CHAPTER XII.

THE ETHICAL TASK UNDER CHRISTIANITY.

The ethical task is to fulfil the moral law, to actualize the ethical ideal in conduct and character. It is to turn obligations into life. It is not enough to know duty, even in completest theory. It must be realized. In its most important and final view, ethics is a question of moral power.

The impotence of the conscience before the moral task has always been an impressive fact. The perception of duty has lacked efficiency for the enforcement of duty. Vision of the right largely fails to secure conformity to it. Even the clearest intellectual discriminations and illuminations of the moral law have often been only as the play of cold light, almost like the aurora of the north quickening nothing into life or fruitage. Here is found the chief point of failure in natural ethics. It has power to dictate, but not to move. It wants an efficient dynamic for overcoming the moral evil that has established itself in human nature and life--evil so positive and dominant as to justify an apostle in representing the better ethical will as disabled: "Ye cannot do the things that ye would." Prof. Flint says: "The wisdom of the heathen world, at its very best, was utterly inadequate to the accomplishment of such a task as creating a due abhorrence of sin, controlling the passions, purifying the heart, and ennobling the conduct."[67]

The aim of Christianity is supremely practical. It seeks to save from sin and bring to righteousness. It wastes no effort for simply speculative results. It comes "not in word only, but in power." Besides its service to morals in confirming and extending our needed knowledge of duty, its greatest ethical service is in supplying the needed dynamic or efficacious force for the realization of the holy life. How does it enable the moral task?

==Completion of the Ethical View.==

=1.= In some degree by the completion of the ethical view itself. The clearer light is forceful and efficacious for a better realization of the moral task. "Knowledge is power," especially knowledge which throws into view the most impressive realities and relations, and appeals with the most cogent motives. By the strong illumination shed upon the general principles of right and virtue, by the definiteness and detail of the instruction and precepts for all situations in life, by the elevation of view in which the moral horizon is widened and extended, so as to show a living brotherhood of every man with every other round the world and a range of moral interests and responsibilities interminable as eternity, by the emphasis with which men are made amenable to God for all moral duties, even those to men, thus vivifying the whole moral consciousness with a sense of a close, unescapable accountability to God the conscience is better enlightened and quickened for its task, strengthened by the fullest certainty and under the vigor of a new inspiration. It has more light for direction; it bears grander motive forces before the will.

==Assurance of Success.==

=2.= By giving assurance of success. In the face of the greatest hindrances and natural incompetence, it certifies an inspiring goal of the moral endeavor. Pointing to redemptive grace, it makes manifest that the administration of this world is not on the side of moral evil, or indifferent to its wrong and blight, but is working for its overthrow, the deliverance of its subjects, and their triumph over it. It proclaims an established and ever-advancing "kingdom," whose consummation will bring all those who, as its subjects, "hunger and thirst after righteousness," triumphantly through and beyond the present militant stage of the moral life into final victory over evil, "a new earth and a new heaven wherein dwelleth righteousness." In this divine assurance that the domination of moral evil, with its anarchy and misery in the soul, is no necessity, that its overthrow is provided for, and that God's government is so in the interest of righteousness and love as to guarantee victory to even the feeblest that in faith appropriate his grace and help, there comes the full inspiration, not only of hope, but of sure success in the moral endeavor. Moral effort is not compelled to be

"Like ships that sailed for sunny isles, But never came to shore."

It has the certainty that

"To him who sides with God No chance is lost."

