Thoughts on the Christian Religion, by a Deist To Which Are Added, a Few Ideas on Miraculous Conversion, and Religion in General, by a Theophilanthropist

Part 2

Chapter 23,867 wordsPublic domain

2. I believe in the equality of men by nature (though so different by accident) the universal power of conscience, and the unerring authority of natural reason.

3. I believe the whole duty of man is comprised in this one great republican principle--Do just as you would be done unto.--My reasons for believing thus are, in the first place, that this first 'cause is wise and powerful beyond our conception, is clearly evinced in the wonderful formation and disposition of nature, exhibited in every thing that we have any perception of. That he is good, the whole creation proves: for we find nothing made but what is useful, beneficial, and conducive to the happiness of the whole. And that he is too far above the reach of human actions to be affected by any thing that can be done on earth, is inferred from nature, reason, and experience: for the only idea that we can form of the Deity is, that he is a perfect, unchangeable being; and if we suppose that he so particularly notices the conduct of mankind as to be differently affected by their different actions, we must allow that he is an imperfect, changeable being, liable to be pleased or vexed at the mere will and pleasure of his creatures, and dependent upon the whim and caprice of _man_.

In the second place, it appears from the experience of mankind in all ages, that Nature, in the creation of man, acts impartially and equally; but leaves his talents, disposition, &c. to be regulated by mere accidental circumstances. That conscience has an universal power, is evident from the dislike and abhorrence, with which all mankind look upon actions that tend to the injury of society. And not to believe in the unerring authority of natural reason, would be to accuse the Deity of injustice for not creating us capable of distinguishing good from evil, and then punishing us for the evil we commit.

In the third place, that the whole duty of man is comprised in this one great republican principle, "Do as you would be done unto," has appeared so notorious to the world in all ages, that it has been universally agreed upon, as the unerring rule of action, and the basis of happiness: by the observing of which there can be neither oppression, deceit, or injustice of any kind. The duty of man is his interest; his interest is to make himself happy; and the surest and best way of doing this is to promote the prosperity of the whole.

Finally, that system of religion which contradicts itself, cannot be wholly true.--That which is not consistent with reason, or agreeable to the order of nature, must be false, as different from the will of the Deity, displayed in all his works:--And, that which tends to promote discord, pride, and deceit, is prejudicial to society, and ought to be discountenanced and opposed by every good man.

ON MIRACULOUS CONVERSIONS.

It appears to be the general opinion among the learned, that all matter is, more or less, in a continual state of transmutation; that there is a perpetual repulsion and attraction in nature. It is also the opinion of many philosophers, that the human mind is never quite stationary.

That locality, early habits, examples, affections, and associations have the greatest effect in forming the characters and opinions of men, is evident to our senses; and that after the character may be considered to be formed, a contrary course of habits, &c. of equally long or longer continuance will generally produce a contrary character.

Every attentive observer must perceive, that we sometimes dislike and entertain an unfavourable opinion of what we at another time approve and cordially agree to. To a cursory examiner these alterations may appear to take place arbitrarily: but to one acquainted with the philosophy of the human mind, accustomed minutely to trace the different links and associations which bias our ideas, they will appear, so far from being arbitrary or supernatural, to be perfectly natural and agreeable to the wise order of things. It would seem that most parties agree to the reasons given by the learned for such alterations, &c., except they be in matters of religion; here each party abandons the usual methods of philosophising, and has recourse to the supernatural interference of divine agency.

That extraordinary instances of conversion from vice to virtue, from error to truth, sometimes take place, for which the most profound and subtle reasoners fail to give satisfactory causes, is most readily granted; but still it may be said, that our not being able to trace a natural cause is no proof of there being none; for past experience has abundantly proved to the world the folly of such kind of inferences. Many things in science and philosophy are now even demonstrable, that formerly were, with equally good reason, considered to be miraculous or supernatural.

There are many reasons for considering the religious conversions not supernatural. There are no human criteria to determine when they are from God and when they are not. So many and so frequent impositions and deceptions take place, that there is no distinguishing the false from the true.

These enlightenments are equally claimed by every sect, however different in opinion. Now, supposing them to be from God, we are under the necessity of believing that there can be only one sect which can really have them; for it would be absurd to suppose the Immutable Creator of all things would inspire his creatures to believe, as true, opposite and different doctrines; and the confining of the divine influence to one sect only, certainly appears to be partial and arbitrary, and contrary to the saying, that "God is no respecter of persons."

