Part 2

B is a copper case to contain one hundred or more pounds of powder; C a cork cushion to give the whole Torpedo such a buoyancy, that it will be only from two to three pounds heavier than salt water. To ascertain such weight, when it is charged with powder and the lock screwed on, it is put into a large tub of sea water. C is to have fifteen or twenty inch-holes bored in its sides and top, to let the water rush in and the air out, otherwise, the air would prevent its immediately sinking. A is a cylindric brass box, about seven inches diameter and two inches deep, in which there is a gun-lock with a barrel two inches long, to receive a charge of powder and a wad, which charge is fired into the powder of the case B. In the brass box A there is also a piece of clockwork moved by a spring, which being wound up and set, will let the lock strike fire in any number of minutes which may be determined within one hour. K is a small line fixed to a pin, which pin holds the clockwork inactive; the instant the pin is withdrawn the clockwork begins to move, and the explosion will take place in one, two, three, or any number of minutes for which it has been set; the whole is so made as to be perfectly tight and keep out the water, although under a pressure of twenty-five or thirty perpendicular feet. D is a pine box two feet long, six or eight inches square, filled with cork; it is ten or fifteen pounds lighter than water, and floats on the surface; the line from it to the Torpedo is the suspending line, which must be of a length in proportion to the estimated draft of water of the vessel to be attacked; vessels of a certain number of guns usually draw within a few feet of the same draft of water; the suspending line should be from four to eight feet longer than the greatest draft of the vessel, that it may bend round the curve of her side, and lay the Torpedo near her keel. From the Torpedo and the float D, two lines, each twenty feet long, are united at E, from thence one line goes to the harpoon, the total length of the line from the Torpedo to the harpoon being about fifty feet, according to the length of the vessel to be attacked, will, when the ship is harpooned in the bow, bring the Torpedo under her bottom near midship. See the harpoon. It is a round piece of iron, half an inch diameter and two feet long, the butt one inch diameter, the exact calibre of the harpoon-gun; in the head of the harpoon there is an eye, the point six inches long is barbed, the line of the Torpedo is spliced into the eye of the harpoon, a small iron or tough copper link runs on the shaft of the harpoon, to the link the Torpedo-line is also tied, and at such a distance, that when the harpoon is in the gun it will form a loop as at H, but when fired, the link will slide along to the butt of the harpoon, and, holding the rope and harpoon parallel to each other, the rope will act like a tail or rod to a rocket, and guide it straight; without this precaution, the butt of the harpoon would turn foremost, and make a very uncertain shot. F is the harpoon-gun, made strong, and to work on a swivel in a stanchion fixed in the stern-sheets of a boat. My experience with this kind of harpoon and gun, is, that I have harpooned a target of six feet square fifteen or twenty times, at the distance of from thirty to fifty feet, never missing, and always driving the barbed point through three inch boards up to the eye, which practice was so satisfactory, that I did not consider it necessary to repeat it. The object of harpooning a vessel on the larboard and starboard bow, is, to fix one end of the Torpedo-line, then, if the ship be under sail, her action through the water will draw the Torpedo under her; if she be at anchor, the tide will drive it under her, where, at the expiration of the time for which the clockwork was set, the explosion will destroy her.

This being the kind of Torpedo and clockwork by which the _Dorothea_ in Walmer roads, and the brig in New-York harbour were blown up, and the harpoon having succeeded to fix the line to the target, these two experiments shall be combined, and the mode of practice, with the prospect of success and risque to the assailants, examined.

PLATE IV, Fig. 1

Represents the stern of a row-boat; a platform about four feet long, three feet wide, is made on her stern on a level with the gunwale, and projecting over the stern fifteen or eighteen inches, so that the Torpedo, in falling into the water, may clear the rudder. On the platform, the Torpedo and its suspending line of cork are to be laid, and the harpoon-line carefully coiled as at F, so that when the harpoon is fired, the line may develope with ease: very pliable well greased, or white line would be best for this purpose. The harpoon and gun are so well engraved as require no explanation. B is the copper case to hold one hundred or one hundred and fifty pounds of powder. C, the box of cork to diminish its tendency to sink and bring it to a specific gravity of only two or three pounds more than sea-water. Its suspending box of cork explained in Plate III is not seen in this figure, lest the drawing should be confused; it can be imagined in its proper place. A, is the brass box with the clockwork lock; D, the pin which prevents the clockwork moving; the line from the pin is tied to a bolt, or otherwise fixed to the boat as at E. Thus fastened, when the Torpedo is pulled into the water, the pin D will remain in the boat, and the clockwork will begin to act. The man who shall be stationed at the gun, and who may be called the harpooner, is to steer the boat and fire when sufficiently near. If he fixes his harpoon in the bow of the enemy, it will then only be necessary to row away; the harpoon and line being fixed to the ship, will pull the Torpedo out of the boat, and at the same instant set the clockwork in motion. This reduces the attack of each boat to one simple operation, that only of firing with reasonable attention. Should the harpooner miss the ship, he can save his Torpedo and return to the attack. While I was with the British blockading fleet off the coast of Boulogne in 1804 and 1805, I acquired some experience on the kind of row-boat best calculated for active movements, and which I now believe well adapted to a harpooning and Torpedo attack; hence I propose clinker-built boats, each twenty-seven feet long, six feet extreme breadth of beam, single banked, and six long oars; one blunderbuss, on a swivel, on the larboard and one on the starboard bow; one ditto on the larboard and one on the starboard quarter, total four, for which cartridges should be prepared, each containing twelve half-ounce balls. To work the blunderbusses, in case of need, two mariners should be placed in the bow, two in the stern; each of those men to be provided with a horse-pistol and cutlass, and each oarsman a cutlass, in case of coming to close quarters with a boat of the enemy.

