Part 1 is the minutes of a report by the Foreign Intelligence Department

of the OKW. Part 2 is a directive from the OKW, dated 8 September 1941, regarding the treatment of Soviet Russian prisoners of war. Part 3 is a memorandum on the guarding of Soviet prisoners of war, and the last document is a copy of the decree by the Council of People’s Commissars regarding the prisoners of war matters dated 1 July 1941.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

KEITEL: Perhaps I can say by way of introduction that these directives were not issued until September, which can be attributed to the fact that at first an order by Hitler existed, saying that Russian prisoners of war were not to be brought back to Reich territory. This order was later on rescinded.

Now, regarding the directive of 8 September 1941, the full text of which I have before me, I should like to say that all these instructions have their origin in the idea that this was a battle of nationalities, for the initial phrase reads, “Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of National Socialist Germany.” That, in my opinion, immediately shows the basis on which these instructions were made and the motives and ideas from which they sprang. It is a fact that Hitler, as I explained yesterday, did not consider this a battle between two states to be waged in accordance with the rules of international law but as a conflict between two ideologies. There are also several statements in the document regarding selection from two points of view: Selection of people who seem, if I may express it in this way, not dangerous to us; and the selection of those who, on account of their political activities and their fanaticism, had to be isolated as representing a particularly dangerous threat to National Socialism.

Turning to the introductory letter, I may say that it has already been presented here by the Prosecutor of the Soviet Union. It is a letter from the Chief of the Intelligence Service of the OKW, Admiral Canaris, reminding one of the general order which I have just mentioned and adding a series of remarks in which he formulates and emphasizes his doubts about the decree and his objections to it. About the memorandum which is attached I need not say any more. It is an extract, and also the orders which the Soviet Union issued in their turn I think on 1 July, for the treatment of prisoners of war, that is, the directives for the treatment of German prisoners of war. I received this on 15 September, whereas the other order had been issued about a week earlier; and after studying this report from Canaris, I must admit I shared his objections. Therefore I took all the papers to Hitler and asked him to cancel the provisions and to make a further statement on the subject. The Führer said that we could not expect that German prisoners of war would be treated according to the Geneva Convention or international law on the other side. We had no way of investigating it and he saw no reason to alter the directives he had issued on that account. He refused point-blank, so I returned the file with my marginal notes to Admiral Canaris. The order remained in force.

DR. NELTE: What was the actual treatment accorded to Soviet prisoners of war? Was it in compliance with the instructions issued or was it handled differently in practice?

KEITEL: According to my own personal observations and the reports which have been put before me, the practice was, if I may say so, very much better and more favorable than the very severe instructions first issued when it had been agreed that the prisoners of war were to be transported to Germany. At any rate, I have seen numerous reports stating that labor conditions, particularly in agriculture, but also in war economy, and in particular in the general institution of war economy such as railways, the building of roads, and so on, were considerably better than might have been expected, considering the severe terms of the instructions.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, may I refer on this occasion to Document Number 6 in the document book?

THE PRESIDENT: Which document book?

DR. NELTE: Document Number 6, in Document Book Number 1—in my document book, Number 6—“Conditions of employment for workers from the East, as well as Soviet Russian prisoners of war.” In this document book I have included from the book I am submitting only those passages which concern the conditions of employment for Soviet Russian prisoners of war. I am submitting this book in evidence as Exhibit K-6, and beg the Tribunal to admit it in evidence without my having to read from it. These instructions refer expressly to the points which indicate that at a later period Soviet Russian prisoners of war were to be treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention as laid down by the OKW, author of the decree.

May I continue?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. You do not wish to read from it?

DR. NELTE: No, I do not want to.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Please, will you explain to me just what relations existed between the police, or rather Himmler, on the one hand and the Prisoners of War Organization, the KGW, on the other?

KEITEL: May I say, first of all, that there was constant friction between Himmler and the corresponding police services and the departments of the Wehrmacht which worked in this sphere and that this friction never stopped. It was apparent right from the first that Himmler at least desired to have the lead in his own hands, and he never ceased trying to obtain influence of one kind or another over prisoner-of-war affairs. The natural circumstances of escapes, recapture by police, searches and inquiries, the complaints about insufficient guarding of prisoners, the insufficient security measures in the camps, the lack of guards and their inefficiency—all these things suited him; and he exploited them in talks with Hitler, when he continually accused the Wehrmacht behind its back, if I may use the expression, of every possible shortcoming and failure to carry out their duty. As a result of this Hitler was continually intervening, and in most cases I did not know the reason. He took up the charges and intervened constantly in affairs so that the Wehrmacht departments were kept in what I might term a state of perpetual unrest. In this connection, since I could not investigate matters myself, I was forced to give instructions to my departments in the OKW.

DR. NELTE: What was the underlying cause and the real purpose which Himmler attempted to achieve?

KEITEL: He wanted not only to gain influence but also, as far as possible, to have prisoner-of-war affairs under himself as Chief of Police in Germany so that he would reign supreme in these matters, if I may say so.

DR. NELTE: Did not the question of procuring labor enter into it?

KEITEL: Later on that did become apparent, yes. I think I shall have to refer to that later but I can say now that one observation at least was made which could not be misinterpreted: The searches and inquiries, made at certain intervals in Germany for escaped persons, made it clear that the majority of these prisoners of war did not go back to the camps from which they had escaped so that obviously they had been retained by police departments and probably used for labor under the jurisdiction of Himmler. Naturally, the number of escapes increased every year and became more and more extensive. For that, of course, there are quite plausible reasons.

DR. NELTE: The prisoner-of-war system, of course, is pretty closely connected with the labor problem. Which departments were responsible for the employment of prisoners of war?

KEITEL: The departments which dealt with this were the State Labor Offices in the so-called Reich Labor Allocation Service, which had originally been in the hands of the Labor Minister and was later on transferred to the Plenipotentiary for the Allocation of Labor. In practice it worked like this: The State Labor Offices applied for workers to the Army district commands which had jurisdiction over the camps. These workers were supplied as far as was possible under the existing general directives.

DR. NELTE: What did the OKW have to do with the allocation of labor?

KEITEL: In general, of course, they had to supervise it, so that allocation was regulated according to the general basic orders. It was not possible, of course, and the inspector was not in a position to check on how each individual was employed; after all, the army district commanders and their generals for the KGW were responsible for that and were the appropriate persons. The actual fight, as I might call it, for prisoner-of-war labor did not really start until 1942. Until then, such workers had been employed mainly in agriculture and the German railway system and a number of general institutions, but not in industry. This applies especially to Soviet prisoners of war who were, in the main, agricultural workers.

DR. NELTE: What was the actual cause for these labor requirements?

KEITEL: During the winter of 1941-42 the problem of replacing soldiers who had dropped out arose, particularly in the eastern theater of war. Considerable numbers of soldiers fit for active service were needed for the front and the armed services. I remember the figures. The army alone needed replacements numbering from 2 to 2.5 million men every year. Assuming that about 1 million of these would come from normal recruiting and about half a million from rehabilitated men, that is, from sick and wounded men who had recovered, that still left 1.5 million to be replaced every year. These could be withdrawn from the war economy and placed at the disposal of the services, the Armed Forces. From this fact resulted the close correlation between the drawing off of these men from the war economy and their replacement by new workers. This manpower had to be taken from the prisoners of war on the one hand and Plenipotentiary Sauckel, whose functions may be summarized as the task of procuring labor, on the other hand. This connection kept bringing me into these matters, too, since I was responsible for the replacements for all the Wehrmacht—Army, Navy, and Air Force—in other words, for the recruiting system. That is why I was present at discussions between Sauckel and the Führer regarding replacements and how these replacements were to be found.

DR. NELTE: What can you tell me about the allocation of prisoners of war in industry and in the armament industry?

KEITEL: Up to 1942 or thereabouts we had not used prisoners of war in any industry even indirectly connected with armaments. This was due to an express prohibition issued by Hitler, which was made by him because he feared attempts at sabotaging machines, production equipment, _et cetera_. He regarded things of that kind as probable and dangerous. Not until necessity compelled us to use every worker in some capacity in the home factories did we abandon this principle. It was no longer discussed; and naturally prisoners of war came to be used after that in the general war production, while my view which I, that is the OKW, expressed in my general orders, was that their use in armament factories was forbidden; I thought that it was not permissible to employ prisoners of war in factories which were exclusively making armaments, by which I mean war equipment, weapons, and munitions.

For the sake of completeness, perhaps I should add that an order issued by the Führer at a later date decreed further relaxation of the limitations of the existing orders. I think the Prosecution stated that Minister Speer is supposed to have spoken of so many thousands of prisoners of war employed in the war economy. I may say, however, that many jobs had to be done in the armament industry which had nothing to do with the actual production of arms and ammunition.

DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have frequently stated that prisoners of war were detained by the police and even placed in concentration camps. Can you give an explanation about that?

KEITEL: I think the explanation of that is that the selection process already mentioned took place in the camps. Furthermore there are documents to show that prisoners of war in whose case the disciplinary powers of the commander were not sufficient were singled out and handed over to the Secret State Police. Finally, I have already mentioned the subject of prisoners who escaped and were recaptured, a considerable number of whom, if not the majority, did not return to their camps. Instructions on the part of the OKW or the Chief of Prisoners of War Organization ordering the surrender of these prisoners to concentration camps are not known to me and have never been issued. But the fact that, when they were handed over to the police, they frequently did end up in the concentration camps has been made known here in various ways, by documents and witnesses. That is my explanation.

DR. NELTE: The French Prosecution have presented a document which bears the Number 1650-PS. This is an order, or, rather, an alleged order, from the OKW ordering that escaped prisoners of war who are not employed are to be surrendered to the Security Service. After what you have just told us, you will have to give an explanation of that. I am showing you, in addition, Document 1514-PS, an order from the Wehrkreiskommando VI (Area Command), from which you will be able to see the procedure adopted by the OKW in connection with the surrender of prisoners of war to the Secret State Police.

KEITEL: First of all, I want to discuss Document 1650-PS. To begin with, I have to state that I did not know of that order, that it was never in my hands, and that so far I have not been able to find out how it came to be issued.

DR. NELTE: Wouldn’t you like to say, first of all, that the document as such is not a document of the OKW?

KEITEL: I am coming to that.

DR. NELTE: I am afraid you must start with that in order to clear up the matter.

KEITEL: The document starts like a document which has been confiscated in a police department. It starts with the words, “The OKW has ordered as follows:”; after that come the Numbers 1, 2, 3 and then it goes on to say, “In this connection I order...”, and that is the Supreme Police Chief of the Reich Security Head Office; it is signed by Müller, not Kaltenbrunner but Müller. I have certainly not signed this order OKW 1 to 3, and I have not seen it; there is no doubt about that. The fact that technical expressions, “Stage 3 b” _et cetera_, are used proves that in itself. These are terms used by the police and they are unknown to me. I must say, therefore, that I am not sure how this document was drafted. I cannot explain it. There are assumptions and possibilities, and I should like to mention them briefly because I have given a great deal of thought to the matter. First, I do not believe that any department of the OKW, that is, the Chief of Prisoners of War Organization or the Chief of the General Wehrmacht Office, could have issued this order independently without instructions to do so. I consider that quite impossible, as it was completely contrary to the general tendency. I have no recollection that I have ever received any instructions of this kind from Hitler or that I have passed any such instruction on to anybody else. I conclude that even if this may look like an excuse, there were, of course, other channels which the Führer used without regard to competency. And, if I must supply an explanation, such orders could have been given through an adjutant without my knowledge. I emphasize that this is a supposition and that it cannot absolve me from blame.

There is only one thing that I would like to say, and that is with reference to the Document 1514-PS. This is a captured order from the Wehrkreiskommando VI, at Münster, dated 27 July 1944, in other words, the summer of 1944. It deals with escaped prisoners of war and how they are to be dealt with. It says “Reference,” and then it quotes seven different orders from the year 1942 up to the beginning of July 1944. This order deals with the question of escaped prisoners of war and ought to have been incorporated in this document, if the military office of Wehrkreis VI had had such an OKW order. That fact is remarkable, and it led me to the conclusion that there never was a written order and that the military authorities in question never received such an order at all. I cannot say more about it since I cannot prove it.

DR. NELTE: You know that the Prosecution have submitted an order, according to which Soviet Russian prisoners of war were to be marked by means of tattooing, so that they could be identified. Would you please make a statement on that?

KEITEL: The facts are as follows: During the summer of 1942, the Führer called the Quartermaster General of the Army to headquarters for a report lasting several hours, at which the Führer asked him to report on conditions in the Eastern rear army territory. I was suddenly called in and told that the Quartermaster General was saying that thousands of Russian prisoners of war were escaping every month, that they disappeared among the population, immediately discarded their uniforms, and procured civilian clothes, and could no longer be identified. I was ordered to make investigations and to devise some means of identification which would enable them to be identified even after they had put on civilian clothing. Thereupon I sent instructions to Berlin, saying that such an order should be prepared but that investigations should first be made by the international law department of the Foreign Office to find out whether such an order could be given at all; and, secondly, whether it could be carried out technically.

I should like to say that we were thinking of tattoo marks of the kind found on many seamen and bricklayers in Germany. But I heard no more about it. One day I met the Foreign Minister at headquarters and talked to him about the question. Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop knew about the inquiry submitted to the Foreign Office and considered the measure extremely questionable. That was the first news I had about the subject. I gave immediate instructions, whether personally or through the adjutant I cannot remember, that the order was not to go out. I had neither seen a draft nor had I signed anything. At any rate I gave an unmistakable order: “The order is in no circumstances to be issued.” I received no further detailed information at the time. I heard nothing more about it and I was convinced that the order had not been issued.

When I was interrogated, I made a statement on those lines. I have now been told by my Defense Counsel that the woman secretary of the Chief of the Prisoners of War Organization has volunteered to testify that the order was rescinded and was not to be issued and, further, that she had received those instructions personally. She said in her statement, however, that this did not happen until several days after the order had actually gone out and that that was the only possible explanation of how that order came to be found in the police office as still valid.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I shall submit the affidavit of the witness which has been received at the appropriate time.

[_Turning to the defendant._] We now turn to the case of Sagan. The Prosecution originally accused you of giving the order for the killing of 50 Royal Air Force officers who escaped from Stalag Luft III at Sagan.

I am no longer clear as to whether the Prosecution still maintain this grave accusation since Reich Marshal Göring and the witness Westhoff have been interrogated, the latter outside these proceedings. I have the report of Westhoff’s interrogation before me and I have also submitted it to you. I should like to ask you now to amplify the statement which the witness Westhoff made during the preliminary proceedings and which he will make shortly in this court, and to say what you yourself know about this extremely grave incident.

KEITEL: The facts are that one morning it was reported to me that the escape had taken place. At the same time I received the information that about 15 of the escaped officers had been apprehended in the vicinity of the camp. I did not intend to report the case at the noon conference on the military situation held at Berchtesgaden, or rather, at the Berghof, as it was highly unpleasant, being the third mass escape in a very short period. As it had happened only 10 or 12 hours before, I hoped that in the course of the day the majority of them would be caught and that in this way the matter might be settled satisfactorily.

While I was making my report Himmler appeared. I think that it was towards the end of my report that he announced the incident in my presence, as he had already started the usual general search for the escaped prisoners. There was an extremely heated discussion, a serious clash between Hitler and myself, since he immediately made the most outrageous accusations against me on account of this incident.

Things are sometimes incorrectly represented in Westhoff’s account, and that is why I am making a detailed statement. During this clash the Führer stated in great excitement, “These prisoners are not to be sent back to the Armed Forces; they are to stay with the Police.” I immediately objected sharply. I said that this procedure was impossible. The general excitement led Hitler to declare again and with considerable emphasis, “I am ordering you to retain them, Himmler; you are not to give them up.”

I put up a fight for the men who had already come back and who should, according to the original order, be brought out again and handed over to the police. I succeeded in doing it; but I could not do anything more.

After that very grave clash...

DR. NELTE: Will you tell me, please who was present during that scene?

KEITEL: As far as I remember, Colonel General Jodl was certainly present, at least for part of the time, and heard some of it, though perhaps not every word, since he was in the adjoining room at first. At any rate, Jodl and I returned to our quarters together. We discussed the case and talked about the extremely unpleasant consequences which the whole matter would have. On returning to my quarters I immediately ordered General Von Graevenitz to report to me the following morning.

In this connection I must explain that Reich Marshal Göring was not present. If I was a little uncertain about that during my interrogation it was because I was told that witnesses had already stated that Göring was present. But right from the beginning I thought it improbable and doubtful. It is also incorrect, therefore, that Göring raised any accusations against me at the time. There had not been a conference in Berlin either. These are mistakes which I think I can explain by saying that Graevenitz, who came with Westhoff and saw me for the first time, was present during the report and witnessed a scene of a kind unusual in military life, because of the violence of my remarks in connection with the incident.

Do you want me to say anything more about the discussion with Graevenitz?

DR. NELTE: The only thing which interests me in this connection is, whether you repeated to Graevenitz the order previously given by Hitler in such a way that both Graevenitz and Westhoff who was also present, might get the impression that you yourself had issued the order for the shooting of the escaped officers.

KEITEL: According to the record of Westhoff’s interrogation, which I have seen, I can explain it, I think, as follows: first of all, I made serious accusations. I myself was extraordinarily excited, for I must say that even the order that the prisoners were to be retained by the police caused me extreme anxiety regarding their fate. I frankly admit that the possibility of their being shot while trying to escape remained in my subconscious mind. I certainly spoke in extreme agitation at the time and did not weigh my words carefully. And I certainly repeated Hitler’s words, which were, “We must make an example,” since I was afraid of some further serious encroachments upon the Prisoners of War Organization in other ways, apart from this single case of the prisoners not being returned to the Wehrmacht. On reading the interrogation report I saw the statement by Graevenitz, or rather, Westhoff, to the effect that I had said, “They will be shot, and most of them must be dead already.” I probably said something like, “You will see what a disaster this is; perhaps many of them have been shot already.”

I did not know, however, that they had already been shot; and I must confess that in my presence Hitler never said a word about anybody being shot. He only said, “Himmler, you will keep them; you will not hand them over.” I did not find out until several days later that they had been shot. I saw among other papers also an official report from the British Government stating that not until the 31st—the escape took place on the 25th—that not until the 31st were they actually shot.

Therefore Westhoff is also wrong in thinking that orders had already been issued saying that an announcement was to be made in the camp stating that certain people had been shot or would not return and that lists of names were to be posted. That order did not come until later, and I remember it; I remember it because of the following incident:

A few days afterwards, I think on or about the 31st, before the situation report, one of the adjutants told me that a report had been received that some had been shot. I requested a discussion alone with Hitler and told him that I had heard that people had been shot by the police. All he said was that he had received it too—naturally, since it was his report. In extreme disgust I told him my opinion of it. At that time he told me that it was to be published in the camp as a warning to the others. Only upon this the announcement in the camp was ordered. In any case, Westhoff’s recollection of some of the facts, which he has sworn to, is not quite accurate, even if such expressions as those used by him and explained by me here may have occurred. We shall hear his own account of that.

DR. NELTE: Did Hitler ever tell you that he had ordered those men to be shot?

KEITEL: No, he never told me that. I never heard it from him. I heard it very much later, as far as I can remember, from Reich Marshal Göring, with whom the whole incident was, of course, the subject of discussions and conversations, especially as an Air Force camp was involved.

DR. NELTE: I should like to say in conclusion: Are you stating under oath, here, that you yourself neither ordered these Royal Air Force officers to be shot, nor did you receive and pass on such an order, nor did you yourself learn who gave the order?

KEITEL: That is correct. I neither received that order nor did I know or hear of it; nor did I pass on such an order. I can repeat this herewith under oath.

DR. NELTE: We now turn to deportations. What the Prosecution refer to as deportation of workers is the removal of bodily fit citizens of the occupied territories to Germany or other occupied territories for the purpose of using them for “slave labor” on defense work or other tasks connected with warfare. That is the accusation which I have read to you.

The Prosecution have repeatedly coupled your name with these accusations and have said that you, that is, the OKW, had co-operated in supplying workers for the German war economy. You know that in fact the Defendant Sauckel was the Plenipotentiary in that field. I should like to ask you whether workers had been taken from the occupied territories and brought to Germany before Plenipotentiary Sauckel was appointed.

KEITEL: As far as I know, workers came from occupied territories, especially those in the West: Belgium, Holland—I do not know about Holland, but certainly France—to Germany. According to what I heard, I understood at the time that it was done by recruiting volunteers. I think I remember that General Von Stülpnagel, the military commander of Paris, told me in Berlin once during a meeting that more than 200,000 had volunteered, but I cannot remember exactly when that was.

DR. NELTE: Was the OKW the competent authority on these matters?

KEITEL: No, the OKW had nothing to do with it. These questions were handled through the usual channels, the OKH, the Military Commanders in France and in Belgium and Northern France with the competent central authorities of the Reich at home, the OKW never had anything to do with it.

DR. NELTE: What about civilian administration in occupied territories?

KEITEL: In occupied territories with civilian administration, the Wehrmacht was excluded from any executive powers in the administration, so that in these territories the Wehrmacht and its services had certainly nothing to do with it. Only in those territories which were still operational areas for the Army were executive powers given to military troops, high commanders, army commanders, _et cetera_. The OKW did not come into the official procedure here either.