People professing to be converted can never give a satisfactory explanation of their state, either to others or themselves, so as to do away all apprehension that they may not be actuated by impulse, fear, affections, &c., with a variety of other natural causes which every day make astonishing alterations in the minds of men.

We sometimes meet with individuals who at one time considered themselves to be inspired, and shewed every outward sign, and afterwards declare they conceive they never were.

Sudden and extraordinary changes frequently take place for the worse; but these are never accounted as supernatural. It appears that conversions most frequently take place after some circumstances which naturally have a tendency to fix the attention, soften the affections, affect the passions, and subdue the will; such as attending religious discourses, the deathbed of a friend, extreme pain, poverty, and distress, &c. Now, may not these be said to account for the first natural link? Then why should the rest of the chain be miraculous? If these observations were untrue, we might expect to find conversions occur as frequently among one sort of society as among another; but that is not the case.

It is observable in religious as well as in other operations of the mind, that those alterations which are the most sudden and vehement, are generally more transient than those which take place more gradually and after accountable associations.

We might naturally expect that those divinely inspired would be superior to the weaknesses of passion and imperfections of nature incidental to others; but our converts appear not to be. These supernatural affections are unattended with any discernibly supernatural effects; the possessors of them never perform miracles!

From these observations it is presumed, that there is abundant reason for apprehending that those conversions termed supernatural are nothing more than nature acting upon the mind of man, agreeably to those wise and immutable laws laid down by the adorable Maker of all things; and the reason of our terming them miraculous is, because we are unable with our weak faculties to trace the wonderful concatenations, and view the infinite variety of shades of which the intellectual part of man is susceptible. At the same time it is confessed, that it being a matter of internal feeling, and what cannot perhaps be demonstrated either way, no arguments on the subject can be hoped of any material benefit, either to the person who supposes himself to have it, but cannot explain it, or to him that has it not, and cannot conceive it.

Bristol,

THEOPHILANTHROPIST.

Feb. 18,1819.

A FEW IDEAS ON THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION.

It appears, that at least 99 persons in 100 take their religious opinions from their parents, and according to education, &c. without ever afterwards examining for themselves. Now, as this belief arises from causes that are variable and quite independent of the believers, it follows, that there is no security whatever for its being true, the chance being always against it: consequently, such persons' opinions are of no weight in the dispute.

A due attention to this consideration will, it is presumed, render the number of real believers and unbelievers in Christian countries much less unequal than at first we may be inclined to suppose.

The evidence for Christianity is founded on probabilities by a process of reasoning, not being intuitive or self-evident. The contrary of its being true can easily be conceived and does not imply a contradiction.

Owing to the different constitutions of the human mind, there always is, more or less, a certain difference of opinion upon all subjects in proportion to their want of self-evident proof. Then, when a subject confessedly has it not, ought we to expect from it those universal results which it could only produce by having it?

That there should be many who are not satisfied with the evidence of the Christian religion is not to be wondered at, since it is not of that nature to produce universal acquiescence. Where then can be the propriety of inveighing so bitterly against some for rejecting what, according to the nature of things, all cannot be expected to receive? Assuredly, the sin of doubting must be proportional to the evidence; then why should we attach the same punishment for disbelieving things that are not self-evident as we do for things that are?

With regard to the assertions, that "'tis their pride prevents their belief, that they make a Deity of their reason, and put themselves in opposition to Heaven," &c. it may be seriously asked, Are these assertors sincere in what they say, or is it merely spleen they, or any one, for an instant conceive it to be possible for a man in his senses, who has any idea of his Maker, or of himself, and is so deeply interested in the subject, to act in such a way?

There may be some reason for considering that doctrine to be false which might cause us to think existence a curse, rather than a blessing, and to entertain views inconsistent with the Divine Nature.

If the orthodox opinions be correct, how few among professors really profess! How small a proportion of mankind profess at all! It follows, according to even probability, that the number of the saved will be extremely small in proportion to that which is lost. Then, when a child is born, according to the laws of chances, there are very great odds against its being saved. Query, Whether it be a blessing to be born, to run any risk at all of endless misery, even were they very contrary of what they appear to be, greatly in favour of everlasting bliss?

Bristol,

THEOPHILANTHROPIST.

Feb. 18,1810.

DEISM EXAMINED

By A Christian

It has often been said, that if Christianity is not competent to withstand the test of reason, it ought to fall.

