did. Virginia thought it might be necessary to examine the whole code

of law, to reform such parts of it as had been calculated to produce a devotion to monarchy, and to reduce into smaller volume such useful parts as had become too diffuse. A committee was appointed to execute this work; they did it; and the Assembly began in October, 1785, the examination of it, in order to change such parts of the report as might not meet their approbation, and to establish what they should approve. We may expect to hear the result of their deliberations about the last of February next.

I have heard that Connecticut undertook a like work; but I am not sure of this, nor do I know whether any other of the States have or have not done the same.

2. The constitution of New Hampshire, established in 1776, having been expressly made to continue only during the contest with Great Britain, they proceeded, after the close of that, to form and establish a permanent one, which they did. The Convention of Virginia which organized their new government, had been chosen before a separation from Great Britain had been thought of in their State. They had, therefore, none but the ordinary powers of legislation. This leaves their act for organizing the government subject to be altered by every legislative assembly; and though no general change in it has been made, yet its effect has been controlled in several special cases. It is therefore thought that that State will appoint a convention for the special purpose of forming a stable constitution. I think no change has been made in any other of the States.

3. The following is a rough estimate of the particular debts of some of the States as they existed in the year 1784:

New Hampshire $500,000 Rhode Island 5,000,000 Massachusetts 430,000 Connecticut 3,439,086⅔ Virginia 2,300,000.

United States' principal of Foreign debt nearly $7,000,000.

The principal of the Domestic debt is somewhere between 27½ millions and 35¼ millions, call it therefore 31,300,000. ------------ $38,300,000.

The other States not named here, are probably indebted in the same proportion to their abilities. If so, and we estimate their abilities by the rule of quotaing them those eight States will owe about fourteen millions, and consequently the particular debts of all the States will amount to twenty-five or twenty-six millions of dollars.

5. A particular answer to this question would lead to very minute details: one general idea, however, may be applied to all the States. Each having their separate debt, and a determinate proportion of the Federal debt, they endeavor to lay taxes sufficient to pay the interest of both of these, and to support their own and the Federal Government. These taxes are generally about one or one and a-half per cent. on the value of property; and from two and a-half to five per cent. on foreign merchandise imported. But the payment of this interest regularly, is not accomplished in many of the States. The people are as yet not recovered from the depredations of the war. When that ended their houses were in ruin, their farms waste, themselves distressed for clothing and necessaries for their households. They cannot as yet, therefore, bear heavy taxes. For the payment of the principal no final measures are yet taken. Some States will have land for sale, the produce of which may pay the principal debt. Some will endeavor to have an exceeding of their taxes to be applied as a sinking fund; and all of them look forward to the increase of population, and of course an increase of productions in their present taxes, to enable them to be sinking their debt. This is a general view. Some of the States have not yet made even just efforts for satisfying either the principal or interest of their public debt.

6. By the close of the year 1785 there had probably passed over about 50,000 emigrants. Most of these were Irish. The greatest number of the residue were Germans. Philadelphia receives most of them, and next to that, Baltimore and New York.

7. Nothing is decided as to Vermont. The four northernmost States wish it to be received into the Union. The Middle and Southern States are rather opposed to it. But the great difficulty arises with New York, which claims that territory. In the beginning every individual revolted at the idea of giving them up. Congress therefore only interfered from time to time, to prevent the two parties from coming to an open rupture. In the meanwhile the minds of the New Yorkers have been familiarizing to the idea of a separation, and I think it will not be long before they will consent to it. In that case, the Southern and Middle States will doubtless acquiesce, and Vermont will be received into the Union.

8. LeMaine, a part of the government of Massachusetts, but detached from it, (the State of New Hampshire lying between,) begins to desire to be separated. They are very weak in numbers as yet: but whenever they shall attain a certain degree of population, there are circumstances which render it highly probable they will be allowed to become a separate member of the Union.

