VOLUME XII

O F F I C I A L T E X T

I N T H E

ENGLISH LANGUAGE

P R O C E E D I N G S

18 April 1946—2 May 1946

CONTENTS

One Hundred and Eleventh Day, Thursday, 18 April 1946, Morning Session 1 Afternoon Session 33

One Hundred and Twelfth Day, Tuesday, 23 April 1946, Morning Session 64 Afternoon Session 97

One Hundred and Thirteenth Day, Wednesday, 24 April 1946, Morning Session 136 Afternoon Session 167

One Hundred and Fourteenth Day, Thursday, 25 April 1946, Morning Session 196 Afternoon Session 226

One Hundred and Fifteenth Day, Friday, 26 April 1946, Morning Session 263 Afternoon Session 292

One Hundred and Sixteenth Day, Monday, 29 April 1946, Morning Session 317 Afternoon Session 350

One Hundred and Seventeenth Day, Tuesday, 30 April 1946, Morning Session 393 Afternoon Session 429

One Hundred and Eighteenth Day, Wednesday, 1 May 1946, Morning Session 460 Afternoon Session 494

One Hundred and Nineteenth Day, Thursday, 2 May 1946, Morning Session 527 Afternoon Session 555

ONE HUNDRED AND ELEVENTH DAY Thursday, 18 April 1946

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): Dr. Seidl.

DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendant Hans Frank): Mr. President, Members of the Tribunal, on 9 April of this year, deviating from the rule made by the Tribunal, I made the application that I should first be allowed to present the documents, then call the witnesses, and then at the end examine the defendant as a witness. I do not know whether the Tribunal is already in possession of the document books. I have ascertained that Volume I of the document book was translated by 8 April, Volume II and III on 11 April, and Volume IV and V a few days later. At any rate, I have not yet received any document books myself, for the reason that the office concerned has not yet received permission to bind the books.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I thought I asked about this, not yesterday, but the day before yesterday—yes; and you said you were perfectly ready to go on.

DR. SEIDL: I had been told that the books had been translated, and I naturally assumed that these books would also be bound. Yesterday I discovered that this is not the case. At any rate, the fault is not mine.

THE PRESIDENT: I was not suggesting that there was any fault on your part.

MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): In the first place, we did not have much to go over with Dr. Seidl. The agreement was reached with him the night before last about 6 o’clock or a little afterwards. Thereafter the materials were put into the process of preparation, and there are 500 pages. They have just not been completed, and it is not so that the people did not receive authority to go ahead. They have not been able to complete their work and there will be some delay.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you can go on with your witnesses. You have the defendant himself to call and several other witnesses.

DR. SEIDL: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And the documents will no doubt be ready by then. We are rising this evening at half past four, and by the time that the Tribunal reassembles, by Tuesday morning, no doubt all the documents will be ready. As to your application, the Tribunal has considered the application and sees no reason to depart from its ordinary rule that the defendant should be called first; that is to say, if you intend to call the defendant.

DR. SEIDL: Oh yes, I intend to examine the defendant; but in the interests of accelerating the proceedings, I suggested that the other witnesses should be heard first so that the examination of the defendant might be as short as possible. It is possible that he can then answer a number of questions merely by saying “yes” or “no.” Another reason why I consider this procedure to be the most expedient is because a proper examination of the defendant is only possible if I have the document books at hand at the same time. That necessity does not apply to the other witnesses. I should, therefore, beg the Tribunal to give me permission so that I can first examine the witnesses who are already in the witnesses’ room.

THE PRESIDENT: The documents are all, or nearly all, I imagine, in German and can be put to the defendant in the course of his examination; and the Tribunal think, as they have already said, that calling the defendant first is in the interests of expedition; and they, therefore, feel they must adhere to their rule.

DR. SEIDL: Very well. In that case, with the permission of the Tribunal, I call the Defendant Dr. Hans Frank to the witness stand.

[_The Defendant Frank took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you give your full name?

HANS FRANK (Defendant): Hans Frank.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me:

I, swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down, please.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, when and where were you born?

FRANK: I was born on 23 May 1900 at Karlsruhe, in Baden.

DR. SEIDL: Will you please give the Tribunal a brief outline of your education?

FRANK: In 1919 I finished my studies at the Gymnasium, and in 1926 I passed the final state law examination, which completed my legal training.

DR. SEIDL: And what profession did you follow after that?

FRANK: I had several legal posts. I worked as a lawyer; as a member of the teaching staff of a technical college; and then I worked principally as legal adviser to Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist German Workers Party.

DR. SEIDL: Since when have you been a member of the NSDAP?

FRANK: I joined the German Labor Party, which was the forerunner of the National Socialist German Workers Party, in 1919, but did not join the newly formed National Socialist Workers Party at the time. In 1923 I joined the Movement in Munich as a member of the SA; and eventually, so to speak, I joined the NSDAP for the first time in 1927.

DR. SEIDL: Were you ever a member of the SS?

FRANK: I have never been a member of the SS.

DR. SEIDL: That means you have never had a rank of an SS Obergruppenführer or General of the SS?

FRANK: I never had the rank of an SS Obergruppenführer or SS General.

DR. SEIDL: Not even honorary?

FRANK: No, not even honorary.

DR. SEIDL: You were a member of the SA. What was the last position you held in that?

FRANK: I was Obergruppenführer in the SA at the end, and this was an honorary position.

DR. SEIDL: What posts did you hold in the NSDAP during the various periods, and what functions did you exercise?

FRANK: In 1929 I became the head of the legal department of the Supreme Party Directorate of the NSDAP. In that capacity I was appointed Reichsleiter of the NSDAP by Adolf Hitler in 1931. I held this position until I was recalled in 1942. These are the principal offices I have held in the Party.

DR. SEIDL: Until the seizure of power you concerned yourself mainly with legal questions within the Party, did you not?

FRANK: I dealt with legal questions in the interest of Adolf Hitler and the NSDAP and its members during the difficult years of struggle for the victory of the Movement.

DR. SEIDL: What were your basic ideas regarding the concept of a state controlled by a legal system?

FRANK: That idea, as far as I was concerned, was contained in Point 19 of the Party program, which speaks of German common law to be created. In the interest of accelerating the proceedings, I do not wish to present my ideas in detail. My first endeavor was to save the core of the German system of justice: the independent judiciary.

My idea was that even in a highly developed Führer State, even under a dictatorship, the danger to the community and to the legal rights of the individual is at least lessened if judges who do not depend on the State Leadership can still administer justice in the community. That means, to my mind, that the question of a state ruled by law is to all intents and purposes identical with the question of the existence of the independent administration of law. Most of my struggles and discussions with Hitler, Himmler, and Bormann during these years were more and more focused on this particular subject. Only after the independent judiciary in the National Socialist Reich had been definitely done away with did I give up my work and my efforts as hopeless.

DR. SEIDL: You were also a member of the Reichstag?

FRANK: In 1930 I became a member of the Reichstag.

DR. SEIDL: What posts did you hold after 1933?

FRANK: First, I was Bavarian State Minister of Justice, and after the ministries of justice in the various states were dissolved I became Reich Minister without portfolio. In 1933 I became the President of the Academy of German Law, which I had founded. I was the Reich Leader of the National Socialist Jurists Association, which was later on given the name of “Rechtswahrerbund.” In 1933 and 1934 I was Reich Commissioner for Justice, and in 1939 I became Governor General of the Government General in Kraków.

DR. SEIDL: What were the aims of the Academy of German Law of which you were the founder?

FRANK: These aims are written down in the Reich Law regarding the Academy of German Law. The main task, the central task, of that Academy was to carry out Point 19 of the Party program to bring German Common Law into line with our national culture.

DR. SEIDL: Did the Academy of German Law have definite functions, or could it act only in an advisory capacity?

FRANK: The Academy of German Law was the meeting place of the most prominent legal minds in Germany in the theoretical and practical fields. Right from the beginning I attached no importance to the question whether the members were members of the Party or not. Ninety percent of the members of the Academy of German Law were not members of the Party. Their task was to prepare laws, and they worked somewhat on the lines of an advisory committee in a well-organized parliament. It was also my idea that the advisory committees of the Academy should replace the legal committees of the German Reichstag, which was gradually fading into the background in the Reich.

In the main the Academy helped to frame only laws of an economic or social nature, since owing to the development of the totalitarian regime it became more and more impossible to co-operate in other spheres.

DR. SEIDL: If I understand you correctly, then the governmental administration of law was solely in the hands of the Reich Minister of Justice, and that was not you.

FRANK: No, I was not Reich Minister of Justice. The Reich Minister of Justice, Dr. Gürtner, was, however, not competent for the entire field of legislation but merely for those laws which came within the scope of his ministry. Legislation in the Reich, in accordance with the Enabling Act, was in the hands of the Führer and Reich Chancellor and the Reich Government as a body. Consequently my name appears in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ at the bottom of one law only, and that is the law regarding the Reintroduction of Compulsory Military Service. However, I am proud that my name stands at the end of that law.

DR. SEIDL: You have stated earlier that during 1933 and 1934 you were Bavarian Minister of Justice.

FRANK: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: In that capacity did you have an opportunity of voicing your opinion on the question of concentration camps, and what were the circumstances?

FRANK: I learned that the Dachau concentration camp was being established in connection with a report which came to me from the Senior Public Prosecutor’s Office in Munich on the occasion of the killing of the Munich attorney, Dr. Strauss. This Public Prosecutor’s Office complained to me, after I had given them orders to investigate the killing, that the SS had refused them admission to the Dachau concentration camp. Thereupon I had Reich Governor, General Von Epp, call a meeting where I produced the files regarding this killing and pointed out the illegality of such an action on the part of the SS and stated that so far representatives from the German Public Prosecutor’s Office had always been able to investigate any death which evoked a suspicion that a crime had been committed and that I had not become aware so far of any departure from this principle in the Reich. After that I continued protesting against this method to Dr. Gürtner, the Reich Minister of Justice and at the same time Attorney General. I pointed out that this meant the beginning of a development which threatened the legal system in an alarming manner.

At Heinrich Himmler’s request Adolf Hitler intervened personally in this matter, and he used his power to quash any legal proceedings. The proceedings were ordered to be quashed. I handed in my resignation as Minister of Justice, but it was not accepted.

DR. SEIDL: When did you become Governor General of the occupied Polish territories, and where were you when you were informed of this appointment?

FRANK: On 24 August 1939, as an officer in the reserve, I had to join my regiment in Potsdam. I was busy training my company; and on 17 September, or it may have been 16, I was making my final preparations before going to the front when a telephone call came from the Führer’s special train ordering me to go to the Führer at once.

The following day I traveled to Upper Silesia where the Führer’s special train was stationed at that time; and in a very short conversation, which lasted less than ten minutes, he gave me the mission, as he put it, to take over the functions of Civil Governor for the occupied Polish territories.

At that time the whole of the conquered Polish territories was under the administrative supreme command of a military commander, General Von Rundstedt. Toward the end of September I was attached to General Von Rundstedt’s staff as Chief of Administration, and my task was to do the administrative work in the Military Government. In a short time, however, it was found that this method did not work; and when the Polish territories were divided into the part which was incorporated into the German Reich and the part which then became the Government General, I was appointed Governor General as from 26 October.

DR. SEIDL: You have mentioned the various positions which you held over a number of years. I now ask you: Did you, in any of the positions you held in the Party or the State, play any vital part in the political events of the last 20 years?

FRANK: In my own sphere I did everything that could possibly be expected of a man who believes in the greatness of his people and who is filled with fanaticism for the greatness of his country, in order to bring about the victory of Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist movement.

I never participated in far-reaching political decisions, since I never belonged to the circle of the closest associates of Adolf Hitler, neither was I consulted by Adolf Hitler on general political questions, nor did I ever take part in conferences about such problems. Proof of this is that throughout the period from 1933 to 1945 I was received only six times by Adolf Hitler personally, to report to him about my sphere of activities.

DR. SEIDL: What share did you have in the legislation of the Reich?

FRANK: I have already told you that, and there is no need to give a further answer.

DR. SEIDL: Did you, as a Reich Minister or in any other State or Party post want this war, or did you desire a war in violation of treaties entered into?

FRANK: War is not a thing one wants. War is terrible. We have lived through it; we did not want the war. We wanted a great Germany and the restoration of the freedom and welfare, the health and happiness of our people. It was my dream, and probably the dream of every one of us, to bring about a revision of the Versailles Treaty by peaceful means, which was provided for in that very treaty. But as in the world of treaties, between nations also, it is only the one who is strong who is listened to; Germany had to become strong first before we could negotiate. This is how I saw the development as a whole: the strengthening of the Reich, reinstatement of its sovereignty in all spheres, and by these means to free ourselves of the intolerable shackles which had been imposed upon our people. I was happy, therefore, when Adolf Hitler, in a most wonderful rise to power, unparalleled in the history of mankind, succeeded by the end of 1938 in achieving most of these aims; and I was equally unhappy when in 1939, to my dismay, I realized more and more that Adolf Hitler appeared to be departing from that course and to be following other methods.

THE PRESIDENT: This seems to have been covered by what the Defendant Göring told us, by what the Defendant Ribbentrop told us.

DR. SEIDL: The witness has already completed his statement on this point.

Witness, what was your share in the events of Poland after 1939?

FRANK: I bear the responsibility; and when, on 30 April 1945, Adolf Hitler ended his life, I resolved to reveal that responsibility of mine to the world as clearly as possible.

I did not destroy the 43 volumes of my diary, which report on all these events and the share I had in them; but of my own accord I handed them voluntarily to the officers of the American Army who arrested me.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, do you feel guilty of having committed crimes in violation of international conventions or crimes against humanity?

THE PRESIDENT: That is a question that the Tribunal has got to decide.

DR. SEIDL: Then I shall drop the question.

Witness, what do you have to say regarding the accusations which have been brought against you in the Indictment?

FRANK: To these accusations I can only say that I ask the Tribunal to decide upon the degree of my guilt at the end of my case.

I myself, speaking from the very depths of my feelings and having lived through the 5 months of this trial, want to say that now after I have gained a full insight into all the horrible atrocities which have been committed, I am possessed by a deep sense of guilt.

DR. SEIDL: What were your aims when you took over the post of Governor General?

FRANK: I was not informed about anything. I heard about special action commandos of the SS here during this trial. In connection with and immediately following my appointment, special powers were given to Himmler, and my competence in many essential matters was taken away from me. A number of Reich offices governed directly in matters of economy, social policy, currency policy, food policy, and therefore, all I could do was to lay upon myself the task of seeing to it that amid the conflagration of this war, some sort of an order should be built up which would enable men to live. The work I did out there, therefore, cannot be judged in the light of the moment, but must be judged in its entirety, and we shall have to come to that later. My aim was to safeguard justice, without doing harm to our war effort.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, did the police, and particularly the Security Police and SD, come under your jurisdiction in the Government General?

FRANK: The Higher SS and Police Leaders were in principle subordinate to the Reichsführer SS Himmler. The SS did not come under my command, and any orders or instructions which I might have given would not have been obeyed. Witness Bühler will cover this question in detail.

The general arrangement was that the Higher SS and Police Leader was formally attached to my office, but in fact, and by reason of his activities, he was purely an agent of the Reichsführer SS Himmler. This state of affairs, even as early as November 1939, was the cause of my first offer to resign which I made to Adolf Hitler. It was a state of affairs which made things extremely difficult as time went by. In spite of all my attempts to gain control of these matters, the drift continued. An administration without a police executive is powerless and there were many proofs of this. The police officers, so far as discipline, organization, pay, and orders were concerned, came exclusively under the German Reich police system and were in no way connected with the administration of the Government General. The officials of the SS and Police therefore did not consider that they were attached to the Government General in matters concerning their duty, neither was the police area called “Police Area, Government General.” Moreover the Higher SS and Police Leader did not call himself “SS and Police Leader in the Government General” but “Higher SS and Police Leader East.” However, I do not propose to go into details at this point.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, did the concentration camps in the Government General come under you, and did you have anything to do with their administration?

FRANK: Concentration camps were entirely a matter for the police and had nothing to do with the administration. Members of the civil administration were officially prohibited from entering the camps.

DR. SEIDL: Have you yourself ever been in a concentration camp?

FRANK: In 1935 I participated in a visit to the Dachau concentration camp, which had been organized for the Gauleiters. That was the only time that I have entered a concentration camp.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, in 1942, by a decree of the Führer, a State Secretariat for Security in the Government General was created. The date is 7 May 1942. What was the reason for creating that State Secretariat?

FRANK: The establishment of this State Secretariat was one of the many attempts to solve the problem of the police in the Government General. I was very happy about it at the time, because I thought now we had found the way to solve the problem. I am certain it would have worked if Himmler and Krüger had adhered to the principle of this decree, which was co-operation and not working against each other. But before long it transpired that this renewed attempt, too, was merely camouflage; and the old conditions continued.

DR. SEIDL: On 3 June 1942, on the basis of this Führer decree, another decree was issued regarding the transfer of official business to the State Secretary for Security. Is that true?

FRANK: I assume so, if you have the document. I cannot remember the details of course.

DR. SEIDL: In that case I shall ask the witness Bilfinger about this point.

FRANK: But I should like to add something to that. Wherever the SS is discussed here, the SS and the police are considered as forming one body. It would not be right of me if I did not correct that wrong conception. I have known during the course of these years so many honest, clean, and upright soldiers among the SS, and especially among the Waffen-SS and the police, that when judging here the problem of the SS in regard to the criminal nature of their activities, one can draw the same clear distinction as in the case of any of the other social groups. The SS, as such, behaved no more criminally than any other social groups would behave when taking part in political events. The dreadful thing was that the responsible chief, and a number of other SS men who unfortunately had been given considerable powers, were able to abuse the loyal attitude which is so typical of the German soldier.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, another question. In the decree concerning the creation of the State Secretariat for Security, it is ordered that the State Secretary—which in this case was the Higher SS and Police Leader—before making basic decisions, had to ask you for your approval. Was that done?

FRANK: No, I was never called upon to give my approval and that was the reason why before long this, my last, attempt proved to be a failure.

DR. SEIDL: Did the Higher SS and Police Leader and the SS Obergruppenführer Krüger, in particular, obey orders which you had given them?

FRANK: Please, would you repeat the question? It did not come through too well. And please, Dr. Seidl, do not speak quite so loudly.

DR. SEIDL: Did the Higher SS and Police Leader Krüger, who at the same time was the State Secretary for Security, obey orders which you gave him in your capacity as Governor General?

FRANK: Not even a single order. On the strength of this new decree I repeatedly gave orders. These orders were supposedly communicated to Heinrich Himmler; and as his agreement was necessary, these orders were never carried out. Some special cases can be confirmed by the State Secretary Bühler when he is here as a witness.

DR. SEIDL: Did the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police, before he carried out security police measures in the Government General, ever obtain your approval?

FRANK: Not in a single case.

DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has submitted a document, L-37, as Exhibit Number USA-506. It is a letter from the Commander of the Security Police and SD of the District Radom, addressed to the branch office at Tomassov. This document contains the following:

“On 28 June 1944 the Higher SS and Police Leader East issued the following order:

“The security situation in the Government General has deteriorated so much during the recent months that the most radical means and the most severe measures must now be employed against these alien assassins and saboteurs. The Reichsführer SS in agreement with the Governor General, has given order that in every case of assassination or attempted assassination of Germans, not only the perpetrators shall be shot when caught, but that in addition, all their male relatives shall also be executed, and their female relatives above the age of sixteen put into a concentration camp.”

FRANK: As I have said that I was never called upon by the Reichsführer SS Himmler to give my approval to such orders, your question has already been answered. In this case, I was not called upon either.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, were you at least informed of such orders from the Reichsführer SS Himmler or from the Higher SS and Police Leader East before they were carried out?

FRANK: The reason why this was not done was always the same. I was told that as Poles were living not only in the Government General but also in those territories which had been incorporated into the Reich, the fight against the Polish resistance movement had to be carried on by unified control from a central office, and this central office was Heinrich Himmler.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, what jurisdiction did you have in the general administration?

FRANK: I think it would accelerate the proceedings if the Witness Bühler could testify to these details. If the Tribunal so desires I will of course answer this question now. In the main I was concerned with the setting up of the usual administrative departments, such as food, culture, finance, science, _et cetera_.

DR. SEIDL: Were there representatives of the Polish and Ukrainian population in the Government General?

FRANK: Yes. The representation of the Polish and Ukrainian population was on a regional basis, and I united the heads of the bodies of representatives from the various districts in the so-called subsidiary committees. There was a Polish and an Ukrainian subsidiary committee. Count Ronikier was the head of the Polish committee for a number of years, and at the head of the Ukrainian committee was Professor Kubiowicz. I made it obligatory for all my offices to contact these subsidiary committees on all questions of a general nature, and this they did. I myself was in constant contact with both of them. Complaints were brought to me there and we had free discussions. My complaints and memoranda to the Führer were mostly based on the reports from these subsidiary committees.

A second form in which the population participated in the administration of the Government General was by means of the lowest administrative units, which throughout the Government General were in the hands of the native population. Every ten to twenty villages had as their head a so-called _Wojt_. This Polish word _Wojt_ is the same as the German word “Vogt”—V-o-g-t. He was, so to speak, the lowest administrative unit.

A third form of participation by the population in the administration was the employment of about 280,000 Poles and Ukrainians as government officials or civil servants in the public services of the Government General, including the postal and railway services.

DR. SEIDL: In what numerical proportion did the German civil servants stand to the Polish and Ukrainian civil servants?

FRANK: The proportion varied. The number of German civil servants was very small. There were times when, in the whole of the Government General, the area of which is 150,000 square kilometers—that means half the size of Italy—there were not more than 40,000 German civil servants. That means to one German civil servant there were on the average at least six non-German civil servants and employees.

DR. SEIDL: Which territories did you rule as Governor General?

FRANK: Poland, which had been jointly conquered by Germany and the Soviet Union, was divided first of all between the Soviet Union and the German Reich. Of the 380,000 square kilometers, which is the approximate size of the Polish State, approximately 200,000 square kilometers went to the Soviet Union and approximately 170,000 to 180,000 square kilometers to the German Reich. Please do not ask me for exact figures; that was roughly the proportion.

That part of Poland which was taken over into Soviet Russian territory was immediately treated as an integral part of the Soviet Union. The border signs in the east of the Government General were the usual Reich border signs of the Soviet Union, as from 1939. That part which came to Germany was divided thus: 90,000 square kilometers were left to the Government General and the remainder was incorporated into the German Reich.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think there is any charge against the defendant on the ground that the civil administration was bad. The charge is that crimes were committed, and the details of the administration between the Government General and the department in the Reich are not really in question.

DR. SEIDL: The only reason, Mr. President, why I put that question was to demonstrate the difficulties with which the administration had to cope right from the beginning in this territory, for an area which originally represented one economic unit was now split into three different parts.

[_Turning to the defendant._] I am coming now to the next question. Did you ever have hostages shot?

FRANK: My diary contains the facts. I myself have never had hostages shot.

DR. SEIDL: Did you ever participate in the annihilation of Jews?

FRANK: I say “yes”; and the reason why I say “yes” is because, having lived through the 5 months of this trial, and particularly after having heard the testimony of the witness Hoess, my conscience does not allow me to throw the responsibility solely on these minor people. I myself have never installed an extermination camp for Jews, or promoted the existence of such camps; but if Adolf Hitler personally has laid that dreadful responsibility on his people, then it is mine too, for we have fought against Jewry for years; and we have indulged in the most horrible utterances—my own diary bears witness against me. Therefore, it is no more than my duty to answer your question in this connection with “yes.” A thousand years will pass and still this guilt of Germany will not have been erased.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, what was your policy for the recruiting of laborers for the Reich when you were Governor General?

FRANK: I beg your pardon?

DR. SEIDL: What policy did you pursue for the recruiting of labor for the Reich in your capacity as Governor General?

FRANK: The policy is laid down in my decrees. No doubt they will be held against me by the Prosecution, and I consider it will save time if I answer that question later, with the permission of the Tribunal.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, did Hitler give you any instructions as to how you should carry out your administration as Governor General?

FRANK: During the first 10 minutes of the audience in his special train Adolf Hitler instructed me to see to it that this territory, which had been utterly devastated—all the bridges had been blown up; the railways no longer functioned, and the population was in a complete turmoil—was put into order somehow; and that I should see to it that this territory should become a factor which would contribute to the improvement of the terribly difficult economic and war situation of the German Reich.

DR. SEIDL: Did Adolf Hitler support you in your work as Governor General?

FRANK: All my complaints, everything I reported to him, were unfortunately dropped into the wastepaper basket by him. I did not send in my resignation 14 times for nothing. It was not for nothing that I tried to join my brave troops as an officer. In his heart he was always opposed to lawyers, and that was one of the most serious shortcomings of this outstandingly great man. He did not want to admit formal responsibility, and that, unfortunately, applied to his policy too, as I have found out now. Every lawyer to him was a disturbing element working against his power. All I can say, therefore, is that, by supporting Himmler’s and Bormann’s aims to the utmost, he permanently jeopardized any attempt to find a form of government worthy of the German name.

DR. SEIDL: Which departments of the Reich gave instructions to you regarding the administration of the Government General?

FRANK: In order to expedite the proceedings I should like to suggest that the witness Bühler give the whole list.

DR. SEIDL: Did you ever loot art treasures?

FRANK: An accusation which is one that touches my private life, and affects me most deeply, is that I am supposed to have enriched myself with the art treasures of the country entrusted to me. I did not collect pictures and I did not find time during the war to appropriate art treasures. I took care to see that all the art treasures of the country entrusted to me were officially registered, and had that official register incorporated in a document which was widely distributed; and, above all, I saw to it that those art treasures remained in the country right to the very end. In spite of that, art treasures were removed from the Government General. A part was taken away before my administration was established. Experience shows that one cannot talk of responsibility for an administration until some time after it has been functioning, namely, when the administration has been built up from the bottom. So that from the outbreak of the war, 1 September 1939, until this point, which was about at the end of 1939, I am sure that art treasures were stolen to an immeasurable extent either as war booty or under some other pretext. During the registration of the art treasures, Adolf Hitler gave the order that the Veit Stoss altar should be removed from St. Mary’s Church in Kraków, and taken to the Reich. In September 1939 Mayor Liebel came from Nuremberg to Kraków for that purpose with a group of SS men and removed this altar. A third instance was the removal of the Dürer etchings in Lvov by a special deputy before my administration was established there. In 1944, shortly before the collapse, art treasures were removed to the Reich for storage. In the Castle of Seichau, in Silesia, there was a collection of art treasures which had been brought there by Professor Kneisl for this purpose. One last group of art treasures was handed over to the Americans by me personally.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, did you introduce ghettos, that is, Jewish quarters in the Government General?

FRANK: I issued an instruction regarding the setting up of Jewish quarters. I do not remember the date. As to the reasons and the necessity for that, I shall have to answer the Prosecutor’s questions.

DR. SEIDL: Did you introduce badges to mark the Jews?

FRANK: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: Did you yourself introduce forced labor in the Government General?

FRANK: Forced labor and compulsory labor service were introduced by me in one of the first decrees; but it is quite clear from all the decrees and their wording that I had in mind only a labor service within the country for repairing the damage caused by the war, and for carrying out work necessary for the country itself, as was of course done by the labor service in the Reich.

DR. SEIDL: Did you, as was stated by the Prosecution, plunder libraries in the Government General?

FRANK: I can answer that question plainly with “no.” The largest and most valuable library which we found, the Jagellon University Library in Kraków, which thank God was not destroyed, was transferred to a new library building on my own personal orders; and the entire collection, including the most ancient documents, was looked after with great care.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, did you as Governor General close down the universities in the Government General?

FRANK: The universities in the Government General were closed because of the war when we arrived. The reopening of the universities was prohibited by order of Adolf Hitler. I supplied the needs of the Polish and Ukrainian population by introducing university courses of instruction for Polish and Ukrainian students—which were actually on a university level—in such a way that the Reich Authorities could not criticize it. The fact that there was an urgent need for native university-trained men, particularly doctors, technicians, lawyers, teachers, _et cetera_, was the best guarantee that the Poles and Ukrainians would be allowed to continue university teaching to the extent which war conditions would allow.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. SEIDL: Witness, we were last speaking of the universities. Did you yourself, as Governor General, close the secondary schools?

FRANK: My suggestion to reopen the Gymnasiums and secondary schools was rejected by Adolf Hitler. We helped to solve the problem by permitting secondary school education in a large number of private schools.

DR. SEIDL: Now, a basic question. The Prosecution accuse you of having plundered the country ruled by you as Governor General. What do you have to say to that?

FRANK: Well, evidently by that accusation is meant everything that happened in the economic sphere in that country as a result of the arrangements between the German Reich and the Government General. First, I would like to emphasize that the Government General had to start with a balance sheet which revealed a frightful economic situation. The country had approximately twelve million inhabitants. The area of the Government General was the least fertile part of the former Poland. Moreover, the boundary between the Soviet Union, as well as the boundary between the German Reich, had been drawn in such a way that the most essential elements, indispensable for economy, were left outside. The frontiers between the Soviet Union and the German Reich were immediately closed; and so, right from the start, we had to make something out of nothing.

Galicia, the most important area in the Republic of Poland from the viewpoint of food supplies, was given to the Soviet Union. The province of Posen belonged to the German Reich. The coal and industrial areas of Upper Silesia were within the German Reich. The frontier with Germany was drawn in such a way that the iron works in Czestochowa remained with the Government General, whereas the iron-ore basins which were 10 kilometers from Czestochowa were incorporated into the German Reich.