DR. NELTE: According to an interrogation report submitted here the Defendant Sauckel said that you, that is, the OKW, were responsible for giving instructions to the military commanders in the occupied territories and that he, Sauckel, was to have their support in his recruiting campaigns for getting the quotas. What can you say about that?

KEITEL: The view held by Plenipotentiary Sauckel can obviously be explained by the fact that he knew neither the official service channels nor the functions of the Wehrmacht, that he saw me at one or two discussions on the furnishing of manpower, and, thirdly, that he sometimes came to see me when he had made his report and received his orders alone. He had probably been given orders to do so, in Hitler’s usual way: Go and see the Chief of the OKW; he will do the rest. The OKW had no occasion to do anything. The OKW had no right to give orders, but in Sauckel’s case I did take over the job of informing the OKH or the technical departments in the General Quartermaster’s office. I have never issued orders or instructions of my own to the military commanders or other services in occupied territories. It was not one of the functions of the OKW.

DR. NELTE: A document has been submitted here according to which Generals Stapf and Nagel had agreed to ask you to exercise pressure or coercion during the recruiting campaigns in the East. That, at any rate, is the assertion by the Prosecution. Do you know of this happening?

KEITEL: I remembered it when the document was presented. It was obviously an attempt on the part of Stapf, who had worked with me in the Army for many years, to get the Führer’s support or assistance through my mediation. Stapf, who was the director of the Economic Staff East at the time, and General Nagel, who was also mentioned in this connection and who was in charge of the Economic Inspectorate Department in the East, had obviously tried to involve me in the matter. According to the document, some pressure had to be applied from higher quarters; but I took no steps at all as I had nothing to do with these things.

DR. NELTE: I am now going to deal with the question of the pillage of art treasures.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we might adjourn now.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. NELTE: The French Prosecution have accused you, among other things, of issuing directives regarding the safeguarding and confiscation of objects of art, libraries, _et cetera_. Were any military orders, directives, or instructions laid down before the campaign in the West or in the East, with regard to objects of art, libraries, and their treatment in occupied territories?

KEITEL: No, as far as I know, there was nothing at all about these matters, although thorough provision had been made for everything else which might happen in the course of a war. I am not aware of any orders which were given with that in mind.

DR. NELTE: I am going to show you three documents submitted by the French Prosecution, which mention you in connection with Rosenberg’s special staff, which has already been mentioned here on various occasions. These are Documents 137-PS, 138-PS, and 140-PS. These are documents from the Chief of the OKW to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in France and in the Netherlands.

KEITEL: The first two documents, 137-PS and 138-PS, came from headquarters. They were dictated in part by myself and sent to offices of the Army. One says “To the Commander-in-Chief of the Army,” the other one “To the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in Occupied France” and to the “Commander of the Wehrmacht in the Netherlands.” They originated partly in answers to queries from various military offices which considered themselves responsible for the safekeeping or guarding of whatever was in the occupied territories, and also from offices which obviously were going to collect, inspect, to register, or otherwise investigate these art treasures, libraries, _et cetera_, and to confiscate them. In one case I was called up on the phone by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, I think, who protested against this, at other times by Reichsleiter Rosenberg. The Führer directed me to instruct military services to acquiesce in this and to state their agreements, as they were directives which he had issued and approved himself. The way in which the documents are drawn up shows, in itself, that they did not emanate from an OKW office. My adjutant signed them; but I myself dictated them on the Führer’s orders and sent them out. These queries may have been made just because no provision had been made and no orders given. I did not know what was to be done with these art treasures, _et cetera_; but I naturally took the view that the object was to safeguard them. No mention was made of transport, or confiscation, or expropriation; and the question did not occur to me; I merely gave these instructions in quite a brief form and did not bother any further about the matter. I took them to be precautionary measures and they did not seem to me to be unjustified.

DR. NELTE: Then you mean the OKW had no jurisdiction over these affairs?

KEITEL: No.

DR. NELTE: It was a question of merely transmitting letters to the military authorities to make known Hitler’s wishes to assist Rosenberg in his task?

KEITEL: That is correct.

DR. NELTE: I should like to put a personal question to you in this connection. Have you ever appropriated to yourself any of the art treasures from public or private ownership in the occupied countries, or did any office whatever assign any work of art to you?

KEITEL: No, I never had anything to do with these things.

DR. NELTE: We now come to the so-called economic exploitation of occupied territories. You are accused of participating, in your official position as Chief of the OKW, in the economic exploitation of the occupied Eastern countries and the Western occupied countries. This question has already been discussed in Reich Marshal Göring’s examination, so I can treat it relatively briefly. It is, however, necessary for you to clarify the extent to which the OKW, and yourself in particular, were connected with these matters, for both the OKW and yourself are mentioned in this connection, as well as the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt (Economic Armament Office), which was a branch of the OKW. General Thomas of that office prepared a compilation which was produced by the Prosecution. What can you say about this question, if I have Document 1157-PS and USSR-80 shown to you?

KEITEL: 1157-PS deals with “Plan Barbarossa Oldenburg.” I would like to say this:

The Wehrwirtschaftsamt (War Economy Office), which even then was no longer known as the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt carried out under its chief, General Thomas, certain organizational preparations, first for the campaign in the West and later for campaign Barbarossa in the East. They were made by the military economic organization at home, in the Reich, which had teams attached to all Wehrkreiskommandos. As a result, advisers and some personnel with experience in problems of war economy supplies and a few small detachments called Feldwirtschaftskommandos (Field Economic Detachments) were assigned to the Army Commands (the A.O.K’s).

The personnel attached to the Quartermaster Staffs at the A.O.K. were responsible for securing, or causing to be secured, supplies, fuel, and food stuffs found in occupied or conquered territories, as well as other articles suitable for the immediate requirements of the troops. They should then co-operate with the Senior Quartermaster, who looks after my army supplies, and the intendant in charge of the transport of supplies, in making them available for the fighting troops. Information obtained regarding war economy in the important areas of France and Belgium, as far as such information could be obtained, was kept for later use. The East, as I believe Reich Marshal Göring has already explained at length, was organized on quite a different basis with a view not only to supplying the troops, but also to exploiting the conquered territories. An organization serving this aim was built up, called Wirtschaftsorganisation Ost-Oldenburg (Economic Organization East-Oldenburg). Its connection with the OKW lay in the fact that the necessary preparations for organizing and developing panels of experts and technical branch offices had to be discussed with the Ministry of Economics, the Four Year Plan, and the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. That was Wirtschaftsorganisation Oldenburg. The OKW and its Chief, that is myself, had no power to give orders or instructions affecting its activities. The organization was created and placed at the disposal of those responsible for putting it in action, giving it instructions and working with it. If General Thomas wrote in his book, which was produced here as a document...

DR. NELTE: 2353-PS (Exhibit Number USA-35), Page 386. Perhaps you will just read that, so that you can give us a summary.

KEITEL: Yes. This is an excerpt from the book of General Thomas, where he describes in detail his own functions and those of the organization which he directed in the OKW, from its origin until far into the war. He says here:

“The functions exercised by the Economic Armament Office (Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt) while the Eastern campaign was going on consisted mainly in the organizational management of the economic machinery set in motion and in advising the Operational Staff for War Economy East.”

DR. NELTE: You need read only Paragraph 4 for your summary.

KEITEL: The Operational Staff for Military Economy East, attached to the Four Year Plan as Barbarossa-Oldenburg, was responsible for the entire economic direction of the whole of the Eastern area. It was responsible, for the technical instructions of the State Secretaries in the Operational Staff for Military Economy, for the organization of Thomas’ Economic Armament Office, and for applying all measures to be taken by the Operational Staff for Military Economy East under the direction and command of the Reich Marshal.

DR. NELTE: How were conditions in the West?

KEITEL: I described very briefly the small group of experts attached to the High Command quartermaster departments in the West. Later on, as I have already stated, at the beginning of June, the entire economic direction was transferred to the Four Year Plan and the plenipotentiaries for the Four Year Plan, as far as anything passed beyond current supplies intended to cover daily requirements, fuel, _et cetera_. This was done by a special decree, which has already been mentioned by the Reich Marshal and which had been issued by the Führer.

DR. NELTE: That was laid down by General Thomas on Page 304 in Document 2353-PS, which we have already mentioned. There is no need for me to read this; and I request the Tribunal to allow me to present the defendant’s affidavit in Document Book Number 2 for the Military Economic Armament Office of the OKW, as Document Keitel-11 in evidence, so that no further questions on the subject may be necessary. I assume that the Prosecution will agree to this procedure.

THE PRESIDENT: What number is it in Book 2?

DR. NELTE: Number 4 in this Document Book Number 2. It is Page 27 and following, in Document Book 2, submitted to the Court. The document is dated 29 March 1946.

THE PRESIDENT: What date did you say it is?

DR. NELTE: The 29th of March 1946. I do not think there is any date in the document book. I will present the original, which I have here.

THE PRESIDENT: How is it described in the document itself? We have a document dated 4 March 1946, “The Economic Armament Office of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht.” Is that right?

DR. NELTE: The document was written on 4 March 1946, but the affidavit was added on 29 March 1946.

THE PRESIDENT: But that appears to have been 8 March? Is it that document?

DR. NELTE: The Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt in the OKW. It is possible.

THE PRESIDENT: That’s here.

DR. NELTE: In any case, there is no doubt about the identity of the document.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Now I come to a topic which is presented again and again before the high Tribunal and which is very difficult because the reason for these questions is not properly understood.

The charge has been made against you that in your capacity as a member of the government, as the Prosecution contend, you knew, or must have known of the happenings in the concentration camps. I am therefore compelled to ask you what you know about the existence of the concentration camps, how much you knew and what you had to do with them. Did you know of their existence? Did you know that concentration camps existed?

KEITEL: Yes, I knew already before the war that concentration camps existed; but at that time I knew only two of them by name; and I supposed and assumed that there were other concentration camps besides the two I knew. I had no further particulars about the existence of concentration camps. As far as internees in such camps were concerned, I knew that they included habitual criminals and political opponents. As Reich Marshal Göring has said, that was the basis of the institution.

DR. NELTE: Did you hear anything about the treatment of internees?

KEITEL: No, I heard nothing precise about it. I assumed that it was a severe form of detention, or one which brought severe measures in its train, under certain specific circumstances. I knew nothing about the conditions found there, especially ill-treatment of internees, tortures, _et cetera_.

I tried in two cases to free individuals who were in concentration camps. One was Pastor Niemöller, by intervention of Grossadmiral Raeder. With the help of Canaris and at the request of Grossadmiral Raeder, I tried to get Pastor Niemöller out of the concentration camps. The attempt was unsuccessful. I made a second attempt at the request of a family in my home village, in a case where a peasant was in a concentration camp for political reasons; and in this case I succeeded. The individual involved was set free. That was in the autumn of 1940. I had a talk with this man; and when I asked him what things were like there, he gave me a non-committal reply to the effect that he had been all right. He gave me no details. I know of no other cases.

DR. NELTE: When you talked to this man did you have the impression that anything had happened to him?

KEITEL: Undoubtedly he did not give that impression. I did not see him directly after his release. I saw him later when I was at home. The reason that I talked to him was because he came to thank me. He said nothing about being badly treated or anything like that at all.

DR. NELTE: It has been stated here that now and again these concentration camps were visited by members of the Wehrmacht, by officers—and high ranking officers, too. How do you explain that?

KEITEL: I am convinced that these visits took place on Himmler’s invitation. I myself once received a personal invitation from him to pay a visit to the Dachau Camp from Munich. He said he would like to show it to me. I know also that large and small groups of officers and commissions were shown through the camps. I think I need scarcely say how these visits were handled as regards the things that were shown to them. To supplement my statement I would like to say it was not uncommon to hear such remarks as “You’ll end up in a concentration camp!” or “All sorts of things go on there.” I do know, however, that whenever anyone came to me with these rumors and stories and I asked what exactly they knew and where the information came from, the reply was always: “I really do not know; I just heard it.” So that whatever one might think, one never got at the facts and never could get at them.

DR. NELTE: You heard that medical experiments were made on these internees, and that this was done by agreement with higher quarters. I ask you whether you had knowledge of that, either personally or from the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht.

KEITEL: No, I never heard anything about the medical experiments on internees, which have been described here in detail, either officially or otherwise. Nothing.

DR. NELTE: I turn now to a group of questions relating to the Prosecution’s assertion that you intended to have General Weygand and General Giraud assassinated or, at least, were participating in plans to that end. You know that witness Lahousen, on 30 November 1945 stated that Admiral Canaris had been pressed by you for some time, November-December 1940, to do away with the Chief of the French General Staff, General Weygand.

Lahousen added that Canaris told his departmental heads that after a talk with you. Did you discuss the case of General Weygand with Canaris?

KEITEL: That is probably correct, for there were reports at the time that General Weygand was traveling in North Africa, visiting the troops, and inspecting the colonial troops. I consider it quite natural that I told Canaris, who was the Chief of Counterintelligence, that it should be possible to determine the object of General Weygand’s journey, the places at which he stopped in North Africa, and whether any military significance could be attached to this visit, as regards putting colonial troops into action or the introduction of other measures concerning them in North Africa. He is sure to have received instructions to try to get information through his Intelligence Department as to what was taking place.

DR. NELTE: I assume, also to keep an eye on him?

KEITEL: Yes.

DR. NELTE: Could the Counterintelligence department send members of its staff to North Africa?

KEITEL: I believe that certain channels of information existed via Spanish Morocco; and I know that Canaris maintained intelligence links with Morocco by way of Spain.

DR. NELTE: My question was meant to find out whether it was officially possible to visit North Africa in agreement with France.

KEITEL: Of course it was possible. After the Armistice, there were Disarmament Commissions in North Africa, as well as in France. We had several Army departments there in connection with checking up the armaments of the North African troops.

DR. NELTE: What was the point, or was there any point, in wishing General Weygand ill? Was he a declared opponent of the policy Germany wished to carry through? What was the reason?

KEITEL: We had no reason to think that General Weygand might be, shall we say, inconvenient. In view of the connection with Marshal Pétain, which was started about the end of September and the beginning of October of that year, and the well-known collaboration policy which reached its height in the winter of 1940-41, it was absurd even to think of doing away with the Marshal’s Chief of Staff. An action of this kind would not have fitted into the general policy followed in dealing with the situation in North Africa. We released a large number of officers in the regular French Colonial Army from French prisoner-of-war camps in the winter of 1940-1941 for service with the colonial forces. There were generals among them; I remember General Juin in particular who, as we knew at the time, had been Chief of the General Staff in North Africa for many years. At my suggestion he was put at the disposal of the Marshal by Hitler, obviously with the aim of utilizing him in the colonial service. There had not been the slightest motive for wishing General Weygand ill or to think of anything of the sort.

DR. NELTE: Is it correct that conferences even took place with the French General Staff and Laval about co-operating in operations in Africa and the strengthening of West Africa?

KEITEL: Yes. Among the documents of the French Armistice Delegation there ought to be a large number of documents asking for all sorts of concessions in connection with North Africa and more especially Central and West Africa, owing to the fact that during the winter of 1940-41 riots had taken place in French Central Africa against which the French Government wanted to take measures. I believe that in the spring of 1941 a conference lasting several days took place in Paris with the French General Staff, in order to prepare measures in which the German Wehrmacht, which already had troops stationed in Tripoli in the Italian area, would participate.

DR. NELTE: So there is no apparent motive?

KEITEL: No.

DR. NELTE: Something must have been said, however, in this conversation with Canaris, which led to this misunderstanding. Can you suggest anything which might have caused this misunderstanding?

KEITEL: It can only be that, according to the very comprehensive details given by Lahousen in his testimony, I said at a later meeting, “What about Weygand?” That was the phrase Lahousen used; and he might have drawn the conclusion that, perhaps, in that sense of the word, as he represented it, he kept on saying “in that sense of the word,” and when asked what that meant, he said, “To kill him.” It is due only to that, it can be due only to that. I must say that Canaris was frequently alone with me. Often he brought the chiefs of his departments along. When we discussed matters by ourselves, I thought he was always perfectly frank with me. If he had misunderstood me, there would certainly have been discussions about it, but he never said anything like that.

DR. NELTE: Is it clear to you that if there had been any idea of putting Weygand out of the way, it would have constituted an act of high political significance?

KEITEL: Yes, of course. In the collaboration of the Führer Adolf Hitler and Marshal Pétain an act of that kind would have had the greatest imaginable political significance.

DR. NELTE: Then you still believe that if it had happened, it would have meant the breaking-off of the policy initiated by Hitler?

KEITEL: Certainly one would have had to expect that.

DR. NELTE: Only with regard to the great importance of General Weygand’s personality?

KEITEL: Yes.

DR. NELTE: Can you give any other explanation, or any proof that the designs attributed to you, but thanks be to God were never put into practice, had no foundation in fact?

KEITEL: Although it was at a much later date that General Weygand was taken to Germany, on the occupation of the hitherto unoccupied zone of Southern France, I was told by the Führer himself that he had given orders only for the general to be interned in his own home, without being inconvenienced by guards—an honorable arrest and not the treatment accorded to an ordinary prisoner of war. Of course, that was in 1942.

DR. NELTE: Therefore, you finally and repeatedly deny under oath that you gave any order or expressed yourself in any way which might lead your hearers to conclude that you intended or wished General Weygand to be put out of the way?

KEITEL: Yes. I can expressly reaffirm that.

DR. NELTE: The witness Lahousen also spoke of Giraud and described the case much in the same way as that of Weygand. In neither case was he in a position to say from his own first-hand knowledge that you had given such an order, but he reported what Canaris had told him and illustrated his testimony by means of later inquiries. I ask you to tell us what you know about the case of Giraud, which created a sensation at the time and also here, and to say what part you took in discussions regarding Giraud.

KEITEL: Giraud’s successful escape from the Fortress of Königstein near Dresden on 19 April 1942 created a sensation; and I was severely reprimanded about the guard of this general’s camp, a military fortress. The escape was successful despite all attempts to recapture the general, by police or military action, on his way back to France. Canaris had instructions from me to keep a particularly sharp watch on all the places at which he might cross the frontier into France or Alsace-Lorraine, so that we could recapture him. The police were also put on to this job; 8 or 10 days after his escape it was made known that the general had arrived safely back in France. If I issued any orders during this search I probably used the words I gave in the preliminary interrogations, namely, “We must get the general back, dead or alive.” I possibly did say something like that. He had escaped and was in France.

Second phase: Efforts, made through the Embassy by Abetz and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to induce the general to return to captivity of his own accord, appeared not to be unsuccessful or impossible, as the general had declared himself willing to go to the occupied zone to discuss the matter. I was of the opinion that the general might possibly do it on account of the concessions hitherto made to Marshal Pétain regarding personal wishes in connection with the release of French generals from captivity. The meeting with General Giraud took place in occupied territory, at the staff quarters of a German Army Corps, where the question of his return was discussed. The Military Commander informed me by telephone of the general’s presence in occupied territory, in the hotel where the German officers were billeted.

The commanding general suggested that if the general would not return voluntarily it would be a very simple matter to apprehend him if he were authorized to do so. I at once refused this categorically for I considered it a breach of faith. The general had come trusting to receive proper treatment and be returned unmolested.

Third phase: The attempt or desire to get the general back somehow into military custody arose from the fact that Canaris told me that the general’s family was residing in territory occupied by German troops; and it was almost certain that the general would try to see his family, even if only after a certain period of time and when the incident had been allowed to drop. He suggested to me to make preparations for the recapture of the general if he made a visit of this kind in occupied territory. Canaris said that he himself would initiate these preparations through his Counterintelligence office in Paris and through his other offices. Nothing happened for some time; and it was surely quite natural for me to ask on several occasions, no matter who was with Canaris or if Lahousen was with him, “What has become of the Giraud affair?” or, in the same way, “How is the Giraud case getting on?” The words used by Mr. Lahousen were, “It is very difficult; but we shall do everything we can.” That was his answer. Canaris made no reply. That strikes me as significant only now; but at the time it did not occur to me.

Third phase: At a later stage—Shall I continue?

DR. NELTE: Fourth phase.

KEITEL: Fourth phase. This began with Hitler saying to me: “This is all nonsense. We are not getting results. Counterintelligence is not capable of this and cannot handle this matter. I will turn it over to Himmler and Counterintelligence had better keep out of this, for they will never get hold of the general again.” Admiral Canaris said at the time that he was counting on having the necessary security measures taken by the French secret state police in case General Giraud went to the occupied zone; and a fight might result, as the general was notoriously a spirited soldier, a man of 60 who lowers himself 45 meters over a cliff by means of a rope—that is how he escaped from Königstein.

Fifth phase: According to Lahousen’s explanation in Berlin, Canaris’ desire to transfer the matter to the Secret State Police, which Lahousen said was done as a result of representations from the departmental heads, was because I asked again how matters stood with Giraud and he wanted to get rid of this awkward mission. Canaris came to me and asked if he could pass it on to the Reich Security Main Office or to the police. I said yes, because the Führer had already told me repeatedly that he wanted to hand it over to Himmler.

Next phase: I wanted to warn Canaris some time later, when Himmler came to see me and confirmed that he had received orders from Hitler to have Giraud and his family watched unobtrusively and that I was to stop Canaris from taking any action in the case. He had been told that Canaris was working along parallel lines. I immediately agreed.