9. It is believed that the State of Virginia has by this time made a second cession of lands to Congress, comprehending all those between the meridian of the mouth of the Great Kanhaway, the Ohio, Mississippi, and Carolina boundary. Within this lies Kentucky. I believe that their numbers are sufficient already to entitle them to come into Congress. And their reception there will only increase the delay necessary for taking the consent of the several Assemblies. There is no other new State as yet approaching the time of its reception.

10. The number of Royalists which left New York, South Carolina and Georgia, when they were evacuated by the British army was considerable, but I am absolutely unable to conjecture their numbers. From all the other States, I suppose perhaps two thousand may have gone.

11. The Confederation is a wonderfully perfect instrument, considering the circumstances under which it was formed. There are, however, some alterations which experience proves to be wanting. These are principally three. 1. To establish a general rule for the admission of new States into the Union. By the confederation no new States, except Canada, can be permitted to have a vote in Congress without first obtaining the consent of all the thirteen legislatures. It becomes necessary to agree what districts may be established into separate States, and at what period of their population they may come into Congress. The act of Congress of April 23, 1784, has pointed out what ought to be agreed on, to say also what number of votes must concur when the number of voters shall be thus enlarged. 2. The Confederation, in its eighth article, decides that the quota of money to be contributed by the several States shall be proportioned to the value of the landed property in the State. Experience has shown it impracticable to come at this value. Congress have therefore recommended to the States to agree that their quotas shall be in proportion to the number of their inhabitants, counting five slaves, however, but as equal to three free inhabitants. I believe all the States have agreed to this alteration except Rhode Island. 3. The Confederation forbids the States individually to enter into treaties of commerce, or of any other nature, with foreign nations: and it authorizes Congress to establish such treaties, with two reservations however, viz., that they shall agree to no treaty which would, 1. restrain the legislatures from imposing such duties on foreigners as natives are subject to; or 2., from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of commodities. Congress may therefore be said to have a power to regulate commerce so far as it can be effected by conventions with other nations, and by conventions which do not infringe the two fundamental reservations before mentioned. But this is too imperfect. Because, till a convention be made with any particular nation, the commerce of any one of our States with that nation may be regulated by the State itself, and even when a convention is made, the regulation of the commerce is taken out of the hands of the several States only so far as it is covered or provided for by that convention or treaty. But treaties are made in such general terms, that the greater part of the regulations would still result to the legislatures. Let us illustrate these observations by observing how far the commerce of France and England can be affected by the State Legislatures. As to England, any one of the legislatures may impose on her goods double the duties which are paid other nations; may prohibit their goods altogether; may refuse them the usual facilities for recovering their debts or withdrawing their property; may refuse to receive their Consuls or to give those Consuls any jurisdiction. But with France, whose commerce is protected by a treaty, no State can give any molestation to that commerce which is defended by the treaty. Thus, though a State may exclude the importation of all wines (because one of the reservations aforesaid is that they may prohibit the importation of any species of commodities), yet they cannot prohibit the importation of French wines, particularly while they allow wines to be brought in from other countries. They cannot impose heavier duties on French commodities than on those of other nations. They cannot throw peculiar obstacles in the way of their recovery of debts due to them, &c., &c., because those things are provided for by treaty. Treaties, however, are very imperfect machines for regulating commerce in the detail. The principal objects in the regulation of our commerce would be: 1. to lay such duties, restrictions, or prohibitions on the goods of any particular nation, as might oblige that nation to concur in just and equal arrangements of commerce. 2. To lay such uniform duties on the articles of commerce throughout all the States, as may avail them of that fund for assisting to bear the burthen of public expenses. Now, this cannot be done by the States separately, because they will not separately pursue the same plan. New Hampshire cannot lay a given duty on a particular article unless Massachusetts will do the same, because it will turn the importation of that article from her ports into those of Massachusetts, from whence they will be smuggled into New Hampshire by land. But though Massachusetts were willing to concur with New Hampshire in laying the same duty, yet she cannot do it for the same reason, unless Rhode Island will also, nor can Rhode Island without Connecticut, nor Connecticut without New York, nor New York without New Jersey, and so on quite to Georgia. It is visible, therefore, that the commerce of the States cannot be regulated to the best advantage but by a single body, and no body so proper as Congress. Many of the States have agreed to add an article to the Confederation for allowing to Congress the regulation of their commerce, only providing that the revenues to be raised on it shall belong to the States in which they are levied. Yet it is believed that Rhode Island will prevent this also. An everlasting recurrence to this same obstacle will occasion a question to be asked. How happens it that Rhode Island is opposed to every useful proposition? Her geography accounts for it, with the aid of one or two observations. The cultivators of the earth are the most virtuous citizens, and possess most of the amor patriæ. Merchants are the least virtuous, and possess the least of the amor patriæ. The latter reside principally in the seaport towns, the former in the interior country. Now, it happened that of the territory constituting Rhode Island and Connecticut, the part containing the seaports was erected into a State by itself, called Rhode Island, and that containing the interior country was erected into another State called Connecticut. For though it has a little sea-coast, there are no good ports in it. Hence it happens that there is scarcely one merchant in the whole State of Connecticut, while there is not a single man in Rhode Island who is not a merchant of some sort. Their whole territory is but a thousand square miles, and what of that is in use is laid out in grass farms almost entirely. Hence they have scarcely any body employed in agriculture. All exercise some species of commerce. This circumstance has decided the characters of these two States. The remedies to this evil are hazardous. One would be to consolidate the two States into one. Another would be to banish Rhode Island from the Union. A third, to compel her submission to the will of the other twelve. A fourth, for the other twelve to govern themselves according to the new propositions, and to let Rhode Island go on by herself according to the ancient articles. But the dangers and difficulties attending all these remedies are obvious.

