Part 33

Dönitz, in a conference of 11 December 1944, said “12,000 concentration camp prisoners will be employed in the shipyards as additional labor”. At this time Dönitz had no jurisdiction over shipyard construction, and claims that this was merely a suggestion at the meeting that the responsible officials do something about the production of ships, that he took no steps to get these workers since it was not a matter for his jurisdiction and that he does not know whether they ever were procured. He admits he knew of concentration camps. A man in his position must necessarily have known that citizens of occupied countries in large numbers were confined in the concentration camps.

In 1945 Hitler requested the opinion of Jodl and Dönitz whether the Geneva Convention should be denounced. The notes of the meeting between the two military leaders on 20 February 1945 show that Dönitz expressed his view that the disadvantages of such an action outweighed the advantages. The summary of Dönitz’ attitude shown in the notes taken by an officer, included the following sentence: “It would be better to carry out the measures considered necessary without warning, and at all costs to save face with the outer world.”

The Prosecution insisted that “the measures” referred to meant the Convention should not be denounced, but should be broken at will. The Defense explanation is that Hitler wanted to break the Convention for two reasons: to take away from German troops the protection of the Convention, thus preventing them from continuing to surrender in large groups to the British and Americans, and also to permit reprisals against Allied prisoners of war because of Allied bombing raids. Dönitz claims that what he meant by “measures” were disciplinary measures against German troops to prevent them from surrendering, and that his words had no reference to measures against the Allies; moreover that this was merely a suggestion, and that in any event no such measures were ever taken, either against Allies or Germans. The Tribunal, however, does not believe this explanation. The Geneva Convention was not, however, denounced by Germany. The Defense has introduced several affidavits to prove that British naval prisoners of war in camps under Dönitz’ jurisdiction were treated strictly according to the Convention, and the Tribunal takes this fact into consideration, regarding it as a mitigating circumstance.

_Conclusion_

The Tribunal finds Dönitz is not guilty on Count One of the Indictment, and is guilty on Counts Two and Three.

_RAEDER_

Raeder is indicted on Counts One, Two, and Three. In 1928 he became Chief of Naval Command and in 1935 Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine (OKM); in 1939 Hitler made him Gross-Admiral. He was a member of the Reich Defense Council. On 30 January 1943 Dönitz replaced him at his own request, and he became Admiral Inspector of the Navy, a nominal title.

_Crimes against Peace_

In the 15 years he commanded it, Raeder built and directed the German Navy; he accepts full responsibility until retirement in 1943. He admits the Navy violated the Versailles Treaty, insisting it was “a matter of honor for every man” to do so, and alleges that the violations were for the most part minor, and Germany built less than her allowable strength. These violations, as well as those of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, have already been discussed elsewhere in this Judgment.

Raeder received the directive of 24 June 1937 from Von Blomberg requiring special preparations for war against Austria. He was one of the five leaders present at the Hossbach Conference of 5 November 1937. He claims Hitler merely wished by this conference to spur the Army to faster rearmament, insists he believed the questions of Austria and Czechoslovakia would be settled peacefully, as they were, and points to the new naval treaty with England which had just been signed. He received no orders to speed construction of U-boats, indicating that Hitler was not planning war.

Raeder received directives on “Fall Grün” and the directives on “Fall Weiss” beginning with that of 3 April 1939; the latter directed the Navy to support the Army by intervention from the sea. He was also one of the few chief leaders present at the meeting of 23 May 1939. He attended the Obersalzberg briefing of 22 August 1939.

The conception of the invasion of Norway first arose in the mind of Raeder and not that of Hitler. Despite Hitler’s desire, as shown by his directive of October 1939 to keep Scandinavia neutral, the Navy examined the advantages of naval bases there as early as October. Admiral Karls originally suggested to Raeder the desirable aspects of bases in Norway. A questionnaire, dated 3 October 1939, which sought comments on the desirability of such bases, was circulated within SKL. On 10 October Raeder discussed the matter with Hitler; his War Diary entry for that day says Hitler intended to give the matter consideration. A few months later Hitler talked to Raeder, Quisling, Keitel, and Jodl; OKW began its planning and the Naval War Staff worked with OKW staff officers. Raeder received Keitel’s directive for Norway on 27 January 1940 and the subsequent directive of 1 March, signed by Hitler.