Now we come to the phase which Lahousen has described at length. I had asked about “Gustav” and similar questions. I wanted to direct Canaris immediately to stop all his activities in the matter, as Hitler had confirmed the order. What happened in Paris according to Lahousen’s detailed reports, that excuses were sought, _et cetera_, that the matter was thought to be very mysterious, that is, Gustav as an abbreviation for the G in Giraud, all this is fancy rather than fact. I had Canaris summoned to me at once, for he was in Paris and not in Berlin. He had done nothing at all, right from the start. He was thus in a highly uncomfortable position with regard to me for he had lied to me. When he came I said only, “You will have nothing more to do in this matter; keep clear of it.”

Then came the next phase: The general’s escape without difficulty to North Africa by plane, which was suddenly reported—if I remember correctly—before the invasion of North Africa by the Anglo-American troops. That ended the business. No action was ever taken by the Counterintelligence whom I had charged to watch him, or by the police; and I never even used the words to do away with the general. Never!

The final phase of this entire affair may sound like a fairy tale, but it is true nevertheless. The general sent a plane from North Africa to Southern France near Lyons in February or March 1944, with a liaison officer who reported to the Counterintelligence and asked if the general could return to France and what would happen to him on landing in France. The question was turned over to me. Generaloberst Jodl is my witness that these things actually happened. The chief of the Counterintelligence Office involved in this matter was with me. The answer was: “Exactly the same treatment as General Weygand who is already in Germany. There is no doubt that the Führer will agree.”

Nothing actually did happen, and I heard no more about it. But these things actually happened.

DR. NELTE: To complete our information, I must ask you a few questions for the French Prosecution have mentioned that later, in a later phase, the family of General Giraud suffered inconveniences or losses of a rather serious nature. When you were searching for Giraud did you cause any trouble to his family, who were living in occupied France? Did you give any directives which would confine or inconvenience the family in any way?

KEITEL: No. I had only an unobtrusive watch kept on the family’s residence in order to receive information of any visit which he might have planned. But no steps of any kind were ever taken against the family. It would have been foolish in this case.

DR. NELTE: Foolish of you?

KEITEL: Yes.

DR. NELTE: To make matters quite clear: You had no knowledge of anything having happened later on?

KEITEL: No, none at all.

DR. NELTE: Well, General Giraud is still alive and I will only ask you, in conclusion, under your oath: Can you confirm that you did not, at any time, give an order or a directive which might be interpreted to mean that General Giraud was to be killed?

KEITEL: No. I never gave such an order, unless the phrase “We must have him back, dead or alive” may be considered of weight in this respect. I never gave orders that the general was to be killed or done away with, or anything of the kind. Never.

DR. NELTE: I have concluded my direct examination of the Defendant Keitel. May I ask you to permit me to submit in evidence the affidavit, that last one, Number 6 in Document Book Number 2. I would like to submit that affidavit in evidence. It is on Page 51 and following and is Document K...

THE PRESIDENT: Didn’t you put that in as K-12 yesterday?

DR. NELTE: Today I submit Keitel-13...

THE PRESIDENT: This affidavit that you want to submit now, where is it and what is the date of it?

DR. NELTE: It is Page 51 and following, and it is dated 9 March 1946.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.

DR. NELTE: This affidavit has also been attested to by Generaloberst Jodl. I ask permission to question him about the affidavit or to show it to him for confirmation when he is called to the witness stand.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MR. DODD: If the Court please, we have looked into the matter of the so-called interrogation of General Von Falkenhorst referred to yesterday by Dr. Nelte. Insofar as we can determine, this paper was never offered in evidence by any members of the Prosecution. It was referred to by M. Dubost—I mean, it was not referred to by him, but it was included in his brief. I did not refer to it, and I did not offer it in evidence. That is how it came into the hands of Dr. Nelte, but not in evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Does Dr. Nelte want to offer it in evidence now?

DR. NELTE: I ask to submit it as Document Number Keitel-14.

THE PRESIDENT: Has it got a PS number or another number?

DR. NELTE: No, Mr. President, it has no other number.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

Now, do any of the other Defense Counsel want to ask questions?

DR. STAHMER: Mr. Defendant, as you have corrected your former statement by answering the question put by your counsel with a statement that Reich Marshal Göring was not present at the conference in which Hitler gave orders for the airmen who had escaped from the Sagan Camp should be held by the police and since you further said that a conference with Reich Marshal Göring in Berlin did not take place, I have only the following questions on this subject: Some weeks after that escape, did you receive a letter from the Quartermaster General of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe informing you that the Luftwaffe wanted to hand over their prison camps to the OKW?

KEITEL: Yes, I received this letter and following an interview with Hitler I declined the offer.

DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions.

DR. SEIDL: At the beginning of the war, the Defendant Dr. Frank was a lieutenant of the 9th Infantry Regiment; is that correct?

KEITEL: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: Do you remember receiving a letter from Dr. Frank, who was then Governor General, in 1942, saying that he wanted to rejoin the Wehrmacht?

The purpose of that letter was, of course, that he be relieved of his office as Governor General in this way. Is that correct?

KEITEL: Yes, I received such a letter and handed it to the Führer who merely made a movement with his hands and said “Out of the question.” I informed Frank of that decision through the liaison officer who was temporarily with him at the time.

DR. SEIDL: That is all.

DR. DIX: Your Lordship, it is 3 minutes to one and it will not take me very long, but it might take me beyond 1 o’clock, so it might be better to adjourn now. I would then put my question to the witness after the recess.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn until 2:00 o’clock.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

DR. DIX: May it please the Tribunal, this witness is competent and an expert who can give the Tribunal definite figures about the armament expenditures of the Reich. However, the witness is certainly not in a position to remember these figures just at the moment. Professor Kraus, my colleague, therefore, during my absence, was kind enough to mark these figures down and to check them in co-operation with the witness. The written deposition was signed by the witness at that time, in order to avoid any misunderstanding. In order to help him recollect these figures, I now ask your permission to have submitted to the witness this deposition which he has signed. I have had translations made of this deposition into the three languages in question and I now submit to the Tribunal eight copies. I also have four copies for the four delegations of the Prosecution, and German copies for the counsels of the Defendants Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Dönitz, and the OKW.

May I ask for just one moment so that the witness can read it?

[_Turning to the defendant._] Witness, would you please look at the first column only, which bears the heading “Total Expenditures.” The second and the third columns show which of those sums were raised through the Reichsbank, on the one hand, and which were raised from other sources, on the other hand. These figures I should like to have certified during the interrogation of Schacht himself, because they were the results of Schacht’s calculations and the witness here can therefore give no information about them. May I ask you concerning these armament expenditures of the Reich, beginning with the fiscal year of 1935, the fiscal year running from 1 April to 31 March: The figures stated herein are: 5,000 millions for 1935, 7,000 millions for 1936, 9,000 millions for 1937, 11,000 millions for 1938, and 20,500 millions for 1939. Are these figures correct?

KEITEL: According to my conviction these figures are correct. May I add that at the beginning of my captivity I also had an opportunity to speak to the Reich Finance Minister about these figures and to co-ordinate our opinions.

DR. DIX: Now, a question about the armament strength of the Reich on 1 April 1938. Is it correct to say that at that time there existed: 24 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, no motorized division, 1 mountain division, 1 cavalry division, and that in addition 10 infantry divisions and 1 armored division were being formed? I wish to add, that of the 3 reserve divisions none had been completed on 1 April 1938; and only 7 to 8 were in the process of being formed and expected to be complete by 1 October 1938.

KEITEL: I consider these figures correct and I have therefore confirmed them in this affidavit.

DR. DIX: That is as far as the deposition goes. I would like to put two more questions to the witness which have not been discussed with him so that I do not know whether he remembers the figures in question.

I consider it possible that the Tribunal would be interested in the proportion of strength between the Reich, on the one hand, and Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, at the time of Hitler’s march into Czechoslovakia; that is the relation of strength (a) concerning the armed might and (b) concerning the civilian population.

KEITEL: I do not remember the accurate figures about that. In the preliminary interrogation I have been questioned about it and I believe the figures will be correct if I say that in the fall of 1938, going by military units, that is, divisions...

DR. DIX: I mean now the time when Hitler marched into Czechoslovakia, in the spring of 1939.

KEITEL: That was in the same year of mobilization, that is to say at that time, as far as figures are concerned, there were fewer divisions than Czechoslovakia had at her disposal. In the fall of 1938 the number of formations, that is, divisions, was probably equal. In the spring of 1939, when we marched in, the strength which was used then was less than that which stood ready in the fall of 1938. Accurate figures, if they are important to this Tribunal, you could get rather from General Jodl.

DR. DIX: As to the number of divisions which Czechoslovakia had at her disposal in March 1939, could you not tell us anything about that?

KEITEL: No, I do not know that exactly.

DR. DIX: Then I shall possibly ask General Jodl about that later.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you will actually offer this document in evidence when the Defendant Schacht gives evidence. Is that what you intend to do?

DR. DIX: I am going to submit it in evidence and it will be included in my document book. It is not necessary to keep it now, because I have to take it up again when Schacht will be examined and you will find it then in the document book. However, I would like to suggest that the copy which I have given to the witness should become a part of the record, because my questions have referred to this document. For this reason it might be useful to make this copy a part of the record.

THE PRESIDENT: If you want to make it a part of the record it had better be given a number now. It had better be S-1 had it not?

DR. DIX: Yes. Your Lordship, may I suggest Schacht-1?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. STAHMER (Representing Dr. Robert Servatius, Counsel for Defendant Sauckel, and the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party): Witness, on 4 January 1944, a conference allegedly took place between the Führer and Sauckel about the procuring of manpower. Were you present at this conference?

KEITEL: Yes.

DR. STAHMER: Did Sauckel on this occasion state that he could not fill, to the extent demanded, the manpower demands of those who asked for it?

KEITEL: Yes, he discussed it thoroughly and also gave his reasons for it.

DR. STAHMER: What reasons did he give?

KEITEL: He pointed out the great difficulties encountered in the areas from which he was supposed to draft or recruit manpower; the strong activity of guerillas and partisans in these areas, the great obstacles in obtaining sufficient police forces for protecting the action, and similar reasons. I do not remember any details.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Field Marshal, were you the leader of the German delegation which signed the capitulation with which the war in Europe was terminated?

KEITEL: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: When and where did that take place?

KEITEL: In Berlin on 8 May, that is to say during the night from 8 to 9 May 1945.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were you asked for full powers which would authorize you to negotiate about the capitulation?

KEITEL: Yes. I took the full powers with me to Berlin. They had been signed by Grossadmiral Dönitz in his capacity as Chief of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht and stated in a few words that he had authorized and ordered me to conduct the negotiations and to sign the capitulation.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these full powers examined and acknowledged by the Allies?

KEITEL: In the course of the afternoon of 8 May I was asked to present the full powers. Obviously they were examined and several hours later they were returned to me by a high ranking officer of the Red Army who said that I had to show them again when signing.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you show them again?

KEITEL: I did have my credentials at hand during the act of capitulation and handed them over to become part of the record.

PROFESSOR DR. HERMANN JAHRREISS (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): Witness, during your testimony you have explained the organization of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht. This organization was based on a decree of the Führer and Reich Chancellor of 4 February 1938. In that decree the OKW was designated as the military staff of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. So, in that aspect you were the Chief of Staff. Now, the Prosecution have repeatedly named Jodl as your Chief of Staff. Is that correct?

KEITEL: No, General Jodl never was my Chief of Staff, he was the Chief of the Armed Forces’ Operations Staff and one of the departmental chiefs of the Armed Forces High Command as I have already stated, although the first among equals.

DR. JAHRREISS: That is to say, the Chief of several collateral co-ordinated offices?

KEITEL: Yes; I never had a Chief of Staff.

DR. JAHRREISS: Mention was made here about the discussion between Hitler and Schuschnigg at Obersalzberg on 12 February 1938. Do you remember that? A diary entry by Jodl referring to this conversation has been submitted to the Tribunal. Was Jodl present at this conference?

KEITEL: No, he was not present and his knowledge is derived from the conference which I described before and which I held with him and Canaris about the news to be disseminated as to certain military preparations during the days following the Schuschnigg conference; it is therefore an impression gained by General Jodl as a result of the description made to him.

DR. JAHRREISS: In the course of the preparations to make the German-Czechoslovakian question acute, that is, the Sudeten question, the plan to stage an incident played a great role. Did you ever give an order to the department Abwehr II (Counterintelligence) under Canaris, to stage such an incident in Czechoslovakia or on the border?

KEITEL: No, such orders were never given to the Abwehr, anyway, not by myself.

DR. JAHRREISS: After Munich, that is in October 1938, Field Marshal, the then Chief of National Defense, Defendant Jodl, left this position and was transferred to Vienna. Who was his successor?

KEITEL: Jodl was transferred to active service. He became chief of an artillery division in Vienna and his successor was Warlimont, at that time Colonel Warlimont.

DR. JAHRREISS: That is to say his successor...

KEITEL: Yes.

DR. JAHRREISS: If I understood you correctly, that is to say Jodl was not only sent on leave but he definitely left his office?

KEITEL: Jodl had definitely left the High Command of the Armed Forces and was personnel officer of a division; Warlimont was not his representative but successor in Jodl’s position.

DR. JAHRREISS: Now, the Prosecution has said that, at the occasion of that famous conference of 23 May 1938—no, 1939—Warlimont was present as deputy designate for Jodl. What had Jodl to do with that conference?

KEITEL: Nothing at all, he was at that time a front-line officer and commander in Vienna.

DR JAHRREISS: Why did you choose Jodl to be chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff?

KEITEL: That was in consequence of our co-operation from 1935 to 1938. My opinion was that I could not find a better man for that position.

DR. JAHRREISS: How did Jodl picture his military career, once his command as artillery commander in Vienna or Brünn had ended?

KEITEL: I knew about his passion and his desire to become commander of a mountain division. He has frequently told me about it.

DR. JAHRREISS: Well, would there have been any chance to get such a command?

KEITEL: Yes, I tried to use my influence with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and I remember that during the summer of 1939, I wrote him that his wish to become the commander of a mountain division in Reichenhall—I do not remember the number—would come true. I was glad to be able to give him that information.

DR. JAHRREISS: Was it up to you to make the decision or was it up to the OKH?

KEITEL: I had made a request to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and he had made the decision.

DR. JAHRREISS: And if I understand correctly, you yourself notified Jodl?

KEITEL: I wrote him a letter because I knew that I would make him very happy.

DR. JAHRREISS: May I ask, Field Marshal, did you correspond regularly with Jodl?

KEITEL: No; I believe that was the only letter which I wrote to him during that year.

DR. JAHRREISS: I ask that for a definite reason: Jodl leaves the OKW. He knows that if the necessity arises he will become chief of the future so-called Armed Forces Operations Staff, that is to say, a rather important position. He goes on active service, as you say. One should think that then he would not only receive a private letter once from you but would be kept informed by you regularly.

KEITEL: That was certainly not done by me and, according to my personal opinion, every general staff officer who goes on active service is very happy if he is not bothered with such things any longer.

DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, but fate does not grant us everything which would make us happy. It could be that somebody received the official order for instance, to keep this gentleman informed.

KEITEL: I certainly did not do it. I do not believe that it happened, but I do not know for sure whether or not somebody tried to do it.

DR. JAHRREISS: During the period when Jodl was in Vienna and Brünn, that is, away from Berlin, was he repeatedly in Berlin in order to get information?

KEITEL: I did not see him and he did not come to see me. I believe it is very unlikely because if such were the case he would have visited me.

DR. JAHRREISS: Then I have to understand from what you say, that when he came to Berlin shortly before the beginning of the war, in response to a telegram, he first had to be informed as to what was going on?

KEITEL: Yes, and that was the first thing done between him and myself.

DR. JAHRREISS: You informed him?

KEITEL: Yes.

DR. JAHRREISS: Another thing, Field Marshal. You remember, perhaps, the somewhat stormy morning in the Reich Chancellery after the Simovic Putsch; that was 27 March 1941, was it not?

KEITEL: Yes, Yugoslavia.

DR. JAHRREISS: If one reflects on the politics and the history of the wars of the last 200 years in Europe, one asks: Was there nobody at that conference in the Reich Chancellery who might have suggested that instead of attacking immediately, it would be better to march to the borders of a state whose attitude was completely uncertain and then clarify the situation by an ultimatum?

KEITEL: Yes, during all these pros and cons under turbulent conditions in that morning session, Jodl, himself, to my knowledge, brought that point up in the debate. Proposal: To march and to send an ultimatum; that is about the way it was.

DR. JAHRREISS: If I am correctly informed, you were in the East in October 1941 for the purpose of an inspection or a visit to Army Group North; is that correct?

KEITEL: Yes, in the autumn of 1941 I frequently went by plane to Army Group North in order to get information for the Führer.

DR. JAHRREISS: Was Field Marshal Von Leeb the commander of Army Group North?

KEITEL: Yes, he was.

DR. JAHRREISS: Did Von Leeb tell you about particular worries which he had at that time?

KEITEL: I think it was my last or the next to the last visit to Von Leeb where the questions of capitulation, that is to say, the question of the population of Leningrad, played an important role, which worried him very much at that time because there were certain indications that the population was streaming out of the city and infiltrating into his area. I remember that at that time he asked me to make the suggestion to the Führer that, as he could not take over and feed 1 million civilians within the area of his army group, a sluice, so to speak, should be made towards the east, that is, the Russian zone, so that the population could flow out in that direction. I reported that to the Führer at that time.

DR. JAHRREISS: Well, did the population turn in any other direction?

KEITEL: Yes, especially to the south into the Southern forests. According to Von Leeb a certain pressure exerted by the population to get through the German lines made itself felt at the time.

DR. JAHRREISS: And that would have impeded your operations?

KEITEL: Yes.

DR. JAHRREISS: Field Marshal, you are aware, I suppose, since it has been mentioned this morning, of the order issued by the Führer and Supreme Commander about the Commandos, dated 18 October 1942, that is Document Number 498-PS which has been submitted here. It had been announced publicly beforehand that an order of that kind would be issued. Do you know that?

KEITEL: Yes; the item in question was included in one of the daily communiqués of the Wehrmacht.

DR. JAHRREISS: We are dealing with the Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October 1942, which, below the usual report, states with reference to what has happened, “The High Command of the Armed Forces therefore considers itself obliged to issue the following orders.” The first item is of no interest here, and then, at the second item appears the following sentence:

“In the future all terror and sabotage Commandos of the British and their accomplices who do not behave like soldiers, but rather like bandits, will be treated as such by the German troops and will be killed in combat without mercy wherever they appear.”

Field Marshal, who drafted this wording?

KEITEL: The Führer personally. I was present when he dictated and corrected it.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, I should like to continue at the point which was last mentioned by Professor Jahrreiss. The order about Commandos, Document Number 498-PS, was discussed. In this order on Commandos, under Number VI, Hitler threatened that all commanders would be court-martialed if they did not carry out this order. Do you know what considerations prompted Hitler to include this particular passage in the order?

KEITEL: Yes, they are actually quite clear; I should think that the purpose, was to put emphasis on the demand that this order should actually be carried out, since it was definitely considered by the generals and those who were to carry it out, as a very grave order; and for that reason compliance was to be enforced by the threat of punishment.

DR. LATERNSER: Now, I should like to ask you several questions concerning the nature of the so-called Groups of the General Staff and the OKW. What do you understand to be the German General Staff?

KEITEL: By the General Staff I understand those officers who are especially trained to be assistants to the higher leadership.

THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has already spent a very long time in explaining the difference between the OKW and the staff of the various commands, and the Prosecution have defined specifically and quite clearly what the group is, which they are asking the Court to declare as criminal; and therefore, I do not see what relevance any further evidence on the subject can have. What are you trying to show by asking him now about what he understands by the General Staff?

DR. LATERNSER: This question was purely preparatory. I intended to connect this question with another one; and, by the answer to the second question, I wanted to prove that under the alleged group, a group has been accused under a wrong name.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not see how it matters if it is a wrong name if the group is specified. But, anyhow, the defendant has already told us what he understands by the General Staff. Will you put your second question.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, if the higher military leaders are considered collectively to form one group which is designated as General Staff and OKW, do you consider this designation to be correct or misleading?

KEITEL: According to our German military concepts this designation is misleading, because to us the General Staff always means a body of assistants, whereas the commanders of armies and army groups and the commanding generals represent the leadership corps.

DR. LATERNSER: The military hierarchy has been discussed sufficiently in this Trial. I want to know only the following from you: Was the relation of these echelons to each other that of military superiors and subordinates or did there exist an additional organization involving these ranks which went beyond purely professional military duties?

KEITEL: No, the General Staff, that is to say, the General Staff officers as assistants to the leaders, could be recognized by their uniforms as such. The leaders or so-called commanders themselves had no relation to each other through any interoffice channels or through any other organizations of any kind.

DR. LATERNSER: Yesterday the affidavit made by Generaloberst Halder was put to you. I would like to discuss now the last sentence of that affidavit; I shall read it to you, “That was the actual General Staff and the highest leadership of the Armed Forces.” Is the statement in that sentence correct or incorrect?

KEITEL: I understand it this way, that Halder wanted to say that those few officers who had General Staff positions were the ones who did the real work in the General Staff of the Army, while the rest of the far more than 100 General Staff officers in the OKH had nothing to do with these matters. That is what I think he wanted to say, a small group which was concerned with these problems.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you know of a single incident where Hitler ever consulted a military leader on a political matter?

KEITEL: No, that did not happen.

