CHAPTER XXI

TURKEY AND THE BALKANS

‘Now mark me well—it is provided in the essence of things, that from any fruition of success, no matter what, shall come forth something to make a greater struggle necessary.’

WALT WHITMAN, _The Open Road_.

Britain and Turkey—My correspondence with Djavid, 1911—Effect of requisitioning the Turkish battleships—Nominal transfer of the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_ to Turkey—General Situation in the Balkans—Bulgaria the dominant factor—Venizelos offers a Greek alliance—Reasons against acceptance—My letter to Mr. Noel Buxton—Menacing attitude of Turkey—Possibilities of a Greek military attack upon Gallipoli—Difficulties of Greek intervention—Search for an army—Withdrawal of the British Naval Mission in Constantinople—Letter to Sir Edward Grey of September 23—Alternative considerations—Secret Turco-German treaty of August 2—The Turco-German attack on Russia—Ultimatum to Turkey and declaration of war—The bombardment of the Dardanelles forts of November 3—Impending Turkish attack upon Egypt—Naval concentration in the Canal—Repulse of the Turkish attack—Arrival of the Australians in Egypt—The prelude to the Dardanelles—General Survey of the War—The Great Strain—The Sudden Relief—The End of the Beginning.

It is now necessary to describe the circumstances attending the entry of Turkey into the war. In Turkey, as in Greece and all the Balkan States except Serbia, there were two violently conflicting parties—pro-German and pro-Entente. The assiduous courting of Turkey by Germany and the condonation of her most atrocious actions had given the Germans great advantages at Constantinople. In addition the profound instinct of the Turk was to be on the opposite side to his historic and tremendous enemy Russia. Britain, on the other hand, took no trouble to counteract these formidable tendencies. Large sections of the British Press and public denounced the Turk, often with justice, in unmeasured terms, and no foreign policy based on special relations with Turkey could have stood for a day in a Liberal House of Commons. Notwithstanding all this, British influence in Turkey rested on foundations so deep and ancient, and the impression produced upon the Turkish mind by her obviously disinterested course of action was so strong, that at any rate up till the beginning of 1914 she would have welcomed a British alliance. This was the wish not only of the old Turks but of the young Turks. When in the summer of 1909 I had visited Constantinople, I made the acquaintance of the Young Turk leaders and passed several days in the company of Djavid, Talaat and Halil. I also met at the German Manœuvres of 1910 Enver Pasha, with whom I established amicable relations. All these men seemed animated by a sincere desire to help their country to reform and revive, and I could not help feeling much sympathy for them in their difficulties.

In 1911, when Turkey was attacked by Italy and her Tripoli Province seized, I received the following letter from Djavid Bey written on behalf of his friends on the then all-powerful Committee of Union and Progress:—

_Djavid Bey to Mr. Churchill_

_October 29, 1911._

My belief in your sincere friendship for Turkey and the Young Turks leads me to speak of a very important matter to-day.

After the Constitution in Turkey those that believed in the beginning of a close friendship between England and Turkey saw with regret the misunderstanding that prevented it. I need not speak of its different causes here. Only the true friends of England in Turkey never ceased from trying to remove it. The actual circumstances appear to be a good occasion for success. The attack of one of the Triple Alliance Powers on our territory has turned the public opinion greatly against the Triplice. The pro-English statesmen in Turkey and pro-Turkish statesmen in England could profit of this occasion.

Knowing and believing you to occupy an important and influential position among our friends in England, I will beg you to join our efforts using your influence in bringing out this friendship. Has the time arrived for a permanent alliance between the two countries? On what basis could it be attempted? Will you please write me your personal views on the matter? They will be considered entirely personal and unofficial. But I will consider myself happy if we can prepare a possible ground for official purposes.

I commended this matter promptly to Sir Edward Grey, but the danger of estranging Italy—apart from political considerations—made it impossible for him to authorize me to say more than the following:—

_Mr. Churchill to Djavid Bey._

_Admiralty, November 19, 1911._

It is a great pleasure to me to receive your letter, the importance of which I fully recognize. So far as the present lamentable struggle is concerned, we have definitely declared our neutrality; and it is not to be expected that we shall alter a policy so gravely decided. My answer therefore to your question must be that at the present time we cannot enter upon new political relations. In the future the enormous interests which unite the two great Mussulman Powers should keep us in touch. That is our wish; the feeling of British public opinion, as you will have seen from recent manifestations of it, opposes no barrier to that wish, if only the Turkish Government will not alienate it by reverting to the oppressive methods of the old regime or seeking to disturb the British status quo as it now exists; and you and your friends, whom I remember to have met with so much pleasure, should bear in mind that England, almost alone among European States, seeks no territorial expansion, and that alone among them she retains the supremacy of the sea. We earnestly desire to revive and maintain our old friendship with Turkey, which while we retain that supremacy should be a friendship of value.

I must apologise for the delay in answering your letter, which was due to the importance of its nature.

In the years which followed the Young Turks looked towards Germany, and here they were very powerfully swayed by their military instincts and training. They rightly regarded Germany as the leading military Power: many of them had received their military education in Berlin, and they were spellbound by the splendour and authority of Prussian organisation. They saw the Russian giant ever growing to the east and to the north. And if England stood aloof, where else could Turkey find protection except through the German sword? I do not see what else we could have expected. Therefore, from the very beginning of the war I hoped for nothing from Turkey and apprehended much.

The first events of the war obviously added to the tension between the two countries. We had found it necessary, as has been described, to requisition the two Turkish battleships which were building in British yards. The money for these ships had been largely raised by public subscription in Turkey, and their sequestration angered not only the Turkish Government but large numbers of patriotic Turks throughout the country. Moreover, in the struggles which ensued in Constantinople and in the Turkish Cabinet between the Turkish war party and those who favoured neutrality, this episode seemed to have weight.

I did my best, with the approval of the Cabinet, to allay the legitimate heartburnings of the Turkish Ministry of Marine. These efforts were seconded by Admiral Limpus, the Head of the British Naval Mission to Turkey, whose relations with the Turks were extremely good and whose mission had won much esteem. But with the arrival at the Dardanelles of the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_, a new and formidable complication arose. These two ships, which had presented themselves at the entrance to the Straits about 5 o’clock on the afternoon of August 10, were received by the Turkish authorities. They were piloted through a passage in the minefield and proceeded to Constantinople. The British Government had a right to assume that they would be interned and disarmed. In view of the delicacy of the situation, however, it was thought prudent to accept a less drastic solution. The following minutes tell their own tale.—

_August 12, 1914._

Sir Edward Grey.

“_Goeben_” and “_Breslau_”

In all the circumstances, the Admiralty agree that the sale or transfer of these two vessels to the Turkish flag should be allowed, provided that the transference is _bona fide_ and permanent. The essential condition to insist on is that all the German officers and men of the crews of both ships must, without exception, be at once repatriated to Germany under parole not to serve again during the war. We cannot agree to any exceptions being made, whether of officers or skilled ratings, or of the ordinary crew. The British Embassy, assisted if necessary by the English Naval Mission, should assure themselves that all the Germans leave at once, and that the ships are definitely handed over to the Turkish Navy. In these circumstances, the Admiralty would allow the [British] Naval Mission to remain, as requested by the Grand Vizier. The Turks could also be informed that after the war is over, we should be quite ready in principle, and as far as we can now foresee, to transfer one or both of the two ships we have requisitioned to their flag, and that we are quite ready to negotiate with them at the present time in regard to payment of the sums due to Turkey.

W. S. C.

_August 17, 1914._

Sir Edward Grey.

The situation about _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ is extremely unsatisfactory. Their sale to Turkey is probably itself a breach of neutrality. The vital condition of the repatriation of the German complements down to the last man has not taken place; probably the whole of the German crews are still on board, and it is admitted that ‘experts are to be retained.’ Meanwhile, the British Naval Mission has been banished from the Turkish ships committed to their charge, and forbidden to go on board the two ex-Germans. As long as the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ remain in this condition, and until we know that the whole of the German crews are definitely repatriated, we have to keep two British [battle] cruisers, which are urgently needed elsewhere, waiting with other vessels outside the Dardanelles. This is a situation which cannot continue indefinitely.

W. S. C.

* * * * *

The Turkish position could only be judged in relation to the general situation in the Balkans; and this could not be understood unless the dominant facts of pre-war Balkan history were continually borne in mind. The first Balkan war saw Bulgaria triumphantly bearing the brunt of the attack on Turkey. While her armies were advancing on Constantinople against the best troops of the Turkish Empire, the Greeks and Serbians were overrunning the comparatively weakly-held regions of Thrace and Macedonia. The Bulgarians, having fought the greatest battles and sustained by far the heaviest losses, found themselves finally checked before Constantinople, and, turning round, beheld almost the whole of the conquered territory in the hands of their Allies. The destination of this territory had been regulated before the war by treaty between the four belligerent minor States. Adrianople had not however surrendered, and in obedience to the treaty the Serbians came to the aid of the Bulgarian forces, and played a prominent part in the capture of that fortress. Both the Serbians and the Greeks utilised the argument that the war had been prolonged through the need of reducing Adrianople as a ground for claiming to repudiate in important particulars the pre-war treaty, and meanwhile they retained occupation of all the conquered districts in their possession. The Bulgarians were quick to repay this claim with violence. They attacked the Greeks and Serbians, were defeated by the more numerous armies of these two Powers, and in the moment of extreme weakness and defeat were invaded from the other side by Roumania, who, having taken no part in the conflict, had intact armies to strike with. At the same time the Turks advanced in Thrace, and led by Enver Pasha recaptured Adrianople. Thus the end of the second Balkan war saw Bulgaria stripped not only of almost all her share of the territory conquered from the Turks (and this entirely divided between Greece and Serbia), but even her native province of the Dobroudja had been wrested from her by Roumania. The terrible cruelties and atrocities which had been perpetrated on both sides in the internecine struggle that followed the expulsion of the Turks had left a river of blood between the Greeks and Serbians on the one hand and the Bulgarians on the other.

It is possible that no nation ever contemplated its fortunes with more profound and desperate resolve than the Bulgarians at this juncture. All their sacrifices had been useless and worse than useless. All the fruits of their conquests had gone to aggrandise their rivals. They had been, as they considered, stabbed in the back and blackmailed by Roumania, to whom they had given no provocation of any kind. They saw the great Powers, England in the van, forbid the return of the Turk to Adrianople without offering the slightest attempt to make their words good. They saw not only Salonika, but even Kavala, seized by the Greeks. They saw large districts inhabited largely by the Bulgarian race newly liberated from the Turks pass under the yoke—to them scarcely less odious—of Serbians and Greeks. It was in these circumstances that the Bulgarian army, in the words of King Ferdinand, ‘furled its standards’ and retired to wait for better days.

This warlike and powerful Bulgaria, with its scheming King and its valiant peasant armies brooding over what seemed to them intolerable wrongs, was the dominant factor in the Balkans in 1914 and 1915.

* * * * *

On August 19, 1914, Monsieur Venizelos, then Prime Minister of Greece, with the approval which he had, astonishing to relate, obtained, of King Constantine, formally placed at the disposal of the Entente powers all the naval and military resources of Greece from the moment when they might be required. He added that this offer was made in a special sense to Great Britain with whose interests those of Greece were indissolubly bound. The resources of Greece, he said, were small, but she could dispose of 250,000 troops, and her navy and her ports might be of some use. This magnanimous offer, made as it was while all was so uncertain, and even before the main battle in France had been joined, greatly attracted me. No doubt on the one hand it was a serious thing to run the risk of adding Turkey to our enemies. On the other hand, the Greek Army and Navy were solid factors; and a combination of the Greek armies and fleet with the British Mediterranean squadron offered a means of settling the difficulties of the Dardanelles in a most prompt and effective manner. The Gallipoli Peninsula was then only weakly occupied by Turkish troops, and the Greek General Staff were known to be ready with well-thought-out plans for its seizure. Moreover, it seemed to me that anyhow Turkey was drifting into war with us. Her conduct in regard to the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ continued openly fraudulent. The presence of these two vessels themselves in German hands in the Sea of Marmora offered a means of putting decisive pressure on the neutrality party in Constantinople. If we were not going to secure honest Turkish neutrality, then let us, in the alternative, get the Christian States of the Balkans on our side. Could we not get them on our side? Could we not make a Balkan confederation of Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and Roumania? Whatever happened, we ought not to fall between two stools.

Sir Edward Grey, however, after very anxious consideration, moved the Cabinet to decline Monsieur Venizelos’ proposal, as he feared, no doubt with weighty reasons, that an alliance with Greece meant immediate war with Turkey and possibly Bulgaria. He feared that it might jeopardise Greece without our being able to protect her. He was anxious above all things not to foster a Greek enterprise against Constantinople in such a way as to give offence to Russia. And, lastly, he hoped that Sir Louis Mallet, who was in close and intimate relations with the Grand Vizier and the leaders of the Turkish neutrality party in Constantinople, would after all be able to keep the peace. Certainly nothing could exceed the skill and perseverance with which the British Ambassador laboured. It followed from this that we should maintain the very handsome offer we had made in common with France and Russia at the outbreak of the war to guarantee the integrity of the Turkish Empire in return for her faithful neutrality. I naturally conformed to the Cabinet decision, but with increasing misgivings. I still continued to work and hope for a Balkan confederation. I gave the following letter, of which the Foreign Secretary approved, to Mr. Noel Buxton, who was starting for a propaganda tour in the Balkans. Of course in view of our decision about Turkey, it could refer only to the common interests of these States against Austria.

_August 31, 1914._

It is of the utmost importance to the future prosperity of the Balkan States that they should act together. This is the hour when the metal can be cast into the mould. It is only by reclaiming from Austria territories which belong naturally to the Balkan races that the means can be provided to satisfy the legitimate needs and aspirations of all the Balkan States. Without taking Austrian territory, there is no way by which any Balkan State can expand except by internecine war. But the application of the principle of nationality to the Southern Provinces of Austria will produce results so advantageous to the Balkan States that the memory and the consequences of former quarrels could be assuaged for ever.

The creation of a Balkan Confederation comprising Bulgaria, Serbia, Roumania, Montenegro and Greece, strong enough to play an effective part in the destinies of Europe, must be the common dream of all their peoples. The result of this war is not doubtful. Sooner or later, Germany will be starved and beaten. Austria will be resolved into its component parts. England has always won in the end; and Russia is unconquerable. England has been the friend of every Christian State in the Balkans during all their years of struggle and suffering. She has no interests of her own to seek in the Balkan Peninsula. But with her wealth and power she will promote and aid every step which is taken to build up a strong union of the Christian peoples, like that which triumphed in the first Balkan War. By acting together in unity and good faith the Balkan States can now play a decisive part, and gain advantages which may never again be offered. By disunion they will simply condemn themselves to tear each other’s throats without profit or reward, and left to themselves will play an utterly futile part in the destinies of the world.

I want you to make your friends in Greece and in Bulgaria realise the brilliant but fleeting opportunity which now presents itself, and to assure them that England’s might and perseverance will not be withheld from any righteous effort to secure the strength and union of the Balkan peoples.

In the early days of September it seemed highly probable that Turkey, under the influence of the German advance on Paris, would make war upon us and upon Greece whatever we did. I began immediately to prepare for the event.

_Mr. Churchill to General Sir Charles Douglas, Chief of the Imperial General Staff._

_September 1, 1914._

_Secret._

I arranged with Lord Kitchener yesterday that two officers from Admiralty should meet two officers from the Director of Military Operations Department of the War Office to-day to examine and work out a plan for the seizure by means of a Greek army of adequate strength of the Gallipoli Peninsula, with a view to admitting a British Fleet to the Sea of Marmora.

In his absence I would ask you to give the necessary directions, as the matter is urgent, and Turkey may make war on us at any moment.

The meeting can take place either here or at the War Office as soon as you can arrange with our Chief of Staff. I will myself explain verbally to the Committee the subject on which his Majesty’s Government desire information.

The Director of Military Operations, General Callwell, replied on the 3rd, on behalf of the General Staff, that the operation of seizing the Gallipoli Peninsula would be an extremely difficult one. Sixty thousand men would be required, thirty thousand of whom should be landed in the first instance, should gain as much ground as possible, should prepare landing stages, and hold their own for a week while the transports returned to Greece for the second thirty thousand. On this basis the operation was considered feasible. These estimates were not excessive, and the Greeks could certainly provide a considerably larger force if necessary.

Thereupon I telegraphed, with the approval of the Foreign Office, to Rear-Admiral Mark Kerr, the head of our naval mission to Greece, as follows:—

_September 4._

In event of war with Turkey, with England and Greece as Allies, Admiralty consider it essential, as a Staff precaution, that the question of the right war policy to be followed should be examined, in consultation with Greek General and Naval Staff, leaving political probabilities to be decided by respective Governments.

Admiralty give you permission to do this, should you be approached by the Greek Government. In principle, the Admiralty views are as follows:

In order to provide unquestionable and decisive superiority over the German and Turkish vessels, the Greek Fleet would be offered, as reinforcements, a squadron and flotilla, and the whole of the combined Fleets would be placed under your command, with the _Indomitable_ as your Flagship. Should circumstances demand it, you would be reinforced with any class of vessel necessary and to any extent.

In order that the right and obvious method of attack upon Turkey (viz. by striking immediately at the heart) may be carried out, the Greek Army would, under superiority of sea predominance, have to seize the Gallipoli Peninsula, thus opening the Dardanelles and enabling the Anglo-Greek Fleet, in the Sea of Marmora, to fight and sink the Turco-German ships, and from there the whole situation can be dominated, in combination with the Black Sea Fleet of the Russians and their military forces.

The Admiralty desire that, in consultation with you, the Greek Naval and Military Experts should immediately examine this enterprise, and that you should report fully by telegraph to the Admiralty what are the general views of the Greek Government upon it, and what, in their opinion, would be the force required to carry it out, assuming that safe transportation is assured. Should we provide the necessary transports, or in what time and to what extent could Greece do so? Have they any alternative suggestions?

The Rear-Admiral’s reply reached me through the Foreign Office on the 9th.

The Greek General Staff have been consulted on the subject of your telegram, and I agree with them in their opinion that, if Bulgaria does not attack Greece, the latter can take Gallipoli with force at their disposal. Greece will not trust Bulgaria unless she at the same time attacks Turkey with all her force. They will not accept Bulgaria’s guarantee to remain neutral.

Subject to above conditions, plan for taking Dardanelles Straits is ready.

Greece can provide necessary transports for troops. A British squadron of two battle cruisers, one armoured cruiser, three light cruisers and flotilla of destroyers will be needed to assist. General Staff and myself originally formulated this plan, but operation has become greater since Turkey has mobilised and obtained German ships.

He mentioned as an alternative the region of Alexandretta.

On September 6 Monsieur Venizelos told our Minister in Athens that he was not afraid of a single-handed attack from Turkey by land as the Greek General Staff were confident of being able to deal with it. The Greek Government had received from Sofia positive assurances of definite neutrality, but did not trust them. They would, however, be satisfied with a formal protest by the Bulgarian Government against a violation of Bulgarian territory by Turkish troops proceeding to attack Greece. If, however, Bulgaria joined Turkey while Serbia was occupied with Austria, the situation would be critical. On this I pointed out to the Foreign Secretary on the same date that a Russian Army Corps could easily be brought from Archangel, from Vladivostok, or with Japanese consent from Port Arthur to attack the Gallipoli Peninsula. ‘The price to be paid in taking Gallipoli would no doubt be heavy, but there would be no more war with Turkey. A good army of 50,000 men and sea power—that is the end of the Turkish menace.’

But it was easier to look for armies than to find them. Sir Edward Grey replied by sending me a telegram that had been received that very morning from Petrograd stating that in view of the very large number of German troops which were being transferred from the Western to the Eastern theatre, Russia was calling up every available man from Asia and the Caucasus, and was only leaving one Army Corps in the latter. Greece would therefore, according to the Petrograd telegram, have to bear the brunt of the war single-handed unless she could placate Bulgaria by territorial concessions. He added on the back of my note, ‘You will see from the telegram from St. Petersburg that Russia can give no help against Turkey. I do not like the prospect in the Mediterranean at all, unless there is some turn of the tide in France.’

It is only by faithful study of this problem that its immense difficulties are portrayed. Lest it should be thought that I underrated the gravity of a war with Turkey, it must be remembered that I had convinced myself that Turkey would attack us sooner or later, and that I was also proceeding on the belief that the German invasion of France would be brought to a standstill. Both these assumptions proved true. I do not claim that my view was the wisest, but only to expose it to historical judgment. The policy emerging from such a view would of course at this juncture have offered Cyprus to Greece in compensation for her offering Kavala to Bulgaria. It would have put the most extreme pressure on Serbia to make concessions to Bulgaria in Monastir. Whether these measures would have succeeded at this time I do not pronounce.

By September 9 the behaviour of the Turks about the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_ had become so openly defiant that it became necessary to withdraw the British Naval Mission, who were exposed to daily insolences at the hands of the Germans and of the Turkish war party. It was my intention to appoint the head of the mission, Rear-Admiral Limpus, to command the squadron watching the Dardanelles, and orders were sent definitely to that effect. This project was not, however, pursued, it being thought that it would be unduly provocative to employ on this station the very officer who had just ceased to be the teacher of the Turkish Fleet. No doubt this was a weighty argument, but in bowing to it we lost the advantages of having at this fateful spot the Admiral who of all others knew the Turks, and knew the Dardanelles with all its possibilities. It was a small link in a long chain. Delay was caused and I had to make fresh arrangements.

On September 21, I telegraphed to Vice-Admiral Carden, who was in charge of the Malta Dockyard:—

Assume command of the squadron off Dardanelles. Your sole duty is to sink _Goeben_ and _Breslau_, no matter what flag they fly, if they come out of Dardanelles. We are not at war with Turkey but the German Admiral Souchon is now Commander-in-Chief Turkish Navy and Germans are controlling and largely manning it. Turks have been told that any Turkish ships which come out with _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ will be equally attacked by us. You are authorised to act accordingly without further declaration or parley. You must deal at your discretion with any minor Turkish war vessel which may come out alone from Dardanelles, either ordering her back or allowing her to proceed as you may think fit, remembering that we do not want to pick a quarrel with Turkey unless her hostile intention is clear.

_Indomitable_ will be diverted from convoy off Crete and ordered to join your squadron. French Commander-in-Chief has been requested to send 2 battle ships of _Patrie_ class to reinforce your flag.