The moral help thus supplied by Christianity is well illustrated by the contrast which it presents to some other teaching, say as seen in Buddhism, extolled in poetry as "The Light of Asia." This is known as one of "the great religions." It is, rather, a philosophy of life, a directory for conduct. It is an atheistic, or at best a pantheistic philosophy, recognizing no personal God and emptying the idea of Deity of practical validity. It had its origin in a deep and oppressive sense of the evil and misery of life, and aimed at their solution and the way of deliverance. On the basis of the oriental "metempsychosis," with its supposed perpetual re-births, on account of earlier sins, into successive distressful lives, it elaborated, for deliverance, a code of duty pervaded by the ascetic spirit and demanding the severest self-discipline. In many of its separate precepts it rises, indeed, here and there to elevations and beauties of moral idea that seem almost akin to the finest and purest of New Testament inculcations. But whether viewed as a philosophy or a religion Buddhism has no personal God, who loves and values men as his own children made in his own image, and ready to come to their help. It has heard, and in its atheistic cosmos, can hear, no voice of redemption, knows of no manifestation of a loving God for deliverance of his sinful children from their sins and their exaltation to the dignity and happiness of fellowship with Himself. In this despair of help from God, in this dolefully pessimistic view of the world and life, and driven to depend only on self-help, is it any wonder that the moral task is directed, not to the development, elevation and joy of personal life, but to its repression, subjugation, and reduction, so as to bring it, at its earthly close, to Nirvana, extinction of conscious individual existence, as the greatest good! By as much as this theory of despair is suited to atrophy all nerve for the ethical task, and sink personality from its true intended elevation of divine fellowship and excellence into the inanity of unconscious being, by so much does the Christian truth of the assured success and victory of right and goodness in the advancing kingdom of God's grace and eternal love, exalting the worth and force of personality to the highest, inspire and sustain the moral endeavor. "Forasmuch as ye know that your labor is not in vain in the Lord."

Much has been written in late years about "the evolution of the moral life," by writers who seek to account for it through the action of merely naturalistic forces in the human constitution and in its physical environment. The above contrast is suggestive of factors in the problem which many of these writers overlook.

==Religious Interest.==

=3.= By uniting the moral side of life with the religious, and so bringing all the powers of the religious interest in vital help for the moral task. The common false diremption between morality and religion, classifying duties to God as religious, and only duties to fellow-men or self as moral, each standing in isolation, and largely of separate accomplishment, allowing men to be "moral" while repudiating all their duties to God, or "religious" while without a conscience enforcing duty to men, leaves flabby nerve for moral endeavor. All the mighty motives from the Godward side are lost. No quickening force for inter-human duties comes from a consciousness of God and his authority, or the future life. Any view that severs morality from God and is bounded by this world and temporal good, must fail to realize the moral life of man. But the Christian view allows no such separation. It unites the two as two sides of the same life of duty, out of one conscience, with vision of both God and men, and one heart true to the indivisible spirit of right. As religious duties are all moral, as obligations to God, and all moral duties are religious, as due to Him, the Christian consciousness of God must re-inforce and vivify with new efficiency the whole twofold moral endeavor. All the distinctly religious interests and forces, reverence of Deity, repentance before God, gratitude, faith, love, hope, spiritual joy, aspiration, desire of immortality and endless blessedness, thus brought into concurrent action with the Christianly enlightened natural conscience, bring an immensely advantageous condition for the actualization of the ethical life. "To believe in an ever-living and perfect Mind, supreme over the universe, is to invest moral distinctions with immensity and eternity, and lift them from the provincial stage of human society to the imperishable theatre of all being. When planted thus in the very substance of things, they justify and support the ideal estimates of the conscience; they deepen every guilty shame; they guarantee every righteous hope; and they help the will with a Divine casting-vote in every balance of temptation."[68]

==Power of Holy Spirit.==

=4.= By the enlightening and obligating force of the Holy Spirit. This reality is assured both in the teaching of the Scriptures and the testimony of the Christian consciousness. We must distinguish between the simply natural action of conscience and the quickening and helping by the divine Spirit. Revelation fully recognizes the natural conscience and its obligating energy, Rom. 2:15; 1:20. It designates it by the term συνείδησις [Greek: syneidêsis] from σύνοιδα [Greek: synoida], _conscius sum_--a knowing with, _i. e._ a conjoined consciousness of self and of right, or a knowing with God, whose law it discerns. Its natural functions of discernment and imperative are not set aside by the Spirit, but enlightened and re-inforced. His part must not be counted zero. "When the Spirit is come, He will convince the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment," John 16:8. He works through the truth, in and through men's natural faculties. While the Christian's own conscience is acting in its natural functions, it is not acting alone. It is not alone; for the Holy Spirit is there as a quickening and helping power. In this is fulfilled the experience expressed by St. Paul: "My conscience also bearing me witness in the Holy Ghost," Rom. 9:1. This is a Christian conscience, one acting not alone and unaided, but embraced within and filled by the influence of the Holy Spirit. This influence has been well expressed as "like the energy of the sunshine in the fruit."

