CHAPTER I

CONTRITION

10. Extent and Efficacy of Contrition.

The most prominent position among the acts of the penitent belongs to contrition.

According to the teaching of the Council of Trent contrition is a hearty sorrow and detestation for past sin together with a firm resolution to sin no more.[107]

We must investigate more closely the _essence_ of this contrition. Contrition is a hearty _sorrow_; this sorrow is interior; hence the prophet speaks of a rending of the heart (_scindite corda vestra_!—Joel ii. 13), and so contrition is called _contritio cordis_, a grinding of the heart. A merely external show of sorrow, the mere recital of an act of contrition, is therefore not a true sorrow. Moreover, since sorrow is a moral act and all moral acts proceed from the will, sorrow must have its roots in the will.

Many very different things may cause us great grief; for instance, the death of a dear relation, the loss of earthly goods, the failure of our plans and undertakings, the suffering of wrongs and affronts, experience of ingratitude and unkindness, a thoughtless word which one has uttered, a mere breach of etiquette that one has committed. Contrition, however, is grief of the soul for _past sin_.

The sins of others may cause us real and deep feelings of pain. What fervent Christian is unconcerned at the many sins which are daily committed and the many affronts offered to God? We are pained by them, but we cannot be contrite for them. We can have contrition only for the _sins which we have ourselves committed_—_de peccato commisso_, as the Council of Trent expresses it.

This being the case, sorrow as understood in this connection is not to be confused with:—

(_a_) Merely speculative sorrow (_dolor intellectivus_), _i.e._, the mere knowledge of the hatefulness and horror of sin. Reason when not blinded can recognize and must recognize clearly the hatefulness and wickedness of sin; yet in spite of this knowledge the will may cling to it and love it; indeed such cases are of frequent occurrence.

(_b_) Or the feeling of guilt or the remorse of conscience (_terrores conscientiæ_) which Luther taught to be of the essence of true sorrow. The feeling of guilt may be present without the help of our will, and even against our will. Remorse of conscience may be roused in us without our wishing it, and it may happen that we cannot allay it even when we wish to do so.

(_c_) Finally, the resolve to amend, the _resipiscentia_, and even the giving up of the sin is not of itself true sorrow; a man may forsake his sin merely because he has indulged in it to excess, because it has no longer any attraction for him, or because he has become tired of it.

True sorrow is not merely a pain and bitterness of heart; it is also a real hatred and horror of sin; but hatred and horror are acts of the will, for it is the will which hates and loves, shrinks from an object or embraces it. The will may shrink from sin at the same time that sensuality makes us crave for the sin; the will, however, must not give way to the craving.

Sorrow and detestation of sin are in themselves distinct, yet they are so bound up in man’s nature, that, where there is detestation there is necessarily also sorrow, so that true and efficacious sorrow for sin, as sin, cannot exist without detestation of the same.[108]

As to the question whether contrition lies more in sorrow for sin or in detestation of it—in other words, in dislike, hatred, and aversion—theologians answer that contrition is founded principally on detestation for sin, and with reason, for:—

(_a_) By this detestation the sinner retracts his evil will and turns towards God; this detestation is, moreover, the cause of sorrow. When, therefore, it is asserted that the sinner should above all have sorrow for his sins, and when by this is understood a sorrowful hatred of sin, this is correct, for in this case horror of sin is there with its complement. Moreover, we must not lose sight of St. Alphonsus’ dictum[109] that there is no reason to doubt that one sentiment includes the other; he who has a horror of his sins is sorry for them, and whoever is supernaturally sorry for them detests them.

Since contrition is the most important element in the disposition of the sinner, it is proper to give in detail the acts which belong to contrition, and to show how the sinner may attain to perfect contrition.

First and foremost, a preliminary act of faith and hope of obtaining pardon by the merits of Christ should be made. How can he repent of his sins who does not believe that there is a God and that God is offended by sin, who does not believe that God is faithful to His promises and merciful to sinners, and who does not hope that God will pardon him? These acts of faith and hope, though they need not be made _explicitly_, are the foundations of contrition; on them are built up the remaining elements which go to form the perfect act. These are:—

1. The knowledge of the hatefulness of sin as an offense against God, and of the awful punishments which the sinner incurs. This knowledge is necessary in order to acquire contrition, for the law of man’s nature makes him love and strive for what his reason proposes to him under the appearance of good, and hate and avoid what it presents as evil.

2. An act of the will, which desires to avoid the evil now known as such; on this follows:—

3. The hatred of past sins which have caused that evil, and the desire of undoing the sin committed. This desire, in the abstract, is only a velleity and quite inefficacious, for that which is done cannot be undone; but it is of efficacy in so far as it means a wish to undo, if it were possible, the sin by which God has been offended and punishment incurred.

4. From this hatred there arises in the rational appetite or in the will a sorrow and real distress that the sins have been committed; hence also follows:—

5. In the sensitive appetite, by picturing to ourselves the horror and evil consequences of sin, a certain hatred and sorrow, which may become so keen as to produce sighs and tears.

6. The resolve and firm determination never more to sin and offend God, or, what comes to the same thing, a resolution to observe faithfully and perfectly God’s commands.

7. Finally, there appears in the truly repentant sinner a willingness to render satisfaction to God for past sins, to chastise and punish himself, and to repair God’s honor.[110]

Contrition is either _perfect_ or _imperfect_[111] according as the sorrow and hatred arise from a motive of perfect love or of some supernatural motive which is inferior to perfect love. Since we understand here by love (_caritas_) the _amor benevolentiæ_, by which we love God above all things for His own sake, _i.e._ on account of His infinite perfections, we may define perfect contrition (_contritio_) as a sorrow and hatred for past sins together with a firm purpose never more to sin, because sin is an injury to God, who is loved above all things for His own sake.

Imperfect contrition (_attritio_) may be founded on many other supernatural motives; these are usually, as the Council of Trent declares, the fear of hell or punishment and the hatefulness of sin.[112] Thus imperfect contrition may be defined: sorrow and detestation of past sin with the determination never more to sin, because sin is an offense against God, who utterly abhors it on account of its hatefulness and avenges it with punishment. The thought of God, the supreme Lord of all, infinitely holy, to whom sin is detestable by its shamefulness, fills the sinner with confusion; the thought of God, who punishes sin with infinite justice, fills him with fear of the punishments of sin, and, impelled by this fear, he repents of having offended God by his sin.

Perfect and imperfect contrition coincide in this respect, that they are both a supernatural sorrow and hatred for sin regarded as an injury to God; they differ, however, specifically in this, that perfect contrition proceeds from perfect love of God, and imperfect contrition from a variety of other less noble motives; they also differ in their efficacy.[113]

11. The Essential Features of Perfect Contrition.

According to the unanimous teaching of theologians, which is based on the Council of Trent, perfect contrition proceeds from perfect love. The Council declares that contrition founded on _caritas_ is perfect; that, in consequence, its perfection depends on _caritas_; hence in order to acquire a complete grasp of the nature of perfect contrition we must investigate the nature of love, its degrees and kinds.

The love of God, of which only there is question here, has for its object God alone, and the motive of this love is similarly always God Himself. There are many aspects under which God may be presented to us as an object of love, and these aspects determine the different degrees of love. First of all there are two kinds of this love: _pure_ or _disinterested_ love, _amor benevolentiæ_ (_amicitiæ_), and selfish or _interested_ love (_amor concupiscentiæ_). God can be loved because He is most worthy of love, because He is good, because He is the highest good. If we love God for His own sake because He is most lovable _in Himself_ (_prout est in se summum bonum_), we have the first kind of love, the pure love of God; if we love Him on our own account because He is _for us_ the highest good (_prout nobis est summum bonum_), we have the second kind of love. The pure love of God is called perfect love, the other imperfect. If now we consider more closely the imperfect love of God, we find two degrees. God is here the object of love in as much as He is good to man, _i.e._ on the one hand God confers His benefits on man on earth and His everlasting possession in heaven completes the happiness of man hereafter, and on the other hand the loss of God means to man on earth unhappiness and suffering and in the next life the eternal punishment of hell. If a man disregards totally the idea of God as a person to be loved and keeps in view only his own selfish interests, he evidently loves only himself, thinking merely of his own present and future well-being, his own joys and sufferings, his own reward and punishment. Such a love, which hardly deserves the name, is downright selfishness and is rightly called a mercenary love (_amor mercenarius_). This love corresponds to the fear which is called _purely servile_, _timor serviliter servilis_, that fear which hates only the punishment and not the sin, which cherishes the inclination to sin, so that a man would sin if he did not fear punishment. Both love and fear of this kind belong to the lowest degree and destroy all supernatural merit and reward.

