay.”

Is that a correct statement of your observations of the SA at that time?

GISEVIUS: Yes, quite.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I call your attention to another question:

“The SA organized huge raids. The SA searched houses. The SA confiscated property. The SA cross-examined people. The SA put people in jail. In short, the SA appointed themselves permanent auxiliary police and paid no attention to any of the principles of the so-called system period (Weimar Republic). The worst problem for the helpless authorities was that the SA never returned its booty at all. Woe unto anyone who gets into their clutches!

“From this time dated the ‘Bunker,’ those dreaded private prisons of which every SA Storm Troop had to have at least one. ‘Taking away’ became the right of the SA. The efficiency of a Standartenführer was measured by the number of arrests he had made, and the good reputation of an SA man was based on the effectiveness with which he ‘educated’”—in quotation marks, the quotation marks being yours—“‘educated’ his prisoners. Brawls could no longer be staged in the fight for power, yet the ‘fight’ went on, only the blows were now struck in the full enjoyment of power.”

Is that a correct statement of your observations of the SA?

GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you also used the term “Bunker,” and it is a slightly technical term with which some of us are not familiar. Will you tell the Tribunal what this Bunker system of the SA was?

GISEVIUS: Bunkers were those cellars or other dungeons with thick walls in which the poor prisoners were locked up, where they were then beaten and in a large measure beaten to death. They were these private jails in which, during the first months, the leaders of the leftist parties and of the trade unions were systematically rendered harmless, which explains the phenomenon that the leftist groups did not act again for so long a time, for there, at the outset and most thoroughly, the entire leadership was done away with.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You also use the expression “‘taking away’ became the inalienable right of the SA,” and “taking away” is in quotation marks. Will you tell us about this “taking away,” what it means?

GISEVIUS: That was the arbitrary arrest, whereby the relatives often for periods of weeks or months did not know where the poor victims had disappeared to, and could be glad if they ever returned home.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you also make this observation in your book:

“Every excess, pardoned as ‘overzealousness in the cause of the National Socialist Revolution,’ was a demonstration of official sanction and necessarily drew in its wake a new excess. It was the bestiality tolerated during the first months that later encouraged the sadistic murderers in the concentration camps. The growth in brutality and insensibility of the general public, which toward the end of the revolution extended far beyond the domain of the Gestapo, was the unavoidable consequence of this first irresponsible attempt to give free rein to the Brown Shirts for their acts of violence.”

Does that, too, represent your observation of the SA?

GISEVIUS: Yes—not of the SA alone but also of general conditions in Germany.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, will you tell us about—as I understand you, after the Röhm Purge the SA was rather abandoned as the private army, and a more reliable and smaller and more compact private army was created under Himmler.

GISEVIUS: A guard which had been established by Himmler long before this time now actually came into action. I do not doubt that Himmler and his closest circle for years had worked toward this very objective so that one day, with their Schutztruppe (protective guard), they could establish the terror system in Germany. But until 30 June the SS had been a part of the SA, and Göring—excuse me, Röhm was also the chief of the SS. The road for Himmler to police chief in Germany, to police chief of evil, was only open after Röhm had been eliminated with his much larger SA. But the will to power of the SS and all the confused and unscrupulous ideas connected therewith must be assumed to have existed in the leadership of the SS already for many years previous to that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, this SS organization selected its members with great care, did it not?

GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Will you tell us something about the qualifications for membership? What was necessary?

GISEVIUS: The members had to be so-called Nordic types. Actually I always considered these questionnaires as a good subject for a humorous paper, and for that reason I am not in a position today to give you exact particulars, except that, if I am not mistaken, the distinguishing characteristics of men and women went so far as underarm perspiration. I recall that Heydrich and Himmler, in selecting SS men who were to do police duty, decided only after a picture had been submitted to them of the future victim who would be charged with carrying out their evil commands. I know that, for example, Nebe repeatedly saved officials in the criminal police force (Kripo) from being transferred to the ranks of the Gestapo by having poor photographs taken of these people so that, as far as possible, they did not look Nordic. In that case, of course, they were turned down immediately. But it would be going too far afield to relate more about these dismal things in this courtroom.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, was the membership of the SS recruited only from what we may call fanatical Nazis, reliable Nazis?

GISEVIUS: I believe we have to make a distinction. In the first years of the SS, many decent German people, especially farmers and people in the country, felt drawn to the SS, because they believed Himmler’s assurance that the SS was to bring order to Germany and to be a counterbalance to the SA terror. In that way, to my knowledge, some people in the years before 1933, and even in 1933 and 1934, entered the SS, because they hoped that here would be a nucleus standing for order and right, and I believe it is my duty to point out the tragedy of these people. Each and every case should be examined before deciding whether, later on, a member was guilty or whether he remained decent.

But from a certain period of time on—I believe I specified yesterday 1935—no one could have any doubts as to the real SS objectives. From then on—here I would like to take up your own expression—fanatical National Socialists, that is, “super” National Socialists, entered the SS.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And from 1935 on, was it, in your judgment as one who was on the ground, necessarily so, that the persons who entered it knew what its actual activities were?

GISEVIUS: Yes; what he was entering into and what orders he had to expect.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Tribunal wishes me to ask you in reference to yesterday’s incident if you have anything to add. I know nothing further on that incident, in reference to the threat made. Is there anything that you wish to add about that incident in order to make it clear to the Tribunal, anything that has not been told about it?

GISEVIUS: I would like to make clear that Dr. Dix did not merely inform me about a discussion he had with Dr. Stahmer. That morning I arrived in the room of the attorneys, and I do not wish to state further particulars, but the atmosphere there was not exactly cordial to begin with. Then I went up to Dr. Dix to report something else. Dr. Stahmer approached, obviously very excited, and asked Dr. Dix for an immediate interview. Dr. Dix refused on the ground that he was talking to me. Dr. Stahmer said in a loud voice that he must speak to Dr. Dix immediately and urgently. Dr. Dix took only two steps aside and the conversation that followed was carried on by Dr. Stahmer in such a loud voice, that I was bound to hear most of it. I did hear it and said to attorney Dr. Kraus who was standing nearby, “Just listen how Dr. Stahmer is carrying on.” Dr. Dix then came over to me, very excited, and after all this fuss, in response to my questions as to what precisely was the demand of the Defendant Göring, he told me what I had half heard anyway. I would like to underline that if I had had the opportunity to tell the story first in my own way, I would have emphasized that I was under the impression that Dr. Stahmer had merely transmitted a statement, or rather what I would call a threat, by the Defendant Göring.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, in this Nazi regime, after Hitler came to power, will you state whether there was, as far as you could see, a systematic practice of the Nazi ministers and Nazi officials enriching themselves by reasons of their confiscation of property of Jews and others?

GISEVIUS: Yes. This became more cynical from year to year and we kept lists as to which of the civil ministers and, above all, which of the generals and field marshals participated in this system. We planned to inquire of all the generals and ministers at a later date whether these donations had been put into a bank account or whether they had possibly used this money for their own personal interests.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And will you state to the Tribunal which of the defendants were engaged in self-enrichment in the manner that you have indicated?

GISEVIUS: I am sorry I am only able to give a negative reply since we repeatedly inquired from the Defendant Schacht...

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this will be a good time to adjourn for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Dr. Gisevius, I have just a few more questions which I would like to put to you in reference to the war and the resistance movement of which you were a part.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, there is just one question I should like to ask the witness. You said that you kept lists of the ministers and generals who participated in this system of spoils. What was your source of information?

GISEVIUS: We had information from the various ministries, from antechambers of ministries, and from the Finance Ministry. But I did not finish the answer before. I said that I could answer the question as to which of the defendants had enriched himself only in the negative.

Concerning the Defendant Schacht, I wanted to continue saying that I personally did not look into these lists, and that I took part only in the questioning of the Defendant Schacht and that he personally had not enriched himself. I did not intend to say in any sense, therefore, that all the defendants, especially Defendants Von Papen or Von Neurath, to name only these two, had enriched themselves. I do not know. I wanted to say only that about Schacht we know, or rather I know, that he did not take part in that system.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, in addition to a system of spoils from confiscated property, there were also open gifts from Hitler to the generals and ministers, were there not, of large sums of property and money?

GISEVIUS: Yes. These were the famous donations with which, especially in the years after the outbreak of the war, the top generals were systematically corrupted.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did that hold true with reference to many of the ministers?

GISEVIUS: I do not doubt it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, as I understood your testimony, whatever doubts you may have had before 1938 when the affair Fritsch occurred, that event or series of events convinced even Schacht that Hitler was bent on aggressive warfare.

GISEVIUS: After the Fritsch crisis Schacht was convinced that now radicalism and the course toward war could no longer be stopped.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There was never any doubt in the minds of all of you men who were in the resistance movement, was there, that the attack on Poland of September 1939 was aggression on Hitler’s part?

GISEVIUS: No, no, there could be no doubt about that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that diplomatic means of righting whatever wrongs Germany felt she suffered in reference to the Corridor and Danzig had not been exhausted?

GISEVIUS: I can only point to the existing documents. There was no will for peace.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, in the German resistance movement, as I understand you, there was agreement that you wanted to obtain various modifications of the Treaty of Versailles, and you also wanted various economic betterments for Germany, just as other people wanted them. That was always agreed upon, was it not?

GISEVIUS: We were all agreed that a calm and a reasonable balance could be achieved again in Europe only when certain modifications of the Versailles Treaty were carried through by means of peaceful negotiations.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your difference from the Nazi group was chiefly, in reference to that matter, one of method.

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: From the very beginning, as I understand you, it was the position of your group that a war would result disastrously for Germany as well as for the rest of the world.

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that the necessary modifications, given a little patience, could be brought about by peaceful means.

