Part 1

TRENCH WARFARE

TRENCH WARFARE

A MANUAL FOR OFFICERS AND MEN

BY J. S. SMITH

SECOND LIEUTENANT WITH THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

NEW YORK E. P. DUTTON & CO. 681 FIFTH AVENUE

COPYRIGHT, 1917, BY E. P. DUTTON & CO.

Printed in the United States of America

TO THE AMERICAN OFFICERS AND MEN WHO SERVED AND ARE SERVING THEIR COUNTRY UNDER ALIEN FLAGS

INTRODUCTION

It is a safe bet that when the German army started for Paris they had plans for use in the event of disaster. The disaster occurred, and a new type of warfare requiring the highest courage, skill and endurance was born. I say born because although trench warfare was known before, it died in birth compared to this war, for the amount of science, energy and variety of weapons used.

More earth has been removed by a combination of man, pick and shovel in making these trenches than was excavated to make the Panama Canal possible, and in less time.

It is my object in this book to give a faint idea and knowledge of the trenches, and to approximately explain the way warfare is carried on, and I offer the information contained herein as a basic foundation on which to use the further knowledge you will gain as an officer, and which, for obvious reasons, I will not and cannot give here.

The notes are all taken from different courses of instruction, and observations made during thirty-one months of service, fifteen of which was spent on the Belgian and French fronts, both as private and officer in the infantry service.

I do not lay down my information as expert and final by any means, but as trench warfare changes from day to day, improvements are made, old ideas discarded, new ones tried, it can be seen that nothing can be laid down as a cut and dried rule, but the principles of trench building, generally speaking, remain the same. This I have endeavored to give, along with a few other notes which will give an idea of the many and varied tasks that a second lieutenant must know before he is fit to take hold of men in a place such as the Western Front, where there is very seldom a chance to rectify mistakes, or to experiment more than once.

When the British and French armies started their retreat from Mons, as far as the British army was concerned they were hampered by their want of knowledge of trench warfare as used in the South African war. The men retired day by day, hardly staying in one place long enough to dig themselves in. At that time for digging a trench system, one valuable lesson was learned, and that was, that the hole such as they had been taught to make in just such circumstances as they were up against then was no good, as it offered them no protection from overhead shrapnel, and at the best of times made a very poor shelter. This hole used to be dug a little more than the width of a man and straight back his full length, he naturally throwing the dirt in front of him and thus making a little parapet.

When the battle of the Marne commenced and the British and the French drove forward, this valuable lesson and many others had been learned, so that when the armies had reached the limits of their endurance, instead of digging themselves in in the old style, a new system was used, greatly assisted by shell fire.

A round hole was dug by each man to fit his individual size and made to suit himself. Here he squatted and fought, if necessary, and got what rest was possible during that day, with the enemies’ line at distances varying from 100 to 500 yards from him. During the night, these men when not fighting or bothered by counter-attacks, or trying to obtain rations, water and the many necessaries that a fighting man requires, deepened their shelters and joined them together by little narrow ditches. During the next day there might be bitter fighting, so it would be even possible that other troops would come up and relieve during the early dusk. The relieved troops would retire a short distance and dig themselves another row of little holes where they might act as supports in case the temporary front line gave. During that night the holes on the front line would be enlarged until they finally joined and gradually without deliberate intention the trench became a permanent feature. Then the line slightly in the rear became connected with the front line system by what were then nothing more or less than ditches and this was the birth of the present system which now stretches from the sea to Switzerland.

The trench systems now generally consist of three complete lines or systems of trenches, each system being self-supporting and independent of the other. The second and third systems are generally laid with due consideration to protection, fields of fire, and all the other tactical requirements that are necessary to such a system; it being impossible in the majority of cases to keep these points in mind during the building of the first or original line. These systems generally run to a depth of six to eight miles from the front firing line. They are so constructed that when a firing line has been broken through to any great extent, what was formerly a communication trench at once becomes a fire trench, and serves to bring a heavy enfilade fire on the troops occupying the captured area.