The victory of the Marne, although afterwards discounted by adverse events, checked the developments in the Near East. Turkey was steadied for the moment, and her attitude towards Greece became less menacing. This however produced a corresponding cooling at Athens about joining in the European war. From the middle of September the conditions throughout the Balkans had declined again from crisis into suspense. They remained however fundamentally vicious.

I continued increasingly to press as opportunity served for a policy of uniting the Balkan States without reference to what might happen in Turkey.

On September 23 I wrote to Sir Edward Grey as follows:—

_September 23, 1914._

_Mr. Churchill to Sir Edward Grey._

I must write you a line about Turkey.... We are suffering very seriously from Turkish hostility. Our whole Mediterranean Fleet is tied to the Dardanelles. We are daily trying to buy Turkish neutrality by promises and concessions. Meanwhile the German grip on Turkey tightens, and all preparations for war go steadily forward. But all this would in itself be of minor consequence but for the fact that in our attempt to placate Turkey we are crippling our policy in the Balkans. I am not suggesting that we should take aggressive action against Turkey or declare war on her ourselves, but we ought from now to make our arrangements with the Balkan States, particularly Bulgaria, without regard to the interests or integrity of Turkey. The Bulgarians ought to regain the Turkish territory they lost in the second Balkan War, and we ought to tell them that if they join with Roumania, Greece, and Serbia in the attack upon Austria and Germany, the Allied Powers will see that they get this territory at the peace. We always said that Adrianople should never fall back into Turkish hands, and the strongest possible remonstrances were addressed to the Porte by you at the time. There is therefore nothing wrong or inconsistent in our adopting this position. If we win the war, we shall be quite strong enough to secure this territory for Bulgaria, and Turkey’s conduct to us with repeated breaches of neutrality would release us from any need of considering her European interests. Like you, I sympathise deeply with Mallet in the futile and thankless task on which he is engaged. I do not know what the result will be, but I am sure it is not worth while sacrificing the bold and decisive alternative of throwing in our lot frankly with the Christian States of the Balkans to get the kind of neutrality which the Turks have been giving us, and for which we are even asked to pay and be grateful. The whole tone of the telegrams from Roumania and Bulgaria is hopeful. I do most earnestly beg you not to be diverted from the highway of sound policy in this part of the world, both during the war and at the settlement, by wanderings into the labyrinth of Turkish duplicity and intrigue. All I am asking is that the interests and integrity of Turkey shall no longer be considered by you in any efforts which are made to secure common action among the Christian Balkan States.

Judged in afterlight these views can hardly be contested. I have never swerved from them; but the reader should understand the other arguments by which the Cabinet was ruled. The loyal desire not to spread the war to regions still uncursed; the dangers in India of a British quarrel with Turkey; our awful military weakness in 1914; Lord Kitchener’s expressed wish to keep the East as quiet as possible till the two Indian Divisions were safely through the Suez Canal; the difficulties of winning the support of Greece, and particularly of King Constantine, without exciting the suspicion and jealousies of Russia about Constantinople; and, lastly, the doubts—admittedly substantial—whether Bulgaria and King Ferdinand could ever, in the absence of substantial military successes in the main theatres or strong local intervention by Allied forces in the Balkans, be detached from the Teutonic system.

When I talked these questions over at the time with Sir Edward Grey it was upon this last argument that he was most inclined to dwell. ‘Until Bulgaria believes that Germany is not going to win the war, she will not be moved by any promises of other people’s territory which we may make her.’ The swift overrunning of Northern France by the German armies, the withdrawal of the French Government to Bordeaux, the fall of Antwerp, the tremendous victories of Hindenburg over the Russians, were events all of which dominated the Bulgarian equally with the Turkish mind. England, without an army, with not a soldier to spare, without even a rifle to send, with only her Navy and her money, counted for little in the Near East. Russian claims to Constantinople directly crossed the ambitions both of King Ferdinand and of King Constantine. In all the Balkans only one clairvoyant eye, only the genius of Venizelos, discerned the fundamental moral issues of the struggle, measured justly the relative powers of the mighty combatants, and appraised at their true value both the victories of the German Army, and the Sea Power under which were slowly gathering the latent but inexhaustible resources of the British Empire.

So the Allies continued to wait and hope at Constantinople, and the days slipped swiftly by.

Not till long after did we learn the blasting secret which would have destroyed all British and Russian doubts. Already in the crisis of July the leaders of the Young Turk party had been in vital negotiation with the Germans, and on August 2 an alliance had been signed between Germany and Turkey. Thus all this time we were deceived. Whether anything that it was in our power to do could have averted the evils must always remain a disputed question; but that the evils were not averted is certain. In the end we had all the evils of both courses and the advantages of no course. We were forced into a war with Turkey which ultimately became of enormous magnitude. Greece was thrown into inextricable confusion. Serbia was overrun. Bulgaria, joining hands with her recent enemies the Turks, became our foe. And Roumania, when she finally came in isolated upon the allied side, suffered the direst vengeance at German hands. A more fearful series of tragedies has scarcely ever darkened the melancholy page of history.

It must not be thought that the action of Turkey was inspired solely by treachery and duplicity. Two parties were struggling for mastery in the capital, but in view of the Treaty of Alliance which had been signed on August 2, there could have been no doubt about the final outcome. Moreover, in the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_, to say nothing of the Turkish Fleet, Enver Pasha and the war party had the means to force the Turkish Government to adhere to the covenants which they had entered into on her behalf. By the middle of October we learnt that Turkish preparations to invade Egypt were actually being made. We learned also from a secret source, that the Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople had received solemn assurances from Enver that Turkey would enter the war against the Entente at an early date. At the end of October, our outposts beyond the Suez Canal had to be withdrawn in face of gathering Turkish forces; and finally, about October 27, the _Breslau_, with the Turkish cruiser _Hamidieh_ and a division of destroyers, followed by the _Goeben_, steamed into the Black Sea, and on the 29th and 30th bombarded the Russian fortress of Sevastopol, sank a Russian transport, raided the harbour of Odessa, torpedoed a gunboat, and, lastly, practically destroyed Novorossisk, its oil tanks and all the shipping in the port.

On this the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople immediately demanded his passports; and the British Foreign Office at 8.15 p.m. on October 30, after reciting its many griefs against the Turks, especially their invasion of the Sinai Peninsula and their misconduct about the Goeben, sent an ultimatum requiring repudiation of these acts and the dismissal of the German Military and Naval Missions within 12 hours. The Admiralty conformed to this decision by telegraphing to all Admirals concerned as follows:—

(_October 31, 1914._ 12.35 a.m.)

Orders sent Ambassador Constantinople 8.15 p.m. 30th October to present ultimatum to Turkey expiring at end of 12 hours. Do not yourself commence hostilities without further orders.

_Add to Vice-Admiral Carden (Indefatigable)._

You may therefore expect Embassy to be leaving very shortly.

Russia declared war on Turkey at the expiry of the ultimatum; and the British and French Ambassadors, in company with their Russian colleague, left Constantinople on November 1—the same day on which at the other end of the world the battle of Coronel was being fought. Naval orders to commence hostilities were sent, in concert with the Foreign Office, in conformity with the expiry of the ultimatum.

_Admiralty to all ships._

_October 31, 1914_ (sent 5.5 p.m.)

‘Commence hostilities at once against Turkey. Acknowledge.’

On November 1 two of our destroyers, entering the Gulf of Smyrna, destroyed a large armed Turkish yacht which was lying by the jetty carrying mines; and late that same day Admiral Carden was instructed to bombard the outer Dardanelles forts at long range on the earliest suitable occasion. This bombardment was carried out on the morning of November 3. The two British battle-cruisers, firing from a range beyond that of the Turkish guns, shelled the batteries on the European side at Sedd-el-Bahr and Cape Helles. The French battleships fired at the Asiatic batteries at Kum Kali and Orkanieh. About eighty rounds were fired altogether, resulting in considerable damage to the Turkish forts, and in several hundred casualties to the Turks and Germans who manned them.

The reasons for this demonstration have been greatly canvassed. They were simple though not important. A British squadron had for months been waiting outside the Dardanelles. War had been declared with Turkey. It was natural that fire should be opened upon the enemy as it would be on the fronts of hostile armies. It was necessary to know accurately the effective ranges of the Turkish guns and the conditions under which the entrance to the blockaded port could be approached. It has been stated that this bombardment was an imprudent act, as it was bound to put the Turks on their guard and lead them to strengthen their defences at the Dardanelles. At the Admiralty we did not think it would have this effect: nor were we wrong. When, three and a half months later (February 19, 1915), Admiral Carden again bombarded these same forts, the Gallipoli Peninsula was totally unprepared for defence, and was still weakly occupied; and small parties of Marines were able to make their way unopposed into the shattered forts and a considerable distance beyond them. That no harm was done can therefore be plainly proved. On the other hand, valuable data were obtained.

We had now to provide against the impending Turkish attack upon Egypt. The First Cruiser Squadron, comprising the _Black Prince_, _Duke of Edinburgh_ and _Warrior_, had been either employed on escort duties at sea or on guard at Alexandria or Port Said. Even before the news of Coronel had reached us, the increasing strain upon our resources had made it necessary to replace these fine ships by older smaller vessels. They were now urgently required to form a combat squadron near the Cap de Verde Islands as part of the second general combination against von Spee. They were also promised to the Commander-in-Chief for the Grand Fleet at the earliest possible moment thereafter. We should have been hard pressed in these circumstances to find a new and satisfactory naval force for the defence of the Canal against the now imminent Turkish attack. The discovery and blocking in of the _Königsberg_ on 31st October liberated two out of the three vessels searching for her. But this was not enough. The destruction of the _Emden_ on the 9th November was an event of a very different order. It afforded us immediate relief, and relief exactly where we required it. The Indian Ocean was now clear. The battleship _Swiftsure_ from the East Indian station was at once ordered to the Canal. Of the fast cruisers that had been searching for the _Emden_, the _Gloucester_, _Melbourne_, _Sydney_, _Hampshire_ and _Yarmouth_ were immediately brought homewards through the Red Sea into the Mediterranean. I felt that the Commander-in-Chief in the East Indies must come himself to the new scene of danger.

_Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, East Indies._

_November 14, 1914._

Naval operations in the Red Sea and Egypt cannot be directed from India. Your presence in Egypt is imperative. You should rejoin your flagship _Swiftsure_ at Port Said by the quickest route at once. _Gloucester_ can take you if she has not already sailed. Telegraph what date you expect to arrive at Suez. On arrival you should consult with General Officer Commanding, Egypt, and work hand in hand with him and with the British authorities.... The following ships will be at your disposal in the Red Sea: _Swiftsure_, _Minerva_, _Doris_, _Proserpine_ ... and eight torpedo-boats from Malta. Measures are also being taken to organise armed launches and improvised gunboats for use in the Canal. Telegraph whether you feel able to discharge the other duties of your command, namely convoy and Persian Gulf operations, at the same time, or what temporary arrangements you suggest during your absence in Egyptian waters.

A few days earlier I had minuted:—

_November 18, 1914._

First Sea Lord. Chief of Staff.

I cannot agree to this. It would be a great waste of a valuable ship. Considerably more than a week has passed since I minuted that _Askold_ should be ordered to the Mediterranean. There or in Egyptian waters this Russian ship will have a chance of fighting against Turkey. To send her off to Hong-Kong is an altogether purposeless errand. Her stores should go on with the mines or in another vessel which keeps company with the mines from Vladivostok. No convoy is necessary; but if it were, the _Clio_ or _Cadmus_, or some little vessel like them, could be used. The whole Japanese Navy is in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. They would quite willingly find a convoy for the mines and the _Askold_ stores. The whole area of the sea, from the coast of Chili to the coast of Mozambique, has been cleared of the enemy. But for vague rumours of a possible armed merchantman at large, there is not the slightest menace. We must profit from this situation to the full while it lasts, and this can only be done by moving every ship that is of any use promptly into waters where they are required. No one knows how many ships we shall want in Egypt when the Turkish invasion begins. There may also be massacres of Christians in the coast towns of Levant which will require vessels for immediate action there. All the ships out of the Indian Ocean that can play an effective part ought to be hurried home. The cruisers ought to steam at least 18 knots. Nearly all these ships have lost three or four precious days since the destruction of the _Emden_ was known.

W. S. C.

These directions were complied with. I searched the oceans for every available ship. During the second and third weeks of November the _Swiftsure_ and the squadron and flotilla mentioned above, together with the French _Requin_ and the Russian _Askold_, entered the Canal for the defence of Egypt. The Turkish attack proved however to be only of a tentative character. Finding themselves confronted with troops and ships, they withdrew after feeble efforts into the Eastern deserts to gather further strength.

All this time the great Australasian convoy, carrying the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, ‘A.N.Z.A.C.,’ has been steaming steadily towards France across the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Preparations had been made if necessary to divert them to Cape Town. But before the convoy reached Colombo General Botha and General Smuts had suppressed the rebellion in South Africa. The Australians and New Zealanders therefore continued their voyage to Europe under the escort of the _Ibuki_ and the _Hampshire_. By the end of November their transports were entering the Canal. As the Turkish invasion of Egypt was still threatening, the need of resolute and trustworthy troops in Egypt was great, and on the first day of December Lord Kitchener, in the fateful unfolding of events, began to disembark the whole Australian and New Zealand Force at Suez for the double purpose of completing their training and defending the line of the Canal.

* * * * *

At this point we may leave the Turkish situation for a time. The German grip was strengthening every day on Turkey. The distresses of her peoples and the improvement of her military organisation were advancing together. Under the guns of the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_, doubt, division and scarcity dwelt in Constantinople. Outside the Straits the British squadron maintained its silent watch. Greece, perplexed at the attitude of Britain, distracted by the quarrels of Venizelos and King Constantine, had fallen far from the high resolve of August. Serbia stoutly contended with the Austrian armies. Roumania and Bulgaria brooded on the past and watched each other with intent regard. In Egypt the training of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps perfected itself week by week.

Thus, as this act in the stupendous world drama comes to its close, we see already the scene being set and the actors assembling for the next. From the uttermost ends of the earth ships and soldiers are approaching or gathering in the Eastern Mediterranean in fulfilment of a destiny as yet not understood by mortal man. The clearance of the Germans from the oceans liberated the Fleets, the arrival of the Anzacs in Egypt created the nucleus of the Army, needed to attack the heart of the Turkish Empire. The deadlock on the Western Front, where all was now frozen into winter trenches, afforded at once a breathing space and large possibility of further troops. While Australian battalions trampled the crisp sand of the Egyptian desert in tireless evolutions, and Commander Holbrook in his valiant submarine dived under the minefields of Chanak and sank a Turkish transport in the throat of the Dardanelles, far away in the basins of Portsmouth the dockyard men were toiling night and day to mount the fifteen-inch guns and turrets of the _Queen Elizabeth_. As yet all was unconscious, inchoate, purposeless, uncombined. Any one of a score of chances might have given, might still give, an entirely different direction to the event. No plan has been made, no resolve taken. But new ideas are astir, new possibilities are coming into view, new forces are at hand, and with them there marches towards us a new peril of the first magnitude. Russia, mighty steam-roller, hope of suffering France and prostrate Belgium—Russia is failing. Her armies are grappling with Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and behind their brave battle fronts already the awful signs of weakness, of deficiency, of disorganisation, are apparent to anxious Cabinets and Councils. Winter has come and locked all Russia in its grip. No contact with her Allies, no help from them, is possible. The ice blocks the White Sea. The Germans hold the Baltic. The Turks have barred the Dardanelles. It needs but a cry from Russia for help, to make vital what is now void, and to make purposeful what is now meaningless. But as yet no cry has come.

* * * * *

I cannot close without taking a more general survey of the naval war.

The reader has now followed through six chapters the steady increase of strain upon Admiralty resources which marked in every theatre the months of September, October and November, 1914. He must understand that, although for the purposes of the narrative it is necessary to deal in separate chapters with each separate set of strains and crises, many of the events were proceeding simultaneously in all theatres at once, and the consequent strains were cumulative and reciprocally reacting on one another, with the result that during November an extraordinary pitch of intensity was reached which could not well be prolonged and could not possibly have been exceeded.

It is worth while to review the whole situation. First, the transport of troops and supplies to France was unceasing and vital to our Army. On the top of all this came the operations on the Belgian Coast, the approach of the enemy to the Channel ports, and the long-drawn crisis of the great battle of Ypres-Yser. Secondly, all the enemy’s cruisers were still alive, and a number of hostile armed merchantmen were free in the outer seas, each threatening an indefinite number of points and areas and requiring from five to ten times their numbers to search for them and protect traffic while they were at large. At the same time the great convoys of troops from India, from Canada, from Australia, and the collection of the British regular garrisons from all parts of the world were proceeding; and no less than six separate expeditions, viz., Samoa, New Guinea, German East Africa, Togoland, the Cameroons and German South-West Africa, were in progress or at a critical stage. Upon this was thrust the outbreak of war with Turkey, the attack upon the Suez Canal, and the operations in the Persian Gulf.

To meet these fierce obligations we had to draw no less than three decisive units from the Grand Fleet. This Fleet, which at the outset of the war was in perfect order, was already requiring refits by rotation, with consequent reduction of available strength. Meanwhile, the submarine menace had declared itself in a serious form, and was moreover exaggerated in our minds. Although the most vehement efforts were being made to give security to our fleets in their Northern harbours, these measures took many weeks, during which anxiety was continual. Behind all stood the German Fleet, aware, as we must suppose, of the strain to which we were being subjected, and potentially ready at any moment to challenge the supreme decision. With the long nights of winter, the absence of all regular troops from the country, the then inadequate training of the Territorial Force and the embryonic condition of the new Kitchener armies, the fear of invasion revived; and, although we rejected it in theory, nevertheless we were bound to take in practice a whole series of precautionary measures. It was a formidable time. More than once the thought occurred that the Admiralty would be forced to contract their responsibilities and abandon to their fate for a time some important interests, in order that those which were vital might be secured. In the event we just got through. It may be claimed that during these months we met every single call that was made upon us, guarded every sea, carried every expedition, brought every convoy safely in, discharged all our obligations both to the Army in France and to the Belgians, and all the time maintained such a disposition of our main forces that we should never have declined battle had the enemy ventured to offer it.

Then suddenly all over the world the tension was relaxed. One after another the German cruisers and commerce destroyers were blocked in or hunted down. The great convoys arrived. The Expeditions were safely landed. Ocean after ocean became clear. The boom defences of our harbours were completed. A score of measures for coping with the submarine were set on foot. Large reinforcements of new ships of the highest quality and of every class began to join the Fleet. The attack on the Suez Canal was stemmed. The rebellion in South Africa was quelled. The dangers of invasion, if such there were, diminished every day with the increasing efficiency of the Territorials and the New Armies. The great battle for the Channel ports ended in decisive and ever glorious victory. And finally with the Battle of the Falkland Islands the clearance of the oceans was complete, and soon, except in the land-locked Baltic and Black Seas and in the defended area of the Heligoland Bight, the German flag had ceased to fly on any vessel in any quarter of the world.[102]

As December passed, a sense of indescribable relief stole over the Admiralty. We had made the great transition from peace to war without disaster, almost without mishap. All the perils which had haunted us before the war, and against which we had prepared, had been warded off or surmounted or had never come to pass. There had been no surprise. The Fleet was ready. The Army had reached the decisive battlefield in time and was satisfactorily maintained. The Mine danger had been overcome. We thought we had the measure of the submarine, and so indeed we had for nearly two years to come. All the enemy’s plans for commerce destruction and all our alarms about them had come to nought. British and allied commerce proceeded without hesitation throughout the world; the trade and food of Britain were secured; the war insurance dropped to one per cent. A feeling of profound thankfulness filled our hearts as this first Christmas of the war approached; and of absolute confidence in final victory.

The mighty enemy, with all the advantages of preparation and design, had delivered his onslaught and had everywhere been brought to a standstill. It was our turn now. The initiative had passed to the Great Amphibian. The time and the means were at our command. It was for us to say where we would strike and when. The strength of the Grand Fleet was, as we believed, ample; and in addition the whole of those numerous squadrons which hitherto had been spread over the outer seas now formed a surplus fleet capable of intervening in the supreme struggle without in any way compromising the foundation of our naval power.

But these realisations were only permissible as the prelude to fresh and still more intense exertions. It would indeed be shameful, so it seemed at least to me, for the Admiralty to rest contented with the accomplishment of the first and most hazardous stage of its task and to relax into a supine contemplation of regained securities and dangers overcome. Now was the time to make our weight tell, perhaps decisively, but certainly most heavily, in the struggle of the armies. Now was the time to fasten an offensive upon the Germans, unexpected and unforeseeable, to present them with a succession of surprising situations leading on from crisis to crisis and from blow to blow till their downfall was achieved.

Moreover, these same Germans were, of all the enemies in the world, the most to be dreaded when pursuing their own plans; the most easily disconcerted when forced to conform to the plans of their antagonist. To leave a German leisure to evolve his vast, patient, accurate designs, to make his slow, thorough, infinitely far-seeing preparations, was to court a terrible danger. To throw him out of his stride, to baffle his studious mind, to break his self-confidence, to cow his spirit, to rupture his schemes by unexpected action, was surely the path not only of glory but of prudence.

* * * * *

Here then ends the first phase of the naval war, and with it this volume. The first part of the British task is done both by land and sea. Paris and the Channel Ports are saved, and the oceans are cleared. It is certain that the whole strength of the British Empire can be turned into war power and brought to bear upon the enemy. There is no chance of France being struck down, before the British Empire is ready; there is no chance of the British Empire itself being paralysed, before its full force can be applied to the struggle. The supreme initiative passes from the Teutonic Powers to the Allies. Resources, almost measureless and of indescribable variety in ships, in men, in munitions and devices of war, will now flow month by month steadily into our hands. What shall we do with them? Strategic alternatives on the greatest scale and of the highest order present themselves to our choice. Which shall we choose? Shall we use our reinforced fleets and great new armies of 1915, either to turn the Teutonic right in the Baltic or their left in the Black Sea and the Balkans? Or shall we hurl our manhood against sandbags, wire and concrete in frontal attack upon the German fortified lines in France? Shall we by a supreme effort make direct contact with our Russian ally or leave her in a dangerous isolation? Shall we by decisive action, in hopes of shortening the conflict, marshal and draw in the small nations in the North and in the South who now stand outside it? Or shall we plod steadily forward at what lies immediately in our front? Shall our armies toil only in the mud of Flanders, or shall we break new ground? Shall our fleets remain contented with the grand and solid results they have won, or shall they ward off future perils by a new inexhaustible audacity?

