Chapter 9

So seriously did the Lacedæmonians regard this blow that they invited the Athenians to make peace virtually in terms of an equal alliance; but the Athenians were now so confident of a triumphant issue that they refused the terms--chiefly at the instigation of Cleon. Some supplies, however, were got into Sphacteria, owing to the high rewards offered by the Lacedæmonians for successful blockade-running. At this moment, Cleon, the Athenian demagogue, having rashly declared that he could easily capture Sphacteria, was taken at his word and sent to do it. He had the wit, however, to choose Demosthenes for his colleague, and to take precisely the kind of troops Demosthenes wanted; with the result that within twenty days, as he had promised, the Spartans found themselves with no other alternatives than annihilation or surrender. Their choice of the latter was an overwhelming blow to Lacedæmonian prestige.

_III.--Victories of Lacedæmon_

The capture of the island of Cythera in the next summer gave the Athenians a second strong station from which they could constantly menace the Peloponnese. On the other hand, in this year the Sicilians were awakening to the fact that Athens was not playing a disinterested part on behalf of the Ionian states, but was dreaming of a Sicilian empire. At a sort of peace congress, Hermocrates of Syracuse successfully urged all Sicilians to compose their quarrels on the basis of _uti possidetis,_ and thus deprive the Athenians of any excuse for remaining. Thus for the time Athenian aspirations in that quarter were checked.

At Megara this year the dissensions of the oligarchical and popular factions almost resulted in its capture by the Athenians. The Lacedæmonian Brasidas, however--who had distinguished himself at Pylos--effected an entry, so that the oligarchical and Peloponnesian party became permanently established in power. The most important operations were now in two fields. Brasidas made a dash through Thessaly into Macedonia, in alliance with Perdiccas of Macedon, with the hope of stirring the cities of Chalcidice to throw off the Athenian yoke; and the democrats of Boeotia intrigued with Athens to assist in a general revolution. Owing partly to misunderstandings and partly to treachery, the Boeotian democrats failed to carry out their programme, the Athenians were defeated at Delium, and Delium itself was captured by the Boeotians.

Meanwhile, Brasidas succeeded in persuading Acanthus to revolt, he himself winning the highest of reputations for justice and moderation as well as for military skill. Later in the year he suddenly turned his forces against the Athenian colony of Amphipolis, which he induced to surrender by offering very favourable terms before Thucydides, who was in command of Thasos, arrived to relieve it. The further successes of Brasidas during this winter made the Athenians ready to treat for peace, and a truce was agreed upon for twelve months. Brasidas, however, continued to render aid to the subject cities which revolted from Athens--this being now the ninth year of the war--but he failed in an attempt to capture Potidæa.

The period of truce terminating without any definite peace being arrived at, the summer of the tenth year is chiefly notable for the expedition sent under Cleon to recover Amphipolis, and for a recrudescence of the old quarrel in Sicily between Leontini and Syracuse. Before Amphipolis, the incompetent Cleon was routed by the skill of Brasidas; but the victor as well as the vanquished was slain, though he lived long enough to know of the victory. Their deaths removed two of the most zealous opponents of the peace for which both sides were now anxious. Hence at the close of the tenth year a definite peace was concluded.

The Lacedæmonians, however, were almost alone in being fully satisfied by the terms, and the war was really continued by an anti-Laconian confederation of the former Peloponnesian allies, who saw in the peace a means to the excessive preponderance of Athens and Sparta. Argos was brought into the new confederacy in the hope of establishing her nominal equality with Sparta. For some years from this point the combinations of the states were constantly changing, while Athens and Sparta remained generally on terms of friendliness, the two prominent figures at Athens being the conservative Nicias and the restless and ambitious young intriguer Alcibiades.

In the fourteenth year there were active hostilities between Argos, with which by this time Athens was in alliance, and Lacedæmon, issuing in the great battle of Mantinea, where there was an Athenian contingent with the Argives. This was notable especially as completely restoring the prestige of the Lacedæmonian arms, their victory being decisive. The result was a new treaty between Sparta and Argos, and the dissolution of the Argive-Athenian alliance; but this was once more reversed in the following year, when the Argive oligarchy was attacked successfully by the popular party.