GISEVIUS: Absolutely.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, it was in the light of that difference of opinion, I suppose, that your resistance movement against the regime in power in Germany carried out these proposals for Putsche and assassinations which you have described.

GISEVIUS: Yes, but I would like to add that we were not only thinking of the great dangers outside, but we also realized what dangers lay in such a system of terror. From the very beginning there was a group of people in Germany who still did not even think of the possibility of war, and nevertheless protested against injustice, the deprivation of liberty, and the fight against religion.

In the beginning, therefore, it was not a fight against war, but if I may say so, it was a fight for human rights. From the very first moment on, among all classes of people, in all professional circles, and in all age groups, there were people who were ready to fight, to suffer, and to die for that idea.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the question may arise here as to what your motives and what your purposes in this resistance movement were with reference to the German people, and I shall ask you to state to the Tribunal your overall purpose in resisting the Government in power in your country.

GISEVIUS: I should like to say that death has reaped such a rich harvest among the members of the resistance movement, that it is only for that reason I can sit here, and that otherwise more worthy and able men could give this answer. Having said this, I feel that I can answer that, whether Jew or Christian, there were people in Germany who believed in the freedom of religion, in justice, and human dignity, not only for Germany but also, in their profound responsibility as Germans, for the higher concept of Europe and the world.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There was a group which composed this resistance, as I understand it.

GISEVIUS: It was not only just a group, but many individuals had to carry the secret of their resistance silently to their death rather than confide it to the Gestapo records; and only a very few persons have enjoyed the distinction of being referred to now as a group.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Most of the men who were associated with you in this movement are dead?

GISEVIUS: Almost all of them.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is there anything you would like to add to clarify your position to the Tribunal, Dr. Gisevius?

GISEVIUS: Excuse me, I did not understand you.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is there anything you would like to add in order that the Tribunal may understand your position in this, your feeling, your very strong feeling in this matter, to understand and appraise your own relation to this situation?

GISEVIUS: I do not like to talk of myself, but I want to thank you, Mr. Prosecutor, for giving me an opportunity to testify emphatically on behalf of the dead and the living.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have concluded the examination.

MAJOR GENERAL G. A. ALEXANDROV (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Was not the understanding arrived at with Counsel for the Prosecution that the witness for the Defendant Frick should only be cross-examined by one prosecutor?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, I have an agreement with the prosecutors to the effect that the examination of the Defendant Schacht and his witnesses will be carried out by the American Prosecution, but that, in the presence of additional questions during cross-examination, the prosecutor from the Soviet Prosecution could also join in the examination. In view of the fact that the Soviet Prosecution has several additional questions to ask the witness Gisevius, which are of great importance to the case, I ask permission to address these questions to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: What are the questions which you say are of particular importance to the Soviet Union? I do not mean the individual questions but the general nature of them.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Questions in connection with the part played by the Defendant Frick in the preparation for war, questions connected with the attitude of the Defendant Schacht towards the Hitler regime, as well as a number of other important questions.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn in order to consider whether the Prosecution ought to be allowed to cross-examine this witness in addition to the cross-examination which has already taken place.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has before it two documents which were presented to it by the Chief Prosecutors upon the subject of cross-examination. In the first of these documents it was provided that the following procedure for the cross-examination of the Defendants Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Frank, Frick, Streicher, and Funk was agreed; and that with reference to Frick the American Prosecution was to conduct the cross-examination of the defendant and his witness. The document was presented because of the Tribunal’s express desire that too much time should not be taken up by the cross-examination by more than one prosecutor.

In addition to that document there was another document, which was only a tentative agreement, and with reference to the Defendant Schacht it provided that the American delegation should conduct the principal cross-examination and the Soviet and the French delegations should consider whether either would wish to follow.

In view of those two documents, the first of which suggests that the Prosecution have agreed to only one cross-examination of the witnesses of the Defendant Frick, and the second of which tentatively suggests that, in addition to the American Prosecution, the Soviet and the French might wish to cross-examine, the Tribunal propose to allow the additional cross-examination in the present instance, and they are loath to lay down any hard and fast rule concerning cross-examination. They hope, however, that in the present instance, after the full cross-examination by the Prosecutor of the United States, the Soviet Prosecutor will make his cross-examination as short as possible. For the future, the Tribunal hopes that the prosecutors may be able to agree among themselves that in the case of witnesses one cross-examination only will be sufficient, and that in any event the additional cross-examination will be made as brief as possible.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Witness, in order to save time, I beg you to answer my questions as briefly as possible.

Tell me, what part did the German Ministry of the Interior and the Defendant Frick personally play in the preparation for the second World War?

GISEVIUS: This question is very difficult for me to answer. I left the Ministry of the Interior as early as May 1935, and I actually cannot say any more about conditions after that time than any other German, that is, that the Ministry of the Interior was part of the German government machine and doubtlessly there, as in all other ministries, those preparations for war were made which administrations have to make in such cases.

DR. PANNENBECKER: May I say something? The witness has just stated that he could not say any more in answering that question than any other German could. I believe that, under these circumstances, the witness is not the right person to make any factual statements.

THE PRESIDENT: He has just said so himself. That is exactly what he said. I don’t see any reason for any intervention. The witness said so.

DR. PANNENBECKER: I only meant that he could not even function as a witness concerning these facts.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: For perfectly obvious reasons I am deprived of all possibility to put these questions to any German, but I am perfectly satisfied with the answers of the witness Gisevius.

[_Turning to the witness._] Do you know anything about the so-called “Three Man College”? It consisted of the Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich, of the Plenipotentiary for Economy, and of a representative of the OKW. This Three Man College was entrusted with the preparation of all fundamental questions pertaining to the war.

GISEVIUS: I personally cannot give any information on that.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Do you know anything about the activities of the Ministry of the Interior in territories occupied by the Germans?

GISEVIUS: As far as I know, the Ministry of the Interior sent important officials into the military administration, but it is not clear to me whether these officials, from that moment on, were subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior or the OKW.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Have you any special knowledge as to whether the machinery of the Reich Commission in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union was recruited from the Ministry of the Interior or at least with considerable help from this ministry?

GISEVIUS: I should assume so, yes. It holds good as far as help is concerned, because the ministry for the occupied Russian territories could take its officials only from the personnel department of the Ministry of the Interior.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: What do you know of the visits paid by the Defendant Frick to the concentration camps?

GISEVIUS: At the time when I was in the Ministry of the Interior I did not hear anything about that.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: And after that?

GISEVIUS: After that I did not hear anything about it either.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Could a situation arise in which the Defendant Frick, although Minister of the Interior, would not be informed regarding the system of concentration camps established in Germany and of the violence and lawlessness practiced in the camps?

GISEVIUS: I believe that I have already yesterday given exhaustive information as to the fact that we were informed about everything.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: In this particular case I am interested in the Defendant Frick. What do you know about him in this connection?

GISEVIUS: I have said yesterday that the Reich Ministry of the Interior received numberless calls for help from all over the country, and yesterday we even saw a letter from the Ministry of Justice. Also I have referred...

THE PRESIDENT: This subject was fully covered yesterday.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall pass on to the next question.

[_Turning to the witness._] Are you acquainted with the secret law issued in Germany in 1940 concerning the killing of sick persons and the old?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: What was the attitude of the Defendant Frick towards the promulgation and enforcing of this law?

GISEVIUS: I assume that he, as Minister of the Interior, signed it.

THE PRESIDENT: The law, if there was a law, was after 1935, was it not? What is the law that you are putting? If it was in 1935, then this witness was not in the Ministry of the Interior.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am speaking of the law which was promulgated in 1940.

THE PRESIDENT: He would not know anything about it any more than anybody else.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am satisfied with the answer which I have received from the witness. Will you now allow me to proceed to questions concerning the Defendant Schacht?

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, you were in close relations with the Defendant Schacht for a considerable period of time; have I understood you correctly?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Thus you were sufficiently acquainted with the state and political activities of the Defendant Schacht?

GISEVIUS: I believe so, yes.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Tell me, what do you know about the part played by the Defendant Schacht in Hitler’s seizure of power?

GISEVIUS: That was just the time when I did not yet know Schacht, and about which I cannot give any information.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: What do you know about it?

GISEVIUS: I knew only that he entered the Cabinet and that without doubt he assisted Hitler in the preliminary political negotiations.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Do you know anything about the meeting engineered by Schacht between Hitler and the big industrialists, in February 1933?

GISEVIUS: No.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: As a result of this meeting a fund was created by the industrialists with a view to guaranteeing the success of the Nazi Party at the elections. What do you know about this meeting?

GISEVIUS: I know nothing about this meeting. In my book I wrote that to my knowledge the largest amount for the election campaign in 1932 was given by Thyssen at that time and Grauert, a member of the Rhein-Hessian iron and steel industry group.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: What was the part played by the Defendant Schacht on this occasion?

GISEVIUS: At that time I did not see Schacht in the Ruhr district, and I also do not know whether he was there at that time. I emphasize again that I did not know him at all.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I know that. But in your book entitled _Until the Bitter End_, published in 1946, and in your replies to preliminary interrogations by defendant’s counsel Dix, you favorably described the Defendant Schacht; is that correct?

GISEVIUS: I did not understand the last words.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I repeat that you favorably described the Defendant Schacht; is that correct?

GISEVIUS: Yes, yes.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: You state that as from 1936, the Defendant Schacht was in opposition to Hitlerite regime, and that he expressed these opinions in a fairly open manner; is that true?

GISEVIUS: No, I state expressly that beginning with 1936 his suspicions were aroused, but that he only became an opponent of Hitler during the Fritsch crisis.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: In which year do you place this crisis?

GISEVIUS: End of 1937 and beginning of 1938. The Fritsch crisis was at the beginning of 1938.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Tell us, under the then existing regime in Germany, could a situation arise where Hitler would not be informed as to these opposite views of Schacht which, according to you, existed at the end of 1937?

