Part 36

The Tribunal finds that Bormann is not guilty on Count One, but is guilty on Counts Three and Four.

1 October 1946

/s/ GEOFFREY LAWRENCE /s/ NORMAN BIRKETT President /s/ FRANCIS BIDDLE /s/ JOHN J. PARKER /s/ H. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES /s/ R. FALCO /s/ NIKITCHENKO /s/ A. VOLCHKOV

DISSENTING OPINION OF THE SOVIET MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

The Tribunal decided:

a) To acquit the Defendants Hjalmar Schacht, Franz von Papen, and Hans Fritzsche;

b) To sentence the Defendant Rudolf Hess to life imprisonment;

c) Not to declare criminal the following organizations: the Reichscabinet, General Staff, and OKW.

In this respect I can not agree with the decision adopted by the Tribunal as it does not correspond to the facts of the case and is based on incorrect conclusions.

I. _The Unfounded Acquittal of Defendant Schacht_

The evidence, submitted to the Tribunal in the case of Schacht, confirms, the following facts:

a) Schacht established contact with Göring in December 1930 and with Hitler at the beginning of 1931. He subsequently established contact between the leadership of the Nazi Party, and the foremost representatives of the German industrial and financial circles. This, in particular, is confirmed by the testimony of Witness Severing (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 23 May 1946; USA-615).

b) In July 1932 Schacht demanded that Von Papen resign his post as Reich Chancellor in favor of Hitler. This fact is confirmed by Von Papen’s testimony at the preliminary interrogation and by Schacht’s own testimony in Court (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 2 May 1946).

c) In November 1932 Schacht collected signatures of German industrialists, urging them to come out for Hitler’s appointment as Reich Chancellor. On 12 November 1932 Schacht wrote to Hitler:

“I have no doubt that the way we are directing the course of events can only lead to your appointment as Reich Chancellor. We are trying to secure a large number of signatures among the industrial circles to ensure your appointment to this post.” (EC-456, USA-773; PS-3901, USA-837)

d) In February 1933 Schacht organized the financing of the pre-election campaign conducted by the Nazi Party, and demanded at the conference of Hitler and Göring with the industrialists that the latter provide three million marks (D-203). Schacht admitted in Court that he had pointed out the necessity for providing the Nazi leaders with this sum (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 3 May 1946), while the Defendant Funk and the former member of the management of “I. G. Farbenindustrie” Schnitzler, who were present at this conference, both confirmed that it was Schacht who was the initiator of the financing of the pre-election campaign (Transcript, 4 July 1946; EC-439, USA-618).

e) Utilizing his prestige, Schacht also repeatedly admitted in his public statements that he asked for the support in the elections of both the Nazi Party and of Hitler (USA-615; USA-616; Transcript, Afternoon Session, 2 May 1946).

On 29 August 1932, Schacht wrote to Hitler: “No matter where my activities lead me in the near future, even if some day you see me imprisoned in a fortress, you can always depend on me as your loyal aide” (EC-457, USA-619).

_Thus, Schacht consciously and deliberately supported the Nazi Party and actively aided in the seizure of power in Germany by the Fascists._ Even prior to his appointment as Plenipotentiary for War Economy, and immediately after the seizure of power by the Nazis, Schacht led in planning and developing the German armaments, as follows:

a) On 17 March 1933, Schacht was appointed President of the Reichsbank (PS-3021, USA-11), and as he himself stated in a speech before his Reichsbank colleagues on 21 March 1938, the Reichsbank under his management was “none other than a National Socialist institution” (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 3 May 1946).

b) In August 1934, Schacht was appointed Reich Minister of Economy (PS-3021, USA-11). His Ministry “was given the task of carrying out the economic preparation for war” (EC-128, USA-623). A special decree granted Schacht, in his capacity of Reich Minister of Economy, unlimited authority in the field of economy (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1934, Part 1, p. 565).

c) Making use of these powers in 1934 Schacht launched upon the execution of the “new program” developed by him (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1934, Part 1, p. 826), and, as Schacht himself noted in his speech of 29 November 1938, this organization played a tremendous part in the course of Germany’s rearmament (EC-611, USA-662).

d) For the purpose of the most effective execution of this “new program” Schacht used the property and means of those political enemies of the Nazi regime, who either became the victims of terror or were forced to emigrate (Schacht’s note to Hitler of 3 May 1939; PS-1168, USA-37).