But there is an imperfect love of God in which man’s heart really turns to God simply because God is good to him, it is true, yet so that he loves Him efficaciously and really and regards the loss of God as the loss of all good and the greatest of misfortunes. Since in such a love of God there is mingled a great deal of the love of self, so that one love is not present without the other, it cannot yet be called the pure love of God, but receives a special name, the _love of chaste concupiscence_, _amor castæ concupiscentiæ_. To this love corresponds that fear of eternal punishment, which does not exclude the thought of God, which fears the punishment of hell because it is the loss of the vision of God, _i.e._ the _pœna damni_. This love is called also the _amor spei_, because in it the hope of possessing God in heaven, the highest reward of all pure souls, is an essential element.

A higher grade of love, midway between this perfect and imperfect love, is called the _love of gratitude_, _amor gratitudinis_, in which we love God for the benefits which He has conferred. When this love is prompted more by the thought of the gifts than the giver, more by the benefit than by the love of the benefactor, it approaches in quality to the love of hope (_amor spei_); one reflects on the past, the other on the future. If, however, the motive of this love of gratitude directly regards the giver and his good will towards mankind, then God is loved with a pure love, for God’s benevolence and love towards men are intimately united with His perfections. This kind of love of gratitude may well be classed with pure love or _caritas_. It is a perfect love (1) because God is loved for His own sake, on account of His infinite goodness and love and generosity, which are identical with God Himself; (2) because it is a benevolent love. All love in respect of its object is either selfish or benevolent; _now this love of gratitude is not selfish because it does not regard its own profit, nor does it strive to gain anything for itself_; (3) because it is a love of friendship, for it is a love which wishes well to Him who loves us and makes a return of love for love.[114]

A great number of distinguished theologians assert that the love of gratitude is perfect love, and the contrition based on it perfect contrition.[115] The Council of Trent might be adduced in favor of this view, since in Sess. 14, cp. 5, can. 4, it enumerates among the motives of imperfect contrition merely the hatefulness of sin and its punishment without the least reference to the motive of gratitude. It is of considerable moment to settle this point exactly, for, as Deharbe says, “a man might never know how to elicit an act of perfect contrition if he were to form a false notion of perfect love. Who can deny that in many cases salvation depends on an act of perfect contrition, and that even where it is possible to receive the Sacrament of Penance it is always advisable to make at least an effort to arouse not only imperfect but also perfect contrition?”[116]

We should be loath to omit the remark that the love of Christ crucified is an eminent incentive to perfect love, and that the sorrow for sin which is founded on the thought that sin was the cause of the awful sufferings and shameful death of Our Saviour, belongs to perfect contrition. A man who is well disposed towards Christ, believing Him to be God, has all that is required to arouse perfect love; and if, influenced by this love, he detests and determines to avoid all that brought such great suffering on Christ, he is exercising an act of perfect love and contrition.[117]

This love is most intimately connected with the love of gratitude, since “for our sins was He wounded and for our iniquities was He stricken.” Indeed nothing is so calculated to fill us with gratitude towards God as the thought of all that the Son of God has done and suffered for us. The crib, the cross, and the Sacraments are the three great monuments of His enduring love towards us, and at the same time they are the three inexhaustible founts of motives of our love for Him. Hence it is that the Church recalls to us so frequently these benefits of Christ. “When we meditate upon her ceremonies and practices, the spirit of her feasts and solemnities, her altars and temples, her prayers, the sense of the liturgies and the object of her devotions, our thoughts are compelled to consider the marvelous love of God and what Our Saviour has done and suffered for us, and we are reminded to be thankful to the Lord and to requite His love with our love.”[118]

From this love of gratitude, as the first stage on the way to pure love, we may ascend yet higher and attain to that entirely pure love by which we seek God as the highest good in Himself, as infinite beauty, as complete perfection, as the source of all goodness, beauty, and perfection, without reference, so far as that is possible, to our own profit. This love is shown by joy in God’s perfections (_amor complacentiæ_); the soul which has this love forgets itself and is lost in the object of its love for which alone it lives; its sole desire is God’s happiness (_amor benevolentiæ_), and it would willingly add to it (_amor desiderii_) but since such increase is impossible it rejoices in things as they are (_amor gaudii_).

It cannot be disputed that such a disinterested love is possible on earth, since many pious souls have had it in an eminent degree; still it must be observed that although the higher stages of love surpass and in surpassing absorb the lower, they do not eliminate them entirely; on the contrary, this pure love does not and cannot exclude the love of hope. It is the explicit teaching of the Church that love for God on earth cannot be so disinterested as to exclude all thought of ourselves and our eternal welfare.

This stage of love answers to filial fear (_timor filialis_) when one thinks no longer about punishment nor fears it, but dreads to give displeasure or offense to the beloved one and carefully avoids all that arouses the anger of God.

The sorrow arising from perfect love is therefore perfect sorrow, _contritio_. This, like unselfish love, may have varying stages of intensity[119] and may be more or less perfect; no special degree of intensity, however, is required, and the lowest is sufficient. It is only right and desirable, however, that we should have the greatest sorrow possible for our sins, penetrating soul and body, so that the whole man may repent of his faults and the tools of sin become again instruments of love.[120] This, however, is not always in our power, and, being a grace, we must ask for it.

We may now sum up our conclusions: Perfect contrition, _contritio_, is the hatred of sin proceeding from a pure love of God with a firm resolution of amendment, a disposition which includes filial fear, and, so far from excluding the hope of salvation and fear of punishment, tends rather to develop them.[121]

12. The Effects of Perfect Contrition and the Obligation of Procuring it.

Perfect contrition restores the sinner to grace at once, even before he has approached the Sacrament of Penance, though the desire of receiving the Sacrament is necessary; it removes the eternal punishment and in part the temporal punishment.

The first part of this statement is _fidei proxima_, for the Council of Trent teaches[122] that perfect contrition reconciles man to God before the Sacrament is received, but that this reconciliation by perfect contrition is not effected without the desire, which is included in the act of contrition, of receiving the Sacrament. This doctrine was confirmed by the condemnation pronounced by Gregory XIII and Urban VIII on the twenty-first and thirty-second of the propositions of Baius. Baius and Jansenius taught among other things that perfect contrition without the Sacrament cannot restore to grace unless in exceptional circumstances, _e.g._ in martyrdom, at the hour of death, when there is no possibility of confessing, or when it is _summe intensa_.

Finally, this doctrine of the efficacy of perfect contrition is clearly expressed in Holy Scripture and in the monuments of tradition; the proofs belong to the domain of dogmatic theology.[123] We add only a single consideration which springs from a well-known principle: Perfect contrition arises from love and is in its essence nothing but an act of love. Now perfect love unites us to God, so that we live in Him and He in us.[124] This perfect union with God overcomes all separation from Him which arose through sin.

Such, then, is the effect of perfect contrition, however poor and weak it may be, for in spite of this it is a sorrow which is inspired and informed by perfect love. Nor does a greater or less degree change the species; the Council of Trent is positive in its declaration that perfect contrition reconciles us to God, and assigns no limit which must be attained before producing this effect. Such, too, is the unanimous teaching of St. Thomas,[125] St. Alphonsus,[126] and the other great theologians.

The sinner is restored to grace by perfect contrition without the Sacrament only when he has the intention of receiving it, for the actual, or at least intentional, reception of the Sacrament is the one single means ordained by Christ for the removal of mortal sin. This intention is included in the act of perfect contrition, as the Council of Trent goes on to teach; hence all theologians hold that the implicit desire (_votum implicitum_) is sufficient, for whoever has true contrition has the wish to fulfill all the commands of God, and hence the command of Christ enjoining the confession of sin.[127] Perfect contrition is an act of perfect love, and this urges man to fulfill the commands of God in accordance with Christ’s words: “He who loves Me will keep My word.”[128] Hence it may happen that a sinner is justified by an act of perfect contrition without any actual confession; it is sufficient that he does not exclude the purpose of confessing his sin.[129]

The resolution to confess the sin does not include the resolution to confess it _as soon as possible_ (_quam primum_). It is enough to confess when a precept of God or of the Church urges.[130]

The other effect of perfect contrition, the remission of eternal punishment, follows from what we have been already considering; moreover the condemnation of Baius’ seventieth proposition makes this doctrine _proxima fidei_. This, too, is the teaching of all Catholic theologians.[131] The guilt is removed by sanctifying grace; but one who has sanctifying grace is a child of God, and has as his heritage a claim to heaven.