GISEVIUS: You mean that Hitler was not informed after 1938?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: No. I asked you, could it be possible, under the then existing regime in Germany, that Hitler was not informed as to this antagonistic attitude on the part of Schacht?

GISEVIUS: Hitler knew very well that Schacht was very critical towards the system and that he frequently expressed disapproval. He often received letters from Schacht and of course heard a great deal, too. But he did not know how far that opposition went.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then how could Schacht remain in the Government of the Reich, as Minister without Portfolio and personal adviser to Hitler, right up to January 1943, if Hitler, as you say, was fully aware of his critical attitude towards his, Hitler’s, policy?

GISEVIUS: Hitler always took care to let prominent individuals disappear quietly or put them in the shade so that foreign propaganda could not take advantage of these facts. The Schacht case is not the only one in which Hitler tried to camouflage an open crisis.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Were you acquainted with a letter from Hitler of 19 January 1939, addressed to Schacht, who at that time was being relieved of his post as President of the Reichsbank? I should like to remind you of the contents of that letter in which Hitler writes to Schacht as follows:

“I avail myself on the occasion of your release from the post of President of the Board of Directors of the Reichsbank to thank you most warmly, most sincerely for the services you have repeatedly rendered while in that position, to Germany and to me personally, during long and arduous years. Above all else, your name will be connected forever with the first period of national rearmament. I am happy that you will now be able, as Reichsminister, to proceed to the solution of new tasks...”

THE PRESIDENT: This was all gone over yesterday by the witness.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Please forgive me, but I have a question to put to the witness in connection with this letter.

[_Turning to the witness._] It would appear, from the contents of this letter, that in January 1939—and I stress the date, Witness—Hitler expressed his appreciation of Schacht’s activities rather differently from the manner in which you worded your evidence. How do you reconcile this divergence of opinion with your assertion that the Defendant Schacht was already in direct opposition to Hitler’s regime towards the end of 1937 and the beginning of 1938?

GISEVIUS: I should like to answer that I am not accustomed to consider any written or oral proclamation by Hitler as truthful. That man always said only that which seemed opportune to him at the moment to deceive the world or Germany. In this particular case Hitler intended to avoid the impression that Schacht’s resignation would cause a difficult economic crisis. But I am only saying now what Hitler could have had in his mind. Yesterday I described with what indignation Schacht received that letter. He considered it derision and debasement.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then I shall refer to another document, to a letter from Schacht himself addressed to Hitler. This is a memorandum of 7 January 1939, in which Schacht wrote to Hitler:

“From the very beginning the Reichsbank has realized that the fruits of a successful foreign policy can only be obtained if this policy is founded on the rebirth of the Wehrmacht. It therefore took upon itself, to a very large extent, the financing of the armament program, despite the monetary and political difficulties involved. The justification of this consisted in the necessity, which far outweighed all other arguments, of manufacturing arms immediately, _ex nihilo_, often even under disguise, in order to ensure a foreign policy which would command respect.”

Do you also consider this document as an expression of Schacht’s attitude?

GISEVIUS: As far as I have understood, you refer to a letter from the year 1935, is that correct?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I refer to a letter of 7 January 1939.

GISEVIUS: Please pardon me. Then I can say only what I said yesterday: that all these letters were very carefully written so that they could not be considered a provocation, and the factual contents of the letter made illusory lest Hitler should simply say, “This is a personal attack on me.” I said yesterday that the problem was to convince the other conservative ministers, who were not so much against Hitler, about the actual situation and neutralize any opposition.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: What was the attitude of the Defendant Schacht towards the Anschluss?

GISEVIUS: The Anschluss happened right in the middle of the Fritsch crisis, or probably at the dramatic climax, and that is why we were firmly convinced that this was a particularly malevolent case of camouflage, and in that sense we were indignant. We had no doubt that the German Army was to be diverted outwards...

THE PRESIDENT: Witness, wait a minute. You were asked if you knew what the attitude of Schacht was to the Anschluss question at that time. You are not answering that question. Do you or do you not know?

GISEVIUS: I cannot give a definite answer about that, because all of us saw clearly that the problem of Austria had to be solved in a legal way. There were differences of opinion with regard to this question in our group. Most of us hoped that the independence of Austria could be preserved. Especially from the German point of view, it was desirable that another independent German State should exist, if at any later time there should be a League of Nations or diplomatic negotiations. However, I cannot state under oath whether Schacht personally was of that opinion or whether he was for an outright annexation. He was certainly against the method.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall quote an excerpt from a speech made by Schacht in Vienna, in March 1938:

“Thank God, these matters could not, in the end, hinder the forward march of the great German people, for Adolf Hitler has created a community of German will and thought, he supported it with the reborn strength of the Wehrmacht, and thereby gave an outward form to this spiritual union of Germany and Austria.”

Do you qualify these statements of Schacht’s also as expressions of his opposition to the Hitler regime?

GISEVIUS: I would have to be able to read the speech in its entirety. I personally would not have said it, but I do not know whether pure judgment on my part here serves any purpose. Would it not be better to ask Schacht what he meant?

THE PRESIDENT: The speech can be put to Schacht when he goes into the witness box, if he does.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Tell me, Witness, you are currently residing in Switzerland? In which town?

GISEVIUS: I live near Geneva in a village called Commugny.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: How long have you lived in Switzerland?

GISEVIUS: Since the first of October 1940.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did you know about Schacht’s arrival in Switzerland in 1943?

GISEVIUS: No. He did not come to Switzerland in 1943.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: In 1942?

GISEVIUS: He did not come to Switzerland in 1942 either.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then Schacht was not in Switzerland either in 1942 or 1943?

GISEVIUS: That is correct.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: In all the time that you yourself lived in Switzerland, did you ever meet the Defendant Schacht or not?

GISEVIUS: Yes, repeatedly. I was in Berlin at least every 4 weeks or 8 weeks and until 1943...

GEN. ALEXANDROV: No. I am asking you about Schacht’s visit to Switzerland.

GISEVIUS: During the war there was only one visit to Switzerland by Schacht—in 1941, on the occasion of his wedding trip, and then I saw him.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: That was in 1941?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: On 14 January 1946, an article was published in the newspaper _Basler Nachrichten_, entitled “What Schacht Thinks.” Do you know anything about that article?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: What do you know about that article?

GISEVIUS: Not more than I read in the paper about it. I have tried to find out who that American was with whom Schacht had the conversation.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: The details do not interest me.

One last question: Did you know anything about a conference held at Hitler’s house in Berchtesgaden, in the summer of 1944, when the advisability of killing imported foreign workers was discussed, in the case of further successful advances by the Allied Forces? Did you hear anything about that conference?

GISEVIUS: No, at that time I could not go to Germany any more, because there were proceedings against me, and I heard nothing about that.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I have no further questions to ask.

THE PRESIDENT: Then do you wish to re-examine, or does any other member of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask questions of the witness?

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, yesterday during the cross-examination the American prosecutor submitted to you a letter of 14 May 1935 by the Reich Minister of Justice to the Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior. In that letter there is an enclosure which mentions a copy of a letter by an inspector of the Secret State Police. Witness, did I understand you correctly to say that you personally assisted in writing that letter?

GISEVIUS: We had cross-connections between the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice, and at times it was desirable, if a letter of a severe nature came from another ministry, for me to present it to my minister. And I do not doubt that Frick was also glad when he received a sharp letter, so that he could submit a matter in a general way and before the Cabinet. Thus I remember that the sending of that letter was discussed in advance with several gentlemen of the Ministry of Justice and with myself.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Do I understand you correctly then that the letter was a joint effort of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior to do something against the Gestapo terror?

GISEVIUS: As for myself, I can certainly say “yes.” I was at that time a member of the Ministry of the Interior. Of course I did not speak to my chief about that point.

DR. PANNENBECKER: In that letter we find on Page 5 of the German text the following sentence—I quote:

“In the concentration camp at Hohnstein in Saxony, inmates had to stand under a dripping apparatus especially constructed for that purpose, until the drops of water, falling at regular intervals, produced serious infected injuries on the scalp.”

Do you know that the guards of that camp were heavily punished for that?

GISEVIUS: No, and if that happened it was an astounding exception.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, then I have one more question. That is in connection with the statement which you just made, that there was an atmosphere of hostility toward you in the room of the attorneys due to the incident which has been mentioned. A number of colleagues are deeply shocked by that statement of yours, and these colleagues were glad that you described conditions in Germany so openly. Could you tell me whether that statement you made applies to all of the Defense Counsel?

GISEVIUS: I am grateful to you that you give me the opportunity to correct an apparent misstatement, or a misunderstanding which was created by my statement. I meant a different incident which occurred as I entered the counsel room, about which I do not want to speak any further here. I wish to emphasize that I realize the difficult task of the Defense Counsel, and that I want to apologize if in any way the impression was created or might be created that I had reproached the great majority of the Defense Counsel in the carrying out of their difficult task.

DR. PANNENBECKER: I thank you. I have no more questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Gisevius, I want to ask you some questions to try and get clear what your various positions were and where you were at various times.

As I understand it, in 1933 you were a civil servant, is that right?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And then you became a member of the Gestapo?

GISEVIUS: The first position I held as a qualified civil servant was in the service of the Political Police. In Germany one is a civil servant even in the training stage. Therefore I have to say that I received my first real position as an official in August of 1933 when I entered the Gestapo.

THE PRESIDENT: And when did you leave that position?

GISEVIUS: The end of December 1933.

THE PRESIDENT: And to what position did you go?

GISEVIUS: Then I entered the Ministry of the Interior; that is to say, the Prussian Ministry of the Interior. In the course of the year 1934 I also entered the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and in May of 1935 I was dismissed from the Ministry of the Interior.