It must be remembered that the considerations, arguments, and notes laid down in this book cannot, under stress of circumstances, always be acted on. It will be found, however, that a certain amount of training and of study as to the conditions governing the sighting, building, and living in these trenches, will cause a man, even under great stress of excitement, to look for and try to obtain the ideal as a matter of habit and without giving much time and thought to the question.

The Art of War is “the greatest amount of common sense used in the shortest possible time.”

J. S. S.

EDITOR’S NOTE

Mr. J. S. Smith, the author of this book, is an American, born in Philadelphia, who enlisted in the 29th Vancouver Battalion in the fall of 1914. He saw service along the Belgian front, and in August 1916 was given a commission in the British Army. He is now (June, 1917) serving with the British Expeditionary Force on the French front.

CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTION vii

LOCATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF TRENCHES 1

DUGOUTS 19

RESISTANCE OF ROOFING MATERIALS 24

DUMPS 25

LATRINES 27

REVETMENTS 28

Sand Bags 29

Corrugated Iron 32

Fire Platforms 34

TRAVERSES 36

LISTENING POSTS 38

OBSERVATION POSTS 43

Loopholes for firing 43

SUPPORT TRENCHES AND SUPPORT DUGOUTS 45

SUPPORT POINTS 46

RESERVE DUGOUTS 47

SECOND LINE 47

COMMUNICATION TRENCHES 48

SKETCH OF TRENCH SYSTEM 56

Section I 56

Section II 58

Section III 63

Section IV 67

TELEPHONE LINES 68

RECESSES 69

NOTICE BOARDS 70

TRENCH DRAINAGE 72

FLOORBOARDS 77

BRUSHWOOD AND STRAW 79

WORKING PARTIES 80

RELIEFS 81

TRAVERSED FIRE TRENCHES 83

OBSTACLES AND ENTANGLEMENTS 84

LOW WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS 85

HIGH WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS 86

ABATIS 88

BARRICADES 88

INUNDATIONS 89

FOUGASSES 89

ORGANIZATION OF BOMBING SQUADS 90

TRAINING 91

EXPLOSIVES 101

BOMBS 103

PERCUSSION BOMBS

Hand Grenade No. 1 103

Hand Grenade No. 2 105

Rifle Grenade No. 3 105

IGNITION BOMBS

Hand Grenade Nos. 6 and 7 107

Hand Grenade Nos. 8 and 9 108

Pitcher Hand Grenade 108

Oval Hand Grenade 110

Ball Hand Grenade 110

Jam-pot Bombs 110

MECHANICAL BOMBS

Hand Grenade No. 5 or Mills’ Grenade 111

GAS WARFARE 113

Tear Shells 116

GAS MASKS OR RESPIRATORS 119

DUTIES OF A PLATOON COMMANDER AT THE FRONT 121

GOING INTO THE TRENCHES 122

IN THE FIRING LINE 123

OBSERVATION 125

Inspection 126

SENTRIES 127

RIFLES 128

PREPARATORY TO ENTERING TRENCHES 130

TAKING OVER TRENCHES 131

SNIPING 131

PATROLS 132

DUTIES OF AN OFFICER 134

HOW TO FIRE A MACHINE GUN IN CASE OF EMERGENCY 140

Lewis Gun 141

Vicker’s Automatic 141

Stoppages 142

PREVENTION OF FROST BITES AND TRENCH FEET 142

TRENCH WARFARE

LOCATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF TRENCHES

In locating the site for a defensive firing line, it must be divided into three sections:--firing line, immediate support and reserves. In doing this several opposing factors should be taken into consideration and their relative importance judged according to the special circumstances and objects in view, keeping in mind the probable lines and manner of defense of the enemy, and whether the trenches are for permanent or for temporary use.

This may be summarized under two heads: first, with the object of attaining the greatest field that can be covered by defensive fire; and, second, the greatest security from offensive fire.

It will even be found that these two constructions will be in conflict. Trenches placed behind the crest of a hill, say fifty to one hundred and fifty yards from the top, will hamper the accuracy of the enemy’s artillery fire. Shooting, to be effective, calls for a high rate of accuracy, and here the only observations possible are from aircraft and balloons; but the enemy side of the hill will be raised ground to the occupants of the trench. At night large numbers of the enemy could collect there, and the dangerous space to them would merely be the distance from your fire trench to the crest of the hill.