The next year is marked by the high-handed treatment of the island of Melos by the Athenians. This was one of the very few islands which had not been compelled to submit to Athens, but had endeavoured to remain neutral. Thither the Athenians now sent an expedition, absolutely without excuse, to compel their submission.

The Melians, however, refused, and gave the Athenians a good deal of trouble before they could be subdued, when the adult male population was put to death, and the women and children enslaved. At this time the Athenians resolved, under colour of an appeal for assistance from the Sicilian city of Egesta, deliberately to set about the establishment of their empire in Sicily. The aggressive policy was vehemently advocated by Alcibiades, and opposed by Nicias. Nevertheless, he, with Alcibiades and Lamachus, was appointed to command the expedition, which was prepared on a scale of unparalleled magnificence. It was on the point of starting, when the whole city was stirred to frenzy by the midnight mutilation of the sacred images called Hermæ, an act laid at the door of Alcibiades, along with many other charges of profane outrages. Of set purpose, however, the enemies of Alcibiades refused to bring him to trial. The expedition sailed. The Syracusans were deaf to the warnings of Hermocrates until the great fleet had actually arrived at Rhegium.

Nicias was now anxious to find an excuse, in the evident falsity of statements made by the Egestans, for the fleet to content itself with making a demonstration and then returning home. The scheme of Alcibiades, however, was adopted for gaining over the other Sicilian states in order to crush Syracuse. But at this moment dispatches arrived requiring the return of Alcibiades to stand trial. Athens was in a panic over the Hermæ affair, which was supposed to portend an attempt to reestablish the despotism which had been ended a hundred years before by the expulsion of the Pisistratidæ. Alcibiades, however, made his escape, and for years pursued a life of political intrigue against the Athenian government.

Nicias and Lamachus, left in joint command, drew off the Syracusan forces by a ruse, and were thus enabled to occupy unchecked a strong position before Syracuse. Although, however, they inflicted a defeat on the returned Syracusan forces, they withdrew into winter quarters; the Syracusans were roused by Hermocrates to improve their military organisation; and both sides entered on a diplomatic contest for winning over the other states of Sicily. Alcibiades, now an avowed enemy of Athens, was received by the Lacedæmonians, whom he induced to send an able Spartan officer, Gylippus, to Syracuse, and to determine on the establishment of a military post corresponding to that of Pylos on Attic soil at Decelea.

_IV.--The Disaster of Syracuse_

In the spring the Athenians succeeded in establishing themselves on the heights called Epipolæ, overlooking Syracuse, began raising a wall of circumvallation, and carried by a surprise the counter-stockade which the Syracusans were raising. In one of the skirmishes, while the building of the wall was in progress, Lamachus was killed; otherwise matters went well for the Athenians and ill for the Syracusans, till Gylippus was allowed to land at Himera, force his way into Syracuse, and give new life. Nicias was guilty of the blunder of allowing Gylippus to land at Himera, to aid the defence, at the moment when it was on the point of capitulation. A long contest followed, the Athenians endeavouring to complete the investing lines, the Syracusans to pierce them with counterworks. Nicias sent to Athens for reinforcements, while the Syracusans were energetically fitting out a fleet and appealing for air in the Peloponnese. Nicias, in fact, was extremely despondent and anxious to resign; the Athenians, however, answered his dispatches by preparing a great reinforcement under the command of Demosthenes, without accepting the resignation of Nicias. The Lacedæmonians, however, also sent some reinforcements; at the same time they formally declared war, and carried out the plan of occupying and fortifying Decelea, which completely commanded the Athenian territory and was the cause of untold loss and suffering.