Raeder defends his actions on the ground it was a move to forestall the British. It is not necessary again to discuss this defense, which has heretofore been treated in some detail, concluding that Germany’s invasion of Norway and Denmark was aggressive war. In a letter to the Navy, Raeder said: “The operations of the Navy in the occupation of Norway will for all time remain the great contribution of the Navy to this war.”

Raeder received the directives, including the innumerable postponements, for the attack in the West. In a meeting of 18 March 1941 with Hitler he urged the occupation of all Greece. He claims this was only after the British had landed and Hitler had ordered the attack, and points out the Navy had no interest in Greece. He received Hitler’s directive on Yugoslavia.

Raeder endeavored to dissuade Hitler from embarking upon the invasion of the U.S.S.R. In September 1940 he urged on Hitler an aggressive Mediterranean policy as an alternative to an attack on Russia. On 14 November 1940 he urged the war against England “as our main enemy” and that submarine and naval air force construction be continued. He voiced “serious objections against the Russian campaign before the defeat of England”, according to notes of the German Naval War Staff. He claims his objections were based on the violation of the Non-Aggression Pact as well as strategy. But once the decision had been made, he gave permission 6 days before the invasion of the Soviet Union to attack Russian submarines in the Baltic Sea within a specified warning area and defends this action because these submarines were “snooping” on German activities.

It is clear from this evidence that Raeder participated in the planning and waging of aggressive war.

_War Crimes_

Raeder is charged with War Crimes on the High Seas. The Athenia, an unarmed British passenger liner, was sunk on 3 September 1939, while outward bound to America. The Germans 2 months later charged that Mr. Churchill deliberately sank the Athenia to encourage American hostility to Germany. In fact, it was sunk by the German U-boat 30. Raeder claims that an inexperienced U-boat commander sank it in mistake for an armed merchant cruiser, that this was not known until the U-30 returned several weeks after the German denial and that Hitler then directed the Navy and Foreign Office to continue denying it. Raeder denied knowledge of the propaganda campaign attacking Mr. Churchill.

The most serious charge against Raeder is that he carried out unrestricted submarine warfare, including sinking of unarmed merchant ships, of neutrals, non-rescue and machine-gunning of survivors, contrary to the London Protocol of 1936. The Tribunal makes the same finding on Raeder on this charge as it did as to Dönitz, which has already been announced, up until 30 January 1943 when Raeder retired.

The Commando Order of 18 October 1942, which expressly did not apply to naval warfare, was transmitted by the Naval War Staff to the lower naval commanders with the direction it should be distributed orally by flotilla leaders and section commanders to their subordinates. Two commandos were put to death by the Navy, and not the SD, at Bordeaux on 10 December 1942. The comment of the Naval War Staff was that this was “in accordance with the Führer’s special order, but is nevertheless something new in international law, since the soldiers were in uniform.” Raeder admits he passed the order down through the chain of command, and he did not object to Hitler.

_Conclusion_

The Tribunal finds that Raeder is guilty on Counts One, Two, and Three.

_VON SCHIRACH_

Von Schirach is indicted under Counts One and Four. He joined the Nazi Party and the SA in 1925. In 1929 he became the leader of the National Socialist Students Union. In 1931 he was made Reichs Youth Leader of the Nazi Party with control over all Nazi youth organizations, including the Hitler Jugend. In 1933, after the Nazis had obtained control of the Government, Von Schirach was made Leader of Youth in the German Reich, originally a position within the Ministry of the Interior, but, after 1 December 1936, an office in the Reich Cabinet. In 1940 Von Schirach resigned as head of the Hitler Jugend and Leader of Youth in the German Reich, but retained his position as Reichsleiter with control over Youth Education. In 1940 he was appointed Gauleiter of Vienna, Reichs Governor of Vienna, and Reichs Defense Commissioner for that territory.