Schacht used swindler’s tactics and coercion in an effort to acquire raw material and foreign currency for armaments (Affidavit of Vice-President of the Reichsbank, Puhl; EC-437, USA-624).

e) During the first days of his association with the Reichsbank, Schacht issued a series of decrees (27 October 1933, 23 March 1934, 19 February 1935), which in the long run helped realize the broad program of the financing of armaments, developed by him, and with the aid of which, as he testified, he “had found the way to finance the rearmament program.”

In his speech in Leipzig on 4 March 1935, Schacht, while summing up his preceding economic and financial activities, announced “. . . everything that I say and do has the Führer’s full agreement and I shall not do or say anything which is not approved by the Führer” (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 3 May 1946).

Having become the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, Schacht unified under himself the leadership of the entire German economy and through his efforts the establishment of the Hitlerite war machine was accomplished.

a) The secret law of 21 May 1935, which appointed Schacht the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, states as follows:

“The task of the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy is to place all the economic resources in the service of warfare. The Plenipotentiary General for War Economy within the framework of his functions is given the right to issue legal orders, deviating from the existing laws. He is the responsible head for financing wars through the Reich Ministry and the Reichsbank” (PS-2261, USA-24).

b) Schacht financed German armaments through the Mefo system of promissory notes, which was a swindling venture on a national scale that has no precedent, and the success of which was dependent upon the realization of the aggressive plans of the Hitlerites. It was because of this that Schacht set 1942 as the date when the Mefo notes were to mature, and he pointed out in his speech of 29 November 1938 the relation between “the daring credit policy” of the Reichsbank and the aims of the Hitlerite foreign policy (EC-611, USA-622).

c) Having made full use of his plenary powers, Schacht carefully developed and carried out a broad program of economic mobilization which allowed the Hitlerite leaders to wage war at any time considered most favorable. In particular, from the report of Schacht’s deputy, Wohltat, “the preparation for mobilization carried out by the Plenipotentiary for War Economy” shows that Schacht provided to the last detail for the system of exploitation of the German economy in war time, all the way from the utilization of industrial enterprises, of raw material resources and manpower down to the distribution of 80,000,000 ration cards (EC-258, USA-625). It is significant that this report was drawn up a month after Hitler’s statement at the conference of 5 November 1937, at which Hitler set forth this concrete plan of aggression (PS-386, USA-25).

Summarizing his past activity, Schacht wrote in January 1937: “I worked out the preparation for war in accordance with the principle that the plan of our war economy must be built in peace time in such a way that there will be no necessity for any reorganization in case of war”. Schacht confirmed his statement in court (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 2 May 1946).

Schacht consciously and deliberately prepared Germany for war.

d) The former Minister of War Von Blomberg testified that: “Schacht was fully cognizant of the plans for development and increase of the German Armed Forces, since he was constantly informed . . . of all the financing necessary for the development of the German armed forces” (USA-838).

On 31 August 1936, Von Blomberg informed Schacht that: “The establishment of all the Air Force units must be completed by 1 April 1937, and therefore large expenditures must be entailed in 1936 . . . .” (PS-1301, USA-123).

In the spring of 1937, Schacht participated in the military exercises in Godesberg (EC-174).

e) In his memorandum to Hitler on 3 May 1935, entitled the “Financing of Rearmament”, Schacht wrote: “A speedy fulfillment of the program for rearmament on a mass scale is the basis of German policy, and, therefore, everything else must be subordinate to this task; the completion of this task, the achievement of this purpose must meet no obstacles . . . .” (PS-1168, USA-37).

In his speech on 29 November 1938, Schacht announced that Reichsbank’s credit policy made it possible for Germany to create an “unsurpassed machine, and, in turn, this war machine made possible the realization of the aims of our policy” (EC-611, USA-622).

