Part 12

Of course it is possible to do a thing well—it is possible to follow the rule for doing it—without knowing the rule. If a man take a live interest in a subject he will naturally tend to look at it from a number of different viewpoints. If he be eternally on the lookout for errors and fallacies in his own thinking he will gradually evolve a logic of his own. And this logic will be concrete, not abstract; it will be something built into, an integral part of, concrete thought, and he will be constantly strengthening the habit of using it. Compared with the logic of the books it may be crude, but it will not consist of mere rules, which can be recited but which are seldom applied.

So with grammar. Instance the writer’s experience with German. Few native Germans could recite offhand what prepositions govern the genitive, dative and accusative, even if they knew what was meant by these terms. But they would (most of them) use these cases correctly, and without the least thought. The educated Englishman or American flatters himself that his correct speech is due to his study of grammar. This is far from true. His speech is due to unconscious imitation of the language of the people with whom he comes into contact, and of the books he reads. And needless to say, the cultivated man comes into contact with other cultivated men and with good literature; the ignoramus does not.

Most of our thinking is influenced in this way. The great thinkers of the past improved their innate powers not by the study of rules for thinking, but by reading the works of other great thinkers, and unconsciously imitating their habitual method and caution.

The fact to remember is that a rule is something that has been formulated after the thing which it rules. It is merely an abstract of current practice or of good practice. Rules are needful because they teach in little time what would otherwise require much experience to learn, or which we might never discover for ourselves at all. They help us to learn things right in the beginning; they prevent us from falling into wrong habits. The trouble with unsupplemented imitation, conscious or unconscious, is that we tend to imitate another’s faults along with his virtues. Rules enable us to distinguish, especially if we have learned the reason for the rules.

But practice and rules should not be compared as if they were opposed. The true road is plenty of practice with conscientious regard to rule. It may be insisted that this has its limits; that there is a point beyond which a man cannot improve himself. I admit that practice has its limits. It may be true that there is a point beyond which a man cannot advance. But nobody knows those limits and no one can say when that point has come.

No two individuals profit in the same degree by the same practice. With a given amount one man will always improve faster than another. But the slower man may keep up with his more speedy brother by more practice. I shall not repeat here the fable of the hare and the tortoise. But any one who has discovered a flaw in his mental make-up, any one who believes that he cannot concentrate, or that his memory is poor, and that therefore he can never become a thinker, should find consolation in the words of William James:

“Depend upon it, no one need be too much cast down by the discovery of his deficiency in any elementary faculty of the mind. . . . The total mental efficiency of a man is the resultant of all his faculties. He is too complex a being for any one of them to have the casting vote. If any one of them do have the casting vote, it is more likely to be the strength of his desire and passion, the strength of the interest he takes in what is proposed. Concentration, memory, reasoning power, inventiveness, excellence of the senses—all are subsidiary to this. No matter how scatter-brained the type of a man’s successive fields of consciousness may be, if he really _care_ for a subject, he will return to it incessantly from his incessant wanderings, and first and last do more with it, and get more results from it, than another person whose attention may be more continuous during a given interval, but whose passion for the subject is of a more languid and less permanent sort.”[25]

XI

BOOKS ON THINKING

The reader who desires to study further on the subject of thinking will find a wide field before him—but he will have to search in cosmopolitan quarters. While much has been written on thinking, it has been in an incidental manner, and has found its way into books written mainly to illuminate other subjects. Among the few books or essays devoted exclusively or mainly to thinking may be mentioned:—John Locke, _The Conduct of the Understanding_; Isaac Watts, _The Improvement of the Mind_; Arnold Bennett, _Mental Efficiency_; T. Sharper Knowlson, _The Art of Thinking_; Arthur Schopenhauer, _On Thinking for Oneself_, in his _Essays_. The last is especially recommended. It is only about a dozen pages long, and is the most stimulating essay written on the subject. This, together with John Locke’s _Conduct_ (which, by the way, is also fairly short) may be considered the two “classics” in the meager literature on thinking.

There is an extensive literature on the psychology of reasoning, on the “positive” science of thinking. The best single work on this subject is John Dewey’s _How We Think_. William James’ chapter on _Reasoning_ in his _Principles of Psychology_ might also be consulted with profit. S. S. Colvin’s, _The Learning Process_ contains some interesting chapters bearing on thought.