Then I came into the newly created, or to-be-created, Reich Criminal Office, which, at its beginning, was the Police Presidium in Berlin. On the date when Himmler was appointed Reich Chief of Police, on 17 June 1936, I was finally dismissed from the police service.

I was then transferred to the Government office in Münster, worked there in price control supervision, and, in the middle of 1937, I took an unpaid vacation, ostensibly to make studies in economics. That vacation was canceled by the Ministry of the Interior at the beginning of 1939, and I was attached to the Government office in Potsdam near Berlin. There I had to do with road building...

THE PRESIDENT: In the middle of 1937 you took unpaid service and studied in economics, I think you said, or an unpaid vacation.

GISEVIUS: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: You still remained a member of the civil service then, did you?

GISEVIUS: Yes; until the 20th of July I was continuously in the civil service.

THE PRESIDENT: Then, in the beginning of 1939 you were posted to the Ministry of the Interior and attached to Potsdam?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, go on; after that?

GISEVIUS: When war broke out the difficulty arose that I had no mobilization order and, on the other hand, my friends wanted to have me in the OKW. From the date of the outbreak of the war until 1 October 1940 I had only a forged mobilization order, and every day I expected to be found out. At which time I would have had to take the consequences.

After the fall of Paris I stated to Canaris and Oster that I would have to ask them now to release me from that somewhat complicated situation. At that time the position of Canaris, temporarily, was so strong that he placed me in an intelligence position with the Consulate General in Zürich. There I received the title of a Vice Consul with the Consulate General in Zürich, and I stayed there as a counterintelligence man, without belonging to the Abwehr formally, until 20 July.

After 20 July I was dismissed from all posts, and I do not know whether I was not even deprived of citizenship. I have found out nothing about that.

THE PRESIDENT: Between the time you went to Zürich and 20 July, were you returning to Germany from time to time?

GISEVIUS: During that time I was mainly in Germany, and only from time to time Oster and Canaris sent me to Switzerland as a courier, on travel orders. Schacht was still quite helpful to me at that time in getting me a Swiss visa, through the Swiss Legation.

THE PRESIDENT: During the time that you were in the Gestapo, from August to December 1933, what was your actual job or function?

GISEVIUS: When I received my first civil service position I was only in training, and I was attached to the then Chief of the Executive Department, Oberregierungsrat Nebe, for training. After the warrant for arrest was issued, at the end of October 1933, I was sent to Leipzig as a reporter for the Reichstag Fire trial.

THE PRESIDENT: You spoke yesterday very often of a man whose name I am not clear about, Nebe, I believe it was.

GISEVIUS: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: What was his position?

GISEVIUS: Nebe was a well-known criminologist at the Berlin Police headquarters before 1933. As a National Socialist he was called into the Gestapo in July 1933 and until the beginning of 1934; he was promoted there to Oberregierungsrat. Then we were successful, with the aid of the Defendant Frick, in having him transferred for some time to the Ministry of the Interior. And then he became the founder and Chief of the Reich Office of Criminology. On the day of the appointment of Himmler as Chief of Police of the Reich he was put into the new Reich Security Main Office. In the course of time he was taken over into the SS; he became an SS Gruppenführer, SS General, and, until 20 July, he was one of the closest subordinates of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. The Defendant Kaltenbrunner was Chief of the Gestapo as well as the Criminal Police and the Information Service. So that thereby Nebe became a subordinate of Kaltenbrunner and received continuously official orders from him, just like the Gestapo Chief Müller.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you wish to ask any questions, Dr. Dix?

DR. DIX: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps we had better do that after the adjournment at a quarter past 2.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

DR. DIX: The Soviet Prosecutor put a question to you in connection with the annexation of Austria. While answering the question you were interrupted. You had just said, I quote “But the form...” Would you please complete your answer now?

GISEVIUS: What I wanted to say was that Schacht was undoubtedly opposed to the Anschluss in this form.

DR. DIX: Then I have one last question, which concerns the so-called incident of yesterday. I discussed this incident with you yesterday and explained the situation as regards my colleague Dr. Stahmer. I also gave you permission to make use of this explanation at any time.

I now request you to give this explanation to the Tribunal.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I interpose an objection. I think that is a most irregular way to inform the Tribunal, if there is anything the Tribunal should be informed about, that Dr. Dix should tell the witness what the witness should tell the Tribunal.

Now, I have no objection to the witness’ relating to the Tribunal anything that he knows from his own knowledge. I do object to the witness’ being asked to relate what Dr. Dix has told him he may tell the Tribunal. I think that is a most irregular way of clarifying it.

DR. DIX: That is not the case. I made a remark about Dr. Stahmer to Dr. Gisevius. That is a matter between the witness and myself; I consider it important that this remark of mine be related and testified to by the witness. It is an incident which he observed, and I prefer that the witness should confirm the fact that I explained this to him. I cannot see anything irregular about this procedure, and I ask for a decision by the Tribunal. Otherwise I should make the explanation myself, but I consider it better for the witness to say what I told him immediately after that incident.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that you may properly put the question to the witness.

DR. DIX: I have already put the question, and you may answer it at this time.

THE PRESIDENT: I am not quite sure now what your question was, but the Tribunal thinks that you may put the question. Was there anything in connection with the incident which the witness has not already told us, which he wishes to say?

DR. DIX: Yes. The question relates to a conversation between the witness and myself.

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, what did I tell you yesterday?

GISEVIUS: You told me immediately that, in your opinion, your colleague Dr. Stahmer did not wish to put undue pressure upon me but that this undue pressure came rather from the Defendant Göring.

DR. DIX: I have no further questions.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, were you, during the war...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, are you attempting to re-examine?

DR. SEIDL: I wanted to put a single question...

THE PRESIDENT: I was not thinking of the time which you would take up, but the question of whether you ought to be allowed to put any question. Yes, go on, Dr. Seidl.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, during the war were you at any time active in the intelligence service of a foreign power?

GISEVIUS: At no time.

DR. SEIDL: It is also not correct...

THE PRESIDENT: That is not a question which you ought to put to this witness in re-examination.

DR. SEIDL: But, Mr. President, it is a question affecting the credibility of this witness. If it should turn out that this witness, who is or was a citizen of the German Reich, had been active in the intelligence service of a foreign power, that fact would have an important bearing on the credibility of the witness.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like to be heard on that. In the first place, I do not think that this witness should be subjected to any attacks. In the second place, I respectfully submit that it does not militate against the credibility of the witness that he should have opposed this kind of an organization. I think that the attack upon the credibility of this witness, if there were one to be made—he is sworn on behalf of the defendants and is not the Prosecution’s witness—the attack is not timely, is not a proper attack, and the substance of it does not go to credibility.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will allow you to put the question.

DR. SEIDL: Please answer my question and remember your oath.

GISEVIUS: Mr. Attorney, it is not at all necessary for you to remind me of my oath. I have said that I was never in the intelligence service of a foreign power. I was in the service of a good, clean German cause.

DR. SEIDL: During the war did you receive funds from any power at war with Germany?

GISEVIUS: No.

DR. SEIDL: Do you know what the three letters OSS mean?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: What do they stand for?

GISEVIUS: They stand for an American intelligence service.

DR. SEIDL: You had nothing to do with that organization?

GISEVIUS: I had friendly and political contacts with several members of this organization.

DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions to put to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: I hope the defendants’ counsel will remember that they have all had a free opportunity to cross-examine this witness already and have not...

DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): The person of Herr Von Papen was not mentioned until the cross-examination by the American prosecutor. Therefore I could not ask questions before.

Witness, you replied in the negative to a question put by the American chief prosecutor yesterday as to whether the Defendant Von Papen at any time protested. Of course, you modified this by pointing out that some written communication by Von Papen had not been addressed to the Ministry of the Interior.

In order to clarify this problem, I should like to know whether this assertion of yours refers only to the Ministry of the Interior. On Page 133 of your book you pointed out that one of the Defendant Von Papen’s main activities as Vice Chancellor consisted in handing in protests and that he addressed these protests above all to Hindenburg and Göring.

GISEVIUS: I again emphasized the latter point yesterday or today. I have no official knowledge of any protest made by Von Papen to the competent police minister after 30 June 1934. I can say only that it would greatly have strengthened the position of the ministry of police if a protest of that nature, describing in detail the murder of Von Papen’s closest co-workers, had reached the Ministry of the Interior. In that case, it is unlikely that this rumor about the suicide or rather the suspicious death of Von Bose and Jung would have reached the public.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you not think that it is understandable, especially considering the position held by Frick, the comparatively insignificant and uninfluential position held by Frick, that one should make such protests to higher authorities if it is possible to do so?

GISEVIUS: At the very moment when the ministers took the position that they could apply only to higher authorities, that is, the dictator himself, they, of their own accord, shattered the constitutional competency of the individual ministries and the Cabinet.

It would have meant a great deal if Herr Von Papen at that time had used the prescribed channels.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: In agreement with your book, you do not dispute the fact that Von Papen made many protests to these higher authorities in respect to other questions as well?

GISEVIUS: No; he did protest frequently.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yesterday, within the scope of your general statements you gave an unfavorable characterization of the Defendant Von Papen. This character sketch coincides with the one you gave in your book. In your book you pay special attention to certain details and draw your conclusions from them.

Since the Defendant Von Papen only occupies a comparatively small amount of space in your book and you probably had nothing to do with him in your official capacity, you must have had to base your statements on second-hand information. Since all these statements, as far as they refer to Von Papen, are incorrect, I refer to them briefly.

First, you proceed from the assumption that, in spite of the events of 30 June, Von Papen did not resign.

On the contrary, it is historically significant that Papen did send in his resignation after the suppression of his Marburg speech, that negotiations about this resignation were pending between Hitler and Hindenburg, and that Hitler accepted Papen’s resignation immediately after the latter’s release on 3 July, when it was again tendered, but did not intend to make it public until a later date, in spite of Papen’s request to the contrary.