Finally, we gather from the Council of Trent[132] and the common doctrine of theologians[133] that a part also of the temporal punishment of sin, in proportion to the intensity of contrition, is remitted, so that a very great and perfect contrition may blot out all the temporal punishment.

Two very _practical_ remarks, applicable both to confessor and to penitent, may find their place here.

Mortal sin is not forgiven, and the sinner is not reconciled to God, till he has made good the injury done to God; in other words, till he has done penance. This is a truth of faith.[134] It follows, then, that he who has the misfortune to fall into sin is obliged to repent of it, and in such wise as to obtain forgiveness; to adopt any other course is to frustrate the whole end of his existence. He must therefore make an act of perfect contrition, or supplement the imperfect contrition by the Sacrament of Penance.

This obligation is certainly pressing when there is danger of death, because it is the necessary means for salvation, and every man is bound by love of God and of himself to take precautions against being forever an enemy of God and of being involved in eternal damnation.

The question now arises whether on other grounds there is a strict obligation of making an act of perfect contrition, for instance, from the consideration of God who has been offended, or for our own interests, since we may die at any moment, and because one who is in a state of mortal sin is but little capable of avoiding other mortal sins.

The following answer may be given:—

1. God might have insisted that the sinner should make good at once after his sin the evil committed, and the injury done to God by mortal sin would be quite motive enough for such legislation. As a matter of fact God does not make any such demand; instead of insisting on His rights, He is long-suffering and permits the sinner to heap offense on offense.

On the other hand, a man cannot remain long in mortal sin without offending God again and once more incurring sin; for it is an insult to the love we owe to God to remain long a slave of the devil and an enemy of God, and such behavior on the part of the sinner makes him guilty of contempt of God’s friendship and rights. To incur, however, grievous sin in this way, the neglect to make an act of perfect contrition must have extended over a considerable time. As to what constitutes a considerable time, it is not easy to define a hard-and-fast limit; a period of several years would certainly be considerable, and it would be a grave sin to remain so long a time in the state of mortal sin; but a man who reconciles himself to God within the limits of the time prescribed by the Church for confession would certainly not incur a new sin _per se_, special circumstances, of course, being excluded which might demand that an act of perfect contrition be made at once.[135]

The possibility of dying before being reconciled to God is certainly a very strong motive to induce a man to consult the safety of his soul and to free it as soon as possible from the state of mortal sin; for at any moment death may surprise a man without warning. If, however, there be no pressing danger of death, that possibility is not sufficient to make delay of reconciliation a new sin; hence one who dies a sudden death may be plunged into hell by sins for which he had not atoned, but he would not be guilty of a new sin by having put off his repentance.

But there is an obligation to avoid putting off for a long time one’s conversion, and hence an act of perfect contrition after mortal sin, because a man in the state of mortal sin is in the greatest danger of falling into other mortal sins, since he has not strength enough to vanquish severe temptations and to withstand the violence of his passions, and since, as St. Gregory the Great[136] says, the unrepented mortal sins which burden his soul draw him by their weight into other worse sins. “Without sanctifying grace it is not possible to refrain long from mortal sin,” says St. Thomas;[137] the sinner might, if he wished, have the necessary moral strength to overcome temptation and to resist his passions; he might curb them by the divine power of grace; but there is the law of the distribution of God’s graces, that God gives only to those who love Him efficacious grace, and while a man persists of his own free will in the state of sin and enmity with God, he equivalently expresses his contempt of grace and so makes himself unworthy of it. As God is ever pouring richer and richer graces on those who make good use of them and coöperate with them, so He withdraws them from those who neglect and resist them. Hence we may adopt the well-founded teaching of St. Alphonsus,[138] who states that the sinner ought not to put off for longer than a month his reconciliation with God; in other words, that the act of perfect contrition should not be delayed beyond that time. By such delay he would incur a new sin. This subject, moreover, is intimately connected with the duty of eliciting the act of love; for according to a very probable opinion of many theologians, of whom the authority is recognized and approved by St. Alphonsus, we are bound to elicit at least once a month an act of love, because we should keep God’s commands either not at all or at least with great difficulty if we failed for so long a time to elicit such an act, and if we were so little solicitous about our duty of loving God. It is impossible to make an act of perfect love without bewailing one’s sins by which a God so infinitely worthy of love has been offended. Hence St. Alphonsus in his practical directions to confessors says:[139] “The duty of making an act of contrition is urgent when one is obliged to make an act of love.”[140]

Since the faithful for the most part are ignorant of any obligation of making an act of perfect contrition within a given time after falling into mortal sin, and, therefore, incur no sin by the non-fulfillment of it, the confessor need not trouble himself to make inquiries about it in the past life of his penitents; indeed he may abstain from instructing them on the existence of such obligation. But he should not fail—without, however, mentioning that neglect means a new sin—to urge his penitents by other motives to return to a state of grace, for the future, as quickly as possible after falling into mortal sin, at least by an act of perfect contrition, and, if occasion offer, by going to confession. Sad experience shows that one fall into mortal sin is very soon followed by others.[141]

Finally, there is an obligation (_per accidens_) to awaken perfect contrition when one has to exercise some act for which a state of grace is required and the Sacrament of Penance is not accessible. A priest, for instance, is in a state of mortal sin and is called upon to administer one of the Sacraments, or one of the faithful has to receive one of the Sacraments of the living and cannot get absolution beforehand. This also holds true if an act of perfect love has to be made; in this case every one is obliged, when there occurs to his mind a mortal sin not yet repented of, to detest the same and to be sorry for it from the motive of the love of God. According to the general opinion of theologians an act of love should be made in the hour of death, whence St. Alphonsus teaches that a dying man who has confessed with only imperfect sorrow should be recommended to elicit an act of perfect contrition, for it is impossible to make an act of love without bewailing the sins from the same motive of love.[142] Finally, this duty is pressing when one is exposed to severe temptations which cannot be overcome while one is in a state of enmity with God.

We would add another observation: Since perfect contrition is so pleasing to God and so helpful to those sinners especially who have fallen seriously, the pastor of souls should seize every opportunity of instructing the faithful and urging them to elicit such acts frequently, especially when they are in danger of death and have no opportunity of approaching the Sacrament of Penance. Children particularly should be taught on this subject, and a good form of the act given to them. They may have need of it themselves in order to be saved from eternal damnation, and they may come to the assistance of their elders at the hour of death; indeed experience teaches that well-instructed children more than once have reminded people in such straits of the act of perfect contrition, and have persuaded those persons to make it with them; finally, what has been learned in childhood will turn out useful to many in their old age.

13. Imperfect Contrition.

The effects of imperfect contrition (_attrition_) are not so great as those of perfect contrition. Imperfect contrition, which excludes the desire of sinning and includes the hope of pardon (this belongs to the sorrow necessary for the Sacrament of Penance), is the proximate disposition which the sinner must have if he is to be justified in the Sacrament of Penance. This is of faith.[143]

Passages almost innumerable of the Holy Scriptures and the Fathers, decrees of Councils and theologians, present this doctrine as revealed by God.[144]

Consequently it is the common and certain teaching of theologians that to receive the grace of the Sacrament of Penance imperfect contrition is sufficient, and that perfect contrition is not of necessity. The Council of Trent declares expressly: “Although imperfect contrition without the Sacrament of Penance is not able _per se_ to restore the sinner to justifying grace, yet it disposes him for the reception of grace in this Sacrament.” The Council is speaking here of the ultimate or proximate disposition which, in union with the Sacrament, suffices for the remission of sin; for it opposes the efficacy of imperfect contrition with the Sacrament to its inefficacy without the Sacrament. Without the Sacrament it cannot produce justification, but disposes towards its reception in the Sacrament; it must therefore produce in the Sacrament this justification, and the disposition of which the Council speaks must be understood of the proximate disposition which is immediately followed by grace; otherwise the contrast drawn between the two would have no meaning.