==Spiritual Regeneration.==

=5.= Through spiritual regeneration and renovation. It is through this profound reality that Christianity accomplishes its great ethical result. It places the principle of holiness, of duty to God and men, in the very heart of human nature and life. It writes the law in the love of the soul.

The divine wisdom of Christianity is marked by the stress which it places upon a purification of the inner life, "the heart," the very fountain of thought, purpose, and conduct. It points to the immoral source of the immoralities of conduct: "Out of the heart proceed murders, adulteries," etc. The remedy must purify the fountain. When this is secured and the law of holiness is established there, the ethical life, in its manifoldness and many-sidedness, comes into realization.

It is thus that the conscience gains control. Its failures result from the strength of opposing passions, desires, and perverted inclination, excited often by temptations without. The affections do not find their centre and rest in God and righteousness. They are irregular, often sordid and misleading. The appetites and passions obscure the moral discernments and resist the moral judgments. There is a law of "sin in the members." The will, which should bow to the direction of the conscience, is swayed by wrong motives. The scepter of the moral faculty is broken by the rebellion of desires at war with right and duty. The faintest whisper of conscience ought to be decisive, but against the imperious ascendency of wrong affections its loudest imperatives prove impotent. But in this moral renovation, giving its "new heart and right spirit," the affections come into harmony with God and all that is good. It is the "writing of the law again in the heart," in the understanding and love. To this new life in the affections, duty becomes a pleasure. The conscience, no longer perplexed and overborne by evil desires, becomes able to assert its rightful authority. The will attains its rightful freedom and power to control efficiently in the domain of righteousness, and to hold the life in the harmonies of right and duty.

Put these different elements of the Christian ethical dynamic together. They aggregate the final moral power. Christianity completes the ethical view, flooding all the principles of right and duty with impressive light. It throws broad and strong illumination over all the moral relations of men, extending the view into the future life, and giving certifying precepts for guidance and support. It gives the inspiring assurance of the triumph of righteousness in the kingdom which God's love is establishing for it. It unites all moral duties under the sanctions and solemnities of obligation to God, and re-inforces them by all the motives and appeals which the religious sentiments and interests address to men. It supplies an exhaustless wealth of truths which give nerve to moral endeavor and are directly convertible into character. And, as expressing the line along which these elements all pass into full effect, by its regenerative action it secures for the innermost sources of conduct a transforming influence which does for the life what making the tree good does for its fruit. Love of right turns convictions of right into character. The efficiency of the conscience no longer stands only in the intellectual judgments, but also in affection for the morally good. With love toward what is good a feebler conscience could sway the life aright. But under this deep inward change, we have clearer moral vision and stronger imperative, together with a transformation of the whole nature into predominant love of righteousness. As the Christian life advances, the principles of duty are more and more established in the heart and conduct as life-forces, and the conscience becomes more and more _de facto_, as it is _de jure_, sovereign for moral obedience. And thus Christianity supplies the divine and sufficient dynamic for the full realization of the ethical life.

INDEX.

Absolutism, Divine, 149-151.

Actions, objects of moral judgment, 183-187.

Affections, benevolent, not supreme, 90-92.

Agnostic tendencies, 81-83, 120-124.

Aim, ethical, in Christianity, 197-198.

Altruism, 154, 161.

Analogy, supports relational theory, 176-177.

Anthropological testimony, 34.

Applicatory moral judgments, 51-52, 67-68, 92-97, 128.

Arnold, Matthew, quoted, 25.

Aristotle, 16, 18, 33, 152.

Assyria, 43.

Assurance of success, quickening to moral endeavor, 220-222.

Aurelius, Marcus, 33.

Authority, moral, belongs not to utility or pleasure, 158-160; nor to "the beautiful," 144; but to "the right," supremely, 79-80, 87-88, 126-136, 158-159, 178-191; to conscience, as discerning the right, 57-58, 86-99, 104.