Now, at Syracuse the besieged took the offensive both by sea and land, and were worsted on the water, but captured some of the Athenian forts, commanding the entry to the besiegers' lines--a serious disaster. By the time that Demosthenes with his reinforcements reached Sicily nearly the whole island had come over to the side of Syracuse. Before this, the Syracusans had again challenged an engagement both by sea and land, with results indecisive on the first day but distinctly in their favour on the second. At this juncture, Demosthenes arrived, and, seeing the necessity for immediate action, made a night attack on the Syracusan lines; but, his men falling into confusion after a first success, the attempt was disastrously repulsed.

Demosthenes was quick to realise that the whole situation was hopeless; but Nicias lacked nerve to accept the responsibility of retiring, and also had some idea that affairs within Syracuse were favourable. His obstinacy gave Demosthenes and his colleague Eurymedon the impression that he was guided by secret information. And now it became the primary object of Gylippus and the Syracusans to keep the Athenians from retiring. Another naval defeat reduced the Athenians to despair; they resolved that they must cut their way out.

The desperate attempt was made, but by almost hopeless men against an enemy now full of confidence. To the excited, almost agonised, watchers on shore, it seemed for a brief space that the ships might force a passage; the fight was a frenzied scuffle; but presently the terrible truth was realised--the Athenian ships were being driven ashore. The last hope of escape by sea was gone, for, though there were still ships enough, the sailors were too utterly demoralised to make the attempt.

Hermocrates and Gylippus, sure that a retreat by land would not be tried, succeeded by a trick in detaining the Athenians till they had themselves sent out detachments to hold the roads. On the third day the Athenians began their retreat in unspeakable misery, amid the lamentations of the sick and wounded, whom they were forced to leave behind. For three days they struggled on, short of food and perpetually harassed, cut off from all communications. On the third day their passage was barred in a pass, and they found themselves in a trap. On the third night they attempted to break away by a different route, but the van and the rear lost touch. Overtaken by the Syracusans, Demosthenes attempted to fight a rearguard action, but in vain, and he was forced to surrender at discretion with his whole force. Next day, Nicias with the van was overtaken, and, after a ghastly scene of confusion and slaughter, the remnants of the vanguard were forced to surrender also. Nicias and Demosthenes were put to death; great numbers were seized as private spoil by their captors, the rest of the prisoners--more than 7,000--were confined for weeks under the most noisome conditions in the quarries, and finally the survivors were sold as slaves. So pitiably ended that once magnificent enterprise in the nineteenth year of the war.

The terrific disaster filled every enemy of Athens with confident expectation of her immediate and utter ruin. Lacedæmonians anticipated an unqualified supremacy. At Athens there was a stubborn determination to prepare for a desperate stand; but half the islanders were intriguing for Lacedæmonian or Persian aid in breaking free, while Alcibiades became extremely busy.

The first Peloponnesian squadron which attempted to move was promptly driven into Piræus by an Athenian fleet and blockaded. On the open revolt of some of the states, the Athenians for the first time brought into play their reserve fund and reserve navy--the emergency had arisen. While one after another of the subject cities revolted, the Athenians struck hard at Chios, and especially Miletus, and obtained marked successes. Meanwhile, a revolution in Samos had expelled the oligarchy and re-established the democracy, to which the Athenians accorded freedom, thereby securing an ally. In Lesbos also they recovered their challenged supremacy.

Phrynicus now came into prominence as a shrewd commander and a crafty politician, while the intricate intrigues of Alcibiades, whose great object was to recover his position at Athens, created perpetual confusion. These events took place in the twentieth year of the war, and to them must be added a Lacedæmonian treaty with Persia through the satrap Tissaphernes. All the leading men, however, were engaged in playing fast and loose, each of them having his personal ambitions in view. Of this labyrinth of plots and counter-plots, the startling outcome was the sudden abrogation of the constitution at Athens and the capture of the government by a committee of five with a council of four hundred and a supplementary assembly of five thousand--in place of the whole body of citizens as formerly. The Five and the Four Hundred in effect were the Government, and established a reign of terror.