This conclusion is confirmed when we consider the institution of the Sacrament. Christ’s object in instituting this Sacrament was to restore the baptized to the life of grace; if it did not really confer the grace of justification, it would have been a means frustrated of its end, and would not have the power which it was intended to have; it could not be expected to call for dispositions which of themselves would atone for sin, and this would be the case if perfect contrition were the required disposition. A remedy for a disease would be a poor gift if it could not cure the disease until the latter was already removed. Finally, the Church received the power of the keys in order that it might loose or retain sins; if perfect contrition were required as the necessary condition, the sins would not be remitted by the power of the keys, but by the dispositions of the penitent. Therefore imperfect contrition is sufficient for justification in the Sacrament of Penance.[145]

Since imperfect contrition in union with the Sacrament has the same effects as perfect contrition without the Sacrament, theologians say that the penitent becomes in the Sacrament _ex attrito contritus_; this expression is not to be understood of the act, as though _attritio_ became _contritio_.

Imperfect contrition, as we have already seen, arises from the thought of the hideousness of sin and from the _fear_ of the punishment which God in His justice inflicts on the sinner. The following are the classes into which, according to St. Thomas,[146] fear is divided:—

1. Worldly fear, _timor mundanus_, when man is feared more than God, or when one offends God in order to avoid suffering.

2. Natural fear, _timor naturalis_, the fear of temporal misfortunes.

3. Slavish fear, _timor serviliter servilis_, when one shrinks from sin merely from fear of punishment, and when one is ready to sin again if there were no punishment. Theologians say of such a man: _solum manum cohibet, voluntatem autem non retrahit a peccato_.

Quite distinct from this fear is:—

4. Servile fear, _timor servilis_, when a man fears the punishments which God inflicts on sin, and on that account really avoids and detests sin: _qui non solum manum sed etiam voluntatem cohibet a peccato_, as the schoolmen express it.

5. Filial fear, _timor filialis seu castus_, is the fear of a man who honors and loves God as his Lord and Father, and from that motive avoids sin and loves the law of God. The last two kinds of fear conjoined form:—

6. Mixed fear, _timor mixtus seu initialis_, which is the disposition of a man who fears sin because it offends God and also because it is punished. Hence St. Thomas gives a clear and short account of these last three kinds of fear: Sometimes man turns to God and clings to Him because he is afraid of evil. This evil may be twofold, the evil of punishment and the evil of guilt. If a man turn and cling to God from fear of punishment, this is servile fear; and when it is done from fear of guilt it is filial fear, for children are afraid of offending their father; if, however, it is done from the fear of the punishment and of the guilt, it is then _timor initialis_, which is intermediate between servile and filial fear.[147]

The sorrow proceeding from servile fear is _attritio_, that imperfect sorrow which, when it excludes the desire of sinning and is joined to the hope of pardon, disposes the sinner to receive the grace of justification in the Sacrament of Penance. It may now be asked whether, along with this imperfect sorrow based on fear as its only motive, there may not be required besides, in order to dispose the sinner _proxime_ for the receiving of grace, some sort of love, at least initial, or whether this love be included in that sorrow. On this subject the Council has given no direct answer. In the seventeenth century this question was debated with such heat that Alexander VII (June, 1667), in order to establish peace, forbade, in the strongest terms and under pain of excommunication _latæ sententiæ_, that any of the disputants in this matter should accuse their opponents of heresy. Four distinct views were proposed and defended on this subject:—

1. The first view teaches that sorrow from the motive of fear, as long as it is true sorrow, is quite sufficient of itself for obtaining sanctifying grace in the Sacrament. This sorrow produces hatred and detestation of sin and a return to God’s law, and is inseparable from the hope of pardon. Hence the sinner becomes capable of receiving the grace of the Sacrament. Melchior Canus is the most famous of the defenders of this view, who are called Attritionists because they hold that mere attrition from the fear of the punishments inflicted on sin is a sufficient disposition. They thought that every sort of love was excluded from this contrition based on fear, a position which seems impossible both psychologically and in view of the action of grace; as was evidently the general opinion of the Fathers at the Council of Trent. Instead of the present clause in cap. 4: _attritio eum ad gratiam in sacramento pœnitentiæ impetrandam disponit_, another had been presented to them: _ad constitutionem sacramenti sufficit, ac donum Dei esse ac Spiritus S. impulsum verissimum non adhuc quidem inhabitantis sed tantum moventis quo pœnitens adjutus_ (_cum sine aliquo dilectionis in Deum motu esse vix queat_) _viam sibi ad justitiam munit et per eam ad Dei gratiam facilius impetrandum disponitur_. Since it was urged that men of eminent learning made a distinction between such sorrow and love, the present form of the clause was chosen in order to avoid defining a scholastic question on which the Doctors were not of one mind; by using the word _disponit_ the Council did not wish to mean a sufficient disposition, and to indicate this more clearly it purposely avoided the use of the word _sufficit_.[148]

2. The second opinion holds that the sorrow based on fear is sufficient only when there is joined with it some beginning of the love of God, as our highest good. This view supported by the most eminent theologians rests on solid foundations, and is now the more usual opinion among theologians. That there is nothing in this view opposed to the Council of Trent is clear from what has been said above on this point. In another place in the Sixth Session (cap. 6) there is indirect authority for it, where the Council, in describing the progress towards preparation for the first grace, teaches that the sinner who is disposing his soul for justification must begin to love God as the source of all justice.[149]

Hence as preparation for the first justification of adults a beginning at least of love is required. Now what is required for their first justification in Baptism, that, at the very least, is demanded for the second justification by Penance, since, as the Fathers express it, Penance is a toilsome Baptism, _baptismus laboriosus_; consequently if a distinction is to be made in terms of greater or less, greater dispositions are required for Penance than for Baptism. Moreover, the Council is unmistakably clear in its declaration that what it teaches with regard to the first justification applies equally to the justification by penance.[150]

In the place where the Council treats of the sorrow required as a preparation for the Sacrament of Penance, it speaks of it plainly as the beginning of a new life;[151] such it could not be if it did not include love, or at least the beginnings of love; for since the new life consists in the love of God, the beginning of the new life must of necessity include the beginning of the love of God.[152]

A third reason may be found in the very nature of the subject. According to the Church’s teaching, the justification of an adult means a real conversion, and this of itself includes a beginning of love. By mortal sin man turns from God to the creature; if the conversion is to be real, he must not only turn away from the creature, but also return to God, and that cannot happen without some initial love. Moreover, it is in the very nature of man ever to desire and love something as his highest good, be it the creature, as happens in mortal sin, or the Creator; since by his conversion he ceases to make the creature his sole object and aim, he must direct his desires to God the uncreated good, and so must love God at least as his highest good.

But this love which is required to accompany imperfect contrition in order to make it a sufficient disposition for obtaining grace in the Sacrament, is not the beginning of the _amor benevolentiæ_ or the _caritas perfecta_ or perfect love; for, as has been seen above, any act of contrition proceeding from perfect love in any degree at once restores a man to grace without the reception of the Sacrament; similarly the beginning of perfect love, joined with imperfect contrition, would justify the sinner without the Sacrament.[153] Penance would thus be a meaningless institution. It is rather the beginning of the _amor concupiscentiæ_ or of the _caritas imperfecta_, in which we love God because He is good to us. This beginning of love is included in imperfect contrition, which arises chiefly from the fear of God’s punishments; for Holy Scripture (Ecclus. xxv. 16) calls the fear of God the beginning of love. Hope of eternal happiness is another motive, for, as St. Thomas of Aquin says, when we hope to obtain a benefit from any one we are drawn towards him and begin to love him. Whoever, then, has imperfect contrition and receives the Sacrament in the hope of pardon, already begins to love God as his liberator, his champion, his Lord. No special intensity is required in this love; it need only be the beginning of love, as long as the love is real—and this is called _amor initialis_.[154]

3. A third opinion demands, not a beginning of imperfect love, but perfect love in its first stages, that is, _caritas initialis_. It need not, however, be so strong as to suffice to remove sin of itself, nor need it be independent of other motives, such as servile fear. Such sorrow, however, would be no longer _attritio_, but _contritio_, which in any degree by itself justifies the sinner apart from the Sacrament.

4. The fourth opinion goes yet further and requires that along with _attritio_ there should be not only pure love, but in such measure that of itself it should move the sinner to bewail his sins and give them up. This is of its nature _contritio_, whence the defenders of this last opinion are called contritionists.[155]

This question is not one of mere theoretical interest, but is of highly practical application; for if the acts of the penitent are the _materia proxima_ of the Sacrament, and if it is the confessor’s duty to make certain of the presence of these acts before giving absolution, he must do so also with respect to contrition; for this reason he must study the nature and properties of contrition in order to secure the integrity of the Sacrament.