The answers to these momentous questions will appear as this tale is carried forward to a further stage.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

APPENDIX A MEMORANDUM BY THE FIRST LORD ON NAVAL STAFF TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT

(A.)—_Military Education and War Staff Training._

1. It is necessary to draw a distinction between the measures required to secure a general diffusion of military knowledge among naval officers and the definite processes by which Staff Officers are to be trained. The first may be called ‘Military Education,’ and the second ‘War Staff Training.’ They require to be treated separately, and not mixed together as in the report of the Committee. Both must again be distinguished from all questions of administration, of material, and of non-military education and training. The _application_ of fighting power can thus be separated from its _development_. We are not now concerned with the forging of the weapon, but only with its use.

_Military Education._

2. As early as possible in his service the mind of the young officer must be turned to the broad principles of war by sea and land. His interest must be awakened. He must be put in touch with the right books, and must be made to feel the importance of the military aspect of his profession. The existing curriculum at Dartmouth and on the cruiser is already too full. And until the officer has reached the rank of Lieutenant I see no immediate opportunity of adding to his instruction. But thereafter his ‘Military Education’ should be provided for in two ways. First: Every Lieutenant should go through a military course of (say) two months during the first four years of his service. The course to be prepared by the Training Division of the War Staff; aim, thoroughness in a simple and strictly limited sphere. The course to conclude by a standard examination to test only what the pupil remembers of his instruction. It would be preferable to hold the courses at Greenwich continuously. Thus a good scheme of instruction adapted to the class of officers and the limits of time will develop and uniformity will be established; and young officers will be accustomed to associate Greenwich with the study of war.

All specialist officers, submarine and air service officers included, must go through this course.

In exceptional circumstances, where exigencies of service do not allow, extension to within the first six years may be granted.

The course will be obligatory on officers now under two years’ service as Lieutenant. There should be four courses a year; the first to begin October, 1914. It should be voluntary for officers now over two years’ service as Lieutenant.

(Let me have calculations about numbers which can be handled during the first five courses; and make proposals for giving effect to the above scheme in detail.)

No grading as Assistant War Staff Officers will result from this course, and no certificate will be given or letters printed after an officer’s name. It is a pure matter of routine, and a necessary qualification of all future naval officers. The college authorities will, however, keep a register of officers, and report upon their general aptitudes for staff work and tactical subjects. This will be of use later in considering claims to compete for entry into the War College.

Secondly, as soon as practicable (if possible, next time) an examination should be held for entry into the War College for the War Staff Course. This examination should be competitive. It will be open to all Commanders and Lieutenant-Commanders, or Lieutenants who will be Lieutenant-Commanders before the course is completed, whose names are submitted by the Flag officers under whom they are serving and who are approved as candidates by the Admiralty. A proportion of vacancies will be assigned to each rank. The results will be published. The object of this examination will be to test ability for staff work. In the first instance the tests will have to be of a simple character, but gradually, as the military education of the naval officer develops, they can be stiffened and extended. The examination will be conducted by the War College according to principles prescribed by the War Training Division. Intending candidates will be notified three months in advance of the subjects in which they should prepare themselves.

When an officer is successful in the competition, but owing to foreign service or other exigency cannot at once attend the War Course, he may be allowed to take a vacancy next time.

Captains of ships and War Staff Officers afloat will aid officers to prepare themselves for this examination.

_War Staff Training._

3. The successful candidates will enter the War College at Greenwich as residents for War Staff training. This course must for the present be limited to one year, but later it should be extended to eighteen months. As an examination will be held every six months, there will at the beginning be two batches under instruction, rising later to three. This will give the necessary numbers at the College. The period of this course, provided the officer gives satisfaction, should, in my opinion, count as sea service.

On completing the course, the officers who have qualified may be placed upon the War Staff List, with the approval of the Admiralty, as at present, and will then be available for staff employment.

(B.)—_Development of the Admiralty War Staff._

1. Two years have passed since this body was instituted, and both the progress made in the Admiralty and the acceptance of the idea by the Fleet justify a further advance.

Three main questions have arisen:—

(1.) The creation of a Trade Division.

(2.) The preparation of Manuals and direction of training generally.

(3.) The detachment of the Mobilisation Department from the War Staff.

I have come to the conclusion that the first essential is the creation of a War Training Division, under a Director, and equal in importance to the Operation and Intelligence Divisions. This division will be charged with the theoretical direction and co-ordination of all tactical and strategical exercises and instruction whether in the Fleets or at the Colleges. It will, of course, have nothing to do with the education which fits a cadet to become a naval officer, or with the training of Specialists of any kind, or with the training which fits a boy to become an able seaman. All this is in the Administrative sphere and belongs to the Second Sea Lord. The War Training Division is concerned only with what the naval officer learns about war, what tactical use the gunnery and torpedo experts make of their weapons, and what exercises are prescribed for the Fleets and Squadrons.

2. Nothing in the work of this division will relieve Flag Officers from their present duties and responsibilities in the training of their commands. But henceforward they will work on regularly explored and considered lines, and within limits which are the result of collective thought and experience; and henceforward continuity and uniformity will be preserved by a central direction and co-ordination, which gathers up and authorises the established conclusions, without restricting reasonable initiative. It is no answer to the advocates of such a Division, to say that war training is given by the Commanders-in-Chief at sea, and that war training is in the department of the First Sea Lord. The Commanders-in-Chief change repeatedly, and with them their personal instruction changes, very often without leaving a trace behind. The First Sea Lord cannot possibly prepare manuals of tactical and strategic instruction. This work can only be done by a regular department permanently at work.

3. I propose, therefore, in principle to constitute without delay a War Training Division of the Admiralty War Staff. This division will be organised under a Director (D.T.D., short for D.N.T.D.) in three sections, denominated respectively X, Y, and Z.

The following will be the main distribution of duties:—

(X). _Manuals and Exercises._

Preparation and revision of all Training Books and Manuals (other than technical or administrative) including Signal Books in their tactical aspect.

Preparation of manœuvre schemes.

Report and criticism of manœuvres.

Record and criticism of tactical and strategic exercises.

Advice upon the initiation of experiments (other than technical or administrative), upon the organisation of units, upon War Establishments, and upon the tactical aspects of New Construction.

Distribution of War Staff publications.

(Y). _War Colleges: Examinations and Courses._

Supervision of War Colleges and all war educational arrangements.

Examinations and courses in tactical and strategic subjects.

Libraries.

(Z). _Historical._

The staff of this new division will be formed in part by reductions from the Mobilisation and Operations Divisions (some of which latter’s work is taken over); and in part by an addition to the Estimates for which Treasury sanction will be required. As a set-off against this there is the economy of reducing an Admiral by bringing the War College to Greenwich.

Nine or ten officers (some of whom can be retired officers) should suffice with the necessary clerks and writers.

Let me have proposals on these lines with estimates.

4. _The Operations Division_ will have been to some extent relieved by the formation of the War Training Division. It must, however, be augmented by the addition of a new section (the Manning Department) dealing with War Mobilisation, which will be explained later; and, secondly, by the new Trade Defence Section. This latter is clearly only a part of the Operations sphere. It is grouped with Operations because the defence of trade is essentially an offensive operation against the enemy’s armed ships.

The Operations Division will, therefore, be organised in four sections—(_a_), (_b_), (_c_), and (_d_)—as follows:—

(_a_) _War Plans._ Distribution of the Fleet. Schemes of attack of all kinds. Joint naval and military action. C.I.D. work. War Room.

(_b_) _Coast Defence._ Plans for the employment of Patrol Flotillas. Air Craft at the Naval Stations. Coastal submarines. Organisation of Signal and Wireless Stations. Examination Service. Distribution of Intelligence along the coast. Joint naval and military action in coast defence. Home Ports Defence Committee. Overseas Defence Committee.

(_c_) _Trade Defence._ All arrangements for the direction of trade in time of war. All naval questions connected with food supply. Armed merchantmen. Distribution of warships for the control of the trade routes. International law. All relations with the Mercantile Marine.

(_d_) _War Mobilisation._ Supervision of the arrangements of the Manning Department for the mobilisation of the Fleet. Advice upon the complements of ships.

Attention is drawn to the minute of the Secretary on the proposed issue of charts and returns to the Trade Division. This necessity is not proved. The staff of the new section must be reconsidered accordingly.

5. _The Intelligence Division_ requires little change, but should, in principle, be divided into three sections, as follows:—

(_l_) Potentially hostile countries. (_m_) Friendly countries. (_n_) Neutral countries.

Section (_l_) is to be charged with the new duty of preparing war plans for the hostile countries separately or in combination against us alone or allied, showing both—

(1.) What they will probably do against us.

(2.) What would be the worst they could do against us. From time to time war games will be played between the Intelligence and Operations Divisions.

Section (_m_) will likewise report on the needs and dangers of the friendly countries and study the measures best adapted to strengthen them in peace and war.

These new duties open to the Intelligence Division a large creative and imaginative sphere, and offer opportunities for the highest tactical and strategic ability.

6. _The Mobilisation Division_ is not well named. Mobilisation is a small and infrequent part of the duties of this division. Mobilisation is, indeed, a comparatively unimportant feature in our naval system, all the more powerful vessels being constantly in full commission, and the Second Fleet requiring only to be ‘completed.’ The day-to-day provision of complements for ships commissioning, and the intricate arrangements connected therewith, constitute the staple of the work of this Department.

Further, its duties are almost entirely administrative, and administration is foreign to the sphere of the War Staff.

I therefore propose that the Mobilisation Division shall be separated from the War Staff, and shall be called the ‘_Manning Department_.’

A section of the Manning Department will, however, be formed to deal with War Mobilisation, and this section will work under the D.M.D., but in close association with the new Training Division of the War Staff.

Thus the whole administrative work connected with the manning of the Fleet will be left intact under the Second Sea Lord, while, at the same time, the War Staff will have included in its circle everything necessary to its reflective and organising duties. I await definite proposals to give effect to this.

7. It is important that every officer serving in the War Staff should look for recommendation for advancement from the C.O.S. I propose, therefore, that C.O.S. should be allotted a proportion of recommendations as if he were a Flag Officer in independent command, and should make them to my Naval Secretary in the usual way for the half-yearly promotions. C.O.S. will also initiate all recommendations for War Staff appointments and appointments to the Naval War College, and all lists of officers for war courses of all kinds will be proposed by him and submitted through the First Sea Lord to me.

The record books in the Private Office will be sufficient for general purposes, but a _Staff Register_ should be formed for recording the War Staff capacities and services of officers whether at the Admiralty, the Colleges, or afloat, and a copy of this register will be kept written up to date in the Private Office.

It may be found necessary to add an officer to the personal staff of C.O.S.

8. I attach a skeleton chart of the new organisation.

9. I add the following general observations. The divisions of the War Staff though separate are parts of one united organisation. Each discharges its own functions in association with the others. They are not to do each other’s work. The Operations Division is not, for instance, to collect its own data. It is to accept them from the Intelligence Division. The Training Division is to accept the conclusions of the Operations Division and propose the Fleet for their execution. But there must also be unity and free intercourse between the three Directors. In order to promote and ensure this, C.O.S. will be enjoined to hold every month a formal Staff meeting with his three Directors and any of their subordinates who may be required for the discussion of Staff questions, and the agenda and minutes of these meetings will be submitted through the First Sea Lord to the First Lord.

(C.)—_The Operations Staff Afloat._

I agree with the proposals of the Second Sea Lord as concurred in and amended by the First Sea Lord. This organisation observes the principle of a clear division between the thinking and administrative branches.

The Captain for administration should bear the title of Flag Captain. The Captain of the ship should simply be styled ‘The Captain.’

The extra officers for the Intelligence and Operations ‘Groups’ (Divisions is too large a word and already taken) can be found from the War Training Division of the Admiralty War Staff which will cease to exist on mobilisation. They should go afloat whenever large manœuvres are in progress, and should be appropriated by name to their posts in war. The Commander-in-Chief should have no one on his staff in war that he does not know and has not worked with.

It is desirable that the Commander-in-Chief’s staff when formed should work out strategic and tactical exercises together at the War College, Portsmouth, or if possible at Greenwich, at least once a year, apart from actual manœuvres afloat, in order that each may know his exact function.

The approved form of the Fleet Flagship Staff is as follows:—

Secretary and clerks.-------C.-in-C.--------Captain of the Flagship. | Captain of the Fleet. (C.O.F.) | +--+-----------------+ | | | Flag Captain for Administration. | | | +-----------+------------+ | | | | | Engineer Fuelling Victualling | Assistant. Assistant. Assistant | (Paymaster | of Flagship). +------------------+---+-------------------------+ | | | Operations Intelligence Communications Group. Group. Group. [103]2 Staff Officers. [103]1 Staff Officer. [103]2 Staff Officers. [104]3 Staff Officers. [104]2 Staff Officers. [104]4 Staff Officers.

I approve also the Second Sea Lord’s proposals for the staffs of Squadron Flagships.

SKELETON CHART OF ADMIRALTY WAR STAFF ORGANISATION.

New additions in heavy type.

+-(a.) War Plans. | +--D.O.D.--+-(b.) Coast Defence. | | | +-(=c.=) =Trade Defence.= | | =Captain for War Staff= | +-(=d.=) =War= =appointments.= | =Mobilisation.= | | | | +-(l.) Hostile countries. | | | | +---D.I.D.-+-(m.) Friendly countries. | | | First Sea Lord.------Chief of Staff--+ +-(n.) Neutral countries. The Secretary. | | | | | | | | +-(=x.=) =Manuals and= +------+---------+ | | | =Exercises.= | | | War Staff | | A.C.R. A.O.P. C.-in-Cs. Secretariat. +-=D.T.D.=-+-(=y.=) =War Colleges.= | =Examinations= | =and Courses.= | +-(=z.=) =Historical.=

W. S. C.

_May 1, 1914._

APPENDIX B

BRITISH DREADNOUGHT STRENGTH

───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── BATTLESHIPS ───────┬─────────────┬───────┬─────────┬────────┬──────┬──────────┬────── Consec-│ Ship. │Launch-│Displace-│ Speed │Armour│ Armament │Weight utive │ │ ed. │ ment. │(design-│ belt │(excluding│ of No. │ │ │ │ ed). │(max.)│guns below│broad- │ │ │ │ │ │ 12 prs.) │side, │ │ │ │ │ │ │ pri- │ │ │ │ │ │ │ mary │ │ │ │ │ │ │guns. ───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼────── │ │ │ tons. │ knots. │ in. │ │ lb. ───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼────── 1│Lord Nelson │ 1906 │ 16,500 │ 18·5 │ 12│4–12 in., │ 5,300 │ │ │ │ │ │ 10–9·2 │ │ │ │ │ │ │in., 24–12│ │ │ │ │ │ │ prs. │ 2│Agamemnon │ 1906 │ │ │ │ │ ───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼────── 3│Dreadnought │ 1906 │ 17,900 │ 20·9 │ 11│10–12 in.,│ 6,800 │ │ │ │ │ │24–12 prs.│ ───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼────── 4│Superb │ 1907 │ 18,600 │ 20·75 │ 10│10–12 in.,│ 6,800 │ │ │ │ │ │ 16–4 in. │ 5│Temeraire │ 1907 │ │ │ │ │ 6│Bellerophon │ 1907 │ │ │ │ │ ───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼────── 7│St. Vincent │ 1908 │ 19,250 │ 21·0 │ 10│10–12 in.,│ 6,800 │ │ │ │ │ │ 20–4 in. │ 8│Vanguard │ 1909 │ │ │ │ │ 9│Collingwood │ 1908 │ │ │ │ │ ───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼────── 10│Neptune │ 1909 │ 19,900 │ 21·0 │ 10│10–12 in.,│ 8,500 │ │ │ │ │ │ 16–4 in. │ ───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼────── 11│Colossus │ 1910 │ 20,000 │ 21·0 │ 11│10–12 in.,│ 8,500 │ │ │ │ │ │ 16–4 in. │ 12│Hercules │ 1910 │ │ │ │ │ ───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼────── 13│Orion │ 1910 │ 22,500 │ 21 │ 12│ 10–13·5 │ 2,500 │ │ │ │ │ │in., 16–4 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ in. │ 14│Thunderer │ 1911 │ │ │ │ │ 15│Monarch │ 1911 │ │ │ │ │ 16│Conqueror │ 1911 │ │ │ │ │ ───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼────── 17│King George V│ 1911 │ 23,000 │ 21 │ 12│ 10–13·5 │ 4,000 │ │ │ │ │ │in., 16–4 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ in. │ 18│Centurion │ 1911 │ │ │ │ │ 19│Ajax │ 1912 │ │ │ │ │ 20│Audacious │ 1912 │ │ │ │ │ ───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼────── 21│Iron Duke │ 1912 │ 25,000 │ 21 │ 12│ 10–13·5 │ 4,000 │ │ │ │ │ │in., 12–6 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ in., 2–3 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ in. │ 22│Marlborough │ 1912 │ │ │ │ │ ───────┴─────────────┴───────┴─────────┴────────┴──────┴──────────┴────── BUILDING ───────┬─────────────┬───────┬─────────┬────────┬──────┬──────────┬────── 23│Benbow │ 1913 │ 25,000 │ 21 │ 12│ 10–13·5 │ 4,000 │ │ │ │ │ │in., 12–6 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ in., 2–3 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ in. │ 24│Emperor of │ 1913 │ │ │ │ │ │ India │ │ │ │ │ │ ───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼────── 25│Queen │ 1913 │ 27,500 │ 25 │ 13│8–15 in., │15,360 │ Elizabeth │ │ │ │ │16–6 in., │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 2–3 in. │ 26│Warspite │ 1913 │ │ │ │ │ 27│Valiant │ │ │ │ │ │ 28│Barham │ │ │ │ │ │ 29│Malaya │ │ │ │ │ │ ───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼────── 30│Resolution │ │ 25,750 │ 21 │ 13│8–15 in., │15,360 │ │ │ │ │ │16–6 in., │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 4–3 in. │ 31│Ramillies │ │ │ │ │ │ 32│Revenge │ │ │ │ │ │ 33│Royal │ │ │ │ │ │ │ Sovereign │ │ │ │ │ │ 34│Royal Oak │ │ │ │ │ │ ───────┴─────────────┴───────┴─────────┴────────┴──────┴──────────┴────── SHIPS BUILDING IN GREAT BRITAIN FOR FOREIGN POWERS AND REQUISITIONED FOR THE ROYAL NAVY ───────┬─────────────┬───────┬─────────┬────────┬──────┬──────────┬────── 35│Agincourt │ │ 27,500 │ 22 │ 9│14–12 in.,│12,900 │ │ │ │ │ │12–6 in., │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 8–3 in., │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 2–3 in. │ │ │ │ │ │ │ A.A.C. │ 36│Erin │ │ 23,000 │ 21 │ 12│ 10–13·5 │14,800 │ │ │ │ │ │in., 16–6 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ in., 8–3 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ in., 2–3 │ │ │ │ │ │ │in. A.A.C.│ 37│Canada │ │ 28,000 │ 23 │ 9│10–14 in.,│16,560 │ │ │ │ │ │12–6 in., │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 8–3 in., │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 2–3 in. │ │ │ │ │ │ │ A.A.C. │ ───────┴─────────────┴───────┴─────────┴────────┴──────┴──────────┴────── BATTLE CRUISERS ───────┬─────────────┬───────┬─────────┬────────┬──────┬──────────┬────── 1│Invincible │ 1907 │ 17,250 │ 26 │ 7│8–12 in., │ 6,800 │ │ │ │ │ │ 16–4 in. │ 2│Inflexible │ 1907 │ │ │ │ │ 3│Indomitable │ 1907 │ │ │ │ │ ───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼────── 4│Indefatigable│ 1909 │ 18,750 │ 25 │ 7│8–12 in., │ 6,800 │ │ │ │ │ │ 16–4 in. │ 5│Lion │ 1910 │ 26,350 │ 28 │ 9│ 8–13·5 │10,000 │ │ │ │ │ │in., 16–4 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ in. │ ───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼────── 6│Australia │ 1911 │ 18,800 │ 25 │ 7│8–12 in., │ 6,800 │ │ │ │ │ │ 16–4 in. │ 7│New Zealand │ 1911 │ │ │ │ │ ───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼────── 8│Princess │ 1911 │ 26,350 │ 28 │ 9│ 8–13·5 │11,200 │ Royal │ │ │ │ │in., 16–4 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ in. │ 9│Queen Mary │ 1912 │ 27,000 │ 28 │ 9│ 8–13·5 │11,200 │ │ │ │ │ │in., 16–4 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ in. │ ───────┴─────────────┴───────┴─────────┴────────┴──────┴──────────┴────── BUILDING ───────┬─────────────┬───────┬─────────┬────────┬──────┬──────────┬────── 10│Tiger │ 1913 │ 28,000 │ 28 │ 9│ 8–13·5 │11,200 │ │ │ │ │ │in., 12–6 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ in. │ ───────┴─────────────┴───────┴─────────┴────────┴──────┴──────────┴──────