_Crimes against Peace_

After the Nazis had come to power Von Schirach, utilizing both physical violence and official pressure, either drove out of existence or took over all youth groups which competed with the Hitler Jugend. A Hitler decree of 1 December 1936 incorporated all German youth within the Hitler Jugend. By the time formal conscription was introduced in 1940, 97 percent of those eligible were already members.

Von Schirach used the Hitler Jugend to educate German Youth “in the spirit of National Socialism” and subjected them to an intensive program of Nazi propaganda. He established the Hitler Jugend as a source of replacements for the Nazi Party formations. In October 1938 he entered into an agreement with Himmler under which members of the Hitler Jugend who met SS standards would be considered as the primary source of replacements for the SS.

Von Schirach also used the Hitler Jugend for pre-military training. Special units were set up whose primary purpose was training specialists for the various branches of the service. On 11 August 1939 he entered into an agreement with Keitel under which the Hitler Jugend agreed to carry out its pre-military activities under standards laid down by the Wehrmacht and the Wehrmacht agreed to train 30,000 Hitler Jugend instructors each year. The Hitler Jugend placed particular emphasis on the military spirit and its training program stressed the importance of return of the colonies, the necessity for Lebensraum, and the noble destiny of German youth to die for Hitler.

Despite the warlike nature of the activities of the Hitler Jugend, however, it does not appear that Von Schirach was involved in the development of Hitler’s plan for territorial expansion by means of aggressive war, or that he participated in the planning or preparation of any of the wars of aggression.

_Crimes against Humanity_

In July 1940 Von Schirach was appointed Gauleiter of Vienna. At the same time he was appointed Reichs Governor for Vienna and Reichs Defense Commissioner, originally for Military District 17, including the Gaue of Vienna, Upper Danube, and Lower Danube and, after 17 November 1942, for the Gaue of Vienna alone. As Reichs Defense Commissioner, he had control of the civilian war economy. As Reichs Governor he was head of the municipal administration of the City of Vienna, and, under the supervision of the Minister of the Interior, in charge of the governmental administration of the Reich in Vienna.

Von Schirach is not charged with the commission of War Crimes in Vienna, only with the commission of Crimes against Humanity. As has already been seen, Austria was occupied pursuant to a common plan of aggression. Its occupation is, therefore, a “crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal”, as that term is used in Article 6 (c) of the Charter. As a result, “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts” and “persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds” in connection with this occupation constitute a Crime against Humanity under that Article.

As Gauleiter of Vienna, Von Schirach came under the Sauckel decree, dated 6 April 1942, making the Gauleiters Sauckel’s plenipotentiaries for manpower with authority to supervise the utilization and treatment of manpower within their Gaue. Sauckel’s directives provided that the forced laborers were to be fed, sheltered, and treated so as to exploit them to the highest possible degree at the lowest possible expense.

When Von Schirach became Gauleiter of Vienna the deportation of the Jews had already been begun, and only 60,000 out of Vienna’s original 190,000 Jews remained. On 2 October 1940 he attended a conference at Hitler’s office and told Frank that he had 50,000 Jews in Vienna which the General Government would have to take over from him. On 3 December 1940 Von Schirach received a letter from Lammers stating that after the receipt of the reports made by Von Schirach, Hitler had decided to deport the 60,000 Jews still remaining in Vienna to the General Government because of the housing shortage in Vienna. The deportation of the Jews from Vienna was then begun and continued until the early fall of 1942. On 15 September 1942 Von Schirach made a speech in which he defended his action in having driven “tens of thousands upon tens of thousands of Jews into the ghetto of the East” as “contributing to European culture”.