Bain, Alexander, 121, 154.

Benevolent affections, not supreme, 90-92.

Bentham, Jeremy, 154.

Book of the Dead, 33.

Bowne, Prof. Borden P., 29, 36, 62, 153, 170, 186.

Brahmanism, 32, 142.

Buckle, 43.

Buddhism, 32, 126, 142, 221-222.

Butler, Bishop, 110-111, 154.

Calderwood, 167.

Cato, 33.

Christ, personal embodiment of his own teaching, 203-204.

Christian ethics, completes the ethical view, 198-200; sources of, 200-205; special features of, 205-217.

Christianity, relation of, to rational ethics, 26-27, 196-198; its distinctive teachings, 205-217; affords power for the moral task, 218-227.

Cicero, 16, 33.

Clarke, Samuel, 166.

Cocker, B. D., quoted, 173.

Coleridge, 167.

Confucianism, 32.

Confucius, 141.

Conscience, simple or complex, 37-39; its existence proved, 39-55; its psychological place, 59-62; its nature determined, 62-83; theistic, 79-80, 86-88; supremacy of, 83-92; acts of necessity, 78-80; educable, 104, 199-200; conceivably formed through theistic evolution, 83-85; enlightened by Christian teaching, 198-217; becomes efficient through Christian forces, 218-227.

Consciousness, testimony as to freedom, 108-110; Christian, source for formulation of ethics, 204-205.

Cudworth, 167.

Demerit, import and measure of, 70-72.

Deontology, 16 (note).

Des Cartes, René, 150.

Dividing line between true and false ethical theories, 130-132.

Diversity of moral judgments, 48, 173.

Dorner, Dr., quoted, 150.

Druidism, 32.

Duty defined, 65.

Dynamic, moral, 198, 218-227.

Education of conscience, 74, 104.

Egypt, 43, 126.

Epictetus, 148.

Ethics, defined, 15-17; historically sketched, 17-20; how divided, 21-23; relation to psychology, 23; to natural theology, 24; to Christian theology, 25; partly psychological, 21-22, 59; partly metaphysical, 21-22, 119-120; relation of evolution to, 54-55, 83-85, 132-137; illuminated by Christianity, 196-217; task of, under Christianity, 218-227.

Eudæmonism, 144-153.

Evolution, in relation to conscience, 54-55, 83-85, 132; to objective moral law, 132-137, 154-155.

Fact, the primary ethical, 28-36.

Faculty, as applied to the conscience, 37-38; psychologically described, 62-80.

Failure of utilitarianism, 155-160.

Fallibility of conscience, 52, 92-94, 103-105.

Fatalism, in Stoic virtue, 147.

Feelings, moral, a part of conscience, 72-77; feelings, objects of moral judgment, 187-189.

Flint, Prof., quoted, 218.

Freedom, personal, abridged in ancient nations, 17-18.

Free-will, necessary to moral agency, 66, 105-106; alternative choice, 106-107, 159; proof of, 107-112; excluded by materialism, 112-113.

God, existence of required by moral law, 79-80, 87-88, 135; relation to moral law, 126, 135-136, 149-151, 158, 169, 172, 178-181, 208-215; moral duties due to Him, 169-170, 222-223.

Good, the chief, 143, 145, 146, 148.

Greece, 17, 43, 143-148.

Gregory, Dr. D. S., 166.

Grote, 123.

Grotius, Hugo, 149-150.

Ground of right, the point defined, 139; sometimes confounded with ground of obligation, 138-139; various theories, 140-167; Egyptian, 140; Chinese, 141; Indian, 142; Zoroastrian, 142-143; Greek, 143-148; Roman, 148; Divine absolutism, 149-150; of Hobbes, 151; sympathetic, 152; utilitarian, 152-165; of relations, 165; spiritual excellence, 166; direct intuition, 167; as subjective or objective, 139-140, 168; proximate ground, 168-178; ultimate, 178-181; not in mere "will" of God, 179-180.

Guilt of wrong-doing, 210-212.

Hamilton, Sir William, 121, 122.