Is it possible, Witness, that you were not correctly informed of this internal event?

GISEVIUS: It is perfectly possible for me not to have known of internal events. I should like, however, to stress the fact that a minister or vice chancellor is under an obligation to give a certain amount of publicity to his opinion and to his decisions; and I can say only that, whatever Papen may have said to Hitler in private, he contrived with consummate skill to conceal from the German people the fact that he intended to resign—or had already resigned; and that is the point.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Are you aware that this same Defendant Von Papen had had a very bad experience a few weeks earlier, when the press was forbidden to publish his speech at Marburg, which contained a frank statement of his opinions, and warning was given that persons found circulating it would be punished?

GISEVIUS: I am aware of it because we were appalled that a Vice Chancellor of the German Reich allowed himself to be silenced in such a way. I believe that the 30th of June would not have involved such a heavy death-roll for the middle classes if Vice Chancellor Von Papen had given a manly “no”—a definite “no” at the proper time.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Your answer makes no reference to the point which I raised before, that Von Papen had actually resigned because the publication of his Marburg speech had been prohibited.

Secondly, you make the assumption that Von Papen took part in the Cabinet session of 3 July, in which the law was passed that the measures involved by 30 June were legal as emergency measures for the protection of the State. Is it known to you that Von Papen did not participate in this session, that he had just been released and went into the Chancellery while the session was in progress, that Hitler asked him to go from the session-room into the adjoining room, that Von Papen again tendered his resignation, which Hitler accepted, and that he left the Chancellery immediately afterwards, without participating in the session at all?

THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether it is possible for the witness to follow your questions, but they are so long and contain so many statements of fact that it is very difficult for anybody else to follow them; it is very difficult for the Tribunal.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: The gist of my question was that Von Papen did not attend the Cabinet session on 3 July. My question to the witness...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, why do you not ask the witness whether he knows whether he did participate or not? If that is the question you want to ask why do you not ask it?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: My question is simply an attempt to find out whether the assertion to the contrary which appears in his book can also be explained by an error in information obtained from a third party.

GISEVIUS: It can be explained by false information, which, through the silence of Herr Von Papen, became known to the public and by which I myself was misled.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thirdly, you go on with the statement that Von Papen, although he went to see Hindenburg afterwards, did not make a sufficiently strong protest against the measures taken. Is it known to you that Von Papen did everything in his power to reach Hindenburg but was kept away from him and he did not reach Hindenburg’s estate at Neudeck until after the 30th of June, after Hindenburg’s death? Can the assertion to the contrary contained in your book be traced back to an error in information?

GISEVIUS: Yes, if you tell me that even in his capacity of Vice Chancellor of the Reich he did not have access to the President of the Reich and still remained in office, in spite of the fact that there were foreign journalists, the foreign diplomatic corps, and even a large number of Germans who heard of this attitude of a German vice chancellor.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: But, Witness, you are forgetting that he was a retired vice chancellor and had already been out of office for several weeks.

Fourthly, you start with the premise that Von Papen attended the Reichstag session at which the measures taken on 30 June were justified. Do you know that Von Papen did not attend that session in spite of Hitler’s summons to him to do so? Is it possible that you could have been informed incorrectly on that point, too?

GISEVIUS: I believe you have already asked me that.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, this is not the Cabinet session; this is the Reichstag session.

GISEVIUS: Yes, then I must be misinformed.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.

[_Dr. Laternser approached the lectern._]

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, it seems to me that the Defense has had every opportunity to interrogate this witness. After the witness was examined by the Prosecution, after his cross-examination, the Defense makes again an application to cross-examine the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks, at any rate, that it is perfectly able to manage its own proceedings without any interruptions of this sort. We can deal with Dr. Laternser when he makes his application to cross-examine.

GEN. RUDENKO: I understand, Mr. President. I merely wanted to say that we would like to shorten the duration of the proceedings as much as possible, and the Prosecution would like the Defense to consider that the same way.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have several further questions to put to the witness, arising from his cross-examination; I assume that the Tribunal have no objection to my questioning him.

THE PRESIDENT: No, if they arise out of the cross-examination of him.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, yesterday, in answer to a question of the American prosecutor, you expressed the opinion that a Putsch against the then existing regime would have been possible only with the co-operation of the generals but that the many discussions which took place did not achieve this co-operation. I should like to ask you, Witness, to which generals you spoke personally about the existing plans for a Putsch on the part of your group?

THE PRESIDENT: You are not concerned with every general in the German Army; you are only concerned with those who are charged with being a criminal group.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Your question must be addressed to them, or with reference to them.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. Then I ask the Court’s permission to describe to the witness the OKW and General Staff circle so that he can answer my question.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can put to him, I think, whether he had contact with any members of the General Staff who are charged with being a criminal group. You know who the generals are.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes. I should like to make a few preliminary remarks to the witness and then put the question. Witness...

THE PRESIDENT: Now, what is the question you want to put?

DR. LATERNSER: So that the witness can answer the question within the limits prescribed by the Tribunal, I should like to give the witness a brief explanation as to the circle of persons actually belonging to this group and then ask him with which of these persons he talked personally in order to win them over for the Putsch intended by his groups. Otherwise...

THE PRESIDENT: If you do it shortly.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, the group General Staff and OKW is held to include the holders of certain appointments from February 1938 to May 1945. These appointments are as follows: The Commanders-in-Chief of the various branches of the Armed Forces...

THE PRESIDENT: You are not going through the whole lot, are you, 130 of them?

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the list is really quite short and otherwise I cannot restrict my question as desired by the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not know what you mean. What I said was, are you proposing to go through the whole 130 generals or officers?

DR. LATERNSER: No, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on.

DR. LATERNSER: The group includes those holding certain appointments; briefly, all those who were commanders-in-chief during the period February 1938 to May 1945. Now, I ask you, with which generals of this group did you personally discuss the subject of Putsch plans, in order to obtain their co-operation in a Putsch, if such were made?

GISEVIUS: You mean commanders-in-chief of groups?

DR. LATERNSER: Of armies, of army groups, branches of the Wehrmacht, and General Staff chiefs of the Wehrmacht branches.

GISEVIUS: I have already mentioned Halder and Brauchitsch.

DR. LATERNSER: One question, Witness; did you discuss with Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch an intended Putsch against the regime or only against the Gestapo?

GISEVIUS: I discussed both with him; and in both cases he answered in the affirmative and acted in the negative.

I spoke to Halder and Witzleben. I knew Kluge well from the old times. I do not know at what period he entered the category to which you refer. At any rate my connection with Kluge was never broken off. I may have talked to other individuals falling within this category.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, but to discuss Putsch plans with a high-ranking military leader is an event of some importance; if you had had a discussion of this kind with a field marshal you would surely remember it.

GISEVIUS: It was not such an important event as all that, Mr. Attorney. Field marshals were not such important people in the Third Reich.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the fact that these generals were spoken to and refused to join a Putsch is not a crime within the meaning of the Charter.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, yesterday I explained that this point is very important because it would exclude the assumption of a conspiracy.

THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid, Dr. Laternser, it is no good answering me that a point is very important. What I asked you was, how is it relevant to show that these generals discussed a revolt against the regime? That, I am putting to you, is not a crime within the meaning of the Charter.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, but this circumstance would exclude the assumption of the conspiracy alleged by the Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: But does it preclude the possibility of a conspiracy to make aggressive war? It has nothing to do with it.

DR. LATERNSER: I did not quite understand that.

THE PRESIDENT: The question of a revolt against the regime in Germany is, it seems to me, not necessarily connected with the conspiracy to carry out aggressive war; therefore, anything which has to do with a revolt against the regime in Germany is not relevant to the question which you have to deal with.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the conspiracy is assumed precisely in connection with the wars of aggression; and if the high military leaders turned against the regime to such an extent that they discussed and even attempted a Putsch, there would be no question of conspiracy.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal think the proper way of putting the question, which they understand you want to put, is to ask which of the generals were prepared to join in a revolt. You may put that question.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, in order to decide how far the circle as a whole was willing to take part I must ask the witness how many of them he spoke to and how many of those declared themselves ready to act with him.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you might put that to him—how many. Ask him how many.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, that was the question I asked at the beginning.

THE PRESIDENT: I said you may put it.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President.

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, with how many generals of this group did you discuss the matter?

GISEVIUS: In the course of years it may have been a dozen or several dozen, but I should like to say that it was the task of Generaloberst Beck and Oster or Canaris to talk to these gentlemen rather than mine. As regards names, I cannot give you much of the information you want; on the other hand I can shorten your question by saying that, unfortunately, very few of the leading generals in the appointments referred to by the Prosecution ever seriously declared their intention of helping to overthrow the system.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, that is exactly what I want to know. You spoke to Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, Halder, and Witzleben?

GISEVIUS: And Olbricht.

DR. LATERNSER: He did not belong to this group. You did speak to these three, then?

GISEVIUS: Also to Kluge.

DR. LATERNSER: Regarding the intended Putsch?

GISEVIUS: Yes, of course.

DR. LATERNSER: And of these four that you mentioned did Field Marshal Von Witzleben agree?

GISEVIUS: They all agreed to begin with. Witzleben was the only one who stuck to his word.

DR. LATERNSER: Then he did participate in this Putsch?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: Did I understand you correctly when you said yesterday that the Putsch of 20 July originated mainly with the Wehrmacht, that is, with the generals and the officers of the General Staff, and that they intended to keep down as far as possible the number of those taking part?

