Part 5

Τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴν ὁπόθεν ηὑρέθη καὶ ὅστις ὁ πρῶτος ἐπιχειρήσας τὸ ψεῦδος πιθανῶς συνθεῖναι πρὸς ὠφέλειαν ἢ ψυχαγωγίαν τῶν ἀκροωμώνων, οὐ μᾶλλον εὔροι τις ἂν ἢ εἴ τις ἐπιχειρήσειε τὸν πρῶτον πταρόντα ἢ χρεμψάμενον ἀναζητεῖν. εἰ δέ, [D] ὥσπερ ἱππεῖς ἐν Θράκῃ καὶ Θετταλίᾳ, τοξόται δὲ καὶ τὰ κουφότερα τῶν ὅπλων ἐν Ἰνδίᾳ καὶ Κρήτῃ καὶ Καρίᾳ ἀνεφάνη,(121) τῇ φύσει τῆς χώρας ἀκολουθούντων οἶμαι τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων, οὕτω τις ὑπολαμβάνει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων πραγμάτων, ἐν οἷς ἕκαστα τιμᾶται, μάλιστα παρὰ τούτων αὐτὰ καὶ πρῶτον ηὑρῆσθαι· τῶν ἀγελαίων ἔοικεν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι [206] τό γε ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ μύθος εὕρημα, καὶ διαμένει ἐξ ἐκείνου μέχρι καὶ νῦν παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς πολιτευόμενον τὸ πρᾶγμα ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἀκροαμάτων, αὐλὸς καὶ κιθάρα, τέρψεως ἕνεκα καὶ ψυχαγωγίας. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ(122) ὄρνιθες ἵπτασθαι καὶ νεῖν οἱ(123) ἰχθύες αἵ τε ἔλαφοι θεῖν ἐπειδὴ πεφύκασιν οὐδὲν τοῦ διδαχθῆναι προσδέονται, κἂν δήσῃ τις κἂν καθείρξῃ, πειρᾶται ὅμως χρῆσθαι τούτοις τοῖς μορίοις, πρὸς ἃ σύνοιδεν αὑτοῖς πεφυκόσι, ταυτὶ τὰ ζῷα, οὕτως οἶμαι καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων [B] γένος οὐκ ἄλλο τι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχον ἢ λόγον καὶ ἐπιστήμην ὥσπερ ἐγκαθειργμένην, ὃ δὴ καὶ λέγουσιν οἱ σοφοὶ δέναμιν, ἐπὶ τὸ μανθάνειν τε(124) καὶ ζητεῖν καὶ πολυπραγμονεῖν, ὡς πρὸς οἰκειότατον ἑαυτῷ τῶν ἔργων, τρέπεται· καὶ ὅτῳ μὲν εὐμενὴς θεὸς ταχέως ἔλυσε τὰ δεσμὰ καὶ τὴν δύναμιν εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἤγαγε, τούτῳ πάρεστιν εὐθὺς ἐπιστήμη, τοῖς δεδεμένοις δὲ ἔτι, [C] καθάπερ οἶμαι Ἰξίων νεφέλῃ τινὶ(125) ἀντὶ τῆς θεοῦ λέγεται παραναπαύσασθαι, τούτοις ἀντ᾽ ἀληθοῦς ψευδὴς(126) ἐντέτηκε δόξα· γίνεται γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν αὐτοῖς(127) τὰ ὑπηνέμια καὶ τερατώδη ταυτὶ τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἐπιστήμης οἷον εἴδωλα ἄττα καὶ σκιαί· πράττουσι γοῦν πρὸ τῆς τῶν ἀληθῶν ἐπιστήμης τὰ ψεύδη καὶ διδάσκουσί γε μάλα προθύμως καὶ μανθάνουσιν ὥσπερ οἶμαι χρηστόν τι καὶ θαυμαστόν. εἰ δ᾽ ὅλως χρή τι καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν τοὺς μύθους τὸ πρῶτον [D] πλασάντων ἀπολογήσασθαι, δοκοῦσί μοι ταῖς τῶν παιδίων ψυχαῖς, ὥσπερ αἱ τίτθαι περὶ τὰς ὀδοντοφυïας κνησιῶσιν αἰτοῖς σκύτινα ἄττα προσαρτῶσι(128) ταῖν χεροῖν, ἵνα αὐτῶν παραμυθήσωνται τὸ πάθος, οὕτω δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τῷ ψυχαρίῳ πτεροφυοῦντι καὶ ποθοῦντι πλέον εἰδέναι τι, διδάσκεσθαι δὲ οὔπω τἀληθῆ δυναμένῳ ταῦτα ἐποχετεύειν, ὥσπερ ἄρδοντες ἄρουραν διψῶσαν, ἵνα δὴ οἶμαι αὐτῶν τὸν γαργαλισμὸν καὶ τὴν ὀδύνην παραμυθήσωνται.