_Total of boat's crew_

1 Harpooner. 1 Bowman. 4 Marines. 6 Oarsmen. Total 12 Men.

Such boats would be active well armed, and, if good men, may be said to be strong handed, and well prepared to make good a retreat, or act on the defensive, in case of encountering the enemy's boats.

Fig. 2

A, is a bird's eye view of a vessel at anchor; B, her cable; EE, two Torpedoes; CD, is their coupling line, about 120 feet long; it is here represented touching the cable collapsing, and the Torpedoes driving by the tide under the vessel. This is the manner in which the _Dorothea_ in Walmer roads, and the brig in New-York harbour, were blown up.

PLATE V. Fig. 1

A, shews a Torpedo, with the harpoon-line fixed to the centre of its end; when the line is thus fixed, the tide cannot drive the Torpedo under a vessel, for the pressure of the current being equal on both sides, it will hang perpendicular to its suspending box of cork C, Fig. 2, and remain as at B, where, exploding, it would blow the water perpendicular to C, and up the side of the ship; the lateral movement of the water from B to E would give her a sudden cant to one side, but do her no injury. This has been proved by the following practice.

On the first of October, 1805, captain Siccombe, in a galley with eight men and his coxswain, placed two Torpedoes in the manner described, Plate IV, Fig. 2, between the buoy and cable of a French gun-brig, in Boulogne roads. The tide drove them until they both lay perpendicular to her sides. When the French saw captain Siccombe advancing without answering the countersign, they exclaimed that the infernal machines were coming, and fired a volley of musketry at his boat, but without touching a man.[C] The moment the French fired, fearing the effect of the explosions, they all ran aft and were in the greatest confusion. The tide drove captain Siccombe's boat so far down, that he was obliged to cross under the brig's stern, where, seeing her men collected, and expecting another volley, he discharged at them two blunderbusses, each containing fifteen half-ounce balls[D], and was rowing away, when both Torpedoes exploded, but, to his astonishment, the brig was not destroyed. On the same night, lieutenant Payne, of captain Owen's ship _l'Immortality_, placed two Torpedoes across the bow of another French gun-brig; he received their fire, had one man wounded, rowed to some distance, and waited till he saw the explosion of the Torpedoes, which did not appear to do any injury to the vessel. When captain Siccombe called on me in the morning and reported these circumstances, I was much at a loss to account for the brig not being blown up. Defective in the experience which this failure gave me, I had not reflected, that if the copper case, with the clockwork and powder, weighed specifically fifteen or twenty pounds more than water, it would hang like a heavy pendulum to its suspending cork-box C, and if the coupling line were fixed in the centre of the end, as at A, Fig. 1, the action of the tide being equal on both sides, would have no tendency to sheer or drive it from its perpendicular position. After about half an hour's consideration, I was forcibly impressed with this error in arrangement, as the real cause of captain Siccombe's and lieutenant Payne's failure.

[Footnote C: They had got some idea of these machines, from an attempt which had been made with them against the Boulogne flotilla, in Oct. 1804, called the Catamaran expedition.]

[Footnote D: The report on this attack in the French papers, acknowledged that the brig had five men killed and eight wounded: this from two blunderbusses shews that the persons in the vessel attacked have to fear the small arms of the Torpedo boats.]