These are the only alterations proposed to the confederation, and the last of them is the only additional power which Congress is thought to need.

12. Congress have not yet ultimately decided at what rates they will redeem the paper money in the hands of the holders. But a resolution of 1784 has established the principle, so that there can be little doubt but that the holders of paper money will receive as much real money as the paper was actually worth at the time they received it, and an interest of six per cent. from the time they received it. Its worth will be found in the depreciation table of the State wherein it was received; these depreciation tables having been formed according to the market price of the paper money at different epochs.

13. Those who talk of the bankruptcy of the United States, are of two descriptions: 1. Strangers who do not understand the nature and history of our paper money. 2. Holders of that paper money who do not wish that the world should understand it. Thus, when in March, 1780, the paper money being so far depreciated that forty dollars of it would purchase only one silver dollar, Congress endeavored to correct the progress of that depreciation by declaring they would emit no more, and would redeem what was in circulation at the rate of one dollar of silver for forty of paper; this was called by the brokers in paper money, a bankruptcy. Yet these very people who had only given one dollar's worth of provisions, of manufactures, or perhaps of silver, for their forty dollars, were displeased that they could not in a moment multiply their silver into forty. If it were decided that the United States should pay a silver dollar for every paper dollar they emitted, I am of opinion (conjecturing from loose data of my memory only as to the amount and true worth of the sums emitted by Congress and by the several States) that a debt, which in its just amount is not more, perhaps, than six millions of dollars, would amount up to four hundred millions, and instead of assessing every inhabitant with a debt of about two dollars, would fix on him thirty guineas, which is considerably more than the national debt of England affixes on each of its inhabitants, and would make a bankruptcy where there is none. The real just debts of the United States, which were stated under the third query, will be easily paid by the sale of their lands, which were ceded on the fundamental condition of being applied as a sinking fund for this purpose.

14. The whole army of the United States was disbanded at the close of the war. A few guards only were engaged for their magazines. Lately they have enlisted some two or three regiments to garrison the posts along the Northern boundary of the United States.