One must exclude the supposition that Schacht was not informed as to what purposes these weapons were to serve since he could not but take into consideration their unprecedented scale and an obvious preference for offensive types of weapons (heavy tanks, bombers, and so on). Besides, Schacht knew perfectly well that not a single country intended to wage war on Germany nor had it any reasons to do so.

a) Schacht utilized the military might growing under his direction to back Germany’s territorial demands which grew in proportion to the increase in armaments.

Schacht testified in Court that “at first he confined himself (in his demands) to the colonies which had once belonged to Germany” (Transcript, Morning Session, 3 May 1946).

In September 1934, during his talk with the American Ambassador Dodd, Schacht pointed out that he desired annexation if possible without war, but through war, if the United States would stay out of it (EC-461, USA-58).

In 1935, Schacht announced to the American Consul Fuller:

“Colonies are essential to Germany. If it is possible, we shall acquire them through negotiations, if not, we shall seize them.” (EC-450, USA-629)

Schacht admitted in Court that military pressure put upon Czechoslovakia was “in some measure the result and the fruit of his labor” (Transcript, Morning Session, 3 May 1946).

b) Schacht personally participated in the plunder of private and State property of the countries which became victims of Hitlerite aggressions.

The minutes of the conference of the Military-Economic Staff on 11 March 1938, in which Schacht participated, state that those present were given Hitler’s latest directives about the invasion of Austria. Further, the minutes state: “After this, at the suggestion of Schacht, it was decided that . . . all the financial accounting will be made in Reichsmarks at the rate of exchange: two schillings for one Reichsmark” (EC-421, USA-645).

Schacht admitted in Court that he personally was in charge of the seizure of the Czechoslovak National Bank after the occupation of Czechoslovakia (Transcript, Morning Session, 3 May 1946).

c) At the beginning of 1940, Schacht offered Hitler his services for negotiations with the United States in regard to the discontinuance of aid to England and he informed Göring of his offer (PS-3700; USA-780).

d) Schacht considered it his duty to greet and congratulate Hitler publicly after the signing of armistice with France, although Schacht, better than anyone else, understood the usurpatory nature of the armistice (German Documentary Film, USA-635).

e) In his letter to Funk on 17 October 1941, Schacht suggested a more effective exploitation of occupied territory. In this case, too, Schacht acted on his own initiative (EC-504; USA-830).

Schacht also participated in the persecution of the Jews:

a) He testified in Court that he “agreed to the policy of the persecution of the Jews as a matter of principle” (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 2 May 1946) although, he stated, “to a certain extent” it was a matter of conscience which, however, “was not serious enough to bring about a break” between him and the Nazis (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 2 May 1946; USA-616).

b) In his capacity of Minister of Economy, Schacht signed a series of decrees, in accordance with which the property of the Jews in Germany was subject to plunder with impunity (USA-832; USA-616). Schacht confirmed in Court the fact that he had signed a series of anti-Semitic decrees (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 2 May 1946).

As to the reasons for Schacht’s resignation from the post of the Minister of Economy and the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy in November 1937, and also from the post of the President of the Reichsbank on 20 November 1939, and finally from the post of the Minister without Portfolio in January 1943, the evidence submitted establishes the following:

a) The reason is not Schacht’s disagreement with the economic preparation for aggressive wars.

Three weeks before leaving the Ministry of Economy and the post of Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, Schacht wrote to Göring: “. . . I also don’t consider that my opinion can differ from yours on economic policy . . . .” (EC-497, USA-775).

In his reply Göring states:

“. . . You promised me your support and collaboration . . . . You have repeated this promise many times, even after differences of opinion began to creep up between us.” (EC-493, USA-642).

Schacht testified in Court that Göring and he only “differed in matters of procedure” (Transcript, Morning Session, 3 May 1946).

In the preliminary examination Göring testified that Schacht’s leaving the Reichsbank “had no relation to the program of rearmament” (USA-648).