DR. LATERNSER: I assume that you were present at most of the conferences with Hitler when the situation was discussed. Could you tell me anything about protests made, with or without success, by any commanders who had come from the front and who happened to be present?

KEITEL: As a rule front Commanders who were present were silent listeners at the general discussion of the situation; and afterwards, according to circumstances, such commanders used to make a special report to Hitler about their respective areas. Then there was also an opportunity, as I believe was already mentioned by Kesselring, to discuss these things personally and to advance opinions. But otherwise nobody had anything to say in these matters.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, were you ever present when particularly emphatic objections were raised, by any commander, to Hitler?

KEITEL: During the discussion of the situation?

DR. LATERNSER: No, I mean, whatever the occasion may have been.

KEITEL: I was not, of course, present at every conference which Hitler had with high ranking commanders in his quarters, but I do not know of any such incidents. I have related in detail those cases which played a role in this war, namely the opposition of the generals in the West, before the beginning of the war, and I understood your question to mean whether I knew of any cases beyond that.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes.

KEITEL: I have related all that and must emphasize once more that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army at that time went to the limit of anything which could be justified from the military viewpoint.

DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of Hitler toward the General Staff of the Army?

KEITEL: It was not a good one. One may say that he held a prejudice against the General Staff and thought the General Staff was arrogant. I believe that is sufficient.

THE PRESIDENT: We have heard all this once, if not more than once.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I do not believe that this witness has been asked about that. As far as I remember, this particular witness has not been asked about these points.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks he has been asked about it.

DR. LATERNSER: I would have paid special attention to this point and would have crossed off this question already if one of my colleagues had put it before.

[_To the defendant._] Would Hitler, in case an application for resignation was tendered by one or more front commanders have been willing to take back an order which he had once given...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, nearly every officer who has come and given evidence to this Court has spoken about that subject, certainly many of them.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, does your objection refer to the question I have put now?

THE PRESIDENT: Nearly all the officers who have been examined in this Court have told us it was impossible to resign. That is what you are asking about, isn’t it?

DR. LATERNSER: Yes. I will be glad to forego that question, if I can assume that the Tribunal accepts those facts which I wanted to prove, as true.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it is cumulative; whether they accept its truth or not, is a different question.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I should like to say something also to this question. I do not believe that it can be considered cumulative, since as has already been pointed out by my colleague, Dr. Dix, the same question when put to two different witnesses is in each case a different question, because the subjective answer of the individual witness to this particular point is desired. But I will forego that question.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other question you want to ask?

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, I have a few more questions.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Witness, to what extent was the headquarters of the Führer protected against attacks during the war?

KEITEL: There was a special guard detachment of the Army and also I believe one company of the Waffen-SS. Very thorough security measures had been taken with every kind of safety device such as fences, obstacles, and similar things. It was very well secured against any surprise attack.

DR. LATERNSER: Were there several zones?

KEITEL: Yes, there was an inner zone and an outer zone and several areas which were fenced in separately.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes. You have already stated that the commanders of the army groups and armies in the East did not have any authority outside their area of operation. Was there a tendency to keep that operational area as small as possible, or as large as possible?

KEITEL: Originally the tendency definitely was to have large areas of operation in order to assure the greatest possible freedom of movement in the rear of the armies and army groups. The Führer was the first who, by drastic means, caused the limitation of these zones to make them as small as possible.

DR. LATERNSER: For what reasons?

KEITEL: As he said, in order to free military officers from administrative measures and get them out of the extended space they had sought for their equipment and to concentrate them into narrowly limited areas.

DR. LATERNSER: You mentioned during your interrogation, units of the Waffen-SS which were assigned to the Army for operational, that is, for combat purposes. I am particularly interested in getting that point clear because, as far as I see, there still prevails some confusion. Did the forces of the SD have anything to do with the units of the Waffen-SS which were subordinated to army units for the purpose of operational assignments?

KEITEL: No, the formations of the Waffen-SS within divisions were incorporated as such into the armies and had nothing to do with anything else. They were in that case purely Army Forces.

DR. LATERNSER: Was it possible for a commander to punish an SS man for any offense?

KEITEL: If the man was caught in the act I believe no commander would have hesitated; but apart from that, the last resort for disciplinary measures and jurisdiction was the Reichsführer Himmler, and not the commander of the army.

DR. LATERNSER: Did the executives of the Einsatzgruppen of the SD have to report to the commanders of the armies upon what they did on Himmler’s orders?

KEITEL: This question has been dealt with here in great detail by the witness Ohlendorf, and I am not informed about the connections which existed between the commanders and the Einsatzgruppen and commands. I was not involved and took no part in it.

DR. LATERNSER: I wanted to know from you whether the Einsatzgruppen of the SD, according to your knowledge of the regulations, were obliged to report to the military commanders in whose rear areas they operated.

KEITEL: I do not believe so; I do not know the orders which were in force in this respect; I have not seen them.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you know whether the higher military commanders at any time were informed of the intention of Hitler or Himmler to kill the Jews?

KEITEL: According to my opinion, that was not the case, since I personally was not informed either.

DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have only one more question, on the subject of the prisoners of war. It had already become known during the war that the conditions relating to the food supply of Soviet Russian prisoners of war during the first period of the eastern campaign were miserable. What was the reason for these conditions which prevailed during that first period?

KEITEL: I can base my statement only on what the Commander-in-Chief of the Army said during the situation report conferences. As I recall, he repeatedly reported that it was clearly a problem of large masses which required extraordinary efforts of organization to provide food supply, housing, and security.

DR. LATERNSER: Now, these conditions were without doubt actually chaotic during a certain period of time. I am thinking of a particular reason which existed, and in order to refresh your memory, Witness, I would like to mention the following:

The Army had already prepared camps in the homeland for the future prisoners of war, because it was planned in the beginning that these prisoners should be transferred to the homeland. In spite of these preparations, however, as has been stated here, this was stopped by a sudden order from Hitler which prohibited the transfer of these Russian prisoners into the homeland.

KEITEL: I explained that this morning; and I said that during a certain period until September, the transfer of Soviet Russian prisoners of war into the Reich was prohibited and only after that the transfer into the home camps was made possible in order to utilize the manpower.

DR. LATERNSER: And the deficiencies which appeared during this first period could not be remedied by the means at the disposal of the troops?

KEITEL: That I do not know. I am not informed about that. Only the OKH, which had the exclusive responsibility, would know that.

DR. LATERNSER: I have only a few more questions about the position of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. When was that position set up?

KEITEL: I believe in 1942.

DR. LATERNSER: 1942. What was the rank connected with that position?

KEITEL: It could be a colonel or a general.

DR. LATERNSER: What I mean is whether it was about the same as the position of a commander of a division?

KEITEL: Well, I would say it was equal to the position of the commander of a brigade or a division, a section chief.

DR. LATERNSER: How many section chiefs were there in the OKW?

KEITEL: I could not say that at present from memory. By way of estimate I had eight department chiefs, each of which had one, two, three or four sections. Therefore there would have been about 30 or 35 section chiefs.

DR. LATERNSER: The Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff was one of the eight or of the 30 section chiefs?

KEITEL: No, I would not like to say that definitely. We had among the department chiefs so-called department group chiefs, who combined several small sections. That was about his position.

DR. LATERNSER: What were the official duties connected with that position?

KEITEL: Naturally the supervision and direction of all the work of that part of the Armed Forces Operations Staff which was attached to the Führer’s headquarters. It was his task to direct that work in accordance with the directives given by Jodl, the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff.

DR. LATERNSER: Was the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff responsible for the strategic planning to a particularly high degree, as is maintained by the Prosecution?

KEITEL: He was, of course, not responsible for that in this capacity, but as a matter of fact he belonged to the small group of high ranking and outstanding general staff officers who were concerned with these things, as Halder has pointed out.

DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have one last question. Was, therefore, the position of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, not equal in importance to the other positions which are included in this group or alleged group of the General Staff and the OKW?

KEITEL: I said chief of a group of departments in the Armed Forces Operations Staff and co-worker in the small group of those who had to deal with operational and strategical questions, but subordinate to General Jodl and director of the work supervisor in the Arbeitsstab.

DR. LATERNSER: Field Marshal, I believe that the question which I have put to you was not completely answered. I have asked you whether the importance of that position was equal to or even approached equality with that of the other offices which are included in the group of the general staff and the OKW.

KEITEL: No, certainly not, because in the group of the General Staff and the OKW there were the commanders-in-chief, the supreme commanders, and the chiefs of the general staff. He certainly did not belong to those.

DR. LATERNSER: Thank you.

HERR LUDWIG BABEL (Counsel for SS): Witness, you have said in your Affidavit Keitel-12 that the SS, at the beginning of the war, became the champions and standard bearers of a policy of conquest and force. In order to exclude any misunderstandings, I should like to clarify the following: What did you mean by SS in this case?

KEITEL: I can say to that, that what has been read here by my counsel was a short summary of a much longer affidavit. If you read the latter you would find for yourself the answer to your question. To state it in a more precise way: It concerned the Reich SS Leadership under Himmler and under those functionaries within his sphere of command, police and SS, who appeared and were active in the occupied territories. The concept of the so-called general SS in the homeland had nothing to do with that. I hope that makes it clear.

HERR BABEL: Yes, thank you.

DR. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD (Counsel for Defendant Bormann): Witness, the Prosecution in their trial brief have charged the Defendant Bormann also with his activity in the so-called Volkssturm. In that connection, I would like to put a few questions to you.

Was an offensive or defensive activity planned for the Volkssturm as it was formed by decree of the Führer of 18 October 1944?

KEITEL: To that I can only say that Reichsleiter Bormann refused to give the military authorities any advice, any co-operation, and any information on the Volkssturm.

DR. BERGOLD: You mean to say that you were not at all informed of the purpose of the Volkssturm?

KEITEL: Only that I saw it as the last levy of men to defend their own homesteads.

DR. BERGOLD: That means that, within the framework of the Wehrmacht, the Volkssturm was not designed for any offensive purpose?

KEITEL: No, but all services of the Wehrmacht which encountered the Volkssturm units in their areas, either incorporated them or sent them home.

DR. BERGOLD: Did I understand you correctly that you wanted to say that that institution, the Volkssturm, was a product of Bormann’s brain or did it originate with Hitler?

KEITEL: I do not know that, perhaps from both.

DR. BERGOLD: Hitler did not tell you about it, either?

KEITEL: No, he spoke only about the Volkssturm and similar things, but military authorities had nothing to do with it.

DR. BERGOLD: Did Bormann report any other military matters to the Führer besides the odd things about the Volkssturm?

KEITEL: He has often accused the Wehrmacht of all sorts of things; I can conclude that only from what I was told, and assume that it originated with Bormann. I do not know it.

DR. BERGOLD: Thank you.

DR. HORN: Is it correct that the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, after his return from Moscow in August 1939, on account of the changed foreign political situation—the guarantee pact between England and Poland had been ratified—advised Hitler to stop the military measures which had been set in motion?

KEITEL: I had the impression at that time that the orders given to me by Hitler were based upon a conversation between him and his foreign minister. I was not present at that conversation.

DR. HORN: Is it correct that Von Ribbentrop, just like the other ministers with portfolio, was as a rule not informed about the strategic plans?

KEITEL: I can say only for myself and for the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, that we were not authorized to do it and that we never did it. If the Reich Foreign Minister was informed about such questions, that information could have come only from Hitler himself. I doubt that he made an exception here.

DR. HORN: The Prosecution have submitted a letter of 3 April 1940, concerning the impending occupation of Denmark and Norway which you sent to the then Reich Foreign Minister. In that letter you informed the Reich Foreign Minister of the impending occupation and requested him to take the necessary political steps. Had you already instructed Von Ribbentrop before that date about the intended occupation of Norway and Denmark?

KEITEL: No, I would not have been allowed to do that, according to the way in which the Führer worked with us. That letter was an unusual method of giving information about this, by the Führer’s order, to the Reich Foreign Minister, who knew nothing about these things. I was ordered to write it to him.

DR. HORN: In connection with the testimony by General Lahousen, I want to ask you one question. At the time of the Polish campaign, was there a directive or an order by Hitler to exterminate the Jews in the Polish Ukraine?

KEITEL: I cannot recall any such things. I know only that during the occupation of Poland—that is after the occupation—the problem of the Polish Jews played a part. In that connection I also put a question once to Hitler to which, I believe, he answered that that area was well suited for settling the Jews there. I do not know or remember anything else.

DR. HORN: At the time of the Polish campaign, was there any plan to instigate a revolt in the Polish Ukraine in the rear of the Poles?

KEITEL: I cannot answer that question, although I have heard such things said here by Lahousen. I do not know or remember anything about it.

DR. HORN: Thank you.

HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for the SA): Field Marshal, you were Chief of the OKW and thereby also the Chief of the KGF, that is, Prisoners of War Organization. Did you ever issue orders or have orders issued on the basis of which members of the SA or units of the SA were detailed to guard prisoners of war or prisoner-of-war camps, or were to be used for that purpose?

KEITEL: I cannot remember that any such directive had been issued by the OKW. I believe that certainly was not the case.

HERR BÖHM: In that respect, was a report ever made to you that any such guard duty was performed?

KEITEL: I cannot remember but I do not mean to deny that some units of the army in some particular place may have used SA men temporarily to assist in guard duty, which I would not know.

HERR BÖHM: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit in open session tomorrow morning at 10 o’clock. At 1230 it will take the supplementary applications for witnesses and documents, and after that at a quarter to 1 it will adjourn into a closed session.

GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Keitel, I would like you to tell me exactly when you received your first commission as an officer?

KEITEL: On 18 August 1902.

GEN. RUDENKO: What military training did you receive?

KEITEL: I came into the army as an officer candidate. Starting as a simple private I advanced through the various ranks of private first class, corporal and ensign to lieutenant.

GEN. RUDENKO: I asked you about your military training.

KEITEL: I was an army officer until 1909, and then for almost 6 years regimental adjutant; then during the World War I, battery commander, and then after the spring of 1915 I served on the general staff.

GEN. RUDENKO: You were evidently not given a correct translation. Did you pass the Staff College or any other college, that is to say, did you receive preliminary training?

KEITEL: I never attended the War Academy. Twice I participated in so-called Great General Staff trips as regimental adjutant and in the summer of 1914 I was detailed to the Great General Staff and returned to my regiment later when the war broke out in 1914.

GEN. RUDENKO: What military training and military rank did Hitler possess?

KEITEL: Only a few years ago I found out from Hitler himself that after the end of World War I, he had been a lieutenant in a Bavarian infantry regiment. During the war he was a private, then private first class and maybe corporal during the last period.

GEN. RUDENKO: Should we not, therefore, conclude that you, with your thorough military training and great experience, could have had an opportunity of influencing Hitler, very considerably, in solving questions of a strategic and military nature, as well as other matters pertaining to the Armed Forces?

KEITEL: No. I have to declare in that respect that, to a degree which is almost incomprehensible to the layman and the professional officer, Hitler had studied general staff publications, military literature, essays on tactics, operations, and strategy and that he had a knowledge in the military fields which can only be called amazing. May I give an example of that which can be confirmed by the other officers of the Wehrmacht. Hitler was so well informed concerning organization, armament, leadership, and equipment of all armies, and what is more remarkable, of all navies of the globe, that it was impossible to prove any error on his part; and I have to add that also during the war, while I was at his headquarters and in his close proximity, Hitler studied at night all the big general staff books by Moltke, Schlieffen, and Clausewitz and from them acquired his vast knowledge by himself. Therefore we had the impression: Only a genius can do that.

GEN. RUDENKO: You will not deny that by reason of your military training and experience you were Hitler’s adviser in a number of highly important matters?

KEITEL: I belonged to his closest military entourage and I heard a lot from him; but I pointed out yesterday to the question of my counsel that even in the simple, every-day questions concerning organization and equipment of the Wehrmacht, I must admit openly that I was the pupil and not the master.

GEN. RUDENKO: From what date do you consider that your co-operation with Hitler began?

KEITEL: Exactly from the day when I was called into that position, 4 February 1938.

GEN. RUDENKO: That means that you were working with Hitler during the entire period of preparation for and realization of aggressive warfare?

KEITEL: Yes. I have already given all the necessary explanations as to how, after I entered my new position in the beginning of February, events followed in quick succession, often in a very surprising manner.

GEN. RUDENKO: Who, besides you, among the military leaders of the OKW and the OKH had the rank of Reich Minister?

KEITEL: The rank of Reich Minister was given to the three commanders-in-chief of the sections of the Armed Forces, and among these the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Reich Marshal Göring, was also Reich Minister of Aviation; likewise I received, as I said yesterday, the rank but not the authority and title of a minister.

GEN. RUDENKO: Who, besides you, among the military collaborators of the OKH and the OKW, signed decrees together with Hitler and the other Reich Ministers?

KEITEL: In the ministerial sector of the Reich Government, there was the method of the signatures of the Führer and Reich Chancellor and the Ministers immediately involved, and, finally of the Chief of the Reich Chancellery. This did not hold good for the military sector, for according to the traditions of the German Army and the Wehrmacht the signatures were given by the principal experts who had worked on the matter, by the Chief of Staff, or by whoever had given or at least drafted the order, and an initial was added on the margin.

GEN. RUDENKO: Yesterday you said that you signed such decrees together with other Ministers of the Reich.

KEITEL: Yes, yesterday I mentioned individual decrees and also gave the reasons why I signed them, and that in so doing I was not Reich Minister and did not receive the function of a minister in office.

GEN. RUDENKO: What organization exercised the function of the War Ministry from February 1938 on?

KEITEL: Until the last days of January, or the first days of February, it was the former Reich Minister for War, Von Blomberg. Beginning with 4 February there was neither a Minister for War nor a War Ministry.

GEN. RUDENKO: That is precisely why I asked you what government organization had replaced the War Ministry and exercised its function, since I knew that this Ministry did not exist.

KEITEL: I, myself, with the Wehrmachtsamt, the former Staff of the War Ministry, whose chief I was, carried on the work and distributed it, as I described in detail yesterday, that is, I transferred all command functions to the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht. But this was not an order of mine but an order of Hitler’s.

GEN. RUDENKO: From the diagram you have submitted to the Tribunal it would appear that the OKW was the central, coordinating, and supreme military authority of the Reich and that it was directly under Hitler’s control. Would this conclusion be correct?

KEITEL: Yes, that was the military staff of Hitler.

GEN. RUDENKO: Who, in the OKW, directly supervised the drafting of military and strategic plans? I am referring specifically to the plans for the attack on Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, Holland, France, Norway, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union.

KEITEL: I believe that yesterday I stated that very precisely, saying that the operational and strategic planning, after an order had been given by Hitler, was prepared and then submitted to Hitler by the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht; that is to say, for the Army, by the High Command of the Army and the General Staff of the Army, and then further decisions were made with respect to it.

GEN. RUDENKO: With regard to Yugoslavia I should like to ask you the following question: Do you admit that a directive issued under your signature, for the preliminary partition of Yugoslavia, is _per se_ a document of great political and international importance, providing for the actual abolition of Yugoslavia as a sovereign state?

KEITEL: I did nothing more or less than to write down a decree by the Führer and forward it to those offices which were interested and concerned. I did not have any personal or political influence whatsoever in these questions.

GEN. RUDENKO: Under your own signature?

KEITEL: As to the signatures which I have given, I made a complete explanation yesterday, as to how they came about and what their significance is.

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, we did talk about it, we did hear about it, and I shall ask some more questions on the subject later on. I should now like to determine with greater precision your own position in the question of Yugoslavia. Do you agree that you, with the direct participation of the OKW, organized acts of provocation in order to find a reason for aggression against Yugoslavia and a justification for this aggression in the eyes of the world?

KEITEL: This morning, in response to questions of the counsel of other defendants, I answered clearly that I did not participate in any preparation of an incident and that Hitler did not wish either that any military offices should ever participate in the discussion, preparation, deliberation, or the execution of incidents. I use “incident” here in the sense of provocation.

GEN. RUDENKO: Undoubtedly. What part did the OKW take to insure the arming of the Free Corps in the Sudetenland?

KEITEL: Which Free Corps, General? I do not know to which Free Corps you refer.

GEN. RUDENKO: The Free Corps of the Sudetenland.

KEITEL: I am not informed as to whether any military office did any gun-running, if I may say so, or secretly sent arms there. I have no knowledge concerning that. An order to that effect was not given, or at any rate did not pass through my hands. I cannot remember that.

GEN. RUDENKO: By whom and for what reason was the order issued to occupy Ostrau in Moravia and Witkovitz by German troops, on 14 March 1939, in the afternoon, while President Hacha was still on the way to Berlin for negotiations with Hitler?

KEITEL: The order was eventually released and decided by the Führer. There had been preparations to occupy by a _coup de main_ that area where the well-known big and modern steel works were located near Mährisch Ostrau—I cannot remember the name now—before the date of the march into Czechoslovakia as originally set. As a justification for that decision, Hitler had told me that it was done in order to prevent the Poles from making a surprise attack from the north, and thereby perhaps taking possession of the most modern rolling mill in the world. This he gave as a reason, and the operation, that is, the occupation, actually took place in the late hours of 14 March.

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, but during the same time, President Hacha was on the way to Berlin to negotiate with Hitler?

KEITEL: Yes, that is correct.

GEN. RUDENKO: This is treachery!

KEITEL: I do not believe that I need to add my judgement to the facts. It is true that the occupation was carried out on that evening. I have given the reasons, and President Hacha learned about it only after he arrived in Berlin.