16. The United States do not own, at present, a single vessel of war; nor has Congress entered into any resolution on that subject.

17. I conjecture there are six hundred and fifty thousand negroes in the five southernmost States, and not fifty thousand in the rest. In most of these latter, effectual measures have been taken for their future emancipation. In the former, nothing is done towards that. The disposition to emancipate them is strongest in Virginia. Those who desire it, form, as yet, the minority of the whole State, but it bears a respectable portion to the whole in numbers and weight of character, and it is continually recruiting by the addition of nearly the whole of the young men as fast as they come into public life. I flatter myself it will take place there at some period of time not very distant. In Maryland and North Carolina a very few are disposed to emancipate. In South Carolina and Georgia, not the smallest symptom of it, but, on the contrary, these two States, and North Carolina, continue importations of negroes. These have been long prohibited in all the other States.

18. In Virginia, where a great proportion of the legislature consider the constitution but as other acts of legislation, laws have been frequently passed which controlled its effects. I have not heard that in the other States they have ever infringed their constitution, and I suppose they have not done it, as the Judges would consider any law as void which was contrary to the constitution. Pennsylvania is divided into two parties very nearly equal, the one desiring to change the constitution, the other opposing a change. In Virginia there is a part of the State which considers the act for organizing their government as a constitution, and are content to let it remain; there is another part which considers it only as an ordinary act of the legislature, who, therefore, wish to form a real constitution, correcting some defects which have been observed in the act now in force. Most of the young people as they come into office arrange themselves on this side, and I think they will prevail ere long. But there are no heats on this account. I do not know that any of the other States propose to change their constitution.

19. I have heard of no malversations in office which have been of any consequence, unless we consider as such some factious transactions in the Pennsylvania Assembly; or some acts of the Virginia Assembly which have been contrary to their constitution. The causes of these were explained in the preceding article.

20. Broils among the States may happen in the following ways: 1. A State may be embroiled with the other twelve by not complying with the lawful requisitions of Congress. 2. Two States may differ about their boundaries. But the method of settling these is fixed by the confederation, and most of the States which have any differences of this kind, are submitting them to this mode of determination, and there is no danger of opposition to the decree by any State. The individuals interested may complain, but this can produce no difficulty. 3. Other contestations may arise between two States, such as pecuniary demands, affrays among their citizens, and whatever else may arise between any two nations, with respect to these, there are two opinions. One that they are to be decided according to the ninth article of the confederation, which says that Congress shall be the last resort in all differences between two or more States, concerning boundary jurisdiction, _or any other cause whatever_; and prescribes the mode of decision, and the weight of reason is undoubtedly in favor of this opinion, yet there are some who question it.

It has been often said that the decisions of Congress are impotent because the confederation provides no compulsory power. But when two or more nations enter into compact, it is not usual for them to say what shall be done to the party who infringes it. Decency forbids this, and it is as unnecessary as indecent, because the right of compulsion naturally results to the party injured by the breach. When any one State in the American Union refuses obedience to the confederation by which they have bound themselves, the rest have a natural right to compel them to obedience. Congress would probably exercise long patience before they would recur to force; but if the case ultimately required it, they would use that recurrence. Should this case ever arise, they will probably coerce by a naval force, as being more easy, less dangerous to liberty, and less likely to produce much bloodshed.

It has been said, too, that our governments, both federal and particular, want energy; that it is difficult to restrain both individuals and States from committing wrong. This is true, and it is an inconvenience. On the other hand, that energy which absolute governments derive from an armed force, which is the effect of the bayonet constantly held at the breast of every citizen, and which resembles very much the stillness of the grave, must be admitted also to have its inconveniences. We weigh the two together, and like best to submit to the former. Compare the number of wrongs committed with impunity by citizens among us with those committed by the sovereign in other countries, and the last will be found most numerous, most oppressive on the mind, and most degrading of the dignity of man.