GISEVIUS: No, I did not make such an exact statement as that. Under a terror regime, only the military circles are in a position to carry out a Putsch; to this extent it is true to say that these few generals who participated were the mainstay of the Putsch. But on 20 July the main weight lay with the wide front of the civilians who for years had fought for the generals and were invariably disappointed by the generals. For this reason alone, because the generals had repeatedly broken their word, we decided this time that on 20 July we would wait until the generals had really taken action, in order not to raise the hopes or burden the conscience of many civilians all to no purpose. That is what I meant by limitation.

DR. LATERNSER: Then the only Putsch which was actually attempted was effected by generals and General Staff officers?

GISEVIUS: And civilians.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes. And the head of this group was, as you testified, Generaloberst Beck?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: And he also belonged to the group indicated under the name General Staff and OKW. Now, I have a further question: Do you know of relations between these military leaders and the Minister of Finance Popitz, who also had designs for a Putsch and is even said to have negotiated with Himmler for the purpose of doing away with Hitler; and do you know anything about that?

GISEVIUS: Yes, that is true. Popitz made great efforts to incite the generals to make a Putsch and to assassinate him. I regret that I did not mention his name at the right time. He too was one of those who, from 1938 or 1939 on, did their best to overthrow the regime.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you discuss that with Minister Popitz?

GISEVIUS: Yes, repeatedly.

DR. LATERNSER: Did he tell you anything about the identity of the high military leaders he had contacted for this purpose?

GISEVIUS: Popitz was in contact with Beck in particular. He is certain to have been in contact with Witzleben; he was in touch with Halder and Brauchitsch. The list of his disappointments is no shorter than the list of disappointments which all the rest of us had.

DR. LATERNSER: Did he himself call it a disappointment?

GISEVIUS: Yes, he was bitterly disappointed. This bitter, everlasting disappointment was our one topic of conversation, and that was the difficulty confronting the civilians, Mr. Attorney.

DR. LATERNSER: There were no other possible ways of doing away with Hitler?

GISEVIUS: No. Since, through the fault of the generals, there was no other means of power, constitutional or otherwise, left in Germany, and the generals, who were the only armed power of the nation, took their orders from Hitler, it was impossible to organize opposition through any other circles. I may remind you that after 1938 every attempt made by the Leftists to organize a strike was punishable in the same way as mutiny in time of war, and I remind you of the hundreds of death sentences imposed on civilians under the war laws.

DR. LATERNSER: Now, a different subject. When...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that this matter has been fully covered and is really not relevant. You have already cross-examined this witness at some length before this, and the Tribunal does not wish to hear any further evidence on this subject in any further cross-examination.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have just finished.

Witness, as regards the Fritsch crisis, when did you...

THE PRESIDENT: I thought you said you had concluded?

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I am afraid I was misunderstood. I have concluded those questions referring to an intended Putsch and I should like to pass on to another point now and put a question on the Fritsch crisis.

THE PRESIDENT: What question?

DR. LATERNSER: As regards the Fritsch crisis I should like to ask the witness when he learned of the exact state of affairs and whether he transmitted his knowledge to high military leaders or caused that knowledge to be transmitted to them.

THE PRESIDENT: But the Fritsch crisis has nothing to do with the charges against the High Command. The charges against the High Command are crimes under the Charter, and the Fritsch crisis has nothing whatever to do with that.

DR. LATERNSER: Then I will withdraw that question.

Witness, today in cross-examination...

THE PRESIDENT: What are you going to put to him now?

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I should like to ask the witness now about some points which he made in reply to the American chief prosecutor’s questions. I believe that some clarification is necessary here.

THE PRESIDENT: The principle is not whether you think the clarification is necessary, but whether the Tribunal thinks it; and, therefore, the Tribunal wishes to know what points you wish to put to him.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, indeed. In the course of his testimony today the witness mentioned the fact that he had in his possession documentary evidence of murders in Poland and Russia. I wanted to ask him who had prepared these reports and in particular whether he is acquainted with a very thorough and scientifically prepared report made by Blaskowitz, commander in Poland, and intended for transmission to his superiors. That would be an extremely important point. Generaloberst Blaskowitz is a member of the group which I represent. From the facts to be shown, it is clear that the members of this group have always taken a stand against cruelty, if such cases were reported to them through official channels. I must therefore establish whether these reports, the object of which was to prevent atrocities, are to be ascribed to the co-operation of generals belonging to the indicted group.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It seems to me, if I may suggest, Your Honors, that counsel is under the apprehension that he has here to deal with individual generals. We are dealing only with the group. If what counsel says about General Blaskowitz is true, that is a defense for him, and I am right to say that General Blaskowitz did defy this Nazi conspiracy. And if that fact is ever verified, he certainly should not be subject to penalties for the acts which he stood up against.

It seems to me that we are going into individual defenses here under a misapprehension that this is the occasion to try each and every one of the generals. We made no charge against them that they either did or did not have a Putsch or a Fritsch affair. The Fritsch affair is only referred to here as fixing the time when the Defendant Schacht became convinced that aggressive warfare was the purpose of the Nazi regime. The Putsch is only introduced because in his defense Schacht says he tried to induce a Putsch. It enters not at all into the case against the General Staff. And most of the General Staff who took any part in the Putsch were hanged and I cannot see how it could be any defense to those who remained and are under trial that a Putsch was or was not conducted. It seems that we are off the main track.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I would like to define my position with regard to this point. Unless I am permitted to ask questions about the attitude of the members of this group and in respect to such an important point, from which it is clear that they combated atrocities, it is impossible for me to make clear to the Tribunal the attitude typical of the high military leaders. It is absolutely necessary for me to follow up such points, especially since I have no other evidence material at my disposal; for I cannot consider a group criminal unless—for instance—the majority of its members actually committed crimes. I must be in a position to ask in this case what position Generaloberst Blaskowitz took in regard to the murders which took place in Poland.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn to consider the matter.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal considers that the questions that you have been putting, if relevant at all, are only extremely remotely relevant, and they cannot allow the cross-examination to continue for any length of time, or the time of the Tribunal would be wasted further. They think, and they rule, that you may put the question which they understand you desire to put in this form: The witness has spoken of reports which were received by the group of which he has spoken about atrocities in the East, and they think you may ask him who submitted those reports.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, I should like you to answer this question: With whom did these reports of murders in Poland and Russia originate?

GISEVIUS: I know of one report made by Generaloberst Blaskowitz during the first few months of the Polish campaign on the basis of information received by him and the military offices under him. Beyond that, as far as I know, such reports were compiled only by the group Canaris-Oster. But I should not care to assert that another report was not written by someone else somewhere.

DR. LATERNSER: What was the aim of the report which Generaloberst Blaskowitz submitted?

GISEVIUS: Generaloberst Blaskowitz intended...

THE PRESIDENT: The report which one particular general made does not tend to show that the group was either innocent or criminal.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, it helps us to find out what the attitude of the group was.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the report of one general is not evidence as to the criminality of the whole group.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, is that question approved? I asked about the aim of the report.

THE PRESIDENT: No; the Tribunal is of the opinion that what was contained in that report is not admissible.

DR. LATERNSER: I have no more questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness may retire.

Dr. Pannenbecker, that concludes your case, does it?

DR. PANNENBECKER: The case of the Defendant Frick is hereby concluded, except for the answers to the interrogatories which I have not yet received.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Counsel for the Defendant Streicher, Dr. Marx, go on.

DR. HANNS MARX (Counsel for Defendant Streicher): With the permission of the Tribunal, Mr. President, I now call the Defendant Julius Streicher to the witness box.

[_The Defendant Streicher took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?

JULIUS STREICHER (Defendant): Julius Streicher.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.

[_The defendant repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. MARX: Witness, would you give the Tribunal first a short description of your career?

STREICHER: I should like to ask the Tribunal to let me make a brief statement in respect to my defense. Firstly...

THE PRESIDENT: You really ought to answer the questions that are put to you.

STREICHER: My Lord, my defense counsel cannot say what I must say now. I should like to ask permission—in short, my defense counsel has not conducted and was not in a position to conduct my defense in the way I wanted; and I should like to state this to the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you understand that the Tribunal does not wish to have its time taken up with unnecessary matters. It has no objection to your stating what is material or to your reading it if necessary. It hopes that you will be as brief as possible.

STREICHER: I mention only facts, four facts.

Firstly, the Charter created for this International Military Tribunal guarantees the defendant the right to an unhampered and just defense.

Secondly, before the Trial began the defendants received a list containing the names of the attorneys from whom the defendant could choose his counsel. Since the Munich attorney whom I had selected for my defense could no longer be put at my disposal, I asked the Military Tribunal to put the Nuremberg attorney Dr. Marx at my disposal. That was done.

Thirdly, when I met my counsel for the first time, I told him he must expect, as my counsel, to be attacked before the public. Shortly afterwards, an attack was made by a Communist newspaper published in the Russian zone of Berlin. The International Tribunal was compelled to make a public statement repudiating the attack of that newspaper and assuring my counsel of the express protection of the Military Tribunal.

Fourthly, although the statement made by the International Military Tribunal left no doubt as to the fact that the Tribunal wished to see the defense of the defendants unhampered, a renewed attack occurred, this time by radio. The announcer said, “There are camouflaged Nazis and anti-Semites among the defendants’ counsel.” That these terroristic attacks were made with the intention of intimidating the defendants’ counsel is clear. These terror attacks might have contributed to the fact—that is my impression—that my own counsel had refused to submit to the Tribunal a large number of pieces of evidence which I considered important.

Fifthly, I wish to state that I have not been afforded the possibility of making an unhampered and just defense before this International Military Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: You can rest assured that the Tribunal will see that everything that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, bears upon the case or is relevant to your case or is in any way material in your case will be presented and that you will be given the fairest opportunity of making your defense.

STREICHER: I thank you. From my life...

DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President; may I ask briefly to be permitted to state my position. May it please the Court, when I was asked to take over Herr Streicher’s defense, I naturally had grave misgivings. I have...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, I do not think it is necessary, really, for you to make any personal explanation at this stage. It is very possible that the defendant may have different ideas about his own defense. I think we had better let him go on with his defense.