To this opinion I willingly subscribe; and so confident am I of our succeeding against our adversaries, the Deists, that I am for truly putting Christianity to this trial. That is, I would that there should be allowed as perfectly free discussion in all theological matters, that the "Age of Reason," and other works of a similar nature, should be allowed to be published. Let the enemies of our religion bring forward their objections as fast as they like; have we not, or our part, a ready refutation for every one of them?

The Deists, I know, have strongly contended, that many actions recorded in the Bible, said to have been done by the express command of God, are shocking to humanity, and in contradiction to all our ideas of moral justice. Such as putting whole nations to the sword; sparing neither age nor infancy; utterly destroying men, women, and children; leaving not a soul to breathe, &c. &c. But does not the Bishop of Llandaff reconcile this seeming incongruity, and vindicate the morality of the sacred writings by explaining, that, as the Almighty constantly superintends all the actions of nature, and in so doing permits, or rather causes smiling infants so to be swallowed up by earthquakes, or destroyed by other natural means; it is evident that these shocking transactions (as they are called) recorded in the Bible, do not militate in the least against the character of the Deity. The unbelievers certainly may bring a puerile argument against this profound assertion of the Bishop's; but the Christian who truly appreciates the real value of an unwavering _faith_, will have for such argument a thorough contempt, even before he reads it. They may tell us, if they choose, that nature being actuated by general and unvarying laws, it is not to be supposed the Almighty, in order to save a human creature, will perform a miracle. Or (to state the case more particularly) if a society of human beings will be so unthinking and imprudent, as to make their residence at the bottom of Mount Vesuvius, or Etna, that the Creator will partially suspend the laws of nature, in order that the burning lavas may not overwhelm them in destruction; or, that if mortals will be so presumptuous as to build their dwellings on the site of former desolations, as Lisbon for instance, that the Almighty will interpose, in order to prevent the recurrence of another earthquake; or that God will in any case partially suspend the eternal laws of the universe, in order to preserve a mortal that may be accidentally liable to be destroyed by their effects. They may tell us all this if they choose, and likewise, that this is quite another thing, to an express command from God himself to one set of human beings to annihilate another.--Thus we refute it all: such arguments are built on _human reason_, which it behoves every pious Christian to distrust!

Let them assert, that Jesus Christ himself, (if there was such a person) has proved the delusion he laboured under, since he actually and distinctly predicted, in more places than one, that his second coming would be in the days of the last surviving apostles, and that the apostles themselves sufficiently shew by their writings, that such was their opinion. Let them descant upon the description of his coming in the clouds (as related in the gospel) with the trumpets sounding before him, and call it a mere representation of human pageantry, and unworthy of being imputed to the Almighty Creator, who has millions of millions of worlds at his command! We thus refute the first part of this misrepresentation. Jesus, after predicting the destruction of Jerusalem, as we find it now related, speaks of his second coming, and gives a description how he will appear in the clouds, with the angels sounding their trumpets before him, &c. &c. and then continues thus: "Verily I say unto you, _this generation shall not pass away, till all these things be fulfilled._" Now it is evident, that this last verse can only allude to the destruction of Jerusalem, and that the passage is misplaced by many sentences. It is true, we have no vouchers for this, nor can we perceive what instance there could have been for any one to have made the alteration; but as more than seventeen centuries have revolved since the death of Christ, and no second coming yet taken place, we are fully justified in maintaining the passage to be misplaced.

The Deists accuse us of all along suppressing their works, and certainly, in this respect, I must acknowledge we have acted unfairly. They say that most of the ancient productions on their side the question are lost; while the answers to them are still extant. From this circumstance they infer, designing and superstitious monks and priests, in order to remove every thing out of the way that might militate against their doctrine, destroyed all the writings of their opponents, while they carefully preserved those of their own party. It is likewise affirmed, the book entitled the Age of Reason, is a more formidable enemy to Christianity than any work ever before published, and threatens, should it become popular, to shake its flimsy fabric (for thus they speak of our religion) to its very foundation; that the charge of blasphemy is brought against it to suppress it, solely from fear of this consequence, and that our oft repeated assertion, "if Christianity cannot withstand the test of reason it ought to fall," is a mere mockery, for, in fact, we fully prove our intention is, never to bring our doctrine to such a tribunal. I am very sorry that this last charge against us is not altogether unfounded. Why should not the arguments of our opponents be allowed to be published? their authors would very soon, I am fully persuaded, meet with a total discomfiture, and find our Polemics more than competent to justify their own cause.