At Athens, the administration thus formed was effective; but the army and fleet at Satnos repudiated the revolution and swore loyalty to the democracy, claiming to be the true representatives of the Athenian state. Moreover, they allied themselves with Alcibiades, expecting through him to receive Persian support; and, happily for Athens, he succeeded in restraining the fleet--which was still more than a match for all adversaries--from sailing back to the Piræus to subvert the rule of the Four Hundred. The more patriotic of the oligarchs saw, in fact, that the best hopes for the state lay in the establishment of a limited democracy; with the result that the extreme oligarchs, who would have joined hands with the enemy, were overthrown, and the rule of the Five Thousand replaced that of the Four Hundred, providing Athens with the best administration it had ever known. A great naval victory was won by the Athenian fleet, under the command of Thrasybulus, over a slightly larger Peloponnesian fleet at Cynossema.

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XENOPHON

Anabasis

Xenophon was born at Athens about B.C. 430, and died probably in 355. He was an Athenian gentleman who in his early-manhood was an intimate member of the Socratic circle. In 401 he joined the expedition of Cyrus, recorded in the "Anabasis," and did not again take up his residence in Athens. The "Anabasis" must be introduced by an historical note. In the year 404 B.C. the Peloponnesian war was brought to a close by a peace establishing the Lacedæmonian supremacy consequent upon the crowning disaster to the Athenians at Aegos Potami. In the same year the Persian king Darius Nothus died, and was succeeded on the throne by his son Artaxerxes. His younger son, Cyrus, determined to make a bid for the throne. He had personal knowledge of the immense superiority of the Greek soldiery and the Greek discipline over those of the Eastern nations. Accordingly, he planned to obtain the services of a large contingent of Greek mercenaries, who had become the more readily available since the internecine struggle between the two leading states of Hellas had been brought to an end. The term "Anabasis," or "going up," applies properly to the advance into the interior; the retreat, with which the work is mainly concerned, is the "Katabasis." The author writes his record in the third person. This epitome has been specially adapted for THE WORLD'S GREATEST BOOKS from the Greek text.

_I.--The Going-up of Cyrus_

Cyrus, the younger brother of Artaxerxes the king, began his preparations for revolt by gradually gathering and equipping an army on the pretext of hostile relations between himself and another of the western satraps, Tissaphernes. Notably, he secretly furnished Clearchus, a Lacedæmonian, with means to equip a Greek force in Thrace; another like force was ready to move from Thessaly under Aristippus; while a Boeotian, Proxenus, and two others friends were commissioned to collect more mercenaries to aid in the war with Tissaphernes.

Next, an excuse for marching up-country, at the head of all these forces, was found in the need of suppressing the Pisidians. He advanced from Sardis into Phrygia, where his musters were completed at Celænæ. A review was held at Tyriæum, where the Cilician queen, who had supplied funds, was badly frightened by a mock charge of the Greek contingent. When the advance had reached Tarsus, there was almost a mutiny among the Greeks, who were suspicious of the intentions of Cyrus. The diplomacy, however, of their principal general, Clearchus, the Lacedæmonian, coupled with promises of increased pay, prevailed, though it had long been obvious that Pisidia was not the objective of the expedition.

Further reinforcements were received at Issus, the eastern seaport of Cilicia; Cyrus then marched through the Cilician gate into Syria. At Myriandrus two Greek commanders, probably through jealousy of Clearchus, deserted. Cyrus won popularity by refusing to presume thereon; and the whole force now struck inland to Thapsacus, on the Euphrates.

At Thapsacus, Cyrus announced his purpose. The Greek soldiers were angry with their generals for having, as they supposed, wilfully misled them, but were mollified by promise of large rewards. One of the commanders, Menon, won the approval of Cyrus by being the first to lead his own contingent across the Euphrates on his own initiative. The advance was now conducted by forced marches through a painfully sterile country. In the course of this, the troops of Clearchus and Menon very nearly came to blows; the intervention of Proxenus only made matters worse; and order was restored by the arrival of Cyrus, who pointed out that the whole expedition must be ruined if the Greeks fell out among themselves.