The town of Lodz, the textile center of Poland, came within the German Reich. The city of Warsaw with a population of several millions became a frontier town because the German border came as close as 15 kilometers to Warsaw, and the result was that the entire agricultural hinterland was no longer at the disposal of that city. A great many facts could be mentioned, but that would probably take us too far. The first thing we had to do was to set things going again somehow. During the first weeks the population of Warsaw could only be fed with the aid of German equipment for mass feeding. The German Reich at that time sent 600,000 tons of grain, as a loan of course, and that created a heavy debt for me.

I started the financial economy with 20 million zlotys which had been advanced to me by the Reich. We started with a completely impoverished economy due to the devastation caused by the war, and by the first of January 1944 the savings bank accounts of the native population had reached the amount of 11,500 million zlotys, and we had succeeded by then in improving the feeding of the population to a certain extent. Furthermore, at that time the factories and industrial centers had been reconstructed, to which reconstruction the Reich authorities had made outstanding contributions; Reich Marshal Göring and Minister Speer especially deserve great credit for the help given in reviving the industry of the country. More than two million fully paid workers were employed; the harvest had increased to 1.6 million tons in a year; the yearly budget had increased from 20 million zlotys in the year 1939 to 1,700 million zlotys. All this is only a sketch which I submit here to describe the general development.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, in your capacity as Governor General did you persecute churches and religion in the areas which you had under your administration?

FRANK: I was in constant personal contact with the Archbishop, now Cardinal, Sapieha in Kraków. He told me of all his sufferings and worries, and they were not few. I myself had to rescue the Bishop of Lublin from the hands of Herr Globocznik in order to save his life.

DR. SEIDL: You mean the SS Gruppenführer Globocznik?

FRANK: Yes, that is the one I mean.

But I may summarize the situation by quoting the letter which Archbishop Sapieha sent to me in 1942, in which, to use his own words, he thanked me for my tireless efforts to protect the life of the church. We reconstructed seminaries for priests; and we investigated every case of arrest of a priest, as far as that was humanly possible. The tragic incident when two assistants of the Archbishop Sapieha were shot, which has been mentioned here by the Prosecution, stirred my own emotions very deeply. I cannot say any more. The churches were open; the seminaries were educating priests; the priests were in no way prevented from carrying out their functions. The monastery at Czestochowa was under my personal protection. The Kraków monastery of the Camaldulians, which is a religious order, was also under my personal protection. There were large posters around the monastery indicating that these monasteries were protected by me personally.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, when did you hear for the first time about the concentration camp at Maidanek?

FRANK: I heard the name Maidanek for the first time in 1944 from foreign reports. But for years there had been contradictory rumors about the camp near Lublin, or in the Lublin District, if I may express myself in such a general way. Governor Zörner once told me, I believe already in 1941, that the SS intended to build a large concentration camp near Lublin and had applied for large quantities of building materials, _et cetera_. At that time I instructed State Secretary Bühler to investigate the matter immediately, and I was told, and I also received a report in writing from Reichsführer SS Himmler, that he had to build a large camp required by the Waffen-SS to manufacture clothes, footwear, and underwear in large SS-owned workshops. This camp went under the name of “SS Works,” or something similar.

Now, I have to say I was in a position to get information, whereas the witnesses who have testified so far have said under oath that in the circles around the Führer nothing was known about all these things. We out there were more independent, and I heard quite a lot through enemy broadcasts and enemy and neutral papers. In answer to my repeated questions as to what happened to the Jews who were deported, I was always told they were to be sent to the East, to be assembled, and put to work there. But, the stench seemed to penetrate the walls, and therefore I persisted in my investigations as to what was going on. Once a report came to me that there was something going on near Belcec. I went to Belcec the next day. Globocznik showed me an enormous ditch which he was having made as a protective wall and on which many thousands of workers, apparently Jews, were engaged. I spoke to some of them, asked them where they came from, how long they had been there, and he told me, that is, Globocznik, “They are working here now, and when they are through—they come from the Reich, or somewhere from France—they will be sent further east.” I did not make any further inquiries in that same area.

The rumor, however, that the Jews were being killed in the manner which is now known to the entire world would not be silenced. When I expressed the wish to visit the SS workshop near Lublin, in order to get some idea of the value of the work that was being done, I was told that special permission from Heinrich Himmler was required.

I asked Heinrich Himmler for this special permission. He said that he would urge me not to go to the camp. Again some time passed. On 7 February 1944 I succeeded in being received by Adolf Hitler personally—I might add that throughout the war he received me three times only. In the presence of Bormann I put the question to him: “My Führer, rumors about the extermination of the Jews will not be silenced. They are heard everywhere. No one is allowed in anywhere. Once I paid a surprise visit to Auschwitz in order to see the camp, but I was told that there was an epidemic in the camp and my car was diverted before I got there. Tell me, My Führer, is there anything in it?” The Führer said, “You can very well imagine that there are executions going on—of insurgents. Apart from that I do not know anything. Why don’t you speak to Heinrich Himmler about it?” And I said, “Well, Himmler made a speech to us in Kraków and declared in front of all the people whom I had officially called to the meeting that these rumors about the systematic extermination of the Jews were false; the Jews were merely being brought to the East.” Thereupon the Führer said, “Then you must believe that.”

When in 1944 I got the first details from the foreign press about the things which were going on, my first question was to the SS Obergruppenführer Koppe, who had replaced Krüger. “Now we know,” I said, “you cannot deny that.” And he said that nothing was known to him about these things, and that apparently it was a matter directly between Heinrich Himmler and the camp authorities. “But,” I said, “already in 1941 I heard of such plans, and I spoke about them.” Then he said that was my business and he could not worry about it.

The Maidanek Camp must have been run solely by the SS, in the way I have mentioned, and apparently, in the same manner as stated by the witness Hoess.

That is the only explanation that I can give.

DR. SEIDL: Therefore you did not know of the conditions in Treblinka, Auschwitz, and other camps? Did Treblinka belong to Maidanek, or is that a separate camp?

FRANK: I do not know; it seems to be a separate camp. Auschwitz was not in the area of the Government General. I was never in Maidanek, nor in Treblinka, nor in Auschwitz.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Prosecution has presented under Number USA-275 the report of the SS Brigadeführer Stroop on the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto. Before that action was initiated, did you know anything about it and did you ever come across this report?

FRANK: I was surprised when the American Chief Prosecutor said in his opening speech, while submitting a document here with pictures about the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto, that that report had been made to me. But that has been clarified in the meantime. The report was never made for me, and was never sent to me in that form. And, thank Heaven, during the last few days it has been made clear by several witnesses and affidavits that this destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto was carried out upon direct orders of Himmler, and over the head of all competent authorities of the Government General. When in our meetings anybody spoke about this Ghetto, it was always said that there had been a revolt in the Warsaw Ghetto which we had had to quell with artillery; reports that were made on it never seemed to me to be authentic.

DR. SEIDL: What measures did you take to see that the population in the Government General was fed?

FRANK: An abundance of measures were taken to get agriculture going again, to import machinery, to teach farmers improved farming methods, to build up co-operative associations, to distribute seeds in the usual way.

DR. SEIDL: The Witness Bühler will speak about that later.

FRANK: Moreover the Reich helped a great deal in that respect. The Reich sent seeds to the value of many millions of marks, agricultural experts, breeding cattle, machines, _et cetera_.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, you have told us what you did for the welfare of the population of the Government General. The Prosecution, however, has charged you with a number of statements which they found in your own diary, and which seem to contradict that. How can you explain that contradiction?

FRANK: One has to take the diary as a whole. You can not go through 43 volumes and pick out single sentences and separate them from their context. I would like to say here that I do not want to argue or quibble about individual phrases. It was a wild and stormy period filled with terrible passions, and when a whole country is on fire and a life and death struggle is going on, such words may easily be used.

DR. SEIDL: Witness...

FRANK: Some of the words are terrible. I myself must admit that I was shocked at many of the words which I had used.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, under Number USA-297 the Prosecution has submitted a document which deals with a conference which you apparently had in 1939 or 1940 with an office of the Chief of the Administration Ober-Ost. I shall have the document handed to you and ask you to tell me whether the report of that man, as it is contained in the document, agrees with what you have said. It is on Page 1, at the bottom, the second paragraph.

FRANK: That is a shortened summary of a speech, which perhaps in an address...

THE PRESIDENT: What is the PS number?

DR. SEIDL: Dr. Frank, what is the number?

FRANK: 297, I believe.

DR. SEIDL: No, on the cover, please.

FRANK: On the cover it says 344. I will return the document to you. Would you kindly ask me about individual phrases. It is impossible for me to read all of its contents.

DR. SEIDL: The number is 297, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it is USA-297. It is EC-344, (16) and (17), is that right?

DR. SEIDL: Yes.

[_Turning to the defendant._] It says here that during the first conversation which the chief of the central department had with the Reich Minister Dr. Frank on 3 October 1939 in Posen, the latter explained the task which had been given him by the Führer and the economic-political principles on which he intended to base his administration of Poland. This could only be done by ruthless exploitation of the country. Therefore, it would be necessary to recruit manpower to be used in the Reich, and so on.

I have summarized it, Mr. President.

FRANK: I am sure that these utterances were not made in the way it is put here.

DR. SEIDL: But you do not want to say that you have never spoken to that man?

FRANK: I cannot remember it at all.

DR. SEIDL: Then, I come to the next question.

FRANK: Moreover, what actually happened seems to me to be more important than what was said at the time.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that your actions as Governor General, and undoubtedly also many excesses by the police and the SD, were due to the guerrilla activities?

FRANK: Guerrilla activities? It can be said that it was the resistance movement, which started from the very first day and was supported by our enemies, which presented the most difficult problem I had to cope with during all these years. For this resistance movement perpetually supplied the police and the SS with pretexts and excuses for all those measures which, from the viewpoint of an orderly administration, were very regrettable. In fact, the resistance movement—I will not call it guerrilla activity, because if a people has been conquered during a war and organizes an active resistance movement, that is something definitely to be respected—but the methods of the resistance movement went far beyond the limits of an heroic revolt. German women and children were slaughtered under the most atrocious circumstances. German officials were shot; trains were derailed; dairies were destroyed; and all measures taken to bring about the recovery of the country were systematically undermined.

And it is against the background of these incidents, which occurred day after day, incessantly, during practically the entire period of my activity, that the events in that country must be considered. That is all I have to say to that.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, in the year 1944 a revolt broke out in Warsaw under the leadership of General Bor. What part did the administration of the Government General have, and what part did you have in putting down that revolt?

FRANK: That revolt broke out, when the Soviet Russian Army had advanced to within about 30 kilometers of Warsaw on the eastern bank of the Vistula. It was a sort of combined operation; and, as it seems to me, also a national Polish action, as the Poles at the last moment wanted to carry out the liberation of their capital themselves and did not want to owe it to the Soviet Russians. They probably were thinking of how, in Paris, at the last moment the resistance movement, even before the Allies had approached, had accomplished the liberation of the city.

The operation was a strictly military one. As Senior Commander of the German troops used to quell the revolt, I believe, they appointed SS General Von dem Bach-Zelewski. The civil administration, therefore, did not have any part in the fighting. The part played by the civil administration began only after the capitulation of General Bor, when the most atrocious orders for vengeance came from the Reich.

A letter came to my desk one day in which Hitler demanded the deportation of the entire population of Warsaw into German concentration camps. It took a struggle of 3 weeks, from which I emerged victorious, to avert that act of insanity and to succeed in having the fleeing population of Warsaw, which had had no part in the revolt, distributed throughout the Government General.

During that revolt, unfortunately, the city of Warsaw was very seriously damaged. All that had taken years to rebuild was burned down in a few weeks. However, State Secretary Bühler, in order to save time, will probably be in a better position to give us more details.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, you are also accused of having suppressed the cultural life of the population of the Government General, especially as regards the theater, broadcasting, films. What have you to say about that?

FRANK: The Government General presented the same picture as every occupied country. We do not have to look far from this courtroom to see what cultural life is like in an occupied country.

We had broadcasting in the Polish language under German supervision. We had a Polish press which was supervised by Germans, and we had a Polish school system, that is, elementary schools and high schools, in which at the end, 80,000 teachers taught in the service of the Government General. As far as it was possible Polish theaters were reopened in the large cities, and where German theaters were established we made sure that there was also a Polish theater at the same time. After the proclamation of the so-called total war in August 1944, the absurd situation arose in which the German theater in Kraków was closed, because all German theaters were closed at that time, whereas the Polish theaters remained open.

I myself selected composers and virtuosos from a group of the most well known musicians of Poland I found there in 1939 and founded the Philharmonic Orchestra of the Government General. This was in being until the end, and played an important part in the cultural life of Poland. I established a Chopin Museum in Kraków, and from all over Europe I collected relics of Chopin. I believe that is sufficient on this point.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, you deny, therefore, having taken any measures which aimed at exterminating Polish and Ukrainian culture.

FRANK: Culture cannot be exterminated. Any measures taken with that intention would be sheer nonsense.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that as far as it was in your power you did everything to avoid epidemics and to improve the health of the population?

FRANK: That State Secretary Bühler will be able to confirm in detail. I can say that everything humanly possible was done.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Prosecution, under Number USSR-223, has submitted an excerpt from the diary, which deals with the report about a police conference of 30 May 1940, and we find here in Pages 33 to 38 the following...

FRANK: [_Interposing._] Unless the Court orders it, it is not necessary to read that.

DR. SEIDL: No, I only want to read one sentence, which refers to the Kraków professors. Apparently, if the diary is correct, you said...

FRANK: [_Interposing._] May I say something about the Kraków professors right away?

DR. SEIDL: Yes.

FRANK: On 7 November 1939 I came to Kraków. On 5 November 1939 before my arrival, the SS and the police, as I found out later, called the Kraków professors to a meeting. They thereupon arrested the men, among them dignified old professors, and took them to some concentration camp. I believe it was Oranienburg. I found that report when I arrived and against everything which may be found there in my diary, I want to emphasize here under oath that I did not cease in my attempts to get every one of the professors released whom I could reach, in March 1940. That is all I have to say to this.

DR. SEIDL: The same police meeting of 30 May 1940 also dealt with the so-called “AB Action,” that is, with the Extraordinary Pacification Action. Before I put to you the question which is concerned with it, I would like to read to you two entries in the diary. One is dated 16 May 1940, and here, after describing that extraordinary tension then existing, you stated the following: That, first of all, an action for pacification would have to be started, and then you said:

“Any arbitrary actions must be avoided; in all cases the safeguarding of the authority of the Führer and of the Reich has to be kept in the foreground.”—I omit several sentences and quote the end—“The action is timed for 15 June.”

On 12 July a conference took place with the Ministerialrat Wille, who was the chief of the Department of Justice, and there you said in your own words:

“Regarding the question as to what should happen to the political criminals who had been arrested during the AB Action, there is to be a conference with State Secretary Bühler, Obergruppenführer Krüger, Brigadeführer Streckenbach and Ministerialrat Wille.”

End of quotation.

What actually happened during that AB Action?

FRANK: I cannot say any more or any less than what is contained in the diary. The situation was extremely tense. Month after month attempted assassinations increased. The encouragement and support given by the rest of the world to the resistance movement to undermine all our efforts to pacify the country had succeeded to an alarming degree, and this led to this general pacification action, not only in the Government General, but also in other areas, and which I believe was ordered by the Führer himself.

My efforts were directed to limiting it as to extent and method, and in this I was successful. Moreover I should like to point out that I also made it clear that I intended to exercise the right of reprieve in each individual case; for that purpose I wanted the police and SS verdicts of death by shooting to be submitted to a reprieve committee which I had formed in that connection. I believe that can be seen from the diary also.

DR. SEIDL: Probably the witness Bühler knows something about it.

FRANK: Nevertheless, I would like to say that the method used at that time was a tremendous mistake.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, have you at any time recognized the principle introduced by the SD and SS of the liability of kin?

FRANK: No, on the contrary. When I received the first reports about it, I complained in writing to Reich Minister Lammers about that peculiar development of the law.

DR. SEIDL: The first SS and Police Leader East was Obergruppenführer Krüger. When was this SS leader recalled and how did it come about?

FRANK: The relations between him and myself became quite impossible. He wanted a peculiar kind of SS and police regime, and that state of affairs could be solved only in one way—either he or I had to go. I think that at the last moment, by the intervention of Kaltenbrunner, if I remember correctly, and of Bach-Zelewski, this remarkable fellow was removed.

DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution once mentioned that it was more a personal struggle for power. But is it more correct to say that there were differences of opinion on basic questions?

FRANK: Of course it was a struggle for power. I wanted to establish a power in the sense of my memoranda to the Führer, and therefore I had to fight the power of violence, and here personal viewpoints separated altogether.

DR. SEIDL: The successor of SS Obergruppenführer Krüger was SS Obergruppenführer Koppe. Was his basic attitude different?

FRANK: Yes. I had that impression; and I am thinking of him particularly when I say that even in the SS there were many decent men who also had a sense of what was right.

DR. SEIDL: Were there Polish and Ukrainian Police in the Government General?

FRANK: Yes, there were 25,000 men of the Polish security, criminal, and uniformed police, and about 5,000 men of the Ukrainian police. They also were under the German police chief.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, I now come to one of the most important questions. In 1942, in Berlin, Vienna, Heidelberg, and Munich, you made speeches before large audiences. What was the purpose of these speeches, and what were the consequences for you?

FRANK: The speeches can be read. It was the last effort that I made to bring home to Hitler, by means of the tremendous response of the German people, the truth that the rule of law was immortal. I stated at that time that a Reich without law and without humanity could not last long, and more in that vein. After I had been under police surveillance for several days in Munich, I was relieved of all my Party offices. As this was a matter of German domestic politics under the sovereignty of the German Reich, I refrain from making any more statements about it here.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that after this you tendered your resignation? And what was the answer?

FRANK: I was, so to speak, in a permanent state of resigning, and I received the same answer: that for reasons connected with foreign policy I could not be released.

DR. SEIDL: I originally intended to read to you from your diary a number of quotations which the Prosecution has submitted; but in view of the fact that the Prosecution may do that in the course of the cross-examination, I forego it in order to save time. I have no more questions to put to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any questions?

Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?

CHIEF COUNSELLOR OF JUSTICE L. N. SMIRNOV (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Defendant, I should like to know what precisely was your legal status and what exactly was the position you occupied in the system of the fascist state. Please answer me: When were you promoted to the post of Governor of occupied Poland? To whom were you directly subordinated?

FRANK: The date is 26 October 1939. At least on that day the directive concerning the Governor General became effective.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You will remember that by Hitler’s order of 12 October 1939 you were directly subordinated to Hitler, were you not?

FRANK: I did not get the first part. What was it, please?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you remember Hitler’s order concerning your appointment as Governor General of Poland? This order was dated 12 October 1939.

FRANK: That was in no way effective, because the decree came into force on 26 October 1939, and you can find it in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_. Before that I was Chief of Administration with the military commander Von Rundstedt. I have explained that already.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: By this order of Hitler you were directly subordinated to him. Do you remember? Paragraph 3, Sub-paragraph 1, of this order.

FRANK: The chiefs of administration in the occupied territories were all immediately under the Führer. I may say in elucidation that Paragraph 3 states, “The Governor General is immediately subordinate to me.”

But Paragraph 9 of this decree states, “This decree becomes valid as soon as I have withdrawn from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army the task of carrying out the military administration.” And this withdrawal, that is, the coming into force of this decree took place on 26 October.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I fully agree with you, and we have information to that effect in the book which you evidently remember. It is Book 5. You do remember this book of the Government General?

FRANK: It is of course in the decree.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, when this order came into force, to whom were you directly subordinate?

FRANK: What shall I read here? There are several entries here. What is your wish? To what do you wish me to answer?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It states that this order came into force on the 26 October. Well, when this order actually became valid, to whom were you subordinated? Was there, or was there not, any further order issued by Hitler?

FRANK: There is only one basic decree about the Governor General. That is this one.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Quite correct. There were no further instructions?

FRANK: Oh yes, there are some, for instance...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I understand that, but there was no other decree determining the system of administration, was there?

FRANK: May I say that you can find it best on Page A-100 in your book, and there you have the decree of the Führer verbatim.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Quite right.

FRANK: And it says also in Paragraph 9, “This decree shall come into effect...” and so on, and that date was the 26th of October.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, that is quite correct. That means that after 26 October you, as Governor General for occupied Poland, were directly subordinate to Hitler?

FRANK: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then perhaps you may remember when, and by whom, you were entrusted with the execution, in occupied Poland, of the Four Year Plan?

FRANK: By Göring.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That means that you were Göring’s plenipotentiary for the execution of the Four Year Plan in Poland, were you not?

FRANK: The story of that mission is very briefly told. The activities of several plenipotentiaries of the Four Year Plan in the Government General were such that I was greatly concerned about it. Therefore, I approached the Reich Marshal and asked him to appoint me trustee for the Four Year Plan. That was later—in January...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, it was in December.

FRANK: Yes, it was later, according to this decree.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This means that as from the beginning of December 1939 you were Göring’s plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan?

FRANK: Göring’s? I was the plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Now perhaps you can remember that in October 1939 the first decree regarding the organization of administration in the Government General was promulgated?

FRANK: Yes. That is here, is it not?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you recall Paragraph 3 of that decree.

FRANK: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It says that “The sphere of action of the State Secretary for Security will be determined by the Governor General in agreement with the Reichsführer SS and”—this is the passage which interests me—“the Chief of the German Police.”

Does that not coincide with Paragraph 3 insofar as from the first day of your appointment as Governor General you undertook the control of the Police and SS, and, consequently, the responsibility for their actions?

FRANK: No. I definitely answer that question with “no,” but I would like to make an explanation....

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What interests me, Defendant; is how could that be explained otherwise?

THE PRESIDENT: Let him make his explanation.

Defendant, you may make your explanation.

FRANK: I want to make a very short statement. There is an old legal principle which says that nobody can transfer more rights to anybody else than he has himself. What I have stated here was the ideal which I had before me and how it should have been. Everybody has to admit that it is natural and logical that the police should be subordinate to the Chief of Administration. The Führer, who alone could have decided, did not make that decree. I did not have the power nor the authority to put into effect this decree which I had so carefully formulated.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then do I understand you to say that this Paragraph 3 was an ideal which you strove to attain, but which you were never able to attain?

FRANK: I beg your pardon, but I could not understand that question. A little slower please, and may I have the translation into German a little slower?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Shall I repeat the question?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I asked you a question; does this mean that the statement can be interpreted as follows: Paragraph 3 of this decree was an ideal which you persistently strove to attain, which you openly professed, but which you were never able to attain? Would that be correct?

FRANK: Which I could not attain; and that can be seen by the fact that later it was found necessary to appoint a special State Secretary for Security in a last effort to find a way out of the difficulty.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you will recall that in April 1942, special negotiations took place between you and Himmler. Did these negotiations take place in April 1942?

FRANK: Yes; certainly. I do not know on what you base your question. I cannot tell you the date offhand, but it was always my endeavor...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: To confirm these facts, I can turn to your diary. Perhaps you will recall that as a result of these negotiations an understanding was reached between you and Himmler.

FRANK: Yes, an understanding was reached.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In order to refresh your memory on the subject I shall ask that the corresponding volume of your diary be handed to you, so that you may have the text before you.

FRANK: Yes, I am ready.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would refer you to Paragraph 2 of this agreement. It states:

THE PRESIDENT: Where can we find this? Is it under the date 21 April 1942?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes; that is quite right; 21 April 1942.

THE PRESIDENT: I think we have got it.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is Document Number USSR-223. It has been translated into English, and I shall hand it over immediately.

THE PRESIDENT: I think we have it now; we were only trying to find the place.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is on Page 18 of the English text.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Go on.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would ask you to recall the contents. It says: “The Higher SS and Police Leader (the State Secretary) is directly subordinate to the Governor General, and, if he is absent, then to his Deputy.”

Does this not mean that Himmler, so to speak, agreed with your ideal in the sense that the Police should be subordinate to you?

FRANK: Certainly. On that day I was satisfied; but a few days later the whole thing was changed. I can only say that these efforts on my part were continued, but unfortunately it was never possible to put them into effect.

You will find here in Paragraph 3, if you care to go on, that the Reichsführer SS, according to the expected decree by the Führer, could give orders to the State Secretary. So, you see, Himmler here had reserved the right to give orders to Krüger direct. And then comes the matter of the agreement...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is true, but in that case I must ask you to refer to another part of the document...

FRANK: May I say in this connection that this agreement was never put into effect, but that this decree was published in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ in the form of a Führer decree. Unfortunately, I do not know the date of that; but you can find the decree about the regulation of security matters in the Government General, and that is the only authoritative statement. Here, also, reference is made to the “expected decree by the Führer,” and that agreement was just a draft of what was to appear in the Führer decree.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, I was just proceeding to that subject. You agree that this decision was practically a verbatim decree of the Führer?

FRANK: I cannot say that offhand. If you will be good enough to give me the words of the Führer decree, I will be able to tell you about that.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes.

[_Turning to the President._] Incidentally this decree appears in your document book, Mr. President.

FRANK: I haven’t the document. It seems to me that the most essential parts of that agreement have been taken and put into this decree, with a few changes. However, the book has been taken away from me and I cannot compare it.

THE PRESIDENT: The book will be submitted to you now.

[_The book was submitted to the defendant._]

FRANK: Very important changes have been made, unfortunately.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would request you to turn to Paragraph 3 of Hitler’s decree, dated 7 May 1942. It is stated here that the State Secretary for Security is directly subordinate to the Governor General. And does this not confirm the fact that the police of the Government General were, nevertheless, directly subordinate to you? That is Paragraph 3 of the decree.

FRANK: I would like to say that that is not so. The police were not subordinate to me, even by reason of that decree—only the State Secretary for Security. It does not say here that the police are subordinate to the Governor General, only the State Secretary for Security is subordinate to him. If you read Paragraph 4, then you come to the difficulties again. Adolf Hitler’s decree was drawn up in my absence, of course. I was not consulted by Hitler, otherwise 1 would have protested, but in any case it was found impracticable.

Paragraph 4 says that the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police gave direct instructions to the State Secretary for Security in the field of security and for the preservation of German nationality. If you compare the original agreement with this, as contained in the diary, you will find that in one of the most important fields the Führer had changed his mind, that is, concerning the Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality. This title embraces the Jewish question and the question of colonization.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It appears to me, Defendant, that you have only taken into consideration one aspect of this question, and that you have given a rather one-sided interpretation of the excerpt quoted. May I recall to your memory Paragraph 4 of this decree which, in Sub-paragraph 2, reads as follows:

“The State Secretary”—this means Krüger—“must receive the consent of the Governor General before carrying out the directives of the Reichsführer SS and the German Police.”

And now permit me to turn to Paragraph 5 of this self-same decree of Hitler’s which states that “in cases of divergencies of opinion between the Governor General and the Reichsführer of the SS and the German Police, my decision is to be obtained through the Reich Minister and the Head of the Reich Chancellery.” In this connection I would ask you, does not this paragraph testify to the very considerable rights granted by you to the leaders of the police and the SS in the Government General and to your own responsibility for the activities of these organizations?

FRANK: The wording of the decree testifies to it, but the actual development was quite the contrary. I believe that we will come to that in detail. I maintain therefore that this attempt to gain some influence over the police and the SS also failed.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then may I ask whose attempt it was? In this case it is evidently an attempt by Hitler for he signed this decree. Krüger was evidently more powerful than Hitler?

FRANK: That question is not quite clear to me. You mean that Krüger went against the decree of the Führer? Of course he did, but that has nothing to do with power. That was considered by Himmler as a tremendous concession made to me. I want to refer to a memorandum of the summer of 1942, I think, shortly after the decree of the Führer came into force.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have the following question to ask you: Is it possible that you...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell us, Defendant, who was the actual leader of the National Socialist Party in the Government General?

FRANK: I hear nothing at all.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you...

FRANK: I hear nothing at all.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have the following question to put to you: After 6 May 1940 in the Government General...

FRANK: 6 May?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, 6 May 1940, after the Nazi organization had been completed in the Government General, who was appointed its leader?

FRANK: I was.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Thus the leadership of the administration of the National Socialist Party and of the Police was concentrated in your hands. Therefore you are responsible for the administration, the Police, and the political life of the Government General.

FRANK: Before I answer that question, I must protest when you say that I had control of the Police.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I believe that that is the only way one could interpret the Führer’s orders and the other documents which I have put to you.

FRANK: No doubt, if one disregards the actual facts and the realities of the situation.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, then, let us pass on to another group of questions. You heard of the existence of Maidanek only in 1944, isn’t that so?

FRANK: In 1944 the name Maidanek was brought to my knowledge officially for the first time by the Press Chief Gassner.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will now ask that you be shown a document which was presented by your defense counsel, which was compiled by you, and which is a report addressed to Hitler, dated June 1943. I will read into the record one excerpt, and I wish to remind you that this is dated 19 June 1943:

“As a proof of the mistrust shown to the German leadership, I enclose a characteristic excerpt from the report of the Chief of the Security Police and SD in the Government General...”

FRANK: Just a moment. The wrong passage has been shown me. I have the passage here on Page 35 of the German text, and it is differently worded.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Have you found the place now?

FRANK: Yes. But you started with a different sentence. The sentence here starts “A considerable part of the Polish intelligentsia...”

