Part 60
Then there comes the transaction of chartering. The vessel was chartered subject to this proviso at the end of it, and the charter-party is negotiated entirely by Zulueta. Whatever Pedro Martinez & Co., supposing there were such persons (and it may be taken that there were such persons, though the evidence of there being such persons is, that Mr. Zulueta says so in his evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons, and it is a fact the negative of which could easily have been proved, but it has not been proved); you may fairly assume, therefore, that there are such persons as Pedro Martinez & Co., for that observation of the learned counsel for the prisoner on the statement of Mr. Zulueta before the Committee is as far as it applies to that particular part of the evidence well founded, namely, that if it were not true the contrary might be proved; but that is not true in the generality to which Mr. Kelly applied it, for there might be a great many statements in that evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons which were not true, but which the prosecutor would not be allowed to prove were not true--I mean those not connected with this particular transaction. There are many things stated in that evidence, which I apprehend, if false, the prosecutor would not be entitled to prove the falsehood of; but I apprehend that does not apply to the existence of Pedro Martinez & Co. But they appear to have existed and to have employed as their agents in this country Pedro Zulueta & Co., and whatever is done in this country by Pedro Martinez is done by Pedro Zulueta & Co. just as much as if they had done it themselves; they knew as much about the matter as the parties themselves; they negotiated this charter-party, and they dispatched the vessel and put on board all the goods. The goods appear by the cockets to have been entered in the name of Captain Jennings; I do not know that that is a circumstance of any suspicion; it is not proved to be out of the way, and I do not see any good reason for suspecting the integrity of the transaction arising out of that particular circumstance. It seems to me, therefore, that Zulueta & Co. do stand in a very different situation from that put a considerable number of times to you by the learned counsel for the prisoner, namely, the situation of a person who is simply the manufacturer or dealer in goods, and who has those goods ordered, such a weight of gunpowder, and who inquiring, “Where shall I send it?” is answered, “Send it on board the Augusta, now lying at Liverpool.” It would be a strong thing from that circumstance to infer that a person sending that gunpowder had any thing to do with slave trading: but that appears not to be the nature of this transaction. In regard to there being a slave trading, all that is done, is done by Zulueta & Co. It is not merely that they had goods sent on board the ship, but they chose the number of the goods to be sent on board the ship--goods which they had bought, for which they had negotiated, and they made out such charter-party, and that charter-party provides that the ship shall proceed to Gallinas, on the coast of Africa.
Gentlemen, that is I think pretty nearly all the evidence that there is in the case. You have the evidence of the captains on the subject. If you think that this was a slaving voyage, you will consider the conduct of Zulueta & Co. in buying, and chartering, and loading it, and dispatching it. Now, Zulueta & Co. are shown to be merchants with very extensive connexions and concerns, and the prisoner particularly is a person of great knowledge and education, and generally speaking one would say that as merchants, though that is a matter for you to consider, I do not know that I can put it higher than this, that they are persons of great skill and great experience. The prisoner had the whole management and direction of the voyage to a particular place to carry goods to that place, that being a place not without suspicion; the vessel itself also being a vessel which had been used for the slave trade, though it might be innocently used afterwards; but, still your attention has been directed to that circumstance, and it has been particularly directed to the circumstance that every thing applicable to slave apparatus was ordered to be removed before the vessel was dispatched. That would be a thing of course to be done, whether the vessel was going on a slave expedition or not, for as has been suggested, the officers of Government always examine a vessel, particularly on going to the coast of Africa. With a view to this, I should think it would be quite a matter of course, even if the vessel was intended to be sent to promote the slave trade, that she should not go out with shackles or leagers, or any thing of that kind on board, for if they are on board, the vessel would be at the mercy of any Custom-house officer; it would be quite advertising the adventure. And there being found these shackles and these leagers on board the vessel at Portsmouth, and their being so dealt with, I do not think at all helps on the case for the prosecution, for the vessel undoubtedly had been a slave vessel, it had been fitted up with these things, and would naturally have them on board her, and as naturally, whether she was intended to be sent out on a slave expedition or not, these things would be taken from on board her; and you find that they were taken from on board. The fact of their having been on board, when the schoolmaster and the cooper saw them on board, does not appear to me to be any thing against her, for she had been a slave vessel. On the other hand, the circumstance of their being taken out and landed before she sailed on her voyage does not appear to be any thing for her, for both these circumstances would have taken place whether the voyage was an innocent or a guilty voyage; those circumstances, in my opinion, have no bearing on the question. Whether the vessel was intended to be engaged in slave trading or not, that is a point I have already put to you in considering whether the voyage was a slave voyage, or for the accomplishment of the slave trade. I did not before advert to the circumstance of these things being on board, and I mention it now only, as it has a sort of colourable look, to show why it is I do not lay any stress upon it.