GERMAN DREADNOUGHT STRENGTH

───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── BATTLESHIPS ───────┬─────────────┬───────┬─────────┬────────┬──────┬──────────┬────── Consec-│ Ship. │Launch-│Displace-│ Speed │Armour│ Armament │Weight utive │ │ ed. │ ment. │(design-│ belt │(excluding│ of No. │ │ │ │ ed). │(max.)│guns below│broad- │ │ │ │ │ │ 12 prs.) │side, │ │ │ │ │ │ │prim- │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ary │ │ │ │ │ │ │guns. ───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼────── │ │ │ tons. │ knots. │ in. │ │ lb. ───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼────── 1│Nassau │ 1908 │ 18,600 │ 19 │ 11·81│12—11 in.,│ 5,376 │ │ │ │ │ │ 12—5·9 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ in., │ │ │ │ │ │ │16—3·4 in.│ 2│Westfalen │ 1908 │ │ │ │ │ 3│Rheinland │ 1908 │ │ │ │ │ 4│Posen │ 1908 │ │ │ │ │ ───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼────── 5│Ostfriesland │ 1909 │ 22,400 │ 20·5 │ 11·81│12—12 in.,│ 7,232 │ │ │ │ │ │ 14—5·9 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ in., │ │ │ │ │ │ │14—3·4 in.│ 6│Heligoland │ 1909 │ │ │ │ │ 7│Thuringen │ 1909 │ │ │ │ │ 8│Oldenburg │ 1910 │ │ │ │ │ ───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼────── 9│Kaiser │ 1911 │ 24,310 │ 21 │ 13·78│10—12 in.,│ 9,040 │ │ │ │ │ │ 14—5·9 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ in., │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 12—3·4 │ │ │ │ │ │ │in., 4—13 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ prs. │ 10│Friedrich der│ 1911 │ │ │ │ │ │ Grosse │ │ │ │ │ │ 11│Kaiserin │ 1911 │ │ │ │ │ 12│Prinzregent │ 1912 │ │ │ │ │ │ Luitpold │ │ │ │ │ │ 13│König Albert │ 1912 │ │ │ │ │ ───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼────── 14│Grosser │ 1913 │ 25,390 │ 22 │ ?│10—12 in.,│ 9,040 │ Kurfürst │ │ │ ? │ │ 14—5·9 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ in., │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 12—3·4 │ │ │ │ │ │ │in., 4—13 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ prs. │ 15│König │ 1913 │ │ │ │ │ 16│Markgraf │ 1913 │ │ │ │ │ ───────┴─────────────┴───────┴─────────┴────────┴──────┴──────────┴────── BUILDING ───────┬─────────────┬───────┬─────────┬────────┬──────┬──────────┬────── 17│Kronprinz │ 1914 │ 25,390 │ 22 │ ?│10—12 in.,│ 9,040 │ │ │ │ ? │ │ 14—5·9 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ in., │ │ │ │ │ │ │ 12—3·4 │ │ │ │ │ │ │in., 4—13 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ prs. │ ───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼────── 18│Ersatz Wörth │ │ 28,050 │ 22 │ ?│8—15 in., │15,360 │ │ │ ? │ ? │ │16—5·9 in.│ ? 19│T │ │ │ │ │ │ 20│Ersatz Kaiser│ │ │ │ │ │ │ Friedrich │ │ │ │ │ │ │ III │ │ │ │ │ │ ───────┴─────────────┴───────┴─────────┴────────┴──────┴──────────┴────── BATTLE CRUISERS ───────┬─────────────┬───────┬─────────┬────────┬──────┬──────────┬────── 1│Blücher │ 1908 │ 15,550 │ 25 │ 6│ 12—8·2 │ 2,204 │ │ │ │ │ │in., 8—5·9│ │ │ │ │ │ │ in., │ │ │ │ │ │ │16—3·4 in.│ 2│von der Tann │ 1909 │ 18,700 │ 25 │ 6│8—11 in., │ 5,376 │ │ │ │ │ │ 10—5·9 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ in., │ │ │ │ │ │ │16—3·4 in.│ ───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼────── 3│Moltke │ 1910 │ 22,640 │ 27 │ 11│10—11 in.,│ 6,720 │ │ │ │ │ │ 12—5·9 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ in., │ │ │ │ │ │ │12—3·4 in.│ 4│Goëben │ 1911 │ │ │ │ │ ───────┼─────────────┼───────┼─────────┼────────┼──────┼──────────┼────── 5│Seydlitz │ 1912 │ 24,640 │ 27 │ 11│10—11 in.,│ 6,720 │ │ │ │ │ │ 12—5·9 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ in., │ │ │ │ │ │ │12—3·4 in.│ 6│Derfflinger │ 1913 │ 28,000 │ 27 │ 7│8—12 in., │ 7,232 │ │ │ │ │ │ 12—5·9 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ in., │ │ │ │ │ │ │12—3·4 in.│ ───────┴─────────────┴───────┴─────────┴────────┴──────┴──────────┴────── BUILDING ───────┬─────────────┬───────┬─────────┬────────┬──────┬──────────┬────── 7│Lützow │ 1913 │ 28,000 │ 27 │ 7│8—12 in., │ 7,232 │ │ │ │ │ │ 12—5·9 │ │ │ │ │ │ │ in., │ │ │ │ │ │ │12—3·4 in.│ 8│Ersatz Hertha│ Bdg. │ │ │ │ │ ───────┴─────────────┴───────┴─────────┴────────┴──────┴──────────┴──────

BRITISH AND GERMAN FLEETS IN HOME WATERS AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

BRITISH. │ GERMAN. _Grand Fleet._ │ _High Seas Fleet._ Iron Duke (10–3·5 inch), Fleet │Friedrich der Grosse (10–12 inch), Flagship. │ Fleet Flagship. │ _1st Battle Squadron._ │ _1st Battle Squadron._ 1 Iron Duke (10–13·5 inch). │ 2 Colossus │10–12 inch. │4 Heligolands (12–12 inch). 1 Neptune │ │4 Nassaus (12–11 inch). 3 St. Vincents │ │ 1 Bellerophon │ │ │ _2nd Battle Squadron._ │ _2nd Battle Squadron._ 4 King George V │10–13·5 inch.│10 Preussens (4–11 inch). 4 Orions │ │ │ _3rd Battle Squadron._ │ _3rd Battle Squadron._ 8 King Edward VII (4–12 inch; 4–9·2│4 Kaisers (10–12 inch). inch). │ │ _4th Battle Squadron._ │ 1 Dreadnought │10–12 inch. │ 2 Bellerophons │ │ 1 Agincourt (14–12 inch). │ (One Light Cruiser attached to each│ Battle Squadron). │ │ _1st Battle Cruiser Squadron._ │ _Cruiser Squadron._ 3 Lions (8–13·5 inch). │ _Battle Cruisers._ 1 New Zealand (8–12 inch). │2 Moltke (10–11 inch). │1 von der Tann (8–11 inch). _2nd Cruiser Squadron._ │1 Derfflinger (8–12 inch). 1 Shannon (4–9·2 inch; 10–7·5 │1 Blücher (12–8·2 inch). inch). │ 3 Achilles (6–9·2 inch; 4–7·5 │ inch). │ │ _3rd Cruiser Squadron._ │ _Light Cruisers._ 4 Antrims (4–7·5 inch; 6–6 inch). │1 Rostock │12–4·1 inch. │2 Strassburgs │ _1st Light Cruiser Squadron._ │3 Mainz. │ 3 Birminghams (9–6 inch). │ 1 Southampton │8–6 inch. │ 1 Falmouth │ │ 1 Bristol (2–6 inch; 10–4 inch). │ │ _Destroyer Flotillas._ │ _Destroyer Flotillas._ 2 Flotillas, each of 20 vessels, │ with Light Cruiser Active and │7 Flotillas, each of 11 vessels. Flotilla Leader Swift. │ │ _Harwich Force._ │ 1 Amethyst (12–4 inch). │ 2 Amphions (10–4 inch). │ 35 Destroyers. │ │ _Channel Fleet._ │ _Other Vessels in Home Waters._ │ _5th Battle Squadron._ │ _Battleships._ 8 Formidables (4–12 inch). │5 Wittelsbachs. │5 Kaiser Class (old) (5–9·4 inch). _6th Battle Squadron._ │2 Brandenburgs (6–11 inch). 2 Lord Nelsons (4–12 inch; 10–9·2 │ inch). │ 5 Duncans │4–12 inch. │ 1 Glory │ │ │ _7th Battle Squadron._ │ 4 Majestics (4–12 inch). │ │ _8th Battle Squadron._ │ 1 Majestic (4–12 inch). │ 5 Glory. │ 4 Light Cruisers were attached to │ the Battle Squadrons. │ │ _7th Cruiser Squadron._ │ _Cruisers._ 5 Cressys (2–9·2 inch; 12–6 inch). │2 Roons (4–8·2 inch; 10–5·9 inch). │2 Prinz Adalbert (4–8·2 inch; │ 10–5·9 inch). _12th Cruiser Squadron._ │ 3 Talbots (11–6 inch). │1 Prinz Heinrich (2–9·4 inch; │ 10–5·9 inch). 1 Charybdis (2–6 inch; 8–4·7 inch) │ (patrolling west end of Channel).│ │ _Dover Patrol._ │ _Light Cruisers._ 2 Light Cruisers. │12 Vessels, with armaments of 10 or │ 12–4·1 inch guns. 22 Destroyers. │ │ _11th Cruiser Squadron._ │ 5 Talbots (11–6 inch) (on the coast│ of Ireland). │ │ _10th Cruiser Squadron._ │ 8 Crescents (Northern Patrol). │ │ _Patrol Flotillas on East Coast._ │ _Destroyers._ 3 Light Cruisers. │67 available for coast patrol, │ service in Baltic, etc. 48 Destroyers. │ 24 Torpedo Boats. │ │ _Submarines._ │ _Submarines._ 65, organised in 8 Flotillas, 7 │ Flotillas for Coast Defence, 1 │27 serviceable. for Overseas operations. │

APPENDIX C MEMORANDUM BY THE FIRST LORD ON TRADE PROTECTION ON AND AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

_Written August 23, 1913, Revised April, 1914_

1. The first security for British merchant ships must be the superiority of the British Navy which should enable us to cover in peace, and hunt down and bring to battle in war, every enemy’s warship which attempts to keep the seas. A policy of vigorous offence against the enemy’s warships wherever stationed, will give immediately far greater protection to British traders than large numbers of vessels scattered sparsely about in an attitude of weak and defensive expectancy. This should be enjoined as the first duty of all British warships. Enemy’s cruisers cannot live in the oceans for any length of time. They cannot coal at sea with any certainty. They cannot make many prizes without much steaming; and in these days of W. T. their whereabouts will be constantly reported. If British cruisers of superior speed are hunting them, they cannot do much harm before they are brought to action. Very few German Town Class cruisers are assigned to foreign stations for this work. If others are detached from the North Sea, and get out safely, we shall be able to detach a larger proportion of the similar British cruisers which have been hitherto opposing them there. They cannot afford to send away many without crippling their battle fleet.

2. As for enemy’s armed merchantmen or merchantmen converted into cruisers for commerce destruction, the only answer to that is to have an equal number of British merchant vessels plying on the trade routes armed and commissioned to engage them when met with. The whole of this threat is very shadowy. Whether the German vessels have their guns on board is extremely doubtful. Not a scrap of evidence has been forthcoming during the last year and a half in spite of every effort to procure it. How are they to be converted on the high seas? Where are they to get rid of their passengers? Are they to take hundreds of non-combatants with them on what the stronger naval Power may well treat as a piratical enterprise? Where are they to coal? To say that we have to maintain a large cruiser fleet to deal with this danger appears extravagant in the highest degree. All that is needed is to arm a similar number of British merchant vessels of the right speed and make arrangements to commission these for their own defence and that of other British ships in their neighbourhood and on their route. The presence of these vessels plying always in considerable numbers along the regular trade routes will from the very outset of the war, and however suddenly it may begin, provide a constant and immediate counter to enemy armed merchantmen, and probably deter them from any injurious action.

3. But the best safeguard for the maintenance of British trade in war is the large number of merchant ships engaged in trading, and the immense number of harbours in the United Kingdom they can approach by ocean routes. This makes any serious interruption by enemy’s commerce destroyers impossible. We must rely on numbers and averages. Provided that we can induce all these ships to put to sea and carry on their business boldly, and provided that they are warned in time and encouraged to leave the regular trade routes and travel wide of them, very few captures will be made even in the early days of the war.

4. It is no use distributing isolated cruisers about the vast ocean spaces. To produce any result from such a method would require hundreds of cruisers. The ocean is itself the best protection. We must recognise that we cannot specifically protect trade routes; we can only protect confluences. The only safe trade routes in war are those which the enemy has not discovered and those upon which he has been exterminated. There are areas where the trade necessarily converges and narrow channels through which it must pass; and these defiles or terminals of the trade routes should be made too dangerous for enemy’s commerce destroyers to approach, by employing our older cruisers in adequate force so as to create an effective sanctuary, control or catchment for our trading ships. These areas should be judiciously selected so as to husband our resources, and not with a view to finding employment for as many old cruisers as possible. It may be taken for certain that no enemy’s armed merchantman unless possessed of exceptional speed will dare to approach the area where he may encounter a British cruiser. Many of our old cruisers steam 19 knots. The number of German merchantmen which steam more is not large. As for the enemy’s warships and his few exceptionally fast vessels, they must be marked down and hunted by fast modern vessels which are concerned with nothing else but to bring them to action.

5. British attacks on the German trade are a comparatively unimportant feature in our operations, and British cruisers should not engage in them to the prejudice of other duties. Economic pressure will be put on Germany by the distant blockade of her shores which will cut off her trade, both export and import, as a whole. If this is effectively done it is of very little consequence to us whether individual German vessels are captured as prizes, or whether they take refuge in neutral harbours till the end of the war. It is reasonable to suppose that German merchant ships, other than those armed and commissioned for warlike purposes, will run for neutral harbours as soon as war breaks out, and that very few will attempt under the German flag to return home running the gauntlet of the numerous British fleets operating in the North Sea.

6. Protection will be afforded to British seaborne trade in time of war by the following measures:—

A. Hunting down of enemy’s warships and armed vessels.

Every German cruiser stationed abroad should be covered in peace and brought to action in war by a superior vessel of superior speed, or alternatively by two equal vessels having speed advantage.

B. Organised warning of British merchant vessels.

All British armed merchantmen plying on the routes will, on receiving the warning telegram by wireless, open their secret instructions which direct them to steam along their regular route warning all unarmed British vessels met with to leave the trade route, and steam without lights at night, keeping well away from their usual course, avoiding company, and making their own way to their port of destination.

7. Similar warnings and directions adapted to each case and each route will be issued by British Consuls at all ports. These should be prepared beforehand in the fullest detail and according to a general scheme. For instance, the British Consul at Buenos Ayres should have separate instructions all ready prepared for every British ship leaving the port for the United Kingdom. These instructions will be regularly kept up to date by the Trade Division of the Admiralty War Staff. They will prescribe for each ship the general course she is to follow, the portions of the voyage she should endeavour to cover in darkness, and the areas within which she will find safety. A good wireless organisation can, of course, deal at once with all vessels so fitted. Thus the unarmed trade will, in the first week of the war, be effectively scattered over immense areas of ocean.

The control and guidance of merchant traffic must, of course, vary with circumstances. There are two quite different situations to consider. The first is that which occurs at the moment of a sudden outbreak of war. We must assume that hostilities begin by surprise, and that the enemy’s commerce destroyers, whether warships or armed merchantmen, will begin their attacks within a very few hours of the first warning being given. None of our Third Fleet cruisers will be on their stations. The only vessels available will be the ordinary foreign squadrons and the fast cruisers shadowing individual German warships, and these will probably not be in positions which have any special relation to the trade routes. None of the British converted auxiliary merchant cruisers will be on the routes: the only thing that will be there and that can be there are the defensive armed merchantmen. In these circumstances it seems probable that the best course would be to scatter the trade; and it is in any case essential that we should have the power to do so, and that all arrangements should be made to that end.

8. When, however, the war has been in progress for some time, and in proportion as our available force increases and we pass from a peace to a war organisation, it may well be that the scattering of the trade will no longer be necessary or even desirable, except perhaps locally between special points. Trading vessels would then be told to return to their regular trade routes; and this might easily lead to drawing such commerce destroyers as then remain into areas where they could be reported, located, and destroyed, by the British cruisers.

9. The organisation for the control and guidance of the trade should therefore be of so complete a character that the trade may be either dispersed about the ocean or concentrated along particular routes; or in some places dispersed and in other concentrated; and that changes from one policy to the other can be made when necessary at any time.

10. The British armed merchantman will only be employed on a strictly limited service, namely, that of carrying food supplies to the United Kingdom. They will be forbidden to engage enemy’s warships and are to surrender if overtaken by them. They will not molest or pursue unarmed ships of the enemy. They will only fire on enemy’s armed merchantmen if they are themselves attacked or pursued by them.

The result of these arrangements will be that the enemy’s armed merchantmen will either have to scatter in haphazard search for prizes, or run into a succession of armed British vessels plying the usual route, finding prizes few and far between on the first course, and nothing but kicks on the other.

11. C. As soon as possible after the outbreak of war a sufficient number of British merchant ships or liners of high speed, selected and prepared beforehand, will be converted into auxiliary cruisers and commissioned for the further policing of the trade routes, and incidentally or if desired to prey on enemy’s commerce. These vessels will be taken over on the same or similar basis as the Cunarders. They will differ from the armed merchantmen in ‘B,’ in that their duties will not be limited to self-defence and warning; they will be directly employed in hunting down enemy’s armed merchantmen; they may be used offensively against enemy’s trade; they will not carry on their ordinary business; they will be wholly taken over by and maintained by the Admiralty; they will be officered and manned by the Royal Navy, will fly the White Ensign, and execute the orders of the Admiralty.

12. D. While we have a large supply of older cruisers, they may be employed in protecting the approaches to the principal trade terminals, and at certain special points. These cruisers will be additional to any fast modern British vessels employed on the general service of hunting down individual German cruisers. They will neglect no opportunity of engaging enemy’s warships or armed merchantmen. They may be at any time withdrawn from their areas by the Admiralty for such a purpose. Only the older ships will be employed on this service; and as they wear out, control will be maintained by a smaller number of new, fast vessels employed on the general and primary service of hunting down the enemy’s warships.

13. E. The last but indispensable condition of maintaining British food supplies and British trade in time of war, is that British traders should send their ships to sea, and from the very beginning of the war press forward boldly on their regular business. The question of encouraging them to do this by means of a system of State Insurance under certain restrictions to guard against fraud, is now being considered by a Sub-Committee of the C.I.D. We have expressed on behalf of the Board of Admiralty the strongest opinion in favour of the adoption of such a system, it being essential to all our arrangements that very large numbers of British vessels, undeterred by a small proportion of captures, should continue to traverse the seas under the British flag.

In exceptional cases convoys will, if necessary, be organised under escort of Third Fleet vessels. It is hoped, however, that this cumbrous and inconvenient measure will not be required.

W. S. C.

_April, 1914._

APPENDIX D MINING

In order to combat the many unwise proposals which were pressed upon me at this time to squander our small stock of mines, I drew up the following paper with which I endeavoured to repel the demands from the Cabinet, the Admiralty and the Fleet. I am aware that these views will be disputed, and I shall no doubt be told that the experience of the later stages of the war has disproved them. I still believe, however, that they were sound and truly applicable to the circumstances of 1914. But I go further and declare that the reasoning held good all through 1915, and 1916. If I am reminded that as part of the life and death struggle against the German submarines in 1917, we were led into a mining policy on a scale so gigantic as dwarfed every previous scheme, and if as the result of this huge diversion of our resources a certain number of German submarines were destroyed, still I assert that these conditions would never have arisen if a proper offensive had been developed by the Royal Navy, as would have been possible at far less cost. All being said, I take my stand as I wrote to Fisher on the _dictum_ ‘Mine in Haste and Sweep at Leisure.’

NOTES BY THE FIRST LORD

Mining is mainly of two kinds, ambush mining and blockade mining.

_Ambush Mining._

Ambush mining depends on the whereabouts of the field remaining unknown. These mines may be scattered about in patches, or short lines in the neighbourhood of the enemy’s ports or of the approaches to your own ports or landing places on the chance of enemy ships running into them. This chance is not great. The seas are very large; the area mined, even if on a great scale, very small. The chances of preserving secrecy long are not great, and most ambush minefields are soon discovered by merchant ships, or other craft of no military value, being blown up by them. On the other hand, every patch of mines soon hampers the movement of the stronger fleet. The position of the minefields cannot be accurately known. There is very often a tendency for them to drag with their anchors in tide and sea. Also ships cannot always be sure of their positions, and very often when out of sight of land, in weather unsuited to taking observations of the sun, 15, 20, or 30 miles’ error in position may easily arise. The fact that you know generally where your own mines are and when you are getting near their area, but do not exactly know where they are, or exactly where you are, tends to paralyse your own movements, and might easily prevent effective action against or the interception of the enemy’s fleet should it put to sea. The conclusion to be drawn is that ambush mines should be very sparingly used, chiefly in sight of land, and that not very much is to be expected from them. The general failure, so far as our present experience goes, of the German policy of ambush mining with which they opened the war illustrates the truth of these conclusions. The only British warship, apart from the gunboat _Speedy_ (which was actually engaged in fishing up mines), lost by this agency has been the _Amphion_, and she was drifted out of her course on to the very minefield whose position she knew and which she was endeavouring to avoid.

This is not by any means to decry the use of ambush mines as an immediate part of a concerted tactical combination. It is for this purpose mainly that the British Fleet mine-layers are organised. To lay mines in the course of an enemy before or during a battle, or across his homeward path if he has put to sea, may be operations of the greatest consequence and value, and it would be most unwise to deplete them of their not too extensive store of mines, which should be reserved for this purpose, and not squandered on promiscuous and haphazard uses.

One more class of ambush mines deserves to be noted. A few scattered about on trade routes and off enemy or neutral ports, if well advertised and enforced by a few ships actually blown up, may exercise a very effective deterrent on neutral commerce which may be of use to the enemy.

_Blockade Mining._

It is not possible to blockade a modern fleet by mining, even on a very large scale, unless superior force is maintained in the neighbourhood of the minefield to prevent or oppose the mines being removed. In the days when Admiral Togo mined the debouches from Port Arthur the submarine did not exist, and it was possible to maintain a close and constant watch on the minefields, so that even if he was unable to stop the enemy removing the mines he knew when they were doing so, and this perhaps gave some clue to their future intentions. Even so, the Russian Fleet put to sea whenever they wanted to. It would not be possible to keep such a watch now without exposing the vessels so engaged to almost certain destruction from the enemy’s submarines. Further, blockade mining is more effective the closer in it is to the enemy’s ports, and therefore the watching vessels would be continually exposed not only to the attacks of the submarines, but to a greatly superior force of enemy destroyers and light cruisers. In order to maintain them against this, appropriate supports would have to be kept close at hand in proper tactical relation and brought up as the need arose, with the result that more and more ships of greater value would be drawn into the most dangerous area of the enemy’s submarine activities, and considerable operations would develop in waters less suited to us and most favourable to the enemy.