22. The States differed very much in their proceedings as to British property, and I am unable to give the details. In Virginia, the sums sequestered in the treasury remain precisely as they did at the conclusion of the peace. The British having refused to make satisfaction for the slaves they carried away, contrary to the treaty of peace, and to deliver up the ports within our limits, the execution of that treaty is in some degree suspended. Individuals, however, are paying off their debts to British subjects, and the laws even permit the latter to recover them judicially. But as the amount of these debts are twenty or thirty times the amount of all the money in circulation in that State, the same laws permit the debtor to pay his debts in seven equal and annual payments.

VII.

_Notes on M. Soulés' work._

PARIS, Sept. 13th, 1786.

SIR,--Before the receipt of your favor of the 11th inst. I had written the enclosed short notes on such parts of your work as I have been yet able to go over. You will perceive that the corrections are very trifling. Such as they are, I will continue them, and forward them to you from time to time as I get along. I will endeavor also to answer such of the queries you propose in your letter as my memory will enable me to do with certainty. Some of them I shall be unable to answer, having left in America all my notes, memorandums, &c., which might have enabled me to give you the information you desire. I have the honor to be, with the most esteem and respect, sir,

Your most obedient humble servant.

M. SOULÉS. TH: JEFFERSON.

_Answers to the queries of M. Soulés._

I am unable to say what was the number of Americans engaged in the affair of Bunker's Hill. I am able, however, to set right a gross falsehood of Andrews. He says the Americans there engaged were constantly relieved by fresh hands. This is entirely untrue. Bunker's Hill (or rather Breed's hill whereon the action was) is a peninsular joined to the main land by a neck of land almost level with the water, a few paces wide, and about one or two hundred toises long. On one side of this neck lay a vessel of war, and on the other several gun-boats. The body of our army was on the main land, and only a detachment had been sent into the peninsular. When the enemy determined to make the attack, they sent the vessel of war and gun-boats to take the position, before mentioned, to cut off all reinforcements, which they effectually did. Not so much as a company could venture to the relief of the men engaged, who therefore fought through the whole action, and at length were obliged to retire across the neck through the cross-fire of the vessels before mentioned.

"On the fall of Montgomery and his aids at Quebec, there were present Colonel Campbell and Major Dubois. Campbell, though having the rank of colonel, was only of the staff; Dubois was of the line. The usage of all nations, therefore, authorized the latter to take the command. But it was a case for which Congress had not yet provided. Campbell availed himself of this; and believing, on the sight of blood, that all was lost, ordered a retreat."

The speech to the Indians, in Andrews', page 357, is a little altered and abridged. You will find the genuine one in the Journal of Congress, of July, 1775. I do not distinctly enough recollect the anecdote of the old man's company, related by Andrews, to affirm it in all its parts. I think I recollect in general that there was such a company.

The questions relative to General Thomas, I could only have answered indistinctly from my own memory: but fortunately there came to Paris a few days ago, and will yet continue there a few days, a Colonel Blackden, an American officer of good understanding and of truth, and who was at the latter part of the affair of Quebec. He was at the surprise of Ticonderoga by Allen, and continued with the army until 1781. I have spoken with him on this subject, and find that he possesses treasures of details, which will be precious to M. Soulés. Any day that M. Soulés will do me the honor to come and take a _famille soupe_ with me, (after the 16th instant,) if he will give me notice in the morning, I will ask Colonel Blackden to meet him here, and will make them acquainted. He is perfectly disposed to give all the information in his power to M. Soulés, and whatever he gives may be relied on. To him, then, I shall refer M. Soulés for answers to his military questions, and will wait his orders, recommending despatch, as Colonel Blackden has not long to stay.

The Stamp Act was passed in February, 1765.