DR. MARX: Nevertheless, I should like to ask permission, Mr. President, just to mention the following point: As attorney and as defense counsel of a defendant I have to reserve for myself the right to decide how I shall conduct the defense. If the client is of the opinion that certain documents or books are relevant, and the attorney is of the opinion that they are not, then that is a difference of opinion between the counsel and his client.

If Herr Streicher is of the opinion that I am incapable or not in a position to conduct his defense, then he should ask for another defense counsel. I am aware that at this stage of the proceedings it would be very difficult for me to follow the matter to its logical conclusion and ask to be relieved of this task of defense. I am not terrorized by any journalist, but for a counsel to lose the confidence of his own client is quite another matter; and for that reason I feel bound to ask the Court to decide whether in these circumstances I am to continue to defend my client.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks, Dr. Marx, that the explanation and the statement which you have just made is in accordance with the traditions of the legal profession and they think therefore that the case ought to proceed and that you should proceed with the case. Now, Defendant, will you go on?

STREICHER: About my life: I was born on 12 February 1885 in a small village in Bavaria Swabia. I was the youngest of nine children. My father was an elementary school teacher. I too became a teacher at an elementary school. In 1909, after I had taught for several years in my native district, I was called to the municipal school in Nuremberg. Here I had the opportunity of contact with the families of the working-class children in the suburbs and of observing social contrasts. This experience led to my decision in 1911 to go into politics. I became a member of the Democratic Party. As a young democratic speaker, I spoke at the Reichstag election in 1912. The car put at my disposal was paid for by the banking firm of Kohn. I stress this point because at that time I had occasion to associate a good deal with Jews, even in the Democratic Party. I must therefore have been fated to become later on a writer and speaker on racial politics.

The World War came and I, too, went into the army as a lance corporal in an infantry regiment. Then I became an officer in a machine-gun unit. I returned home with both Iron Crosses, with the Bavarian Order, and the rare Austrian Cross of Merit attached to the Ribbon for Gallantry. When I had returned home, I had no desire to go into politics again. I intended only to stay in private life and devote myself to my profession. Then I saw the blood-red posters of revolution in Germany and for the first time I joined the raging masses of that time. At a meeting, when the speaker had finished, I asked to be heard as an unknown person. An inner voice sent me onto the platform and I spoke. I joined in the debate and I spoke on recent happenings in Germany. In the November revolution of 1918 the Jews and their friends had seized the political power in Germany. Jews were in the Reich Cabinet and in all the provincial governments. In my native Bavaria the Minister President was a Polish Jew called Eisner-Kosmanowsky. The reaction among the middle classes in Germany manifested itself in the form of an organization known as Schutz und Trutzbund (Society for Protective and Offensive Action). Local branches of this organization were formed in all the large cities in Germany; and fate willed that after I had again spoken at a gathering, a man came up to me and asked me to come to the Kulturverein (Cultural Society) in the Golden Hall and hear what they had to say there.

In this way, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I became involved in what brings me here today. Destiny made of me what international propaganda thought it had made. I was called a bloodhound—a blood czar of Franconia; my honor was attacked, a criminal was paid 300 marks to swear in this very hall that he had seen me, as an officer in France during the war, rape a Madame Duquesne, a teacher’s wife in Atis, near Peronne. It was 2 years before someone betrayed him and the truth came out.

Gentlemen, the receipt for 300 marks was produced here in this court. With 300 marks they tried to deprive me of my honor.

I mention this case only because my case is a special case; and if it is to be judged with justice, then I must be allowed to make such a remark in passing. In this connection, I may say that it is no coincidence that the first question asked me by the Soviet Russian officer who interrogated me was whether I was a sex criminal.

Gentlemen, I told you how I was fated to be drawn into the Schutz und Trutzbund. I told you what conditions were like in Germany at the time, and it was therefore quite a natural development that I no longer visited the centers of revolution to join in debate. I felt myself impelled to call meetings of my own and so I spoke for perhaps 15 years almost every Friday before about 5,000 to 6,000 people. I admit quite frankly that I went on making speeches over a period of 20 years in the largest cities of Germany, sometimes at meetings on sport fields and on public squares, to audiences of 150,000 to 200,000 people. I did that for 20 years, and I state here that I was not paid by the Party. The Prosecution will never succeed, not even through a public appeal, in getting anybody into this room who could testify that I had ever been paid. I still had a small salary which continued after I was relieved of my position in 1924. Nonetheless, I remained the one and only unpaid Gauleiter in the Movement. It goes without saying that my writing supported myself and my assistants later on.

And so, Gentlemen, in the year 1921—I return now to that period—I went to Munich. I was curious because someone had said to me, “You must hear Adolf Hitler some time.” And now destiny again takes a hand. This tragedy can only be grasped by those whose vision is not limited to the material, but who can perceive those higher vibrations which even today have not had their full outcome.

I went to the Munich Bürgerbräukeller. Adolf Hitler was speaking there. I had only heard his name. I had never seen the man before. And there I sat, an unknown among unknowns. I saw this man shortly before midnight, after he had spoken for 3 hours, drenched in perspiration, radiant. My neighbor said he thought he saw a halo around his head; and I, Gentlemen, experienced something which transcended the commonplace. When he finished his speech, an inner voice bade me get up. I went to the platform. When Adolf Hitler came down, I approached him and told him my name.

The Prosecution has submitted a document to the Tribunal which recalls that moment. Adolf Hitler wrote in his book, _Mein Kampf_, that it must have cost me a great effort to hand over to him the movement which I had created in Nuremberg.

I mention this because the Prosecution thought that these things in Hitler’s book, _Mein Kampf_, should be submitted and used against me. Yes, I am proud of it; I forced myself to hand over to Hitler the movement which I had created in Franconia. This Franconian movement gave the movement which Adolf Hitler had created in Munich and southern Bavaria a bridge to northern Germany. That was my doing.

In 1923 I took part in the first National Socialist revolution or, rather, attempted revolution. It will go down in history as the Hitler Putsch. Adolf Hitler had asked me to come to Munich for it. I went to Munich and took part in the meeting in which Adolf Hitler came to a solemn agreement with representatives of the middle classes to go to northern Germany and put an end to the chaos.

I marched with them up to the Feldherrnhalle. Then I was arrested and, like Adolf Hitler, Rudolf Hess, and others, was taken to Landsberg on the Lech. After a few months I was put up as candidate for the Bavarian Parliament by the Völkischer Block and was elected in the year 1924.

In 1925 after the Movement had been permitted again and Adolf Hitler had been released from jail, I was made Gauleiter of Franconia. In 1933 I became a deputy to the Reichstag. In 1933 or 1934 the honorary title of SA Gruppenführer was bestowed on me.

In February 1940 I was given leave of absence. I lived for 5 years, until the end of the war, on my estate. At the end of April I went to southern Bavaria, to the Tyrol. I wanted to commit suicide. Then something happened which I do not care to relate. But I can say one thing: I said to friends, “I have proclaimed my views to the world for 20 years. I do not want to end my life by suicide. I will go my way whatever happens as a fanatic in the cause of truth until the very end, a fanatic in the cause of truth.”

I might mention here that I deliberately gave my fighting paper, _Der Stürmer_, the subtitle, _A Weekly for the Fight for Truth_. I was quite conscious that I could not be in possession of the entire truth, but I also know that 80 or 90 percent of what I proclaim with conviction was the truth.

DR. MARX: Witness, why were you dismissed from the teaching profession? Did you ever commit any punishable or immoral act?

STREICHER: Actually I have answered this question already. Everybody knows that I could not have been active publicly in this profession if I had committed a crime. That is not true. I was dismissed from my profession because the majority of the parties in the Bavarian Parliament in the fall of 1923, after the Hitler Putsch, demanded my dismissal. That, Gentlemen, was my crime of indecent behavior.

DR. MARX: You know that two charges are made against you. First, you are accused that you were a party to the conspiracy which had the aim of launching a war, or wars, of aggression generally, of breaking treaties and by so doing, or even at an earlier stage, of committing Crimes against Humanity.

Secondly, you are accused of Crimes against Humanity as such. I should like to ask various questions on the first point now. Did you ever have discussions with Adolf Hitler or other leading men of the State or the Party at which the question of a war of aggression was discussed?

STREICHER: I can answer that with “no” right away, but I should like to be permitted to make a short statement.

In 1921, as I have already said, I went to Munich; and before the public on the platform I handed over my movement to the Führer. I also wrote him a letter in this connection later. No other conference took place with Adolf Hitler or any other person. I returned to Nuremberg and went on making speeches. When the Party program was proclaimed I was not present. That announcement, too, was made in public; the conspiracy was so public that political opponents could make attempts at terrorization.

To sum up: At none of the secret meetings was any oath taken or anything agreed upon which the public could not have known. The program stood; it had been submitted to the Police; on the basis of the law governing organizations the Party, like other parties, was entered in the register of organizations. So that at that time there was no conspiracy.

DR. MARX: Witness, one of the most important points of the Party program was the demand, “Freedom from Versailles.” What were your ideas as to the possibility of some day getting rid of the Versailles Treaty?

STREICHER: I think I can state that very shortly. I believe the Tribunal has known this for some time. Of course you will sometimes find one traitor in a people—like the one who was sitting here today; and you will also find unlimited numbers of decent people. And after the last war these decent people themselves took up the slogan, “Freedom from Versailles.”

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If Your Honor pleases, I think I must object to this sort of procedure. This witness has no right to call another witness a traitor. He has not been asked any question to which that is a response, and I ask that the Tribunal admonish him in no uncertain terms and that he confine himself to answering the questions here and that we may have an orderly proceeding.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you will observe that injunction.