But if the minefield is not watched, the enemy has no difficulty in proceeding to sea at any time he chooses. He will soon learn the existence of the minefield, because one or two small craft will be blown up on it. In the British Fleet the regular mine-sweepers can sweep a clear channel ahead of the Fleet at a rate of 12 knots an hour through any minefield. The Germans have not used, as we have, old gunboats converted as mine-sweepers, but have built a special class of good, fast vessels. It must therefore be assumed that they could sweep a channel at least as quickly as, and probably quicker than, we could. They could therefore proceed to sea at any time if they wished to do so, and with scarcely any delay. Also, if they did not wish immediately to proceed to sea, they could sweep a channel through the minefield of which they would know the existence, and which, being in close contact with land where actual bearings could be obtained, they could follow exactly, and so have continued means of ingress and egress. We, on the other hand, would not know where this channel was, and would be prevented from approaching by the known existence of our own field. The conclusion is that it is not possible by blockade mines to stop a fleet from putting to sea, even if that were what we wanted to do.

Still less is it possible to stop the enemy’s submarines from putting to sea, either by ambush mines or blockade mines. The rise and fall of the tide between high and low water makes a minefield ineffective against shallow-draft craft for half the twenty-four hours. The distance of 50 yards, which is the usual interval between mines, is five times the breadth of a submarine. By diving to 50 feet, the chance of contact with the mine is removed, and only the lesser danger of fouling the moorings remains. It is perfectly easy to sweep a channel for submarines, as for other vessels, at any time. Where there is any uncertainty about the whereabouts of a minefield, trawlers, or small merchant ships with a very few people on board, can go ahead of the submarines and pilot them out. If necessary, vessels could be specially prepared as mine-bumpers, with a kind of cow-catcher apparatus in front of them. We are experimenting with five different methods of fitting ships for mine-bumping, and shall very soon have a number of vessels which can go almost with impunity into a minefield. British submarines have frequently traversed, wittingly and unwittingly, the German minefields around Heligoland, and German submarines are probably traversing our southern mined area with indifference, and impunity, at the present time.

On the other hand, it is a curious truth that your own minefield is a greater deterrent to your own operations than to those of the enemy. You have put it down yourself, so you do not want to sweep it up. You know where it is, though not very accurately. You instinctively try to avoid the waters you have yourself fouled. Nothing has been more valuable than the searching and relentless watching maintained in the Heligoland Bight by our submarines since the beginning of the war. Its vigilance and efficiency have defeated themselves by forcing the Germans to retire actually inside their basins and canal, and thus depriving our submarines of any targets. It would be a great pity to hamper them in their work and expose them to additional dangers for the sake of such vain and illusory precautions. The weak passive defence of mines cannot for a moment be compared as a military measure with the enterprising offensive of submarines.

The above considerations also apply to suggested schemes for shutting submarines in by a network of mines fastened together by wire. Mine-sweepers or mine-bumpers would force a channel through this as easily as through ordinary lines of mines, the only difference being that several being dragged along by the string would be exploded at the same time. Also it is evident that the limitations of this form of defence cannot be carried very far on account of the enormous quantities of material and explosives required. It would be very difficult and dangerous to lay in close proximity to the enemy’s ports and fleets. The process would be slow; the losses certain, and it could in any case block only a very small portion of the 100–mile broad mouth of the Heligoland Bight. Devices of this character may, however, be useful in defending one’s own harbours, and making anchorages submarine-proof, where we can, by our superior strength, prevent our arrangements from being interfered with. A variety of these methods are at present in use, and are being rapidly extended and developed. The following seven principal expedients are being applied:—

(1) Sinking ships with cement or stone in such a way as to form an absolute breakwater and barrier like the mole of a harbour.

(2) Electrical contact mines strung very closely together, and capable of being made dangerous or safe by the current being switched on or off.

(3) Barges or piles, with torpedo nets attached to them.

(4) Loose wire nets of very large mesh, not fastened at either end, which clog round a submarine and entangle it.

(5) Network arrangement, with explosives attached.

(6) Network arrangements, with upright floating spars, which also entangle the submarine.

(7) Long lengths of fishing nets, particularly Portuguese tunny nets, which operate in the same way.

As the war progresses, we shall gradually improvise the torpedo-proof harbours, of which, except on our southern coast, we are now entirely destitute.

I explained to the Cabinet the quantities of mines which we had in store, and which were available in the future. The experience of the last three months seems to justify the partial and limited reliance put by the Admiralty upon mining as a method of warfare.

W. S. C.

_October, 1914._

APPENDIX E FIRST LORD’S MINUTES

_Formation of the Royal Naval Division_

Secretary. First Sea Lord. Second Sea Lord.

In order to make the best possible use of the surplus naval reservists of different classes, it is proposed to constitute permanent cadres of one marine and two naval brigades. The marine brigade has already been partially formed in four battalions, aggregating 1,880 active service men. To this will be added an approximately equal number of reservists, making the total strength of the brigade 3,900, organised in four battalions of four double companies of approximately 250 men. The two naval brigades will also consist of four battalions, each, if possible, of 880 men, organised in sixteen double companies of 220. The composition of each battalion should be as follows:—

R.N.V.R. 375 R.F.R. (picked, under 30 years of age) 313 R.N.R. 190

The total numbers required for the two naval brigades would therefore be:—

R.N.V.R. 3,000 R.F.R. 2,500 R.N.R. 1,500

The marine brigade will be commanded by a Colonel, and each battalion by a Lieutenant-Colonel; each company by a Major and a Captain. The means of remedying the shortage of junior officers will be dealt with separately. About fifty new subalterns, R.M., must be entered either permanently or on a three years’ or till the war stops engagement.

Each naval brigade will be commanded by a Captain, R.N.; five of the battalions by a Commander or naval officer promoted to that rank, and three by R.N.V.R. Commanders; each company will be commanded by a Lieutenant-Commander, R.N. or R.N.V.R., or, if these are not forthcoming, by a Major, R.M. The question of making good deficiencies in these and in the marine brigade will be dealt with separately. There are, however, available 50 R.N.V.R. Lieutenants, 66 Sub-Lieutenants, and 12 Midshipmen; total, 128. About 50 more officers would be required.

The use of these brigades need not be considered until the organisation has advanced sufficiently to allow of their military value to be judged.

The formation of these brigades should be completed so far as resources allow in the present week. The officers commanding the companies and battalions must be appointed forthwith. The first essential is to get the men drilling together in brigades; and the deficiencies of various ranks in the battalions can be filled up later. It may ultimately be found possible in the course of the war to build up all battalions of the marine and naval brigades to the army strength of 1,070, and the organisation will readily adapt itself to this. All the men, whether sailors or marines, while training in the three brigades will be available if required for service afloat, and it must be distinctly understood that this is the paramount claim upon them; but in the meanwhile they will be left to be organised for land service.

W. S. C.

_August 16, 1914._

ACTION OF AUGUST 28

Secretary. First Sea Lord. Third Sea Lord. Director of Naval Ordnance.

1. Let me have an estimate of how long it will take to refit for service in every particular the vessels damaged in the recent action. Careful attention should be paid to the wishes and suggestions of the officers who fought them, in order that everything possible can be done to increase their fighting efficiency.

2. The failure of the 4–inch guns in the _Arethusa_ is most serious, and must be thoroughly investigated. I am informed that it arose both from the breaking of the ejector catches, of which there were no spares, and secondly from the coating of the cartridge cases, which gradually fouled the gun. At one critical moment only one 4–inch gun could fire, and but for her 6–inch guns the Arethusa would have been destroyed. I wish to receive a statement showing that an effective remedy has been provided.

3. Every effort should be made while the ships are refitting to give the officers and men a few days’ leave. The nervous strain of a modern action is considerable, and a change of scene is required to restore poise and resiliency.

W. S. C.

_August 30, 1914._

Secretary. First Sea Lord. Chief of Staff.

(1) Selections might be made from all the reports of this action, beginning with some of the submarine reconnaissance reports which the Prime Minister has repeatedly urged me to publish. All interesting matter which can be made public without detriment to the future should be collected, circulated to the Fleet, and published in the newspapers.

(2) The criticism in the Commander-in-Chief’s report and various references to discrepancies in the arrangements which occur in Commodore S’s and other statements must all be kept absolutely secret. Mistakes are always made in war, but there is no need to weaken confidence by dwelling on them after success has been obtained. The Senior Officers concerned in the manœuvre should, however, all have the opportunity of studying the full reports in order that every effort may be made to improve arrangements in the future. Beyond this profoundly secret circle no whisper must go.

(3) I am awaiting your recommendations for honours, promotions, and rewards to be accorded to the officers and men who distinguished themselves in this fortunate and skilful enterprise.

W. S. C.

_September 6, 1914._

SEPARATION ALLOWANCES FOR THE NAVY

Financial Secretary.

I have to-day obtained the assent of the Cabinet in principle to the granting of a separation allowance to the whole Navy at once. The scale should be the full Army scale less any deductions which should be made on account of higher pay and allowances the sailor may receive as compared with the soldier. These details are to be settled between the Admiralty and the Treasury. I regard the matter as one of prime importance and urgency.

It is, of course, understood that the present decision only authorises the payment of a separation allowance during the period of active service, and that the question of what is to happen in time of peace is not prejudiced.

I wish you to take up this question in conjunction with the Accountant-General and the Naval Branch and make me your proposals in the course of to-morrow. It will be a great fillip to our sailors when this great boon to them is announced to the Fleet, as I hope it may be, in the next few days. Pray press it forward by every means in your power, acting with the Treasury and calling me in where there is a hitch or difficulty.

W. S. C.

_September 4, 1914._

Financial Secretary.

The Cabinet decided that evidence of allotment regularly made should decide whether the Separation Allowance should be paid or not, and that legal marriage is not indispensable. Where it is clear that the woman has been dependent on the man, and the man has recognised this tie by a regular allotment, the legality of the marriage will be assumed.

W. S. C.

_September 19, 1914._

ENEMY RESERVISTS

Secretary.

Please inquire who was responsible for allowing a merchant ship from Buenos Ayres with 400 German reservists on board, to pass Gibraltar and to convey them to Italian ports, whence they left to join their units. How was it that these men were not arrested and made prisoners of war when passing the Straits?

W. S. C.

_September 5, 1914._

LIFE-BELTS

Secretary. First Sea Lord. Fourth Sea Lord. Chief of Staff.

The sinking of the _Pathfinder_ shows how important it is that there should be more life-belts or life-buoys available on our ships. Many lives would have been saved in this case if such steps had been taken. I don’t like the German system of going into action with life-belts on, but there certainly ought to be in the boats and on the deck of British ships something like 100 life-belts or life-buoys which could be seized and would float overboard if the vessel foundered.

Pray let me have a proposal.

W. S. C.

_September 10, 1914._

SUBMARINE HONOURS

Secretary. Naval Secretary. First Sea Lord.

Since it is difficult to choose which man in a submarine has done specially well, it is necessary that the decoration should be given to the boat, and that the men should ballot among themselves to decide who is to have it.

W. S. C.

_September 17, 1914._

BLOCKADE

Secretary. First Sea Lord. A.C.L. C.O.S. and others.

A standing Admiralty Committee will be formed under the presidency of the Additional Civil Lord, to be called ‘The Restriction of Enemies’ Supplies Committee,’ composed as follows:—

One representative of the Trade Division of the War Staff.

One representative of the Foreign Office.

One representative of the Board of Trade.

Mr. Alan Burgoyne, M.P.

Mr. C. Money, M.P.

The duties of this Committee will be to examine and watch continually all means or routes by which supplies of food or raw material may reach Germany and Austria; to report weekly all importations or exportations to and from these countries coming to their knowledge; and to recommend by what methods, financial, commercial, diplomatic, and military, they may be hampered, restricted, and, if possible, stopped. Measures should, in the first instance, be recommended to secure full and accurate information from day to day of all vessels unloading cargoes which may ultimately reach Germany or Austria at neutral ports, and the port of Rotterdam especially, as well as the possibility of supplies coming through a northern part of Sweden or from Sweden itself across the Baltic, or through Norway and Denmark. Holland must be the subject of the closest study, it being clearly impossible for the British Government to allow the neutral port of Rotterdam to serve as a base of supplies to the enemy. Trustworthy agents in Holland must be obtained or dispatched thither for this purpose. Any possible importation overland through Italy or up the Adriatic must be included in the survey.

Funds will be forthcoming for any special action required.

The Committee should hold its first meeting on Friday, the 14th, using a committee room at the Admiralty.

A.C.L. to nominate his own Secretary, and make all further arrangements to carry this minute into effect.

W. S. C.

_August 13, 1914._

MUNITIONS

Lord Kitchener.

Captain Hankey, of the Committee of Imperial Defence, has been to me with what seems rather a good idea. He suggests that Girouard should be put at the head of an emergency armament multiplication committee or department, to set on foot and develop the maximum possible output of guns, rifles, ammunition, etc. I am sure, myself, that more could be done by the firms than is being done at present. For instance, after you told me of the pressure you had put upon them and that their complete limits had been reached, our people went round and obtained undertakings from the trade to produce 700 rifles a week more, additional to all that had been ordered by you.

This is only a half-formed idea, and I pass it on to you not as a recommendation, but simply for what it is worth.

W. S. C.

_September 3, 1914._

UNITED STATES NEUTRALITY

Sir Edward Grey.

Please see attached.

I should be so glad if you could see your way to making a strong stand against this. Even if we ultimately have to give way, the fact that they will have overruled our protest will, in the existing balance of public opinion in the United States, make them desirous of being helpful, or at any rate not unfriendly, on other points at issue.

Our case is clear. The Germans have announced their intention, have endeavoured on a large scale, and have partially begun, to arm merchant ships as commerce destroyers, and they even claim to carry out this process of arming and equipping in neutral harbours or on the high seas. We have been forced in consequence of this to arm a number of our ships in self-defence. In doing this we follow the undoubted law of the seas as it was practised in all the great wars of the past. We claim that by international law a merchant ship armed in her own defence, so long as she takes no aggressive action, is entitled to the full status of a peaceful trading ship. We ask that our ships so armed for this purpose shall be accorded that status in the neutral ports of the world. We are quite willing to agree that German merchant ships similarly armed in self-defence shall be similarly treated. It is only when merchant ships are armed and commissioned as auxiliary cruisers, not for purposes of self-defence, but for those of commerce destruction, that we claim they should be treated as ships of war. And here again we ask no better treatment for ourselves than for the enemy.

We recognise the natural difficulty to a neutral State, anxious to preserve a strict impartiality, of discerning whether ships carrying the same armament are intended for offensive or defensive action. We offer that this question should be decided by a simple and practical test. If the armed merchant ship is engaged in ordinary commerce, discharging and taking a regular cargo, and embarking passengers in the usual way, she should be counted as a trader in spite of her armament. If, on the other hand, she is not engaged in commerce, is not doing the ordinary things she would do and has done in times of peace, but is either carrying special cargoes of coal and stores to belligerent cruisers on the high seas, or is travelling in ballast, or is not trafficking in her cargo in the natural way, then we say she should be treated as a ship of war, even if the Government of the State whose flag she flies declares that she is only armed and will only fight in self-defence. We must therefore hold a neutral Government impeccable if she allows a German armed merchantman, which takes a regular cargo in the ordinary way, to arm in her ports or leave them for the high seas, even if subsequently that vessel engages not merely in self-defence, but in actual aggressive attack. Neutrals who deal with ships according to the ‘Cargo Test’ must be held blameless by us whatever the subsequent careers of the vessels may be. The issues which remain open after these ships have put to sea can only be decided between the belligerents.

The second point that I hope you will be able to fight is: no transference after the declaration of war of enemy’s ships to a neutral flag, as agreed upon in the Declaration of London. We cannot recognise such transferences, which are plainly, in the nature of things, designed to enable the transferred ship to obtain under the neutral flag an immunity from the conditions created by the war.

I would earnestly ask that both these points should be pressed now in the most direct and formal manner on Powers concerned, and particularly upon the United States, and that very great pressure should be exerted.

In this connection it may be pointed out that the United States have already allowed one or more ships, including the _Kronprinz Wilhelm_, to leave their ports armed, denuded of cargo, and cleared for action, and that to stop British ships of a self-defensive character is showing a partiality to one of the belligerents incompatible with fair and loyal neutrality. If to this is to be added the attempt which Mr. Bryan has made, by his personal intervention, to take over the Hamburg-American liners from Germany and run them under the American flag, it seems to me clear that a situation has arisen which, in the ultimate issues, ought, in some form or other, to be brought publicly before the people of the United States. I am under no illusions as to their attitude, but the forces at work there in the present circumstances are such as to make it impossible for any Government to load the dice against England, or go openly one inch beyond an even neutrality.

I venture to suggest to you that this position ought to be fought up to the point of full publicity, and by every means and influence at our disposal, before we are forced to consider the various inferior alternatives which no doubt exist.

W. S. C.

_August 19, 1914._

Secretary. First Sea Lord. Admiral Slade. Chief of Staff. Captain Webb.

The Cabinet decided this morning that we must abandon, under protest and as an exception, the running of defensively-armed merchantmen to American ports. We do this on the assumption that we in no way waive the principle, but in consideration of the fact that the United States are preventing a large number of German ships suitable for armament from fitting out. We must also stipulate that the guns, having been landed from these ships, shall be returned without their mountings in some other non-military vessel on which and from which they clearly cannot be used during the voyage.

Pray draft a note to the Foreign Office accordingly.

W. S. C.

_September 3, 1914._

THE BRITISH PATROL OFF NEW YORK

Secretary. First Sea Lord. Chief of Staff. Admiral Slade.

I have felt uncomfortable about this for some time. Although it is strictly legal, it must be very galling to the Americans to see their capital port picketed in this way. Instructions should be given that the patrolling cruisers should usually keep 8 or 10 miles away, or even farther if possible, and should only close in occasionally when there is some special need. They should, above all, be careful never to infringe the 3–mile limit, and should discharge their duties with tact, remembering how greatly British interests are concerned in the maintenance of good relations with the United States. On the other hand, the closest watch should be kept on shore upon the Hamburg-American liners, and our cruisers should be given the earliest warning if these are seen to be getting up steam. It ought to be quite easy to give our cruisers full warning of any movement. The prevention of these Hamburg-American liners leaving armed and fuelled is practically the whole duty of our vessels off New York; and as long as they are in a position to discharge this they need not be too obtrusive in their other duties.

W. S. C.

_October 26, 1914._

ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES

_Dover._

First Sea Lord and others.

It is intolerable that we should be told that Dover is not safe against submarine attack. It is the only military harbour we have except Portland. We must be able to keep ships there safely. Measures are being taken to close one of the entrances by sinking two ships. This is urgent and vital, and should be pressed forward from hour to hour without a moment’s pause. The other entrance should have an anti-submarine net and gate arranged. If the boom defence has carried away it must be repaired and replaced by night-and-day exertions. Meanwhile the long barges fitted with nets which have been prepared at Dunkirk should be brought over as soon as the weather allows, and used either to block the entrance or to give net-protection to ships lying inside.

W. S. C.

_November 1, 1914._

HIGH-EXPLOSIVE PRODUCTION

A.C.L.

You must act in this matter and refer to me only when special need arises. The points to be held in view are clear and simple:—

1. We must have effective Government control of all the explosive works, so as to attain the maximum output, and ensure our not being hampered by German influences, which are powerful and subtle in the Explosive Trust.

2. Naval interests must be properly safeguarded, and this can only be either by the Navy taking Nobels and the other two companies, or by an absolutely equal representation and control as between the two Departments over the whole of the explosive factories combined. We cannot be placed in the position of being overborne by the military authorities, and having our necessary demands set aside.

3. It is, however, our duty to do everything in our power to aid in the expansion of the Army and the production of war material for the conduct of the campaign, and at a certain point only State policy can decide whether naval or military interests are to claim priority.

4. We must make a good bargain for the country; and if these people are financed by Government money to set up great new works and broaden the scale of their business, good arrangements should be made to transfer these works to the Government at the end of the war.

W. S. C.

_November 9, 1914._

THE DUMMY FLEET

(_Most Secret._) Secretary. First Sea Lord. Third Sea Lord. Director of Naval Construction. Naval Secretary.

It is necessary to construct without delay a dummy fleet: 10 merchant vessels, either German prizes or British ships, should be selected at once. They should be distributed among various private yards not specially burdened with warship building at the present time. They are then to be mocked up to represent particular battleships of the 1st and 2nd Battle Squadrons. The actual size need not correspond exactly, as it is notoriously difficult to judge the size of vessels at sea, and frequently even destroyers are mistaken for cruisers. We are bearing in mind particularly aerial and periscope observations, where deception is much more easy. It is not necessary that the structures should be strong enough to stand rough weather. Very little metal would be required, and practically the whole work should be executed in wood or canvas. The ships would move under their own power under favourable conditions of weather from one base to another, and even when the enemy knows that we have such a fleet its presence will tend to mystify and confuse his plans and baffle and distract the enterprise of his submarines. He will always be in doubt as to which is the real and which is the dummy fleet. An attack upon the dummy fleet can be made not less dangerous than an attack upon the real fleet by the proper use of our own submarines and destroyers with towing charges, and possibly by traps of nets and mines.

The matter is urgent. Three years ago I formed this idea, and deeply regret that I have been so long deterred from putting it into execution. The Third Sea Lord, Fourth Sea Lord, and Naval Secretary will meet to-day under the Third Sea Lord, and formulate detailed proposals for immediate action. The utmost secrecy must be observed, and special measures taken to banish all foreigners from the districts where the mocking-up is being done. I should hope to receive the list of ships which are selected for conversion to-morrow morning, and the list of firms among whom the work will be parcelled out during the course of that day. Estimates of cost and time should also be made, but paint, canvas, and woodwork can be quickly done, and I should expect in a fortnight, or at the outside in three weeks, that 10 vessels will be actually at our tactical disposal.

W. S. C.

_October 21, 1914._

THE COASTAL PATROL

Secret. First Sea Lord.

If the system of working the patrol flotillas explained in the enclosed memorandum, has actually been enforced, it is in complete violation not only of the obvious principles of war, but of all the orders and directions issued on this subject during the last three years. The word ‘distribution’ applied to armed force implies the most vicious ideas. To proceed by dividing the front to be watched by the number of destroyers available for watching and working out the number of miles to the destroyers is the negation of good sense and military principle.