Happiness, an end, but not supreme, 161-163; idea of, not identical with that of right, 156; without the moral imperative, 158-160.

Hedonism, 146.

Herbert Spencer, on moralizing effects of intellectualism, 43; on relativity of knowledge, 122; explanation of the moral sentiments, 35, 155.

Heredity and conscience, 83-84.

Hickock, Dr. Laurens P., 166.

Historical witness to the ethical distinctions, 29-31.

History of ethics, glance at, 17-20.

Hobbes, 151.

Horace, 33.

Hume, 152, 154.

Hutcheson, 154.

Imperative, the moral, 65-66, 99, 158, 212-213.

Instinct, not conscience, 57-58.

Intentions, have moral quality, 190; teleological motives, 190.

Intuitional, the conscience perceptions, 60-63, 76, 78-79.

Jouffroy, Theo. Simon, 166.

Judgments, moral, universal, 29; conflict of, 47; agreement, 48-51; primary, 62-67; secondary, 51, 128; not infallible, 52.

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 81; phenomenalism, 121-122; on the ground of right, 167; "categorical imperative," 212-213.

Knowledge, relation of, to moral judgments, 51-52, 59-62, 67-68, 92-93, 95-96, 102-105, 172-175, 205-209.

Lecky, quoted, 157 (note).

Literature, its testimony to the moral sense, 33.

Mansel, Dean, 121.

Marcus Aurelius, 148.

Martineau, James, 88, 174, 223-224.

Merit and demerit, import of, 68-70; measure of, 71.

Metaphysics of ethics, 21, 119-195.

Mill, James, 154.

Mill, J. Stuart, 82, 121-122, 154.

Mohammedanism, 32.

Monism, material, 133-137, 155.

Moral agency, 100-118, 172, 182.

Moral distinctions, fact of, 28-36; faculty of, 37-85; objectively real, 125-126; not made by mental organization, 127; intuitions, 63; immutable and eternal, 127-128.

Moral emotions, 44-47.

Moral Law, perceived obligation, 64-66; theistic, 79-80, 87-88, 135; only for free agents, 136; grandeur of, 129-130; universal, 213-215.

Morality, relation of Christianity to, 197-198.

Moral motives, 73, 75-76.

Moral qualities, predicable of personal beings, 182; external acts, 183-187; feelings, desires, etc., 187-189; hereditary propensities, 189; intellectual activities, 191; intentions, 190; will, 193-195.

Necessitarianism, 112-115.

Necessity, in the action of conscience, 78; in intellect and sensibility, 174-175.

Nemesis, in history, 31.

Newman, Francis, 80.

Nirvana, 142, 222.

Obligation, perceived, 64; felt, 64-65; belongs to moral agent, 65; central in conscience, 65; implies objective moral law, 125-137.

Old Testament ethics, 202-203.

Paley, William, 153.

Pascal, 47.

Peculiarity of the moral perceptions, 40.

Persistence of the moral sense, 48, 64.

Phenicia, 43.

Phenomenalism, 81, 121-125.

Philosophical part of ethics, 21.

Plato, 18, 33, 144, 148, 152.

Plausibility of utilitarianism, 161-165.

Positive Philosophy, 82.

Principles, higher and lower, Dr. Martineau's rules, 174-175.

Presuppositions to responsibility, 102-103, 105-108, 172.

Psychology, relation to ethics, 23; in study of conscience, 59; shows the place of conscience, 59-62.

Quatrefages, 32.

Regeneration, to realize the ethical life, 215-217, 225-226.

Relativity of knowledge, 81, 120-125.

Religion, witness to the ethical distinctions, 31-33; becomes moral obligation, 169-170, 222-223.

Right, rated in value, 160.

Robinson Crusoe, 170.

Roman teaching, 148.

Rome, 43.

Seneca, 33, 148.

Sensibility, the, as related to the conscience, 72-76; to moral agency, 115.

Shaftesbury, 154.

Shintoism, 32.

Skepticism, intellectual, 123.

Smith, Adam, 151.

Smyth, Dr. Newman, quoted, 200, 203.

Society, ethical constituted, 29, 116.