I immediately had a large tub made, then filling a copper case with powder, I screwed on to it the clockwork lock, and tied to it the pine box C, then suspending the whole Torpedo by a line in the tub of seawater; the end of the suspending line was tied to one end of a scale-beam. I then filled the pine box C with cork, until the whole volume of the Torpedo and box of cork would, when just covered with water, hold three pounds in equilibrio in the scale on the other end of the beam. The Torpedo being then three pounds heavier than water, had a sufficient tendency to sink; and being so balanced, would, while under water, be easy moved by a slight pressure to either side. Then, instead of tying the coupling line to the end of the Torpedo, as at A, I tied it to a bridle, as at B, which presenting the side on an angle to the tide, the pressure of the current in the direction of the arrow, would cause the Torpedo to sheer from B to G. This arrangement perfectly succeeded to sheer the Torpedo from its perpendicular C, and the side of the vessel to E, near the keel, a position, near which it should be to do execution. In this situation, the explosion being under the vessel, would have a great body of water to remove laterally, before it could get out by a line curving round her side. The water, when acted on in so instantaneous a manner as by the explosion of one hundred or one hundred and fifty pounds of powder, does, for the instant, operate like a solid body; hence the explosion raises the vessel up with a great force, acting on a small portion of her bottom, which portion giving way, is the same in effect, as though a high sea had lifted her fifteen or twenty feet, and let her down on the point of a rock of three or four feet diameter. This, I believe, accounts for the certain destruction which will follow all explosions that take place near the keel. In all cases when the explosion is under water, the action will be perpendicular to the surface, as from B to C, for in the perpendicular, there are less particles to remove, and less resistance than in any diagonal, as for example, from B to D.

The French papers, giving an account of the attack of captain Siccombe and lieutenant Payne, acknowledged that the Torpedoes blew up along side of the gun-brigs, but gave them only a violent shock and cant to one side; they spoke of the engines as things of little consequence and not to be feared. It is now, however, evident, that they owed the safety of the two brigs to the trifling circumstance of the Torpedoes not being properly balanced in water, and the coupling lines not being tied to a bridle, so as to make the Torpedoes sheer under the bottoms of the brigs.

Fig. 3

Is a bird's eye view of a ship of the line, either at anchor or under sail, and the Torpedo boats rowing on to the attack. I am sensible that there are strong prejudices against the possibility of row-boats attacking a ship or ships of the line, with any reasonable hope of success; I will, therefore, commence my reasoning and demonstrations by the following questions. What is the basis of the aggression and injustice of one nation towards another? Is it not a calculation on their power to enforce their will? What is the basis of all courage and obstinate perseverance in battle? Is it not a calculation on some real or presumed advantage? A frigate of 30 guns is not expected to engage a ship of eighty guns, for every rational calculation is against her, and to strike her colours would be no dishonour. If I now prove that all the calculations are in favour of the Torpedo boats, it shall hereafter be no dishonour for a ship of the line to strike her colours, and tamely submit to superior science and tactics.

I will run my calculations against a third rate, an 80 gun ship, she being the medium between first rates of 110 guns and fifth rates of 44 guns. I will suppose her to enter one of our ports or harbours in a hostile manner; her draft of water, when loaded, is twenty-two feet; her full complement of men six hundred. Were we to oppose to the enemy an 80 gun ship, she would cost four hundred thousand dollars; we would also have to give her a full complement of six hundred men. If she engaged the enemy, the chances are equal that she would be beaten; if an obstinate engagement, she might have from one to two hundred men killed and wounded, and be so shattered as to require repairs to the amount of forty or fifty thousand dollars; she might be taken and lost to the nation, and add to the strength of the enemy. It is now to be seen if six hundred men and a capital of four hundred thousand dollars, the value of an eighty gun ship, cannot be used to better advantage in a Torpedo attack or defence.

600 men at 12 to a boat, would man 50 boats,

50 boats at one hundred dollars each $5,000

50 Torpedoes complete, one hundred and fifty dollars each, powder included 7,500

50 harpoon-guns, thirty dollars each 1,500

200 blunderbusses, twenty dollars each 4,000

100 pair of pistols, fifteen dollars a pair 1,500

600 cutlasses, three dollars each 1,800

Contingencies 3,000 ------ Total $24,300

The pay and provisions for six hundred men, whether in an 80 gun ship or in Torpedo boats, may be estimated, for the present, to amount to the same sum annually.