From this it is at once apparent that the contritionist must proceed differently from the attritionist. The former will, if he is true to his principles, not only investigate whether the penitent’s sorrow for sin be joined with belief and hope of pardon, but also whether that sorrow proceed from the love of God, or at least the beginning of it, which love must be a love of God above all things. This investigation, however, is very difficult, and wearisome to confessor and penitent, at least if the latter be uninstructed. The attritionist, on the contrary, merely inquires whether his penitent has sorrow springing from a motive of faith and the hope of forgiveness; this inquiry offers no difficulty to either confessor or penitent. Once it is established that the sorrow comes from a motive of faith and is joined to the hope of pardon, one may fairly presume and conclude that there is _amor initialis_, so that further investigation is superfluous; for if we hope for good from any one, we have already at least a beginning of love for him.

Moreover, the confessor will observe that since the view requiring a beginning of love with imperfect contrition is more probable than the opposite, _probabilitate externa et interna_, it is also the safer; since, however, in giving and receiving the Sacraments an explicit papal decision enjoins the adoption of the safer view, it is not only of counsel but of precept, strongly binding, to elicit before receiving the Sacrament of Penance together with contrition an act of love, if only initial love. Though the initial love which is comprised in the imperfect contrition is not the love of benevolence or _caritas_, but the _amor concupiscentiæ_, yet _caritas_ is in no way excluded from it, and cannot be excluded without grievous sin on the part of the penitent. Would it not be the sign of a bad disposition if a man were expressly unwilling to avoid sin if it did not deprive him of heaven or lead him to hell? “I do not say,” says St. Francis de Sales on this subject, “that this sorrow excludes the perfect love of God; I say only that it does not of its own nature include it; it neither rejects it nor embraces it; it is not opposed to love, but it can exist without it.”

Thus imperfect contrition disposes the penitent towards perfect love. Any one who desires and hopes to attain so great a boon as the grace of God, all unmerited as it is, will certainly be unable to refrain from meditating on the infinite love which procures him this great grace, and from that he will rise to the love of God for His own sake as infinitely good and lovable. Hence St. Thomas says that whenever a man hopes to get a benefit from God he is led to love God for His own sake only.[156]

We add one more practical observation: The imperfect contrition arising from fear of hell, which excludes the desire of sin, and in which is contained at least virtually the hope of pardon, is quite sufficient to secure the fruit of the Sacrament of Penance; yet we ought to take pains that we have, as far as possible, perfect contrition, not only because this is more pleasing to God, but also because in this way the grace is made more certain and more grace is obtained and a greater measure of the temporal punishment remitted; because we are thus more sure of attaining true and necessary attrition, and finally, because we fulfill in this manner the precept which binds us to make, from time to time during our lives, an act of love. Indeed if a penitent chose to dwell only on the lowest motives of contrition, it would be a sign that his heart was not sufficiently fixed upon God, and there would be occasion for suspecting that there still lurked in his soul an undue affection for sin, curbed only by fear of punishment.[157]

14. The Necessary Qualities of Contrition.

If the Sacrament of Penance is to be received validly and with fruit, the contrition must be real, formal, supernatural, universal, supreme, and sacramental.[158]

1. First of all, the contrition must be real or genuine. Now contrition is, according to the Council of Trent, a grief of the soul and a horror of sin. A sorrow expressed only in words would be a sham sorrow; that would not do: a real sorrow is required. A sorrow merely imaginary, even without guilt on the part of the penitent, in which case his good faith would certainly save him from the guilt of a sacrilege, could not possibly supply for the want of a necessary and essential part of the Sacrament.[159] Hence God’s command by the prophet Joel: _Scindite corda vestra et non vestimenta vestra_—Rend your hearts and not your garments (the sign of mourning; Joel ii. 3). And truly it is meet that sorrow should begin there where sin had its origin, namely, in the heart; for from the heart, as the Scripture tells us, come forth evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, etc.[160]

The contrition must be formal, _i.e._ explicit; a virtual or implicit contrition, such as is contained in another act, say in an act of love or the resolution to confess and receive absolution, is not enough even though it excludes the affection towards sin.

Thus a penitent might conceivably elicit an act of perfect love without making any act of contrition, and then, after confessing his sins, be justified in virtue of the act of perfect love, though he would not validly receive absolution if he confined himself to the act of love. The contrition must be quite explicit, for it is the essential matter of the Sacrament, and virtual matter here would be about as practical as virtual bread and wine in the Sacrament of the Eucharist. Hence it is not enough to say: “I love thee, O my God, above all things, because thou art the sovereign good; forgive me my sins.” Such words are only an act of love and a prayer for pardon, not a formal act of sorrow. The words must be explicit: “I am sorry for my sins.”[161]

Hence we see the error in the opinion held by several of the older theologians, who called attrition any kind of sorrow which did not come up to the standard of perfect contrition by want of an adequate motive of sorrow, or through deficiency of resolution of amendment, or because sin was not shunned as the greatest of evils.

Others besides have conjectured that it was necessary and sufficient for absolution in the Sacrament that the penitent believes he had contrition, _i.e._ that he ought to make efforts to be contrite and to believe that he has perfect contrition; such a putative sorrow, according to them, was sufficient, however distinct it might be from the sorrow of perfect contrition.

Both views are false. If imperfect contrition were only a velleity, instead of being a real horror of sin, it would not be sufficient for the Sacrament, and such sorrow could never be called genuine attrition. On the contrary, any sorrow which has the properties enumerated above is sufficient even if the penitent knowingly confine his efforts to imperfect contrition without aspiring to perfect it.[162]

There were also some theologians who maintained as a probable opinion that the virtual sorrow included in a formal act of love or in a resolution of amendment was sufficient. This view is stigmatized by Suarez as rash, by Vasquez as false. Other theologians, however, consider that this condemnation is too severe.

On this question Reuter[163] remarks that a penitent need not be worried about the formal act of sorrow if he has elicited an act of perfect love while reflecting on his sins (_memor peccatorum_), for it is morally impossible for any one with his sins before his eyes to elicit an act of perfect love of God without detesting his sins. The same may be said with regard to the purpose of amendment, for it is morally impossible to form it without having formal sorrow. This is made clear from the consideration of any practical resolution which is based on supernatural motives; for if the hatred of sin is not yet a formal detestation and sorrow of past sin, it becomes so in any one who reflects that he has been guilty of sin.[164]

2. The sorrow which disposes for the worthy reception of the Sacrament must on the one hand be prompted by divine supernatural grace which begins, accompanies, and perfects the whole work of salvation, and on the other must proceed from some supernatural motive based on faith; for the dispositions required for a supernatural gift must be supernatural. The second condition is more important, for God will certainly give grace to a man to do that which he is obliged to do. Merely natural or worldly love or fear will give rise to natural sorrow; supernatural sorrow springs from a supernatural fear or love of God. The distinction between the two is not merely quantitative but qualitative; they have nothing in common, and no amount of natural sorrow will ever rise to the dignity of supernatural sorrow. Natural sorrow is of no efficacy in the work of conversion. When the prophets exhort to repentance they do not confine themselves to exhort the sinner, “Be converted,” but, “Be ye converted to the Lord your God.” A true penitent was, in their eyes, not one who turned from his sins; they required that he should also turn to God. Sorrow, then, must have a religious character, must be prompted by divine grace, must spring either from fear or love of God.

If sorrow is to have this supernatural character, it must be based on supernatural motives suggested by faith. Faith is the first condition for justification which the Council of Trent demands of the sinner; in addition to this other conditions are laid down, especially the act of hope. These acts need not be formally elicited, but it is required that the motive of sorrow for sin should proceed from faith if it is to be of use for salvation.

We may thus approach the question which, as Lehmkuhl says, many moralists treat with a certain scrupulosity—whether before the Sacrament is received explicit acts of faith and hope must be made, or whether implicit acts are sufficient. Lehmkuhl himself answers the question as follows:[165] To require that the penitent should elicit an act of faith with its formal object explicitly and with deliberation before or apart from the act of contrition is unreasonable; there would be reason for it only in the case of a penitent who had lost his faith by sinning against it. But an act of faith meaning the assent to a proposition of faith which springs from the habit of faith (_assensum in aliquam veritatem ut fide notam ab habitu fidei oriundum_), is rightly demanded since it is otherwise impossible to derive contrition from a supernatural motive. Thus there is no doubt that a formal and explicit act of faith is necessary; but this is certainly present if the necessary contrition be there.