Ever since the Manœuvres of 1912 I have repeatedly explained the principles which should govern the working of the patrol flotillas (_see_ attached papers), and these have been expounded to the C.I.D. and issued to the War Staff with the full concurrence of the First Sea Lord and the C.O.S. If there has been a departure from these principles and an adoption of the barbarous method of ‘distributing’ the destroyers along the whole coast in a single row like toy soldiers on the kitchen table, this shows a total lack of comprehension.

It must again be repeated:—

1. That the coast, with its cyclists, signal stations, and watchers, is the line of observation, and the only line of observation, which can certainly report the arrival of an enemy;

2. That the patrol flotillas, both of submarines and destroyers, instead of being frittered away on useless cordon and patrolling duties, should be kept concentrated and ready for action at selected sally-ports along the coast, ready to proceed in force to any point where shore information shows that an enemy is attempting to land;

3. That there is to be nothing like routine or sentry-go patrolling, except at the mouths of harbours, and that from time to time occasional good bold reconnaissances 60, 70, and 80 miles out to seaward should be pushed from each sallyport by the whole of the boats available, varied occasionally by the prying scouting of a single destroyer;

4. That the prevention of mine-laying can only be done by trawlers, who must summon help from the nearest patrol centre if necessary.

It must be recognised that nothing in our dispositions prevents an enemy from approaching the British coasts with transports, and beginning a landing there, but that if the flotillas are properly handled he should be attacked within a few hours by submarines and destroyers, and that the numbers and strength of the forces against him should continually increase until long before any considerable force can be landed the enemy’s transports and escort would be overwhelmed, and those who are landed hopelessly cut off. The only alternative to this policy of letting the enemy begin to land and then attacking him while his landing is in progress is the close blockade of the Heligoland Bight. There is much to be said for and against both courses, but the intermediate course of ‘distributing’ a weak and thin cordon of patrols at a short distance from the coast in the hopes of putting up some defensive shield or screen is utterly futile.

The policy at present approved is to concentrate the flotillas at fixed points and keep them strong and fresh and fit for action, while relying upon the coast watch to give early and accurate information of any attack by the enemy. If this policy be adhered to strictly and simply it will not be found impossible to spare the 12 destroyers which the Commander-in-Chief needs. It is, however, to be considered whether they could not better be taken from the two 1st Fleet Flotillas at Harwich.

W. S. C.

_November 7, 1914._

THE RIFLE SHORTAGE

The following course is to be adopted:—

1. As soon as the War Office are ready to hand over the 50,000 Japanese rifles, the whole of the rifles, long and short, whether used by sailors or marines, on board H.M. ships at home and abroad, will be collected and brought on shore to the Royal Naval Ordnance Depots. The Japanese rifles will be issued to all ships in their place; there will be no rifles of any sort on board H.M. ships other than Japanese.

2. From the British rifles surrendered by the Fleet, 15,000 short .303 charger loading rifles will be set aside for the Royal Naval Division, i.e. one rifle for each of 12,000 men, plus 25 per cent for reserve and training. All the rifles now possessed by the Royal Naval Division will then be surrendered to the Ordnance Depots in exchange for the 15,000 short .303 British rifles aforesaid. Therefore the Royal Naval Division will have 15,000 short British .303, and no more.

3. There will then be handed over to the Army 57,800 rifles, of which 9,000 will be short charger loading.

4. The 50,000 Japanese rifles will be issued to the Fleet in the following proportion:—

One rifle for each marine, and one rifle for every 5 sailors, ships on foreign service receiving one rifle for every 3 sailors. The rest of the rifles will be issued as required to trawlers and auxiliaries, and kept in the Royal Marine and Royal Naval Ordnance Depots.

The Fleet will thus be completely re-armed with the 50,000 Japanese rifles, and the Royal Naval Division with .303 short rifles ready for field service.

Let me now have calculations worked out on this basis; and draft a letter accordingly to the War Office.

W. S. C.

_November 25, 1914._

INDEX

_Aboukir_, 351, 354 Cruiser. Launched 1900. Displacement 12,000 tons. Speed 21½ knots. Two 9·2″, twelve 6″ guns.

Abrolhos, coaling base, 444

_Acasta_ class, 142

_Acheron_ class, 142

_Active_, 144 Light cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 3,440 tons. Speed 25½ knots. Ten 4″ guns.

Admiralty, Board of, 256–61

Admiralty Transport Department, 397–98

Aerenthal, Count, 30

Aerial attack and defence, 220–21, 340–44

Aeroplanes, 336–44

Agadir Crisis, 38–67

_Agamemnon_, 225 Battleship. Launched 1906. Displacement 16,500 tons. Speed 18½ knots. Four 12″, ten 9·2″ guns.

Airships, 338

Albert, King, 380, 403

_Albion_, 310, 447, 467, 484 Battleship. Launched 1898. Displacement 12,950 tons. Speed 18 knots. Four 12″, twelve 6″ guns.

Algeciras Conference, 25–28

_Algerine_, 315 Canadian sloop. Launched 1895. Displacement 1,050 tons. Speed 13 knots. Six 4″ guns.

Allen, Captain, 476

Alsace-Lorraine, 7, 50–1

Americans and the War, 293

_Amphion_, 264 Light cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 3,440 tons. Speed 25½ knots. Ten 4″ guns.

Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, 15, 25, 41

Anglo-French military conversations authorized by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, 27, 29

Anglo-Persian Oil Convention, 137, 139, 181

Antwerp, 348, 355–90, 398–9, 408, 411–12

_Arethusa_, 148, 332 Light cruiser. Launched 1913. Displacement 3,500 tons. Speed 29 knots. Two 6″, six 4″ guns.

_Ariadne_, 332 German light cruiser. Launched 1900. Displacement 2,618 tons. Speed 22 knots. Ten 4·1″ guns.

Armoured cars, 344–5

Army mobilized, 234, 247–80

_Asama_, 465, 468–69 Japanese cruiser. Launched 1898. Displacement 9,885 tons. Speed 22 knots. Four 8″, fourteen 6″ guns.

_Askold_, 315–16, 323, 468, 544 Russian light cruiser. Launched 1900. Displacement 5,905 tons. Speed 23 knots. Twelve 6″ guns.

Asquith, H. H., 24, 28–9, 66, 99

—— invites Mr. Churchill to Admiralty, 66

Aston, General, 335, 347, 377

_Astræa_, 467 Light cruiser. Launched 1893. Displacement 4,360 tons. Speed 19¾ knots. Two 6″, eight 4·7″ guns.

_Attentive_, 388, 403 Scout. Launched 1904. Displacement 2,670 tons. Speed 25 knots. Nine 4″ guns.

_Audacious_, 408, 429–31, 437, 498 Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1912. Displacement 23,000 tons. Speed 21 knots. Ten 13·5″, sixteen 4″ guns.

_Australia_, 262, 314–6, 321–24, 465, 467–8 Australian battle cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 18,800 tons. Speed 25 knots. Eight 12″, sixteen 4″ guns.

Australian Navy: First fight, 471–2

Austria, 29–31, 275

—— ultimatum to Serbia, 204

Bacon, Admiral, 74–5, 345

Balfour, Earl, 15, 21–4, 158, 197, 232

Balkan States, 18, 522–51

Ballin, 96, 99, 189, 207–8

—— letter to Sir E. Cassel, 112

_Barham_, 140–1 Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1914. Displacement 27,500 tons. Speed 25 knots. Eight 15″, twelve 6″ guns.

Bartolomé, _see_ De Bartolomé, Commodore

Bayly, Admiral Lewis, 160

Beaconsfield, 4

Beatty, Earl, 87–8, 160, 331–2, 422, 438, 483, 509–10, 514–9

—— and submarine alarm, 422–4

Belgium: Neutrality, 234

_Bellerophon_, 223 Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1907. Displacement 18,600 tons. Speed 21 knots. Ten 12″, sixteen 4″ guns.

_Benbow_, 465 Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1913. Displacement 25,000 tons. Speed 21 knots. Ten 13·5″, twelve 6″ guns.

Beresford, Lord Charles, 71–2, 73–5

Bertie, Sir Francis, 369

_Berwick_, 467 Cruiser. Launched 1902. Displacement 9,800 tons. Speed 23 knots. Fourteen 6″ guns.

Bethlehem Steel Company, 498

Bethmann-Hollweg, 37, 96–7, 103

Birkenhead, Lord, 229

_Birmingham_, 518 Light cruiser. Launched 1912. Displacement 5,440 tons. Speed 25½ knots. Nine 6″ guns.

Bismarck, Prince, 7, 207

Black, Sir Frederick, 138

_Black Prince_, 269, 312, 467, 484, 542 Cruiser. Launched 1904. Displacement 13,550 tons. Speed 23½ knots. Six 9·2″, ten 6″ guns.

Blake, Wm., 440

_Blanche_, 428 Light cruiser. Launched 1909. Displacement 3,350 tons. Speed 25 knots. Ten 4″ guns.

‘Blimps,’ 338

_Blonde_, 143–5, 147 Light cruiser. Launched 1910. Displacement 3,350 tons. Speed 25 knots. Ten 4″ guns.

Board of Admiralty, 256–61

Boer War, 12

Borden, Sir Robert, 183, 187

Bosnia, 30–1

Botha, General, 306, 464, 544

Boué de Lapeyrère, Admiral, 237

Bowles, Thomas Gibson, 353

_Breslau_, 526–7, 529, 536, 539, 544 German light cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 4,500 tons. Speed 27 knots. Twelve 4·1″ guns.

Bridgeman, Sir Francis, 82–3, 89, 120, 133

Bridges, Colonel, 386, 400, 404–5, 411

Briggs, Admiral, 83, 144

_Brilliant_, 407 Light cruiser. Launched 1891. Displacement 3,600 tons. Speed 19½ knots. Two 6″, six 4·7″ guns.

_Bristol_, 448, 451, 467, 475, 478 Light cruiser. Launched 1910. Displacement 4,800 tons. Speed 25½ knots. Two 6″, ten 4″ guns.

British Expeditionary Force, 250, 276–80

British Navy: Assembly at Portland, 1912, 121–4; German submarine alarm, 413–41; in 1914–15, 501; leaves for Scapa Flow, 224–27; mobilised, July, 1914, 201; mobilised, July 31–August 4, 228–46; visits Kronstadt and Kiel, 198–202; _see_ under names of ships, and _passim_.

British ultimatum to Germany, 235–46

Broqueville, M. de, 372–3, 377–8

Budget of 1909, 20

Bulkeley-Johnson, Colonel, 303

Buller, Captain, 308

Bülow, General von, 358

Bülow, Prince, 25

Burmah Oil Companies, 139, 323

Burney, Admiral, 480

Burns, John, 24

_Bustard_, 404 Gunboat. Launched 1871. Displacement 254 tons. One 6″, one 4·7″ gun.

Buxton, Noel, 530

Byng, General, 377

_Cadmus_, 316, 543 Sloop. Launched 1903. Displacement 1,070 tons. Speed 13 knots. Six 4″ guns.

Caillaux, M., 65

Calais, 346

Callaghan, Sir George, 83, 225, 231–2

_Calliope_, 497 Light cruiser. Launched 1914. Displacement 3,750 tons. Speed 29 knots. Two 6″, eight 4″ guns.

Callwell, General, 532

Cambon, M., 231–2

_Cambria_, 497 Light cruiser. Launched 1915. Displacement 3,750 tons. Speed 29 knots. Five 6″ guns.

Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, 24–9

—— authorises Anglo-French military conversations, 27–9

—— supports France at Algeciras, 27

Canadian Army, 327–9

_Canopus_, 310, 444–56, 458, 462–3, 466, 470–1, 473, 475 Battleship. Launched 1897. Displacement 12,950 tons. Speed 18¼ knots. Four 12″, twelve 6″ guns.

_Canterbury_, 497 Light cruiser. Launched 1915. Displacement 3,750 tons. Speed 29 knots. Five 6″ guns.

_Cap Trafalgar_, 308 German armed merchant cruiser.

Capper, General, 377

Caprivi, Count, 9

Carden, Admiral, 535, 540–1

_Carmania_, 308 Armed merchant cruiser.

_Carnarvon_, 447–8, 451, 465, 467–9, 473, 475, 478, 493. Cruiser. Launched 1903. Displacement 10,850 tons. Speed 22¼ knots. Four 7·5″, six 6″ guns.

Carson, Lord, 197–8, 229

_Carysfort_, 497 Light cruiser. Launched 1914. Displacement 3,750 tons. Speed 29 knots. Two 6″, eight 4″ guns.

Cassel, Sir Ernest, 96, 99–100, 112–3, 189

Castelnau, General de, 356, 358

_Castor_, 497 Light cruiser. Launched 1915. Displacement 3,750 tons. Speed 29 knots. Five 6″ guns.

Cawdor, Lord, 74

Chamberlain, Joseph, 12, 22

_Champion_, 497 Light cruiser. Launched 1914. Displacement 3,750 tons. Speed 29 knots. Two 6″, eight 4″ guns.

Channel Ports, 395–412

Charles, Archduke, 198

_Chatham_, 312 Light cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 5,400 tons. Speed 25½ knots. Eight 6″ guns.

_Chikuma_, 316–7, 321, 323, 466 Japanese light cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 4,950 tons. Speed 26 knots. Eight 6″ guns.

Chinese Labour cry, 20, 25

Churchill, Lord Randolph, 187

Churchill, Winston Spencer, Agadir crisis, 1911; letter to Sir E. Grey, 63–4; air defence of Great Britain, 348; at Antwerp, 372–90; attacks on, 431–2; attends Committee of Imperial Defence, 53–8; authorises examination of letters of spies, 49; _Aboukir_, _Hogue_ and _Cressy_, 352–4; goes to Admiralty, 64; Herr Ballin and Mr. Churchill, 207–8; letters to Sir E. Grey, _passim_; letter to Sir E. Cassel on German Navy Law, 113; letter to Lord Fisher on liquid fuel problem, 137–8; letter to Sir E. Carson on Irish affairs, 196–7; letter to Prince Louis on his resigning office, 435–6; letters to Sir John French, 408, and _passim_; ‘Military Aspects of the Continental Problem,’ 1911, 58–62; naval cordite, 48; President of Board of Trade, 29; proposes Naval War Staff, 81–4; sends ‘warning telegrams’ to Commanders-in-Chief, 218–20; signs order ... Battle of Falklands, 473; sends for Lord Fisher, 75; speech at Belfast, 101; speech at Glasgow, 101–3; studies military position in Europe, 49–50; talk with Count Metternich, 50–1; Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, 29; and _passim_.

_Cleopatra_, 497 Light cruiser. Launched 1914. Displacement 3,750 tons. Speed 29 knots. Two 6″, eight 4″ guns.

_Clio_, 316, 543 Sloop. Launched 1903. Displacement 1,070 tons. Speed 13 knots. Six 4″ guns.

Colville, Admiral, 426

‘Commence hostilities against Germany,’ 245

_Condé_, 467 French cruiser. Launched 1902. Displacement 9,856 tons. Speed 21 knots. Two 7·6″, eight 6·4″, six 3·9″ guns.

_Conquest_, 497 Light cruiser. Launched 1914. Displacement 3,750 tons. Speed 29 knots. Two 6″, eight 4″ guns.

Constantine, King, 529, 538

Convoy system, 310–13, 317, 322–9

Corbett, Sir Julian, 93 (note)

Cordite, 48

_Cormoran_, German armed merchant cruiser, 316

_Cornwall_, 448, 451, 465, 467–9, 473, 475, 477–8 Cruiser. Launched 1902. Displacement 9,800 tons. Speed 23 knots. Fourteen 6″ guns.

Coronel and the Falklands, 442–77

_Courageous_, 500 Cruiser. Launched 1916. Displacement 18,600 tons. Speed 32 knots. Four 15″, eighteen 4″ guns.

Cradock, Admiral, 444–66, 492

_Cressy_, 351–3 Cruiser. Launched 1899. Displacement 12,000 tons. Speed 21½ knots. Two 9·2″, twelve 6″ guns.

Crewe, Lord, 185, 231

Cromarty, 162

_Cumberland_, 467 Cruiser. Launched 1902. Displacement 9,800 tons. Speed 23 knots. Fourteen 6″ guns.

Cunliffe, Lord, 139

Custance, Sir Reginald, 160

Cuxhaven: attack by seaplanes, 489

_Daily Chronicle_, 187

Dallas, Colonel, 363–4, 368, 371–2, 374

‘Danger Year,’ 32

_Dartmouth_, 312–3, 465, 467–8 Light cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 5,250 tons. Speed 25½ knots. Eight 6″ guns.

Dawnay, Hugh, 303

De Bartolomé, Captain, 82, 439, 466, 484

De Robeck, Admiral, 467

_Defence_, 269, 313, 444, 446–7, 451–6, 462–70, 473, 439, 492 Cruiser. Launched 1907. Displacement 14,600 tons. Speed 22½ knots. Four 9·2″, ten 7·5″ guns.

Deguise, General, 372, 384–5

Delcassé, 16, 26, 44

_Derfflinger_, 141 German battle cruiser. Launched 1913. Displacement 28,000 tons. Speed 27 knots. Eight 12″, twelve 5·9″ guns.

Devlin, Mr., 191

Devonshire, Duke of, 22

Dillon, John, 191

Disraeli, 12

Djavid Bey, 523–4

_Donegal_, 467 Cruiser. Launched 1902. Displacement 9,800 tons. Speed 23 knots. Fourteen 6″ guns.

Donnesmarck, Count, 26

_Doris_, 543 Light cruiser. Launched 1896. Displacement 5,600 tons. Speed 19½ knots. Eleven 6″ guns.

Douglas, Sir Charles, 531

Dreadnought Battle Fleet, 482, 486

_Dresden_, 307, 444–6, 448, 456, 463, 477–8, 493, 548 German light cruiser. Launched 1907. Displacement 3,544 tons. Speed 24 knots. Twelve 4·1″ guns.

Dryden, John, 236 (_note_)

Dual Alliance, 9, 12

Dubail, General, 356, 358

_Dublin_, 268–72, 275 Light cruiser. Launched 1912. Displacement 5,400 tons. Speed 25½ knots. Eight 6″ guns.

_Duke of Edinburgh_, 269, 542 Cruiser. Launched 1904. Displacement 13,550 tons. Speed 23 knots. Six 9·2″, ten 6″ guns.

Dumble, Colonel, 398

Dunkirk, 345–8

_Dupleix_, 314 French cruiser. Launched 1900. Displacement 7,578 tons. Speed 21 knots. Eight 6·4″, four 3·9″ guns.

Dupont, General, 336

Dutch neutrality, 361–2

_Eber_, 307 German gunboat. Launched 1903. Displacement 977 tons. Speed 13 knots. Eight 3·4″ guns.

_Edgar Quinets_, 484 French cruiser. Launched 1907. Displacement 13,780 tons. Speed 23 knots. Fourteen 7·6″ guns.

Elgin, Lord, 24

_Emden_, 307–9, 312, 316–7, 319, 322–4, 468, 471–2, 542–3 German light cruiser. Launched 1908. Displacement 3,544 tons. Speed 24 knots. Ten 4·1″ guns.

_Empress of Asia_, 316 Armed merchant cruiser.

_Empress of India_, 465 Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1913. Displacement 25,000 tons. Speed 21 knots. Ten 13·5″, twelve 6″ guns.

_Empress of Japan_, 316 Armed merchant cruiser.

_Empress of Russia_, 316 Armed merchant cruiser.

_Enchantress_, 122 Admiralty yacht.

_Encounter_, 316–7, 320, 466 Australian light cruiser. Launched 1903. Displacement 5,880 tons. Speed 21 knots. Eleven 6″ guns.

Enver Pasha, 523, 528, 539

Esher, Lord, 388

_Essex_, 448 Cruiser. Launched 1901. Displacement 9,800 tons. Speed 22½ knots. Fourteen 6″ guns.

_Euryalus_, 351 Cruiser. Launched 1901. Displacement 12,000 tons. Speed 21½ knots. Two 9·2″, twelve 6″ guns.

Ewing, Sir Alfred, 503

_Falcon_, 407 Destroyer. Launched 1899. Displacement 375 tons. Speed 30 knots. One 12–pr., five 6–pr. guns.

Falklands and Coronel, 442–78

Falklands Victory, Fisher’s opinion, 491–3

_Fearless_, 332, 351 Light cruiser. Launched 1912. Displacement 3,440 tons. Speed 25½ knots. Ten 4″ guns.

Ferdinand, 538

_Firedrake_, 219, 508, 512–3 Destroyer. Launched 1912. Displacement 860 tons. Speed 33 knots. Two 4″ guns.

Fisher, Lord, 85, 113, 125–7, 137, 144–5, 179–80, 259, 354, 436–41, 452, 454, 462, 465, 473, 510

—— appointed First Sea Lord, 437; at the Admiralty, 479–501; and Falklands Victory, 493–4; character sketch, 71–8; letter on a naval programme, 106–9

Foch, Marshal, 358–9, 410, 491

_Foresight_, 404 Scout. Launched 1904. Displacement 2,850 tons. Speed 25 knots. Nine 4″ guns.

Fowler, Sir Henry, 24

_Fox_, 311, 313, 317 Light cruiser. Launched 1893. Displacement 4,360 tons. Speed 19½ knots. Two 6″, eight 4·7″ guns.

Franco-German War, 6–8

Franco-Russian Alliance of 1892, 7–10

_Frauenlob_, 333 German light cruiser. Launched 1902. Displacement 2,657 tons. Speed 21 knots. Ten 4·1″ guns.

French, Earl, 249–50, 279, 286, 289, 299–300, 302, 342, 371, 382, 395, 400, 408–11

—— differences between French and Kitchener, 398–9, 408

—— letter to Mr. Churchill on Lord Kitchener’s visit to Paris, 300–1

French General Staff, 57

French Navy, 242. _See also_ under names of Ships

_Furious_, 500 Cruiser. Launched 1916. Displacement 19,100 tons. Speed 31½ knots. Two 18″, eight 5·5″ guns.

_Geier_, 307, 316, 468–9 German light cruiser. Launched 1894. Displacement 1,597 tons. Speed 16 knots. Eight 4·1″ guns.