THE PRESIDENT: Which page is it?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Page 35 of the German text, last paragraph.

FRANK: It starts here with the words “A considerable part...”

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: All right. Then I will continue:

“As a proof of the degree of the mistrust shown to the German leadership I enclose”—these are your own words, this passage comes somewhat higher up in the quotation—“a characteristic excerpt from the report of the Chief of the Security Police and SD in the Government General for the period from 1 to 31 May 1943, concerning the possibilities of propaganda resulting from Katyn.”

FRANK: That is not here. Would you be good enough to show me the passage? Now, what you are presenting here is not in my text.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, it is there; it comes somewhat earlier in your text.

FRANK: I think it has been omitted from my text.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I begin now at that part which you find lower down at the bottom. Follow the text:

“A large part of the Polish intelligentsia, however, as before, will not allow itself to be influenced by the news from Katyn and holds against the Germans alleged similar cruelties, especially in Auschwitz.”

I omit the next sentence and I continue:

“Among that portion of the working classes which is not communistically inclined, this is scarcely denied; at the same time it is pointed out that the attitude of Germany towards the Poles is not any better.”

Please note the next sentence:

“It is said that there are concentration camps at Auschwitz and Maidanek where likewise the mass murder of Poles is carried out systematically.”

How can one reconcile this part of your report which mentions Auschwitz and Maidanek, where mass murder took place, with your statement that you heard of Maidanek only at the end of 1944. Well, your report is dated June 1943; you mentioned there both Maidanek and Auschwitz.

FRANK: With reference to Maidanek we were talking about the extermination of Jews. The extermination of Jews in Maidanek became known to me during the summer of 1944. Up to now the word “Maidanek” has always been mentioned in connection with extermination of Jews.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently, we are to understand—I refer to the text submitted to you—that in May 1943 you heard of the mass murder of Poles in Maidanek, and in 1944 you heard of the mass murder of Jews?

FRANK: I beg your pardon? I heard about the extermination of the Jews at Maidanek in 1944 from the official documents in the foreign press.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And you heard of the mass killings of the Poles in 1943?

FRANK: That is contained in my memorandum, and I protest: these are the facts as I put them before the Führer.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will ask that another document be shown to you. Do you know this document, are you acquainted with it?

FRANK: It is a decree dated 2 October 1943. I assume that the wording agrees with the text of the original decree.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, it is in full agreement with the original text. In any case your defense counsel can follow the text and will be able to verify it. I have to ask you one question. What do you think of this law signed by you?

FRANK: Yes, it is here.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You were President of the Reich Academy of Law. From the standpoint of the most elementary standards of law, what do you think of this law signed by you?

THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the number of it?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is Exhibit USSR-335, Mr. President.

FRANK: This is the general wording for a court-martial decree. It provides that the proceedings should take place in the presence of a judge, that a document should be drawn up, and that the proceedings should be recorded in writing. Apart from that I had the power to give pardons, so that every sentence had to be submitted to me.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to tell us how this court for court-martial proceedings was composed, who the members of this court were. Would you please pay attention to Paragraph 3, Point 1 of Paragraph 3?

FRANK: The Security Police, yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You were telling us of your hostile attitude to the SD. Why then did you give the SD the right to exert oppression on the Polish population?

FRANK: Because that was the only way in which I could exert any influence on the sentences. If I had not published this decree, there would have been no possibility of control; and the Police would simply have acted at random.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You spoke of the right of reprieve which was entrusted to you. Would you please note Paragraph 6 of this law. I remind you that a verdict of a summary court-martial by the SD was to be put into effect immediately according to the text. I remind you again that there was only one possible verdict: “death.” How could you change it if the condemned person was to be shot or hanged immediately after the verdict?

FRANK: The sentence would nevertheless have to come before me.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, but a sentence had to be carried out immediately.

FRANK: Those were the general instructions which I had issued in connection with the power given me to grant reprieves, and the committee which dealt with reprieves was constantly sitting. Files were sent in...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Since you have spoken of the right to reprieve, I will put to you another question. Do you remember the AB Action?

FRANK: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you remember that this action signified the execution of thousands of Polish intellectuals?

FRANK: No.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then what did it signify?

FRANK: It came within the framework of the general action of appeasement and it was my plan to eliminate, by means of a properly regulated procedure, arbitrary actions on the part of the Police. This was the meaning of that action.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I do not understand very well what you mean. How did you treat persons who were subject to the AB Action? What happened to them?

FRANK: This meeting really only dealt with the question of arrests.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you what happened to them later?

FRANK: They were arrested and taken into protective custody.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And then?

FRANK: Then they were subjected to the proceedings which had been established. At least, that is what I intended.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Was this left to the Police exclusively?

FRANK: The Police were in charge.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In other words, the Police took over the extermination of these people after they had been arrested, is that so?

FRANK: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, then tell us, please, why you did not exercise your power of reprieve while they were carrying out this inhuman action?

FRANK: I did make use of it.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will put before you your statement, dated 30 May 1940. You certainly remember this meeting with the Police on 30 May 1940, when you gave final instructions to the police before carrying out this action?

FRANK: No.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You stated the following:

“Any attempt on the part of the legal authorities to intervene in the AB Action, undertaken with the help of the Police, should be considered as treason to the State and to German interests.”

Do you remember this statement?

FRANK: I do not remember it, but you must take into account all the circumstances which spread over several weeks. You must consider the statement in its entirety and not seize upon one single sentence. This concerns a development which went on for weeks and months, in the course of which the reprieve committee was established by me for the first time. That was my way of protesting against arbitrary actions and of introducing legal justice in all these proceedings. That is a development extending over many weeks, which you cannot, in my opinion, summarize in one sentence.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am speaking of words which in my opinion can have only one meaning for a jurist. You wrote:

“The reprieve committee which is part of my office is not concerned with these matters. The AB Action will be carried out exclusively by Higher SS and Police Leader Krüger and his organization. This is a purely internal action for quieting the country which is necessary and lies outside the scope of a normal legal trial.”

That is to say you renounced your right of pardon?

FRANK: At that particular moment; but if you follow the further development of the AB Action during the following weeks you will see that this never became effective. That was an intention, a bad intention, which, thank God, I gave up in time. Perhaps my defense counsel will be able to say a few words on the subject later.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One single question interests me. Did you renounce your right of pardon while carrying out this operation or not?

FRANK: No.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well then, how can you account for your words, this one sentence: “The reprieve committee is not concerned with these matters.”?

How should we interpret these words?

FRANK: This is not a decree; it is not the final ruling on the matter. It is a remark which was made on the spur of the moment and was then negotiated on for days. But one must recognize the final stage of the development, and not merely the various motives as they came up during the development.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, I understand that very well, Defendant. But I would like to ask you, was this statement made during a conference with the Police and did you instruct the Police in that matter?

FRANK: Not during that meeting. I assume it came up in some other connection. Here we discussed only this one action. After all, I also had to talk to State Secretary Bühler.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, all right. While discussing the AB Action with the Police you stated that the results of this action would not concern the reprieve committee which was subordinated to you, is that right?

FRANK: That sentence is contained in the diary. It is not, however, the final result, but rather an intermediate stage.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps I can recall to you another sentence, in order that you may judge the results of this action. Perhaps you can recall this part which I will put to you. You stated the following:

“We need not bring these elements into German concentration camps, for in that case we would only have difficulties and an unnecessary correspondence with their families. We must simply liquidate matters in the country, and in the simplest way.”

What you mean is that this would simply be a question of liquidation in the simplest form, is that not so?

FRANK: That is a terrible word. But, thank God, it did not take place in this way.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, but these persons were executed. What do you mean by saying that this was not carried out? Obviously this was carried out, for the persons were executed.

FRANK: When they were sentenced they were killed, if the right to pardon them was not exercised.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And they were condemned without application of the right of pardon?

FRANK: I do not believe so.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Unfortunately these people are no more, and therefore obviously they were executed.

FRANK: Which people?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Those who were arrested under the AB Action. I will remind you of another excerpt connected with this AB Action. If you did not agree with the Police with regard to certain police actions it would be difficult to explain the celebrations in connection with the departure of Brigadeführer SS Streckenbach when he left for Berlin. Does this not mean that you were at least on friendly terms with the Police?

FRANK: In connection with political relations many words of praise are spoken which are not in keeping with the truth. You know that as well as any other person.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will allow myself to remind you of only one passage of your speech addressed to the Brigadeführer Streckenbach, one sentence only. You said:

“What you, Brigadeführer Streckenbach, and your people, have done in the Government General must not be forgotten; and you need not be ashamed of it.”

That testifies, does it not, to quite a different attitude toward Streckenbach and his people?

FRANK: And it was not forgotten either.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have no further questions to put to the defendant.

THE PRESIDENT: Does that conclude the cross-examination?

MR. DODD: I have only one or two questions, if Your Honor pleases.

[_Turning to the defendant._] In the course of your examination I understood you to say that you had never gathered to yourself any of the art treasures of the Government General. By that I do not suppose you to mean that you did not have them collected and registered; you did have them collected and registered, isn’t that so?

FRANK: Art treasures in the Government General were officially collected and registered. The book has been submitted here in Court.

MR. DODD: Yes. And you told the Tribunal that before you got there one Dürer collection had already been seized—before you took over your duties.

FRANK: May I ask you to understand that as follows:

These were the Dürers which were removed in Lvov before the civilian administration was set up there. Herr Mühlmann went to Lvov at the time and took them from the library. I had never been in Lvov before that. These pictures were then taken directly to the Führer headquarters or to Reich Marshal Göring, I am not sure which.

MR. DODD: They were collected for Göring, that is what I am driving at. Is that not a fact?

FRANK: State Secretary Mühlmann, when I asked him, told me that he came on orders of the Reich Marshal and that he had taken them away on orders of the Reich Marshal.

MR. DODD: And were there not some other art objects that were collected by the Reich Marshal, and also by the Defendant Rosenberg, at the time you told the Tribunal you were too busy with war tasks to get involved in that sort of thing?

FRANK: I know of nothing of that sort in the Government General. The Einsatzstab Rosenberg had no jurisdiction in the Government General; and apart from the collection of the composer Elsner and a Jewish library from Lublin I had no official obligation to demand the return of any art treasures from Rosenberg.

MR. DODD: But there were some art treasures in your possession when you were captured by the American forces.

FRANK: Yes. They were not in my possession. I was safeguarding them but not for myself. They were also not in my immediate safekeeping; rather I had taken them along with me from burning Silesia. They could not be safeguarded any other way. They were art treasures which are so widely known that they are Numbers 1 to 10 in the list in the book—no one could have appropriated them. You cannot steal a “Mona Lisa.”

MR. DODD: Well, I merely wanted to clear that up. I knew you had said on interrogation there were some in your possession. I am not trying to imply you were holding them for yourself, if you were not. However, I think you have made that clear.

FRANK: I should like to remark in this connection, since I attach particular importance to the point, that these art treasures with which we are concerned could be safeguarded only in this way. Otherwise they would have been lost.

MR. DODD: Very well. I have one other matter I would like to clear up and I will not be long.

I understood you also to say this morning that you had struggled for some time to effect the release of the Kraków professors who were seized and sent to Oranienburg soon after the occupation of Poland. Now, of course, you are probably familiar with what you said about it yourself in your diary, are you?

FRANK: Yes, I said so this morning. Quite apart from what is said in the diary, what I said this morning is the truth. You must never forget that I had to speak among a circle of deadly enemies, people who reported every word I said to the Führer and Himmler.

MR. DODD: Well, of course, you recall that you suggested that they should have been retained in Poland, and liquidated or imprisoned there.

FRANK: Never—not even if you confront me with this statement. I never did that. On the contrary, I received the professors from Kraków and talked to them quietly. Of all that happened I regretted that most of all.

MR. DODD: Perhaps you do not understand me. I am talking about what you wrote in your own diary about these professors, and I shall be glad to read it to you and make it available to you if you care to contest it. You are not denying that you said they should either be returned for liquidation in Poland, or imprisoned in Poland, are you? You do not deny that?

FRANK: I have just told you that I did say all that merely to hoodwink my enemies; in reality I liberated the professors. Nothing more happened to them after that.

MR. DODD: All right.

Were you also talking for special purposes when you gave General Krüger, the SS and Higher Police official, that fond farewell?

FRANK: The same applies also in this case. Permit me to say, sir, that I admit without reservation what can be admitted; but I have also sworn to add nothing. No one can admit any more than I have done by handing over these diaries. What I am asking is that you do not ask me to add anything to that.

MR. DODD: No, I am not asking you to add anything to it; rather, I was trying to clear it up, because you’ve made a rather difficult situation, perhaps, for yourself and for others. You see, if we cannot believe what you wrote in your diary, I don’t know how you can ask us to believe what you say here. You were writing those things yourself, and at the time you wrote them I assume you didn’t expect that you would be confronted with them.

THE PRESIDENT: Does he not mean that this was a record of a speech that he has made?

MR. DODD: In his diary, yes. It is recorded in his diary.

THE PRESIDENT: When he said, “I did that to hoodwink my enemies”?

MR. DODD: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: I presume that that particular record is a record of some speech that he made.

MR. DODD: It is. It is entered in the diary.

FRANK: May I say something about that. It wasn’t that I put myself in a difficult position; rather the changing course of the war made the situation difficult for every administrative official.

MR. DODD: Finally, do you recall an entry in your diary in which you stated that you had a long hour and a half talk with the Führer and that you had...

FRANK: When was the last conference, please?

MR. DODD: Well, this entry is on Monday, the 17th of March 1941. It’s in your diary.

FRANK: That was probably one of the very few conferences; whether I was alone with him, I don’t know.

MR. DODD: ...in which you said you and the Führer had come to a complete agreement and that he approved all the measures, including all the decrees, especially also the entire organization of the country. Would you stand by that today?

FRANK: No, but I might say the following: The Führer’s approval was always very spontaneously given, but one always had to wait a long while for it to be realized.

MR. DODD: Was that one of the times you complained to him, as you told us this morning?

FRANK: I constantly complained. As you know, I offered to resign on 14 occasions.

MR. DODD: Yes, I know; but on this occasion did you make many complaints and did you have the approval of the Führer, or did he turn down your complaints on this occasion of the 17th of March, 1941?

FRANK: The Führer took a very simple way out at the time by saying, “You’ll have to settle that with Himmler.”

MR. DODD: Well, that isn’t really an answer. You’ve entered in your diary that you talked it out with him and that he approved everything, and you make no mention in your diary of any disappointment over the filing of a complaint. Surely, this wasn’t a speech that you were recording in your diary; it seems to be a factual entry on your conversations with the Führer. And my question is simply, do you now admit that that was the situation, or are you saying that it was a false entry?

FRANK: I beg your pardon, I didn’t say that I made false entries. I never said that, and I’m not going to argue about words. I am merely saying that you must judge the words according to the entire context. If I emphasized in the presence of officials that the Führer received me and agreed to my measures, then I did that to back up my own authority. I couldn’t do that without the Führer’s agreement. What my thoughts were, is not made clear from this. I should like to emphasize that I’m not arguing about words and have not asked to do that.

MR. DODD: Very well, I don’t care to press it any further.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, do you wish to re-examine?

DR. SEIDL: Witness, the first question put to you by the Soviet Prosecutor was whether you were the chief of the NSDAP in the Government General, and you answered “yes.” Did the Party have any decisive influence in the Government General on political and administrative life?

FRANK: No. The Party as an organization in that sphere was, of course, only nominally under my jurisdiction, for all the Party officials were appointed by Bormann without my being consulted. There is no special Führer decree for the spheres of activity of the NSDAP in the occupied territories, in which it says that these spheres of activity are directly under Reichsleiter Bormann’s jurisdiction.

DR. SEIDL: Did your activity in that sphere of the NSDAP in the territory of the Government General have anything at all to do with any Security Police affairs?

FRANK: No, the Party was much too small to play any important part; it had no state function.

DR. SEIDL: The next question: The Soviet Prosecution showed you Document USSR-335. It is the Decree on Drumhead Courts-Martial of 1943. It states in Paragraph 6: “Drumhead court-martial sentences are to be carried out at once.” Is it correct if I say that no formal legal appeal against these sentences was possible, but that a pardon was entirely admissible?

FRANK: Certainly; but, nevertheless, I must say that this decree is impossible.

DR. SEIDL: What conditions in the Government General occasioned the issuing of this decree of 2 October 1943? I am thinking in particular of the security situation.

FRANK: Looking back from the more peaceful conditions of the present time, I cannot think of any reason which might have made such a demand possible; but if one recalls the events of war, and the universal conflagration, it seems to have been a measure of desperation.

DR. SEIDL: I now come back to the AB Action. Is it true that in 1939 a court-martial decree was issued providing for considerably greater legal guarantees than that of 1943?

FRANK: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that people arrested in the AB Action were, on the strength of this court-martial decree, sentenced or acquitted?

FRANK: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: Is it also true that all sentences of these courts were, as you saw fit, to be passed on to the competent reprieve committee under State Secretary Bühler?

FRANK: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: The prosecutor of the United States has laid it to your charge that in Neuhaus, where you were arrested after the collapse of the German Armed Forces, various art treasures were found, not in your house, but in the office of the Governor General. Is it true that you sent State Secretary Dr. Bühler with a letter to Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, and that this letter contained a list of these art treasures?

FRANK: Yes, not only that, I at once called the attention of the head of the Pinakothek in Munich to the fact that these pictures were there and that they should at once be safeguarded against bombing. He also looked at the pictures and then they were put in a bombproof cellar. I am glad I did so, for who knows what might otherwise have happened to these valuable objects.

DR. SEIDL: And now one last question. The Prosecution has submitted Document 661-PS. This document also has a USSR exhibit number, which I don’t know at the moment. This is a document which has been made to have a bearing on the activities of the Academy for German Law, of which you were president. The document has the heading “Legal Formation of Germany’s Polish Policy on Racial-Political Lines”; the legal part serves as a tect for the Committee on the Law of Nationalities in the Academy for German Law. I’m having this document submitted to you. Please, will you tell me whether you’ve ever had this document in your hands before?

FRANK: From whom does it come?

DR. SEIDL: That is the extraordinary part; it has the Exhibit Number USA-300.

FRANK: Does it state anywhere who drew it up or something of the sort?

DR. SEIDL: The document has no author; nor does it show on whose order it was compiled.

FRANK: I can say merely that I’ve never seen the document; that I never gave an order for it to be drawn up; so I can say really nothing about it.

DR. SEIDL: It states here that it was found in the Ministry of Justice in Kassel. Was there a Ministry of Justice in Kassel in 1940?

FRANK: A Ministry of Justice in Kassel?

DR. SEIDL: Yes.

FRANK: That has not been in existence since 1866.

DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the defendant can return to his seat.

DR. SEIDL: In that case, with the permission of the Tribunal, I shall call witness Dr. Bilfinger.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: This document which you produced as USSR-223, which are extracts from Defendant Frank’s diary; are you offering that in evidence? Apparently some entries from Frank’s diary have already been offered in evidence; others have not. Are you wishing to offer this in evidence?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This document has already been submitted in evidence under two numbers; the first number is 2233-PS, which was submitted by the American Prosecution, and the second is Exhibit USSR-223, and was already submitted by us on 15 February, 1946.

THE PRESIDENT: I see. Have these entries which you have in this document been submitted under USSR-223? You see, the PS number does not necessarily mean that the documents have been offered in evidence. The PS numbers were applied to documents before they were offered in evidence; but the USSR-223 does imply that it has been offered in evidence.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This document has already been presented in evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, what the Tribunal wants to know is whether you wish to offer this USSR-223 in evidence, because unless it was read before it hasn’t been offered in evidence, or it hasn’t gone into the record.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: We already read an excerpt on 15 February, and it is, therefore, already read into the record.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: May I retire, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

[_The witness Bilfinger took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you stand up, please, and will you tell us your full name?

RUDOLF BILFINGER (Witness): Rudolf Bilfinger.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, since when were you active in the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA), and in what position?

BILFINGER: From the end of 1937 until the beginning of 1943 I was government councillor in the RSHA, and later senior government councillor and expert on legal questions, and legal questions in connection with the police.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that on two occasions and at different times you were head of the “Administration and Law” department attached to the commander of the Security Police and SD in Kraków?

BILFINGER: Yes. In the autumn of 1940 and in 1944 I was head of the department “Administration and Law” attached to the commander of the Security Police and SD in Kraków.

DR. SEIDL: What were the tasks you had to fulfil at different times in the Government General—in broad outline.

BILFINGER: In 1940 I had the task of taking over from the Government General a number of branches of the police administration and working in that connection under the Higher SS and Police Leader.

DR. SEIDL: What was the legal position of the Higher SS and Police Leader, and what was his relation to the Governor General? Did the Higher SS and Police Leader receive his instructions concerning the Security Police and the SD from the Governor General? Or did he receive them direct from the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the Police, that is, Himmler?

BILFINGER: The Higher SS and Police Leader from the very beginning received his instructions direct from the Reichsführer SS, Himmler.

DR. SEIDL: Is it furthermore true that the commander of the Security Police and of the SD in the Government General also received direct orders and instructions from Amt IV, the Gestapo, and from Amt V, the Criminal Police in the RSHA?

BILFINGER: Yes, the commander of the Security Police received many orders direct from the various departments of the RSHA, particularly from departments IV and V.

DR. SEIDL: Did the institution of the State Secretariat for Security, which occurred in 1942, bring about a change in the legal position of the Governor General with reference to measures of the Security Police and the SD?

BILFINGER: The appointment of a State Secretary as such did not alter the legal position of the Governor General or of the State Secretary. New spheres of activity were merely added to the State Secretariat for Security.

DR. SEIDL: Do you know of a decree of Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police, Himmler, in the year 1939, and what were its contents?

BILFINGER: I knew of a decree, probably dated 1939, dealing with the appointment of the Higher SS and Police Leader, which ruled that the Higher SS and Police Leader would receive his instructions direct from Himmler.

DR. SEIDL: The institution of the State Secretariat dated from 7 May 1942 and was based on a Führer decree. The application of this decree called forth another decree dated 3 June 1942, which dealt with the transfer of official business to the State Secretary for Security. Do you know the contents of that decree?

BILFINGER: The essential contents of the decrees which you have mentioned are known to me.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that on the basis of this decree the entire Political Police and the Criminal Police, as had been the case before, were again subordinated to the State Secretary for Security within the framework of the Security Police?

BILFINGER: These two branches from the very beginning were under the Higher SS and Police Leader, and later on under the State Secretary for Security. To this extent the decree did not bring about a change, but was merely a confirmation.

DR. SEIDL: Is it known to you that in Appendix B of that decree there are 26 paragraphs in which all the branches of the Security Police are transferred to the Higher SS and Police Chief as State Secretary for Security?

BILFINGER: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: Do you know that in this decree, in Appendix B, Jewish matters are also mentioned specifically?

BILFINGER: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: Do you know that in Paragraph 21 of Appendix B it is ruled:

“The special fields of the Security Police: Representation of the Government General at conferences and meetings, particularly with the central offices of the Reich, which deal with the above-mentioned special fields.”?

BILFINGER: I know that as far as the sense is concerned, such a ruling was contained therein. Whether Paragraph 21 or another paragraph was worded this way I don’t remember.

DR. SEIDL: Is it also true that on the basis of this decree the last remains of the administrative police were removed from the administration of the Government General and handed over to the State Secretary for Security, who was directly under Himmler.

BILFINGER: That was the intention and the purpose of this decree. But, contrary to the wording of that decree, only a few branches were taken away from the administration; concerning the remainder a fight ensued later. The result was, however, that all branches of the police administration were taken away.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, did the administration of the Government General have anything to do with the establishment and administration of concentration camps?

BILFINGER: To the best of my knowledge, no.

DR. SEIDL: You were with the Chief of the Security Police and SD in Kraków. When did you yourself hear of concentration camps at Maidanek, Treblinka, and Lublin for the first time?

BILFINGER: May I correct you, I was attached to the Commander of Security Police.

DR. SEIDL: Yes, the Commander of the Security Police.

BILFINGER: I heard of Maidanek for the first time when Lublin and Maidanek were occupied by the Russians; and through propaganda I heard for the first time what the name Maidanek meant, when the then Governor General Frank ordered an investigation regarding events in Maidanek and responsibility for these events.

DR. SEIDL: According to your own observation, generally speaking, what were the relations like between the Governor General and the SS Obergruppenführer Krüger, and what were the reasons for those relations?

BILFINGER: Relations between them were very bad from the beginning. The reasons were partly questions of organization and of the use of the Police, and partly essential differences of opinion.

DR. SEIDL: What do you mean by essential differences of opinion? Do you mean different opinions regarding the treatment of the Polish population?

BILFINGER: I can still recollect one example which concerned the confirmation of police court-martial sentences by Governor General Frank. In opposition to Krüger’s opinion, he either failed to confirm a number of sentences or else mitigated them considerably. In this connection I remember such differences of opinion.

DR. SEIDL: Were these sentences which were passed in connection with the so-called AB Action?

BILFINGER: I know nothing of an AB Action.

DR. SEIDL: You came to the Government General later, did you?

BILFINGER: I came to the Government General in August 1940.

DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions for this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask questions?

DR. RUDOLF MERKEL (Counsel for Gestapo): May I put a few questions to the witness?

Witness, the Prosecution states that the State Police was a circle of persons formed in accordance with a common plan, and that membership in it was voluntary. Since you had an especially high position in the RSHA, I ask you to tell me briefly what you know about these questions?

BILFINGER: Of the members of the Secret State Police only a small part were volunteers. The former officials, the officials of the former political department of the headquarters of the Commissioner of the Police, constituted the nucleus of the membership of the Secret State Police. The various local police head offices were created from these former political departments of the central police headquarters, and at the same time practically all the officials from these former political departments were taken over. In Berlin, for example, it was Department I-A of the central police headquarters.

Apart from that, administrative officials were transferred from other administrative authorities to the Secret State Police, or were detailed to go here. As time went on people from other administrations and offices were forced to transfer to the Secret State Police. Thus, for instance, the entire frontier customs service was transferred to the Secret State Police in 1944 by order of the Führer. At about the same time the whole of the intelligence service was transferred.

In the course of the war numerous members of the Waffen-SS who were no longer eligible for active military service were detailed to the Secret State Police. In addition many people who originally had had nothing to do with police work were drafted as emergency members to the Secret State Police.

DR. MERKEL: If I summarize it by saying that the Secret State Police was a Reich authority and that the German civil service law applied to its employees, is that correct?

BILFINGER: Yes.

DR. MERKEL: Was it possible for the officials to resign from the Secret State Police easily?

BILFINGER: It was extremely difficult and, in fact, impossible to resign from the Secret State Police. One could resign only in very special circumstances.

DR. MERKEL: It has been stated here with reference to the composition of the Secret State Police personnel that there was the following proportion: executive officers about 20 percent; administrative officials about 20 percent; and technical personnel approximately 60 percent. Are these figures about right?

BILFINGER: I have no general information about the composition of the personnel; but for certain offices about which I knew more these figures would probably apply.

DR. MERKEL: Under whose jurisdiction were the concentration camps in Germany and in the occupied countries?

BILFINGER: The concentration camps were under the jurisdiction of the Economic Administration Main Office under SS Gruppenführer Pohl.

DR. MERKEL: Did the Secret State Police have anything to do with the administration of the concentration camps?

BILFINGER: No. It maybe that at the beginning certain concentration camps here and there were administered directly by the Secret State Police for a short period. That was probably the case in individual instances. But in principle even at that time, and later on without exception, the concentration camps were administered by the Economic Administration Main Office.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know at all who gave orders for the liquidations which took place in the concentration camps?

BILFINGER: No, I know nothing about that.

DR. MERKEL: Can you say anything about the grounds for protective custody? On the strength of what legal rulings was protective custody decreed after 1933?

BILFINGER: Protective custody was based on the Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of the People and the State, of February 1933, in which a number of the basic rights of the Weimar Constitution were rescinded.

DR. MERKEL: Was there later a decree by the Minister of the Interior which dealt with protective custody, at the end of 1936 or the beginning of 1937?

BILFINGER: Yes, at that time the Protective Custody Law was drawn up. The legal basis as such remained in force. At that time power to decree protective custody was confined to the Secret State Police. Before that a number of other offices, rightly or wrongly, had decreed protective custody. To prevent this, protective custody was then confined to the Secret State Police.

DR. MERKEL: Is it correct that for some time you were in France. In what capacity were you there?

BILFINGER: In the late summer and autumn of 1943 I was commander of the Security Police in France, in Toulouse.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know anything about an order from the RSHA, or from the commander of the Sipo for France, or from individual district commanders, to the effect that ill-treatment or torture was to be applied when prisoners were interrogated?

BILFINGER: No, I do not know of such orders.

DR. MERKEL: Then how do you explain the ill-treatment and atrocities which actually took place in connection with interrogations, proof of which has been given by the Prosecution?

BILFINGER: It is possible that ill-treatment did occur; in a number of cases this either took place in spite of its being forbidden, or else it was committed by members of other German offices in France which did not belong to the Security Police.

DR. MERKEL: Did you, while you were active in France, hear of any such ill-treatment either officially or by hearsay?

BILFINGER: I never heard of any such ill-treatment at the hands of members of the German police or the German Armed Forces. I heard only of cases of ill-treatment carried out by groups consisting of Frenchmen who were being employed by some German authority.

DR. MERKEL: Were there so-called Gestapo prisons in France?