Accordingly St. Alphonsus is quite justified in believing that he can reconcile the divergent views of the theologians by teaching that formal faith is certainly necessary, but not reflex faith: that is a separate and distinct consideration of the grounds of faith. It is just the same with regard to hope; for if a man receive the Sacrament in a genuine spirit of penance in order to get forgiveness of his sins, he is making an act of hope _explicite_ (though not yet _reflexe_, still _exercite_) that God will grant him pardon in the Sacrament through the merits of Christ.[166] All this, however, holds good only for the faithful who are instructed in the things necessary for salvation.

Our faith presents to our consideration many motives for contrition, which, as has been shown above, are reduced to two by the Council of Trent: fear of punishment and hatefulness of sin. This hatefulness may have many forms: the general malice which belongs to every sin (in so far as it is an injury to God our highest good, and rebellion against Him, or ingratitude to God our Father and Benefactor, or infamous unfaithfulness to Jesus our loving Redeemer), or the particular malice which is proper to each sin, since every sin has its own peculiar wickedness and is the opposite to some special virtue. A further motive is found in the sufferings and death of Christ, which may be considered a motive of _caritas_, and the loathsome state of the soul when deprived of sanctifying grace.

Among the punishments which excite us to salutary contrition are first of all the fire of hell, and then purgatory.

All these motives may be called eternal; the pains of purgatory may be numbered among the eternal motives because they begin only when a man has passed from this life into eternity.

It is to be observed that any one of these motives is sufficient to awaken in us true contrition; nor is it necessary that we should choose a motive with which we made acquaintance first by revelation; we know many of these motives as well by reason as by faith; we must only take care that the motive which impels us to sorrow appeals to us not merely from the point of view of reason, but as proposed by faith. If, however, one is moved to contrition by a particular motive, namely, the peculiar malice of some sin even when this malice is made known to us by faith, it is better to add a universal motive either of fear or of the malice residing in all sin, so that the sorrow may not be insufficient or doubtful for any sin which, having escaped observation, was not repented of.

The sorrow which comes from the thought of the temporal sufferings of this life may be regarded as supernatural if these sufferings are looked upon as inflicted by God, as being signs of His anger, and as a sort of foretaste of His eternal punishments if we do not amend. Hence the sorrow which comes from the thought of earthly pains cannot be set down at once and absolutely as supernatural sorrow; the supernatural aspect must be kept in view, and then the sorrow may be regarded as supernatural and sufficient for approaching the Sacrament. Not only reason, but faith also, teaches us that in God’s providence sin has many evil consequences, and that on account of sin God strikes mankind with pains and calamities both private and public. Moreover, the Council of Trent enumerates among the motives of attrition “the fear of hell and of punishment,” and in the punishment we are to understand the pains of this life, for the Council mentions as an example the Ninivites who repented of their sins, moved by fear of the destruction of their city, which had been prophesied by Jonas, unless they did penance; nor are the Ninivites the only instance where God has threatened temporal punishment in order to frighten sinners and move them to penance. Not all theologians, however, admit temporal punishments as motives of supernatural sorrow (among them Vasquez and Toletus); they try to weaken the argument drawn from the Council of Trent by asserting that the Council does not speak of two motives, which apart from one another can give rise to sufficient contrition, but that the words are to be taken conjunctively, so that the fear of earthly punishments must be joined to fear of the pains of hell, since the latter only are made known to us by faith. Our proof is in no way invalidated by this argument; besides, many theologians, and those the most famous, stand by the first view, so that it may be considered as the _sententia communis_. The words of one of them, the eminent Suarez, may be quoted here. He writes:[167] “Hence I infer that such sorrow [as is required for the valid reception of the Sacrament of Penance] must proceed from a divine and supernatural motive. That a temporal and human sorrow is not sufficient is plain from the words of the Council of Trent, and the reason is not to be misunderstood, for such a motive does not deprive the will of the affection towards sin.” And in another place he writes: “Vega (l. 13 in Trid. c. 14) concedes that sorrow based on the fear of other punishment apart from hell-fire is sufficient for attrition. This view is correct if we suppose that the fear is not merely human and natural. Granted that the pains be only temporal, if they are considered as inflicted by God, as proclaiming God’s anger, as being a foretaste in some way of the divine punishments in the next life if we do not reform, they can move us to a supernatural sorrow which may fairly be classed with the sorrow which is based on the fear of hell; thus we exercise the virtue of Christian hope when we look to God for temporal benefits in so far as they affect in any way our eternal life or fall under the special and supernatural providence of God.”

Since, however, the negative proposition denying the efficacy of sorrow springing from fear of earthly punishments for reception of the Sacrament is the safer one and is not altogether improbable, it is the view which must be adopted in practice; so a penitent should not confine himself to the thought of the temporal penalties, but use it to proceed to the consideration of the divine justice as revealed in eternal penalties, “for,” as Lugo expresses it, “this consideration will create the fear of God, who can inflict both one and the other penalty.” This last reflection will certainly move him to a determined resolution to avoid sin as the greatest of evils, and to avoid it even if that involves other suffering. If, however, a man dwell on the thought of the suffering which his sins have drawn upon him, or on the suffering which usually follows in the train of sin, he will not necessarily be induced thereby to resolve steadfastly to shun sin more than any other evil; for it is possible that the avoiding of sin may involve him in greater misfortunes in this life than those which would come from committing the sin; and it is impossible that the fear of a less evil will effectually nerve a man to endure the worse evil. Nevertheless the sorrow and purpose of amendment, if they are to be of any use for justification, must be such as to determine the man _implicite_ to endure all the evils of this life rather than commit sin; and though the penitent is not obliged to reflect _explicite_ on the matter, yet the motive of his sorrow and amendment must be so powerful that, as long as this motive is present, it would compel him to choose any suffering rather than sin. Finally, it may be mentioned that the consideration of the temporal suffering is a powerful weapon in the hands of the confessor to move an obstinate and unrepentant sinner to contrition, and thence to lead him to higher and safer motives.[168]

3. The sorrow must be universal (_universalis_), _i.e._ it must extend to all past sins, at least to those which are mortal. No single mortal sin can be forgiven unless it is repented of, nor without other mortal sins of which one has been guilty being forgiven, for none can be forgiven without sanctifying grace; but sanctifying grace is incompatible with mortal sin, for it is impossible that any one should be at the same time a child of God and the slave of the devil, worthy of everlasting reward and deserving eternal punishment; because “there is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus” (Rom. viii. 1). Hence it is promised in Holy Scripture: “If the wicked do penance for all the sins which he hath committed, and keep all My commandments, ... living he shall live”;[169] and the second Lateran Council says, that a repentance would evidently be useless in which a man left out several sins and repented only of one; for it is written: “Whosoever shall keep the whole law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all.” He who is attached to one sin shall no more cross the threshold of eternal life than one who is addicted to all possible sins.[170]

There are only two ways of attaining universal contrition; one way is to apply special motives of sorrow to each particular sin, the other is to repent of all sins, both the known and the unknown, through a universal motive. This universality does not require that one should reflect on all his sins so as to elicit an act of contrition for each particular sin; this is necessary only if a man confines himself to those motives which of their own nature do not apply to all mortal sins. In practice, however, it is strongly recommended to base the sorrow on universal motives. If, then, a man is sorry for his sins, his mortal sins at least, from a universal motive, and afterwards recalls other sins, he may confess them along with the rest and receive absolution for them without having to make a new act of contrition; this fresh act would be required if his repentance had proceeded from motives peculiar to each sin. Besides there arises at the fresh recollections of his other sins in a repentant sinner a renewal of his sorrow; this renewal is useful, for it insures a more perfect preparation, but it is not necessary.

We must distinguish between the universality of the sorrow and the universality of the purpose of amendment. The sorrow is general when it extends to all sins committed, at least to those which are mortal; the resolution, however, must be to avoid all mortal sins whether they have been committed or not.

If a penitent has only venial sins to confess, the sorrow need not be universal; it must have, however, the other properties.[171] Since venial sin may coexist in the soul along with sanctifying grace, the love of God is not lost, and since one venial sin may be forgiven apart from others, it is enough in preparing for confession to make an act of sorrow for one or other of the venial sins. Of course in such a case only those sins are forgiven which are repented of; nor is it incompatible with the essence of venial sin that a man should be really sorry for one, especially if it be peculiarly vile, without being sorry for the rest.