By this time, Artaxerxes had realised that the repeated warnings of Tissaphernes and others were justified; and as the expedition neared Babylonia, signs of the enemy became apparent in the deliberate devastation of the country. Here Orontes, one of the principal Persian officers of Cyrus, was convicted of treason and put to death.

The army was again reviewed, the whole force amounting to some 100,000 barbarians and nearly 14,000 Greeks; the enemy were reputed to number over 1,000,000, though not so many took part in the engagement. Cyrus now advanced, expecting battle immediately at an entrenched pass; but, finding this unoccupied, he did not maintain battle order; which was hurriedly taken up on news of the approach of the royal forces. The Greeks, under Clearchus, occupied the right wing, Cyrus being in the centre, and Ariæus on the left. The king's army was so large that its centre extended beyond the left of Cyrus.

The Greeks advanced on the royalist left, which broke and fled almost without a blow. Thinking that the Greeks might be intercepted and cut off, Cyrus charged the centre in person with his bodyguard, and routed the opposing troops; but dashing forward in the hope of capturing Artaxerxes, was himself pierced by a javelin, and fell dead on the field. So ended the career of the most brilliant Persian since Cyrus the Great had established the Persian Empire; brave, accomplished, the mirror of honour, just himself and the rewarder of justice in others, generous and most loyal to his friends.

_II.--The Homeward March_

When Cyrus fell, the left wing, under Ariæus, broke and fled. The Greeks had meantime poured on in pursuit of the royalist left, while the main body of the royalists were in possession of the rebel camp, though a Greek guard, which had been left there, held the Greek quarter. Artaxerxes, however, had no mind to give battle to the returning Greek column.

It was not till next day that Clearchus and his colleagues learned by messengers from Ariæus that Cyrus was slain, and that Ariæus had fallen back to the last halting-place, where he proposed to wait twenty-four hours, and no more, before starting in his retreat westward. Clearchus replied, that the Greeks, for their part, had been victorious, and that if Ariæus would rejoin them they would win the Persian crown for him, since Cyrus was dead. The next message was from Artaxerxes inviting the Greeks to give up their arms; to which they replied that he might come and take them if he could, but if he meant to treat them as friends, they would be no use to him without their arms, if as enemies, they would keep them to defend themselves.

Though no formal appointment was made, the Greeks recognised Clearchus as their leader. They fell back to join Ariæus, who declined the proposal to seat him on the Persian throne; and it was agreed to follow a new route in retreat to Ionia, the way by which the force had advanced being now impracticable.

Now, however, Artaxerxes began to negotiate through Tissaphernes, the Greeks maintaining a bold and even contemptuous front, warranted by the king's obvious fear of risking an engagement.

Finally, an offer came to conduct the Greeks back to Grecian territory, providing them, at their own cost, with necessaries. Prolonged delays, however, aroused suspicions of treachery among the Greeks, who distrusted Tissaphernes and Ariæus alike; but Clearchus held it better not to break openly with the Persians. The march at last began along a northerly route towards the Black Sea, the Greeks keeping rigidly apart from the Persian forces which accompanied them, in readiness for an attack.

At the crossing of the Tigris suspicion was particularly active, the conduct of Ariæus being especially dubious; but still no overt hostilities were attempted until the river Zabatus was reached, after three weeks of marching. Here Clearchus endeavoured to end the extremely strained relations between the Greeks and the barbarian commanders by an interview with Tissaphernes. Both men carefully repudiated any idea of hostile intentions, and the Persian invited Clearchus and the Greek officers generally to attend a conference. Not all, but a considerable number--five generals, including Clearchus, Proxenus, and Menon, with twenty more officers and nearly two hundred others--attended. At a given signal all were treacherously massacred; but a fugitive reached the Greek camp, where the men sprang to arms. Ariæus, approaching with an escort, declared that Clearchus had been proved guilty of treason, but was received with fierce indignation, and withdrew.