BILFINGER: No, the Security Police in France did not have prisons of their own. They handed over their prisoners to the detention camps of the German Armed Forces.

DR. MERKEL: One last question: The Prosecution has given proof of a large number of crimes against humanity and war crimes which were committed with the participation of the Security Police. Can one say that these crimes were perfectly obvious and were known to all members of the Secret State Police, or were these crimes known only to a small circle of persons who had been ordered directly to carry out the measures concerned? Do you know anything about that?

BILFINGER: I didn’t quite understand the question from the beginning. Were you referring to France or to the Security Police in general?

DR. MERKEL: I was referring to the Security Police in general.

BILFINGER: No ill-treatment or torture of any kind was permitted; and, as far as I know, nothing of the kind did happen, still less was it known generally or to a larger circle of persons. I knew nothing about it.

DR. MERKEL: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? Is there nothing you wish to ask arising from Dr. Merkel’s cross-examination, Dr. Seidl?

DR. SEIDL: I have only one more question to ask the witness.

Witness, in Paragraph 4 of the decree of 23 June 1942 the following ruling is made, and I quote:

“The SS and Police Leaders in the districts are directly subordinate to the governors of the districts, just as the State Secretary for Security is subordinate to the Governor General.”

Thus it does not say that the entire police organization is subordinate, but only the police leaders.

Now I ask you whether orders which had been issued by the commanders of the Security Police and the SD were forwarded to the governors or were sent directly to the district chiefs of the Security Police and the SD?

BILFINGER: These orders were always sent directly from the commander to the district chiefs of the Security Police and the SD. The commander could give no instructions to the governors.

DR. SEIDL: If I understand you correctly you mean that the Security Police and the SD had their own official channels which had absolutely nothing to do with the administrative construction of the Government General.

BILFINGER: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions for the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.

DR. SEIDL: With the permission of the Tribunal, I call as the next witness the former Governor of Kraków, Dr. Kurt von Burgsdorff.

[_The witness Von Burgsdorff took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?

KURT VON BURGSDORFF (Witness): Kurt von Burgsdorff.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me:

“I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Government General was divided into five districts at the head of each of which there was a governor; is that correct?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: From 1 December 1943 until the occupation of your district by Soviet troops you were governor of the district Kraków?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. To use the correct official term, I was...

GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Mr. President, the defense counsel has put the question of the “occupation” of this region by Soviet troops. I energetically protest against such terminology and consider it a hostile move.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I have just been told that perhaps a mistake in the translation has crept in. All I intended to say was that, in the course of the year 1944, the area of which this witness was governor was occupied by the Soviet troops in the course of military action. I do not know what the Soviet prosecutor is protesting against; it is at any rate far from my intention to make any hostile statement here.

THE PRESIDENT: I think the point was, it was not an occupation; it was a liberation by the Russian Army.

DR. SEIDL: Of course; I did not want to say any more than that the German troops were driven out of this area by the Soviet troops.

Witness, will you please continue with your answer?

VON BURGSDORFF: I was entrusted with exercising the duties of a governor—that is the correct official expression. Until a few months ago I was still an officer of the Wehrmacht, and during my entire activity in Kraków I remained an officer of the Wehrmacht.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, according to your observations, what basically was the attitude of the Governor General toward the Polish and Ukrainian people?

VON BURGSDORFF: I want to emphasize that I can answer only for the year 1944. At that time the attitude of the Governor General was that he wished to live in peace with the people.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that already in 1942 the Governor General had given the governors the opportunity of setting up administrative committees, comprised of Poles and Ukrainians, attached to the district chiefs?

VON BURGSDORFF: There was a governmental decree to this effect. Whether that was in 1942 or not I do not know.

DR. SEIDL: Did you yourself make use of the authorization contained therein, and did you establish such administrative committees?

VON BURGSDORFF: In the district of Kraków I had such a committee established at once for every district chief.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, according to your observations what was the food situation like in the Government General, and particularly in your district?

VON BURGSDORFF: It was not unsatisfactory; but I must add that the reason for that was that, in addition to the rations, the Polish population had an extensive black market.

DR. SEIDL: According to your observations what was the attitude of the Governor General on the question of the mobilization of labor?

VON BURGSDORFF: He did not wish any workers sent outside the Government General, because he was interested in retaining the necessary manpower within the country.

DR. SEIDL: Was the Church persecuted by the Governor General in the Government General; and what basically was the attitude of the Governor General to this question, according to your observations?

VON BURGSDORFF: Again I can answer only for my district and for the year 1944. There was no persecution of the Church; on the contrary, the relations with churches of all denominations were good in my district. On my travels I always received the clergy, and I never heard any complaint.

DR. SEIDL: Did you have any personal experience with the Governor General with regard to this question?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. In the middle of January 1944 I was appointed District Standortführer by the Governor General, who at the same time was the Party Leader in the Government General; that is, I was appointed to a Party office for the district of Kraków. I pointed out to him, as I had pointed out to the Minister of the Interior, Himmler, before, that I was a convinced church-going Christian. The Governor General replied that he was in no way perturbed by that and that he knew of no provision in the Party program which prohibited it.

DR. SEIDL: What, according to your observations, were the relations like between the Governor General and the administration of the Government General on the one side, and the Security Police and the SD on the other side?

VON BURGSDORFF: Doubtlessly underneath they were bad, because the Police always ended by doing only what it wanted and did not concern itself with the administration. For that reason in the country districts also there was real friction between the administration offices and the Police.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that when you took office, or shortly after, the Governor General issued several instructions referring to the Police? I quote from the diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank, the entry of 4 January 1944:

“The Governor General then gave some instructions to Dr. Von Burgsdorff with reference to his new activities. His task will be to inform himself, as a matter of principle, of all decisive factors in the district. Above all the Governor should direct his efforts to opposing energetically any encroachments by the Police.”

VON BURGSDORFF: Today I no longer remember that conversation of 4 January 1944, but it may have taken place. However, I do remember that after I took office, at the end of November 1943, I went to see the Governor General once more and told him that I had heard that the relations with the Police were not good and were scarcely tolerable for the administration. He replied that he was doing what he could in order, as I might put it, to bring the Police to reason. It was on the basis of this statement by the Governor General that I definitely decided to remain in the Government General. I had, as is known, told the Reich Minister of the Interior that I was unwilling to go there.

DR. SEIDL: In your capacity as Governor did you have any authority to issue commands to the Security Police and the SD in your district?

VON BURGSDORFF: None whatsoever.

DR. SEIDL: Did you yourself ever see a police directive?

VON BURGSDORFF: Never. With the Police, orders are passed down vertically, that is, directly from the Higher SS and Police Leader to the SS and Police Leader respectively—and that is probably the usual way—from the chief of the Security Police to the unit commander of the Security Police.

DR. SEIDL: In your activity as Governor did you have anything to do with the administration of concentration camps?

VON BURGSDORFF: Never.

DR. SEIDL: Do you know who administered the concentration camps?

VON BURGSDORFF: No, not from my own experience; but I have heard that there was some central office in Berlin under the Reichsführer SS.

DR. SEIDL: When did you hear for the first time of the Maidanek concentration camp?

VON BURGSDORFF: From you, about a fortnight ago.

DR. SEIDL: You want to tell the Tribunal under oath...

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: ...that you, although you were Governor of Kraków in the occupied Polish territory, did not learn about that until during your captivity?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes, I am firmly convinced that I heard about this concentration camp from you for the first time.

DR. SEIDL: When did you for the first time hear of the Treblinka concentration camp?

VON BURGSDORFF: Also from you on the same occasion.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Governor General is accused by the Prosecution of issuing a summary court-martial decree in the year 1943. What at that time was the security situation in the Government General?

VON BURGSDORFF: Again I can judge only for the year 1944. As the German troops came back from the East, it became worse and worse, so that in my district it became increasingly difficult to carry out any kind of administration.

DR. SEIDL: According to your observations what was the economic situation like in the agricultural and industrial sectors of your district, and is the statement justified that, allowing for wartime conditions, the administration of the Government General had done everything to promote economy?

VON BURGSDORFF: Economy in my district was at full force in 1944 both in industry and in agriculture. Some industries had been transferred from the Reich to the Government General; and, as far as agriculture was concerned, the administration imported large quantities of fertilizers and seeds and the like. Horse breeding was also greatly promoted in my district.

DR. SEIDL: The Defendant Dr. Frank is accused of not having done everything that was necessary with regard to public health and sanitary conditions. What can you say about this point?

VON BURGSDORFF: I can say that in my district—again speaking of 1944—hospitals were improved and new ones installed. A great deal was done, especially in the fighting of epidemics. Typhus, dysentery, and typhoid were greatly reduced by inoculation.

DR. SEIDL: The Defendant Frank is also accused of having neglected higher education. Do you know anything about the conditions in the Government General in regard to this?

VON BURGSDORFF: When I came into the Government General there was no longer any higher education at all. On the basis of other experiences I suggested immediately that Polish universities be opened again. I contacted the president of the main department for education, who told me that the government was already entertaining such plans. In every one of my monthly reports I pointed out the necessity for Polish universities, because within a short time, or more correctly in a few years’ time, there would be a shortage of technicians, doctors, and veterinaries.

DR. SEIDL: Now, one last question. There was a so-called sphere of activity of the NSDAP in the Government General; you were the District Standortführer in the Government General?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, what, according to your observations, were the relations between the Governor General and the Head of the Party Chancellery, Bormann?

VON BURGSDORFF: I believe I can say without exaggeration that they were extremely bad. As District Standortführer I combined this office with that of District Governor and witnessed the last great struggle of the Governor General against Bormann. The Governor General held the view, and in this he was justified, that it was wrong to combine the Party office with the government office. He was afraid there would be too much interference not only by the Police but also by the Party, and he wanted to prevent that. Bormann, on the other hand, wanted to establish the predominance of the Party over the State in the Government General as well. That led to the most serious conflict.

DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions for the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other Defense Counsel wish to ask any other questions?

DR. OTTO FREIHERR VON LÜDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath): Witness, you were at one time Under State Secretary in the Government of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia? When was that?

VON BURGSDORFF: From the end of March 1939 until the middle of March 1942.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And to whom were you directly subordinate as Under State Secretary? The State Secretary Frank or the Reich Protector?

VON BURGSDORFF: State Secretary Frank.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: How did you come to know about the activities of Von Neurath as Reich Protector?

VON BURGSDORFF: From conferences with him and personal conversations.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What kind of work did you have to do as Under State Secretary?

VON BURGSDORFF: I was in charge of the administration proper.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Were the Police and the various SS and police offices subordinate to you?

VON BURGSDORFF: No.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: To whom were they subordinate?

VON BURGSDORFF: To State Secretary Frank.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was State Secretary Frank’s attitude to Von Neurath?

VON BURGSDORFF: You mean officially?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Officially, yes, of course.

VON BURGSDORFF: Herr Von Neurath tried at first to get on with Herr Frank; but the stronger Frank’s position became, the more impossible that was. State Secretary Frank, later Minister Frank, had behind him the entire power of the SS and the Police, and finally Hitler also.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: From whom did Frank get his orders directly?

VON BURGSDORFF: As far as I know, from Himmler; however, I saw that on one or two or three occasions he received direct orders from Hitler.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And that happened mostly without Von Neurath being consulted?

VON BURGSDORFF: That I cannot say, but I assume so.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was it possible for Frank to perform his political functions independently within his sphere of activity, or did he have to have the approval of Herr Von Neurath?

VON BURGSDORFF: Whether he was authorized or allowed to do so, I should not like to decide, but at any rate he did so.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Were Herr Von Neurath and Herr Frank of the same opinion concerning the policy towards the Czech people?

VON BURGSDORFF: I did not understand your question.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath agree with the policy toward the Czech people pursued by Frank or his superior, Himmler?

VON BURGSDORFF: No.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Could he carry through his aims?

VON BURGSDORFF: He could not do anything, confronted as he was by Himmler’s and Hitler’s immense power.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was Herr Von Neurath’s own policy and attitude?

VON BURGSDORFF: At the beginning I spoke very often about these things to Herr Von Neurath. On the basis of the decree of 15 March he hoped and believed he could get the Germans and Czechs in the Protectorate to live together reasonably and peacefully.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But as Frank’s position became stronger, that became more and more difficult?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you remember that in the middle of November 1939 serious disturbances broke out among the students in Prague?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you also remember that on the day after these incidents Herr Von Neurath and Frank flew to Berlin?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you remember that Frank returned from Berlin alone on the same day?

VON BURGSDORFF: I believe I can recall that Frank returned on the same day, but I do not know whether he returned alone.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: You don’t know whether Herr Von Neurath returned with him?

VON BURGSDORFF: No.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything else about the incidents connected with the students’ disturbances and what the consequences were?

VON BURGSDORFF: They resulted, as far as I remember, in the execution of several students and in the closing of the universities.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know whether the universities were closed on Himmler’s order?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about the attitude of Herr Von Neurath towards the Catholic and Protestant Churches?

VON BURGSDORFF: His attitude was always above reproach, and there were no difficulties with the churches during the time that I was in the Protectorate.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know that Herr Von Neurath was in contact with the Archbishop of Prague until the latter’s death?

VON BURGSDORFF: No, I don’t know anything about that.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything concerning whether, during the term of office of Herr Von Neurath, with his approval or upon his orders, art treasures of any kind, pictures, monuments, sculptures, libraries, or the like, belonging either to the State or to private owners, were confiscated and removed from the country?

VON BURGSDORFF: It is certain, absolutely certain, that he did not order anything of the sort. Whether he consented in any way to this I do not know, but I do not believe so. I remember one incident in the Malta Palace, where some Reich office—I don’t remember today which it was—removed art treasures. Herr Von Neurath immediately did everything to make good this damage.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know that the customs union which had been ordered by Berlin from the very beginning between the Protectorate and Germany was not established for a long time because of Herr Von Neurath’s intervention?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. I definitely know about that. However, in the interest of the truth, I have to add that State Secretary Frank also was against the customs union, because, like Herr Von Neurath, he believed that the economy of the Protectorate would be damaged by the stronger economy of Germany.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: While Von Neurath was Reich Protector, was there any compulsory deportation of workers?

VON BURGSDORFF: I am convinced that that did not happen. Workers were recruited, but in an entirely regular manner. That was the case while I was in the Protectorate.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know whether Von Neurath made travel in or out of the Protectorate dependent on official approval?

VON BURGSDORFF: Whether or not Von Neurath did that, I do not know.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about the closing of the secondary schools?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about it?

VON BURGSDORFF: I remember that the closing of the secondary schools was a necessary consequence of the closing of the universities. There were too many secondary schools in the Protectorate. Not all of them were closed by any means. On the other hand technical schools were greatly expanded and new ones established. I cannot remember anything more exact about it.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about Von Neurath’s attitude towards the Germanization of Czechoslovakia as intended by Himmler?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes, I remember the memorandum which Von Neurath sent to Hitler about the whole affair. That memorandum was intended to defer Himmler’s plans for forced Germanization. Von Neurath expressed the view, which he had frequently mentioned to me, that in the interest of peace in the Protectorate he did not advocate these attempts at Germanization.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have no more questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?

MR. DODD: Tell us, please, when you first joined the National Socialist Party?

VON BURGSDORFF: On 1 May 1933.

MR. DODD: And did you achieve office in any of its affiliated organizations?

VON BURGSDORFF: I was an honorary SA Gruppenführer.

MR. DODD: Any other honors?

VON BURGSDORFF: Then for a few years, just as I had been during the democratic regime, I was legal advisor to the administration of Saxony.

MR. DODD: Weren’t you also an Oberbannführer in the HJ, the Hitler-Jugend?

VON BURGSDORFF: I once became Oberbannführer on the occasion of the Reich Youth Leader’s visit to Prague. But that was purely a gesture of courtesy, which had no consequences.

I should like to mention again, since you speak of Party offices, that, as was said before, because of my post as Governor of Kraków I was District Standortführer from the middle of January 1944 until the end, that is the middle of January 1945.

MR. DODD: You also received the gold badge of the Hitler Youth, did you not?

VON BURGSDORFF: No.

MR. DODD: Weren’t you in some way associated with Reinhard Heydrich when you were in Prague?

VON BURGSDORFF: I was with Heydrich until the middle of 1942. Then, as is generally known, because of the course pursued by Heydrich, I left the Protectorate, and at 55 years of age I went into the army.

MR. DODD: What position did you occupy with relation to Heydrich?

VON BURGSDORFF: The same as under Herr Von Neurath; I was Under State Secretary.

MR. DODD: Let me put it to you this way: You told us that you never heard of Maidanek, the concentration camp?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.

MR. DODD: And you never heard of Auschwitz?

VON BURGSDORFF: Of Auschwitz, yes.

MR. DODD: Had you heard of an installation known as Lublin?

VON BURGSDORFF: Of Lublin? Not of the concentration camp but of the city of Lublin, of course.

MR. DODD: Did you know of a concentration camp by the name of Lublin?

VON BURGSDORFF: No.

MR. DODD: You did know, I assume, of many other concentration camps by name?

VON BURGSDORFF: Only of German camps, yes—of Dachau and Buchenwald.

MR. DODD: That is all.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you any questions?

DR. SEIDL: I have no more questions for the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Who is your next witness?

DR. SEIDL: The next witness would be the former secretary of the Governor General, Fräulein Kraffczyk. However, if I understood the Tribunal correctly yesterday, this session will end at 1630 hours.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now until Tuesday morning.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 23 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]

ONE HUNDRED AND TWELFTH DAY Tuesday, 23 April 1946

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I shall dispense with the hearing of the witness Struve, Chief of the Central Department for Agriculture and Food in the Government General. With the permission of the Tribunal I am now calling witness Dr. Joseph Bühler.

[_The witness Bühler took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?

JOSEPH BÜHLER (Witness): Joseph Bühler.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, how long have you known Defendant Dr. Hans Frank; and what were the positions in which you worked with him?

BÜHLER: I have known Herr Frank since 1 October 1930. I worked with him in government spheres of service from the end of March 1933. I served under him officially when he was Minister of Justice in Bavaria; later when he was Reich Commissioner for Justice; and still later when he was Minister. From the end of September 1939 Herr Frank employed me in an official capacity in the Government General.

DR. SEIDL: In what capacity did you serve in the Government General at the end?

BÜHLER: From about the second half of 1940 I was state secretary in the government of the Government General.

DR. SEIDL: Were you yourself a member of the Party?

BÜHLER: I have been a Party member since 1 April 1933.

DR. SEIDL: Did you exercise any functions in the Party or any of the affiliated organizations of the Party, particularly in the SA or the SS?

BÜHLER: I never held an office in the Party. I was never a member of the SA or the SS.

DR. SEIDL: I now come to the time during which you were state secretary to the chief of the government in the Government General. Will you please tell me what the relations were between the Governor General on the one side and the Higher SS and Police Leader on the other side?

BÜHLER: I might perhaps say in advance that my sphere of activity did not touch upon police matters, matters relating to the Party, or military matters in the Government General.

The relations of the Governor General to the Higher SS and Police Leader, Obergruppenführer Krüger, who was allocated to him by the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police were, from the very beginning, made difficult by essential differences of opinion. These differences of opinion concerned the conception of the task and the position of the Police in general in an orderly state system, as well as the conception in particular of the position and tasks of the Police in the Government General. The Governor General held the view that the Police must be the servant and the organ of the executive of the state and that accordingly he and the state authorities should give orders to the Police and that this assignment of tasks involved a limitation of the sphere of activity of the Police.

The Higher SS and Police Leader Krüger, on the other hand, held the view that the Police in general had, of course, to fulfill tasks originating with the executive of the state but that in fulfilling these tasks it was not bound by the instructions of the administrative authorities, that this was a matter of technical police questions, decisions about which administrative authorities could not make and were not in a position to make.

Regarding the power to give orders to the Police, it was Krüger’s view that because of the effectiveness and unity of police activity in all occupied territories, such power to issue orders had to rest with the central authority in Berlin and that he and only he could issue orders.

As far as the duties of the Police were concerned, it was Krüger’s opinion that the Governor General’s view regarding the limitation of these duties as unfounded for the very reason that he, as Higher SS and Police Leader, was simultaneously the deputy of the Reichsführer SS in the latter’s capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality.

As far as the relation of the Police to the question of Polish policy was concerned, it was Krüger’s view that, in connection with work in non-German territory, police considerations would have to play a predominant role and that with police methods everything could be achieved and everything could be prevented. This overestimation of the Police led, for instance, to the fact that, during later arguments between the Police and the administration regarding their respective spheres of work, matters concerning non-German groups were listed among the competences of the Police.

DR. SEIDL: Do you know that as early as 1939 Reichsführer SS Himmler issued a restricted decree, according to which the handling of all police matters was his own concern or the concern of his Higher SS and Police Leader?

BÜHLER: That this was the case became clear to me from the actions taken by the Police. I did not see a decree to this effect, but I can state this much: The Police in the Government General acted exactly as in the directives which I have described before.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, in 1942, by decree of the Führer, a State Secretariat for Security was instituted. At whose instigation was this instituted and what was the position taken by the Governor General in that connection?

BÜHLER: This decree was preceded by a frightful campaign of hatred against the person of the Governor General. The institution of the State Secretariat for Security was considered by the Police a step, an important step, in the fight for the removal of the Governor General. The matters specified in that decree, or at least the majority of them, were not being transferred to the Police now for the first time, but the actual state of affairs was—the actual course of events had already been—in conformity to the contents of this decree before it was issued.

DR. SEIDL: In the decree implementing this Führer decree and dated 3 June 1942 all the police spheres of activities which were to be transferred to the State Secretary were given in two lists; in an Appendix A, the tasks of the Regular Police; and in an Appendix B, the tasks of the Security Police. Were these police matters at that time transferred completely to the State Secretary and thus to the police sector?

BÜHLER: The administration did not like giving up these matters; so where the Police had not already got hold of them, they were given up only with reluctance.

DR. SEIDL: You are thinking first of all of the spheres of the so-called administrative police, health police, _et cetera_, are you not?

BÜHLER: Yes, that is to say, the police in charge of communications, health, food, and such matters.

DR. SEIDL: If I have understood your statements correctly, you mean that the entire police system, Security Police as well as SD and Regular Police, was directed by the central office, either by Himmler himself or by the Reich Security Main Office through the Higher SS and Police Leader?

BÜHLER: In general according to my observations, it was possible for the Security Police to receive orders direct from Berlin without their going through Krüger.

DR. SEIDL: And now another question: Is it correct that resettlements were carried out in the Government General, by Reichsführer SS Himmler in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality?

BÜHLER: Resettlements, in the opinion of the Governor General, even if carried out decently, always caused unrest among the population. We had no use for that in the Government General. Also, these resettlements always caused a falling off of agricultural production. For these reasons, the Governor General and the Government of the Government General did not, as a matter of principle, carry out resettlements during the war. To the extent that such resettlements were carried out, it was done exclusively by the Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Governor General, because of this arbitrary resettlement policy, repeatedly had serious arguments with Himmler, Krüger, and SS Gruppenführer Globocznik?

BÜHLER: That is correct. The intention of preventing such resettlements always led to arguments and friction between the Higher SS and Police Leader and the Governor General.

DR. SEIDL: The Defendant Dr. Frank is accused by the Prosecution of the seizure and confiscation of industrial and private property. What basically was the attitude of the Governor General to such questions?

BÜHLER: The legal provisions in this sphere of the law originated with the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. Confiscation of private property and possessions in the annexed Eastern territories and in the Government General was subject to the same regulations.

The decree of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan provided for the creation of a trust office—the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost—with its central administration in Berlin. The Governor General did not want to have the affairs of the Government General administered in Berlin, and therefore he opposed the administration of property in the Government General being entrusted to the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost. Without interference by the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, he established his own rules for confiscations in the Government General and his own trust office. That trust office was headed by an experienced higher official from the Ministry of Economy of Saxony.

DR. SEIDL: What happened to the factories and works which were situated in the Government General and were formerly the property of the Polish State?

BÜHLER: Factories, as far as they were included in the armament program, were taken over by the military sector, that is to say, by the Inspector for Armaments, who was subordinate to the OKW and later to Minister Speer. Factories outside the armament sector, which had belonged to the former Polish State, the Governor General tried to consolidate into a stock company and to administer them separately as property of the Government General. The chief shareholder in this company was the Treasury of the Government General.

DR. SEIDL: That is to say, these factories were administered entirely separately by the Reich Treasury?

BÜHLER: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution submitted an extract from Frank’s diary in evidence under Number USA-281 (Document Number 2233(d)-PS.) This is a discussion of Jewish problems. In this connection Frank said, among other things:

“My attitude towards the Jews is based on the expectation that they will disappear; they must go away. I have started negotiations for deporting them to the East. This question will be discussed at a large meeting in Berlin in January, to which I shall send State Secretary Dr. Bühler. This conference is to take place at the Reich Security Main Office in the office of SS Obergruppenführer Heydrich. In any case Jewish emigration on a large scale will begin.”

I ask you now, did the Governor General send you to Berlin for that conference; and if so, what was the subject of the conference?

BÜHLER: Yes, I was sent to the conference and the subject of the conference was the Jewish problem. I might say in advance that from the beginning Jewish questions in the Government General were considered as coming under the jurisdiction of the Higher SS and Police Leader and handled accordingly. The handling of Jewish matters by the state administration was supervised and merely tolerated by the Police.

During the years 1940 and 1941 incredible numbers of people, mostly Jews, were brought into the Government General in spite of the objections and protests of the Governor General and his administration. This completely unexpected, unprepared for, and undesired bringing in of the Jewish population from other territories put the administration of the Government General in an extremely difficult position.

Accommodating these masses, feeding them, and caring for their health—combating epidemics for instance—almost, or rather, definitely overtaxed the capacity of the territory. Particularly threatening was the spread of typhus, not only in the ghettos but also among the Polish population and the Germans in the Government General. It appeared as if that epidemic would spread even to the Reich and to the Eastern Front.

At that moment Heydrich’s invitation to the Governor General was received. The conference was originally supposed to take place in November 1941, but it was frequently postponed and it may have taken place in February 1942.

Because of the special problems of the Government General I had asked Heydrich for a personal interview and he received me. On that occasion, among many other things, I described in particular the catastrophic conditions which had resulted from the arbitrary bringing of Jews into the Government General. He replied that for this very reason he had invited the Governor General to the conference. The Reichsführer SS, so he said, had received an order from the Führer to round up all the Jews of Europe and to settle them in the Northeast of Europe, in Russia. I asked him whether this meant that the further arrival of Jews in the Government General would cease, and whether the hundreds of thousands of Jews who had been brought into the Government General without the permission of the Governor General would be moved out again. Heydrich promised me both these things. Heydrich said furthermore that the Führer had given an order that Theresienstadt, a town in the Protectorate, would become a reservation in which old and sick Jews, and weak Jews who could not stand the strains of resettlement, were to be accommodated in the future. This information left me definitely convinced that the resettlement of the Jews, if not for the sake of the Jews, then for the sake of the reputation and prestige of the German people, would be carried out in a humane fashion. The removal of the Jews from the Government General was subsequently carried out exclusively by the Police.

I might add that Heydrich demanded, particularly for himself, his office, and its branches, the exclusive and uninterrupted competence and control in this matter.

DR. SEIDL: What concentration camps in the Government General did you know about during your activity as State Secretary?

BÜHLER: The publications in the press during the summer of 1944 called my attention to the Maidanek camp for the first time. I did not know that this camp, not far from Lublin, was a concentration camp. It had been installed as an economic establishment of the Reichsführer SS, in 1941 I think. Governor Zörner came to visit me at that time and he told me that he had objected to the establishment of this camp when he talked to Globocznik, as it would endanger the power supply of the city of Lublin; and there were objections, too, on the part of the Police with regard to the danger of epidemics. I informed the Governor General of this and he in turn sent for Globocznik. Globocznik stated to the Governor General that certain workshops for the needs of the Waffen-SS at the front had been erected on that site by him. He mentioned workshops for dressing furs but he also mentioned a timber yard which was located there.

In these workshops for dressing furs, as I heard, fur articles from the collection of furs were altered for use at the front. At any rate, Globocznik stated that he had installed these workshops in compliance with Himmler’s command.

The Governor General prohibited the erection of any further installations until all questions were settled with the police in charge of building and blueprints had been submitted to the state offices, in other words until all rules had been complied with, which apply to the construction of buildings. Globocznik never submitted these blueprints. With regard to the events inside the camp, no concrete information ever reached the outside. It surprised the Governor General just as much as it surprised me when the world press released the news about Maidanek.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Prosecution has submitted a document, Number 437-PS, Exhibit USA-610, which is a memorandum from the Governor General to the Führer, dated 19 June 1943. I think you yourself drafted that memorandum. On Page 35 a report of the commander of the Security Police is mentioned and quoted verbatim in part. This report of the Security Police mentions also the name of Maidanek.

Did you at that time realize that this Maidanek was identical or probably identical with that camp near Lublin?

BÜHLER: No. I assumed that, like Auschwitz, it was a camp outside the territory of the Government General, because the Governor General had repeatedly told the Police and the Higher SS and Police Leader that he did not wish to have concentration camps in the Government General.

DR. SEIDL: Under whose jurisdiction was the administration of concentration camps in the Government General?

BÜHLER: I don’t know because I did not know of the existence of the camps. In August, on the occasion of a visit to the reception camp at Pruszkow, I heard about the administration of concentration camps in general. At that time I brought instructions from Himmler to the camp commandant, according to which transport of the inhabitants of Warsaw who had been removed from the city to concentration camps was to cease forthwith.