Still, the penitent should exert himself to be sorry for all the venial sins of which he accuses himself. It is no sin to confess venial sins for which one is not sorry, so long as _materia sufficiens_ for which there is actual sorrow is offered to the power of the keys. It may be assumed that the penitent, confessing venial sins for which he is not sorry, does not care to be absolved from them; from these the confessor does not intend to absolve. Reasons may exist for confessing venial sins for which there is no real sorrow, _e.g._ in order to practice humility, to be better known and guided by one’s confessor, etc.[172]

4. The sorrow must be a sorrow surpassing all other sorrow (_sovereign_, _supreme_) which shrinks from past sin as a greater evil than any in the world, so that a man is prepared to forego every good and suffer any evil rather than fall into sin again. This sorrow must be supreme _appretiative_. Yet it is not required that the sensible feeling of pain should be infinitely great or surpassing all other pain; nor is it necessary that the heart should feel more keenly, or be more disturbed, or be more cast down than it would be by some earthly suffering or loss which should appeal more immediately to the sensitive faculties. Thus a man may experience a more intense and lively sorrow for temporal losses, such as the death of a dear friend or relation, and yet his contrition may be appreciatively much greater. Of this he would give ample proof if he were disposed to avoid sin, even though the sin could make good his losses. Hence it is not by the acuteness of the sensible suffering that sorrow for sin must surpass other pain, but by the displeasure at past sin and the determination of the will to endure all kinds of suffering and every temporal calamity and evil rather than consent to a single mortal sin. The sorrow for sin must therefore be appreciatively sovereign, not necessarily intensively so. The intensity makes no change whatever in the substance of an act. Though contrition is usually the more perfect the more intense it is, yet the intensity ought not to be aimed at, for it would only prepare the way for scruples; moreover, there is no proof that such intensity is necessary.[173]

Though the penitent must have a greater horror of sin than of any other evil, it is not necessary that he should make a deliberate comparison of it with other evils, and make a vivid picture of each particular misfortune, putting to himself the question whether he is ready to endure it in preference to committing sin. Indeed such a course would be highly imprudent and dangerous and likely to destroy the real contrition and purpose of amendment which he had, as well as to excite an inclination for the sin which he detested. Hence when such comparisons obtrude themselves on the mind of the penitent, he should positively reject them and cling to the absolute and unconditional general resolution of never sinning again, helping himself by the reflection that God’s grace will never be wanting at the right moment, and resolving with the help of that grace never more to sin.[174]

The question whether the sorrow can ever be excessive is already answered from the foregoing. The sorrow which is of the essence of contrition, _i.e._ displeasure at our past sins in so far as they are an injury to God, can never be excessive; the greater our love, the greater must be our displeasure, and love cannot be too great. As to the sensible feeling of sorrow which is not at all necessary for true contrition, this should never be carried so far as to interfere with the duty of self-preservation, though as a matter of course there is little occasion to fear that sensible sorrow will go so far. For the sensible sorrow over a spiritual evil is always somewhat remote and cannot easily be so acute as direct physical suffering or as the pain which comes from a misfortune appealing directly to the senses.[175]

As in contrition there is no definite intensity required, neither is any certain duration; for a man may in one moment elicit an act of perfect or imperfect contrition; it may be quite suddenly aroused by divine grace, as in the case of David when he exclaimed in his sorrow, “I have sinned against the Lord,” or as in the case of St. Peter, who at one glance of Jesus was melted into bitter tears. The moment contrition becomes actual it is sufficient for absolution. In practice, however, the faithful should be urged to spend some time before confession in rousing a genuine sorrow that will answer all demands, by reflecting with the help of God’s grace on the nature of sin and its consequences; moreover, they should be cautioned not to be satisfied with a mechanical repetition of an act of contrition, otherwise the sorrow may be wanting, or at its best be very weak. Yet sorrow is of the highest importance because it is the most essential of the _actus pœnitentis_, the very soul of confession.[176]

15. The Relation of Contrition to the Sacrament.

Finally, the sorrow must be sacramental, _i.e._ in connection with the Sacrament of Penance. For instance, in order that attrition along with the Sacrament may be able to restore a man to sanctifying grace, it must be joined with at least the implicit intention of receiving the Sacrament, and coexist virtually with the absolution.

A man who in preparing for confession bewails the sins which he has discovered in examining his conscience, makes an act of contrition _ex intentione implicita_ of receiving the Sacrament. If, however, his sorrow is expressed without any intention of receiving the Sacrament or without any thought of confession, he must renew his act of sorrow in order to be sure of receiving absolution validly, unless he afterwards decides to go to confession in consequence of the still virtually enduring contrition, so that his confession proceeds from his sorrow. Hence the following conclusions are drawn:—

I. An act of contrition made without reference to the receiving of absolution makes the validity of the absolution doubtful.

II. It is not necessary, however, that the penitent should make the act of contrition in consequence of his resolution to go to confession. This is the usual practice, it is true, and certainly a very good one, but it is enough if by his contrition he be moved to make his confession, and if he thus unite his sorrow, still persevering, with the sacramental act. It is also sufficient if the penitent makes an act of sorrow in the interval between the confession of his sins and the giving of the absolution.[177]

The reason for making these demands upon the penitent is that the acts of the penitent are not only an interior preparation for, but they are the _materia ex qua_ of, the Sacrament. The sorrow, therefore, must be brought into relation to the Sacrament; and since this doctrine is probable and is the common teaching, this relation must be established in practice at least _ante factum_, _i.e._ the confessor must before giving absolution take care that the penitent makes his act of sorrow with a view to the Sacrament.

Hence the question amounts really to this: What relation is demanded between the act of sorrow and the Sacrament? not whether such a relation be necessary; for, on the one hand, it cannot be defended with any probability that such relation is unnecessary, and, on the other hand, it is not in accordance with either truth or prudence that the penitent, before making the act of contrition, should establish its relation to the confession or be obliged to have the intention of receiving the Sacrament.

Some sort of bond, however, must exist between the contrition and the Sacrament. It is false to infer from the Catholic teaching of the Council of Trent that the eliciting of the act of sorrow or _dolor in fieri_, as it is called, is the _materia proxima_ of the Sacrament; it is rather the sorrow already elicited or the _dolor in facto esse_, which is the matter of the Sacrament; it is not in or by itself _proxima materia_: it becomes so by means of the confession and in union with the confession. That sorrow is sufficient which coexists in any way with the will of receiving the Sacrament. In other words, the sorrow must _inform_ the confession, _i.e._ make the accusation a penitent or sorrowful confession, and apt to effect a reconciliation with God. If then the sorrow coexists in any way with the confession and is referred to it, that sorrow constitutes _proxime_ the matter of the Sacrament and there is no necessity for the penitent to have the intention of confessing before making the act of contrition. In a similar way water is the matter of Baptism; it is not necessary that the water should be procured with the intention of conferring the Sacrament; it is quite enough to take the water which comes to hand and to apply it to the sacramental use. Now there can be no doubt that the sorrow also, though not elicited with a view to the Sacrament, can remain present in some way in the soul, and while so present may later on be brought into contact with and applied to the Sacrament. A man, for instance, who under the influence of his contrition seeks an opportunity of going to confession, or makes use of the opportunity of going which presents itself, has certainly not lost his contrition; he has it rather in greater abundance, though he reflects no more on his sorrow, nor even retains any certain recollection of it afterwards.

Lacroix has no sufficient reason for demanding that sorrow must be aroused with the view of going to confession, saying that otherwise the sorrow would not be a sacramental act, just as the pouring of water made without the intention of baptizing, though referred immediately afterwards to the baptismal act and the form added, is not a sacramental function. The comparison, we answer, is not to the point, for the sorrow is not _in et per se materia proxima_ as is the pouring of the water in Baptism. If, however, a man poured out the water with some other intention, and then still in the act of pouring formed the intention of baptizing, the Baptism would be valid. The same argument holds for penance; hence that sorrow is sufficient which coexists in any way with the wish to receive the Sacrament.

In the case quoted above where the penitent first confesses his sins and then makes his act of sorrow before receiving the Sacrament, or when he is moved to contrition by the words of his confessor, a difficulty may arise, since the confession must be a sorrowful one. Such an enumeration of the sins cannot, of course, be considered as informed by sorrow; the humble demand for absolution, however, takes up the accusation again and perfects it; and makes it _materia proxima_ of the Sacrament.