On method, the amount of literature is even more imposing than that on the psychology of reasoning. Probably the most thorough book is Stanley Jevon’s _The Principles of Science_, though this, consisting of two volumes, will require quite some ambition to attack. A good recent short work is J. A. Thomson, _Introduction to Science_. Herbert Spencer’s short essay, _An Element in Method_, in his _Various Fragments_ might also be mentioned. Of those works treating method mainly from a corrective standpoint, I have already mentioned Jevon’s _Elementary Lessons in Logic_. _The_ authoritative and most comprehensive book on logic is still John Stuart Mill’s great tome. Of course this list of books on method, as well as that on the psychology of reasoning, cannot pretend to be more than merely suggestive. If the reader desires an extensive bibliography in either of these subjects he will probably find it in one of the books mentioned.

On doubt and belief, William Clifford, _The Ethics of Belief_, and William James, _The Will to Believe_, might be read. The viewpoints of the two essays are in almost direct contradiction.

On reading, Alexander Bain’s _The Art of Study_, in his _Practical Essays_, will be found useful. Bacon’s essay _On Studies_, which is not more than a couple pages long, contains more concentrated wisdom on the subject than is to be found anywhere.

On subjects most worth thinking about, the reader cannot do better than read Herbert Spencer’s essay _What Knowledge is of Most Worth?_ in his _Education_. As to books most worth reading, consult the lists of John Morley, Sir John Lubbock, and Frederic Harrison; Sonnenschein’s _Best Books_ (in two volumes); Baldwin’s _The Book Lover_; Dr. Eliot’s _Five Foot Shelf_ and Frank Parson’s _The World’s Best Books_, previously referred to.

On the art of living—the art of planning time so as to have room for thinking, as well as valuable hints as to how that thinking is to be carried out—consult Arnold Bennett, _How to Live on Twenty-four Hours a Day_, and E. H. Griggs, _The Use of the Margin_ (both very, very small books).

Finally, there is much useful material, as well as incalculable inspiration, to be obtained from the intellectual and literary biographies of great thinkers. Especially is this true of autobiography. Among others may be mentioned the autobiographies of John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer, and an autobiographical fragment by Charles Darwin.

FOOTNOTES:

[ 1] See Herbert Spencer, _Education_.

[ 2] Pillsbury, _Essentials of Psychology_.

[ 3] _Principles of Psychology_, Vol. II, p. 332.

[ 4] See William A. Scott, _Money_.

[ 5] _How We Think._

[ 6] _Autobiography_, Vol. I, p. 463.

[ 7] _Autobiography._

[ 8] Hugh Elliot, _The Letters of John Stuart Mill_.

[ 9] Essay, _Over-Legislation_.

[10] _The Conduct of the Understanding._

[11] _The Will to Believe._

[12] _Autobiography._

[13] _Science and Education._

[14] T. Sharper Knowlson, _The Art of Thinking_.

[15] _The Conduct of the Understanding._

[16] _On Thinking for Oneself._

[17] This may seem unjustified. Witness, however, this remarkable statement in a prospectus of Charles Eliot’s “Five Foot Shelf”: “ . . . The man who has not read the ‘Wealth of Nations’ is hardly qualified to speak or even think wisely on these vital subjects.” If this be true, Adam Smith himself was hardly qualified because he certainly could not have read his own book before he had written it!

[18] Essay _On Thinking for Oneself_.

[19] _Autobiography._

[20] Edward Griggs, _The Use of the Margin_.

[21] _Literary Taste._

[22] The most advanced and severe psychologists may object to some statements in this exposition. I admit that a word may be used as the concept, _but only provided it is accompanied by a “fringe” of potential associates_. I also admit that in order to be dealt with as if general, the visual image must be accompanied by such a “fringe.” But I do insist that this fringe itself is in a constant state of flux. That is the important point for our present purposes.

[23] _Literary Taste._

[24] And consult Arnold Bennett’s _How to Live on 24 Hours a Day_.

[25] _Talks to Teachers._

THE END

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE:

Original spelling and grammar have been generally retained. Original small caps are now uppercase. Italics look _like this_. Footnotes have been relabeled 1–25 and moved to the end of the book. The transcriber produced the cover image and hereby assigns it to the public domain. Original page images are available from archive.org—search for “cu31924031014867”.

End of Project Gutenberg's Thinking as a Science, by Henry Hazlitt (1894-1993)