DR. SEIDL: Was that after the uprising in Warsaw?

BÜHLER: It was during it; it must have been on or about 18 or 19 August 1944. The camp commandant, whose name I have forgotten, told me at the time that he did not know about that order, and that he could receive instructions only from the Chief of Concentration Camps.

DR. SEIDL: Do you know whether the Governor General himself ever sent a Pole, a Ukrainian, or a Jew to a concentration camp?

BÜHLER: Nothing like that ever happened, when I was present.

DR. SEIDL: Is it true that a large number of Jewish workmen who were working in the castle at Kraków were taken away by the Security Police against the wishes of the Governor General and during his absence?

BÜHLER: This Jewish workers’ colony is known to me because I lived in that castle. I also know that the Governor General always took care of the maintenance of this colony. And the chief of the Chancellery of the Government General, Ministerial Counsellor Keit, once told me that this group of Jewish workers had been taken away by force by the Police during the absence of the Governor General.

DR. SEIDL: I now come to the so-called AB Action, this extraordinary pacification action. What were the circumstances which occasioned this action?

BÜHLER: It may have been about the middle of May 1940 when one morning I was called from the government building, where I performed my official work, to visit the Governor General in the castle. I think I remember that Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart had also been called. There we met the Governor General together with some officials of the Police. The Governor General stated that, in the opinion of the Police, an extreme act of pacification was necessary. The security situation at that time, as far as I remember, was this: Certain remnants of the Polish armed forces were still roaming about in deserted forest regions, causing unrest among the population, and probably giving military training to young Poles. At that time, that is May 1940, the Polish people had recovered from the shock which they had suffered at the sudden defeat in 1939; and they began openly, with little caution and without experience, to start a resistance movement everywhere. This picture I remember clearly because of the statement given by the Police on that or some other occasion.

DR. SEIDL: May I interrupt you and quote from Frank’s diary, an entry of 16 May 1940. I quote:

“The general war situation forces us to regard the security situation in the Government General very seriously. From a number of symptoms and actions one can draw the conclusion that a large organized wave of resistance among the Poles is present in the country awaiting the outbreak of greater and violent events. Thousands of Poles are reported to have been organized secretly and to have been armed, and are being incited to carry out acts of violence of all sorts.”

Then the Governor General quoted some recent examples, as, for instance, an uprising in certain villages under the leadership of Major Huballa in the district of Radom; the murder of families of German blood in Józefów; the murder of the mayor of Grasienta, _et cetera_.

“Illegal pamphlets, inciting to rebellion, are being distributed and even posted up everywhere; and there can therefore be no doubt that the security situation is extremely serious.”

Did the Governor General express himself in that manner at the time?

BÜHLER: When I took part in that meeting, the Governor General spoke about the situation for some time, but the details I cannot recollect.

DR. SEIDL: What happened after that?

BÜHLER: I had only one impression. In the previous months the Governor General had succeeded, by taking great pains, in imposing on the Police a procedure for courts-martial which had to be observed in making arrests and dealing with suspicious persons. Furthermore, the Police had to concede that the Governor General could refer the sentences of a summary court-martial to a reprieve commission and that the execution of sentences could take place only after the sentences had been confirmed by the Governor General. The statements of the Governor General during this conference in the middle of May 1940 made me fear that the Police might see in these statements the possibility for evading the court-martial and reprieve procedure imposed on them. For that reason I asked the Governor General for permission to speak after he had finished his statement. The Governor General cut me short at first and stated that he wanted to dictate something to the secretary in a hurry, which the latter was then to dictate to a stenotypist at once and then put it into its final version. Thereupon the Governor General dictated some authorization, or order, or some such document; and with absolute certainty I remember that after he had finished dictating, the secretary and I think, quite definitely, Brigadeführer Streckenbach, the Commander of the Regular Police, left the room. I am saying this in advance because it explains the fact that everything that happened afterwards has not been recorded in the minutes. The secretary was no longer present in the room. I expressed my fears, saying that these requirements laid down for court-martial procedure should be observed under all circumstances. I am not claiming any particular merit in this connection, because if I had not done it then this objection would have been raised, I am convinced, by Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart, or the Governor General himself would have realized the danger which his statements might have caused in this respect. At any rate, in reply to my objection, and without any debate, the Governor General stated at once that arrests and shootings could take place only in accordance with the court-martial procedure, and that sentences of the summary courts-martial would have to be examined by the reprieve commission.

In the ensuing period these instructions were followed. I assume that it is certain that the reprieve commission received all sentences pronounced by these courts-martial and dealt with them.

DR. SEIDL: Another entry in Frank’s diary, 12 July 1940, leads one to the conclusion that at first these leaders of the resistance movement concerned were merely arrested. I quote a statement of the Governor General:

“Regarding the question what is to be done with the political criminals caught in connection with the AB Action, a discussion is to take place in the near future with State Secretary Dr. Bühler, Obergruppenführer Krüger, Brigadeführer Streckenbach, and Ministerial Counsellor Wille.”

Who was Ministerial Counsellor Wille, and what task did he have in that connection?

BÜHLER: I might say in advance that there is a gap in my memory which makes it impossible for me to say for certain when the Governor General told Brigadeführer Streckenbach that in all cases he would have to observe court-martial procedure and respect the reprieve commission. On the other hand, I think I can remember for certain that at the time this discussion took place between Krüger, Streckenbach, Wille, and me, arrests only had taken place and no executions. Ministerial Counsellor Wille was the head of the Department of Justice in the Government and was the competent official for all matters concerning reprieves. The Governor General wanted these matters dealt with by a legally trained, experienced man.

During the conference with Krüger, Streckenbach, and Wille it had been ruled that the persons who had been arrested up to that time were to be subjected to court-martial procedure and that sentences had to be dealt with by the reprieve commission. The Police were not exactly enthusiastic about this. I remember that Krüger told me privately after the conference that the Governor General was a jack-in-the-box with whom one couldn’t work, and that in the future he would go his own way.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal thinks that this has been gone into in too great detail.

DR. SEIDL: Yes, I am coming to the end of my questions.

Witness, during a Police meeting in 1940 on 30 May, the Defendant Dr. Frank mentioned among other things the following: “The difficulties we had had with the Kraków professors were terrible. If we had handled the matter here, it would have taken a different course.” Who arrested these professors, and to what extent was the Governor General concerned with this matter?

BÜHLER: On 7 or 8 November 1939, when the Governor General arrived in Kraków to begin his activities, all professors of the University of Kraków were arrested by the Security Police without his knowledge and taken away to concentration camps in the Reich. Among them were acquaintances of the Governor General, with whom shortly before he had had social and academic connections through the Academy for German Law. The Governor General used his influence on Obergruppenführer Krüger persistently and uninterruptedly until he achieved the release of the majority of these professors from concentration camps.

This statement of his, which contradicts this, was made, in my opinion, for the purpose of placating the Police, for the Police did not like releasing these professors.

DR. SEIDL: What basically was the attitude of the Governor General concerning mobilization of labor?

BÜHLER: The Governor General and the Government of the Government General were always attempting to get as many Polish workers for the Reich as possible. It was clear to us, however, that the employment of force in recruiting workers might bring about temporary advantages but that recruitment of workers in that way would not promise much success in the long run. The Governor General gave me instructions, therefore, to conduct extensive and intensive propaganda in favor of employment in the Reich and to oppose all use of force in the recruitment of workers.

On the other hand the Governor General wanted to make his recruitment of workers for the Reich successful by demanding decent treatment for Polish workers in the Reich. He negotiated for many years with the Reich Commissioner for the Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel, and improvements were in fact achieved. The Governor General was especially opposed to the identifying of Jews and Poles by distinguishing marks in the Reich. I remember a letter from Reich Commissioner Sauckel in which he informed the Governor General that he had made every effort to insure the same treatment for Polish workers as for other foreign workers, but that his efforts were no longer crowned by success whenever the influence of the Reichsführer SS opposed them.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, I now come to another point. Under Number USA-275 the Prosecution has submitted Document 1061-PS, which is a report of Brigadeführer Stroop on the destruction of the ghetto in Warsaw. Were you, or the Governor General, informed beforehand about the measures planned by the Security Police?

BÜHLER: I certainly was not. As to the Governor General, I do not know that he was informed about any such plans.

DR. SEIDL: What did you learn afterwards about the events at the ghetto in Warsaw in 1943?

BÜHLER: I heard what practically everybody heard—that an uprising had broken out in the ghetto which had long been prepared; that the Jews had used the building materials given them for the purpose of air-raid protection to set up defense works; and that during the uprising violent resistance was encountered by the German troops.

DR. SEIDL: I now come to the Warsaw uprising of 1944. To what extent did the administration of the Government General participate in the quelling of that revolt?

BÜHLER: As our comrades in Warsaw were encircled by the insurrectionists, we asked the Governor General to apply to the Führer for assistance to bring about a speedy quelling of the Warsaw revolt. Apart from that the administration assisted in the welfare of the population in connection with the evacuation in the battle zone of the quarters that were to be destroyed. But the administration did not exercise any authority here.

DR. SEIDL: On 4 November 1945 you made an affidavit. The affidavit bears the number 2476-PS. I shall now read to you that affidavit, which is very brief, and I shall ask you to tell me whether the contents are correct. I quote:

“In the course of the quelling of the Warsaw revolt in August 1944, approximately 50,000 to 60,000 inhabitants of Warsaw (a Polish estimate) were taken away to German concentration camps. As a result of a _démarche_ made by the Governor General, Dr. Frank, to the office of Reichsführer SS Himmler, the latter prohibited further deportations. The Governor General tried to secure the release of the 50,000 to 60,000 inhabitants of Warsaw who had already been taken to concentration camps in the Reich. The Chief of the Reich Security Main Office, Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner, refused this request, made in writing as well as orally on the occasion of a visit of mine to Berlin in September or October 1944, on the grounds that these inhabitants of Warsaw were being used in the secret manufacture of armaments in the Reich and that therefore a general release was out of the question. However, he would be willing to consider individual applications favorably. Individual applications for release from concentration camps were granted by Kaltenbrunner during the subsequent months.

“Contrary to the Polish estimate, the number of persons taken from Warsaw to concentration camps in the Reich was estimated to be small by Kaltenbrunner. I myself reported to my office Kaltenbrunner’s statement regarding the number of internees, and after a renewed investigation I found that the above-mentioned figure of 50,000 to 60,000 was correct. These were the people who had been taken to concentration camps in Germany.”

I now ask you, are the contents of this affidavit, made before an American officer, correct?

BÜHLER: I can supplement it.

THE PRESIDENT: Before he supplements it, is it in evidence? Has it yet been put in evidence?

DR. SEIDL: It has the number 2476-PS.

THE PRESIDENT: That doesn’t prove it has been put in evidence. Has it been put in evidence? Dr. Seidl, you know quite well what “put in evidence” means. Has it been put in evidence? Has it got a USA exhibit number?

DR. SEIDL: No, it has not a USA exhibit number.

THE PRESIDENT: Then you are offering it in evidence, are you?

DR. SEIDL: I don’t want to submit it formally in evidence; but I do want to ask the witness about the contents of this affidavit.

THE PRESIDENT: But it is a document, and if you are putting it to the witness, you must put it in evidence and you must give it an exhibit number. You cannot put documents to the witness and not put them in evidence.

DR. SEIDL: In that case I submit this document as Document Number Frank-1.

I now ask you, Witness, whether the contents of this affidavit are correct, and, if so, whether you can supplement this affidavit.

BÜHLER: Yes, I should like to supplement it briefly. It is possible that I went to see Kaltenbrunner twice about that question—not only once—and after Kaltenbrunner had refused to release these people the second time, on the strength of my experiences with the camp commandant in Camp Pruszkow, I had the impression that it was not in Kaltenbrunner’s power to order such a release. He didn’t talk to me about that.

DR. SEIDL: But from his statements you had the impression that perhaps he too did not have the power to release those people?

BÜHLER: During those conferences I had brought up questions about the Polish policy, and from these conferences I had the impression that I might gain Kaltenbrunner’s interest in a reasonable Polish policy and win him over as an ally in negotiations with Himmler. At any rate, talking to me, he condemned the methods of force used by Krüger. I gathered from these statements that Kaltenbrunner did not want to see methods of force employed against the Poles and that he would have helped me if he could.

DR. SEIDL: The Soviet Prosecution has submitted a document bearing the Exhibit Number USSR-128 (Document Number 3305-PS). It is a teleprinted message from the intelligence office of the Higher SS and Police Leader East addressed to the Governor General and signed by Dr. Fischer, then Governor of Warsaw. Under Figure 2 it reads as follows:

“Obergruppenführer Von dem Bach has been given the new task of pacifying Warsaw, that is to say, of laying Warsaw level with the ground during the war, except where military considerations of its value as a fortress are involved. Before the destruction, all raw materials, all textiles, and all furniture will be removed from Warsaw. The main task will fall to the civil administration.

“I herewith inform you that this new Führer decree regarding the razing of Warsaw is of the greatest significance for the further new policy regarding the Poles.”

As far as you can recollect, how did the Governor General receive and view that telegram? And to what extent was his basic attitude altered on the strength of that message?

BÜHLER: This telegram referred to instructions which Obergruppenführer Von dem Bach had received from the Reichsführer SS. The administration in the Government General did not welcome the destruction of Warsaw. On the contrary, I remember that, together with the Governor General, ways which might be used to avoid the destruction of Warsaw were discussed. Just what was really tried I cannot recollect. It may be that further steps were not taken because of the impossibility of achieving anything.

DR. SEIDL: I now turn to another subject.

THE PRESIDENT: We might adjourn now for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Your Honors, before I continue the interrogation of the witness Dr. Bühler, I should like to inform you that I forego the interrogation of the witness Helene Kraffczyk; so this witness will be the last one.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Defendant Dr. Frank has been accused by the Prosecution of not having done everything within his power to ensure the feeding of the population of the Government General. What can you say about that?

BÜHLER: The decisive reason, the real cause, why the population in the Government General could not be supplied as efficiently and as satisfactorily as in Germany was the lack of co-operation on the part of the Polish population in the measures taken by the Germans to bring about a just and equal distribution of food quotas. This lack of co-operation was caused by patriotic considerations, the aversion to German domination, and the continuous, effective propaganda from the outside. I do not believe that there was a single country in Europe where so much was pillaged, stolen, and diverted to the black market, where so much was destroyed and so much damage was done in order to sabotage the food program, as in the Government General.

To give one example: All the dairy machinery, which had been provided with great pains, and the chain of dairies, which had been organized with difficulty, were destroyed again and again so that a more or less comprehensive control of milk and fat supplies could not be carried out. I estimate that the fat sold on the free market and the black market in the Government General was several times the quantity of that controlled and distributed officially.

Another decisive reason may be seen in the fact that the Government General had been carved out of a hitherto self-contained governmental and economic structure and that no consideration had been given effecting a proper economic balance.

The large centers of consumption in the Government General, that is to say, the cities such as Warsaw, Kraków, later Lvov, and also the industrial area in the center of Poland, had previously received their supplies to a very large extent directly from the country through the standing market. In these areas of the Government General there was a lack of granaries; a lack of refrigerators; there was no systematic chain of dairies; and storehouses of all kinds were lacking—all necessary for the directing or controlling of a supply economy by the state.

The Government General had to construct all these things step by step, and therefore the supplying of the population was proportionately difficult. It was not intended to supply the population fully right away; the supplies were to be improved gradually. I always saw to it that the directives issued for combating the black market allowed margins for the acquisition of foodstuffs and that the inhabitants of the cities were given the opportunity of contacting the producers. In 1942 the rations were to have been increased; then an order came from the Delegate for the Four Year Plan that rations were not to be increased and that certain quotas of foodstuffs were to be allocated to the Reich. Most of these foodstuffs were not taken out of the area, but were consumed by the Armed Forces on the spot. The Governor General fought continually against the authorities of the Four Year Plan, in order to achieve an increase and an improvement in the food supplies for the Polish population. That struggle was not without success. In many cases it was possible to increase the rations considerably, especially those of the workers in armament industries, and other privileged groups of the working population.

To sum up I should like to say that it was not easy for the population of the Government General to get its daily food requirements. On the other hand there were no famines and no hunger epidemics in the Government General. A Polish and Ukrainian auxiliary committee, which had delegations in all districts of the Government General, saw to the supply of foodstuffs for those parts of the population which were in greatest need. I used my influence to have this committee supplied with the largest possible amount of foodstuffs, so that it should be able to pursue its welfare work successfully, and it is known to me that that committee took special care of the children of large cities.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, what were the measures that the Governor General took to safeguard art treasures in the areas under his administration?

BÜHLER: With a decree of 16 December 1939 the Reichsführer SS, in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality, had already ordered, without informing the Governor General, that all art treasures of the Government General were to be confiscated and transported to the Reich. The Government General was successful in preventing this transport to a great extent.

Then a man arrived in the Government General from the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, State Secretary Mühlmann, who claimed to have plenary authority from the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. I asked to see that authorization. It was signed, not by Göring himself, but by somebody in his circle, Gritzbach. He was entrusted with the task of safeguarding the art treasures of the Government General in the interests of the Reich. In order to bring this commissioner—provided as he was with plenary authority from the Reich—into line with the Government General, the Governor General entrusted to him, in addition, the task of collecting together the art treasures of the Government General. He collected these art treasures and also had catalogues printed; and I know, from conferences which took place with the Governor General, that the Governor always attached the greatest importance to having these art treasures kept within the area of the Government General.

DR. SEIDL: The prosecution, under Number USA-378, that is Document 1709-PS, submitted a report about the investigation of the entire activity of the Special Commissioner for the Collection and Safeguarding of Art and Cultural Treasures in the Government General. On Page 6 of that report it reads, and I quote:

“Reason for investigation: Order of the State Secretary of the Government of the Government General of 30 June 1942 to investigate the entire activity of the Special Commissioner appointed for the collection and safeguarding of art and cultural treasures in the Government General, according to the decree of the Governor General of 16 December 1939.”

I ask you now what caused you in 1942 to give this order for investigation, and did the report lead to serious charges?

BÜHLER: The investigation was found necessary because of the possibility of a collision of duties, in the case of State Secretary Mühlmann, between the order given by the Reich and the order given by the Governor General. I had also heard that some museum pieces had not been properly taken care of. The investigation showed that State Secretary Mühlmann could not be blamed in any way.

DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has submitted another document, 3042-PS, Exhibit USA-375. It is an affidavit by Dr. Mühlmann, and I quote:

“I was the Special Commissioner of the Governor General of Poland, Hans Frank, for the safeguarding of art treasures in the Government General, from October 1939 to September 1943. Göring in his capacity as chairman of the Reich Defense Council had commissioned me with this duty.

“I confirm that it was the official policy of the Governor General, Hans Frank, to take into safekeeping all important art treasures which belonged to Polish public institutions, private collections, and the Church. I confirm that the art treasures mentioned were actually confiscated; and it is clear to me that in case of a German victory they would not have remained in Poland, but would have been used to complement German art collections.”

I ask you now: Is it correct that the Governor General from the very beginning considered all art treasures which had been safeguarded the property of the Government General?

BÜHLER: Insofar as they were state property, yes; insofar as they were private property, they were temporarily confiscated and safeguarded; but the Governor General never thought of transferring them to the Reich. If he had wanted to do that, he could have taken advantage of the war situation itself in order to send these art treasures to Germany. But where the witness obtained his information, as contained in the last sentence of his affidavit, I do not know.

DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution submitted a document, L-37, under Exhibit Number USA-506. It is a letter of 19 July 1944 from the commander of the Security Police and SD of the district of Radom, to the branch office of Tomassov. There it says, among other things, and I quote:

“The Higher SS and Police Leader East issued the following order on 28 June 1944:”

I skip a few sentences and then quote:

“The Reichsführer SS, with the approval of the Governor General, has ordered that in all cases where assassinations of Germans or attempts at such assassinations have occurred, or where saboteurs have destroyed vital installations, not only the perpetrators are to be shot but also all their kinsmen are likewise to be executed and their female relatives above 16 years of age are to be put into concentration camps.”

Is it known to you whether the Governor General ever spoke about this question with the Reichsführer SS and whether he had given any such approval?

BÜHLER: I know nothing about the issuing of an order of that kind. Once during the second half of 1944, an order came through my hands relating to the joint responsibility of kin, but I cannot say whether that concerned the Reich or the Government General; it was a police order, I should say. If it had had that formula, “with the approval of the Government General,” I should have questioned the Governor General on that point.

DR. SEIDL: Would such an approval have been consistent with the fundamental attitude of the Governor General to this question as you knew it?

BÜHLER: The fundamental attitude of the Governor General was on the contrary opposed to all executions without trial and without legal reasons.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that from 1940 on the Governor General complained continually to the Führer about the measures taken by the Police and the SD?

BÜHLER: Yes; I myself drew up at least half a dozen memoranda of about the length of the one submitted, addressed to the Führer direct or to him through the Chief of the Reich Chancellery. They contained repeated complaints with regard to executions, encroachments in connection with the recruiting of workers, the importation of inhabitants of other regions without the permission of the Governor General, the food situation, and happenings in general which were contrary to the principles of an orderly administration.

DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution submitted one of these memoranda under the number USA-610. This is a memorandum to the Führer of 19 June 1943. Is this memorandum essentially different to any previous or later memoranda; and what, basically, was the attitude of the Führer to such complaints and proposals?

BÜHLER: This memorandum, which has been submitted, is somewhat different from the previous ones. The previous memoranda contained direct accusations with regard to these happenings and the encroachments by the Police. When these memoranda remained unsuccessful, acting on the order of the Governor General, I drew up the complaints contained in this memorandum of June in the form of a political proposal. The grievances listed there were not caused by the government of the Governor General; rather they were complaints about interference by outside authorities.

DR. SEIDL: In the diary we find on 26 October 1943 a long report about the 4 years of German construction work in the Government General which was made by you yourself. On the basis of what documents did you compile that report?

BÜHLER: I compiled that report on the basis of the material which the 13 main departments of the government had given me.

DR. SEIDL: Now a question of principle: What, basically, was the attitude of the Governor General to the Polish and Ukrainian people, as you know it from your 5 years’ activity, as the head of the government?

BÜHLER: The first principle of all was that of keeping peace in this area and of increasing the usefulness of this area as far as possible by improving its resources, economically speaking. In order to achieve that, decent treatment of the population was necessary; freedom and property must not be infringed upon. Those were the principles of policy according to which, acting on the order of the Governor General, I always carried out my functions as state secretary of the government.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Governor General also tried within the framework of wartime conditions to grant the population a certain minimum of cultural development?

BÜHLER: That was the desire of the Governor General, but the realization of this desire very frequently met with resistance on the part of the Security Police, or the Propaganda Ministry of the Reich, or it was made impossible by conditions themselves. But in principle the Governor General did not wish to prohibit cultural activity among the Polish and Ukrainian populations.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that he tried particularly to revive higher education and that, evading the directives from the Reich, he instituted so-called technical courses in colleges?

BÜHLER: Instruction was certainly given at the technical schools by Polish professors in Warsaw and Lvov which corresponded approximately to a university education. As a matter of principle, the Governor General also wanted to open secondary schools and seminaries for priests, but that always failed because of the objections of the Security Police. As no agreement could be reached, and acting on the order of the Governor General, in October 1941 on my own authority I promised the opening of secondary schools and, I believe, of seminaries for priests with a certain advisory autonomy for the Poles. Two days after this announcement the Führer’s opinion was transmitted to me that I had no authority to announce such measures.

DR. SEIDL: Dr. Frank’s diary often mentions the principle of unity of administration and the fact that the Governor General was the deputy of the Führer in this territory and the representative of the authority of the Reich. Does this conception tally with the facts? What other authorities of the Reich and the Party came into the administration of the Government General?

BÜHLER: The authority of the Governor General was limited from the very beginning in many important respects. Thus, for instance, before the establishment of the Government General, the Reichsführer SS had been invested with full power in the matter of the preservation of German Nationality in all occupied territories. The Delegate for the Four Year Plan had equal authority and power to issue decrees, in the Government General. But many other offices as well, such as those for armaments, post, railways, building, and other departments tried, and tried successfully, to take over parts of the administration of the Government General or to gain some influence over it. After the Governor General had lost his offices as Reichsleiter in 1942, there was a special rush in this direction. I might almost say that it became a kind of sport to diminish the prestige of the King of Poland.

DR. SEIDL: Who appointed, dismissed, and paid the police officials in the Government General and otherwise saw to their interests from the point of view of the Civil Service?

BÜHLER: That was done exclusively by Himmler’s administrative office in Berlin.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that even officials of the administration of the Government General were arrested by Krüger and that it was not possible for even the Governor General to effect their release? I remind you of the case of Scipessi.

BÜHLER: Yes. I can confirm that from my own experience. Even from my own circle people were arrested without my being notified. In one such case I instructed the commander of the Security Police that the official was to be released within a certain space of time. He was not released, and I demanded the recall of the commander of the Security Police. The result was that Himmler expressed his special confidence in this commander of the Security Police and the recall was refused.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, how long was the Government General able to work at all under normal conditions?

BÜHLER: I might almost say, never at any time. The first year was taken up in repairing destruction caused by the war. There were destroyed villages, destroyed cities, destroyed means of transport; bridges had been blown up in very large numbers. After these destroyed objects had been repaired, as far as it was possible under war conditions, the Government General became again the deployment area for the war against the East, against the Russians, and then the transit area to the front and the line of communications area. It was the great repair shop for the front.

DR. SEIDL: Another question: During the war Himmler presented to the Reich Government the draft of a law concerning the treatment of anti-social elements. What was the attitude of Dr. Frank towards this draft?

BÜHLER: As far as I can remember...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal thinks that the matters which the witness is going into are really matters of common knowledge. Everyone knows about that. I think you might take the witness over this ground a little bit faster than you are.

DR. SEIDL: Yes, Sir. He has given the answer already.

Witness, during the war did the government of the Reich...

THE PRESIDENT: But I am speaking of the future, Dr. Seidl.

DR. SEIDL: Yes, Sir.

[_Turning to the witness._] During the war, Himmler submitted to the Reich Government, the draft of a law concerning the treatment of anti-social elements.

BÜHLER: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: What was the attitude of the Governor General to this?

BÜHLER: The Governor General protested against this. At the conference which I had with Heydrich in February 1942 the latter asked me as a special request to ask the Governor General to retract his protect against the law. The Governor General refused to do this.

DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has presented a chart which shows Dr. Frank as having authority over the Reich Minister of Justice, Dr. Thierack. Did such a situation ever exist?

BÜHLER: That must be an error; such a situation never existed.

DR. SEIDL: What, according to your observations, were the relations between the Governor General and the Reichsführer SS Himmler?

BÜHLER: The Governor General and the Reichsführer SS Himmler as individuals were so different...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, I thought we had been hearing all morning what the relations were between the Governor General and the Reichsführer.

DR. SEIDL: Then I will not put that question.

Witness, the Soviet Prosecution, under Exhibit Number USSR-93, (Document Number USSR-93), submitted an appendix to the report of the Polish Government. The appendix is entitled “Cultural Life in Poland.” I have shown it to you once before and would like you to tell me whether the Governor General, or his government, ever actually issued such directives?

BÜHLER: I do not remember ever having signed such directives or having seen any such directives signed by the Governor General. This document submitted to me, seems to me to be a fake or a forgery. That can be recognized from the contents.

DR. SEIDL: In the diary we find a large number of entries referring to the policies of the Governor General which seem to contradict what you yourself said before as a witness. How can you explain these contradictions?

BÜHLER: These statements by the Governor General, which have also been called to my attention during previous interrogations, do not merely seem to contradict what I said; they very clearly do contradict what I had to say as a witness. As I myself heard such statements frequently, I have tried to understand how he came to make such statements; and I can only say that Frank perhaps took part more than was necessary in the conferences and affairs of the government officials. There was scarcely a conference in which he did not take part. Thus it happened that he had to speak many times during one day, and I might say that in 99 out of 100 cases he spoke on the spur of the moment, without due reflection, and I frequently witnessed how after making such grotesque statements he would try in the next sentences, or at the next opportunity, to retract them and straighten them out. I also witnessed how he rescinded authority which he had delegated on the spur of the moment. I am sure that if I could go through the diary for every one of these statements, I would be able to give you a dozen—dozens of other statements to the contrary.

DR. SEIDL: Frank’s diary includes...

BÜHLER: I should like to say the following: When the Governor General was working with the members of his administration, he never made such statements; at least I cannot remember any. Those statements were always made when the Higher SS and Police Leader was sitting next to him, so that I had the impression that he was not free at such moments.

DR. SEIDL: The diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank covers about 10,000 to 12,000 typewritten pages. Who kept this diary—he himself or somebody else?

BÜHLER: According to my observations, the diary was kept by stenographers. At first by one stenographer, Dr. Meidinger, later by two stenographers, Nauk and Mohr. The procedure was that these stenographers were in the room during conferences and took notes.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that to a certain extent these stenographers received reports from a third person as to what was said at a conference?

BÜHLER: I often noticed that these stenographers did not take the trouble to record everything literally, but merely wrote summaries of the sense. I was also sometimes asked what this or that person, or what the Governor General, had said or thought in some particular instance.

DR. SEIDL: Did the Governor General see these entries in the diary or read them later?

BÜHLER: From what I know of the Governor General I do not believe that he read them over.