Now I remember the name. The rolling mill was Witkovitz.

GEN. RUDENKO: I have a few more questions to ask you in connection with the aggression against the Soviet Union. You testified to the Tribunal yesterday on the subject. You explained your position, with regard to the attack on the Soviet Union. But you informed the Tribunal that the orders for preparing Plan Barbarossa were given at the beginning of December 1940. Is that right?

KEITEL: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you definitely remember and confirm this?

KEITEL: I do not know of, or do not remember, any specific order by the High Command of the Wehrmacht which called for the drawing up of this plan called Barbarossa any earlier than that. I explained yesterday, however, that some order had been issued, probably in September, concerning transport and railway facilities and similar matters. I cannot recall whether I signed that order, but yesterday I mentioned such a preparatory order to improve transport conditions from the West to the East.

GEN. RUDENKO: In September?

KEITEL: It may have been in September or October, but I cannot commit myself as to the exact time.

GEN. RUDENKO: I wish to know the exact time.

KEITEL: More accurate information may probably be obtained at a later stage from General Jodl, who ought to know it better.

GEN. RUDENKO: Of course we shall ask him about it during the course of his interrogation. I should like you to recollect the following briefly: Did you first learn of Hitler’s schemes to attack the Soviet Union in the summer of 1940?

KEITEL: No. In the summer of 1940 this conversation which is mentioned in Jodl’s diary—I believe that is what you are referring to, you mean the conversation from Jodl’s diary—I was not present at this obviously very casual and brief conversation and did not hear it. My recollections concerning that period also justify my belief that I was not present, because I was on the move almost every day by airplane and was not present at the discussions of the situation at that time.

GEN. RUDENKO: And when did your conversation with Ribbentrop take place?

KEITEL: That may have been during the last days of August; I believe, it was in the beginning of September, but I cannot give the exact date any more. I reconstruct the date by the fact that I did not return to Berchtesgaden until 10 August, and that I wrote the memorandum which I mentioned yesterday at a later date.

GEN. RUDENKO: And so you assure the Tribunal that you first heard about Hitler’s schemes to attack the Soviet Union from the conversation with Ribbentrop?

KEITEL: No, no. After having been absent from Berchtesgaden for about two weeks, partly on leave and partly on duty in Berlin, I returned to headquarters at Berchtesgaden; and then on one of the subsequent days, probably during the middle of August, I heard for the first time ideas of that kind from Hitler. That was the basis for my deliberation and my memorandum.

GEN. RUDENKO: In that case, have I put my question correctly in asking whether you learned of Hitler’s schemes in the summer of 1940?

KEITEL: Yes. The middle of August, after all, is still summer.

GEN. RUDENKO: August is still summer, we will not quibble about that. Further, I should like to remind you of the evidence of the witness Paulus, which he gave here before the Tribunal, on 11 February of this year. Paulus, as you will remember, informed the Tribunal that when he entered the OKH on 3 September 1940, he found among other plans an unfinished preliminary operational draft of a plan for attacking the Soviet Union, known under the name of Barbarossa. Do you remember that part of Paulus’ testimony?

KEITEL: I remember it only insofar as he stated that it was a study or a draft for a maneuver, and that he found a document on the occasion of his transfer to the OKH, to the General Staff of the Army. This is not known to me, and it could not be known to me because the documents, files, and other reports of the General Staff of the Army were never at my disposal; and I never had an opportunity to look at them.

GEN. RUDENKO: I wish to establish one fact. Do you deny that the OKH, in September 1940, was elaborating plans in connection with Plan Barbarossa?

KEITEL: If we go by the testimony of Field Marshal Paulus, then I could not say that it is not true, since I cannot know whether it actually was true. I can neither deny nor affirm it.

GEN. RUDENKO: All right. You informed the Tribunal that you were opposed to the war with the Soviet Union.

KEITEL: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: You also stated that you went to Hitler with the suggestion that he should change his plans with regard to the Soviet Union. Is that correct?

KEITEL: Yes, not only to change them, but to drop this plan and not to wage war against the Soviet Union. That was the content of my memorandum.

GEN. RUDENKO: That is precisely what I asked you. I would like to ask you now about a conference, evidently known to you, which was held 3 weeks after Germany had attacked the Soviet Union, the conference of 16 July 1941. Do you remember that conference, which dealt with the tasks for the conduct of the war against the Soviet Union?

KEITEL: No, at the moment I do not know what you mean. I do not know.

GEN. RUDENKO: I do not intend to submit that document to you at this particular minute. You may remember that I submitted it to the Defendant Göring, when the question of the dismemberment and of the annexation of the Soviet Union arose. Do you remember?

KEITEL: That is a document which I know. I believe it is marked on top “BO-FU,” and during my interrogation here I have identified it as a memorandum from Reichsleiter Bormann.

GEN. RUDENKO: That is correct.

KEITEL: I made that statement. At that time I also testified that I was called in only during the second part of the conference and that I had not been present during the first part of it. I also testified that it was not the minutes but a free summary made by Reichsleiter Bormann, dictated by him.

GEN. RUDENKO; But you do remember that even then, on 16 July, the question was already being advanced about the annexation by Germany of the Crimea, the Baltic States, the regions of the Volga, the Ukraine, Bielorussia and other territories?

KEITEL: No, I believe that was discussed at the first part of the conference. I can remember the conference, from that stage on where questions of personnel were discussed, that is, certain personalities who were to be appointed. That I remembered. I have seen the document here for the first time and did not know of it before; and did not attend the first half of the conference.

GEN. RUDENKO: In that case may I put the question differently: What were the final aims pursued by Hitler and his entourage at that time, against the Soviet Union?

KEITEL: According to the explanations which Hitler had given me, I saw the more profound reasons for this war in the fact that he was convinced that a war would break out some way or other within the next years between the Greater Slav Empire of Communism and the German Reich of National Socialism. The reasons which were given to me were something like this: If I believe or rather if I am convinced that such a conflict between these two nations will take place, then it would be better now than later. That is how I can put it. But I do not remember, at least not at the moment, the questions which are in this document about the dismemberment of several areas. Perhaps they were constructions of fantasy.

GEN. RUDENKO: And you tell the Tribunal under oath that you did not know of the Hitlerite plans to seize and colonize the territories of the Soviet Union?

KEITEL: That has not been expressed in that form. It is true that I believed that the Baltic provinces should be made dependents of the Reich, and that the Ukraine should come into a closer connection from the point of view of food supply or economy, but concrete plans for conquest are not known to me and if they were ever touched upon I never considered them to be serious problems. That is the way I looked at it at that time. I must not explain how I see it today, but only how I saw it at that time.

GEN. RUDENKO: Did you know that at this conference of 16 July Hitler announced the necessity of razing the city of Leningrad to the ground?

KEITEL: I do not believe that during that conference—I have read that document here again. That it is contained in the document I cannot remember now. But I have had this document here in my hands; I have read it in the presence of the American Prosecutor; and if it is stated therein, then the question of whether or not I have heard it depends entirely on the moment at which I was called to that conference.

GEN. RUDENKO: I do not intend to hand you the document now, because it has already been submitted several times. But in the minutes previously quoted to the Defendant Göring, who read them himself, it is said, “The Leningrad region is claimed by the Finns. The Führer wants to raze Leningrad to the ground and then cede it to the Finns.”

KEITEL: I can only say that it is necessary to establish from what moment on I attended that conference. Whatever was said before that moment I did not hear, and I can indicate that only if I am given the document or if one reads the record of my preliminary interrogation. That is what I told the interrogating officer at that time.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. We shall give you the minutes of the conference of 16 July immediately. While the passages required are being found, I shall ask you a few more questions, and by that time the passages will have been found.

With regard to the destruction of Leningrad, did you not know about it from other documents?

KEITEL: I have been asked about that by the Russian Delegation and the general who is present here in this courtroom. He has called my attention to a document.

GEN. RUDENKO: That was during the preliminary investigation, that is quite right.

KEITEL: I know the document which came from the Navy, from an admiral, as well as a second document which contained a short directive, I believe on the order of Jodl, concerning Leningrad. I have been interrogated regarding both documents. As to that I can state only that neither through artillery operations during the siege, nor by operations of the Air Force, could the extent of destruction be compared with that of other places we know about. It did not materialize, we did not carry it out. It never came to a systematic shelling of Leningrad, as far as I know. Consequently, only that can be stated which I said at that time under oath to the gentlemen of the Soviet Delegation.

GEN. RUDENKO: According to your knowledge was Leningrad never shelled?

KEITEL: Certainly artillery was also used in the Leningrad area, but it never went so far as to constitute shelling for the purposes of destruction. That would have occurred, General, if it had come to an attack on Leningrad.

GEN. RUDENKO: Look at this document, and I shall then ask you a few supplementary questions. [_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

KEITEL: It is very simple. My entry is exactly after the moment after this remark had been made. I told the American interrogator at the time that I just heard the discussion about the appointment of Gauleiter Lohse when I entered the room. The preceding remarks I did not hear.

GEN. RUDENKO: Have you acquainted yourself with those minutes of the report on the conference of 16 July that deal with Leningrad?

KEITEL: Yes, that is where I entered.

GEN. RUDENKO: You saw that there was such an entry in the minutes of the meeting. You arrived at the conference just as they had finished talking about Leningrad?

KEITEL: Yes. I entered the room when they were talking about the qualifications of Gauleiter Lohse, whether or not he was suitable for an administrative office. These were the first words which I heard. A debate was going on about that subject just when I entered.

GEN. RUDENKO: It states there quite clearly: “Raze the city of Leningrad to the ground.”

KEITEL: Yes, I have read that here.

GEN. RUDENKO: The same is stated in the decree, is it not?

KEITEL: Yes; but there is no direct connection with me. Do you mean the order of the Navy, the order which was found with the Navy?

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you know that there were two decrees, one issued by the naval command and the other by the OKW, signed by Jodl? You do know that, do you not?

KEITEL: Yes, I have seen both these decrees here. They were submitted by the Russian Delegation.

GEN. RUDENKO: And you know that the decree signed by the Defendant Jodl also refers to the destruction of the city of Moscow.

KEITEL: That I do not remember exactly, any more since only Leningrad was referred to at that time, when I glanced at it. But if it is stated there, I will not doubt it at all.

GEN. RUDENKO: I am asking you: Did the OKW issue decrees for the purpose of having them obeyed?

KEITEL: The order or communication of the Navy is first of all no OKW order and how it originated is not known to me. The short order of the OKW, signed “By order of Jodl,” was not drafted in my presence, as I already stated yesterday. I would have signed it but I was absent and therefore do not know either to which reasons or discussions this order was due.

GEN. RUDENKO: You have not replied to my question. I am asking you: The directives issued by the OKW were given out to be obeyed? Can you reply to me briefly?

KEITEL: This is a directive but not an order, because an order can be given only by the office of the local command of the army. It was therefore a directive, an aim, an intention.

GEN. RUDENKO: And are directives from the OKW not meant to be carried out?

KEITEL: Certainly they are meant to be carried out.

GEN. RUDENKO: As to your statement that no one shelled Leningrad, it does not even call for further denial, since it is a well-known fact.

KEITEL: May I at least say that I did not issue that order. That is why I do not know anything about it.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you know that before the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union the Defendant Göring issued a so-called Green Folder containing directives on the economic matters in the territories of the U.S.S.R. intended for occupation?

KEITEL: Yes, that is known to me.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you affirm that in your directive of 16 June 1941 you instructed all the German troops to obey these directives implicitly?

KEITEL: Yes, there is a directive which makes known to all units of the Army the organizations which are assigned for important tasks and what their responsibilities are, and that all the military commands of the Army must act in compliance therewith. That I passed on; it was not my order, I passed it on.

GEN. RUDENKO: Was it your own order or were you merely obeying the Führer’s instructions?

KEITEL: I merely passed on the orders received from the Führer, and I could not give any orders at all to Reich Marshal Göring in that respect.

GEN. RUDENKO: You did not issue an order to Field Marshal Göring, but addressed your order to the troops?

KEITEL: I could not give him any orders either; I could only communicate the will of the Führer to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and he had to pass it on to his army groups.

GEN. RUDENKO: You did not disagree with this will of the Führer’s?

KEITEL: I did not raise any objection, since this did not concern a duty of the OKW. I followed the order and passed it on.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you admit that this order gave you instructions for the immediate and complete economic exploitation of the occupied regions of the Soviet Union in the interest of German war economy?

KEITEL: I did not give such an order containing the aims and tasks which were to be carried out by the organization Economic Staff Oldenburg, since I had nothing to do with that. I only passed on the contents of the Green Folder—it is known what this name stands for—to the High Command of the Army for appropriate action.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you admit that the directives contained in Göring’s Green Folder were aimed at the plunder of the material wealth of the Soviet Union and all her citizens?

KEITEL: No. In my opinion nothing was said about destruction in the Green Folder. Instead of destruction one ought to say, to make good use of surplus, especially in the field of the food supply and the utilization of raw materials for the entire war economy of Germany, but not the destruction of them.

GEN. RUDENKO: Please repeat what you have said.

KEITEL: I said that in the Green Folder there were principles for the utilization of present and future reserves which were considered surplus, but never for their destruction. To let the Soviet population starve at the same time, on account of this, that was not the case. I have seen these things on the spot and therefore I am qualified to speak about them.

GEN. RUDENKO: You do not consider that plunder?

KEITEL: The quibble about words, whether booty, or exploitation of reserves found during the war, or looting, or the like, is a matter of concepts which I believe need not be defined here. Everyone uses his own expressions in this respect.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well, do not let us argue about it. I have one last question to ask you with regard to the attack on the Soviet Union: Do you agree that the methods of warfare adopted by the German Army in the East stood in striking contrast with the simplest concept of military honor of an army and the exigencies of war?

KEITEL: No, I cannot admit that in this form. I would rather say, the fact that the brutalizing—I have used this term before—that the brutalizing of the war against the Soviet Union and what occurred in the East, is not to be attributed to instigation by the German Army but to circumstances which I have stated in an affidavit submitted by my counsel to the Tribunal. I would furthermore like to ask the Russian Prosecutor to read it so that he can see my opinion about it.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. To conclude the question of aggression and to pass to the question of atrocities, I have to ask you the following question, and I trust you will impart to the Tribunal the information you possess in your capacity as Hitler’s closest adviser on the conduct of the war.

My question is the following: What tasks did the High Command of the Armed Forces entrust to the German Army in case Germany fought to the finish a victorious war against the Soviet Union?

KEITEL: I do not know what you mean by that. Which demands were put to the military leadership in case the war would be a success? May I ask you to put this question differently. I did not understand it.

GEN. RUDENKO: I have in mind tasks for the further conduct of the war after a successful conclusion of the Eastern campaign.

KEITEL: There could have occurred what actually did occur later, that is, the landing of the British and American forces in France, in Denmark, or in Germany, _et cetera_. There were various possibilities of warfare which might occur and which could not be anticipated at all.

GEN. RUDENKO: I am not asking this question in general. You are evidently acquainted with a document entitled, _Manual of Naval Warfare_, which had already been drafted on 8 August 1941 and contained plans for the subsequent conduct of the war after the conclusion of the Eastern campaign. I refer here to the drafting of plans for an attack on Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. Do you know this document?

KEITEL: It has not been submitted to me so far. It is a surprise at the moment, and I cannot recall it.

GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know this document.

This document, Your Honors, is Number S-57; it was submitted to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-336. I shall show it to you in a minute. Please hand this document to the defendant. [_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

KEITEL: I see this document for the first time, at any rate here during the proceedings. It begins with the sentence, “A draft of directives concerning further plans after the end of the Eastern campaign was submitted to the Naval Operations Staff.” This order or directive of the Navy I have never seen nor could I have seen it. It is a draft of directives which could come only from the High Command of the Wehrmacht. In the Armed Forces Operations Staff there were officers from the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and it is quite possible that ideas which took the shape of drafts of directives were made known at the time to the officers of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. I cannot remember any such draft of directives of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, but perhaps Generaloberst Jodl may possibly be in a position to give information about that. I cannot remember it.

GEN. RUDENKO: You do not remember it? I shall not examine you about it closely but you see that the document plans the seizure of Gibraltar with the active participation of Spain. In addition it provides for an attack on Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and so forth. And you say that you know nothing of this document?

KEITEL: I shall be glad to give information about that. An attack to seize Gibraltar, the entrance to the Mediterranean straits, had already been planned for the preceding winter but had not been carried out, that is, during the winter of 1939-40. It was nothing new and the other topics which have been mentioned were those which developed ideas based on the situation existing north of the Caucasus as a result of the operations. I do not at all mean to say that these ideas were not given any thought, but I do not remember it and I did not read every document or paper of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff when it was in the drafting stage.

GEN. RUDENKO: If you consider as mere scraps of paper documents concerning the seizure of foreign countries, then what documents do you consider as important?

KEITEL: I can state only the following, which is true and sincere. In wartime one makes many plans and considers various possibilities which are not and cannot be carried out in the face of the hard facts of reality; and therefore it is not permissible to regard such papers afterwards from an historical point of view, as representing throughout the will and intention of the operational and strategic war leadership.

GEN. RUDENKO: I agree with you that from an historical point of view this document is at present of no importance whatsoever. But taken in conjunction with the plan of the German General Staff at a time when this Staff thought it was going to defeat the Soviet Union, the document does acquire a very different meaning. However, I shall not examine you any further about this document, for the time being.

I now pass on to the subject of atrocities and of your attitude towards these crimes. Your counsel, Dr. Nelte, has already handed you the principal documents of the Prosecution on the subject of atrocities. I do not therefore intend either to submit them again or to enter into any detailed argument on the subject. I shall merely examine you on the basic principles of these documents which were submitted by your counsel when he interrogated you.

I shall first of all refer to a document entitled, “Directive on the Introduction of Military Jurisdiction in Region Barbarossa and on the Adoption of Special Military Measures.” Do you remember that document? It was drawn up on 13 May 1941 more than a month before the outbreak of war against the Soviet Union. Do you remember that in that document, drawn up before the war, instructions were given that suspect elements should immediately be brought before an officer and that he would decide whether they were to be shot? Do you remember that directive? Did you sign the document?

KEITEL: Yes, I have never denied that. But I have given the necessary explanations as to how the document came into being and who was its originator.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of the document?

GEN. RUDENKO: Document C-50, dated 13 May 1941.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

GEN. RUDENKO: [_To the defendant_]: Although you declare that you have already elucidated the matter to your counsel, I am nevertheless obliged to put this question to you in a slightly different form: Did you consider that an officer had a right to shoot people without trial or investigation?

KEITEL: In the German Army there have always been courts-martial for our own soldiers as well as for our enemies, which could always be set up, consisting of one officer and one or two soldiers all three of whom would act as judges. That is what we call a court-martial (Standgericht); the only requisite is always that an officer must preside at this court. But as a matter of principle I have to repeat the statement which I have made yesterday...

GEN. RUDENKO: One moment! Please reply to this question. Did not this document do away with judicial proceedings in the case of so-called suspects, at the same time leaving to an officer of the German Army the right to shoot them? Is that correct?

KEITEL: In the case of German soldiers it was correct and was permitted. There is a military tribunal with judicial officers and there is a court-martial which consists of soldiers. These have the right to pass and to execute an appropriate sentence against any soldier of the German Army in court-martial proceedings.

THE PRESIDENT: You are not answering the question. The question is, what right does this document give, not what the orders in the German Army are.

GEN. RUDENKO: Can you reply to the following question? Did this document do away with judicial proceedings and did it give the German officer the right to shoot suspects, as stated herein?

KEITEL: That was an order which was given to me by Hitler. He had given me that order and I put my name under it. What that means, I explained in detail yesterday.

GEN. RUDENKO: You, a Field Marshal, signed that decree. You considered that the decree was irregular; you understood what the consequences of that decree were likely to be. Then why did you sign it?

KEITEL: I cannot say any more than that I put my name to it and I thereby, personally, assumed in my position a degree of responsibility.

GEN. RUDENKO: And one more question. This decree was dated 13 May 1941, almost a month before the outbreak of war. So you had planned the murder of human beings beforehand?

KEITEL: That I do not understand. It is correct that this order was issued about 4 weeks before the beginning of the campaign Barbarossa, and another 4 weeks earlier it had been communicated to the generals in a statement by Hitler. They knew that weeks before.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you know how this decree was actually applied?

KEITEL: I have also told my opinion to the interrogating General of the Soviet Army in the preliminary interrogations; whether generals discussed this order with me has not been mentioned, but I wish to point out that it says specifically here that the higher commanders have the right to suspend this order concerning court jurisdiction as soon as their area is pacified. I have given the same answer to every general who has asked me about the reasons for this order and its effect. I said that it provides that they were allowed to suspend this order as soon as they considered their area to be pacified. That is an individual subjective question for the discretion of the commanders and it is provided therein.

GEN. RUDENKO: And now for the final question in connection with this order or directive. This order actually assured German soldiers and officers impunity for arbitrary actions and actions of lawlessness?

KEITEL: Within certain limits, within certain limits! The limit was strictly defined in the oral order to the generals, namely, application of severest disciplinary measures among their own troops.

GEN. RUDENKO: I think, Defendant Keitel, that you have seen these “certain limits” in the documents submitted to the Tribunal and in the documentary films.

I shall now ask you the following question: On 12 May 1941 the question of the treatment of captured Russian political commissars and military prisoners was under consideration. Do you remember that document?