General Election of 1906, 24

_General_, German mail steamer, 266

George, David Lloyd, 20, 24, 28–9, 43–7, 282, 292

—— speech at Bankers’ Association on Agadir crisis, 43–5

—— effect on Germany, 45–6

German alliance with Turkey, 539

German colonial expansion, 6–7, 95

German finance, 1909, 35–6

German merchant ships captured, 326

German Navy, 12–15, 32–4, 36, 51, 333–4, 503. _See also_ names of ships.

German Navy Law, 53–124

German oversea trade, 326

German plan for attacking France, Sir H. Wilson’s view, 53–67

German spies, 49

German torpedo boats, 487–8

Germany and balance of power, 6–11

—— and Boer War, 11–2

—— declares war on Russia, 231

—— invited to join Japanese Alliance, 14

—— Moroccan problem, 14

Gerrard, Major, 340

_Glasgow_, 445–8, 450–1, 453–4, 460, 463, 466, 469–71, 473, 475, 477–8, 492 Light cruiser. Launched 1909. Displacement 4,800 tons. Speed 25½ knots. Two 6″, ten 4″ guns.

_Glorious_, 500 Cruiser. Launched 1916. Displacement 18,600 tons. Speed 32 knots. Four 15″, eighteen 4″ guns.

_Glory_, 310, 328 Battleship. Launched 1899. Displacement 12,950 tons. Speed 18¼ knots. Four 12″, twelve 6″ guns.

_Gloucester_, 267, 269, 271–2, 468, 542 Light cruiser. Launched 1909. Displacement 4,800 tons. Speed 25½ knots. Two 6″, ten 4″ guns.

_Gneisenau_, 307–8, 313–6, 320–3, 424, 443–64, 466, 468–70, 474–8, 484 German cruiser. Launched 1906. Displacement 11,420 tons. Speed 22½ knots. Eight 8·2″, six 5·9″ guns.

_Goeben_, 219, 222, 236–43, 266–75, 525–7, 529, 535, 539–40, 544 German battle cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 22,640 tons. Speed 26 knots. Ten 11″, twelve 5·9″ guns.

_Good Hope_, 308, 444, 446–54, 456–59, 463, 469–70, 316, 492 Cruiser. Launched 1901. Displacement 14,100 tons. Speed 23 knots. Two 9·2″, sixteen 6″ guns.

Goodenough, Admiral, 510

Goulding, Sir Edward, 229

Grant, Captain Noel, 308

Grant-Duff, Col., 49 (_note_)

Greene, Sir Graham, 439

Grey, Earl, 24–31, 40–5, 96–9, 105, 115, 155, 186, 189, 191, 197, 204, 207–8, 210–6, 231, 360, 365–6, 370, 384, 524–7, 530, 534, 536

Gun: weight of shell fired, 125–6

Gunnery, 125–31

Haig, Earl, 90, 395

_Halcyon_, 479 Torpedo gunboat. Launched 1894. Displacement 1,070 tons. Speed 19 knots. Two 4·7″ guns.

Haldane, Lord, 24, 48, 66, 103–4, 111, 231

—— asks for a Naval War Staff, 56

—— goes to Berlin, 98–9

—— Haldane Plan, 248

Halil Bey, 523

Hall, Captain Reginald, 502

_Hamidieh_, 540 Turkish fight cruiser. Launched 1903. Displacement 3,800 tons. Speed 22 knots. Two 6″, eight 4·7″ guns.

_Hampshire_, 314, 316–7, 323–4, 468, 542, 544 Cruiser. Launched 1903. Displacement 10,850 tons. Speed 23 knots. Four 7·5″, six 6″ guns.

Hankey, Captain, 49, 172, 220

Harcourt, Sir William, 20

Harland and Wolff, 499

Hartlepool bombardment, 507–9, 520

‘Harwich Striking Force,’ 330, 402, 480–1, 506–7

Hase, Commander von, 141 (_note_)

Hedin, Dr. Sven, 402

Heligoland Bight Action, 331–4

Heligoland exchanged for Zanzibar, 11

Henry, Sir Edward, 47–8

Herzegovina, 30–1

Hicks-Beach, Sir M., 22

_Highflyer_, 308, 467 Light cruiser. Launched 1898. Displacement 5,600 tons. Speed 20 knots. Eleven 6″ guns.

_Himalaya_, 316 Armed merchant cruiser.

Hindenburg, 538

Hipper, Admiral von, 514, 518–21

_Hizen_, 453, 465, 467–9 Japanese battleship. Launched 1900. Displacement 12,700 tons. Speed 18 knots. Four 12″, sixteen 6″ guns.

_Hogue_, 351–3 Cruiser. Launched 1900. Displacement 12,000 tons. Speed 21½ knots. Two 9·2″, twelve 6″ guns.

Holbrook, Commander, 415, 545

Holland and neutrality, 361–2

Hood, Admiral, 255–6, 401, 403–7, 422, 480, 492

Hopwood, Sir Francis. _See_ Southborough, Lord

Hornby, Admiral, 328

_Humber_, 401 Monitor. Launched 1913. Displacement 1,250 tons. Speed 11½ knots. Two 6″, two 4·7″ guns.

_Hyacinth_, 468 Light cruiser. Launched 1898. Displacement 5,600 tons. Speed 20 knots. Eleven 6″ guns.

_Ibuki_, 316, 321–2, 327, 472, 544 Japanese cruiser. Launched 1907. Displacement 14,620 tons. Speed 22 knots. Four 12″, eight 8″, fourteen 4·7″ guns.

_Idzumo_, 415, 453, 465, 467–9 Japanese cruiser. Launched 1899. Displacement 9,750 tons. Speed 22 knots. Four 8″, fourteen 6″ guns.

_Ikoma_, 466 Japanese cruiser. Launched 1906. Displacement 13,750 tons. Speed 21 knots. Four 12″, twelve 6″, twelve 4·7″ guns.

Imperial Defence, Committee of, 173, 221

_Inconstant_, 497 Light cruiser. Launched 1914. Displacement 3,500 tons. Speed 29 knots. Two 6″, six 4″ guns.

_Indefatigable_, 140, 239–40, 313, 540 Battle cruiser. Launched 1909. Displacement 18,750 tons. Speed 25 knots. Eight 12″, sixteen 4″ guns.

_Indomitable_, 239–40, 266, 274, 312, 467–8, 533, 536 Battle cruiser. Launched 1907. Displacement 17,250 tons. Speed 25 knots. Eight 12″, sixteen 4″ guns.

_Inflexible_, 266, 428, 466–8, 472,475–8, 481, 493 Battle cruiser. Launched 1907. Displacement 17,250 tons. Speed 25 knots. Eight 12″, sixteen 4″ guns.

Ingenohl, Admiral von, 515–6

Intelligence Department, 495–6, 502–5

Invasion, 177–8, 288–9, 409, 419, 490

_Invincible_, 261, 331, 427, 428, 465–8, 475–8, 481, 493 Battle cruiser. Launched 1907. Displacement 17,250 tons. Speed 25 knots. Eight 12″, sixteen 4″ guns.

Ireland and the European balance, 179–202

_Iron Duke_, 517 Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1912. Displacement 25,000 tons. Speed 21 knots. Ten 13·5″, twelve 6″ guns.

Isvolsky, M., 30

Italian neutrality, 237, 242

Jackson, Sir Henry, 310–1, 320, 439

Jackson, Admiral Thomas, 439, 502

Jameson Raid, 11, 20

Japanese Alliance, 14

Japanese Navy, 468; convoy, 321. _See also_ names of ships

Japanese ultimatum to Germany, 315

Jellicoe, Lord, 83–4, 146, 179, 232, 276, 278, 331, 408, 417–8, 425–6, 428, 437, 466, 480–9, 517

—— opinion of Mr. Churchill, 109

—— raids the British coast in 1913, 153–4

—— takes command of the Fleets, 233

—— and submarine alarm, 417–9, 421

Jerram, Admiral, 314

Joffre, General, 285–6, 298, 301–2, 347, 365–7, 400, 491

Jutland, Battle of, 338

_Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse_, 308 German armed merchant cruiser.

_Karlsruhe_, 307–8, 444, 448, 461, 477 German light cruiser. Launched 1912. Displacement 4,820 tons. Speed 27 knots. Twelve 4·1″ guns.

Keble’s _Christian Year_, 146

Kelly, Captain John, 270–1

Kelly, Captain W. A. Howard, 271

_Kent_, 465, 467, 473, 475–6, 478 Cruiser. Launched 1901. Displacement 9,800 tons. Speed 23 knots. Fourteen 6″ guns.

Kerr, Admiral Mark, 532–3

_Kersaint_, 316 French gunvessel. Launched 1897. Displacement 1,223 tons. Speed 15 knots. One 5·5″, five 3·9″ guns.

Keyes, Commodore, 278, 330, 332, 349, 438, 506, 508, 512–3, 519

Khaki Election, 20, 24

Kiderlen-Wächter, 39, 46

Kiel Canal, 98

_King Alfred_, 350 Cruiser. Launched 1901. Displacement 14,100 tons. Speed 23 knots. Two 9·2″, sixteen 6″ guns.

_King Edwards_, class of ship, 481, 484–5

Kitchener, Lord, 160, 214, 248, 250–5, 287–9, 294, 299–304, 306–7, 326, 329, 334, 337, 343, 347, 360, 362, 365–73, 377, 381–4, 388–9, 399–400, 408–9, 412, 430, 490, 531, 538

—— and British Territorial system, 254; effects of Mons, 288–9; goes to Paris and Lord French’s comment, 299–304; differences between Kitchener and French, 399–400, 408; orders batteries from India, 307; Secretary of State for War, 250–1

Kluck, General von, 279, 357–8

_Köln_, 332 German light cruiser. Launched 1909. Displacement 4,280 tons. Speed 27 knots. Twelve 4·1″ guns.

_Komet_, 307 German torpedo gunboat. Launched 1892. Displacement 971 tons. Speed 21 knots. Four 3·4″ guns.

_Königsberg_, 307–9, 311, 324, 471–2, 542 German light cruiser. Launched 1906. Displacement 3,350 tons. Speed 23 knots. Ten 4·1″ guns.

Kruger, President, 11

_Kurama_, 466 Japanese cruiser. Launched 1907. Displacement 14,620 tons. Speed 22 knots. Four 12″, eight 8″, fourteen 4·7″ guns.

Lambert, Mr., 183

_Lancaster_, 328, 467 Cruiser. Launched 1902. Displacement 9,800 tons. Speed 23 knots. Fourteen 6″ guns.

_Lance_, 402 Destroyer. Launched 1914. Displacement 965 tons. Speed 29 knots. Three 4″ guns.

Lanrezac, General, 279, 286, 299

Lansdowne, Marquis of, 14

Law, Mr. Bonar, 229

_Legion_, 402 Destroyer. Launched 1914. Displacement 965 tons. Speed 29 knots. Three 4″ guns.

_Leipzig_, 307–9, 311, 315, 447–8, 455–7, 463, 476–8 German light cruiser, Launched 1905. Displacement 3,200 tons. Speed 22½ knots. Ten 4·1″ guns.

_Lennox_, 402 Destroyer. Launched 1914. Displacement 965 tons. Speed 29 knots. Three 4″ guns.

_Leopard_, 480 Destroyer. Launched 1897. Displacement 350 tons. Speed 30 knots. One 12–pr., five 6–pr. guns.

Licensing Bill, 1908, 28

Lichnowsky, Prince, 255

Lighters, 500

Limpus, Admiral, 525, 535

Lindequist, von, 65

_Lion_, 89, 109, 134, 145–6, 333, 428, 517 Battle cruiser. Launched 1910. Displacement 26,350 tons. Speed 27 knots. Eight 13·5″, sixteen 4″ guns.

Liquid fuel, 133–41

_Lively_, 480 Destroyer. Launched 1900. Displacement 385 tons. Speed 30 knots. One 12–pr., five 6–pr. guns.

London Conference, 1871, 30

_Lord Nelson_, 261 Battleship. Launched 1906. Displacement 16,500 tons. Speed 18½ knots. Four 12″, ten 9·2″ guns.

Loreburn, Earl (Sir Robert Reid), 24, 42

Louis of Battenberg, Prince, 82–3, 89–90, 120, 162 (_note_), 183, 201, 242, 259, 287, 313, 350, 377, 380–2, 396, 429, 462, 503

—— orders the Fleet not to disperse, 209; letter of resignation, 435–6

_Loyal_, 402 Destroyer. Launched 1913. Displacement 965 tons. Speed 29 knots. Three 4″ guns.

Lucas, Lord, 250

Ludendorff, General, 282

_Lurcher_, 219, 333, 508, 512 Destroyer. Launched 1912. Displacement 860 tons. Speed 35 knots. Two 4″ guns.

‘_Luxus Flotte_,’ 103, 112

_Macedonia_, 448, 451, 478 Armed merchant cruiser.

McKenna, Mr., 32–3, 44, 68, 74–5, 102, 125

Macnamara, Dr., 181, 183

Madden, Admiral, 83

‘Maestricht Appendix,’ 55, 64

_Magdeburg_, 503–4 German light cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 4,500 tons. Speed 27 knots. Twelve 4·1″ guns.

Mahan, Admiral, 93 (_note_)

_Maidstone_, 404 Depot ship for submarines.

_Mainz_, 333 German light cruiser. Launched 1909. Displacement 4,232 tons. Speed 25½ knots. Twelve 4·1″ guns.

_Majestic_, 312, 328 Battleship. Launched 1895. Displacement 14,900 tons. Speed 17½ knots. Four 12″, twelve 6″ guns.

_Malaya_, 111, 140–1 Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1914. Displacement 27,500 tons. Speed 25 knots. Eight 15″, twelve 6″ guns.

Mallet, Sir Louis, 530, 537

Mannesmann Brothers, 38

Marine Brigade, 255, 334–5, 343, 347

Marix, Commander, 389 (_note_)

Marne, Battle of, 299, 357–8

Marsh, Mr., 205 (_note_)

Marwitz, 359

Maunoury, General, 356–7

Maurice of Battenberg, Prince, 436

_Melbourne_, Lord, 52

Melbourne, 314, 316–7, 320–3, 327, 468, 471, 542 Australian light cruiser. Launched 1912. Displacement 5,400 tons. Speed 25½ knots. Eight 6″ guns.

Mensdorf, Count, 256

Mercantile marine, 264

_Mersey_, 401 Monitor. Launched 1913. Displacement 1,250 tons. Speed 11½ knots. Two 6″, two 4·7″ guns.

Metternich, Count, 40, 44–6, 50–2

‘Military Aspects of the Continental Problem, 1911,’ by Mr. Churchill, 58–62

Milne, Sir Berkeley, 238–9, 266–75

_Minerva_, 312, 543 Light cruiser. Launched 1895. Displacement 5,600 tons. Speed 19½ knots. Eleven 6″ guns.

_Minotaur_, 142, 313–4, 316–7, 321–2, 327, 467, 472, 484 Cruiser. Launched 1906. Displacement 14,600 tons. Speed 22½ knots. Four 9·2″, ten 7·5″ guns.

Moltke, H., Count, 7, 12, 51

_Monarch_, 109 Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1911. Displacement 22,500 tons. Speed 21 knots. Ten 13·5″, sixteen 4″ guns.

Monitors, 498–500

_Monmouth_, 308, 445–64, 416, 469, 478, 492 Cruiser. Launched 1901. Displacement 9,800 tons. Speed 22·4 knots. Fourteen 6″guns.

Mons, 289

_Montcalm_, 315–6, 320–2, 324, 465–6 French cruiser. Launched 1900. Displacement 9,367 tons. Speed 21 knots. Two 7·6″, eight 6·4″, four 3·9″ guns.

Moore, Admiral, 127, 138

Morley, Lord, 24, 42, 250

Morocco crisis, 25–7, 38–67

Motor omnibuses from London streets, 347

_Mousquet_, 308 French destroyer. Launched 1902. Displacement 300 tons. Speed 30 knots. One 9–pr., six 3–pr. guns.

Munro, Commander, 423–4

_Myrmidon_, 406 Destroyer. Launched 1900. Displacement 370 tons. Speed 30 knots. One 12–pr., five 6–pr. guns.

Napoleon, 153, 245

Nasmith, Commander, 519

Naval Brigades, 377–90, 392

Naval Intelligence Division, 495–6, 502–5

Naval Reserves called out, 231

Naval Volunteers, 255

Naval War Staff, 56, 69, 90–3

_Neptune_, 122 Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1909. Displacement 19,900 tons. Speed 21 knots. Ten 12″, sixteen 4″ guns.

New Guinea Expedition, 322

New Zealand, 319–20

New Zealand Contingent sails, 321–2

_New Zealand_, 219, 237, 274, 331, 428, 466 Battle cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 18,800 tons. Speed 25 knots. Eight 12″, sixteen 4″ guns.

_Newcastle_, 315, 450, 453, 465, 467–8 Light cruiser. Launched 1909. Displacement 4,800 tons. Speed 25½ knots. Two 6″, ten 4″ guns.

Newspaper Press Committee, 431

Nicholson, Sir William, 50, 249

Nieuport, 406

_Nürnberg_, 307, 316–7, 319, 446, 448, 455–6, 463, 477–8 German light cruiser. Launched 1906. Displacement 3,396 tons. Speed 23½ knots. Ten 4·1″ guns.

_Nusa_, 307 German Government yacht.

_Ocean_, 312 Battleship. Launched 1898. Displacement 12,950 tons. Speed 18¼ knots. Four 12″, twelve 6″ guns.

Oguri, Admiral, 469

Oil Problem, 133–41, 179–81

Oliver, Admiral, 374–5, 401, 438, 452, 466, 474, 493, 502, 504, 508

Ollivant, Colonel, 306, 345, 347

_Olympic_, liner, 431

Omnibuses from London streets, 321

Oram, Sir Henry, 129, 133, 144, 147

_Orama_, 448, 451, 473 Armed merchant cruiser.

Osmaston, Colonel, 397

Ostend, 404; British destroyers fire on, 402–3

_Otranto_, 445–447, 450, 454, 456–9, 463, 466, 469–70, 478 Armed merchant cruiser.

Ottley, Sir Charles, 81, 220

Pakenham, Captain, 83, 86–7, 89

_Panther_, 39, 46 German gunboat. Launched 1901. Displacement 962 tons. Speed 13 knots. Eight 3·4″ guns.

Paris, General, 347, 381–3, 385, 387

_Pegasus_, 308 Light cruiser. Launched 1897. Displacement 2,135 tons. Speed 20 knots. Eight 4″ guns.

_Philomel_, 323–24 Light cruiser. Launched 1890. Displacement 2,575 tons. Speed 19 knots. Eight 4·7″ guns.

_Pioneer_, 316, 324 Australian light cruiser. Launched 1899. Displacement 2,200 tons. Speed 20 knots. Eight 4″ guns.

‘Plan XVII,’ 285–7

_Planet_, 307 German surveying vessel.

Pohl, Admiral von, 260, 334

_Princess Royal_, 328, 333, 428, 466–7, 481–5 Battle cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 26,350 tons. Speed 27 knots. Eight 13·5″, sixteen 4″ guns.

_Prince Eitel Friedrich_, 316 German armed merchant cruiser.

_Proserpine_, 543 Light cruiser. Launched 1896. Displacement 2,135 tons. Speed 20 knots. Eight 4″ guns.

Protectionist Movement, 20, 22

_Psyche_, 323–4 Light cruiser. Launched 1898. Displacement 2,200 tons. Speed 20 knots. Eight 4″ guns.

_Pyramus_, 323–4 Light cruiser. Launched 1897. Displacement 2,135 tons. Speed 20 knots. Eight 4″ guns.

_Queen Elizabeth_, 137, 140–1, 465, 545 Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1913. Displacement 27,500 tons. Speed 25 knots. Eight 15″, twelve 6″ guns.

_Queen Mary_, 141 Battle cruiser. Launched 1912. Displacement 27,000 tons. Speed 27 knots. Eight 13·5″, sixteen 4″ guns.

Rawlinson, Sir Henry, 303, 381–3, 386–8, 394

Reading, Lord, 291

Redmond, Mr., 191, 197

Reid, Sir Robert. See Loreburn, Earl

_Renown_, 495, 500 Battle cruiser. Launched 1916. Displacement 26,500 tons. Speed 32 knots. Six 15″, seventeen 4″ guns.

_Repulse_, 495, 500 Battle cruiser. Launched 1916. Displacement 26,500 tons. Speed 32 knots. Six 15″, seventeen 4″ guns.

_Requin_, 544 French battleship. Launched 1885. Displacement 7,200 tons. Speed 14 knots. Two 10·8″, six 3·9″ guns.

_Reshadieh_, 222 Turkish battleship building in Great Britain. Requisitioned for Royal Navy. Renamed Erin. Launched 1913. Displacement 22,940 tons. Speed 21½ knots. Ten 13·5″, sixteen 6″ guns.

_Revenge_, 409, 492 (old.) (Renamed _Redoubtable_ later.) Battleship. Launched 1892. Displacement 14,000 tons. Speed 17½ knots. Four 13·5″, ten 6″ guns. (new.) Dreadnought Battleship. Launched 1915. Displacement 25,750 tons. Speed 23 knots. Eight 15″, fourteen 6″ guns.

_Rinaldo_, 407 Sloop. Launched 1901. Displacement 980 tons. Speed 13 knots. Six 4″ guns.

Ripon, Lord, 24

Roberts, Earl, 248–9, 360

Ronarc’h, Admiral, 371, 377, 379

_Roon_, 514 German cruiser. Launched 1903. Displacement 9,350 tons. Speed 21 knots. Four 8·2″, ten 5·9″ guns.

Rosebery, Lord, and Anglo-French Agreement, 15

Rouvier, M., 26

Roy, General, 371, 377

Royal Fleet Reserve, 255

Royal Flying Corps, 336–7

Royal Naval Air Service, 336–7

Royal Naval Division, 306–7

Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, 255

_Royalist_, 497 Light cruiser. Launched 1914. Displacement 3,500 tons. Speed 29 knots. Two 6 six 4″ guns.

Russian Army, 55, 298

Russo-Japanese War, 14, 23

— Influence of Russian defeat on German policy, 14

Saint-Seine, Comte de, 233

_Salamis_, 498 Greek battle cruiser building in Germany, 1914.

Salisbury, Marquess of, 10, 11, 21

Samoa, 321, 444–5

Samson, Commander, 340, 343–4, 398

Samuel, Sir Marcus, 108

_Sapphire_, 428 Light cruiser. Launched 1904. Displacement 3,000 tons. Speed 22 knots. Twelve 4″ guns.