THE PRESIDENT: How can this witness tell whether he read the notes later?

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the witness, Dr. Bühler, was the Governor General’s closest collaborator.

THE PRESIDENT: If you wanted to put that sort of question, you should have asked the Defendant Frank.

DR. SEIDL: A further question, Witness. According to your observations what caused the Governor General not to destroy that diary, but to hand it over when he was arrested?

BÜHLER: On 15 March for the last time I was...

THE PRESIDENT: That, again is a matter which rests in the mind of Dr. Frank, not of this witness, why he did not destroy it.

DR. SEIDL: He has answered the question already, and I forego the answer of the witness.

[_Turning to the witness._] Now, one last question. In 1942, after the speeches made by Dr. Frank, he was deprived of all his Party offices. What effect did that have on his position as Governor General?

BÜHLER: I have already referred to that. It weakened his authority considerably, and the administration in the Government General became increasingly difficult.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct, that the Governor General repeatedly, both in writing and orally, tendered his resignation?

BÜHLER: Yes, written applications for resignation I often worded myself; and I know that he also asked orally many times to be permitted to resign, but that this was never approved.

DR. SEIDL: I have no more questions for the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants’ counsel wish to ask any questions?

DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): Witness, is it correct that by far the largest number of the Polish workers who came to Germany, came into the Reich before April 1942, that is, before Sauckel came into office?

BÜHLER: I cannot make any definite statement about that, but I know that the recruitment of labor produced smaller and smaller results and that the main quotas were probably delivered during the first years.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were the labor quotas which had been demanded from the Governor General reduced by Sauckel in view of the fact that so many Poles were already working in the Reich?

BÜHLER: I know of one such case; Sauckel’s deputy, President Struve, talked to me about it.

DR. SERVATIUS: Is it true that Himmler for his own purposes recruited workers from the Polish area, without Sauckel’s knowledge and without observing the conditions which Sauckel had laid down?

BÜHLER: I assume that that happened. Whenever I was told about roundups of workers, I tried to clear matters up. The Police always said, “That is the labor administration,” and the labor administration said, “That is the Police.” But I know that once, on a visit to Warsaw, Himmler was very annoyed at the loafers standing at the street corners; and I consider it quite possible that these labor raids in Warsaw were carried out arbitrarily by the Police without the participation of the labor administration.

DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know Sauckel’s directives with regard to the carrying out of labor recruitment?

BÜHLER: I have not seen them in detail, and I don’t remember them. I know only that Sauckel stated, on the occasion of a visit in Kraków, that he had not ordered the use of violence.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was that a speech of Sauckel’s?

BÜHLER: No, it was a conference.

DR. SERVATIUS: Do you recall an address which Sauckel made in Kraków to the various authorities?

BÜHLER: He spoke as a Party speaker.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did he make any statements there about the treatment of workers?

BÜHLER: These statements were made at a conference which preceded the visit to the Governor General.

DR. SERVATIUS: And what was the nature of his remarks?

BÜHLER: My people had told him and his people that there had been encroachments, and he answered that he had not ordered the use of violence and denied that these events—the arrest of people in motion picture houses or other places of assembly—had ever been ordered or decreed by him.

DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know the structure of the labor administration in the Government General?

BÜHLER: The Labor Department was part of my field of authority.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel have any immediate influence on the carrying out of labor recruitment?

BÜHLER: Not only did he have influence, but he also sent a deputy who was not under my authority.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was it possible for that deputy to carry out the recruitment of labor direct?

BÜHLER: If he wanted to, yes.

DR. SERVATIUS: In what manner? Could he give any instructions, or direct orders?

BÜHLER: The recruiting units set up by Sauckel were not under my authority. I tried on several occasions to get these people within my organization, but these attempts were always countered with the argument that these recruiting units had to be used in all the occupied territories and that they could not be attached to one particular area.

In other words, Sauckel’s deputy in the Government General, President Struve, who was also in charge of the Labor Department, was on the one hand dependent on Sauckel’s directives and did not need to pay attention to me but was also on the other hand responsible to me to the extent that he acted as president of the Labor Department.

DR. SERVATIUS: What branches handled forced recruitment whenever that became necessary? Could the recruiting units do that?

BÜHLER: I do not know. The deputy always denied the fact of forced recruitment.

DR. SERVATIUS: I have no more questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask questions? Does the Prosecution desire to cross-examine?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Witness, I should like to define your official position more accurately. As from 1940 and until the moment of the liberation of Poland you were Frank’s chief deputy, were you not?

BÜHLER: From the end of September until November 1939 I served the Governor General in a leading position on his labor staff. In November 1939 I became Chief of the Department of the Governor General; that was the central administrative office of the Governor General, in Kraków. During the second half of the year 1940 the designation of this function was changed to “State Secretary of the Government,” and I was State Secretary of the Government until I left Kraków on 18 January 1945.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently you were the chief deputy of the Defendant Hans Frank.

BÜHLER: My field of activity was definitely limited. I had to direct the administrative matters. Neither the Police, nor the Party, nor the Wehrmacht, nor the various Reich offices which were directly active in the area of the Government General, were under my authority.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: When Frank was away, who was then his deputy?

BÜHLER: The deputy of the Governor General was Seyss-Inquart, Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And after Seyss-Inquart left?

BÜHLER: After the departure of Seyss-Inquart there was a gap. I cannot recall the month, but I think it was in 1941 that I was assigned as deputy of the Governor General. But that appointment was approved only with certain modifications. I was supposed to represent the Governor General only when he was neither present in the area nor...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Answer me briefly. When Frank was away, did you carry out his duties?

BÜHLER: I answer as my conscience dictates. Whenever Frank was not present within the area, and could not be reached outside the area, then I was supposed to represent him.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I understand. That means that you took over when he was away.

BÜHLER: Yes, whenever he could not be reached outside of the area either.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, yes. That is precisely what I am asking about.

I should like the witness to be shown the typed transcript of the report on a conference of 25 January. Will you show him, first of all, the list of those who were present. The Tribunal will find the passage that I desire to quote...

THE PRESIDENT: What year? You said the 25th of January.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: 1943, Mr. President. Your Honors will find it on Page 7, Exhibit Number USSR-223, (Document Number USSR-223), Paragraph 6.

Witness, is that your signature among the list of those present?

BÜHLER: My signature, yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That means you were present at that conference.

BÜHLER: 1943, yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I shall quote three sentences from the typed transcript of the report. Please hand the original to the witness.

I quote three sentences from this document. It is Dr. Frank’s speech:

“I should like to emphasize one thing. We must not be too soft-hearted when we hear that 17,000 have been shot. These persons who have been shot are also victims of the war.... Let us now remember that all of us who are meeting together here figure in Mr. Roosevelt’s list of war criminals. I have the honor of being Number 1. We have thus, so to speak, become accomplices in terms of world history”.

Your name is second on the list of those present at the conference. Do you not consider that Frank must have had sufficient grounds to number you among the most active of his accomplices in crime?

BÜHLER: About such statements of the Governor General I have already said all that is necessary.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then you ascribe this to the Governor General’s temperament?

THE PRESIDENT: Witness, that is not an answer to the question. The question was, do you consider yourself to be one of those criminals?

BÜHLER: I do not consider myself a criminal.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: If you do not consider yourself a war criminal, will you perhaps recollect who personally—I emphasize the word “personally”—actively participated in one of Frank’s most cruel orders with regard to the Polish population? I am talking about the decree of 2 October 1942. Were you not one of the participants?

BÜHLER: Which measures? Which decree? I should like to be shown it.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am talking about the decree signed 2 October and published 9 October 1943, Exhibit Number USSR 335, (Document Number USSR-335), the decree about the creation of the so-called courts-martial conducted by the Secret Police.

BÜHLER: The draft of this decree did not come from my office.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Does this mean that you deny participation in rendering that cruel decree effective?

BÜHLER: Yes, the decree comes from the Police.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The passage I should like to quote, Mr. President, is on Page 35, of our document book, and in Paragraph 4 of the English translation.

[_Turning to the witness._] Did you not, together with Dr. Weh, at a time when even Frank was undecided about signing, succeed in persuading him to do so and bring into force a decree of a frankly terrorist nature to legalize tyranny by the Police?

I quote Page 142 of the minutes on the conference with State Secretary Dr. Bühler (he evidently means you) and with Dr. Weh, concerning the order issued by Dr. Weh for combating attacks on the German work of reconstruction in the Government General:

“After some brief statements by the State Secretary Dr. Bühler and Dr. Weh, the Governor General withdraws his objections and signs the drafted decree.”

Was it not you?

BÜHLER: I request the interpreter to repeat the question.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am asking you: Was it you who persuaded Frank to sign that decree as quickly as possible?

BÜHLER: No.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Does that mean that the entry is false?

BÜHLER: No.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In that case, how am I to understand you, if this is “no” and the other is “no”?

BÜHLER: I can explain that to you exactly. The draft for this decree had been submitted to the Governor General by SS Oberführer Bierkamp who had recently been assigned to the Government General. The Governor General...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you please...

THE PRESIDENT: [Interposing] He is in the middle of his answer. You must let the man answer. What were you saying? You were saying the draft had been made by somebody?

BÜHLER: This draft had been submitted to the Governor General by Bierkamp who had just recently come to the Government General. The Governor General returned this draft and had it revised in the legislative department. When it was presented to the Governor General, the Governor General’s doubts were whether the legislative department had revised it or not. I do not assume material responsibility for this draft, and I did not have to.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You simply explained to Frank that the project of the decree had been sufficiently worked over by the competent technical department?

BÜHLER: Yes, by the legislative department.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And after that the Governor General signed the decree?

BÜHLER: Obviously.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were you not the person who, at the meeting of 23 October 1943, when a letter from Count Ronikier, a person evidently known to you, was discussed, referred to the practical interpretation of this cruel decree of 2 October and stated that the application of the decree would in the future favor the camouflaging of the murder of hostages by giving the shootings of hostages the semblance of a legal sentence? Were you that person?

BÜHLER: I ask that the question be repeated. I understood only part of it.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were you the person who, at the meeting of 23 October 1943, stated that the application of the decree of 2 October would, in the future, favor the camouflaging of the shooting of hostages, since it would give them the semblance of a legal sentence?

BÜHLER: It is not quite clear to me. May I repeat what I understood?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: If you please.

BÜHLER: You want to ask me whether I was the one who, on the occasion of a conference on the 23rd of October 1944...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: 1943.

BÜHLER: 1943—who, on the occasion of a conference on 23 October 1943 stated—stated what?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You stated that the application of the decree of 2 October would help to camouflage the shooting of hostages.

BÜHLER: No.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The place which I wish to quote now, Your Honors, is on Page 26 of the English translation of Exhibit Number USSR-223, (Document Number 2233-PS), Paragraph 4. I shall now quote your own words to you:

“State Secretary Dr. Bühler considers it advisable that all those Poles who are to be shot should first be tried by regular court-martial proceedings. In the future one should also refrain from referring to such Poles as hostages, for the shooting of hostages is always a deplorable event and merely provides foreign countries with evidence against the German leadership in the Government General”.

BÜHLER: I said that, and thus I objected, and wanted to object, to the shooting of hostages and to executions without court-martial proceedings.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: So you consider that a court consisting of high-ranking, police officials represents justice and is not a travesty of the very idea of justice?

BÜHLER: To which court do you refer? I pleaded for courts-martial.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is the very court I am talking about, the “Standgericht” or summary court-martial, composed of Gestapo officials centralized in the Government General, according to the decree of 2 October.

BÜHLER: I can give you information about the reasons which may have led to this stiffening of the summary court-martial order of 2 October, so that you may understand how, psychologically, such a decree came about.

MR. COUNSELLOR. SMIRNOV: I am not interested in psychology. I am interested in knowing if a court, composed of secret police officials and considered to be a court, is not in fact sheer mockery of the very idea of a court of justice?

BÜHLER: The summary courts-martial had to be appointed exactly in accordance with the decree. I am not of the opinion that a summary court-martial, simply because it is composed exclusively of police, should not be considered a court. But I did not make these statements which you have held against me now in reference to this decree of 2 October; rather I demanded, in general, sentences by courts-martial, and termed the shooting of hostages a regrettable fact.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You are not giving me a direct answer to my question. Perhaps you will remember Paragraph 3 of the decree which stipulates how these courts were to be composed. Show the witness Paragraphs 3 and 4. I am reading Paragraph 4 into the record:

“The summary courts-martial of the Security Police are to be composed of one SS Führer of the office of the commander of the Security Police and the SD, and of two members of these organizations”.

Would a court of this composition not testify _a priori_ to the nature of the sentence which the court would impose?

BÜHLER: Did you ask me?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, yes.

BÜHLER: Whether I consider a summary court-martial a court? I think, you are asking me about things which have nothing to do with my field of activity. I do not know what reasons were given for composing these courts in this fashion. I cannot therefore say anything about it.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you will look at the signature to that decree. It is signed by Frank, and it was you who persuaded Frank to sign that decree.

BÜHLER: I thought that I had corrected that error before. I did not persuade Herr Frank to sign that order. Rather, I told him that that order had been worked out in the legislative department. As before, I must now deny any responsibility for this order, because it did not belong to my sphere of activity.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I shall pass on to another series of questions. Do you recollect the following subparagraph of that decree, particularly the report of Obergruppenführer Bierkamp at the conference of 27 October 1943 in Kraków?

BÜHLER: I cannot remember without notes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please show him the passage which I wish to quote. The passage I wish to quote, Your Honors, is on Page 26 of our document, the last paragraph of the text. I quote the passage in question:

“Pursuant to the decree of even date, the Security Police have detained many people who since 10 October have committed criminal acts. They have been condemned to death and will be shot as an expiation for their crimes. Their names will be made known to the population by means of posters, and the population will be told that such and such people may expect a pardon, provided there are no further murders of Germans. For every murdered German, 10 Poles will be executed....”

Does it not testify to the fact that from the very first days of the enforcing of Frank’s decree, it merely served to mask mass executions of hostages?

BÜHLER: No.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then to what does it testify if, for each slain German, 10 Poles entirely unconnected with the crime were to be executed in accordance with these so-called “verdicts”?

BÜHLER: In my opinion it testifies that 10 Poles would be shot who had committed crimes punishable by death, and who had been sentenced to death.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: For each German killed?

BÜHLER: It is possible that these Poles were called hostages. That is possible.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That means that the decree camouflaged the system of taking hostages?

BÜHLER: No, it was rather that real shootings of hostages no longer occurred. Real shootings of hostages occur when people who are not criminals, who are innocent, are shot because of an act committed by someone else.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you think this will be a convenient time to break off?

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has heard with the deepest regret of the death of Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone of the Supreme Court of the United States of America. His loss will be most deeply felt in America, where he had proved himself to be a great public servant. But it is fitting that this Tribunal, upon which the representatives of the United States sit, should express its sympathy with the American people in their great loss.

After serving as Dean of the Law School of Columbia University he was appointed Attorney General of the United States in 1923, and two years later he became Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. In 1941 he became Chief Justice and discharged the duties of that high office with great ability and in accordance with the highest traditions.

The Tribunal desires that I should express its sympathy in acknowledgement of the great loss the American people have sustained.

Mr. Justice Jackson, the Chief Prosecutor of the United States, is a member of the Supreme Court over which the Chief Justice presided, and perhaps he would like to add a few words.

MR. JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON (Chief of Counsel for the United States): May it please the Tribunal: It is not only because he was the head of the judicial system of the United States that the news of the passing of Chief Justice Stone brings sadness to every American heart in Nuremberg, but because he was the personal friend of so many of us. He had a rare capacity for personal friendship. No one was more kind to, and thoughtful of, the younger men who from time to time came to Washington; and they found in him a guide, philosopher, and friend.

Now, I know that not only do I feel the loss of a personal friend but that the American representatives on the Tribunal, Mr. Biddle and Judge Parker, feel the same way, and many of the younger men on the staff had intimate contact with the Chief Justice which you might not expect if you had not known Harlan Stone.

As Attorney General he took over the Department of Justice at one of its most difficult periods and imparted to it the impress of his integrity, an impress which stayed with it and was traditional in the department, as we well know.

As a Justice of the Court he was a forward-looking man, open-minded, always patient to hear the arguments of both sides and to arrive at his decision with that complete disinterestedness and detachment which is characteristic of the just judge. He presided with great fairness and with kindness to his associates and to those who appeared before him.

It is the passing of a man who exemplified in public life those sturdy qualities which we have come to associate with the New Englander.

The consolation of his friends lies in this: He died exactly as he would have chosen to die, in full possession of his faculties and in the discharge of his duties.

I express great appreciation that this Tribunal has seen fit to take note of his passing and to allow us to record on behalf of the American Bar our appreciation of his talents and character.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, before proceeding to a further examination of the witness, I feel that I ought to make the following statement:

During the examination of the witness by counsel for the defense Dr. Seidl, the former stated that the document, which is an official appendix to the report of the Government of the Polish Republic, was a forgery. This document sets out the losses suffered by the Polish Republic in objects of cultural value. The Soviet Prosecution does not wish to enter into any controversies on the subject, but it does request the Tribunal to note that this is an official appendix to the report of the Government of the Polish Republic, and that it considers the statement of the witness as libellous.

THE PRESIDENT: [_To the witness._] Did you say anything then?

BÜHLER: I was going to say that it was a document that contained a list of art treasures.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that the document, Colonel Smirnov, a document which contains a list of art treasures?

BÜHLER: No, I do not mean that.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, Mr. President. It is a list of losses in cultural treasures. It is a list of libraries and of the losses suffered by these libraries during the reign of the Germans in Poland.

THE PRESIDENT: It is USSR-93, is it not, the document you are referring to?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is an appendix to the Document Number USSR-93, an official report by the Polish Government.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it deals with certain directives. That was the evidence that was given this morning.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, Mr. President. This is a list of losses sustained. It is an official appendix to the report of the Polish Government. It contains no directives, but it does state the sum total of the losses sustained by the public libraries in Poland.

THE PRESIDENT: [_To the witness._] Is there anything you want to say about it?

BÜHLER: Yes. I do not think the description just given applies to the document which I had in mind. The document which I question contains directives regarding German cultural policy in the Government General. It does not deal with art treasures or details of library property.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. What I took that you said this morning was that the directives which you thought were referred to in the document did not appear to have been made, or at any rate you had not heard of them, and you thought they might be forgeries.

BÜHLER: I questioned the document.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the document.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: May I proceed to the next question?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You state that you personally, as well as the administration of the Government General, had no close connection with the activities of the Police. Have I understood you correctly?

BÜHLER: May I hear that question again, please?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You declare that neither you personally nor the administration of the Government General were in any way closely connected with the activities of the Police. Have I understood you correctly?

BÜHLER: We had daily contact with the Police, but we had differences of opinion. Moreover, the Police were not under my jurisdiction; the Chief of Police was in no way under my orders.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In that case the Police did not come within your competence?

BÜHLER: No, it was not one of my duties.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: How then can you explain that no one but you carried out successful negotiations with the Police for the exploitation of the property of Jews executed in the concentration camps? Do you remember these negotiations?

BÜHLER: I did not quite understand you.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you: If you had no direct relations with the Police, how can you explain the fact that you, and none other but you, were the person who carried out successful negotiations with the Police for the exploitation of property belonging to Jews murdered in the concentration camps? Do you remember these negotiations with the Police?

BÜHLER: I do not remember any such negotiations, and I could not have conducted them. In any case the Administration was the department which, by order of the Four Year Plan, had to effect the confiscation of Jewish property.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, have I your permission to submit a document handed to us by the American Prosecution, Document Number 2819-PS? It is a directive issued by the Administration of the Economic Department of the Government General and addressed to the Governors of Warsaw, Radom, Lublin, and Galicia. May I submit this document?

I quote the following from the text of this document:

“Subject: Transfer of Jewish movable property from the SS to the Government.

“I inform you herewith that, on 21 February 1944, in the presence of various departmental directors, an agreement was reached by State Secretary Dr. Bühler and the Higher SS and Police Leader, Obergruppenführer Koppe, that movable Jewish property, insofar as it is, or will be in the future, in storehouses, will be placed at the disposal of the Government by the SS. In execution of the agreement arrived at I have ordered that the taking over of the goods stored in the various SS depots shall take place in the shortest possible time. Goods deriving from confiscation and safeguarding have likewise been turned over to me by the commander of the Security Police and the Security Service. Please get in touch with the local SS and Police Leader in order to come to an understanding....”

Here I interrupt the quotation. After this, Witness, do you still insist that you had no relations with the Police?

BÜHLER: I was in touch with the Police daily in my work, I do not want to deny that for a moment; but I had no right to give orders to the Police.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In any case the property of Jews murdered in the concentration camps of Poland was, as a result of your negotiations, transferred to warehouses in the Government General?

BÜHLER: That is not correct. The property mentioned was not that which proceeded from Jews who were killed, but simply property which came from Jews and which was removed by the Police after having been converted through the administration department in the regular way.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But could the Security Police or the SD be in possession of property belonging to Jews who were not murdered?

BÜHLER: Why not? Right from the beginning the Police had taken over Jewish problems, and therefore also came into possession of their property in this manner.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But did the Auschwitz depot in Chopin Street also keep the property of Jews who had not been murdered? Of Jews who were still alive?

BÜHLER: The depots which have been mentioned here are not to be interpreted as being concentration camps, but as depots where goods were stored.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What other depots were there for storing the movable property of Jews besides those in the concentration camps?

BÜHLER: I do not know what things looked like in concentration camps, as I have never entered or seen one; but that the Police took possession of movable Jewish property is something I was certainly told about by the director of my trustee department.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you this: In 1944 when the machines of destruction were working at top speed at Auschwitz and Maidanek, what depots or warehouses existed for the storage of Jewish movable property besides those which stored the movable property of Jews executed in concentration camps? Do you know of any other warehouses and where they were located?

BÜHLER: The Jews were deprived of their property on the spot. I have never assumed that Jewish property was to be found in concentration camps. I did not know anything at all about these camps. Where the Police took that movable property was not clear to me, but depots must have existed.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would draw your attention to the date—21 February 1944. At that time were there any Jews still alive in Poland, or were the Jewish ghettos already quite empty?

BÜHLER: The Jewish ghettos were empty, but there were still some Jews; I know that because they were being used in one way or another in the armament industry. Jewish property could not have been removed from the territory, it must have been somewhere in the Government General, very probably near the ghettos or wherever else the evacuation of Jews took place. And this telegram, I repeat, does not concern stores which were in concentration camps; they were everywhere. Every place had property stored somewhere which originated from the resettlement of the Jews.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then the Jewish ghettos were already empty. In that case, what happened to the Jews from Poland?

BÜHLER: When these Jewish ghettos were emptied, I assumed they were resettled in the northeast of Europe. The chief of the RSHA had definitely told me at the conference in February 1942 that this was the intention.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: On the 21 February 1944 the front line ran through the Government General. How and where could the Jews have been transferred to the northeast?

BÜHLER: According to the conference this was to have taken place in 1942.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The document is dated 1944, 21 February 1944.

I pass on to the next question. Tell me, does not the fact that the police chiefs attended all the conferences at the headquarters of the Governor General and that the Governor General arranged for special conferences to be held dealing exclusively with police matters indicate that the very closest relations existed between the administration department of the Governor General and the Gestapo?

BÜHLER: I have already mentioned at the beginning that the view of the Governor General was that he should have jurisdiction over the Police. This is the reason why the Governor General repeatedly called the Police for discussions around the conference table. But that did not prevent the Police from going their own way and using methods of their own.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But were no conferences held by the Governor General for dealing directly and exclusively with police problems, and with police problems only?

BÜHLER: Yes, from time to time.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Very well. Then will you tell me who took Krüger’s place when he was removed from his post as Chief of Police?

BÜHLER: As far as I can remember Krüger was removed from his post in Kraków in November 1943 and was replaced by Obergruppenführer Koppe.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What were your personal relations with Koppe?

BÜHLER: The relationship with the Police under Krüger had always been hostile, and whenever the administration department had any wish that involved police jurisdiction, such wishes had always been frustrated by Krüger; therefore, after Krüger had left Kraków I tried to establish a comradely relationship with the new Higher SS and Police Leader, so that in this manner I could influence the work of the Police and the methods employed by them.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Could you answer briefly: What exactly were your personal relations with Koppe? Were they good or bad?

BÜHLER: They were comradely.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I should like to show you one document. You, Mr. President, will find the passage on Page 38, Paragraph 2, of the English translation. I am reading the passage into the record. It is a statement made by Frank to Himmler at the conference with Himmler on the 12 February 1944:

“Immediately after the exchange of greetings, Reichsführer SS Himmler entered into conversation with me and SS Obergruppenführer Koppe. The Reichsführer asked me right at the beginning how I was co-operating with the new Secretary of State for Security, SS Obergruppenführer Koppe. I expressed my deep satisfaction at the fact that between myself and SS Obergruppenführer Koppe, as well as between him and State Secretary Dr. Bühler, there existed extraordinarily good relations of friendly co-operation.” (Document Number 2233-PS.)

Does that statement by Frank correspond to the fact, Witness?

BÜHLER: At that time Koppe had been in the Government General only a few weeks. This statement confirms just what I said here at the beginning, namely, that after Krüger had been replaced by Koppe I tried through comradely relations with Koppe to gain influence over the police powers in the Government General. Thus there had been no friction up to that time.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And between Koppe and Dr. Bühler, that is, between Koppe and yourself, there existed the most comradely collaboration; is that correct?

BÜHLER: I repeat, my relations with Koppe were comradely. Apart from that, the problems with which we had to deal brought me into daily contact with Koppe. For instance, there was this question of Jewish property. One could not possibly have discussed such a question with Krüger, as he held the view that all Jewish property belonged to the SS.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: When Koppe took over the post of Chief of Police, was there any change with regard to the Polish population? Did the police measures become less severe? Did they become less repressive with Koppe’s arrival?

BÜHLER: I believe they were milder.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to follow the minutes of one particular administrative conference of the 16 December 1943, held at Kraków.

Please show the witness the original.

Incidentally, is that your signature on the list of those present? On Page 154.

BÜHLER: Government meeting, 16 December 1943? Yes, I signed that; that is right.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell me, do you remember who Ohlenbusch was?

BÜHLER: Ohlenbusch was the President of the Department of Propaganda.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Was he in any way connected with the Police or with the administration?

BÜHLER: Ohlenbusch participated in the government meetings, at which the Police were also present as a rule.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But he himself, in his own function, did he have any connection with the Police or not?

BÜHLER: As a state official and head of a government department he did, of course, have connections with the Police, official connections.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But he was an official of the civilian administration of your organization?

BÜHLER: Yes, of course. As far as his official position was concerned, he was subordinate to me.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am reading into the record a short extract from Page 176. Your Honors will find it on Page 33 of our document book, Paragraph 3, Ohlenbusch’s speech:

“It would be well to consider whether, for reasons of expediency, one should not, as far as possible, carry out executions on the spot where the attempt upon the life of a German took place. One ought, perhaps, also to consider whether special execution sites should not be created for this purpose, for it has been confirmed that the Polish population streamed to the execution grounds, which were accessible to all, in order to put the blood-soaked earth into containers and take them to the church.” (Document Number 2233-PS.)

Do you not consider this question a purely police question?

BÜHLER: It does not mention buckets of blood in my translation. It says containers. I do not think that the blood could be carried away in buckets.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: We are talking here about containers into which the blood-soaked soil was placed. Do you not consider that the question of organizing secret execution grounds was purely a matter for the Police?

BÜHLER: I am of the same opinion. For this reason this matter was by no means approved of. But perhaps I may add that at the same time German pedestrians in Kraków and Warsaw were being shot in the back daily, without any reason, and that this affair was due to the excitement which...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am asking you about something else, Witness. Do you not consider the fact that this question was discussed at the initiative of Ohlenbusch as positive proof that even the petty officials in the civilian administration interfered in police matters and were in direct contact with the Police?

BÜHLER: No, I would not say so. This was not suggested as a police measure. It arose from the threat under which all Germans lived at that stage of the occupation.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This question of secret execution grounds—did it arise on Ohlenbusch’s initiative? I trust you are not going to deny this.

BÜHLER: What do you mean by this question?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did it arise on—was it provoked by the initiative of Ohlenbusch? You are not going to deny it?

BÜHLER: I do not know whether this was discussed at all. In my opinion there was not...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The typewritten report of that conference is before you, and you were present at that conference.

BÜHLER: Yes, there are statements made by Ohlenbusch, if I am not mistaken. Yes, it mentions “President Ohlenbusch” here. That is right.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I shall proceed to the next question. Did SS Obergruppenführer Koppe not report on the subject at all during the conference? I will quote a brief excerpt which Your Honors will find on Page 34, Paragraph 2. It is on Page 180 of your document book.

“...For the railway outrage 150 and for the two German officials, 50 Polish terrorists were executed either on the spot or in the immediate vicinity. It must be remembered that the shooting of 200 people affects at least 3,000 (nearest relatives)...” (Document Number 2288-PS.)

Do you not consider this as evidence that with the arrival of Koppe the same savage measures of repression were used against the people of Poland?

BÜHLER: Inasmuch as this mentions the shooting of 150 and 50 people this obviously concerns the shooting of hostages, which never did have the approval of the Governor General or my approval. If I have nevertheless stated that in its entirety Koppe’s regime appeared milder to me, then I must stand by that statement of mine.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Does this mean that the hostage system did not meet either with your approval or with the approval of the Governor General; is that correct?