Every one knows that Mr. Paine was illiterate, that is, he only knew his own language perfectly, and had a smattering of French. Now, have we not bishops, deacons, lecturers, curates, &c. who are acquainted with Hebrew, Greek, Syriac, Arabic, Latin, and several other tongues, living as well as dead; and surely, it would be strange, if, with all this various learning, aided by their laborious researches into the antiquated writings of the primitive Christians, (those credible attesters of _miracles and witchcraft_,) that they should not be able to overturn such a paltry antagonist as Thomas Paine; who, alas! made use of no other weapon but _human reason_; who ridiculed _Faith_ as a mere _chimera_; and maintained, that a strict observance of _moral virtue_ constituted the only worship that was in _reality_ pleasing to the Deity. Physiologists have asserted, I know, that the human brain is only capable of a certain degree of active energy, and that every additional talent we may acquire must be gained at the expence of all the other powers; and that, consequently, he who is familiar with a variety of languages cannot possibly think very profoundly in any, the whole of his intellect being absorbed, and the pure ideal part of it absolutely extinguished, in the complicated matter of grammatical construction, and the endless labour of committing to memory the various characters and innumerable quantity of words necessary for obtaining such knowledge. On the other hand, it is boldly averred, that he who knows his own language perfectly, and no other, may become, as it were, in his very essence, a compound of thought and reflection, capable of drawing, from the luminous stores of his own understanding alone, arguments that shall put to flight all the scholastic quibbling of the mere Christian linguist, causing the gloom engendered by his subtilties to vanish like mist before the sun.

The Deists accuse us of disturbing the last moments of the virtuous, and terrifying their imaginations with the prospect of eternal damnation. They say, that when such infatuated persons (whose bodily weakness renders them more than childish) become overwhelmed with the dreadful picture, and give way to the weakness of humanity, that we then infer, they had a proper sense of the enormity of their guilt before they died; and that we then exclaim, in the gloomy pomposity of the fanatic Young,

"Men may live fools, but fools they cannot die!"

This quotation, when applied to the case in question, the Deists maintain to be unjust, and are for making a new reading, as being rather more applicable, viz.

"Men may live wisely, but fools they often die!"

"Shame!" the Deists cry, "forbear to disturb the departing moralist with your strange dogmas! His sole trust is in his Creator, therefore let his last hours be spent in peace! Your interference is useless, and as it adds to the sufferings of expiring humanity, may well be termed impious and cruel. And further, what conviction can be gained from making public the imbecile and terror-extorted confessions made by the dying; for as Rousseau rightly observes, it is 'our reason that determines our belief, and when, through sickness, that faintly becomes impaired, what dependence can be placed on any opinion we may then adopt?'" All this seems at the first glance very striking and imposing, but is easily refuted. I shall confine myself, however, to only answering the latter part of the above. I maintain, then, that even shouting our dogmas in the ears of the dying,1 and thereby disturbing their last moments, is a mere trifle, when put in competition with the eternal advantages that may by this means accrue to their souls. It is well known, that Christians formerly, more generally than at present, did not scruple to compel men to become converts; and when the heretics, as they were termed, obstinately held out, they actually burnt them for _the love of Christ!_ This manner of proceeding Dr. Paley has, in some measure, justified, 2 by affirming, that as the salvation of the soul is a matter of infinitely more importance than the well-being of the body, so these _converters_, who actually believed salvation to exclusively depend on the reception of their dogmas, may be said to be in some sort excusable, for endeavouring by all the means within their power to save a man's soul, though his body, in consequence, might be devoted to the flames.

1 Vide Life of M. de Voltaire.

2 Vide Haley's Evidences of Christianity, Part III. Chap. vii.

Some, I know, would go further, and urge, that even the burning of those who _were_ converted by the threats of the holy fathers, was not impolitic, since it may be justified as the above principle, of preferring the welfare of the soul to that of the body. For might not a new-made convert, made so against the evidence of his own reason, recant, and thus render all the pious zeal of those _soul-preservers_ quite abortive? Nothing more likely, and therefore to make sure of his eternal felicity, they were equally excusable in committing him to the flames. A similar principle influenced the pious Monk towards the unfortunate Jew, as related in a well-known but somewhat ancient story, concluding with these lines:

"Drag, drag me out--I freeze--I die." "Your peace, my friend, is made on high; Full absolution here I give; Saint Peter will your soul receive: Wash'd clean from sin, and duly shriven, New converts always go to heaven; No hour for death so fit as this; Thus, thus I launch you into bliss!" So said--the Father in a trice His convert launch'd beneath the ice.