The vice-president of the Reichsbank, Puhl, confirmed that Schacht’s resignation from the Reichsbank can be explained by “his desire to extricate himself from a dangerous situation” which developed as the result of Schacht’s own crooked financial operations (EC-438, USA-646).

b) The reason is not Schacht’s disapproval of mass terror conducted by the Hitlerites.

The witness for the Defense, Gisevius, testified that he constantly informed Schacht of the criminal actions of the Gestapo, created by Göring, and that nevertheless, right up to the end of 1936, Schacht looked for “Göring’s support” (Transcript, Morning Session, 24 April 1946).

In his letter to Von Blomberg on 24 December 1935, Schacht suggested that the Gestapo apply “more cautious methods” since the open terror of the Gestapo “hinders the objectives of the armament” (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 2 May 1946).

On 30 January 1937, Schacht was awarded a golden Party insignia by Hitler (EC-500; Transcript, Afternoon Session, 2 May 1946). As stated in an official German publication, “he was able to be of greater help to the Party than if he were actually a member of the Party” (EC-460, USA-617).

Only in 1943, having understood earlier than many other Germans, the inevitability of the failure of the Hitlerite regime, did Schacht establish contact with the opposition circles, however, doing nothing to help depose this regime. Therefore, it was not by chance that having found out these connections of Schacht, Hitler still spared Schacht’s life.

It is thus indisputably established that:

a) Schacht actively assisted in the seizure of power by the Nazis;

b) During a period of 12 years Schacht closely collaborated with Hitler;

c) Schacht provided the economic and financial basis for the creation of the Hitlerite military machine;

d) Schacht prepared Germany’s economy for the waging of aggressive wars;

e) Schacht participated in the persecution of Jews and in the plunder of territories occupied by the Germans.

_Therefore, Schacht’s leading part in the preparation and execution of the common criminal plan is proved._

The decision to acquit Schacht is in obvious contradiction with existing evidence.

II. _The Unfounded Acquittal of Defendant Von Papen._

The verdict does not dispute the fact that Von Papen prepared the way for Hitler’s appointment to the post of the Reich Chancellor and that he actively helped the Nazis in their seizure of power.

In a speech of November 1933, Von Papen said the following on the subject:

“. . . just as I at the time of taking over the Chancellorship (this was in 1932) have advocated to pave the way to power for the young fighting liberation movement, just as I on 30 January was selected by a gracious fate to put the hands of our Chancellor and Führer into the hands of our beloved Field Marshal, so do I today again feel the obligation to say to the German People and all those who have kept confidence in me:

“The kind Lord has blessed Germany by giving it in times of deep distress a leader . . . .” (PS-3375).

_It was Von Papen who revoked Bruning’s order dissolving the SS and the SA_, thus allowing the Nazis to realize their program of mass terror (D-631).

Again it was the defendant who, by the application of brute force, did away with the Social Democrat Government of Braun and Severing (Severing’s Testimony, Transcript, Afternoon Session, 14 June 1946).

On 4 January 1933, Von Papen had a conference with Hitler, Hess, and Himmler (D-632).

Von Papen participated in the purge of the State machinery of all personnel considered unreliable from the Nazi point of view; _on 21 March 1933, he signed a decree creating special political tribunals_; he had also signed an order granting amnesty to criminals whose crimes were committed in the course of the “national revolution”; he participated in drafting the text of the order “insuring Party and State unity”; and so on.

Subsequently Von Papen faithfully served the Hitler regime.

After the Putsch of 1934, _Von Papen ordered his subordinate Tschirschky to appear in the Gestapo_, knowing full well what awaited him there (D-684).

Von Papen helped to keep the bloody murder secret from public opinion (D-717; D-718).

The defendant played a tremendous role in helping Nazis to take possession of Austria.

Three weeks after the assassination of Dollfuss, on 26 July 1934, Hitler told Von Papen that he was being appointed Minister to Vienna, especially noting in a letter: “You have been and continue to be in possession of my fullest and most unlimited trust . . . .” (PS-2799).