If, on the contrary, the sorrow has been elicited with no idea at all of confessing the sin, there is reason for doubting whether an act so completely independent of the confession will become _materia_ of the Sacrament. Absolution cannot be demanded in face of the probability of such an essential defect; yet one can hardly acquire sufficient certainty of the existence of such defect to make the repetition of the confession obligatory.[178]

III. The sorrow must coexist at least virtually with the absolution if it is to be sacramental. This virtual coexistence is secured if the sorrow is excited immediately before the accusation or the absolution, or even one, two, or four hours before confession; and St. Alphonsus admits that real sorrow may last one or two days and still be sufficient for absolution, when it comes from the desire of being reconciled with God, or when it urges a man to go to confession in order to avoid the sins along with the occasion of them. On the other hand, a sorrow removed by so long an interval would not be sufficient for valid absolution if the confession were made out of mere devotion, or in fulfilment of a vow, or for some similar reason. In these latter instances one or two hours is the widest limit which could be assigned for the virtual duration of the contrition. Hence we must condemn the teaching of some moralists that the act of sorrow endures over an unlimited time, and that it is quite sufficient if it is not retracted in the interval. Of course the act of contrition loses completely all its value for absolution by any retraction; and sorrow is retracted expressly by any new complacency in the sin or by any fresh mortal sin.

The reasons for the doctrine just given have already been laid down in the preceding paragraphs on the relation between contrition and absolution. The theologians fall back in particular on the analogy between the civil and sacramental tribunals. As in a civil process some time may elapse between the hearing of the case and the passing of the sentence without invalidating the sentence, so some interval may elapse between the sorrow and the absolution by which sentence is pronounced; this delay, however, must not be too long.[179]

In practice the priest must teach the faithful and insist on their renewing the act of sorrow immediately before confession, if it is some time since they made it, and also on a due amount of time being given to eliciting contrition, since the fruit of the Sacrament is more abundant in proportion to the care taken in preparing for it.

In the case, however, where confession has been made with genuine sorrow but without the necessary reference to the Sacrament, the penitent should not be obliged to repeat the confession, for the other view with regard to the sorrow, that it is not _materia sacramenti_, but only a disposition on the part of the penitent, is not altogether without probability; besides it is scarcely probable that the former act of contrition has not been renewed when the man intended to confess, and that it has no sufficient coexistence with the confession, or at least with the intention to confess. Only when there is danger of death or any risk of the penitent dying before receiving absolution again, the safer course, as far as possible, should be adopted; for on such important occasions prudence counsels us to guard against even slight doubts, so as not to jeopardize our eternal salvation.

It is certain, as we remarked above, that the act of contrition is retracted by a fresh mortal sin, and its effect, in consequence, no longer endures. It is not so easy to settle the question, with regard to venial sins, as to whether the sorrow for venial sin based on a universal motive is revoked by a fresh venial sin, or whether the sorrow continues. If it is conceded that the sorrow is revoked, scruples may easily arise if the sorrow has not been renewed immediately before confession. This practice is very good; but not necessary, if the fresh venial sin is less grievous than those which the penitent intended to confess when he made his act of sorrow.[180]

There is still another question to consider. An act of contrition is made, extending to all past sins, those which are forgotten as well as those which are remembered; must this be renewed if the penitent afterwards confesses the forgotten sins and desires a second absolution?

A renewal of the sorrow in this case does not seem necessary, provided that the sorrow in the first confession extended to all past sins, even those which by chance had escaped the memory; for in this case the process was not objectively complete. The sorrow and the implicit intention of receiving absolution were applied to all sins, even those inculpably forgotten; and as the renewal of the sorrow would not be at all necessary if the penitent, after making an act of contrition on universal grounds, recalls just before the absolution some sins forgotten and confesses them before the absolution is pronounced, so it is not necessary in the case mentioned, since it is much the same whether one receives many particular absolutions or a general one embracing all the sins. Such is the view of the greater number of the moralists. Lugo, St. Alphonsus, and Reuter may be mentioned particularly as favoring it; St. Alphonsus calls this teaching _communis_, Roncaglia _moraliter certa_, Sporer, Elbel, and many others _probabilissima_; it has been declared even _indubitata apud omnes_; _pro ea stat_, says Lugo, _communis praxis_. If in this case one or two confessors perhaps insist on the renewal of the sorrow, the greater number agree in acting differently or in suggesting it merely as a piece of advice.

The champions of the other view urge that the case is closed by the first absolution; if then absolution is to be given again, a new _materia proxima_ is required, and even if the sorrow continue, it has no relation to the second absolution. It is easily seen that this is not a strong reason.[181] Yet though the renewal of the sorrow be not necessary for the validity of the absolution, it is advisable to make again the act of sorrow, which is easy to do and certainly increases the grace. The confessor deals prudently with a penitent under such circumstances when he requires him to make a short renewal of his act of contrition.[182]

The doctrine just developed is not only adopted _ex communi sententia_ in the case more or less frequent, where a mortal sin which had been forgotten is confessed immediately after or very soon after absolution, but also in two other cases. For instance, a penitent in immediate danger of death must be absolved after one or two sins have been confessed; after this, if he be still alive, the confession is continued and completed. The other example is when a penitent (a very rare case) is absolved by his superior from the reserved sins only, and from the remaining sins by another confessor.[183]

The result of this doctrine ought not to be, however, that confessors and penitents become less solicitous about contrition for sins already remitted by the Sacrament. It may, however, as Ballerini remarks, be very useful in quieting scruples, especially of those who accuse themselves of venial sins and in addition tell some mortal sin already confessed and absolved; for if there is little ground for doubting the sorrow for past mortal sins in a penitent who has usually only venial sins to confess, and shows by his constant victories over temptation his aversion to mortal sin, yet certain anxious penitents are frequently troubled with scruples about their want of contrition, especially if they happen to hear a preacher who, with a zeal sometimes devoid of prudence, condemns the repeated confession of past sins made without true contrition. Such scruples may be overcome by various means, but especially by the doctrine just given.[184]

To conclude with a few practical questions:—

1. How must the confessor deal with a penitent who thinks he has only very slight contrition? He must first of all not be too hasty in deciding that this penitent is indisposed and without the necessary contrition; there are men whose hearts are so hard and inaccessible to sensible impressions that it is only with difficulty and at rare intervals that they are moved to a sensible sorrow, and such are easily inclined to think that they have not the proper dispositions. The confessor must remember that the feeling of sorrow is not at all required, but that a real grief over the past life and an earnest desire to amend are sufficient; he must satisfy himself that these dispositions are present and cannot demand more. He may, moreover, reasonably assume the presence of these dispositions in the penitent if the latter be willing to listen to warning and instruction, if he has at any time really endeavored to amend, if he is ready to perform the penance imposed, and to carry out other prescriptions of a like nature.[185]

2. When with regard to former confessions the priest wishes to ascertain whether the penitent has had real sorrow, the following points may serve as indications:—

(_a_) If the penitent has made use of the means suggested to him for overcoming the sin.

(_b_) If he has avoided at least the proximate occasions of sin.

(_c_) If the number of sins has become less.

(_d_) If the penitent is convinced that he had real sorrow and purpose of amendment; for it is a first principle in the Sacrament of Penance that the penitent’s word is to be taken, since he is there his own accuser and witness.[186]

The priest must act here with great prudence so as not to frighten away the penitent, and at the same time not to indulge in an indiscreet leniency by which he would himself commit sin and involve both the penitent and himself in ruin.

3. It is not easy for the confessor to discover when the penitent has not real contrition; the following directions, which Cardinal Denoff in his pastoral brought to the notice of all the confessors of his diocese, may be of use:—

(_a_) If the penitent approaches with a proud bearing as though despising the minister of Christ.

(_b_) If he answers with impatience and anger the questions which the confessor is bound to put.

(_c_) If in the course of his confession he constantly makes excuses and accuses others more than himself.

(_d_) If he mentions the gravest sins as though they were ordinary occurrences.

(_e_) If it is evident that he is trying to conceal a mortal sin which the confessor in the course of his examination has detected.

(_f_) If he refuses to accept a penance proportioned to the number and gravity of his sins, and given with all consideration for his circumstances.

(_g_) If he is unwilling to employ the necessary means to reform.

(_h_) If, finally, he belongs to the number of those unhappy sinners who seek ignorant or easy-going confessors, with a view of getting absolution only, without any intention of reforming.[187]

4. If the priest has to deal with an obstinate sinner, he must discreetly unite mildness and severity, but above all pray to God for him, since every good gift comes from the Father of light. He may picture to him God’s great mercy and the love of Jesus to give him courage; or he may try to soften the hardness of his heart by reminding him of God’s justice (cf. S. Alph. Praxis Confessar. cp. I).