What powers the Parliament might rightfully exercise over us, and whether any, had never been declared either by them or us. They had very early taken the gigantic step of passing the Navigation Act. The colonies remonstrated violently against it, and one of them, Virginia, when she capitulated to the commonwealth of England, expressly capitulated for a free trade. [See the articles on the Notes on Virginia, p. 201.] This capitulation, however, was as little regarded as the original right, restored by it, had been. The navigation act was re-enacted by Charles, and was enforced. And we had been so long in the habit of seeing them consider us merely as objects for the extension of their _commerce_, and of submitting to every duty or regulation imposed with that view, that we had ceased to complain of them. But when they proposed to consider us as objects of _taxation_, all the States took the alarm. Yet so little had we attended to this subject, that our advocates did not at first know on what ground to take their stand. Mr. Dickenson, a lawyer of more ingenuity than sound judgment, and still more timid than ingenious, not daring to question the authority to regulate commerce so as best to answer their own purpose, to which we had so long submitted, admitted that authority in its utmost extent. He acknowledged * * * * * that they could levy duties, internal or external, payable in Great Britain or in the States. He only required that these duties should be bonâ fide for the _regulation_ of commerce, and not to raise a solid _revenue_. He admitted, therefore, that they might control our commerce, but not tax us. This mysterious system took, for a moment, in America as well as in Europe. But sounder heads saw in the first moment, that he who could put down the loom, could stop the spinning wheel, and he who could stop the spinning wheel could tie the hands which turned it. They saw that this flimsey fabric could not be supported. Who were to be judges whether duties were imposed with a view to burthen and suppress a branch of manufacture, or to raise a revenue? If either party, exclusively of the other, it was plain where that would end. If both parties, it was plain where that would end also. They saw, therefore, no sure clue to lead them out of their difficulties but reason and right. They dared to follow them, assured that they alone could lead them to defensible ground. The first elements of reason showed that the members of Parliament could have no power which the people of the several counties had not. That these had naturally a power over their own farms, and, collectively, over all England. That if they had any power over counties out of England, it must be founded on compact or force. No compact could be shown, and neither party chose to bottom their pretensions on force. It was objected that this annihilated the navigation act. True, it does. The navigation act, therefore, becomes a proper subject of treaty between the two nations. Or if Great Britain does not choose to have its basis questioned, let us go on as we have done. Let no new shackles be imposed, and we will continue to submit to the old. We will consider the restrictions on our commerce, now actually existing, as compensations yielded by us for the protection and privileges we actually enjoy, only trusting that if Great Britain, on a revisal of these restrictions, is sensible that some of them are useless to her and oppressive to us, she will repeal them. But on this she shall be free. Place us in the condition we were when the king came to the throne, let us rest so, and we will be satisfied. This was the ground on which all the States very soon found themselves rallied, and that there was no other which could be defended.

I will now proceed with remarks on the history. I do not think that M. Soulés mentioned the affair of the Cedars, which happened in April, 1775. This was an affair of no small importance. A committee was appointed by Congress to institute inquiries concerning it, as may be seen by the journal of June 14, 1776. The report of that committee is inserted in the journal of July the 10th, and I can assure M. Soulés, that the facts therein stated were proved unhesitatingly to the committee by witnesses present at the transactions, and who were on watch. I have the originals of that inquiry in my possession in America. The Captain Foster therein mentioned, was afterwards taken with Burgoyne's army, though permitted to go at large on his parole. He was not received into any American company, nor did the British officers, his fellow-prisoners, choose to be seen in company with him--so detestable had been the transaction, &c. Vol. i. p. 324. I have been very well informed, that during all the latter part of the defence, the garrison were obliged to return the cannon balls of the enemy, with which, indeed, the ground was covered, having none of their own left.

Page 325. "Il Peut un Serjent," &c. This particular truly related in Andrews.