Socrates, 17, 143, 144, 153.

Solidarity of humanity, 164.

Sophocles, 33.

Spencer, Herbert, 35, 43, 122, 157.

Spinozism, 112.

Stoic ethics, 146-148.

Supremacy of conscience, 86-99.

Sympathetic Theory, 151.

Tâoism, 32.

Theology, relation to ethics, 24, 25.

Theoretical and practical ethics distinguished, 21-23.

Universalism of moral law, 127-130, 213-215.

Utilitarianism, 35, 152-164; error of, 155-160; measure of truth involved in, 161-165; evolutionist, 155-156, 159; Lecky on, 157 (note).

Value of the morally good, 160.

Volitions, objects of moral judgment, 193-196.

Wayland, Dr. Francis, 166.

Whewell, 95.

Will, free, 106-112; point of personal responsibility, 194-195.

Will of God, not itself the absolute ground of right, 179-181.

Wollaston, 166.

Wolseley, Lord, 43.

Zoroastrianism, 32, 142.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, Chap. I.

[2] The term Deontology, from τὸ δέον [Greek: to deon], what is due or binding, and λόγος [Greek: logos], discourse, has been used by some modern writers as a fit designation of moral science. Though it has never come into general use, it is etymologically well adapted to express the element of obligation involved in the moral sense. See Krauth-Flemming Vocabulary of the Philosophical Sciences, p. 132.

[3] De Fato, Cap. I, 1.

[4] See Wuttke's Christian Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 69-122.

[5] Wuttke's Christian Ethics, I, p. 95. Int. to Aristotle's Ethics, p. vi (Bohn's Ed.).

[6] Matthew Arnold, Literature and Dogma, Chap. I.

[7] Philosophy of Theism, Harper & Brothers, N. Y., p. 220.

[8] See The Oldest Book in the World, Bibliotheca Sacra, October, 1882 (Vol. XLV). Also C. Loring Brace's The Unknown God (A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York, 1890), pp. 1-40.

[9] Prof. Borden P. Bowne. Philosophy of Theism, p. 216.

[10] History of Civilization, p. 125 (D. Appleton & Co., N. Y.).

[11] Study of Sociology, p. 363.

[12] Fortnightly Review, December, 1888.

[13] See, for instance, Paley's Moral Philosophy, Chap. V.

[14] See Chap. IV, p. 83.

[15] So Hume, Adam Smith, Thomas Brown.

[16] Jeremy Bentham, Jas. Mill, J. S. Mill, Herbert Spencer.

[17] Borden P. Bowne, Int. to Psychological Theory (Harper & Brothers, N. Y., 1887), p. 206. Prof. Bowne thinks, indeed, that this distinction, traced to its roots, depends on "a feeling of approval or disapproval in connection with the aims and principles of conduct," and that the ideal of life and the law of conduct spring out of "this basal feeling." He asserts that "we can only represent the motives and actions to ourselves, and wait for the immediate feeling of approval or disapproval to manifest itself." He maintains that nothing is gained by regarding the distinction as an intuition of the reason instead of a feeling, because, he says, "its universality depends on its content, and not upon its psychological classification." But we may well ask if it really does make no difference whether this distinction, the "ethical ideal," comes as a perception of reality, the action of a knowing power, or as a "feeling" which perceives nothing and to account for which there is no perceived ethical reality, no discernment of the elemental ideas of right and wrong, upon which approval or disapproval can arise and rest. We are entitled to ask: How can there be a feeling of ethical approval when there is no insight of the distinction between moral good and evil? The "feeling" that arises from no perception of anything to approve, or that approves without any perceived principle or law of approval, is blind. It has no standard or reason for an ethical approval. Moreover, Prof. Bowne admits: "As long as they [the aims and principles of conduct] are unrecognized there is no moral life. As long as they are unclearly perceived, there are only the germs of a moral life. When they are brought out into clear recognition, the self-conscious moral life begins."

[18] See Wuttke's Christian Ethics (Nelson & Phillips, N. Y.), Vol. II, pp. 139, 140.

[19] Borden P. Bowne's Int. to Psychological Theory (Harper & Bros., N.Y., 1887), p. 184.