In this connection it is impossible to ignore the testimony of the American Ambassador Messersmith who quoted Von Papen as saying that “the seizure of Austria is only the first step” and that he, Von Papen, was in Austria for the purpose of “further weakening the Austrian Government” (USA-57).

The defendant was Hitler’s chief advisor in effecting plans for the seizure of Austria. It was he who proposed several tactical maneuvers to quiet the vigilance of world opinion on the one hand, and allow Germany to conclude her war preparations, on the other.

This follows indisputably from Von Papen’s statement to the Austrian Minister Berger-Waldeneck (PS-1760), from the report of Gauleiter Reuner of 6 July 1939 (USA-61), from Von Papen’s report to Hitler of 21 August 1936 (D-706), from Von Papen’s report to Hitler of 1 September 1936 (PS-2246, USA-67), and from a series of other documents which had been submitted in evidence.

Von Papen played this game until the issuance of the order for alerting the German Armed Forces for moving into Austria. He participated in arranging the conference between Hitler and Schuschnigg of 12 February 1938 (USA-69).

It was Von Papen who in a letter to Hitler emphatically recommended that financial aid be given the Nazi organization in Austria known as the “Freedom Union”, specifically for “its fight against the Jewry” (PS-2830).

Indisputable appears the fact of the Nazi seizure of Austria and of Von Papen’s participation in this act of aggression. After the occupation of Austria, Hitler rewarded Von Papen with the golden insignia of the Nazi Party (D-632).

Neither is it possible to ignore Von Papen’s role as agent provocateur when in his capacity of diplomat he was the German Ambassador to Turkey—whenever evaluation of his activity there is made.

The post, of Ambassador to Turkey was at the time of considerable importance in helping the Nazis realize their aggressive plans.

The official Nazi biographer wrote about Von Papen as follows: “Shortly (after the occupation of Austria) the Führer had need of Von Papen’s services again and on 18 April 1939, he therefore appointed him German Ambassador in Ankara” (D-632).

It should also be noted that for his Turkish activities, Hitler rewarded Von Papen with the Knight’s Cross of the War Merit Order with Swords (D-632).

Thus, evidence submitted establishes beyond doubt that:

a) Von Papen actively aided the Nazis in their seizure of power.

b) Von Papen used both his efforts and his connections to solidify and strengthen the Hitlerian terroristic regime in Germany.

c) Von Papen actively participated in the Nazi aggression against Austria culminating in its occupation.

d) Von Papen faithfully served Hitler up to the very end, aiding the Nazi plans of aggression both with his ability and his diplomatic skill.

It therefore follows that Defendant Von Papen bears considerable responsibility for the crimes of the Hitlerite regime.

For these reasons I cannot consent to the acquittal of Defendant Von Papen.

III. _The Unfounded Acquittal of Defendant Fritzsche_

The acquittal of Defendant Hans Fritzsche follows from the reasoning that Fritzsche, allegedly, had not reached in Germany the official position making him responsible for the criminal actions of the Hitler regime and that his own personal activity in this respect cannot be considered criminal. The verdict characterizes him as a secondary figure carrying out the directives of Goebbels and Von Ribbentrop, and of the Reich Press Director Dietrich.

The verdict does not take into consideration or mention the fact that it was Fritzsche who until 1942 was the director _de facto_ of the Reich press and that, according to himself, subsequent to 1942 he became the “commander-in-chief of the German radio” (Transcript, Morning Session, 23 January 1946).

For the correct definition of the role of Defendant Hans Fritzsche it is necessary, firstly, to keep clearly in mind the importance attached by Hitler and his closest associates (as Göring, for example) to propaganda in general and to radio propaganda in particular. This was considered one of the most important and essential factors in the success of conducting an aggressive war.

In the Germany of Hitler, propaganda was invariably a factor in preparing and conducting acts of aggression and in training the German populace to accept obediently the criminal enterprises of German fascism.

The aims of these enterprises were served by a huge and well centralized propaganda machinery. With the help of the police controls and of a system of censorship it was possible to do away altogether with the freedom of press and of speech.