KEITEL: At the moment I cannot recall which one you mean. It is not clear to me what you are referring to at the moment.

GEN. RUDENKO: I refer to the document dated 12 May 1941, which established that the political leaders of the Red Army should not be recognized as prisoners of war but should be destroyed.

KEITEL: I have seen only notes on it. I do not recall the document at present but I know the facts. I cannot recall the document at the moment. May I see it please?

GEN. RUDENKO: If you please. [_The document was handed to the defendant._]

THE PRESIDENT: What number is it?

GEN. RUDENKO: Number 884-PS. It is a document dated 12 May 1941 and entitled: “Treatment of Political and Military Russian Functionaries.”

KEITEL: It is not an order but a memorandum on a report by the Department of National Defense, with the remark that decisions by the Führer are still required. The memorandum probably refers to a suggested order, I remember this now; I saw it at the time and the result of the report is not mentioned but merely a suggestion which was put down for the ruling. As far as I know, the ruling was taken on those lines then communicated to the High Command of the Army as having been approved by the Führer or having been attended to, or discussed, or agreed upon, directly between the Führer and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

GEN. RUDENKO: What do you mean when you speak of “regulation”? We have learned so many expressions from German Army terminology, such as “regulation,” “special treatment,” “execution,” but they all, translated into vulgar parlance, mean one thing, and one thing only—murder. What are you thinking of when you say “regulation”?

KEITEL: I did not say “regulation.” I do not know which word was understood to mean regulation. I said that, in the sense of that memorandum, according to my recollection, directives had been issued by Hitler to the Army at that time, that is, an approval to the suggestion which has been made in the memorandum.

GEN. RUDENKO: In that case you do not deny that as far back as May, more than a month before the outbreak of war, the document had already been drafted which provided for the annihilation of Russian political commissars and military personnel? You do not deny this?

KEITEL: No, that I do not deny. That was the result of the directives which had been communicated and which had been worked out here in writing by the generals.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 6 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]

ONE HUNDRED AND FIRST DAY Saturday, 6 April 1946

_Morning Session_

GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Keitel, I am asking you about the directive concerning the so-called communist insurrectionary movement in the occupied territories. Yesterday your counsel showed you this directive. It is an order of 16 September 1941, Number R-98. I shall remind you of one passage from this order. It states:

“In order to nip in the bud any conspiracy, the strongest measures should be taken at the first sign of trouble in order to maintain the authority of the occupying power and to prevent the conspiracy from spreading...”;

and furthermore:

“...one must bear in mind that in the countries affected human life has absolutely no value and that a deterrent effect can be achieved only through the application of extraordinarily harsh measures.”

You remember this basic idea of the order, that human life absolutely does not amount to anything. Do you remember this statement, the basic statement of the order, that “human life has absolutely no value”? Do you remember this sentence?

KEITEL: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: You signed the order containing this statement?

KEITEL: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do you consider that necessity demanded this extremely evil order?

KEITEL: I explained some of the reasons for this order yesterday and I pointed out that these instructions were addressed in the first place to the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht offices in the Southeast; that is, the Balkan regions, where extensive partisan warfare and a war between the leaders had assumed enormous proportions, and secondly, because the same phenomena had been observed and established on the same or similar scale in certain defined areas of the occupied Soviet territory.

GEN. RUDENKO: Does this mean that you consider this order to have been entirely correct?

KEITEL: I have already explained in detail, in replying to questions, my fundamental standpoint with regard to all orders concerning the treatment of the population. I signed the order and by doing so I assumed responsibility within the scope of my official jurisdiction.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal considers that you are not answering the question. The question was perfectly capable of an answer “yes” or “no” and an explanation afterwards. It is not an answer to the question to say that you have already explained to your counsel.

GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you once more, do you consider this order, this particular order—and I emphasize, in which it is stated that “human life has absolutely no value”—do you consider this order correct?

KEITEL: It does not contain these words; but I knew from years of experience that in the Southeastern territories and in certain parts of the Soviet territory, human life was not respected to the same degree.

GEN. RUDENKO: You say that these words do not exist in the order?

KEITEL: To my knowledge those exact words do not appear; but it says that human life has very little value in these territories. I remember something like that.

GEN. RUDENKO: According to your recollection now, you remember that you were interrogated by General Alexandrov on 9 November 1945. To a question in regard to the meaning of this sentence you replied: “I must admit that this sentence is authentic, although the Führer himself inserted this sentence in the order.”

Do you remember your explanation?

KEITEL: That is correct. That is true.

GEN. RUDENKO: I can produce this order for you. I did not produce it because you were familiarizing yourself with it yesterday.

KEITEL: I did not read through all the points yesterday. I merely admitted its actual existence.

THE PRESIDENT: It would help the Tribunal if you got a translation of the document. When you are cross-examining upon a document and as to the actual words of it, it is very inconvenient for us not to have the document before us.

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I shall at once present this order to the defendant.

[_Handing the document to the defendant._]

THE PRESIDENT: Is it Document 389-PS?

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, this is Document 389-PS.

THE PRESIDENT: When you are citing a document it would be a good thing if you would cite the number rather slowly because very often the translation does not come through accurately to us.

GEN. RUDENKO: All right, I shall observe this in the future, Mr. President. I numbered this document R-98, but it has a double number, R-98 and 389-PS. I cited Subparagraph 3 b) of this order.

Defendant Keitel, have you familiarized yourself with the document?

KEITEL: Yes. The text in the German language says that “in the countries affected human life frequently has no value...”

GEN. RUDENKO: And further?

KEITEL: Yes, “...and a deterrent effect can be obtained only by extreme harshness. To atone for the life of a German soldier...”

GEN. RUDENKO: Quite clear. And in this same order, in this same Subparagraph “b,” it is stated that:

“To atone for the life of one German soldier, 50 to 100 Communists must, as a rule, be sentenced to death. The method of execution should strengthen the measure of determent.”

Is that correct?

KEITEL: The German text is slightly different. It says: “In such cases in general, the death penalty for 50 to 100 Communists may be considered adequate.”

That is the German wording.

GEN. RUDENKO: For one German soldier?

KEITEL: Yes. I know that and I see it here.

GEN. RUDENKO: That is what I was asking you about. So now I ask you once more...

KEITEL: Do you want an explanation of that or am I not to say any more?

GEN. RUDENKO: I shall now interrogate you on this matter. I ask you whether, when signing this order you thereby expressed your personal opinion on these cruel measures? In other words, were you in agreement with Hitler?

KEITEL: I signed the order but the figures contained in it are alterations made personally by Hitler himself.

GEN. RUDENKO: And what figures did you present to Hitler?

KEITEL: The figures in the original were 5 to 10.

GEN. RUDENKO: In other words, the divergence between you and Hitler consisted merely in the figures and not in the spirit of the document?

KEITEL: The idea was that the only way of deterring them was to demand several sacrifices for the life of one soldier, as is stated here.

GEN. RUDENKO: You...

THE PRESIDENT: That was not an answer to the question. The question was whether the only difference between you and Hitler on this document was a question of figures. That admits of the answer, “yes” or “no.” Was the only difference between you and Hitler a question of figures?

KEITEL: Then I must say that with reference to the underlying principle there was a difference of opinion, the final results of which I no longer feel myself in a position to justify, since I added my signature on behalf of my department. There was a fundamental difference of opinion on the entire question.

GEN. RUDENKO: All right. Let us continue.

I would like to remind you of one more order. It is the order dated 16 December 1942, referring to the so-called “Fight against the Partisans.” This document was submitted to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-16; I shall not examine you in detail with regard to this order. It was presented to you yesterday by your defense counsel.

KEITEL: I do not remember that at the moment.

GEN. RUDENKO: You do not remember?

KEITEL: Not the one that was presented yesterday.

GEN. RUDENKO: All right. If you do not remember I can hand you this document in order to refresh your memory.

THE PRESIDENT: What was the PS number of this document?

GEN. RUDENKO: This is the document submitted by the Soviet Prosecution as Exhibit Number USSR-16 (Document Number USSR-16).

THE PRESIDENT: I just took down that it was USA-516, but I suppose I was wrong in hearing. It is USSR-16, is it?

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, USSR-16.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

GEN. RUDENKO: [_Handing the document to the defendant._] I shall interrogate you, Defendant Keitel, only on one question in connection with this order. In Subparagraph 1 of this order, Paragraph 3, it is stated, and I would draw your attention to the following sentence:

“The troops are therefore authorized and ordered in this struggle to take any measures without restriction even against women and children, if that is necessary to achieve success.”

Have you found this passage?

KEITEL: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: Have you found the order calling for the application of any kind of measures you like without restriction, also against women and children?

KEITEL: “To employ without restriction any means, even against women and children, if it is necessary.” I have found that.

GEN. RUDENKO: That is exactly what I am asking you about. I ask you, Defendant Keitel, Field Marshal of the former German Army, do you consider that this order is a just one, that measures may be employed at will against women and children?

KEITEL: Measures, insofar as it means that women and children were also to be removed from territories where there was partisan warfare, never atrocities or the murder of women or children. Never!

GEN. RUDENKO: To remove—a German term—means to kill?

KEITEL: No. I do not think it would ever have been necessary to tell German soldiers that they could not and must not kill women and children.

GEN. RUDENKO: You did not answer my question.

Do you consider this order a just one in regard to measures against women and children or do you consider it unjust? Answer “yes” or “no.” Is it just or unjust? Explain the matter later.

KEITEL: I considered these measures to be right and as such I admit them; but not measures to kill. That was a crime.

GEN. RUDENKO: “Any kind of measures” includes murder.

KEITEL: Yes, but not of women and children.

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, but it says here “Any kind of measures against women and children.”

KEITEL: No, it does not say “any measures.” It says “...and not to shrink from taking measures against women and children.” That is what it says.

No German soldier or German officer ever thought of killing women and children.

GEN. RUDENKO: And in reality...?

KEITEL: I cannot say in every individual case, since I do not know and I could not be everywhere and since I received no reports about it.

GEN. RUDENKO: But there were millions of such cases?

KEITEL: I have no knowledge of that and I do not believe that it happened in millions of cases.

GEN. RUDENKO: You do not believe it?

KEITEL: No.

GEN. RUDENKO: I shall proceed to another question. I shall now refer to one question, the question of the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. I do not intend to examine you in regard to the branding of Soviet prisoners of war and other facts; they are sufficiently well known to the Tribunal. I want to examine you in regard to one document, the report of Admiral Canaris, which was presented to you yesterday. You remember yesterday your counsel submitted to you the Canaris report; it is dated 15 September 1941 and registered under Document Number EC-338. As you will remember, even a German officer drew attention to the exceptional arbitrariness and lawlessness admitted in connection with the Soviet prisoners of war. Canaris in this report pointed to the mass murders of Soviet prisoners of war and spoke of the necessity of definitely eliminating this arbitrariness. Did you agree with the statements advanced by Canaris in his report, with reference to yourself?

KEITEL: I did not understand the last statement. With reference to myself?

GEN. RUDENKO: The last question amounts to this: Were you, Keitel, personally in agreement with the proposals made by Canaris in his report, that the arbitrary treatment permitted should be done away with where Soviet prisoners of war were concerned?

KEITEL: I answered my counsel yesterday...

GEN. RUDENKO: You can answer my question briefly; were you in agreement with it?

KEITEL: Yes, I will be brief—on receiving that letter, I immediately submitted it to the Führer, Adolf Hitler, especially on account of the enclosed publication by the Peoples’ Commissars, which was dated the beginning of July, and I asked for a new decision. On the whole I shared the objections raised by Canaris, but I must supplement that...

GEN. RUDENKO: You shared them? Very well. I shall now present you with the original copy of Canaris’ report, containing your decision.

Mr. President, I shall now present to the defendant the document containing his decision. This decision was not read into the record in court and I shall also present the text of his final decision to the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you have the original?

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, I gave it to the defendant.

And now, Witness Keitel, will you please follow?

KEITEL: I know the document with the marginal notes.

GEN. RUDENKO: Listen to me and follow the text of the decision. This is Canaris’ document, which you consider a just one. The following are the contents of your decision:

“These objections arise from the military conception of chivalrous warfare. We are dealing here with the destruction of an ideology and, therefore, I approve such measures and I sanction them.” Signed: “Keitel.”

Is this your resolution?

KEITEL: Yes, I wrote that after it had been submitted to the Führer for decision. I wrote it then.

GEN. RUDENKO: It is not written there that the Führer said so; it is said “I sanction them”—meaning Keitel.

KEITEL: And I state this on oath; and I said it even before I read it.

GEN. RUDENKO: This means that you acknowledge the decision. I will now draw your attention to another passage of this document. I draw your attention to Page 2. Please observe that the text of Canaris’ report mentions the following:

“The separation of civilians and prisoners of war who are politically undesirable, and decisions to be made in regard to their fate, is to be effected by task forces (Einsatzkommando) belonging to the Security Police and the SD in accordance with directives not known to the Wehrmacht establishments and whose execution cannot be checked by the latter.”

Canaris writes this; your decision, Defendant Keitel, is written in the margin. It says, “Highly expedient.” Is that correct?

KEITEL: Please repeat the last question. The last words I heard were “Canaris writes.”

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, and I am now mentioning the fact that your decision “Highly expedient” appears in the margin, opposite that paragraph, and written by your own hand. Have you found this?

KEITEL: Yes. The word “expedient” refers to the fact that the army offices had nothing to do with these Einsatzkommandos and knew nothing about them. It states that they are not known to the Wehrmacht.

GEN. RUDENKO: And furthermore it refers to the fact that the Security Police and the SD should wreak vengeance on civilians and prisoners of war? You consider that expedient?

KEITEL: No, I thought it expedient that the activities of these Kommandos be unknown to the Armed Forces. That is what I meant. That appears here and I underlined “unknown.”

GEN. RUDENKO: I am asking you, Defendant Keitel, known as Field Marshal and one who, before this Tribunal, has repeatedly referred to yourself as a soldier, whether you, in your own blood-thirsty decision of September 1941, confirmed and sanctioned the murder of the unarmed soldiers whom you had captured? Is that right?

KEITEL: I signed both decrees and I, therefore, bear the responsibility within the sphere of my office; I assume the responsibility.

GEN. RUDENKO: That is quite clear. In this connection I would like to ask you, since you have repeatedly mentioned it before the Tribunal, about the duty of a soldier. I want to ask you: Is it in accordance with the concept of a “soldier’s duty” and the “honor of an officer” to promulgate such orders for reprisals on prisoners of war and on peaceful citizens?

KEITEL: Yes, as far as the reprisals of August and September are concerned, in view of what happened to German prisoners of war whom we found in the field of battle, and in Lvov where we found them murdered by the hundreds.

GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Keitel, do you again wish to follow the path to which you resorted once before, and revive the question of the alleged butchery of German prisoners of war? You and I agreed yesterday that as far back as May 1941, prior to the beginning of the war, you had signed a directive on the shooting of political and military workers in the Red Army. I have some...

KEITEL: Yes, I also signed the orders before the war but they did not contain the word “murder.”

GEN. RUDENKO: I am not going to argue with you since this means arguing against documents; and documents speak for themselves.

I have a few last questions to ask you: You informed the Tribunal that the generals of the German Army were only blindly carrying out Hitler’s orders?

KEITEL: I have stated that I do not know if any generals raised objections or who they were, and I said that it did not happen in my presence when Hitler proclaimed the principles of the ideological war and ordered them to be put into practice.

GEN. RUDENKO: And do you know that the generals, on their own initiative, promulgated orders on atrocities and on the violation of the laws and customs of war, and that these orders were approved by Hitler?

KEITEL: I know that high authorities in the Army issued orders altering, modifying, and even cancelling in part; for instance, as regards jurisdiction, the March decree and other measures, because they also discussed it with me.

GEN. RUDENKO: You do not understand me. I did not ask about modifications, but whether the generals, on their own initiative, ever promulgated orders inciting to the violation of the laws and customs of war.

KEITEL: I do not know of that. I do not know what order you are referring to, General. At the moment I cannot say that I know that.

GEN. RUDENKO: I shall refer to one order only. What I have in mind is General Field Marshal Reichenau’s order governing the conduct of troops in the East.

This document, Mr. President, was presented by the Soviet Prosecution as Exhibit Number USSR-12 (Document Number USSR-12). The passages to which I refer are underlined in this document, and I shall read into the record one quotation from this order governing the conduct of troops in the East:

“Feeding the inhabitants and prisoners of war...is...a mistaken humanity...”

KEITEL: I know the order. It was shown to me during a preliminary interrogation.

GEN. RUDENKO: This order, issued on Reichenau’s initiative and approved by Hitler, was distributed as a model order among all the army commanders.

KEITEL: I did not know that; I heard about it here for the first time. To my knowledge I never saw the order either.

GEN. RUDENKO: Of course you would, quite obviously, consider such orders as entirely insignificant. After all, could the fate of Soviet prisoners of war and of the civilian population be of any possible interest to the Chief of the OKW, since their lives were of no value whatsoever?

KEITEL: I had no contact with the commanders at the front and had no official connection with them. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army was the only one who had.

GEN. RUDENKO: I am finishing your cross-examination. When testifying before the Tribunal you very often referred, as did your accomplices, the Defendants Göring and Ribbentrop, to the Treaty of Versailles, and I am asking you, were Vienna, Prague, Belgrade and the Crimea part of Germany before the Treaty of Versailles?

KEITEL: No.

GEN. RUDENKO: You stated here that in 1944, after the law had been amended, you received an offer to join the Nazi Party. You accepted this offer, presented your personal credentials to the leadership of the Party, and paid your membership fees. Tell us, did not your acceptance to join the membership of the Nazi Party signify that you were in agreement with the program, objectives, and methods of the Party?

KEITEL: As I had already been in possession of the Golden Party Badge for three or four years, I thought that this request for my personal particulars was only a formal registration; and I paid the required Party membership subscription. I did both these things and have admitted doing them.

GEN. RUDENKO: In other words, before this formal offer was ever made, you already, _de facto_, considered yourself a member of the Nazi Party?

KEITEL: I have always thought of myself as a soldier; not as a political soldier or politician.

GEN. RUDENKO: Should we not conclude, after all that has been said here, that you were a Hitler-General, not because duty called you but on account of your own convictions?

KEITEL: I have stated here that I was a loyal and obedient soldier of my Führer. And I do not think that there are generals in Russia who do not give Marshal Stalin implicit obedience.

GEN. RUDENKO: I have exhausted all my questions.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, do you remember on the 2d of October 1945 writing a letter to Colonel Amen, explaining your position? It was after your interrogations, and in your own time you wrote a letter explaining your point of view. Do you remember that?

KEITEL: Yes, I think I did write a letter; but I no longer remember the contents. It referred to the interrogations, however.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.

KEITEL: And I think it contained a request that I be given a further opportunity of thinking things over, as the questions put to me took me by surprise and I was often unable to remember the answers.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to remind you of one passage and ask you whether it correctly expresses your view:

“In carrying out these thankless and difficult tasks, I had to fulfill my duty under the hardest exigencies of war, often acting against the inner voice of my conscience and against my own convictions. The fulfillment of urgent tasks assigned by Hitler, to whom I was directly responsible, demanded complete self-abnegation.”

Do you remember that?

KEITEL: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I just want you to tell the Tribunal, what were the worst matters in your view in which you often acted against the inner voice of your conscience? Just tell us some of the worst matters in which you acted against the inner voice of your conscience.

KEITEL: I found myself in such a situation quite frequently, but the decisive questions which conflicted most violently with my conscience and my convictions were those which were contrary to the training which I had undergone during my 37 years as an officer in the German Army. That was a blow at my most intimate personal principles.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wanted it to come from you, Defendant. Can you tell the Tribunal the three worst things you had to do which were against the inner voice of your conscience? What do you pick out as the three worst things you had to do?

KEITEL: Perhaps, to start with the last, the orders given for the conduct of the war in the East, insofar as they were contrary to the acknowledged usage of war; then something which particularly concerns the British Delegation, the question of the 50 R.A.F. officers, the question which weighed particularly heavy on my mind, that of the terror-fliers and, worst of all, the Nacht und Nebel Decree and the actual consequences it entailed at a later stage and about which I did not know. Those were the worst struggles which I had with myself.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will take the Nacht und Nebel.

My Lord, this document and a good many to which I shall refer are in the British Document Book Number 7, Wilhelm Keitel and Alfred Jodl, and it occurs on Page 279. It is L-90, Exhibit USA-503.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Defendant, I will give you the German document book. It is 279 of the British document book, and 289...

KEITEL: Number 731?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Page 289. I do not know which volume it is; Part 2, I think it is.

You see, the purpose of the decree is set out a few lines from the start, where they say that in all cases where the death penalty is not pronounced and not carried out within a week,

“...the accused are in the future to be deported to Germany secretly, and further proceedings in connection with the offenses will take place here. The deterrent effect of these measures lies in: (a) the complete disappearance of the accused;

(b) the fact that no information may be given as to their whereabouts or their fate.”

Both these purposes, you will agree, were extremely cruel and brutal, were they not?

KEITEL: I said both at the time and yesterday, that I personally thought that to deport individuals secretly was very much more cruel than to impose a sentence of death. I have...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you turn to Page 281—291 of yours—281 of the English Book?

KEITEL: Yes, I have it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that this is your covering letter:

“The Führer is of the opinion:”—Line 4—“In the case of offenses such as these, punishment by imprisonment, or even penal servitude for life, will be considered a sign of weakness. Effective and lasting intimidation can only be achieved either by capital punishment or by measures which keep the culprit’s relatives and the population generally uncertain as to his fate.”