Scapa Flow, 414, 425–6, 485–6, 505

Scarborough bombardment, 507–9, 520

_Scharnhorst_, 307–8, 313–4, 316–7, 320–4, 443, 445–69, 476–7, 483–4 German cruiser. Launched 1906. Displacement 11,420 tons. Speed 22½ knots. Eight 8·2″, six 5·9″ guns.

Scheer, Admiral, 261 (_note_), 332–4, 431, 504, 515

Scheldt, 361, 373

Schwab, Mr., 497–8

Seaplanes, 336–44

Serbia, 31, 204

_Severn_, 401 Monitor. Launched 1914. Displacement 1,250 tons. Speed 11½ knots. Two 6″, two 4·7″ guns.

_Shearwater_, 315 Canadian sloop. Launched 1901. Displacement 980 tons. Speed 13 knots. Six 4″ guns.

Shells, weight of, 121–2

Slade, Admiral, 139

Smith, F. E. _See_ Birkenhead, Lord

Smith, Sir James M., 205 (_note_)

Smuts, General, 464, 544

Souchon, Admiral, 265, 269, 275, 536

South African War, 12, 20

_Southampton_, 517 Light cruiser. Launched 1912. Displacement 5,400 tons. Speed 25½ knots. Eight 6″ guns.

Southborough, Lord, 108, 138

Spee, Admiral von, 317–9, 442, 455–8, 460–6, 473–7, 542

Spenser-Grey, Commander, 389 (_note_)

Spies, 49, 224

_Stettin_, 333 German light cruiser. Launched 1907. Displacement 3,396 tons. Speed 23½ knots. Ten 4·1″ guns.

Stoddart, Admiral, 448, 452–5, 460–4, 462, 473

_Strassburg_, 333 German light cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 4,500 tons. Speed 27 knots. Twelve 4·1″ guns.

Sturdee, Admiral, 438, 455, 462, 466, 472–5, 493–4

Submarine menace, 409, 413–41, 495–7

Sueter, Commodore, 340, 344

_Swift_, 143–5, 422 Destroyer leader. Launched 1907. Displacement 1,800 tons. Speed 35 knots. Four 4″ guns.

_Swiftsure_, 312–3, 542–3 Battleship. Launched 1903. Displacement 11,800 tons. Speed 19½ knots. Four 10″, fourteen 7·5″ guns.

Swinton, Major, 300

_Sydney_, 314, 316–7, 320–4, 327, 468, 471–2, 542 Australian light cruiser. Launched 1912. Displacement 5,400 tons. Speed 25½ knots. Eight 6″ guns.

Talaat Bey, 523

Tanks, 344–5

Tariff Reform, 22

Tennyson-D’Eyncourt, Sir Eustace, 129

Tholens, Lieutenant, 333

Thomson, Graeme, 396

_Tiger_, 428, 465–6 Battle cruiser. Launched 1913. Displacement 28,000 tons. Speed 28 knots. Eight 13·5″, twelve 6″ guns.

Tirpitz, Admiral von, 33, 46, 66, 103, 111, 114, 117–8, 140, 188–91, 260, 263, 333, 515

Togo, Admiral, 86, 131

Toul demanded by Germany, 156, 218

Transport Department, 397–8

_Tribal_ class, 142

Triple Alliance, 7, 12, 16

_Triumph_, 219, 313–7 Battleship. Launched 1903. Displacement 11,800 tons. Speed 19½ knots. Four 10″, fourteen 7·5″ guns.

Troubridge, Admiral, 120, 267, 269, 272–3

_Tsukuba_, 466 Japanese cruiser. Launched 1905. Displacement 13,750 tons. Speed 21 knots. Four 12″, twelve 6″, twelve 4·7″ guns.

Turkey enters the War, 522–51

Turkish alliance with Germany, 266, 539–40

Tweedmouth, Lord, 74

Tyrrell, Sir William, 210, 367

Tyrwhitt, Admiral, 148, 330–2, 349, 352, 404, 506

_Undaunted_, 402 Light cruiser. Launched 1914. Displacement 3,500 tons. Speed 29 knots. Two 6″, six 4″ guns.

Unionist Party supports Government, August, 1914, 215–6, 232

_Valiant_, 140–1 Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1914. Displacement 27,500 tons. Speed 25 knots. Eight 15″, twelve 6″ guns.

_Venerable_, 406–7 Battleship. Launched 1899. Displacement 15,000 tons. Speed 18 knots. Four 12″, twelve 6″ guns.

_Vengeance_, 467, 493 Battleship. Launched 1899. Displacement 12,950 tons. Speed 18 knots. Four 12″ twelve 6″ guns.

Venizelos, M., 529–30, 534, 538, 544

Verdun demanded by Germany, 156, 218

Villiers, Sir F., 364, 367, 370

Von der Marwitz, 359

Warrender, Sir George, 508–10, 512, 514–8

_Warrior_, 269, 467, 484, 542 Cruiser. Launched 1905. Displacement 13,550 tons. Speed 23 knots. Six 9·2″, four 7·5″ guns.

_Warspite_, 140–1 Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1913. Displacement 27,500 tons. Speed 25 knots. Eight 15″, twelve 6″ guns.

Watts, Sir Philip, 106, 129, 133, 144, 147

Webb, Captain, 427

Weddigen, Lieutenant, 352

Wemyss, Admiral, 527

Westminster, Duke of, 302

_Weymouth_, 313, 465, 407–8 Light cruiser. Launched 1910. Displacement 5,250 tons. Speed 24¾ knots. Eight 6″ guns.

Whitby bombardment, 520

White, Sir W., 108

_Wildfire_, 406–7 Sloop. Launched 1888. Displacement 1,140 tons. Speed 14 knots.

William, Crown Prince, 65

William, German Emperor, 11, 26, 33, 96, 98, 101, 104, 110–2, 216, 334

Wilmot, Sir E., 107

Wilson, Sir Arthur K., 78, 84–6, 146, 159, 437–9, 462, 481, 486, 488, 505, 510–2

—— character sketch, 78–81; letter to Mr. Asquith refusing to undertake office of First Sea Lord unless under Mr. Churchill, 85; opposes creation of Naval War Staff, 81; view of the British plan in event of war, 55

Wilson, Sir Henry, 50, 53, 55, 286

—— states his view of the German plan for attacking France, 53–5

Wyndham, George, 508

_Yahagi_, 466 Japanese light cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 4,950 tons. Speed 26 knots. Eight 6″ guns.

Yarmouth, bombardment of, 479–81

_Yarmouth_, 314, 316–7, 323–4, 468, 542 Light cruiser. Launched 1911. Displacement 5,250 tons. Speed 24¾ knots. Eight 6″ guns.

_Yashima_, Japanese battleship, loss of, 430

Yeomanry Cavalry, 347

Ypres, 411

Zanzibar, 11

_Zélée_, 316, 445 French gunboat. Launched 1899. Displacement 554 tons. Speed 13 knots. Two 3·9″, four 2·5″ guns.

_Zemchug_, 308, 314, 323 Russian light cruiser. Launched 1903. Displacement 3,130 tons. Speed 23 knots. Eight 4·7″ guns.

Zeppelins, 337–40, 400

Footnote 1:

Prince Henckel von Donnesmarck.

Footnote 2:

Von Tirpitz’s account is quite direct. “At his [von Kiderlen-Wächter’s] suggestion the Chancellor dispatched the gunboat _Panther_ to the Moroccan port Agadir on July 1, 1911, and left the British Government, when it asked the reason, completely in the dark and without a reply for many weeks. The result was that on July 21 Lloyd George delivered a speech which had been drawn up in the British Cabinet, in which he warned Germany that she would find British power on the side of France in the event of a challenge.”

Footnote 3:

The work had been begun by Lieutenant-Colonel Adrian Grant-Duff, afterwards killed on the Aisne.

Footnote 4:

The italics are mine.

Footnote 5:

The close blockade of the German ports was prescribed in the war orders of 1909, during Lord Fisher’s term of office. Sir Arthur Wilson did not reveal any modification, which he had made in consequence of new conditions to anyone.

Footnote 6:

Sir Charles Ottley: at that time Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence.

Footnote 7:

The memorandum abridged can be read in Appendix A.

Footnote 8:

Admiral Mahan.

Footnote 9:

Sir Julian Corbett.

Footnote 10:

_Reflections on the World War_, v. Bethmann-Hollweg, p. 48.

Footnote 11:

It was not in fact completed till August, 1914.

Footnote 12:

By later decision a Squadron of British Battle-cruisers was stationed in the Mediterranean.

Footnote 13:

i.e. The Entente.

Footnote 14:

The final published text of the law provided for 72.

Footnote 15:

Sir Francis Hopwood, now Lord Southborough, the Additional Civil Lord.

Footnote 16:

A doubtful gem! They could have coaled only in a few ports with special appliances.

Footnote 17:

This is the biggest gun which can be completely worked by hand, the shot being lifted by a single man.

Footnote 18:

_Lion, Tiger, Queen Mary, Princess Royal._

Footnote 19:

Contrary to common opinion and, as many will think, to the proved lessons of the war, I do not believe in the wisdom of the Battle-Cruiser type. If it is worth while to spend far more than the price of your best battleship upon a fast heavily-gunned vessel, it is better at the same time to give it the heaviest armour as well. You then have a ship which may indeed cost half as much again as a battleship but which at any rate can do everything. To put the value of a first-class battleship into a vessel which cannot stand the pounding of a heavy action is false policy. It is far better to spend the extra money and have what you really want. The battle-cruiser in other words should be superseded by the fast battleship, i.e. fast strongest ship, in spite of her cost.—W.S.C.

Footnote 20:

The Third Sea Lord.

Footnote 21:

Director of Admiralty Contracts.

Footnote 22:

An approximate estimate of the return obtained by His Majesty’s Government on their original investment of £2,200,000, in the Anglo-Persian Oil Co., Ltd.:

(1) The original Government investment of £2,200,000 in £1 Ordinary Shares has become one of 5 million shares, and the appreciation in value of these at current prices represent approximately some £16,000,000

(2) The Government has received in dividends, interest, Income Tax, Excess Profits, Duty and Corporation Tax, over 6,500,000

(3) The supply contract has enabled the Government Departments to save on the purchase price of oil as compared with current prices, about 7,500,000

(4) It may also be claimed that the prices of oil supplied by other companies have been brought down by the competition of the Anglo-Persian Company, though to what extent must be a matter of opinion: and further, that the saving on oil prices under the supply contract may be expected to continue throughout the currency of the contract. It would not be unfair to estimate the effect of the last two factors at an additional 10,000,000 ——————————— Total £40,000,000

Footnote 23:

Actually four.

Footnote 24:

_Kiel and Jutland_, by Commander George von Hase.

Footnote 25:

Rear-Admiral Briggs was at this time Controller or Third Sea Lord.

Footnote 26:

No one can form any idea of the difficulties the Admiralty encountered in securing adequate defences for Eastern harbours. Coast Defence was in the province of the War Office and paid for on their estimates. They needed every penny for their Field Army and Expeditionary Force, and naturally marshalled all their experts against expenditure on fortifications in Great Britain. In consequence expert opinion was always divided. The discussions evaporated in technicalities, and the lay members of the Committee were rarely convinced of the unwelcome need of spending money. To such a point was the dispute carried, that Prince Louis and I undertook in desperation to fortify Cromarty ourselves, arm it with naval guns and man it with marines. And this was the only new work completed when the war broke out.

Footnote 27:

Mr. Marsh and Mr. (now Sir James) Masterton Smith.

Footnote 28:

I have inconsistently adopted the familiar spelling of this ship’s name instead of _Göben_.

Footnote 29:

Later in the morning I learnt that Lord Fisher was in the office and I invited him into my room. I told him what we had done and his delight was wonderful to see.

Foolish statements have been made from time to time that this sending of the Fleet to the North was done at Lord Fisher’s suggestion. The interview with me which Lord Fisher records in his book is correctly given by him as having taken place on the 30th. The Fleet had actually passed the Straits of Dover the night before. I think it necessary to place on record the fact that my sole naval adviser on every measure taken prior to the declaration of war was the First Sea Lord.

Footnote 30:

Now Lord Birkenhead.

Footnote 31:

Dryden, _Threnodia Augustalis_.

Footnote 32:

The minute constituting the Division is printed in Appendix A.

Footnote 33:

Appendix B.

Footnote 34:

Admiral Scheer, p. 13.

Footnote 35:

Appendix C. I hope it may be read.—W. S. C.

Footnote 36:

See map to face p. 274.

Footnote 37:

_The Flight of the Goeben_, Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne.

Footnote 38:

See Official Naval History, pp. 60, 61.

Footnote 39:

At the Falklands the two British battle cruisers used up nearly three-quarters of their ammunition to sink only two weaker antagonists, using 12–inch guns against 8·8–inch. The _Goeben_ single-handed would have had to have sunk four, using 11–inch guns against 9·2–inch.

Footnote 40:

The italics are mine.—W. S. C.

Footnote 41:

General Lanrezac—‘_Le plan de Campagne Français_,’ p. 110.

Footnote 42:

General von Kluck—‘_The March on Paris_,’ p. 38.

Footnote 43:

Committee of Imperial Defence.

Footnote 44:

The Fourth Division (the Fifth to go).

Footnote 45:

The Fourth Division (fifth in order of embarkation) arrived on the field at the beginning of the battle of Le Cateau.

Footnote 46:

Actually called the 6th Army.

Footnote 47:

In fact, however, it was the 1st Middlesex (19th Infantry Brigade attached to 4th Division), who captured the guns at Néry, the Guards being miles away at Villers Cotterets.

Footnote 48:

The italics are new.

Footnote 49:

The Third German Army took Rheims and were bombarded in the town by the Second Army.

Footnote 50:

Official History Appendix 22, p. 473.

Footnote 51:

The correspondence on this subject is printed in the Official History of the War, Appendix 22, p. 471.

Footnote 52:

See map to face p. 328.

Footnote 53:

See Appendix.

Footnote 54:

The old battleships in question were actually “Canopuses”—the class above “Majestics.”

Footnote 55:

The underlining denotes approximately the comparative values of the units.

Footnote 56:

Only those ships of the Japanese Navy who took part in the operations are included.

Footnote 57:

_Encounter_ went instead of _Melbourne_.

Footnote 58:

They went without escort and without mishap.

Footnote 59:

Admiral Scheer, p. 52.

Footnote 60:

_See also_ Appendix.

Footnote 61:

Dupont, ‘Haut Commandment Allemand en 1914,’ p. 92.

Footnote 62:

The Naval torpedo school centre.

Footnote 63:

The first design of the Tank made at my request by Admiral Bacon in September, 1914, carried a bridge in front which it dropped on arriving at a trench, passed over, and automatically raised behind it.

Footnote 64:

An officer of the General Staff who had been attached, at my request in 1913, to the Admiralty War Staff in order to promote an effective _liaison_ between the two staffs. This very gifted officer rendered us invaluable service. He died prematurely after the hardships of the war, throughout the whole of which he served with distinction in situations of responsibility and danger.

Footnote 65:

Mr. Thomas Gibson Bowles.

Footnote 66:

‘The loss on September 22,’ wrote Mr. Gibson Bowles, ‘of the _Aboukir_, the _Cressy_ and the _Hogue_, with 1,459 officers and men killed, occurred because, despite the warnings of admirals, commodores and captains, Mr. Churchill refused, until it was too late, to recall them from a patrol so carried on as to make them certain to fall victims to the torpedoes of an active enemy.’

Footnote 67:

But see Lord Esher: ‘One night he (Kitchener) was in bed asleep, when Mr. Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, bursting into the room, pleaded for the War Minister’s permission to leave at once for Antwerp. In spite of the late hour, Sir Edward Grey arrived in the middle of the discussion, and while he was engaging Lord Kitchener’s attention, Mr. Churchill slipped away. He was next heard of when a telegram from Antwerp was put into Lord K.’s hands, in which his impetuous colleague asked bravely to be allowed to resign his great office, to be given command of a Naval Brigade, and pleading that reinforcements should be hurried out to those “forlorn and lonely men,” as he called them, who were vainly trying to hold on to the Antwerp lines. Lord K. was not upset, but he was not unmoved, etc....’—_The Tragedy of Lord Kitchener_, p. 67.

It is remarkable that Lord Esher should be so much astray; for during the war I showed him the text of the telegrams printed in this chapter and now made public for the first time. We must conclude that an uncontrollable fondness forbade him to forsake fiction for fact. Such constancy is a defect in an historian.

W. S. C.

Footnote 68:

Commanders Marix and Spenser-Grey.

Footnote 69:

It was perhaps an unconscious recognition of the naval significance of Antwerp that all three great Powers—Germany, France and Britain—used in its attack and defence Naval Brigades formed since the outbreak of war.

Footnote 70:

Rawlinson’s Force was so styled.

Footnote 71:

The heavy losses of the 7th Division have often been attributed to their attempt to relieve Antwerp. In fact, however, these losses did not begin until after they had joined the main army.

Footnote 72:

i.e. The absence of a greater French effort.

Footnote 73:

A battleship.

Footnote 74:

A curious coincidence or foreboding. Almost at that moment the _Audacious_ was moving to her doom.

Footnote 75:

War Office.

Footnote 76:

This will be discussed in the second volume. The alternatives are here only mentioned to explain the context.

Footnote 77:

This energetic and practical officer, whom I had employed during the previous eighteen months to supervise the fortification of Cromarty, had already designed a type of anti-submarine boom which he was actually installing at Cromarty.

Footnote 78:

I have slightly abridged this minute.

Footnote 79:

_October 28, 1914._

DEAR MR. CHURCHILL,—

I have lately been driven to the painful conclusion that at this juncture my birth and parentage have the effect of impairing in some respects my usefulness on the Board of Admiralty. In these circumstances I feel it to be my duty, as a loyal subject of His Majesty, to resign the office of First Sea Lord, hoping thereby to facilitate the task of the administration of the great Service, to which I have devoted my life, and to ease the burden laid on H.M. Ministers.

I am, Yours very truly, LOUIS BATTENBERG, _Admiral_.

_October 29, 1914._

MY DEAR PRINCE LOUIS,—

This is no ordinary war, but a struggle between nations for life or death. It raises passions between races of the most terrible kind. It effaces the old landmarks and frontiers of our civilisation. I cannot further oppose the wish, you have during the last few weeks expressed to me, to be released from the burden of responsibility which you have borne thus far with so much honour and success.

The anxieties and toils which rest upon the naval administration of our country are in themselves enough to try a man’s spirit; and when to them are added the ineradicable difficulties of which you speak, I could not at this juncture in fairness ask you to support them.

The Navy of to-day, and still more the Navy of to-morrow, bears the imprint of your work. The enormous impending influx of capital ships, the score of thirty-knot cruisers, the destroyers and submarines unequalled in modern construction which are coming now to hand, are the results of labours which we have had in common, and in which the Board of Admiralty owes so much to your aid.

The first step which secured the timely concentration of the Fleet was taken by you.

I must express publicly my deep indebtedness to you, and the pain I feel at the severance of our three years’ official association. In all the circumstances you are right in your decision. The spirit in which you have acted is the same in which Prince Maurice of Battenberg has given his life to our cause and in which your gallant son is now serving in the Fleet.

I beg you to accept my profound respect and that of our colleagues on the Board.

I remain, Yours very sincerely, WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.

Footnote 80:

Throughout this chapter the map facing page 476 and the table of ships on page 478 will be found useful.

Footnote 81:

The rocks of Abrolhos off the Brazilian Coast were our secret coaling base in these waters.

Footnote 82:

Details relating to colliers, supply ships and mails have been omitted, unless of significance to the account.

Footnote 83:

The table of ships on page 478 will be found useful.

Footnote 84:

_Official History of the War: Naval Operations_, Vol. I, p. 344.

Footnote 85:

All the ships in small capitals fought eventually in the battle of the Falkland Islands.

Footnote 86:

Here the reader should certainly look at the map facing page 476, which deals directly with this situation.

Footnote 87:

All the above telegrams had to be sent by various routes and most were repeated by several routes, as of course we could not communicate direct across these great distances. But I omit the procedure to simplify the account.

Footnote 88:

See opposite page 474.

Footnote 89:

Only _Dreadnoughts_ had tripods.

Footnote 90:

_The Grand Fleet_, by Sir John Jellicoe, p. 31.

Footnote 91:

_See_ Appendix D., p. 566.

Footnote 92:

I was in France for thirty-six hours.—W. S. C.

Footnote 93:

Battle cruiser.

Footnote 94:

Appendix E.

Footnote 95:

Two had had to be removed from each of the five ‘Queen Elizabeths,’ owing to spray interference.

Footnote 96:

See map to face page 518.

Footnote 97:

i.e. about 80 miles West of Heligoland.

Footnote 98:

It must be explained that in these days the wireless communication with destroyers and still more submarines was not as perfect as it became later on. The _Firedrake_ had therefore been stationed in the morning midway between the submarines and Harwich to pass on messages. She had late in the afternoon, after the orders to take the submarines into the Bight had reached her, rejoined Commodore Keyes and the link was, for the time being, broken.

Footnote 99:

The whole of this operation is described in minute detail in the official British Naval History, and should be studied with the excellent charts by those who are interested in its technical aspect. So complicated is the full story that the lay reader cannot see the wood for the trees. I have endeavoured to render intelligible the broad effects.—W.S.C.

Footnote 100:

See map to face page 518, ‘The Dawn Situation.’

Footnote 101:

See map facing this page, ‘The Noon Situation.’

Footnote 102:

The _Dresden_ and two armed merchant cruisers were alive for a few weeks more, but in complete inactivity.

Footnote 103:

In peace.

Footnote 104:

In war.

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES

1. P. 50, changed “Tirah Expedition in 1988” to “Tirah Expedition in 1898”. 2. P. 517, changed “out Light Cruiser Squadron” to “our Light Cruiser Squadron”. 3. Silently corrected typographical errors and variations in spelling. 4. Retained anachronistic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings as printed. 5. Footnotes have been re-indexed using numbers and collected together at the end of the last chapter. 6. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_. 7. Enclosed bold font in =equals=. 8. Superscripts are denoted by a caret before a single superscript character, e.g. M^r. 10. P. 24, changed “The result of the polls in January, 1906, was a Conservative landslide” to “The result of the polls in January, 1906, was a Liberal landslide”.