The enemy could and would entrench themselves on their side of the crest and by raising their parapet enjoy the advantage of a higher front, which would eventually lead to their entirely controlling the area behind your trenches, which are continually used by the relief and fatigue parties.

It is a principle that grazing rifle fire upon a defensive enemy is more effective than plunging fire, but any entrenched position higher than your own held by an enemy gives them a tremendous advantage. Regardless of what opinion may be held as to the maximum depth of a field of fire required to meet or repel attacks, whether in masse or open order, it should be obvious that the greater the depth of the field of fire and the more extensive the view of the enemy’s operations, the better it will be for the defending forces.

Protection from and localization of artillery fire must be provided by the internal construction of the trench rather than by a position that protects but also restricts the field of fire. There are frequently found in front of a firing line small areas of ground which are not covered by direct fire from your trench. A flanking fire frequently can cover these areas, but in spite of this, they must be watched constantly by means of listening posts or concealed observation posts, which may be hidden by the banks of rivers, hedges, ruined houses, or whatever natural existing concealment renders observation possible.

At night, it is a safe principle to support listening posts by automatic rifles, trip wires with noise making arrangements attached to them as common sense under the circumstances dictates. Great care and caution must always be taken to prevent the discovery of these listening posts by the enemy, and when discovered, alternative posts should be made or greater care taken for the protection of the men occupying these posts, such as overhead protection by mesh wire against bombing, and the upkeep of a small supply of bombs and close-range weapons in the post. The important trenches on the front having been located with a view of protecting the immediate front and with due regard to their relation, tactically, to the other trenches already located, the connecting trenches obviously must be subservient to the more important ones. Every endeavor must be made to avoid enfilade fires in the flanks, to give and to receive mutual support, and in particular to support those flanks which are not protected otherwise.

It is an essential consideration in the location of all these trenches that lateral communications can be established, and that supplies, supports, reserves, ammunition, etc., together with the means of retiring if necessary be taken into account. The distance from the water supplies and the possibility of concealing approaches is a further governing factor, although in many cases an ideal condition cannot be realized.

Then there is the counter attack, in case the fire trench should be taken, and the kind of soil which is so essential to its relation to bad weather and water seepage--these also require thought and study.

These things are main considerations to be kept in mind after a line has been settled on, whether during attack or whether siting trenches under common circumstances. It is not expected and is not necessary, when trying to obtain a position during attack, to keep all of these conditions in mind, but it is essential that when the attack has been finished and things return to slightly more normal circumstances, that these things be given instant consideration and proper action taken.

Were such a thing as concealment possible, it should be the first thing of importance to be kept in mind. Listening posts, machine gun positions, reserve dugouts, company, battalion and regimental headquarters, and similar things, at some distance behind or on fire lines, may be concealed, but fire-trenches are sure to be observed sooner or later (mostly sooner) by aeroplane and other means of observation, and it is best that one should admit the impracticability of concealment at once and take the proper protective measures. If opportunity for concealment offers itself, as it may do, according to the lay of the land, it should be taken always. It should always be kept in mind that one should try to place himself in the position of having the enemy’s point of view, both from his trenches and his aerial observations.

Advantage should be taken and even care given along trenches to the extensive cultivation of the weeds, grasses, etc., that may grow rapidly in the excavated soil.

It is, and always will be, a matter of much argument that trenches should not be dug near hedges, ditches, roads or rows of trees, on account of easy ranging mark given to the enemy artillery. In a country where such things are scarce, the idea may have a leg to stand on, but certainly to the Western Front it does not apply. It does not take artillery a moment to approximate by ranging shot, check by deduction or addition the range of trenches in any area, even if lying along a hedge or road. The ditch or hedge in some cases will provide the starting of a trench and offer fair amount of cover from fire to the troops working. A ditch immediately in front or behind the trench greatly helps to solve the many and varied difficulties of drainage, and when in front of a trench, can be made into a formidable obstacle, generally by throwing in varied lengths of barbed wire. Trenches under the cover of a hedge are very often safe from aerial observation, and even when located, sniping and observation can be carried on from them if the contours of the ground are favorable. It is always possible to do a certain amount of repairing and moving of troops only when unobserved from the enemy’s trenches. If advantage is not taken of these natural protections, such as hedges and trees, then they must be destroyed.