I was observing that though people in general might not be well aware of this trade being intended to be carried on, yet persons not extremely simple, but skilful people, may be fairly taken to know what the object is with which a voyage is undertaken when they themselves are the agents, supplying, chartering, loading, and dispatching a ship for the voyage. It may be that the object may be concealed from them, or that they may not know that this voyage to the Gallinas was a slaving expedition. A simple person, who knew nothing about these matters and had not some special acquaintance with the trade, might know nothing at all about it, they might not know the nature of the trade carried on at this place. The mention of Gallinas on the coast of Africa would not convey to the mind of an ordinary person that it was to a mere den where this traffic and nothing else was carried on; but this vessel is sent to the Gallinas by these gentlemen, who are very skilful persons, who negotiate the whole transaction. Now, it may very generally be taken that people know what they are about, unless they can show there was some particular concealment, some hinderance to their knowing to this extent that this was a place connected with the slave trade, and so exclusively engaged in the slave trade as it really seems to be; but, supposing that a case is made which requires an answer, if it is shown that there was a slave trade, and that a person did employ a vessel in that business, and did load it for that business, that certainly is a case raising some degree of presumption against the person who has been engaged, and one would be very glad if the case were of a description in which it had been met by a decisive answer in point of fact.
It is said on the part of the prisoner, first, that this was not a slaving voyage. Now, if it had been a slaving voyage--it is possible that there might be a case, which unless fairly answered would lead to the presumption that that was the object--in which an answer might exist, but where it would be impossible for the prisoner to get it, you would feel a difficulty in acting on such a case; but in the present case, supposing that this was not a slaving expedition, the answer exists, and the answer might be given with the greatest ease. There appears to me no reason why it should not be given. The house of Martinez & Co. have a house at Cadiz, and a house at the Havannah, and if they did not send this vessel for the purpose of the slave trade, and they were quite innocent in this matter, any one of them or their clerks might with the greatest ease be called. There is no deficiency of funds here, and it would put an end to all question if they could say, “This was not for the slave trade; these goods were to be employed for--and then they might fill up the blank, I do not know how, but by some words expressing an innocent purpose, and that would be a full answer; but there is an absence of all answer that bears on the question whether there was slave trading intended or not.
Now, supposing you should be of opinion that there was no slave trading intended, there is an end of the case. I think you may perhaps be of opinion this vessel was intended for slave trading. Supposing you are of that opinion, then you come to that which is the anxious and important question, namely, whether the prisoner was cognizant of that fact. It is alleged that the prisoner is not the exclusive manager of the concerns of the house; it is not very likely he should be; he appears to have been fully cognizant of this particular matter; and, supposing that considering the exclusive part taken by these gentlemen in this transaction of dispatching the vessel, supposing you should think that a case requiring an answer, then you will consider whether it should not have an answer, if one exists. Now, it appears that the prisoner is not exclusively cognizant of all the transactions of this house. There are two other partners; there are--though it is not in evidence, but it may be presumed that there are--clerks and persons employed in the house of Zulueta, all or any of whom might have been called. It is alleged that the profit on this transaction would be extremely small. I do not think that the petty gain of this one transaction is the matter, for it appears that Pedro Martinez & Co. do a great deal of business, and it is possible that whenever persons have a large and valuable business to conduct, there is some small portion that the correspondent and agent would willingly get rid of if he could; but he is not allowed to pick and choose, but he must take the whole. That is one of the grounds they put; the other is as to character.
Now, inasmuch as there are two other partners, and it is probable there might be some other persons in the concern, there arises this consideration. It is true, supposing that there were a case made, but that the prisoner was innocent of it, that he could not call Martinez & Co. on that supposition as he might on the supposition of there being no slave trading, for Martinez & Co. would not be innocent persons, and they would not be willing to come into this country and say, “We carried on the slave trading, but it was disguised from our correspondent Zulueta & Co.” If you think there is a case requiring an answer, the question then is, would there have been any difficulty in the prisoner calling his two partners and others conversant with the business of the firm, and proving that Zulueta & Co. knew nothing at all about this, that they had not the least suspicion, that Martinez & Co. never communicated the fact to them, and that the illegal purpose was utterly unknown to them, for some reasons which the prisoner cannot give, but which his partners could? It would be extremely desirable they should do it, if the defence existed in point of fact.
Supposing the case made to require an answer, there are two modes of answering a charge. The one is, that of calling a great number of persons to prove that it was unlikely, from the high character of the firm, that they should engage in such a transaction; that is one. Another mode, is calling three or four persons, who if he were guilty must know it, and who will prove that he was not. The former of these modes has been adopted on this occasion. You have, however, the case before you. I do not think it necessary to go any further into the evidence, having, I conceive, stated the effect of it sufficiently. If you are satisfied that there was a slave trading, you will consider whether Zulueta, the prisoner, was cognizant of it, and shipped these goods, and dispatched the ship for the purpose of accomplishing the object of slave trading; and then, in considering that, you will consider the observations, as far as they are entitled to attention, and the evidence of the very high character of the prisoner--a character I should say very strong indeed, and almost conclusive, supposing the case were one that did not admit of an answer in point of fact. If he has the means of showing that he did not do that with which he is charged, and he only says, I will prove that I am extremely unlikely to do it; I do not say how far you should give weight to that sort of evidence. You ought to be well satisfied of a fact of this sort, before you find him guilty of such a charge as this.