While the Jews were being deported from Vienna, reports, addressed to him in his official capacity, were received in Von Schirach’s office from the office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD which contained a description of the activities of Einsatzgruppen in exterminating Jews. Many of these reports were initialed by one of Von Schirach’s principal deputies. On 30 June 1944 Von Schirach’s office also received a letter from Kaltenbrunner informing him that a shipment of 12,000 Jews was on its way to Vienna for essential war work and that all those who were incapable of work would have to be kept in readiness for “special action”.

The Tribunal finds that Von Schirach, while he did not originate the policy of deporting Jews from Vienna, participated in this deportation after he had become Gauleiter of Vienna. He knew that the best the Jews could hope for was a miserable existence in the ghettos of the East. Bulletins describing the Jewish extermination were in his office.

While Gauleiter of Vienna Von Schirach continued to function as Reichsleiter for Youth Education and in this capacity he was informed of the Hitler Jugend’s participation in the plan put into effect in the fall of 1944 under which 50,000 young people between the ages of 10 and 20 were evacuated into Germany from areas recaptured by the Soviet forces and used as apprentices in German industry and as auxiliaries in units of the German Armed Forces. In the summer of 1942 Von Schirach telegraphed Bormann urging that a bombing attack on an English cultural town be carried out in retaliation for the assassination of Heydrich which, he claimed, had been planned by the British.

_Conclusion_

The Tribunal finds that Von Schirach is not guilty on Count One. He is guilty under Count Four.

_SAUCKEL_

Sauckel is indicted under all four Counts. Sauckel joined the Nazi Party in 1923, and became Gauleiter of Thuringia in 1927. He was a member of the Thuringian legislature from 1927 to 1933, was appointed Reichsstatthalter for Thuringia in 1932, and Thuringian Minister of the Interior and head of the Thuringian State Ministry in May 1933. He became a member of the Reichstag in 1933. He held the formal rank of Obergruppenführer in both the SA and the SS.

_Crimes against Peace_

The evidence has not satisfied the Tribunal that Sauckel was sufficiently connected with the common plan to wage aggressive war or sufficiently involved in the planning or waging of the aggressive wars to allow the Tribunal to convict him on Counts One or Two.

_War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity_

On 21 March 1942 Hitler appointed Sauckel Plenipotentiary General for the Utilization of Labor, with authority to put under uniform control “the utilization of all available manpower, including that of workers recruited abroad and of prisoners of war”. Sauckel was instructed to operate within the fabric of the Four Year Plan, and on 27 March 1942 Göring issued a decree as Commissioner for the Four Year Plan transferring his manpower sections to Sauckel. On 30 September 1942 Hitler gave Sauckel authority to appoint Commissioners in the various occupied territories, and “to take all necessary measures for the enforcement” of the Decree of 21 March 1942.

Under the authority which he obtained by these decrees, Sauckel set up a program for the mobilization of the labor resources available to the Reich. One of the important parts of this mobilization was the systematic exploitation, by force, of the labor resources of the occupied territories. Shortly after Sauckel had taken office, he had the governing authorities in the various occupied territories issue decrees, establishing compulsory labor service in Germany. Under the authority of these decrees Sauckel’s commissioners, backed up by the police authorities of the occupied territories, obtained and sent to Germany the laborers which were necessary to fill the quotas given them by Sauckel. He described so-called “voluntary” recruiting by a whole batch of male and female agents just as was done in the olden times for shanghaiing”. That real voluntary recruiting was the exception rather than the rule is shown by Sauckel’s statement on 1 March 1944, that “out of five million foreign workers who arrived in Germany not even 200,000 came voluntarily”. Although he now claims that the statement is not true, the circumstances under which it was made, as well as the evidence presented before the Tribunal, leave no doubt that it was substantially accurate.