BÜHLER: It did not have my approval, and I do not think it had the approval of the Governor General.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you please look at Page 185 of the document in your possession. I begin with the quotation:

“The Governor General expressed his gratitude and recognition to SS Obergruppenführer Koppe for his effective work and spoke of his satisfaction that an expert with such high qualifications should be at the head of the police organization in the Government General. He promised SS Obergruppenführer Koppe the active co-operation of all offices in the Government General and expressed his best wishes for the success of his work.” (Document Number 2233-PS.)

How are we to interpret this statement in the light of your previous answer?

BÜHLER: This statement of the Governor General does not apply to these 50 and 150 people. It applies to the work in its entirety which was to be done by Koppe in the Government General. And one of the principles that was to be applied to that work—which I helped bring about—was that shootings of hostages were to cease. It is quite possible that in this case that principle had not yet been applied.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Would you please wait one minute. Just before this you read Koppe’s report on the shooting of the hostages, Page 180. And after that the Governor General expressed his approval. This means that it was precisely this activity of Koppe’s that the Governor General had approved?

BÜHLER: Well, this was not the only statement made by Koppe. The statement of the Governor General was in reference to all the statements made by Koppe, and not to detached portions.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Very well. In that case he also approved, among other things, of this statement, that is to say, this report.

BÜHLER: But I know that the Governor General, together with me, was exerting pressure on Koppe in order to stop the shooting of hostages.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you kindly inform me who, while Krüger was still Chief of Police, issued instructions for the shooting of one male inhabitant from each house which displayed a poster announcing a Polish national holiday?

BÜHLER: That is unknown to me.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask to have the corresponding document submitted to you. It is in the document book, on Page 1, Paragraph 7:

“The Governor General received District Chief, Dr. Waechter, who reported on the appearance in some districts of inflammatory posters on the occasion of the 11 November (the Polish Day of Liberation). The Governor General ordered that from every house where a poster remains exhibited one male inhabitant is to be shot. This order is to be carried out by the Chief of Police. Dr. Waechter has taken 120 hostages in Kraków as a precautionary measure.”

Do you remember that? Who then introduced this criminal practice of taking hostages?

BÜHLER: Are you trying to say that I was present during that conference?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I should like to ask you about something else.

BÜHLER: Please, will you answer my question? Was I there or was I not?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am not obliged to answer your question. It is you, Witness, who have to answer mine. It is I who am interrogating you, not you who are examining me. Kindly answer the next question. You resided in Kraków. Acting on Frank’s orders, Dr. Waechter, as a precautionary measure, detained 120 hostages. Do you wish to say that you knew nothing about this either?

BÜHLER: I know nothing about this measure; nor is it known to me that hostages were shot.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please answer the following question. Have I understood you correctly—did you state today that there was no famine in Poland?

BÜHLER: Yes, there was no famine in Poland.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am asking you to be shown the speech of Dr. Bühler, State Secretary—that obviously means you—at a meeting on the 31 May 1943, in Kraków. I begin the quotation:

“...The Government of the Government General has for a long time been clear on the point that the scale of food rations allowed to non-Germans cannot be continued any longer without the population taking matters into its own hands or being driven to insurrection... The difficulties of the food situation, which naturally have a bad effect on the morale of the population, the enormous rise in prices, the exaggerated and narrow-minded salary and wage policy, have driven part of the Polish population to despair.” (Document Number 2233-PS.)

Did you say that?

BÜHLER: I could follow the first part, but I could not find the last sentence.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Would you kindly follow the text. In the text you will find both the first part and the last sentence: “...have driven part of the Polish population to despair.” Please study the text.

BÜHLER: Where does it say so, please? Would you show it to me?

[_The text was indicated to the witness._]

I made these statements, and...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then I also have the following question to ask you. Do you not think that your announcement in 1943 bears witness to the fact that you have today testified falsely before the Tribunal?

BÜHLER: No; no. What I meant by my statement was that the population would take things into its own hands. When for instance a worker remained away from his place of work for 3 days to go in search of food, this was considered by me to be a desperate step on the part of the worker.

However, I said this morning that it was very difficult for the population to obtain the necessary food supplies but that it was not impossible, so that I did not notice famine at all in the Government General.

And please may I ask you to consider that 80 percent of the population of the Government General were country people, so that there could be no famine on a large scale unless the countryside had been completely despoiled, and that was not the case.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You stated that as a result of the food quotas established in the Government General a revolt might arise, and you said that the population was driven to despair by hunger. Is that not evidence that a famine was raging in the country?

BÜHLER: By “revolt” I meant “unrest,” not an armed uprising. It is quite clear that morale and the will to work did suffer by reason of the insufficient rations. I stated this morning how it was that adequate provisioning of the population could not be carried out. On the other hand, however, there was such a widespread free market and black market that even the worker, if he had sufficient time, could obtain food; and if he did not have time, he took it. That was what I meant by the workers taking things in their own hands.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please, answer this question. Were only such educational possibilities left to the Poles as would—according to the plan of Frank and Goebbels—merely emphasize the hopeless destiny of their nation?

BÜHLER: Efforts to keep down the level of education of the Polish population were noticeable. These tendencies originated from Himmler in Berlin.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to answer: What was done with the Polish universities?

BÜHLER: They were closed and they were not reopened. However, technical courses were arranged in Warsaw and in Lvov in which these people received university education; but, to be sure, these courses had to be closed by demand of the Reich.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you will recollect under whose signature the decree was issued to close the universities. Perhaps you will recognize this signature? It is an official report.

BÜHLER: The decree regarding the appointment of university trustees was signed by the Governor General in November 1940.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you please tell me whether technical schools only were left in Poland?

BÜHLER: Not technical schools alone remained open; there were, for instance, commercial schools, and the attendance there was very large. Apart from that, there were craft schools and elementary schools, which were set up on a large scale.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In other words, only those schools were left which trained artisans, and petty commercial clerks and tradesmen?

BÜHLER: Whether only petty or also more important traders attended them I do not know. At any rate commercial schools were permitted.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I should like to know on whose initiative the royal palace at Warsaw was destroyed?

BÜHLER: I do not know for certain. I heard once that it had been the Führer’s wish that the castle in Warsaw, which was heavily damaged, should be razed to the ground.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And by whose personal order was this castle, the royal castle of Warsaw destroyed?

BÜHLER: I do not know whether it was blown up; that I do not know.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes. It was destroyed. Who ordered it to be destroyed, do you know?

BÜHLER: I do not know.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You do not know?

BÜHLER: No.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The quotation which I want to read to you is on Page 1 of the translation of the document submitted by us to the Tribunal. It is a very short quotation. I shall proceed to read it into the record:

“...The Führer discussed the general situation with the Governor General and he approved of the work of the Governor General in Poland, especially the pulling down of the palace at Warsaw and the intention not to reconstruct the city...”

Was it not true that the palace in Warsaw was destroyed by order of Frank?

BÜHLER: It is not known to me that the castle was destroyed. As far as I know there was at one time a project to pull it down, but the plan was abandoned.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell me, please, was it not in your presence that the Defendant Frank on 21 April 1940 issued an order to apply police measures during the so-called recruitment of labor.

BÜHLER: I should have to see the minutes. I cannot remember it offhand.

[_The document was handed to the witness._]

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The place which I should like to quote is on Page 46 of the document, the last paragraph. I quote:

“Discussion with State Secretary Dr. Bühler, SS Obergruppenführer Krüger, and Dr. Frauendorfer in the presence of Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart.

“Subject of discussion is the deportation of workers, especially agricultural workers, to the Reich.

“The Governor General stated that, as all methods in the way of appeals, _et cetera_, had been unsuccessful, one was now obliged to come to the conclusion that the Poles evaded this duty of work either out of malice, or with the intention of doing Germany indirect harm by not placing themselves at her disposal. He therefore asked Dr. Frauendorfer whether there were any measures left which had not yet been taken to win the Poles over voluntarily.

“Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer answered this question in the negative.

“The Governor General stated emphatically that a final decision was now required of him. The question now was whether one would not have to resort to some form of coercive measure.”

Was that not an order to apply coercive measures when recruiting labor?

BÜHLER: I will not contradict the statement, as I have seen the minutes. It is one of the utterances of the Governor General which, I believe, were not altogether made voluntarily but which in no way altered the course which I took on this question.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please answer the following question: Were you present at a discussion with Sauckel on 18 August 1942, and was it in your presence that Frank told Sauckel that he—as he put it—“joyfully” informed him that he had shipped a fresh convoy of workers to the Reich with the help of the Police.

BÜHLER: Together with my departmental heads who dealt with the recruitment of workers I had a conference with Reich Commissioner Sauckel before the visit to the Governor General took place. I cannot now remember whether I was present when Reich Commissioner Sauckel visited the Governor General. I ask to see the minutes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please show the defendant, I mean the witness, the passage.

[_The document was handed to the witness._]

I will now read into the record two short passages on Pages 918 and 920. Doctor Frank says:

“I am very glad that I can inform you officially that up to this date we have sent to Germany over 800,000 workers. Only a short time ago you asked for another 140,000. I am happy to inform you officially that, in accordance with our agreement of yesterday, 60 percent of these newly requested workers will be sent by the end of October, and the other 40 percent will be dispatched to the Reich by the end of the year.”

Then I will ask you to pass on to Page 120. There is only one other sentence I want to quote:

“Besides the 140,000, you can count on a further number of workers from the Government General during the coming year, for we will use the Police to get them.”

Does that not imply the use of Draconian police methods in the so-called recruiting of manpower?

BÜHLER: I do not recollect that I was present on that occasion, so I can in no way confirm whether that was said in this way.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I have no more questions to put to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: [_To Dr. Seidl._] Do you want to re-examine?

DR. SEIDL: I have a few more questions to ask the witness.

First of all, I should like to clarify a misunderstanding which seems to have arisen. The question which I put to the witness in connection with Document Number USSR-93 referred only to Appendix 1, which has the title “Cultural Life in Poland.” That appendix deals with directives regarding cultural policies which the administration of the Government General was supposed to have issued, and the way I understood the witness was that he only wanted to answer that particular question and not refer to the other appendices, such as, for instance, those dealing with confiscated art treasures.

Perhaps it would have been better if he had not used the word “forged.” At any rate, he wanted to say that he did not know the directives in question.

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, is it correct that by far the greater number of Polish workers who were brought to the Reich were volunteers?

BÜHLER: May I, first of all, say that I by no means wished to accuse the Prosecution of committing a forgery. I merely wanted to point out that possibly they were using a forged document. I did not want to accuse the Prosecution itself of a forgery.

Now, regarding the question put by defense counsel, I want to say that according to my observations by far the greater number of all the workers from the Government General went to the Reich voluntarily.

DR. SEIDL: So as to assist your memory, I am going to read a short quotation from the diary, which deals with the recruiting of workers.

On 4 March 1940 the Governor General addressed a meeting of the town mayors of the Lublin district and stated the following regarding the recruitment of workers:

“He rejected the issue of a new decree, as demanded by Berlin, containing particular coercive measures and threats of punishment. Measures which attract attention abroad should be avoided. The forcible transport of people had every argument against it.”

Does that conception reflect the true views of the Governor General?

BÜHLER: I was not present during that conference, so I did not hear that utterance by the Governor General, but it does tally with those instructions and principles which the Governor General gave to me and which I have always resolutely observed and carried out.

DR. SEIDL: Were you present during a conference on 14 January 1944—I see you were there—it was a conference with the State Secretary Dr. Bühler, Dr. Koppe, and several others. I quote from it:

“The Governor General resolutely opposes the employment of Police for carrying out such measures. Such a task is not a matter for the Police.”

Is it correct that the Governor General repeatedly opposed the use of Police in connection with the recruiting of workers?

BÜHLER: That was not the only occasion. The deputy of Reich Commissioner Sauckel was often attacked by him during public meetings when he talked about raids for recruiting workers; but I must state that Sauckel’s deputy always declared that it was not he who had given instructions for these raids.

DR. SEIDL: The first quotation which the prosecutor submitted to you was an entry dated 25 January 1943. He asked you whether you regarded yourself as a war criminal. I shall now put to you another passage from that conference, at which you yourself were present. I quote from Page 7 of that entry in the diary. The Governor General stated:

“State Secretary Krüger, you know that orders of the Reichsführer SS can be carried out by you only after you have spoken with me. This was omitted in this instance. I express my regret that you have carried out an order from the Reichsführer without first informing me, in accordance with the orders of the Führer. According to that order, instructions of the Reichsführer SS may be carried out here in the Government General only after I have previously given my approval. I hope that this is the last time that that is overlooked; because I do not want to trouble the Führer about every single case of this kind.” (Document Number 2233-PS.)

I shall skip a sentence and continue to quote:

“It is not possible for us to disregard Führer orders, and it is out of the question that in the sphere of police and security direct orders from the Reichsführer should be carried out over the head of the man who has been appointed here by the Führer; otherwise I should be completely superfluous.”

I now ask you, is it correct that there were very frequently such disputes between the Governor General and the Higher SS Police Leader Krüger, and that the Governor General terminated these disputes by asking for co-operation, so that some sort of administration could function in this territory?

BÜHLER: Yes, that is correct, such disputes were our daily bread.

DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has also submitted to you another exhibit, USSR-335 (Document Number USSR-335), the Court-Martial Decree, dated October 1943. I now ask you what the security situation was like in the Government General then, and would it have been at all possible at that time to control the situation with normal criminal procedure?

THE PRESIDENT: Doctor Seidl, has that not already been dealt with very fully in his examination in chief?

DR. SEIDL: I forego having this question answered again. Now one last question, which refers to art treasures.

Is it correct that a portion of the art treasures which were found in the region of Upper Silesia were taken to the last official residence of the Governor General at Neuhaus to be safeguarded, and that the Governor General gave you instructions to prepare a list of these articles and send it to Reich Minister Lammers?

BÜHLER: The Governor General dictated a report to Reich Minister Lammers about the transfer of 20 of the most outstanding art treasures from the property of the Polish State. I was present when it was dictated and I took that report personally to State Secretary Kritzinger in Berlin. It was stated therein that these art treasures, so as to save them from the Russians, had been taken from Seichau, or whatever the place is called, to Schliersee. These art treasures were left unguarded in the official residence of the Governor General.

DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions to put to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.

DR. SEIDL: I have now completed the examination of witnesses, but as the document books have not yet been bound, I would like to suggest that at some later stage, perhaps after the case of Frick, I could submit these document books.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, how many books are you presenting?

DR. SEIDL: A total of five volumes, but I myself have not received them yet.

THE PRESIDENT: Has the Tribunal approved the documents in five volumes?

DR. SEIDL: They are almost entirely documents which have already been submitted by the Prosecution and an agreement has been reached with the Prosecution regarding the documents.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, we need not wait now for the document books. The document books will be considered by the Tribunal when they are put in and then, if you have anything in particular you want to say upon them in explanation, you may do so.

DR. SEIDL: Very well.

THE PRESIDENT: No doubt you will comment upon them in your final speech. You say that they are mostly documents which have already been put in, and therefore it would not be necessary to make any preliminary comment upon them. You will be able to deal with them in your final speech.

DR. SEIDL: But I should have liked to quote a few passages during my submission of evidence, since this is necessary to establish the connection, and as it would be impossible to do all that during my final speech; but I do not think that too much time will be lost through that.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Seidl, it would not be very useful to the Tribunal for you to make a commentary upon the documents at a later stage, when your witnesses have been finished and somebody else’s—some other defendant’s—witnesses have been interpolated; therefore, the Tribunal thinks it will be much better and much more convenient to the Tribunal if you defer your comments on the documents until your final speech.

Well, Dr. Seidl, as I understand, you have two books which are before us now. Three is it?

DR. SEIDL: There is a total of five books. The other three do not appear to have been bound.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but you say that most of the documents in them are documents which are already in evidence.

DR. SEIDL: The diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank, which contains 42 volumes, has been submitted, but the Prosecution has used only those parts which appeared favorable for them. In my opinion it is, therefore, necessary that the connections should to some extent be re-established during the submission of evidence. Also, there are other documents in the document book which I believe should be read, at least in extract, before this Tribunal, but I shall, of course, limit myself to the absolutely necessary passages when I read the documents. I should like to suggest to the Tribunal that the matter be handled as it was in the case of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, so that I submit the individual documents to the Tribunal as exhibits. There are several speeches by the Defendant Frank, there are decrees and legal regulations, there are two affidavits, and I really think that somehow an opinion with regard to them should be given during the submission of evidence; and, besides, individual documents will have to be given exhibit numbers. Up to now only one document has been submitted as evidence on behalf of the Defendant Frank, and that is the affidavit of the witness Dr. Bühler; but I have the intention of bringing a whole series of further documents formally to the notice of the Tribunal and would like to postpone that only because the Tribunal has not yet received the bound document books.

THE PRESIDENT: When will these other books be ready, Dr. Seidl?

DR. SEIDL: I was told that they would be completed by this evening.

THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think you will take in dealing with these books?

DR. SEIDL: I think that two hours will be enough.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal will adjourn now.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal would like you to deal with your documents now, and insofar as they are documents which have already been put in evidence, unless you wish to refer to other passages in them, they think that you need only tell us what the documents are and put them in evidence, unless it is very important to you to refer to any particular document. So far as they are new documents, you will, no doubt, offer them in evidence and make such short comments as you think necessary. But the Tribunal hopes that you will be able to finish this afternoon. With reference to the other books that you have, we understand that you have all the documents in German yourself, and therefore you can refer us to those documents now.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, upon the wish of the Prosecution and also, I believe, of the Tribunal, I have reduced the original bulk of my document books considerably. The first five document books, as I had had them prepared, contained more than eight hundred pages. The new form is considerably shorter; but I have not received the German text of the new form, so that I am not in a position just now to give the number of pages to the Tribunal or to co-ordinate my page numbers with the numbered pages of the translations. If I may express a wish, it is that we should first wait until the five document books in their new form are available, because otherwise it is very likely that the numbering of the pages would not correspond to the numbering of the individual documents as exactly as might be desired.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it best that you should begin now with the first three volumes. We have them here.

DR. SEIDL: If the Tribunal has the first three volumes, then I will begin. I begin with Volume I. The first document on Page 1 is the decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor, dated 12 October 1939, concerning the administration of the occupied Polish territories. This decree defines in detail the authority of the Governor General. In Paragraphs 5 and 6 some of the limitations to the authority of the Governor General are included, which the witnesses Dr. Lammers and Dr. Bühler have already pointed out. This document bears the number 2537-PS and it will be Exhibit Frank-2.

I pass to Page 3 of the document book. This document is the decree of the Führer concerning the establishment of a State Secretariat for Security in the Government General, dated 7 May 1942. I quote Paragraph 2:

“The State Secretary for Security serves at the same time as deputy of the Reichsführer SS in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality.”

On Page 4 I quote Paragraph IV:

“The Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police is authorized to give the State Secretary for Security direct instructions in the province of security and the preservation of German Nationality.”

This document will be Exhibit Frank-3 (Document Number Frank-3).

Following the decree of the Führer of 7 May 1942 comes the decree for the transfer of authority to the State Secretary for Security, of 23 June 1942. I do not know whether that decree is already bound in that volume. Apparently that decree, which was added later, has not yet been translated.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the date?

DR. SEIDL: 23 June 1942.

THE PRESIDENT: We have one of 27 May 1942.

DR. SEIDL: That decree apparently has not yet been translated because it was added afterwards, and I will put it in the document book later. It will be Document Frank-4. In Paragraph 1 of that decree, we find, “The jurisdictions of the administrative and creative branches of the Police referred to in appendices A and B are now transferred to the State Secretary for Security.” In Appendix 1 the spheres of authority of the Order Police are mentioned under 15 headings—no, I must correct that—26 headings; and in Appendix B the spheres of authority of the Order Police come under 21 headings.

I pass now to Document Book I, Page 5. That is the decree of the Führer concerning the appointment of officials and the termination of this status as officials in the sphere of the Government General, of 20 May 1942. I quote from the figure 3, Paragraph 2:

“The Governor General’s sphere of activity does not, in the sense of this decree, include officials belonging to the province of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, or those belonging to the Customs Frontier Service.” (Document Number Frank-4(e).)

I pass to Page 6 of the document book, the decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor, for the Preservation of German Nationality, of 7 October 1939, which is already Exhibit USA-305 (Document Number 686-PS).

The next document is the letter from Reich Marshal Göring to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, of July 1941.

MR. DODD: Mr. President, I suggest that an exhibit number be given as we go along so that we can follow better, and later on have some track of the exhibits as they go in. The last one and this one have not been given any exhibit number.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): The last one was Frank-5, was it not?

THE PRESIDENT: No. Frank-5 was the one of the 27th of May 1942.

MR. DODD: We did not know that; we did not get the number over the speaker. I am sorry.

THE PRESIDENT: It may not have been stated but I took it down as that myself. Will you take care to state each time, Dr. Seidl, what the exhibit number is that you are giving. You are dealing now with the letter of the 31st of July 1941.

DR. SEIDL: Yes. This letter has a USA number, namely, 509.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Wait a minute, perhaps I made a mistake. Yes, Mr. Dodd, I think I made a mistake. The reason why Dr. Seidl did not give a number was because it was already in evidence as USA-305. I made a mistake. It was not Frank-5. He only got to Frank-4. The next one is USA-509.

DR. SEIDL: 509 (Document Number 710-PS). I pass to Page 10 of the document book. That is an order, a directive rather, of the High Command of the Armed Forces concerning Case Barbarossa, USA-135 (Document Number 447-PS), and I quote Paragraph 2:

“It is not intended to declare East Prussia and the Government General an operational area of the Army. On the other hand, on the basis of the unpublished Führer decrees of 19 and 21 October 1939 the Commander-in-Chief of the Army is authorized to enact measures that are necessary for the execution of his military task and for the security of his troops.”

I pass to Page 11 of the document book, a directive for the execution of the Führer decree concerning the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, of 27 March 1942. I quote Paragraph 4:

“The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor will have at his disposal for the performance of his tasks the authority delegated to me by the Führer to issue instructions to the highest Reich authorities, their subordinate offices, as well as to the offices of the Party and its formations and affiliated organizations; to the Reich Protector; to the Governor General; to the military commanders and the chiefs of the civil administrations.”

This document becomes Exhibit Number Frank-5 (Document Number Frank-5).

The next document is on Page 12—the decree by the Führer, concerning a Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, of 21 March 1942, from which it can be seen that his authority to issue instructions included the Government General. It becomes Exhibit Number Frank-6 (Document Number Frank-6).

The document on Page 13 of the document book deals also with the authority of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor to issue instructions. It is already Exhibit USA-206 (Document Number 3352-PS).

The document on Page 15 is a letter from Professor Dr. Kubiowicz, Chairman of the Ukrainian Control Committee, to the Defendant Dr. Frank. It already has the Exhibit Number USA-178 (Document Number 1526-PS); and I will read only the first sentence from that document, in order to show what the relation was between the Defendant Dr. Frank and the author of that letter. I quote:

“Complying with your wish I send you this letter, in which I should like to state the abuses and the painful incidents which create an especially difficult position for the Ukrainian population within the Government General.”

Then I pass on to Page 16 of the document book. That is an excerpt from Exhibit USA-275 (Document Number 1061-PS), namely, the report of SS Brigadeführer Stroop about the destruction of the Warsaw ghetto. I quote the second paragraph of Section II, from which it can be seen that the order came directly from the Reichsführer SS Himmler:

“When the Reichsführer SS visited Warsaw in January 1943, he ordered the SS and Police Leader in the District of Warsaw to transfer to Lublin the armament factories and other enterprises of military importance which were installed within the ghetto, including the workers and the machines.”

The affidavit which the Prosecution submitted during the cross-examination of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner should then really follow after Page 16 of the document book.

COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): As far as I can gather, there has been some misunderstanding on this point. Under the number mentioned by Dr. Seidl in his document book there is no document referring to the Warsaw ghetto, but there is a document from the Chief of Police and SS in Galicia relating to the solution of the Jewish problem in Galicia. I should like this elucidated.

DR. SEIDL: The document on Page 16 is the report by the SS Brigadeführer Stroop which has already been submitted as Exhibit USA-275. The report by SS Führer Katzmann, which the Russian Prosecutor apparently means, concerning the solution of the Jewish question in Galicia, is on Page 17 of the document book, that is, on the next page. Apparently the insertion of Page 16 in the document book which was prepared for the Russian Prosecution was overlooked.

After that report by Brigadeführer Stroop, Exhibit USA-275 should be inserted as Page 16a, the affidavit by SS Brigadeführer Stroop which was submitted during the cross-examination of the Defendant Dr. Kaltenbrunner under Exhibit Number USA-804. That affidavit bears the Document Number 3841-PS. I could not include that affidavit in the document book because it was submitted by the Prosecution only after I had sent the document book to be translated.

As Page 16b another document should be put in which was also submitted during the cross-examination of Dr. Kaltenbrunner. That is the affidavit by Karl Kaleske. That affidavit bears the Exhibit Number USA-803, Document Number 3840-PS. That would be Page 16b of the document book.

Now I come to the report which the Soviet Prosecutor had in mind and which deals with the solution of the Jewish question in Galicia. It is on Page 17 of the document book. That measure has the Exhibit Number USA-277 and the Document Number L-18. I quote Pages 4 and 5, word for word:

“After it had been found in more and more cases that Jews had succeeded in making themselves indispensable to their employers by providing them with scarce goods, _et cetera_, it was considered necessary to introduce really Draconic measures.”

I pass to Paragraph 2 and quote:

“As the administration was not in a position and showed itself too weak to master this chaos, the SS and Police Leader simply took over the whole question of the employment of Jewish labor. The Jewish labor agencies, which were staffed by hundreds of Jews, were dissolved. All employment certificates given by firms or administrative offices were declared invalid, and cards given Jews by the labor agencies were made valid again by being stamped by the police offices.”

I pass to Page 19 of the document book. That deals with the letter of the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery to Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police Himmler, of 17 April 1943. That document is Number 2220-PS and Exhibit Number USA-175. I quote:

“In our conference of 27 March of this year we had agreed to prepare written memoranda about conditions in the Government General on which to base our intended report to the Führer.

“The material compiled for this purpose by SS Obergruppenführer Krüger has already been submitted to you directly. On the basis of this material I have had a report prepared which sums up the most important points contained therein, subdivides them clearly, and culminates in an explanation of the measures to be taken.

“The report has been checked with SS Obergruppenführer Krüger and has his complete concurrence. I am submitting a part of it to you herewith.”—It is signed—“Dr. Lammers.”

I pass on to Page 20 of the document book and I quote:

“Secret. Concerning conditions in the Government General...

“The German administration in the Government General has to accomplish the following tasks: 1) To increase agricultural production for the purpose of securing food for the German people and seize as much of it as possible, to allot sufficient rations to the native population occupied with work essential to the war effort, and to remove the rest for the Armed Forces and the homeland.”

I leave out the following points and pass to the letter “B”, where Krüger or his assistant criticized the measures of the Governor General. I quote:

“German administration in the Government General has failed grossly with respect to the tasks listed under “A”. Even if a relatively high percentage, namely, over 90 percent, of the delivery quota of agricultural products for the Armed Forces and the homeland was successfully met in the year 1942 and if the labor procurement requirements of the homeland were generally satisfied, nevertheless, on the other hand, two things must be made clear: First, these accomplishments were not achieved until the year 1942. Before that, for example, only 40,000 tons of bread grain had been delivered for the Wehrmacht. Secondly, and above all, there was the omission to create for the attainment of such performances those prerequisites of an organizational, economic, and political character which are indispensable if such performances are not to lead to a breakdown in the situation as a whole, from which chaotic conditions in every respect could eventually come about. This failure of the German administration can be explained in the first place by the system of the German administrative and governmental activity in the Government General as embodied in the Governor General himself, and secondly by the misguided principles of policy in all questions decisive for conditions in the Government General.

“I) The spirit of the German administration in the Government General.

“From the beginning it has been the endeavor of the Governor General to make a state organization out of the Government General which was to lead its own existence in complete independence of the Reich.”

Then I pass to Page 22 of the report, Paragraph 3 and I quote:

“3) The treatment of the native population can only be led in the right direction on the basis of clean and orderly administrative and economic leadership. Only such a foundation makes it possible to handle the native population firmly and if necessary even severely, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, to act generously with them and cause a certain amount of satisfaction among the population by allowing certain liberties, especially in the cultural field. Without such a foundation severity strengthens the resistance movement, and meeting the population halfway only undermines respect for the Germans. The above-mentioned facts prove that this foundation is lacking. Instead of trying to create this foundation, the Governor General inaugurates a policy of encouraging the individual cultural life of the Polish population, which in itself is already overshooting the goal but which, under the existing conditions and viewed in connection with our military situation during the past winter, can only be interpreted as weakness, and must achieve the opposite of the aim intended.

“4) The relationship between racial Germans and the Polish-Ukrainian population in the Government General.

“The cases are numerous in which the German administration has permitted the requirements of racial Germans in the Government General to be put into the background in favor of the interests of the Poles and Ruthenians, in its endeavor to win over the latter. The opinion was advanced that racial Germans resettled from somewhere else were not to be installed immediately as settlers, but for the duration of the war were only to be employed as farm workers. A legal foundation for the expropriation of Polish property has not been created so far. Bad treatment of racial Germans by their Polish employers was not stopped. German citizens and racial German patients were allowed to be treated in Polish hospitals by Polish physicians, badly and at great expense. In German spas in the Government General the sheltering of children of German citizenship from territories threatened with bombing, and of veterans of Stalingrad was hampered, while foreigners took convalescent vacations there, and so on.