You will agree that there again these sentences of the Führer which you are here transmitting were cruel and brutal, were they not?

KEITEL: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, what I...

KEITEL: May I add something?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, as shortly as you can.

KEITEL: I made a statement yesterday on this subject and I drew your attention particularly to the words: “It is the Führer’s long considered will,” which were intended to convey to the generals who were receiving these orders what was written between the lines.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, you know, Defendant, that that was by no means the end of this series of orders, was it? This order was unsuccessful despite its cruelty and brutality in achieving its purpose, was it not? This order, the Nacht und Nebel Order, in that form was unsuccessful in achieving its purpose; it did not stop what it was designed to stop? Is that right?

KEITEL: No, it did not cease.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that in 1944 you had to make a still more severe order. Would you look at Document D-762? My Lord, that will become Exhibit GB-298.

[_Turning to the defendant._] It says:

“The constant increase in acts of terror and sabotage in the occupied territories, committed more and more by bands under unified leadership, compels us to take the sternest countermeasures in a degree corresponding to the ferocity of the war which is forced upon us. Those who attack us from the rear at the crisis of our fight for existence deserve no consideration.

“I therefore order:

“All acts of violence committed by non-German civilians in the occupied territories against the German Wehrmacht, the SS, or the Police, or against installations used by them, are to be combated in the following manner as acts of terrorism and sabotage:”—(1)—“The troops,”—the SS and so on—“are to fight down on the spot...all terrorists and saboteurs.”—(2)—“Those who are apprehended later are to be handed over to the nearest local Security Police and the SD office.”—(3)—“Accomplices, especially women, who take no active part in the fighting, are to be employed on labor. Children are to be spared.”

Now, would you look at Paragraph II:

“The Chief of the OKW will issue the necessary executive instructions. He is entitled to make alterations and additions as far as required by the exigencies of war operations.”

Did you think that was a cruel and severe order or not?

KEITEL: Yes, I do think so, but may I make one small correction? It must have been incorrectly translated. The actual wording is: “Women are to be employed on labor. Children are to be spared.” So it says in the original version which I have before me.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I said “spared.” “Spared” meant that they were not to be treated thus. I was careful to mention that.

KEITEL: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you had authority to make alterations and additions. Did you, by your alterations and additions, attempt to mitigate the severity of that order in any way?

KEITEL: I have no recollection of having issued any additional orders to mitigate its severity. I may also say that I never would have issued anything without first presenting it to the Führer.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let us see what you did issue. Would you look at Document D-764, which will be Exhibit GB-299?

Now, that is your executive order, countersigned I think by the Senior Military Judge, putting forward your order based on that decree; and would you look at Paragraphs 4 and 5:

“All legal proceedings now going on in connection with acts of terrorism, sabotage, or other crimes committed by non-German civilians in the occupied territories which imperil the security or readiness for action of the occupying power are to be suspended. Indictments are to be dropped. Sentences already pronounced are not to be carried out. The culprits are to be handed over with a report on the proceedings to the nearest local Security Police and SD office. In the case of death sentences which have already become final, the regulations now in force will continue to apply.

“Crimes affecting German interests but which do not imperil the security or readiness for action of the occupying power do not justify the retention of jurisdiction over non-German civilians in the occupied territories. I authorize the commanders of the occupied territories to draw up new regulations in agreement with the Higher SS and the Police Leader.”

And then you ask them to consider among the first, one handing them over to the SD for forced labor.

That was certainly not mitigation of the order, was it? You were not making it any easier.

KEITEL: There are a few sentences to be added here. This arose out of the daily discussion of these matters which I dealt with later on the same lines as the first decree. I made suitable annotations, and signed them.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, that is what you called terrorism and sabotage. Let us look at what happened to people who were guilty of something less than terrorism or sabotage. Look at Document D-763. That will be GB-300. “Non-German civilians...”

KEITEL: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “Non-German civilians in the occupied territories who endanger the security or tactical preparedness of the occupying power otherwise than through acts of terrorism and sabotage, are to be handed over to the SD. Section I, Number 3...”—that is the part that says women will be employed on labor and children will be spared—“of the Führer’s order also applies to them.”

Well, you knew perfectly well what would happen to anyone who was handed over to the SD, that he would probably be killed, certainly be put into a concentration camp, did you not?

KEITEL: I did not interpret it that way; the words “to be allocated on labor” were always used; but it has become clear to me from what I have learned that they frequently ended in the concentration camp. However, it was always described to us, to me, as a labor camp. That was the description, “labor camps of the Secret State Police.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But this is August 1944. You will agree that that is a most severe course to take with people who have been guilty of something less than terrorism or sabotage, do you not?

KEITEL: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let us...

KEITEL: I assume that you do not wish me to discuss this origin and development here. Otherwise I could explain them; but I will merely answer the question. The answer is, yes, it was a very severe measure. The explanation, if I may state it very briefly, is that, as is known, during the interminable daily situation reports on the incidents in all the occupied territories, I received from the Führer instructions and orders which were afterwards crystallized in a form similar to this document; and I think I have already described in detail the way in which I discussed these things with him and how I worked, that on principle I never issued or signed anything which did not agree in principle with his wishes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was severe enough for you for only 3 weeks, was it not, because on 4 September, which is barely 3 weeks later, you issued another order, Document D-766, Exhibit GB-301. Now, this was issued, as it shows, as an agreement with Himmler, Kaltenbrunner, the Reich Minister of Justice and Dr. Lammers. Now look at I:

“Non-German civilians in occupied territories who have been sentenced by German courts for a criminal act against the security or tactical preparedness of the occupying power, the sentence having become final, and who are in custody in the occupied territories or in the home front area, are to be handed over, together with a report on the facts, to the nearest local Security Police and SD office. An exception is made only in the case of those sentenced to death for whom the execution of the penalty has been ordered.

“II. Persons convicted of criminal acts against the Reich or the occupying power and prohibited, in accordance with the directives...issued by the Führer for the prosecution of such acts, from intercourse with the outside world, are to be given a distinguishing mark.”

Now, had you any idea how many people would be affected by that order?

KEITEL: No, I cannot say anything about that. I know only that it was made necessary by the increasing tension in the occupied territories, due to lack of troops to keep order.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let me remind you. You called a conference to consider this matter. That is shown in Document D-765, and I also show you D-767, the report of the conference. You need not worry about 765, which just says that there is to be a conference, but in Document D-767, which will be Exhibit GB-303, there is a report of the conference. The second paragraph says:

“The Reichsführer SS”—Himmler—“demands in his letter the immediate surrender to the SD of approximately 24,000 non-German civilians who are under arrest or held for interrogation.”—Now listen to this: “No answer was given to the question raised during the discussion as to why they must be surrendered to the SD at the present moment, in spite of the considerable amount of administrative work involved.”

Can you give any answer now as to why 24,000 people who had been sentenced should be transferred to the tender mercies of the SD?

KEITEL: May I read this note? I do not know it; may I read it now, please?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly. You will see that I did not trouble you with it all, but it says what I had already put to you earlier, that the Nacht und Nebel Decree had become superfluous as a result of the terror and sabotage decree, and that the Wehrmacht Legal Department had presented these things for discussion.

Now, can you give us any answer as to why these 24,000 unfortunate persons who had been sentenced should be handed over to the tender mercies of the SD?

KEITEL: I must say that I am surprised by the whole incident. I did not attend the conference, and apparently I did not read the note since, as a matter of principle, I always marked every document which had been presented to me with my initials. I am not acquainted with the figures quoted; this is the first time I have seen them; I am not acquainted with them and I do not remember them, unless another order was...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will give you something which you have read.

KEITEL: As regards the facts about which you ask, I must answer in the affirmative. I do not know the figures, only the facts.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you cannot answer my question. You cannot give us any reason as to why the Wehrmacht and these other offices were sending the 24,000 people, who had been sentenced by ordinary courts, over to the SD? You cannot give us any reason for that?

KEITEL: No; I may say that up to a point I can. I think “SD” is a misinterpretation. I think police custody was meant. That does not mean the same thing.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly not.

KEITEL: I do not know if it might have been the same thing.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Surely you have been at this Trial too long to think that handing people over to the SD means police custody. It means a concentration camp and a gas chamber usually, does it not? That is what it meant in fact, whether you knew it or not.

KEITEL: I did not know it, but it obviously led to the concentration camp in the end. I consider it possible; in any case, I cannot say that it was not.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the last paragraph but one refers to the OKW.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, I am just coming to that.

[_Turning to the defendant._] If you will notice that, Defendant, two paragraphs below the one I put to you it states:

“As the OKW is not particularly interested in trying the minor matters still remaining for the military tribunals, they are to be settled by decrees to be agreed upon by local authorities.”

It is quite clear that your office was deeply concerned in this business, was it not, Defendant?

KEITEL: I do not know exactly what it means, but it was obviously mentioned at that conference.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, before I put the next document, I want you to realize how we have been going. We started with the Nacht und Nebel Decree, which disappeared, and we went on to the Terror and Sabotage Decree. We then proceeded to acts which were less than terror and sabotage, but were criminal acts under the rules of the occupying power.

I now want you to consider what was done to people who simply refused to work. Would you look at Document D-769? That is Exhibit GB-304. That is a telegram from Luftwaffe General Christiansen, who was in the Netherlands, Commander of the Air Forces in the Netherlands, through his Chief of Staff.

Now listen to this:

“Owing to railway strike, all communications in Holland at standstill. Railway personnel does not respond to appeals to resume work. Demands for motor vehicles and other means of transport for moving troops and maintaining supplies are no longer obeyed by the civil population. According to the Führer’s decree of 18 August 1944”—that is the Terror and Sabotage Decree, which you have already had—“and the supplementary executive instructions of the Chief of the OKW”—which we have already seen—“troops may use weapons only against persons who commit acts of violence as terrorists or saboteurs, whereas persons who endanger the security or tactical preparedness of the occupying power in any other way than by terrorism or acts of sabotage, are to be handed over to the SD.”

Then General Christiansen comes in with this:

“This regulation has proved too complicated, and therefore ineffective. Above all, we do not possess the necessary police forces. The troops must again receive authority to shoot also, with or without summary court-martial, persons who are not terrorists or saboteurs in the sense of the Führer’s decree, but who endanger the fighting forces by passive resistance. It is requested that the Führer’s decree be altered accordingly, as the troops cannot otherwise assert themselves effectively against the population, which in its turn, appears to endanger the conduct of operations.”

Now, Defendant, will you agree that shooting, with or even without trial, railway men who will not work, is about as brutal and cruel a measure as could well be imagined by the mind of man? Do you agree?

KEITEL: That is a cruel measure, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was your answer to that cruel measure?

KEITEL: I cannot say. I do not recollect the incident at all, but perhaps the answer is there.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, look at the Document D-770, which is, I think, your answer; it is Exhibit GB-305. You will notice on the distribution list that that goes to the Commander of the Armed Forces in the Netherlands, and further to the signal which we have just been looking at. Now, you say:

“According to the Führer’s order of 30 July 1944, non-German civilians in the occupied territories who attack us in the rear in the crisis of our battle for existence deserve no consideration. This must be our guiding principle in the interpretation and application of the Führer’s decree itself and the Chief of the OKW’s executive decree of 18 August 1944.

“If the military situation and the state of communications make it impossible to hand them over to the SD, other effective measures are to be taken ruthlessly and independently. There is, naturally”—and I ask you to note the word “naturally”—“no objection to passing and executing death sentences by summary court-martial under such circumstances.”

I can not remember, Defendant, whether you have ever had an independent command yourself or not. Have you? Have you had an independent command, apart from your division? I think that was the last independent command you had. You have not had an independent command yourself, have you? Don’t I make myself clear?

KEITEL: I did not understand. What do you mean by “independent”?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I mean that you have not been a commander or chief of an army or army group yourself, if I remember rightly, or of an area, have you?

KEITEL: No, I have not.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I ask you to put yourself in General Christiansen’s position. That answer of yours was a direct encouragement, practically amounting to an order, to shoot these railway men out of hand, was it not? “To take other effective measures ruthlessly and independently.”

KEITEL: That is explained by the form of summary court-martial. It is not left to the discretion of the individual; jurisdiction of summary court-martial was provided.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at the way it is put, Defendant. I suggest to you that it is quite clear. One sentence states: “If handing over to the SD is impossible, owing to the military situation and the state of communications, other effective measures are to be taken ruthlessly and independently.”

Then, the next sentence: “There are, naturally”—look at the word “naturally.” I suppose that it was “natürlich” in German. Is that correct?

KEITEL: I have not the word “natürlich” here. Two words, so far as I can make out, have been inserted.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it says: “There are, naturally, no objections to passing and executing death sentences by summary court-martial procedure.” What you are saying is that, of course, there is no objection to a summary court, but you are telling him, in addition to that, that he is to take effective measures ruthlessly and independently. If General Christiansen had shot these railway men out of hand, after getting that letter from you, neither you nor any other superior could have blamed him for it, could you?

KEITEL: According to the last sentence, he was obliged to carry out summary court-martial procedure. It says: “There are no objections to the executing of this sentence by summary court-martial under such circumstances.” That is how I meant it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But what did you mean by “effective measures to be taken ruthlessly and independently”? What did you mean by that, if it was only an ordinary summary court procedure?

KEITEL: Not apart from summary court procedure, but by means of the same. That is what the last sentence means. It is already unusual to appoint a summary court-martial in such cases.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, even on your basis, to use a military summary court to shoot railway men who will not work is going rather far even for you, is it not? It is going rather far, isn’t it?

KEITEL: That was a very severe measure, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you tell the Tribunal that when you make all these additions, taking you through the chain of additions that you make to the order replacing the Nacht und Nebel Order, of which you disapproved, do you say that you went to Hitler for every one of these executive orders and answers that you made?

KEITEL: Yes. I went to him on the occasion of every one of these orders. I must emphasize the fact that I did not issue any of these orders without previously submitting it to the Führer. I must expressly point out that that was so.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I think a misunderstanding has crept into the translation. The translation interprets “Standgericht” as summary court. I do not believe that the words “summary court” reflect accurately what we understand in the German language by “Standgericht.” I do not know just what you understand in the English or American language by “summary court,” but I can imagine that this means some summary procedure.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I was taking it in favor of the Defendant that it meant the court he referred to yesterday, one officer and two soldiers. I was taking that. If I am wrong, the Defendant will correct me. Is that right, Defendant?

KEITEL: I described this Standgericht (summary court-martial procedure) briefly yesterday, and the criterion of a summary court-martial was that it was not always necessary for a fully trained legal expert to be present, although it was desirable.

THE PRESIDENT: While you are on the subject of translation, the Defendant seemed to suggest that there was no word in the German which is translated by the English word “naturally.” Is that true?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I had it checked and I am told that the translation is right.

THE PRESIDENT: There is a German word which is translated by “naturally”? I should like to know that from Dr. Nelte.

DR. NELTE: I am told that a false conception or false judgment might be produced in this connection since in British and American law a summary court has no right to pass sentences of death. I am told that a summary court...

THE PRESIDENT: Excuse me, Dr. Nelte, I did not ask that question. The question I asked you was whether there was any German word which is translated into English by the word “naturally.” Is that not a clear question?

DR. NELTE: In the German text it says “under such circumstances, of course.” I think the English translation is incorrect in using the word “naturally” and in putting it after “in these circumstances” instead of at the beginning, so that one is led to conclude that it means, “there are naturally no objections (es gibt natürlich keine Einwendungen),” whereas the German text says, “Against the passing and executing of death sentences by summary court procedure there are—under such circumstances, of course—no objections (Gegen die Verhängung und Vollstreckung von Todesurteilen im standgerichtlichen Verfahren bestehen unter solchen Verhältnissen selbstverständlich keine Bedenken).”

THE PRESIDENT: Then the answer to my question is “yes.” There is a word in the German which is translated “naturally.”

DR. NELTE: Yes, but the words “naturally” and “under such circumstances” are separated in the English version, while in the German version they belong together. “Naturally” refers to “under such circumstances.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want to come to another point. You told us yesterday that with regard to forced labor you were concerned in it because there was a shortage of manpower and you had to take men out of industry for the Wehrmacht. Your office was concerned with using military forces in order to try and round-up people for forced labor, was it not?

KEITEL: I do not think that is quite the correct conception. The Replacement Office in the High Command of the Wehrmacht...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you are going to deny it, I put the document to you. I put General Warlimont’s views to you and see if you agree. I think it saves time in the end. If you look at Document 3819-PS, which will be Exhibit GB-306, Page 9 of the English version. It is the report of a meeting at Berlin on 12 July 1944. You have to look on through the document after the letters from the Defendant Sauckel and the Defendant Speer, the account of a meeting in Berlin. I think it is Page 10 of the German version. It starts with a speech by Dr. Lammers and goes on with a speech from the Defendant Sauckel, then a speech from the witness Von Steengracht, then a speech from General Warlimont: “The Deputy of the head of the OKW, General Warlimont, referred to a recently issued Führer order.” Have you found the portion? I will read it if you have.

KEITEL: Yes, I have found the paragraph “The Representative of the Chief of the OKW...”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “The Representative of the Chief of the OKW, General Warlimont, referred to a recently issued Führer order, according to which all German forces had to participate in the task of raising manpower. Wherever the Wehrmacht was stationed, if it was not employed exclusively in pressing military duties (as, for example, in the construction of coastal defenses), it would be available, but it could not be assigned expressly for the purpose of the GBA. General Warlimont made the following practical suggestions:

“a) The troops employed in fighting the partisans are to take over, in addition, the task of raising manpower in the partisan areas. Everyone who cannot give a satisfactory reason for his presence in these areas is to be recruited by force.

“b) When large cities are wholly or partly evacuated on account of the difficulty of providing food, those members of the population suitable for labor are to be utilized for labor with the assistance of the Wehrmacht.

“c) The refugees from the areas near the front should be rounded up with special vigor with the assistance of the Wehrmacht.”

After reading this report of General Warlimont’s words, do you still say that the Wehrmacht...

KEITEL: I am not aware that the Armed Forces have ever received an order mentioning the rounding-up of workers. I would like to say that I know of no such demand and I have not found any confirmation of it. The conference as such is unknown to me and so are the proposals you mentioned. It is new as far as I am concerned.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is quite clear that General Warlimont is suggesting that the Wehrmacht should help in the rounding-up of forced labor, isn’t it?

KEITEL: But as far as I know it has never happened. I do not know that such an order was given. According to the record, this is a proposal made by General Warlimont, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, perhaps in those circumstances you should read the three lines after the passage you have read.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I should. The next line:

“Gauleiter Sauckel accepted these suggestions with thanks and expressed the expectation that a certain amount of success could be achieved by this means.”

KEITEL: May I say something about that? May I ask that Gauleiter Sauckel be asked at a given time whether and to what extent troops of the Armed Forces did actually participate in such matters. It is not known to me.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No doubt the Defendant Sauckel will be asked a number of questions in due time. At the moment I am asking you. You say that you do not know anything about it?

KEITEL: No, I do not recollect that any order was given in this connection. I gather from the statement by Warlimont that discussions took place.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want to ask you a few questions about the murder of various prisoners of war. I want to get it quite clear. Did you mean yesterday to justify the order for the shooting of Commandos, dated 18 October 1942? Did you wish to say that it was right and justified, or not?

KEITEL: I stated yesterday that neither General Jodl nor I thought that we were in a position, or considered it possible, to draft or submit such a written order. We did not do it because we could not justify it or give reasons for it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The next question that I put to you is this: Did you approve and think right the order that was made that Commandos should be shot?

KEITEL: I no longer opposed it, firstly on account of the punishment threatened, and secondly because I could no longer alter the order without personal orders from Hitler.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you think that that order was right?

KEITEL: According to my inner convictions I did not consider it right, but after it had been given I did not oppose it or take a stand against it in any way.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know that your orders had contained provisions for the use of parachutists being dropped for sabotage purposes, don’t you? Your own orders have contained that provision of parachutists being dropped for sabotage purposes. Don’t you remember in the Fall Grün against Czechoslovakia? I would put it to you if you like, but I would so much prefer that you try to remember it yourself. Don’t you remember that your own orders contained a provision for parachutists being dropped for sabotage purposes in Czechoslovakia?

KEITEL: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You don’t?

KEITEL: No, I do not remember the order.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I refer you to it. My Lord, it is Page 21 and 22 of the document book.

KEITEL: Which document book, please?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. It ought to be your first document book, and quite early on. It is part of the Fall Grün, which is Document 388-PS, and it is Item 11. I think it is somewhere about Page 15 or 16 or 20. You remember the Schmundt minutes and then it is divided into items.

The Tribunal will find it at the foot of Page 21:

[_Turning to the defendant._]

“For the success of this operation, co-operation with the Sudeten German frontier population, with deserters from the Czechoslovakian Army, with parachutists or airborne troops, and with units of the sabotage service will be of importance.”

KEITEL: May I read the paragraph that I think you mean?

SIR DAVID. MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes; it is headed “Missions for the Branches of the Armed Forces...”

KEITEL: “Missions for the Branches of the Armed Forces.” It states:

“For success, co-operation with the Sudeten German frontier population and the deserters from the Czechoslovakian Army, with parachutists or airborne troops and with units of the sabotage service can be of importance.”