(Now one could no more discover where myth was originally invented and who was the first to compose fiction in a plausible manner for the benefit or entertainment of his hearers, than if one were to try to find out who was the first man that sneezed or the first horse that neighed. But as cavalry arose in Thrace and Thessaly(129) and archers and the lighter sort of weapons in India, Crete and Caria—since the customs of the people were I suppose adapted to the nature of the country,—just so we may assume about other things as well, that where anything is highly prized by a nation it was first discovered by that nation rather than by any other. On this assumption then it seems likely that myth was originally the invention of men given to pastoral pursuits, and from that day to this the making of myths is still peculiarly cultivated by them, just as they first invented instruments of music, the flute and the lyre, for their pleasure and entertainment. For just as it is the nature of birds to fly and of fish to swim and of stags to run, and hence they need not be taught to do so; and even if one bind or imprison these animals they try none the less to use those special parts of themselves for the purpose for which they know they are naturally adapted; even so I think the human race whose soul is no other than reason and knowledge imprisoned so to speak in the body—the philosophers call it a potentiality—even so I say the human race inclines to learning, research and study, as of all tasks most congenial to it. And when a kindly god without delay looses a man’s fetters and brings that potentiality into activity, then on the instant knowledge is his: whereas in those who are still imprisoned false opinion instead of true is implanted, just as, I think, Ixion is said to have embraced a sort of cloud instead of the goddess.(130) And hence they produce wind‐eggs(131) and monstrous births, mere phantoms and shadows so to speak of true science. And thus instead of genuine science they profess false doctrines, and are very zealous in learning and teaching such doctrines, as though forsooth they were something useful and admirable. But if I am bound to say something in defence of those who originally invented myths, I think they wrote them for childish souls: and I liken them to nurses who hand toys to the hands of children when they are irritated by teething, in order to ease their suffering: so those mythologists wrote for the feeble soul whose wings are just beginning to sprout, and who, though still incapable of being taught the truth, is yearning for further knowledge, and they poured in a stream of myths like men who water a thirsty field, so as to soothe their irritation and pangs.(132))

[207] Τοῦ δὲ τοιούτου προβαίνοντος καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εὐδοκιμοῦντος, εἵλκυσαν ἐντεῦθεν οἱ ποιηταὶ τὸν αἶνον, ὃς τοῦ μύθου διαφέρει τῷ μὴ πρὸς παῖδας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄνδρας πεποιῆσθαι καὶ μὴ ψυχαγωγίαν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ παραίνεσιν ἔχειν τινά. βούλεται γὰρ ἐπικρυπτόμενος παραινεῖν τε καὶ διδάσκειν, ὅταν ὁ λέγων τὸ φανερῶς εἰπεῖν εὐλαβῆται, [B] τὴν παρὰ τῶν ἀκουόντων ὑφορώμενος ἀπέχθειαν. οὕτω τοι καὶ Ἡσίοδος αὐτὸ φαίνεται πεποιηκώς· ὁ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτον Ἀρχίλοχος ὥσπερ ἥδυσμά τι περιτιθεὶς τῇ ποιήσει, μύθοις οὐκ ὀλιγάκις ἐχρήσατο ὁρῶν, ὡς εἰκός, τὴν μὲν ὑπόθεσιν, ἣν μετῄει, τῆς τοιαύτης ψυχαγωγίας ἐνδεῶς ἔχουσαν, σαφῶς δὲ ἐγνωκώς, ὅτι στερομένη μύθου ποίησις ἐποποιΐα μόνον ἐστίν, ἐστέρηται δέ, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τισ, ἑαυτῆς, οὐ γὰρ ἔτι λείπεται ποίησις, ἡδύσματα ταῦτα παρὰ τῆς ποιητικῆς Μούσης ἐδρέψατο, [C] καὶ παρέθηκέ γε αὐτοῦ τούτου χάριν, ὅπως μὴ σιλλογράφος τις, ἀλλὰ ποιητὴς νομισθείη.

(Then when the myth was gaining ground and coming into favour in Greece, poets developed from it the fable with a moral, which differs from the myth in that the latter is addressed to children and the former to men, and is designed not merely to entertain them but conveys moral exhortation besides. For the man who employs fable aims at moral exhortation and instruction, though he conceals his aim and takes care not to speak openly, for fear of alienating his hearers. Hesiod, for instance, seems to have written with this in view. And after him Archilochus often employed myths,(133) adorning and as it were seasoning his poetry with them, probably because he saw that his subject matter needed something of this sort to make it attractive, and he well knew that poetry without myth is merely versification(134) and lacks, one may say, its essential characteristic, and so ceases to be poetry at all. Therefore he culled these sweets from the Muse of Poetry and offered them to his readers, in order that he might not be ranked merely as a writer of satire but might be counted a poet.)