“The big plans for resettlement in the Lublin district for the benefit of racial Germans could have been carried out with less friction if the Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality had found the administration willing to co-operate and assist in the proper manner.”

I pass to Page 24 and quote, under C:

“The administrative system, embodied in the Governor General personally, and the material failure of the general German administration in the most various fields of decisive importance has not only shaken the confidence and the will to work of the native population, but has also brought about the result that the Poles, who have been socially divided and constantly disunited throughout their history, have come together in a united national body through their hostility to the Germans. In a world of pretense, the real foundations are lacking on which alone the achievements which the Reich requires from the Government General, and the aims which it must see realized in the latter, can be brought about and fulfilled in the long run. The non-fulfillment of the tasks given to the general administration—as happened, for example, in the field of the Preservation of German Nationality—led to a condition which made it necessary for other administrative bodies (the Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality...and the Police) to take over these tasks.”

Now I pass to Page 27 of the document book. That is the repeatedly mentioned report by the Governor General to the Führer of 19 June 1943. The document is Number 437-PS, Exhibit USA-610. Of this document the Prosecution has so far quoted only Pages 10 and 11. These are the very points in this memorandum which the Governor General most severely criticized.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking now of the report which begins on Page 20?

DR. SEIDL: I am speaking of the report which begins on Page 27. I have already finished the report which begins on Page 20.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, what number did you give to that on Page 20?

DR. SEIDL: The report on Page 20 is an integral part of the letter which begins on Page 19, and which already has the number USA-175.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I see, yes.

DR. SEIDL: Now I come to the document on Page 27. That is a memorandum which has already been mentioned by various witnesses and was submitted under Exhibit Number USA-610 (Document Number 437-PS) by the Prosecution. Of this report the Prosecution has only read Pages 10 and 11, which are Pages 36 and 37 of the document book, that is to say, only those passages in the report which were condemned as excesses of the Police, and against which excesses the Governor General complained to the Führer.

I do not intend to read the whole memorandum; but I will pass on to Page 27 of the report, which is Page 53 of the document book, and I quote under Section 2:

“The almost complete discontinuation of the possibilities for participation in the cultural field has led, even among the lowest classes of the Polish people, to considerable discontent. The Polish middle and upper classes have a great need for self-expression. Experience shows that the possibility of cultural activity would at the same time mean a diversion from the political questions of the day. German propaganda frequently comes across the objection, on the part of the Poles, that the restriction of cultural activity enforced by the German authorities not only prevents a contrast being made with the Bolshevist lack of culture, but also shows that Polish cultural activity falls below the degree of culture allowed to Soviet citizens...

“3. The closing of colleges, high schools, and secondary schools is on the same level. Its well-considered purpose is without doubt the lowering of the Polish educational standard. The realization of this goal appears, from the point of view of the necessities of war, not always beneficial to German interests. As the war goes on the German interest increases in the mobilization of able foreign replacements in the various fields of knowledge. But more important than that is the fact that the crippling of the school system and the severe hampering of cultural activities foster the growth of a Polish national body, led by the intelligentsia, to conspire against Germany. What was not possible during the course of Polish national history, what even the first years of German dominion could not bring about, namely, the achievement of national unity in a common purpose to hold together through thick and thin, now threatens to become a reality, slowly but surely, because of the German measures. German leadership cannot allow this process of unifying the individual classes of the Polish population to pass unheeded in the face of the growing power of resistance of the Poles. German leadership should promote class distinction by certain cultural concessions and should be able to play one class off against the other.

“4. The recruiting of labor and the methods employed, even though often exercised under the unavoidable pressure of circumstances, have, with the aid of clever Bolshevist agitation, evoked a strong feeling of hatred among all classes. The workers thus obtained often come to work with firm resolve to engage in positive resistance, even active sabotage. Improvement of recruiting methods, together with the continued effort to arrest the abuses still practiced in the treatment of Polish workers in the Reich, and lastly, some provision, however meager it may be, for the families left behind, would cause a rise in morale, and the result would be an increased desire to work and increased production in the German interest.

“5. When the German administration was set up at the beginning of the war the Polish element was removed from all important positions. The available German staff had always been inadequate in quantity and quality. Besides, during the past year, a considerable number of German personnel have had to be transferred to meet the replacement needs of the armed forces. Already an increased amount of non-German manpower has had to be obtained compulsorily. An essential change in the treatment of the Poles would enable the administration, while exercising all necessary precaution, to induce a greater number of Poles to collaborate. Without this the administration, in view of the present amount of personnel—not to speak of future transfers—cannot continue to function. The increased participation of Poles would further help to raise the morale itself.

“Besides the positive changes set down in these proposals, a number of methods employed up till now in the treatment of Poles should be changed or even completely abandoned, at least for the duration of the fighting in Europe.

“1) I have already shown in special reports that confiscation and evacuation of agricultural land have caused great and irreparable damage to agricultural production. Not less great is the damage to morale caused by such actions. Already the seizure of a great part of the large Polish estates has understandably embittered those affected by it, who naturally represent that strata of the population which is always anti-Bolshevist. But, because of their numerically small strength and their complete isolation from the mass of the people, their opposition does not count nearly as much as the attitude of the mass of the population which consists mainly of small farmers. The evacuation of Polish peasants from the defense zone, no doubt necessary for military-political reasons, has already had an unfavorable effect on the opinion and attitude of many farmers. At any rate, this evacuation was kept within certain territorial limits. It was carried out with careful preparation on the part of the governmental offices with a view to avoiding unnecessary hardship. The evacuation of Polish farmers from the Lublin district, held to be necessary by the Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality, for the purpose of settling racial Germans there, was much more serious. Moreover—as I have already reported separately—the pace at which it was carried out and the methods adopted caused immeasurable bitterness among the populace. At short notice families were torn apart; those able to work were sent to the Reich, while old people and children were directed to evacuate Jewish ghettos. This happened in the middle of the winter of 1942-43 and resulted in considerable loss of life, especially among members of the last mentioned group. The dispossession meant the complete expropriation of the movable and immovable property of the farmers. The entire population succumbed to the belief that these deportations meant the beginning of a mass deportation of the Poles from the region of the Government General. The general impression was that the Poles would meet a fate similar to that of the Jews. The evacuation from the Lublin District was a welcome opportunity for communist agitation, with its own peculiar skill, to poison the feeling in the entire Government General, and even in the annexed Eastern territories, for a long time. Thus it came about that considerable portions of the population in the territories to be evacuated, but also in territories not affected, fled into the woods and considerably increased the strength of the guerrillas. The consequence was a tremendous deterioration of the security situation. These desperate people were incited by skillful agents to upset agricultural and industrial production according to a definite plan.

“2) One has only to mention the crime of Katyn for it to become obvious that the safeguarding of personal security is an absolute condition for winning over the Polish population to the fight against Bolshevism. The lack of protection against seemingly arbitrary arrests and executions makes good copy for communist propaganda slogans. The shooting of women, children, and old men in public, which took place again and again without the knowledge and against the will of the government, must be prevented in all circumstances. Naturally this does not apply to the public executions of bandits and partisans. In cases of collective punishments, which nearly always hit innocent persons and are applied against people who are fundamentally politically indifferent, the unfavorable psychological effect cannot possibly be overestimated. Serious punitive measures and executions should be carried out only after a trial based at least upon the elementary conceptions of justice and accompanied by publication of the sentence. Even if the court procedure is carried on in the most simple, imperfect and improvised manner, it serves to avoid or to lessen the unfavorable effect of a punitive measure which the population considers purely arbitrary, and disarms Bolshevist agitation which claims that these German measures are only the prelude to future events. Moreover, collective punishment, which by its nature is directed primarily against the innocent, in the worst case against forced or desperate persons, is not exactly looked upon as a sign of strength of the ruling power, which the population expects to strike at the terrorists themselves and thereby liberate them from the insecurity which burdens them.”

I pass now to Page 37 of the report and quote under Section 3:

“Besides the most important prerequisites mentioned in 1) and 2) to restore calm in the Government General, security of property among non-agricultural people must also be guaranteed, insofar as it is not counter to the urgent needs of war. Expropriation or confiscation without compensation in the industrial sector, in commerce and trade, and of other private property, should not take place in any case if the owner or the custodian has not committed an offense against the German authorities. If the taking over of industrial enterprises, commercial concerns, or real estate is necessary for reasons connected with the war, one should proceed in every case in such a way as to avoid hardship and under guarantee of appropriate compensation. Such a procedure would on the one hand further the initiative of Polish business men, and on the other hand avoid damage to the interests of German war economy.

“4) In any attempt to influence the attitude of the Poles, importance must be attached to the influence of the Catholic Church which cannot be overestimated. I do not deny that the Catholic Church has always been on the side of the leading fighters for an independent national Poland. Numerous priests also made their influence felt in this direction even after the German occupation. Hundreds of arrests were carried out among them. A number of priests were taken to concentration camps and also shot. However, in order to win over the Polish population, the Church must be given at least a legal status even though it might not be possible to co-operate with it. It can without doubt be won over to reinforce the struggle of the Polish people against Bolshevism, especially today under the effect of the crime of Katyn, for the Church would always oppose a Bolshevist regime in the Vistula area, if only out of the instinct of self-preservation. To achieve that end, however, it is necessary to refrain in the future from all measures against its activity and its property, insofar as they do not run directly counter to war requirements.

“Much harm has been done even quite recently by the closing of monasteries, charitable institutions, and church establishments.”

THE PRESIDENT: I had thought that your extracts were going to be brief. But you have now read from Page 53 to Page 65.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, this document is the only one of this kind which is available to me, and in view of the fact that the Prosecution has quoted in full only those passages which the Defendant Dr. Frank himself criticized most severely, I consider it my duty now to read a number of passages, to quote them, in order to give the entire picture correctly and to show what the Defendant Dr. Frank really intended to achieve with this document. I shall only quote a few more lines and then I will pass to another document.

THE PRESIDENT: I had hoped that one or two extracts from that document would show what the Defendant Frank was putting forward—one or two paragraphs.

DR. SEIDL: I will go on to the next document, Mr. President, that is on Page 68, the affidavit by the witness Dr. Bühler, which I presented to the witness today and which has been given the document number Frank-1; Page 68 in the document book.

On Page 70 there appears Exhibit USA-473 (Document Number L-49). If I remember correctly this document has already been read in full by the Prosecution, and I would like to ask the Court only to take judicial notice of that also in the defense of Dr. Frank.

On Page 72 of the document book is an affidavit of the former Kreishauptmann, Dr. Albrecht. To be exact I have to state that this is not really an affidavit in the true sense of the word. It is only a letter which Kreishauptmann Dr. Albrecht sent to me through the General Secretary of the Tribunal. I then returned the letter in order to have it sworn to by the witness, but I have to say that until now that sworn statement has not been returned, so that for the time being this exhibit would only have the material value of a letter. Therefore I ask the Tribunal to decide whether that document can be accepted by the Tribunal as an exhibit in the form of a letter.

THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal did consider that matter before when your application was before it. They will accept the document for what it is worth. If you get the document in affidavit form you will no doubt put it in.

DR. SEIDL: Yes. That will be Document Number Frank-7. I forego the quoting of the first points and proceed directly to Page 74 of the document book and I quote under Section 4:

“Dr. Frank’s fight against the exploitation and neglect of the Government General in favor of the Reich. Conflict with Berlin.

“The first meeting with Dr. Frank occurred shortly after the establishment of the Government General in the autumn of 1939, in the Polish district capital Radom, where the 10 Kreis chiefs of this district had to report concerning the condition of the population in their administrative district and the problem of reconstructing, as quickly and effectively as possible, the general as well as the administrative and economic life. What struck one most was the keen awareness of Dr. Frank and his deep concern about the area entrusted to him. This found expression in the instructions not to consider or treat the Government General or allow it to be treated, as an object of exploitation or as a waste area, but rather to consider it as a center of public order and an area of concentration at the back of the fighting German front and at the gates of the German homeland, forming a link between the two. Therefore the loyal native inhabitants of this country should have claim to the full protection of the German administration as citizens of the Government General. To this end the constant efforts of all authorities and economic agencies would be demanded by him, also constant control through supervisors, which would be personally superintended by him in periodical inspection trips with the participation of the specialized central offices. In this way, for instance, the two districts which were administered by me were inspected by him personally three times in 4 years.

“In face of the demands of the Berlin central authorities, who believed it possible to import more from the Government General into the Reich than the former could afford, Dr. Frank asserted vigorously the political independence of the Government General as an ‘adjunct of the Reich’ and his own independence as being directly subordinated only to the Supreme Head of the State, and not to the Reich Government. He also instructed us on no account to comply with demands which might come to us on the basis of personal relations with the authorities by whom we were sent, or with the ministries concerned; and if by so doing we came into conflict with our loyalty to the Reich, which was equally expected of us, to report to him about it. This firm attitude brought Dr. Frank the displeasure of the Berlin government circles, and the Government General was dubbed ‘Frankreich.’ A campaign of calumny was initiated in the Reich against him and against the entire administration of the Government General by systematically generalizing and exaggerating regrettable ineptitudes and human weaknesses of individuals, at the same time attempting to belittle the actual constructive achievements.”

I should like to ask the Tribunal merely to take official notice of Section 5, also Section 6, and I will only quote from Section 7.

“7) Dr. Frank as an opponent of acts of violence against the native population, especially as an opponent of the SS.

“Besides the exploitation and the pauperization of the Government General, the accusation of the enslaving of the native population as well as deporting it to the Reich, and many atrocities of various kinds which have appeared in the newspaper reports on the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, were interpreted as serious evidence against Dr. Frank. As far as atrocities are concerned, the guilt lies not with Dr. Frank but in some measure with the numerous non-German agitators and provocateurs who, with the growing pressure on the fighting German fronts, increased their underground activity; but more especially with the former State Secretary for Security in the Government General, SS Obergruppenführer Krüger, and his agencies. My observations in this respect are sketchy, because of the strict secrecy of these offices.

“On the other hand, Dr. Frank went so far in meeting the Polish population that this was frequently objected to by his German compatriots. That he did the correct thing by his stand for the just interests of the Polish population is proved, for example, by the impressive fact that barely a year and a half after the defeat of the Polish people in a campaign of 18 days, the concentration of German army masses against Russia in the Polish area took place without any disturbance worth mentioning, and that the Eastern railroad was able, with Polish personnel, to move the troop transports up to the most forward unloading points without being delayed by acts of sabotage.”

I quote the last paragraph on Page 79:

“This humane attitude of Dr. Frank, which earned him respect and sympathy among considerable groups of the native population, led, on the other hand, to bitter conflicts with the SS, in whose ranks Himmler’s statement, ‘They shall not love us, but fear us,’ was applied as the guiding principle of their thoughts and deeds.

“At times it came to a complete break. I still recall quite clearly that during a government visit to the Carpathian areas in the summer of 1943 in the district center of Stanislav, when he took a walk alone with me and my wife in Zaremcze on the Prut, Dr. Frank complained most bitterly about the arbitrary acts of the SS, which quite frequently ran counter to the political line taken by him. At that time he called the SS the ‘Black Plague’; and when he noticed our astonishment at hearing such criticism coming from his lips, he pointed out that if, for example, my wife were to be wrongfully arrested one day or night by agencies of the Gestapo and disappear, never to be seen again, without having been given the opportunity of defense in a court trial, absolutely nothing could be done about it. Some time afterwards he made a speech to the students in Heidelberg, which attracted much attention and was loudly applauded, about the necessity for the re-establishment of a German constitutional state such as had always met the real needs of the German people. When he wanted to repeat this speech in Berlin, he is said to have been forbidden by the Führer and Reich Chancellor, at Himmler’s instigation, to make speeches for 3 months, as reported to me by a reliable, but unfortunately forgotten, source. The struggle against the methods of violence used by the SS led to Dr. Frank’s having a nervous breakdown, and he had to take a fairly long sick leave. As far as I can remember this was in the winter of 1943-44.”

I ask the Court to take official notice of Section 8, and I pass on to Page 84 of the document book. That is an affidavit by SS Obergruppenführer Erich Von dem Bach-Zelewski, of 21 February 1946. This affidavit becomes Document Frank-8.

THE PRESIDENT: Did this witness not give evidence?

DR. SEIDL: The witness was questioned here by the Prosecution, and I made the motion at that time that either I be allowed to interrogate the witness again or be granted the use of an affidavit. On 8 March 1946 the Tribunal made the decision, if I remember correctly, that I could use an affidavit from that witness but that the Prosecution would be free if they desired to question the witness again.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. SEIDL: I shall read the statements of the witness concerning this matter, and I quote:

“1) Owing to the infiltration of Russian partisan groups over the line of the river Bug into the Government General in 1943, Himmler declared the Government General to be a ‘guerrilla warfare territory.’ Thus it became my duty as Chief of Anti-Partisan Units to travel about the Government General to collect information and get experience, and to submit reports and suggestions for fighting the partisans.

“In the general information Himmler gave me, he called the Governor General Dr. Frank a traitor to his country, who was conspiring with the Poles and whom he would expose to the Führer very shortly. I still remember two of the reproaches Himmler made against Frank:

“a) At a lawyer’s meeting in the Old Reich territory Frank is said to have stated that ‘he preferred a bad constitutional state to the best conducted police state’; and

“b) During a speech to a Polish delegation Frank had disavowed some of Himmler’s measures and had disparaged, in front of the Poles, those charged with carrying them out, by calling them ‘militant personalities.’

“After having, on a circular tour, personally obtained information on the spot about the situation in the Government General, I visited the higher SS and Police Führer Krüger and the Governor General, Dr. Frank, in Kraków.

“Krüger spoke very disapprovingly about Dr. Frank and blamed Frank’s faltering and unstable policy towards the Poles for conditions in the Government General. He called for harsher and more ruthless measures and said that he would not rest until the traitor Frank was overthrown. I had the impression, from Krüger’s statements, that personal motives also influenced his attitude, and that he himself would have liked to become Governor General.

“After that I had a long discussion with Dr. Frank. I told him of my impressions; and he went into lengthy details about a new policy for Poland, which aimed at appeasing the Poles by means of concessions. In agreement with my personal impressions Dr. Frank considered the following factors responsible for the crisis in the Government General:

“a) The ruthless resettlement action carried out now in the midst of war, especially the senseless and purposeless resettlement carried out by the SS and Police Führer Globocznik in Lublin.

“b) The insufficient food quota allotted to the Governor General.

“Dr. Frank called Krüger and Globocznik declared enemies of any conciliatory policy, and said it was absolutely essential that they should be recalled.

“Being convinced that if Dr. Frank failed, he would be succeeded only by a more ruthless and uncompromising person, I promised him my support. Having been assured of strictest secrecy I told Frank I shared his opinion that Krüger and Globocznik would have to disappear. He, Dr. Frank, knew however that Himmler hated him and that he was urging Hitler to have him removed. With such a state of affairs any request on Frank’s part to have Krüger and Globocznik recalled would not only be rejected but would even strengthen their position with Himmler. Frank should give me a free hand, then I could promise him that both would be relieved of their posts within a short time. Dr. Frank agreed to that, and I then made use of the military mistakes that Krüger and Globocznik had committed in order to bring about their recall by Himmler.

“3) The Warsaw revolt of 1944...”

THE PRESIDENT: I must point out to you that you said you were going to be only 2 hours over five volumes. You have now been over an hour over one volume, and you are reading practically everything in these documents. It is not at all what the Tribunal has intended. You have been told that you may make short comments showing how the documents are connected with each other and how they are connected with all the evidence. That is not what you are doing at all.

DR. SEIDL: In that case I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of Paragraph 3 of the affidavit by Von dem Bach-Zelewski.

Paragraph 3 deals with the Warsaw revolt in the year 1944 and the question as to whether the Governor General had anything to do with the crushing of that revolt.

Then I pass on to Page 92.

THE PRESIDENT: As a matter of fact, does the Indictment charge anything in connection with the crushing of the Warsaw revolt in 1944?

DR. SEIDL: There is nothing in the Indictment itself about the part played by the Governor General in the crushing of that revolt. The Soviet Prosecution have, however, submitted a telegram which, while it is not clear whether it was sent, nevertheless connects the Defendant Dr. Frank in some way with the Warsaw revolt. But I shall not go into details about that now.

I pass on to Page 92 of the document book.

This is an affidavit by the witness Wilhelm Ernst von Palezieux, in whose case the Tribunal has approved an interrogatory. But I was told by the Tribunal that in place of an interrogatory I could submit an affidavit. I quote only the two main paragraphs as follows:

“The art treasures stored in the castle in Kraków, from the spring of 1943, were under official and legal supervision there. When speaking to me Dr. Frank always referred to these art treasures as state property of thy Government General. Catalogues of the existing art treasures had already been made before I came to Poland. The list of the first selection had been printed in book form as a catalogue with descriptions and statements of origin, and had been ordered by the Governor General.”

THE PRESIDENT: Now you are reading the affidavit all over again. We do not want that sort of...

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President. I assumed that in those cases where a witness does not appear before the Tribunal in person, it is admissible that either the interrogatory or the affidavit be read, because otherwise the contents of his testimony would not become part of the record nor, therefore, part of the proceedings.

THE PRESIDENT: That rule was in order that the defendants and their counsel should have the document before them in German; that is the reason for reading the documents through the earphones. The Tribunal will adjourn now, but I want to tell you that you must shorten your presentation of this documentary evidence. We have already been a good deal more than an hour over one book and we have four more books to deal with, and it does not do your case any good to read all these long passages because we have some more weeks of the trial. It is only necessary for you to give such connecting statements as make the documents intelligible, and to correlate them with the oral evidence that is being given.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 24 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]

ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTEENTH DAY Wednesday, 24 April 1946

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal: I left off yesterday at the last document of Volume I. It is the affidavit of the witness Ernst von Palezieux, and I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. The affidavit is given the document number Frank-9, and that completes the first volume.

THE PRESIDENT: The first volume, what page?

DR. SEIDL: That was Page 92 of the first volume, Document Frank-9.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. That is the end of the first volume, isn’t it?

DR. SEIDL: Yes, that is the end of the first volume. Volumes II, III, and IV of the document book comprise extracts from the diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank. I do not propose to number all these extracts individually, but I ask the Tribunal to accept the whole diary as Document Frank-10 (Document 2233-PS), and I propose to quote only a few short extracts. For example Pages 1 to 27, Mr. President, are extracts from the diary which have already been submitted by the Prosecution. I have put the extracts submitted by the Prosecution into a more extensive context, and by quoting the entire passages I have attempted to prove that some of these extracts do not represent the true and essential content of the diary. Those are Exhibits USA-173, on Page 1 of the document book, USSR-223 on Page 3, USA-271 on Page 8, USA-611 on Page 11 of the document book. On Page 14 of the document book there appears to be a misprint. The USA number is not 016 but 613.

THE PRESIDENT: It begins on Page 13 in my copy, doesn’t it?

DR. SEIDL: No, it is on Page 14. It is an entry dated 25 January 1943.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the document that I have and which I think you are referring to, is Document 2233 (aa)-PS, Exhibit USA-613. That is on Page 13. I don’t think it makes any difference.

DR. SEIDL: In that case it must be an error by the Translation Department. At any rate I do not think it is important, I mean this quotation.

I now turn to Page 20 of the document book, a quotation by the Soviet Prosecution. On Page 22 there is a quotation by the Soviet Prosecution. Page 24 of the document book contains quotations by the Prosecution of both the United States and of the Soviet Union. Exhibit USA-295. Perhaps I may point out that these extracts are only a few examples merely to show that in a number of cases the impression obtained is different if one reads either the entire speech or at least a portion of it.

I then turn to Page 32 of the document book, an entry dated 10 October 1939, in which the Defendant Dr. Frank gives instructions for negotiations with the Reich Food Ministry regarding the delivery of 5,000 tons of grain per week—Page 32 of the document book.

On Page 34 there is an entry of 8 March 1940, and I quote the first three lines. The Governor General states:

“In close connection therewith is the actual governing of Poland. The Führer has ordered me to regard the Government General as the home of the Polish people. Accordingly, no Germanization policy of any kind is possible.”

I now pass on to Page 41 of the document book; an entry dated 19 January 1940. I quote the first five lines:

“Dr. Walbaum (Chief of the Health Department): The state of health in the Government General is satisfactory. Much has already been accomplished in this field. In Warsaw alone 700,000 typhus injections have been given. This is a huge total, even for German standards; it is actually a record.”

The next quotation is on Page 50 of the document book, an entry dated 19 February 1940:

“The Governor General is further of the opinion that the need for official interpretation of Polish law may become greater. We should probably have to come to some form of Polish government or regency, and the head of the Polish legal system would then be competent for such a task.”

THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid there seems to have been some slight difference in the paging and therefore if you would give us carefully and somewhat more slowly the actual date of the document we should be able to find it perhaps for ourselves. The pages do not seem to correspond.

DR. SEIDL: The last quotation which I read was dated 19 February 1940.

I now turn to a quotation; that is, an entry of 26 February 1940, and I quote:

“In this connection the Governor General expresses...”

This is on Page 51 in my book. The entry is of 26 February 1940.

THE PRESIDENT: Page 40 in ours.

DR. SEIDL: “In this connection the Governor General expresses the wish of Field Marshal Göring that the German administration should be built up in such a way that the Polish mode of living as such is assured. It should not give the impression that Warsaw is a fallen city which is becoming germanized, but rather that Warsaw, according to the Führer’s will, is to be one of the cities which would continue to exist as a Polish community in the intended reduced Polish state.”

A further entry, dated 26 February 1940, deals with the question of higher education. I quote:

“The Governor General points out in this connection that the universities and high schools have been closed. However, in the long run it would be an impossible state of affairs, for instance, to discontinue medical education. The Polish system of technical schools should also be revived and with the participation of the city.”

The next quotation is on Page 56 of my document book. An entry of 1 March 1940.

“The Governor General announces in this connection that the directive has now been issued to give free rein to Polish development as far as it is possible within the interests of the German Reich. The attitude now to be adopted is that the Government General is the home of the Polish people.”

A further entry deals with the question of workers in the Reich territory. Page 60 of my document book, entry of 19 September 1940—I beg your pardon, 12 September 1940. I quote:

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a moment. You mean the first of September, do you?

DR. SEIDL: 12 September—no, it should be 12 March; there is obviously a misprint; 12 March 1940, Page 197 of the diary. I quote:

“Governor General Dr. Frank emphasizes that one could actually collect an adequate number of workers by force following the methods of the slave trade, by using a sufficient number of police, and by procuring sufficient means of transportation; but that, for a number of reasons, however, the use of propaganda deserves preference under all circumstances.”

The next quotation is on Page 68 in my document book; an entry of 23 April 1940. I quote the last five lines. The Governor General states:

“The Governor General is merely attempting to offer the Polish nation protection in an economic respect as well. He was almost inclined to think that one could achieve better results with Poles than with these autocratic trustees....”

I now turn to Page 71 of my document book, an entry dated 25 May 1940. Here the Governor General gives an explanation to the President of the Polish Court of Appeal, Bronschinski. I quote the last four lines:

“We do not wish to carry on a war of extermination here against a people. The protection of the Polish people by the Reich in the German zone of interest gives you the possibility of continuing your development according to your national traditions.”

I turn to Page 77 of my document book, an entry from Volume III, July to September, Page 692. I quote:

“The Governor General then spoke of the food difficulties still existing in the Government General”—this was to Generaloberst von Küchler—“and asked the general to see to it that the provisioning and other requirements of new troops arriving should be as light a burden as possible on the food situation of the Government General. Above all, no confiscation whatsoever should take place.”

I turn to Pages 85 and 86; entries in Volume III, July to September 1940, Page 819 of the diary. This entry deals with the establishment of the medical academy which was planned by the Governor General. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this fact.

The next quotation is on Page 95 of the document book, an entry dated 9 October 1940, from the speech of the Governor General on the occasion of the opening of the autumn trade fair at Radom. I quote Line 5.

“It is clear that we...”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the important things for us are the page in the diary and the date. We seem to have the pages in the diary and the dates, so if you will tell us them that will be of the greatest help to us.

DR. SEIDL: The date is 9 October 1940; Pages 966-967 of the diary, I quote Line 6:

“It is clear that we do not wish to denationalize, nor shall we germanize.”

The next quotation...

THE PRESIDENT: The translation in our book of that sentence is:

“It is clear that we neither want to denationalize nor degermanize.”

DR. SEIDL: That is apparently an error in the translation.

THE PRESIDENT: In which translation? In the one I have just read out?

DR. SEIDL: In the English translation. I shall now quote literally:

“It is clear that we neither wish to denationalize nor shall we germanize.”

The other makes no sense.

THE PRESIDENT: That is what I read. Well, it is right in our book anyhow.

DR. SEIDL: The Governor General wished to say that we did not want to deprive the Poles of their national character and that we did not intend to turn them into Germans.

I now turn to Page 101, to an entry dated 27 October 1940, Pages 1026 to 1027 of Volume IV of the diary. A conference with Reich Minister of Labor Seldte. I quote, Line 7:

“He, the Governor General, had complained to the Führer that the wages of Polish agricultural laborers had been reduced by 50 percent. In addition, their wages had for the most part been used for purposes which were completely foreign to the idea of this exchange of workers.”

The next quotation is dated 29 November 1940. It is on Page 1085 in