_Foreman of the Jury._ We beg to retire, my Lord.
_A Juryman._ May we find on any particular count?
Mr. Justice _Maule_. You will consider the charge as that of employing a vessel, or loading goods on board, for the purpose of accomplishing the slave trade. The great question is, the knowledge and intention of the prisoner. If the thing was done with his knowledge and intention, and it was for the purpose of slave trading, there is no doubt that he bought and dispatched the ship, and loaded the goods. I do not see why you should trouble yourselves with any particular count.
[_The Jury withdrew at Twenty Minutes before Twelve, and returned into Court at Ten Minutes after One, finding a verdict of_ “NOT GUILTY.”
Mr. Serjeant _Bompas_. My Lord, there is another indictment against the prisoner for a misdemeanour. It appears to me that it involves necessarily the very same question, and therefore, as far as I can judge of it, and of course with the authority of the prosecutor, I feel that it would be wrong to put the prisoner again on his trial for that offence. It seems to me that it will depend upon the same evidence, and I cannot but conclude that the Jury will come to the same conclusion. I will take the opportunity of saying one word. Observations having been made with respect to myself when the former case was going on, when I could not interfere, I can merely say, that with regard to myself, the prosecutor, and of every person connected with the prosecution, there was no possible fact or document which I could have admitted, which could have done the prisoner the slightest benefit.
Mr. Justice _Maule_. That observation was made in Mr. Kelly’s address.
Mr. Serjeant _Bompas_. It was impossible we could have any view but that the Jury should have the whole before them, and we rejoice in the result.
Mr. _Kelly_. With regard to what has fallen from my learned friend, Mr. Serjeant Bompas, I am greatly obliged to my learned friend for making that observation to his Lordship. As far as respects that part of what has fallen from my learned friend, which respected the other indictment, it will be desirable in the course of the present session--I do not say to-day or to-morrow--but in the course of the present session, to empannel a Jury, and that the prisoner, Mr. Zulueta, should be acquitted in respect of that indictment. With regard to the other observation which has fallen from my learned friend, I beg to assure him, which I do with the utmost possible sincerity, that I never intended to say any thing which could be construed in the slightest degree as disrespectful to him. There is no gentleman at the bar less deserving of any disrespectful observation than my learned friend.
Mr. Serjeant _Bompas_. Your observations were made in public, and therefore I felt it necessary to say what I did. Your Lordship will order the expenses to be paid?
Mr. Justice _Maule_. Certainly: I think that it was a very proper case for inquiry. The most convenient course will be just to swear the Jury in the second case, and take a verdict.
Mr. Serjeant _Bompas_. If the Jury have no objection.
_The Jury were sworn to try the Indictment for Conspiracy._
(_The Jury were charged with the Prisoner in the usual way._)
Mr. Serjeant _Bompas_. Gentlemen, you have heard what I stated to the learned Judges. The case has been already before you, and I am quite satisfied with your decision; you will, therefore, find the prisoner Not Guilty.
_The Jury immediately pronounced the Prisoner_ “NOT GUILTY.”
LONDON: C. WOOD & CO., PRINTERS, POPPIN’S COURT, FLEET STREET.
Transcriber’s Notes
Inconsistent, archaic and unusual spelling, hyphenation, spacing of abbreviations and capitalisation used in the source document have been retained. Missing and unnecessary quote marks have not been corrected, unless listed below. The same applies to apparently missing and unnecessarily repeated words have not been deleted, except as listed below.
Depending on the hard- and software and their settings used to read this text, not all elements may display as intended.
The spelling of proper and geographical names has not been standardised (Macauley / Macaulay, Findlay / Finlay, Nallow / Narrow, Jenning / Jennings, Gollupchick / Gollupchik / Golupchick / Golupchik / Goluptichick, Talford / Talfourd, Nichol / Nickol / Nicolls, Arnot / Arnott, etc.)
The differences between the Table of Contents and the text itself have not been rectified.
Page 22, cassada: possibly an error for cassava.
Changes made
Footnotes have been moved outside text paragraphs.
Some obvious minor misprints and typographical, formatting and punctuation inconsistencies and errors have been standardised or corrected silently.
References to Questions 7958, 7961, 7965, 7967 and 7970 have been changed to 7958*, 7961*, 7965*, 7967* and 7970* respectively cf. their numbering in the text.
Page vii: Page number 225 changed to 235
Page 75: question number 5052 changed to 5552
Page 103: closing quote mark deleted after ... on the vessel.
Page 130: closing quote mark added after ... without delay,
Page 133: second Question 6785 changed to Question 6785*
Page 144: paragraph number 6875 (second occurrence) changed to 6876.