STREICHER: I ask the Tribunal to excuse me. It was a slip of the tongue.

THE PRESIDENT: The observation that you apparently made I did not catch myself, but it was made with reference to a witness who has just given evidence here and you had no right at all to call him a traitor or to make any comment upon his evidence.

DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, you will please refrain from making such remarks. Adolf Hitler always spoke on the anniversary days of the Party about a sworn fellowship. What do you say about that?

STREICHER: Sworn fellowship—that meant that he, Hitler, was of the conviction that his old supporters were one with him in thought, in heart, and in political loyalty—a sworn fellowship sharing the same views and united in their hearts.

DR. MARX: Would not that mean that a conspiracy existed?

STREICHER: Then he would have said we were a fellowship of conspirators.

DR. MARX: Was there any kind of close relationship between you and the other defendants which could be termed a conspiracy, and were you better acquainted or did you have especially close relations with any one of these defendants?

STREICHER: Inasmuch as they were old members of the Party we were one community of people with the same convictions. We met at Gauleiter meetings; or when one of us spoke in the other’s Gaustadt, we saw one another. But I had the honor of getting to know the Reich Ministers and the gentlemen from the Army only here. A political group therefore—an active group—certainly did not exist.

DR. MARX: In the early days of the Party what solution was foreseen for the Jewish problem?

STREICHER: Well, in the early days of the Party, the solution of the Jewish problem was never mentioned just as the question of solving the problem of the Versailles Treaty was never mentioned. You must remember the state of chaos that existed at that time in Germany. An Adolf Hitler who said to his members in 1933, “I shall start to promote a war,” would have been dubbed a fool. We had no arms in Germany. Our army of 100,000 men had only a few big guns left. The possibility of making or of prophesying war was out of the question, and to speak of a Jewish problem at a time when, I might say, the public made distinctions with respect to Jews only on the basis of religion, or to speak of the solution of this problem, would have been absurd. Before 1933, therefore, the solution of the Jewish problem was not a topic of discussion. I never heard Adolf Hitler mention it; and there is no one here of whom I could say I ever heard him say one word about it.

DR. MARX: It is assumed that you had particularly close relations with Adolf Hitler and that you had considerable influence on his decisions. I should like to ask you to describe your relations with Adolf Hitler and to clarify them.

STREICHER: Anyone who had occasion to make Adolf Hitler’s acquaintance knows that I am correct in saying that those who imagined they could pave a way to his personal friendship were entirely mistaken. Adolf Hitler was a little eccentric in every respect and I believe I can say that friendship between him and other men did not exist—a friendship that might have been described as intimate friendship. It was not easy to approach Adolf Hitler; and any one who wanted to approach him could do so only by performing some manly deed.

If you ask me now—I know what you mean by that question—I may say that before 1923 Adolf Hitler did not trust me. Although I had handed over my movement to him unreservedly, he sent Göring—who later became Marshal of the Reich—some time later to Nuremberg. Göring was then a young SA leader—I think he was an SA leader—and he came to investigate matters and to determine whether I or those who denounced me were in the right. I do not mean this as an accusation, but merely as a statement of fact. Soon after that he sent a second and then a third person—in short, he did not trust me before 1923.

Then came Munich and the Putsch. After midnight, when most of them had left him, I appeared before him and told him that the public must be told now when the next great day would come. He looked at me intently and said, “Will you do it?” I said, “I will do it.”

Maybe the Prosecution has the document before it. Then, after midnight, he wrote on a piece of paper, “Streicher will be responsible for the entire organization.” That was to be for the following day, 11 November; and on 11 November I publicly conducted the propaganda, until an hour before the march to the Feldherrnhalle. Then I returned and everything was in readiness. Our banner—which was to become a banner of blood—flew in front. I joined the second group and we marched into the city towards the Feldherrnhalle. When I saw rifle after rifle ranged before the Feldherrnhalle and knew that now there would be shooting, I marched up 10 paces in front of the banner and marched straight up to the rifles. Then came the massacre, and we were arrested.

I have almost finished.

At Landsberg—and this is the important part—Hitler declared to me and to the men who were in prison with him, that he would never forget this action of mine. Thus, because I took part in the march to the Feldherrnhalle and marched at the head of the procession, Adolf Hitler may have felt himself drawn to me more than to the others.

That was the friendship born of the deed.

DR. MARX: Have you finished?

STREICHER: Yes.

DR. MARX: Were you consulted by Adolf Hitler on important matters?

STREICHER: I saw Adolf Hitler only at Gauleiter conferences; when he came to Nuremberg for meetings we had meals together, along with five, ten, or more people. I recall having been alone with him only once in the Brown House at Munich, after the completion of the Brown House; and our conversation was not a political one. All the conversations which I had with Adolf Hitler, whether in Nuremberg, Munich, or elsewhere, took place in the presence of Party circle members.

DR. MARX: Now I come to 1933. On 1 April 1933 a boycott day was decreed throughout the entire German Reich against the Jewish population. What can you tell us about that and what part did you play in it?

STREICHER: A few days before 1 April I was summoned to the Brown House in Munich. Adolf Hitler explained to me something that I already knew, namely, that a tremendous propaganda campaign against the new Germany was being carried on by the foreign press. Although he himself had only just become Chancellor, although Hindenburg was still at the head of the Reich, although Parliament existed, a tremendous campaign of hate against Germany had begun in the foreign press.

The Führer told me that even the Reich flag, the emblem of sovereignty, was being subjected to insults abroad and that we would have to tell world Jewry, “Thus far and no farther.” We would have to show them that we would not tolerate it any longer.

Then he told me that a boycott day was to be fixed for 1 April and that I was to organize it. Perhaps it would not be irrelevant to point out the following facts: Adolf Hitler thought that it might be a good thing to use my name in connection with this boycott day; that was not done in the end. So I undertook the organization of the boycott and issued a directive, which I believe is in the hands of the Court. There is no need for me to say much about it. I gave instructions that no attempts should be made on the lives of Jews, that one or more guards should be posted in front of all Jewish premises—that is to say, in front of every Jewish store—and that these guards should be responsible for seeing that no damage was done to property. In short, I organized the proceedings in a way which was perhaps not expected of me; and perhaps not expected by many members of the Party. I frankly admit that.

One thing is certain; except for minor incidents the boycott day passed off perfectly. I believe that there is not even one Jew who can contradict this. The boycott day was a disciplined proceeding and was not “anti” in the sense of an attack on something. It has a purely defensive connotation.

DR. MARX: Was a committee formed at the time consisting of prominent, that is, leading members of the Party and did that committee ever appear?

STREICHER: As to the committee, it was like the Secret Cabinet Council in Berlin, which never met. In fact, I believe that all the members of the Cabinet did not even see each other or get to know each other.

DR. MARX: The committee members?

STREICHER: The boycott committee, that was put in the newspapers in Berlin by Goebbels. That was a newspaper story. I spoke to Goebbels on the telephone once. He asked how things were going in Munich, where I was. I said that everything was going perfectly. Thus no conference ever took place; it was only done for effect, to make it appear a much bigger thing than it was.

DR. MARX: Witness, you made a mistake a few minutes ago, speaking of the Munich affair in 1923. You meant 9 November—or did you not—9 November 1923, and what did you say?

STREICHER: I do not remember.

DR. MARX: It should be 9 November 1923?

STREICHER: 9 November 1923.

DR. MARX: Yes. The so-called “Racial Law” was promulgated at the Reich Party Day in Nuremberg in 1935. Were you consulted about the planning and preparation of the draft of that law; and did you have any part in it, especially in its preparation?

STREICHER: Yes, I believe I had a part in it insofar as for years I have written that any further mixture of German blood with Jewish blood must be avoided. I have written such articles again and again; and in my articles I have repeatedly emphasized the fact that the Jews should serve as an example to every race, for they created a racial law for themselves—the law of Moses, which says, “If you come into a foreign land you shall not take unto yourself foreign women.” And that, Gentlemen, is of tremendous importance in judging the Nuremberg Laws. These laws of the Jews were taken as a model for these laws. When, after centuries, the Jewish lawgiver Ezra discovered that notwithstanding many Jews had married non-Jewish women, these marriages were dissolved. That was the beginning of Jewry which, because it introduced these racial laws, has survived throughout the centuries, while all other races and civilizations have perished.

DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, this is rather too much of a digression. I asked you whether you took part in planning and working out the draft of the law, or whether you yourself were not taken by surprise when these laws were promulgated.

STREICHER: I was quite honest in saying that I believe I have contributed indirectly to the making of these laws.

DR. MARX: But you were not consulted on the law itself?

STREICHER: No. I will make a statement, as follows:

At the Reich Party Day in Nuremberg in 1935, we were summoned to the hall without knowing what was going to happen—at least I myself had no knowledge of it—and the racial laws were proclaimed. It was only then that I heard of these laws; and I think that with the exception of Herr Hess, _et cetera_, this is true of most of the gentlemen in the dock who attended that Reich Party Day. The first we heard of these decrees was at the Reich Party Day. I did not collaborate directly. I may say frankly that I regarded it as a slight when I was not consulted in the making of these laws.

DR. MARX: It was thought that your assistance was not necessary?

STREICHER: Yes.

DR. MARX: Were you of the opinion that the 1935 legislation represented the final solution of the Jewish question by the State?

STREICHER: With reservations, yes. I was convinced that if the Party program was carried out, the Jewish question would be solved. The Jews became German citizens in 1848. Their rights as citizens were taken from them by these laws. Sexual intercourse was prohibited. For me, this represented the solution of the Jewish problem in Germany. But I believed that another international solution would still be found, and that some day discussions would take place between the various states with regard to the demands made by Zionism. These demands aimed at a Jewish state.

DR. MARX: What can you tell us about the demonstrations against the Jewish population during the night of 9 to 10 November 1938, and what