Page 5. "Ils en vinrent," &c. See the journal of Congress. That it was on that day put off to the 1st of July. This was done at the instance of the members opposed to it. The friends of the resolution objected, that if it were not agreed to till the 1st of July, they would after that have to frame a Declaration of Independence, and that more time would then be lost. It was therefore agreed between the two, that the resolution should be put off till the 1st of July; and that a committee should be immediately appointed to draw a Declaration of Independence, conformable to the resolution, should it be adopted. A committee was accordingly appointed the next day. On the 1st of July the resolution was proposed, and when ready for a vote, a State required it to be put off till the next day. It was done, and was passed the next day, 2d of July. The Declaration of Independence was debated the 2d, 3d and 4th days of July, and on the last of these was passed and signed.

Page 6th. A "se retirèrent ensuite du Congres." I do not remember that the delegates of Maryland retired from Congress, and I think I could not have forgotten such a fact. On the contrary, I find by the journal of Congress, that they were present, and acting on the 11th, 12th, 17th, 18th and 24th of June.

Page 7. A "la plus grande partie." It should rather be the most important parts.

Page 7, 6. "Les états ferraient encore aujourd'hui partie de l'empire Britannique." M. Soulés may be assured that the submission of the States could not have been effected but by a long course of disasters, and such, too, as were irreparable in their nature. Their resources were great, and their determination so rooted, that they would have tried the last of them. I am as satisfied as I can be of anything, that the conjecture here stated would not have been verified by the event.

Page 14. "Provinces unis," should not this always be "états unis?"

Page 15. "Mais qu'on pouvoir aussi les interpreter," &c. His exact answer was, "That it was true the, &c. might include _anything_, but that might also include _nothing_."

Page 16. "Tant de confiance," &c. Their main confidence was in their own resources. They considered foreign aid as probable and desirable, but not essential. I believe myself, from the whole of what I have seen of our resources and perseverance, that had we never received any foreign aid, we should not have obtained our independence. But that we should have made a peace with Great Britain on any terms we pleased short of that, which would have been a subjection to the same king, a union of force in war, &c. 2. That had France supplied us plentifully with money, suppose about four millions of guineas a year, without entering into the war herself at all, we should have established our independence, but it would have cost more time and blood, but less money. 3. That France, aiding us as she did, with money and forces, shortened much the time, lessened the expense of blood, but at a greater expense of money to her than would have otherwise been requisite.

Page 18. "_L'extremité_ septentrional," &c. I think the word "cotè" would be better adapted than "extremité" to the form of the island.

Page 21. "3000 hommes," inquire of Colonel Blackden.

Perhaps the propositions of Congress to the Hessians may be worth mentioning. See their journals, 1776, Aug. 14.

I will make a general observation here on the events of Long Island, New York, &c., at this time. The maxim laid down by Congress to their generals was, that not a foot of territory was to be ceded to their enemies where there was a possibility of defending it. In consequence of these views, and against his own judgment, General Washington was obliged to fortify and attempt to defend the city of New York. But that could not be defended without occupying the heights on Long Island which commanded the city of New York. He was therefore obliged to establish a strong detachment in Long Island to defend those heights. The moment that detachment was routed, which he had much expected, his first object was to withdraw them, and his second to evacuate New York. He did this, therefore, immediately, and without waiting any movement of the enemy. He brought off his whole baggage, stores and other implements, without leaving a single article except the very heaviest of his cannon and things of little value. I well remember his letter to Congress, wherein he expressed his wonder that the enemy had given him this leisure, as, from the heights they had got possession of, they might have compelled him to a very precipitate retreat. This was one of the instances where our commanding officers were obliged to conform to popular views, though they foresaw certain loss from it. Had he proposed at first to abandon New York, he might have been abandoned himself. An obedience to popular will cost us an army in Charleston in the year 1779.

Page 30. "Une fuite precipiteé." It was a leisurely retreat as I have before observed.

Page 41. "Que je n'ai prie obtener que d'un anglais." Colonel Blackden can probably give M. Soulés good intelligence on this affair. I think I recollect the slaughter on Kniphauser's side to have been very great.