[20] Theism, p. 13. Quoted from William Knight's Essays in Philosophy (Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, 1890), p. 276.

[21] J. Stuart Mill.

[22] "The Crisis in Morals," by Jas. Thomas Bixby, Ph. D. (Boston, Roberts Brothers, 1891).

[23] Prof. Huxley, in one of his latest utterances, puts this point strongly: "The practice of what is ethically best--what we call goodness or virtue--involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence. In place of ruthless self-assertion, it demands self-restraint; in place of thrusting aside, or treading down, all competitors, it requires that the individual shall not merely respect, but shall help his fellows; its influence is directed, not so much to the survival of the fittest, as to the fitting of as many as possible to survive." Lecture at Oxford on "Ethics and Evolution."

[24] See Dr. Martineau's Types of Ethical Theory, II, pp. 5, 99-110.

[25] W. Whewell, Elements of Morality, Sect. 275.

[26] The Doctrine of Morality, by Dr. R. B. Fairbairn (Whitaker, N. Y., 1887), pp. 109-113.

[27] This feature is recognized in what is usually termed "formal freedom," _i. e._ that psychical capacity of rational choice which is essentially formative of "personality." To lose this would be the loss of personality. Whether the power of free choice between good and evil is impaired in man's corrupt state, being put in bondage or subserviency to a depraved love of sin, is quite a different question.

[28] "Liberum arbitrium habetur, quando positis ad agendum requisitis, potest quis agere vel non agere." Quoted from W. S. Lilly's Right and Wrong, p. 104, 2d Ed., London, Chapman and Hall.

[29] Part I, Chap. VI.

[30] Materialistic evolution, which holds matter as being the energy and cause of all things, leaves no place for free-will, because in truth it leaves no place for mind. For "mind" or "soul" as a real entity or being which thinks, feels and wills, it substitutes mere "mentality" as an effect of atomic or molecular changes in the brain. "Mind," as a self-conscious spirit that itself self-knowingly acts, is repudiated. Nothing is left but a series of sensations, thoughts and wishes that are as truly physically-produced effects as are the varied perfumes of flowers, the fall of rain or the waves of the sea. No selfhood remains in man but the physical organism which, in material causation, gives out the various forms of products or manifestations denominated "mental." But this materialistic theory is not science. It not only stands contradicted by the common judgment of mankind in all ages, but breaks down utterly in the presence of scientific psychology. For this finds among its unquestionable and irreducible facts a real self-conscious subject or self back of the series of thoughts, emotions and volitions, holding all these psychical experiences in its unitary consciousness, and, with its memories of the past, carrying its personal identity through present activity on into the future. The series of mental experiences, in the theory, are independent of each other and dependent only on the brain changes which directly produce them, and thus, by necessity, ignorant of each other. Personal identity, therefore, is full disproof of the theory. For personal identity rests in a single abiding consciousness, in which all separate mental acts are known as its own acts, the materials for memory and comparison. The truth is, that all moral distinctions arise out of the conviction that each individual, in the center of his personality, is a soul, itself determining its rational choices and responsible for the conduct of life.

[31] The contradiction thus involved is well put by Prof. E. D. Roe, of Oberlin, O., in Bibliotheca Sacra, Oct., 1894: "This law (autonomy) pre-supposes the freedom of the will, for without freedom 'oughtness,' 'responsibility' and 'repentance' would possess no significance. Every one, as the necessarians admit, acts under the idea of freedom. Their hypothesis to explain this is, that the subject acts under illusion (necessary illusion, of course). But here an hypothesis is necessary to explain the hypothesis. Why, if necessity is the truth, is the subject necessitated to believe falsity? A very strange truth it is which necessitates itself to be disbelieved." Pp. 656, 657.

[32] See Introduction to the Study of Philosophy, by J. H. W. Stuckenberg, D. D. (Armstrong & Sons, New York, 1888), pp. 321, 322.

[33] Metaphysics, Lect. VIII.

[34] See Dr. McCosh's Defense of Fundamental Truth, Chap. X, 3.

[35] First Principles, Chap. IV, § 22.