The manner in which the unfortunate slave laborers were collected and transported to Germany, and what happened to them after they arrived, has already been described. Sauckel argues that he is not responsible for these excesses in the administration of the program. He says that the total number of workers to be obtained was set by the demands from agriculture and from industry; that obtaining the workers was the responsibility of the occupation authorities transporting them to Germany that of the German railways, and taking care of them in Germany that of the Ministries of Labor and Agriculture, the German Labor Front, and the various industries involved. He testifies that insofar as he had any authority he was constantly urging humane treatment.

There is no doubt, however, that Sauckel had over-all responsibility for the slave labor program. At the time of the events in question he did not fail to assert control over the fields which he now claims were the sole responsibility of others. His regulations provided that his commissioners should have authority for obtaining labor, and he was constantly in the field supervising the steps which were being taken. He was aware of ruthless methods being taken to obtain laborers, and vigorously supported them on the ground that they were necessary to fill the quotas.

Sauckel’s regulations also provided that he had responsibility for transporting the laborers to Germany, allocating them to employers and taking care of them, and that the other agencies involved in these processes were subordinate to him. He was informed of the bad conditions which existed. It does not appear that he advocated brutality for its own sake, or was an advocate of any program such as Himmler’s plan for extermination through work. His attitude was thus expressed in a regulation:

“All the men must be fed, sheltered and treated in such a way as to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest conceivable degree of expenditure.”

The evidence shows that Sauckel was in charge of a program which involved deportation for slave labor of more than 5,000,000 human beings, many of them under terrible conditions of cruelty and suffering.

_Conclusion_

The Tribunal finds that Sauckel is not guilty on Counts One and Two. He is guilty under Counts Three and Four.

_JODL_

Jodl is indicted on all four Counts. From 1935 to 1938 he was Chief of the National Defense Section in the High Command. After a year in command of troops, in August 1939 he returned to become Chief of the Operations Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces. Although his immediate superior was Defendant Keitel, he reported directly to Hitler on operational matters. In the strict military sense, Jodl was the actual planner of the war and responsible in large measure for the strategy and conduct of operations.

Jodl defends himself on the ground he was a soldier sworn to obedience, and not a politician; and that his staff and planning work left him no time for other matters. He said that when he signed or initialed orders, memoranda, and letters, he did so for Hitler and often in the absence of Keitel. Though he claims that as a soldier he had to obey Hitler, he says that he often tried to obstruct certain measures by delay, which occasionally proved successful as when he resisted Hitler’s demand that a directive be issued to lynch Allied “terror fliers”.

_Crimes against Peace_

Entries in Jodl’s diary of 13 and 14 February 1938 show Hitler instructed both him and Keitel to keep up military pressure against Austria begun at the Schuschnigg conference by simulating military measures, and that these achieved their purpose. When Hitler decided “not to tolerate” Schuschnigg’s plebiscite, Jodl brought to the conference the “old draft”, the existing staff plan. His diary for 10 March shows Hitler then ordered the preparation of “Case Otto”, and the directive was initialed by Jodl. Jodl issued supplementary instructions on 11 March, and initialed Hitler’s order for the invasion on the same date.

In planning the attack on Czechoslovakia, Jodl was very active, according to the Schmundt Notes. He initialed items 14, 17, 24, 36, and 37 in the Notes. Jodl admits he agreed with OKH that the “incident” to provide German intervention must occur at the latest by 1400 on X-1 Day, the day before the attack, and said it must occur at a fixed time in good flying weather. Jodl conferred with the propaganda experts on “imminent common tasks” such as German violations of international law, exploitation of them by the enemy and refutations by the Germans, which “task” Jodl considered “particularly important”.

After Munich, Jodl wrote:

“Czechoslovakia as a power is out . . . . The genius of the Führer and his determination not to shun even a World War have again won the victory without the use of force. The hope remains that the incredulous, the weak, and the doubtful people have been converted and will remain that way.”

Shortly after the Sudeten occupation, Jodl went to a post command and did not become Chief of the Operations Staff in OKW until the end of August 1939.