These parachutists and airborne troops were in fact to be set to work on frontier fortifications, as I explained yesterday, since army authorities believed that the artillery resources at our command were insufficient to permit our combating them with artillery.

This does not mean parachutists or saboteurs, but actual members of the German Air Force, and the sabotage service is mentioned at the end.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The sabotage service must be people who are going to do sabotage if they are going to be of any use, must they not? They do sabotage, don’t they?

KEITEL: Undoubtedly; but not by means of airborne troops and parachutists, but through saboteurs in the frontier areas who offer their services for this kind of work. Yes, that is what they are thinking of. We had many such people in the Sudeten region.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to argue with you, but I want to have it clear. I now want to come to the way in which this order of the Führer was announced. You will find the order—the Tribunal will find it on Page 64—but what I want him to look at if he would be so kind, is Page 66 of the book, Page 25, Defendant, of your book. The second sentence of the Defendant Jodl’s “To the Commanders” about this order. That is on Page 25, and Defendant Jodl says: “This order is for the commanders only and must not under any circumstances fall into enemy hands.” Was that because you and the Defendant Jodl were ashamed of the order, that you had this secrecy provision put on it?

KEITEL: I have not found it yet, and I would like to know the connection. Page 25 is a teletype letter.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: From the Oberkommando Wehrmacht, dated 19 October. Now have you got it, the second sentence?

KEITEL: Dated 18 October 1942?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 19 October, issuing order of the 18th. “This order is for commanders only and must not under any circumstances fall into enemy hands.” Was that because you were ashamed of the order, that it was put like that?

KEITEL: I have not seen the letter and I think General Jodl should be asked about it. I do not know the contents, but I have already stated the opinion of both of us. I cannot give you the reason.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can’t give me the reason for this secrecy?

KEITEL: I do not know the motives behind it and I would ask you to put this question to General Jodl. I have not seen it. But I have already stated my own views and those of General Jodl.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I want you to look at the way that even Hitler expresses it with regard to this. If you look—I guess it is Page 31 in our book. It is a report from Hitler wherein he says:

“The report which should appear on this subject in the Armed Forces communiqué will state briefly and laconically that a sabotage, terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and exterminated to the last man.” (Document Number 503-PS)

You were doing your best—and when I say “you,” I mean you collectively, Hitler, yourself, and Jodl and everyone else concerned. You were doing your best to keep quiet about this, about anything being known about this order, weren’t you?

KEITEL: That was not my impression; on the contrary, in every case we subsequently published the facts in the Wehrmacht orders, the Wehrmacht report. It is my recollection, namely, that in the Wehrmacht report we stated that such and such an incident had occurred, followed by such and such consequences. That is my recollection.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am now only going to ask you to look at one document further on, because in that regard, you remember, after the Soviet Union tried certain people at Kharkov, when you were trying to get up some counterpropaganda—now, look at this document, about these executions, it is Page 308, Document UK-57. You have got a copy of it. I am going to ask you about only two incidents. You see it is a memorandum and the passage that I want you to look at is Number 2, the fourth memorandum, Paragraph 2, which is headed “Attempted Attacks on the Battleship _Tirpitz_.” Do you see that?

KEITEL: Just one moment, I have not found it yet. Battleship _Tirpitz_, oh, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Have you got it? Just listen, now:

“At the end of October 1942 a British Commando that had come to Norway in a cutter, had orders to carry out an attack on the Battleship _Tirpitz_ in Drontheim Fjord, by means of a two-man torpedo. The action failed since both torpedoes, which were attached to the cutter, were lost in the stormy sea. From among the crew, consisting of six Englishmen and four Norwegians, a party of three Englishmen and two Norwegians were challenged on the Swedish border; however, only the British seaman in civilian clothes, Robert Paul Evans, born 14 January 1922, in London, could be arrested and the others escaped into Sweden.

“Evans had a pistol pouch in his possession, such as are used to carry weapons under the armpit, and also a knuckle duster.”

And now the next page:

“Violence representing a breach of international law could not be proved.”

Did incidents such as that, under this order, come to your attention?

KEITEL: I do not remember the actual incident, but I can see that it has been reported by the department.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now you have told us that you have been a soldier for 41 years; that emphasizes your military position. What, in the name of all military tradition, has that boy done wrong by coming from a two-man torpedo to make an attack on a battleship; what had he done wrong?

KEITEL: No, this is an attack against a weapon of war, if carried out by soldiers in their capacity of members of the armed forces, it is an attack made with the object of eliminating a battleship by means of sabotage.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But why, why should you not if you were prepared to go on a two-man torpedo for an attack against a battleship, what is wrong with a sailor doing that? I want to understand what is in your mind. What do you, as a man who has been a soldier for 40 years, what do you see wrong for a man doing that, towing out a torpedo against a battleship? Tell us. I cannot understand what is wrong.

KEITEL: This is no more wrong than an attack with an aerial bomb if it is successful. I recognize that it is right, that it is a perfectly permissible attack.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, if you did not see that incident I will not go through putting the others in, as they are all just the same, men in uniform coming up to the Gironde to attack German ships.

What I want to understand is this. You were a Field Marshal, standing in the boots of Blücher, Gneisenau, and Moltke. How did you tolerate all these young men being murdered, one after the other without making any protests?

KEITEL: I have stated here in detail my reasons for not making any further resistance or objection; and I cannot alter any statement now. I know that these incidents occurred and I know the consequences.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, Field Marshal, I want you to understand this. As far as I know, in the German military code, as in every military code, there is no obligation on the part of a soldier to obey an order which he knows is wrong, which he knows is contrary to the laws of war and law. It is the same in your army, and our army, and I think in every army, isn’t that so?

KEITEL: I did not personally carry out the orders of 18 October 1942. I was not present either at the mouth of the Gironde or at the attack on the battleship _Tirpitz_. I knew only that the order was issued, together with all the threats of punishment which made it so difficult for the commanders to alter or deviate from the order on their own initiative. You, Sir David, asked me yourself whether I considered this order to be right or to serve any useful purpose and I have given you a definite answer: that I could not have prevented the action taken at the mouth of the Gironde or in the case of _Tirpitz_ if I had wanted to.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see my difficulty. I have given you only two cases; there are plenty more. There are others which occurred in Italy which we have heard. The point I am putting to you is this: You were the representative; that you have told us a hundred times, of the military tradition. You had behind you an officers corps with all its...

KEITEL: No, Sir David, I must deny that. I was not responsible either for the Navy or for the Army or for the Air Force. I was not a commander; I was a Chief of Staff and I had no authority to intervene in the execution of orders in the various branches of the Armed Forces, each of which had its own Commander-in-Chief.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We have heard about your staff rank, but I want to make this point perfectly clear. You were a Field Marshal, Kesselring was a Field Marshal, Milch was a Field Marshal, all, I gather, with military training behind them and all having their influence if not their command, among the Armed Forces of Germany. How was it that there was not one man of your rank, of your military tradition, with the courage to stand up and oppose cold-blooded murder? That is what I want to know.

KEITEL: I did not do it; I made no further objection to these things. I can say no more and I cannot speak for others.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let us pass if you can say no more than that. I want to see what you did with regard to our French allies because I have been asked to deal with some matters for the French Delegation.

You remember that on the Eastern Front you captured some Frenchmen who were fighting with the Russians. Do you remember making an order about that? You captured some De Gaullists, as you called them, that is Free French people who were fighting for the Russians. Do you remember your action with regard to that?

KEITEL: I recollect the transmission of a Führer order in regard to the surrender of these Frenchmen to their lawful government, which was recognized by us.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is not, of course, the part of the order I want to put to you.

“Detailed investigations are to be made in appropriate cases with regard to relatives of Frenchmen fighting for the Russians. If the investigation reveals that relatives have given assistance to facilitate escape from France, then severe measures are to be taken.

“OKW/Wi. Rü is to make the necessary preparations with the respective military commander or the Higher SS and Police Leader in France.—Signed—Keitel.”

Can you imagine anything more dreadful than taking severe measures against the mother of a young man who has helped him to go and fight with the allies of his country? Can you imagine anything more despicable?

KEITEL: I can think of many things since I have lost sons of my own in the war. I am not the inventor of this idea; it did not originate with me; I only transmitted it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You appreciate the difference, Defendant, between the point which you made and the point which I make. Losing sons in a war is a terrible tragedy. Taking severe measures against a mother of a boy who wants to go and fight for his country’s allies, I am suggesting to you, is despicable. The one is a tragedy; the other is the height of brutality. Do you not agree?

KEITEL: I can only say that it does not state the consequences of the investigations and findings. I do not know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if that is all the answer you can make I will ask you to look at something else.

KEITEL: No, I should like to add that I regret that any families were held responsible for the misdeeds of their sons.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will not waste the time by taking up the word “misdeed.” If you think that is a misdeed it is not worth our discussing it further. I just want to protest against your word.

Now, let us see; that was not an isolated case. Just look at Page 110 (a) of the document book which you have, Page 122. This is an order quite early on 1 October 1941.

“Attacks committed on members of the Armed Forces lately in the occupied territories give reason to point out that it is advisable that military commanders always have at their disposal a number of hostages of different political tendencies, namely:

“(1) Nationalists,

“(2) Democratic-bourgeois, and

“(3) Communists.

“It is important that these should include well-known leading personalities, or members of their families whose names are to be made public.

“Hostages belonging to the same group as the culprit are to be shot in case of attacks.

“It is asked that commanders be instructed accordingly.—Signed—Keitel.” (Document 1590-PS).

Why were you so particular that, if you happened to arrest a democratic-bourgeois, your commanders should have a sufficient bag of democratic-bourgeois to shoot as hostages? I thought you were not a politician.

KEITEL: I was not at all particular and the idea did not originate with me; but it is in accordance with the instructions, the official regulations, regarding hostages which I discussed yesterday or on the day before and which state that those held as hostages must come from the circles responsible for the attacks. That is the explanation, or confirmation, of that as far as my memory goes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you agree with that as a course of action, that if you found a member of a democratic-bourgeois family who had been taking part in, say, sabotage or resistance, that you should shoot a number of democratic-bourgeois on his behalf? Did you approve of that?

KEITEL: I have already explained how orders for shooting hostages, which were also given, were to be applied and how they were to be carried out in the case of those deserving of death and who had already been sentenced.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am asking you a perfectly simple question, Defendant. Did you or did you not approve of a number of democratic-bourgeois to be taken as hostages for one democratic-bourgeois who happened to be...

KEITEL: It does not say so in the document; it says only that hostages must be taken; but it says nothing about shooting them.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you mind looking at it since you corrected me so emphatically? Depending upon the membership of the culprit, that is, whether he is a nationalist, or a democratic-bourgeois or Communist, “hostages of the corresponding group are to be shot in case of attacks.”

KEITEL: If that is in the document then I must have signed it that way. The document referring to the conference with the commanders shows clearly how it was carried out in practice.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now answer my question. Did you approve of that?

KEITEL: I personally had different views on the hostage system, but I signed it, because I had been ordered to do so.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say you had a different view. Will you just look at a letter from Herr Terboven, who was in charge in Norway, Document 870-PS, and it is Page 85, 71 (a), RF-281. This is a report from Terboven for the information of the Führer and I want you to look at Paragraph 2, “Counter-measures”, Subparagraph 4. Do you see it? Have you got it, Defendant? I am sorry, I did give you the number; probably you did not hear it, 71 (a), Page 71 (a) of the document book. So sorry I did not make it clear. My Lord, I am told that this has been put in by the French Prosecution as Exhibit RF-281. I gave it a GB number, as I recall.

THE PRESIDENT: What number is it?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: RF-281.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you find Section 2, Paragraph 4? That is:

“Now I have just received a teleprint from Field Marshal Keitel, asking for a regulation to be issued, making members of the personnel, and, if necessary their relatives, collectively responsible for cases of sabotage occurring in their establishments (joint responsibility of relatives). This demand serves a purpose and promises success only if I am actually allowed to perform executions by firing squads. If this is not possible, such a decree would have exactly the opposite effect.”

Opposite the word “if I am actually allowed to perform executions by firing squads” there is the pencil note from you, “Yes, that is best.” So that is a third example where I suggest that you, yourself, are approving and encouraging the shooting of next of kin for the act of some member of their family. What do you say to that, your own pencil mark?

KEITEL: I did make that marginal note. An order given in this matter was different. A reply was given which was different. I wrote that note.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I wanted to know. Why did you write this remark, “Yes, that is best,” approving of a firing squad for relatives of people who had committed some occupation offense in Norway? Why did you think it was best that there should be a firing squad for the relations? Why?

KEITEL: It was not done and no order to that effect was given. A different order was given.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is not what I am asking, and I shall give you one more chance of answering it. Why did you put your pencil on that document, “Yes, that is best”?

KEITEL: I am no longer in a position to explain that today, in view of the fact that I see hundreds of documents daily. I wrote it and I admit it now.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Of course, unless it means something entirely different from what you have written, it meant that you approved it yourself and thought the best course was that the relations should be shot by a firing squad.

I think Your Lordship said that you wished to adjourn.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not finished, My Lord. I have a few matters for Monday morning.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the defendant can return to the dock, and we will proceed with the other applications.

[_The defendant left the stand._]

Sir David, shall we deal with these applications in the same way as we have done before?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. The first one that I have is an application on behalf of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner for a witness called Hoess, who was former Commander of the Auschwitz Concentration Camp. My Lord, there is no objection on the part of the Prosecution to that.

THE PRESIDENT: So that is the application which has to be made by a great number of the defendants’ counsel.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, yes, Your Lordship is quite right.

My Lord, as Commandant of the Auschwitz Concentration Camp, the Prosecution feel that he could contribute to the information of the Tribunal, if no objection is forthcoming.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, I see that you are among the counsel who applied for him. Is there anything you wish to add about that?

DR. STAHMER: I have nothing to add to my written application.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Then the Tribunal will consider this, you see, after you have dealt with them.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the next one is Dr. Naville. Dr. Naville was allowed as witness to the Defendant Göring, provided he can be located. He has been located in Switzerland and I understand he has informed the Tribunal that he sees no use in his coming here as a witness for Göring, and he is now asked for by Dr. Nelte, Counsel for Keitel, to prove that prisoners of war had been treated according to the rules of the Geneva Convention, Dr. Naville having been a representative of the Red Cross. Dr. Nelte, I am told, will be satisfied with an interrogatory, and the Prosecution have no objection to an interrogatory.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte?

DR. NELTE: That is correct; I agree, providing that I am allowed to put my questions to Dr. Naville in writing.

But may I add something here, not to this application to present evidence, but with reference to another application, which I already submitted to the Prosecution through the Translation Division yesterday or the day before. My application, to admit Hitler’s stenographers as witnesses was rejected by the Tribunal as irrelevant. I have now received a letter and an affidavit from one of these stenographers, and in that affidavit I find a passage which refers to Keitel’s attitude towards Hitler at interviews and conferences with him.

Public opinion has criticized the defendants as being in the habit of quoting dead men whenever they want to say anything in their favor; and similar statements have been made in this Court. The Defendant Keitel requests that the part of the affidavit which I have already submitted and which I intend to submit, be admitted as an affidavit so that the witness can still be rejected and yet it will be possible for me to submit that passage of the affidavit with the agreement of the Prosecution.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Dr. Nelte, My Lord, will submit the passage, we will consider it, but I have not had the chance of doing it up until now.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, if you will carry out that course and if you want, there is no objection to it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Very well, you will let me have it, a copy of it?

DR. NELTE: Certainly.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the next application is on behalf of the Defendant Von Schirach, a request to submit an affidavit of Dr. Hans Carossa. The gist of the affidavit is that the defendant tried to keep himself independent of Party directives in matters of literature and art and that, while Gauleiter in Vienna, he repeatedly intervened on behalf of Jews and concentration camp inmates. My Lord, the Prosecution have no objection to an affidavit being filed.

The next is an application on behalf of the Defendant Funk for interrogatories to be submitted to Mr. Messersmith, dealing with Funk’s relation to the Party and his work in the Reich Ministry of Propaganda. My Lord, the Prosecution have no objection, but remind the Tribunal that the Defendant Funk has already, on the 15th of March, asked permission to submit another affidavit to Mr. Messersmith, dealing with Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit. The Prosecution did not raise any objections, but the Tribunal has not, as far as we know, granted that yet. So I wanted the Tribunal to know there was a previous request...

THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean an affidavit or interrogatory on the 15th of March?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Interrogatories.

THE PRESIDENT: Interrogatories? Surely we must have dealt with it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that is the information that my office had. They have not seen the...

THE PRESIDENT: I see.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In case the Tribunal had not dealt with it, we want to point out that there is one outstanding. We have no objection to either.

Then the Defendant Rosenberg requests Hitler’s decree to Rosenberg of June 1943. There is no objection on the part of the Prosecution. I am told that we can not trace any previous application but the position at the moment is that we haven’t any objection to it.

Then, My Lord, the next is Von Neurath, an application for a questionnaire for Professor Kossuth, long a resident of Prague. Really they ask for interrogatories. My Lord, there is no objection to interrogatories.

Then, My Lord, there is an application in reverse, if I may put it so, from Dr. Dix on behalf of the Defendant Schacht, the downgrading of Herr Huelse, who was drafted as a witness, to an affidavit. My Lord, we have no objection to that.

DR. DIX: This is the witness Huelse. He was granted to me as a witness. In order to shorten and simplify the proceedings, I have decided to forfeit the right to hear the witness because there was an affidavit. I have received the affidavit. While my application to dispense with the witness was pending, however, the witness arrived in Nuremberg. He is here now, and I think therefore, that it will be best for him to stay and for me to be allowed to examine him by confronting him with his own affidavit, asking him to confirm it, and then put some additional questions to him. I think that would be much more practical than having the witness here to no purpose, sending him back again and retaining only the affidavit. My purpose, in any case, was partly to avoid the complications connected with getting him here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you withdraw the application to have the affidavit...

THE PRESIDENT: Is the witness Huelse a prisoner or not, or an internee?

DR. DIX: He is a free witness. He is not in detention and he is free to move about Nuremberg.

THE PRESIDENT: Can he remain here until the Defendant Schacht’s case comes on?

DR. DIX: I hope so. He has told me that he can stay and that he is willing to do so.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, we have no objection. The Tribunal has already granted him as a witness. If Dr. Dix wants him as a witness, of course we have no objection to it.

The next one is an application on behalf of the Defendant Streicher, for an affidavit from a Dr. Herold. To put it quite shortly, the Prosecution suggest that it should be interrogatories rather than an affidavit and on that basis we would make no objection.

My Lord, there is only one thing I have to say. I had a most useful discussion with Dr. Dix last night, following out the Tribunal’s suggestion of going through the documents. Dr. Dix was most helpful in explaining the purpose of his documents and what they were. I do suggest that if any of the Defense Counsel when they are explaining the documents would also care to explain the purport of their witnesses—I do not want to embarrass them in any way—but if they would voluntarily explain the purport of witnesses, either to Mr. Dodd or myself, we might be able to save them a great deal of time, by indicating whether the evidence of that witness would be agreed to or might be the subject of objection.

I only throw it out now, as we are going to meet over the documents, and if they would extend it to witnesses, I am sure we could achieve a most profitable co-operation.

THE PRESIDENT: You are suggesting, Sir David, are you, that they should explain to you the nature of the evidence which the witness was going to give?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And if the Prosecution were not going to dispute it, that it might be incorporated in an affidavit?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that we could probably dispense with the witness, and probably incorporate that in an affidavit. Of course, I have been told the general purport of the witness, because I attended on the application, but if they could elaborate on it a little more as it often happens when they see the witness and let me know what the scope of the witness’ testimony would be, I could probably concede, either in whole or in part, and save them a lot of work and the Tribunal a lot of time.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the Tribunal would like to know whether the defendants’ counsel think that is a possible course, whether it might lead to some shortening of the defense. Could Dr. Dix possibly tell us whether he thinks it would be possible?

DR. DIX: Of course, I cannot make any statement on the views of my colleagues, since I cannot read their minds. All I can say at the moment is that I will recommend to my colleagues, as unusually helpful and practical, the kind of conversation which I had the honor of having with Sir David yesterday. Personally, I think that my colleagues too will agree to this procedure unless there is any particular objection to it, which is, of course, always possible. I cannot say any more at the moment.

THE PRESIDENT: You understand what Sir David was suggesting, that such a conversation should apply not only to documents but also to witnesses and if you could indicate rather more fully than you do in your applications what the subject of their evidence was going to be, possibly the Prosecution might be able to say in those circumstances that upon those matters they should not propose to dispute the evidence and therefore it might be incorporated in an affidavit?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, if Your Lordship allows me to interject, if they care to bring a statement on a particular witness’ testimony, the Prosecution would, I am sure, in many particulars be prepared to say, “Well, you produce that statement on that point and we will admit it, without any formality.”

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps, Dr. Dix, you and the other counsel for the defendants could consider that matter.

DR. DIX: I have understood it to be exactly as Your Lordship has just stated it. I discussed both the witnesses and the documents with Sir David and that was very helpful; and in that sense I will...

THE PRESIDENT: If that is all we need do at the moment, then...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the Tribunal will adjourn.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 8 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]

TRANSCRIBER NOTES

Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document; however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus “Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals: hence Führer, Göring, Kraków, and Ljoteč etc. throughout.

Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations between the German, English, French, and Russian documents presented in the trial.

An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as possible to the original document presentation and layout.

[The end of _Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal Vol. 10_, by Various.]