[36] Quoted from Dr. McCosh. Fundamental Truths, Chap. X, 3.

[37] This is the old apothem: The _ratio cognoscendi_ is grounded in the _ratio essendi_.

[38] See A. Alexander's Moral Science, Chap. VII.

[39] Brace's The Unknown God (A. C. Armstrong & Son, N. Y.), pp. 1-40; The Oldest Book in the World, in Bibliotheca Sacra, Oct., 1888.

[40] Quoted by Prof. Jas. Legge, in The Religions of China, from Confucius's Doctrine of the Mean (Chas. Scribner's Sons, New York), p. 139.

[41] Wuttke's Christian Ethics, I, pp. 47-52.

[42] Wuttke's Christian Ethics, I, p. 59; Brace's Unknown God, pp. 182-197; S. D. F. Salmond's The Christian Doctrine of Immortality (F. & T. Clark, 1895), Chap. VI.

[43] εὐδαιμονία [Greek: eudaimonia].

[44] Republic X, 613a; Theaet., 176.

[45] See Wuttke's Christian Ethics, Vol. I, Sec. 14, and Martineau's Types of Ethical Theory, Book I, Branch I.

[46] See Luthardt's Christian Ethics (T. & T. Clark), Vol. I, p. 9.

[47] ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν [Greek: homologoumenôs tê physei zên], Diogenes, L. VII, 87.

[48] The quotation, Acts 17:28, is probably from the Phænomena of the Stoic poet Aratus.

[49] See Dr. Dorner's System of Christian Doc., II, p. 14.

[50] See Horace, Book III, Ode III. Sophocles' Œdipus Tyrannus, lines 863-871. Peter Bayne's Testimony of Christ to Christianity, p. 44.

[51] Prof. Borden P. Bowne designates this teaching as "the goods ethics." Principles of Ethics (Harper & Bros.), Ch. I.

[52] Moral and Political Philosophy, Chap. VI.

[53] See pp. 133-137.

[54] Herbert Spencer, Data of Ethics, § 45.

[55] What is Reality? by Francis Howe Johnson (Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston), pp. 475-498.

[56] Lecky, in History of European Morals, says: "In all nations and in all ages, the ideas of interest and utility on the one hand and of virtue on the other, have been regarded by the multitude as perfectly distinct, and all languages recognize the distinction. The terms honor, justice, rectitude, or virtue, and their equivalents in every language, present to the mind ideas essentially and broadly differing from the terms prudence, sagacity, or interest. The two lines of conduct may coincide, but they are never confused, and we have not the slightest difficulty in imagining them antagonistic. When we say a man is governed by a high sense of honor, or by strong moral feeling, we do not mean that he is prudently pursuing either his own interests or the interests of society." ... "There is no fact more conspicuous in human nature than the broad distinction, both in kind and degree, drawn between the moral and the other parts of our nature. But this on utilitarian principles is altogether unaccountable. If the excellence of virtue consists solely in its utility or tendency to promote the happiness of men, we should be compelled to canonize a crowd of acts which are utterly remote from all ordinary motives of morality." Vol. I, Chap. I.

[57] Moral Science (Boston, 1867), pp. 39-44.

[58] Christian Ethics, p. 104.

[59] Borden P. Bowne, Principles of Ethics, p. 113.

[60] B. F. Cocker, Theistic Conception of the World, p. 377.

[61] Types of Ethical Theory, Vol. II, § 15.

[62] Principles of Ethics, pp. 39-40. For a clear exposition of this distinction, see Dr. D. S. Gregory's Christian Ethics, Pt. I, Divis. III, sec. 1.

[63] Martensen's Christian Ethics (General), § 7.

[64] Newman Smyth's Christian Ethics (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1892), p. 3.

[65] Newman Smyth's Christian Ethics, p. 60.

[66] John 1:4; 8: 12; 9: 5.

[67] "Theism," p. 305.

[68] James Martineau, in Nineteenth Century, Vol. I, quoted by Prof. Drummond in "Natural Law in the Spiritual World" (J. Pott & Co., New York), p. 168.

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Transcriber's note:

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