It is obvious that a great deal of labor can be lost and work thrown away if a policy is not adopted and continued. Battalions relieving one another up and down the line may waste a tremendous amount of labor unless the relieved officer’s policy is explained. If each commanding officer of a relieving battalion is permitted to air his own theories, duplication of work and lack of continuity will exist. Therefore, it is essential that the officers relieving the trench be thoroughly informed of work going on. With this object in view some of the officers of the relieving battalion should do a tour of duty (about 24 hours) before their troops take over the trench. An Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer are detailed from each relieving company for this duty. In the trench this officer is instructed by the senior officer present, and the non-commissioned officer by the ranking non-commissioned officer, in the policy to be continued. The commanding officer of the occupying company should have a sketch map of his sector of trench which he turns over to the relieving officer. This map should show the work under construction; proposed work; wire defenses; and if possible, the enemies machine gun emplacements, observation posts, snipers and work in progress. The notes accompanying the map should give the general conditions concerning the work--depth to which it is safe to dig, nature of soil, conditions regarding drainage, and all information in regard to the enemies’ activities during the period of occupancy. In addition, the relieving officer has the trench diary showing all the information covering every minute detail of the happenings during that company’s stay in the trenches. This diary is a continuous record of that particular sector and remains with the occupying company until it is relieved and then passes into the possession of the relieving half company, and so on, forming a continuous running record of the policy applying to the upkeep and methods employed therein. This diary, unless it is buried to avoid falling into the hands of the enemy, will continue until the end of the war. So every half company inherits one from his predecessor in the line upon its assuming the obligations previously assumed by its fore-runner, thus preventing a duplication of work and assuring continuity of endeavor.

There are certain obvious requirements that have to become rules. When required to fill sandbags, always look for the nearest excavation being made and fill from there, if distance permits.

As a matter of fact, in every trench there is a continuous revetting, widening of communications or control trenches, or driving of a tunnel to a listening post.

Inasmuch as the time for filling sandbags is never ending, if work is being done and the earth is not absolutely needed for parapet or parados, the earth, if dry, should be put in sandbags, and, if necessary, stored until it is needed. The repair work that is most necessary takes precedent and is about as follows: Any damage to parados or traverses should be immediately attended to. During the night any damage to the wire entanglements must be repaired. Drainage comes next in order of importance, and this involves the digging of sumps and deepening of the drainage bottom. These are the repairs, but improvements must continually be made in the dugouts and communication trenches.

The ultimate design of a fire-trench depends upon its closeness to the enemy. When the latter are within 150 yards, the traversed fire-trench shown in sketch should be employed, as it provides adequate accommodation and protection for men who may at any moment be called upon to make use of bomb, bayonet and bullet; but if the enemy trenches are more than 150 yards distant, the ultimate design would depend upon the number of machine guns and automatic rifles available. Each of these guns has a firing capacity of about 25 rifles. Each gun therefore gives a reduction in the number of men required to hold the line, and in consequence reduces the amount of trench needed to protect these men.

A design, known as the “T” shaped fire-trench, makes an adaptable basis for entrenching under these conditions. Many lengths of a continuous traversed trench have no great field of fire, and yet, having been dug, they must be held, and unless properly held and kept in repair, they naturally become a source of danger.

As shown in the sketch, a traversed trench consists of a series of fire-bays interrupted by a series of traverses. The object of these being to localize the effect of shells or bombs landing in a fire-bay, and preventing enfilade fire down the length of the trench, as well as localizing any entry of the enemy into your line.

Dimensions vary up and down the line. Sometimes according to the lay of the land, sometimes according to the opinions, whims or fancies of the regiments making them, but the following dimensions should be kept in mind, and it will be found that they show the average of the whole general line on the Western Front.