Here is an establishment of fifty boats with their Torpedoes, and armed complete, for 24,300 dollars; the economy 375,700 dollars.[E] It is evident the ship could not put out fifty boats to contend with our fifty; she could not, in fact, put out twenty; therefore, as to boat fighting, the enemy could have no chance of success, and would have to depend for protection on her guns and small arms. Unless in a case of great emergency, the attack should be in the night, for if an enemy came into one of our harbours to do execution, the chances would be much against her getting out and to any great distance before night. In a night usually dark, rowboats, if painted white, and the men dressed in white, cannot be seen at the distance of three hundred yards; and there are nights so dark, that they cannot be seen if close under the bow. I might here draw into my calculations on chances that an enemy, who understood the tremendous consequences of a successful attack with Torpedoes, would not like to run the risk of the night being dark. But in any night, the fifty boats closing on the vessel in all direction, would spread or divide her fire, and prevent it becoming concentered on any one or more boats. Boats which row five miles an hour, and which all good boats can do for a short time, run at the rate of one hundred and forty yards a minute. At the distance of three hundred yards from the ship, they take the risque of cannon shot, which must, from necessity, be random and without aim, on so small a body as a boat, running with a velocity of one hundred and forty yards a minute. At two hundred yards from the ship, the boats must take the chance of random discharges of grape and cannister shot; and at one hundred yards from the ship, they must run the risque of random musket; each boat will, therefore, be two minutes within the line of the enemy's fire before she harpoons, and two minutes after she has harpooned before she gets out of the line of fire, total, four minutes in danger[F]: the danger, however, is not of a very serious kind, for, as before observed, no aim can be taken in the night at such quick moving bodies as row-boats; yet some men might be killed, and some boats crippled[G]; in such an event, the great number of boats which we should have in motion, could always help the unfortunate. But what would be the situation of the enemy, who had their six hundred men in one vessel? The Torpedo boats closing upon her, twenty-five on the larboard and twenty-five on the starboard bow, some of them would certainly succeed to harpoon her between the stem and main chains, and if so, the explosion of only one Torpedo under her would sink her, killing the greatest part of the people who were between decks, and leave those who might escape to the mercy of our boats to save them.

[Footnote E: As each boat with a Torpedo, and armed complete, costs four hundred and eighty-six dollars, this economy would pay for seven hundred and eighty-nine boats; hence, eight hundred and thirty-nine Torpedo boats, with Torpedoes and arms, could be fitted out for the sum which one 80 gun ship would cost.]

[Footnote F: A deduction may be made from this time; after harpooning, if the ship were anchored in a current which ran one mile and a half an hour, that would be two feet three lines a second; hence, if the distance from the harpoon to the Torpedo were sixty feet, thirty seconds would be sufficient for the tide to push it under the keel; its clockwork might be set to explode in one minute from the time the Torpedo fell out of the boat. If a vessel were under sail, running more than two miles an hour, one minute would be sufficient time for the clockwork to act before explosion. After explosion there would, of course, be no resistance, and the probability is, that all hands would be too much occupied in attempting to save themselves, to keep them under any discipline. Thus each Torpedo boat would not be more than three minutes within the line of the enemy's fire.]

[Footnote G: It is very easy to make the boats so that they cannot be sunk.]

I now beg of my reader to meditate on this kind of attack, and make up his mind on which are in the greatest danger, the six hundred men in the ship or the six hundred men in the boats? Are not the chances fifty to one against the ship, that she would be blown up before she could kill two hundred men in the boats? Should this appear evident, or be proved by future practice, no commander would be rash enough to expose his ship to such an attack.

To give a fair comparative view of the two modes of fighting, I have, in these calculations, made the number of men on each side equal; by the same rule, if twenty ships of 80 guns were to come into one of our ports, we should be necessitated to have one thousand boats and twelve thousand men; but such a preparation would not be necessary. It can never be necessary for us to have more boats than are sufficient to meet the boats which the enemy could put out to oppose us; an 80 gun ship, which is to work her guns, cannot be encumbered with many boats; they usually have:

1 launch, which is a bad rowing boat, 1 long-boat, which may row well, 1 the captain's barge, a good row-boat, 1 yawl or galley, a good row-boat.

They may, in some cases, have two more boats, total number, six; therefore, twelve boats on our part would be sufficient to attack an 80 gun ship[H]; particularly as all our boats would be built expressly for running, and our business is to run to harpoon and not to fight; for this purpose our six oarsmen, in each boat, never quit their oars, while our four marines keep up a running fire. The six or eight boats, if the enemy could put out so many, could not prevent our twelve boats closing on the ship. If our boats came into contact with the boats of the enemy, the contest would be reduced to boat fighting; the ship could not use her cannon or small arms against us without firing on her own boats. If we succeeded to drive the boats under the guns of the ship, we should follow so close, that her guns and small arms could not be used, for in the night and amidst a number of boats in confusion, they could not discriminate between friends and enemies. On this theory, if twenty ships of 80 guns, or a force to that amount, were to enter one of our ports, two hundred and forty boats, with two thousand, eight hundred and eighty men would be sufficient, and perhaps more than sufficient, for the attack; and the following view of chances exhibits a strong probability, that such a force of Torpedo boats and men would destroy the twenty ships of the line within one hour.