Ὁ δὲ δὴ τῶν μύθων Ὅμηρος ἢ Θουκυδίδης ἢ Πλάτων, ἢ ὅ, τι βούλει καλεῖν αὐτόν, Αἴσωπος ἦν ὁ Σάμιος, δοῦλος τὴν τύχην(135) μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν προαίρεσιν, οὐκ ἄφρων μὴν(136) οὐδὲ κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀνήρ. ᾧ γὰρ ὁ νόμος οὐ μετεδίδου παρρησίας, τούτῳ προσῆκον ἦν ἐσκιαγραφημένας τὰς συμβουλὰς καὶ πεποικιλμένας ἡδονῇ καὶ χάριτι παραφέρειν, ὥσπερ οἶμαι τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι τὸ δέον ἐπιτάττουσιν, [D] ἐὰν δὲ ἅμα τις οἰκέτης γένηται τὴν τύχην καὶ τὴν τέχνην ἰατρός, πράγματα ἔχει κολακεύειν ἅμα καὶ θεραπεύειν τὸν δεσπότην ἀναγκαζόμενος. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ τῷ κυνὶ προσήκει ταύτης τῆς δουλείας, λεγέτω, γραφέτω, παραχωρείτω τῆς μυθολογίας αὐτῷ πᾶς ὁστισοῦν, εἰ δὲ μόνος εἶναί φησιν ἐλεύθεροσ, ἐπὶ τί χρήσεται τοῖς μύθοις, οὐκ οἶδα. πότερον ἵνα τὸ πικρὸν καὶ δάκνον τῆς συμβουλῆς ἡδονῇ καὶ χάριτι κεράσας [208] ἅμα τε ὀνήσῃ καὶ ἀποφύγῃ τὸ προσλαβεῖν τι παρὰ τοῦ ὀνιναμένου κακόν; ἀλλὰ τοῦτό ἐστι λίαν δουλοπρεπές. ἀλλ᾽ ἄμεινον ἄν τις διδαχθείη μὴ τὰ πράγματα ἀκούων αὐτὰ μηδὲ τὰ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς ὀνόματα κατὰ τὸν κωμικὸν τὴν σκάφην σκάφην λέγοντα; ἀλλ᾽ ἀντὶ τοῦ μὲν δεῖνος τὸν Φαέθοντα τί(137) δέον ἐνομάσαι; [B] τί δὲ χραίνειν οὐκ εὐαγῶς τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τοῦ βασιλέως Ἠλίου; τίς δὲ ὁ Πὰν καὶ τίς ὁ Ζεὺς τῶν χαμαὶ ἐρχομένων ἀνθρώπων ἄξιος καλεῖσθαι, ἵν᾽ ἐκεῖθεν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς μεταθῶμεν ἡμῶν τὰς διανοίας; καίτοι, εἰ καὶ τοῦτο οἷόν τε ἦν, ἄμεινον ἦν αὐτοὺς ἐνομάσαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ἦ γὰρ οὐχ οὕτω κρεῖττον ἦν εἰπεῖν ἀνθρωπικὰ θεμένους ὀνόματα; μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ θεμένους, [C] ἤρκει γὰρ ὅσαπερ ἡμῖν οἱ γονεῖς ἔθεντο. ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μήτε μαθεῖν ἐστι ῥᾷον(138) διὰ τοῦ πλάσματος μήτε τῷ Κυνικῷ πρέπον πλάττειν τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοῦ χάριν οὐκ ἐφεισάμεθα τοῦ πολυτελοῦς ἀναλώματος, πρὸς δὲ δὴ καὶ ἐφθείραμεν τὸν χρόνον πλάττοντες καὶ συντιθέντες μυθάρια, εἶτα λογογραφοῦντες καὶ ἐκμανθάνοντες;

(But the Homer of myths, or their Thucydides, or Plato, or whatever we must call him, was Aesop of Samos, who was a slave by the accident of birth rather than by temperament, and he proved his sagacity by this very use of fable. For since the law did not allow him freedom of speech, he had no resource but to shadow forth his wise counsels and trick them out with charms and graces and so serve them up to his hearers. Just so, I think, physicians who are free‐born men prescribe what is necessary, but when a man happens to be a slave by birth and a physician by profession, he is forced to take pains to flatter and cure his master at the same time. Now if our Cynic also is subject to this sort of slavery, let him recite myths, let him write them, and let everyone else under the sun leave to him the _rôle_ of mythologist. But since he asserts that he alone is free, I do not know what need he has of myths. Does he need to temper the harshness and severity of his advice with sweetness and charm, so that he may at once benefit mankind and avoid being harmed by one whom he has benefited? Nay, that is too much like a slave. Moreover, would any man be better taught by not hearing facts as they really are, or called by their real names, like the comic poet who calls a spade a spade?(139) What need to speak of Phaethon instead of So‐and‐so? What need sacrilegiously to profane the title of King Helios? Who among men that walk here below(140) is worthy to be called Pan or Zeus, as though we should ascribe to those gods our human understanding? And yet if indeed this were possible it would have been better to give the men their own names. Would it not have been better to speak of them thus and to bestow on them human names, or rather not bestow, for those that our parents gave us were enough? Well then if it is neither easier to learn by means of fiction, nor appropriate for the Cynic to invent that sort of thing at all, why did we not spare that wasteful expense,(141) and moreover why did we waste our time in inventing and composing trivial myths and then making stories of them and learning them by heart?)

Ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ὁ μὲν λόγος οὔ φησι δεῖν ἀντὶ τῶν ἀληθῶν [D] καὶ μὴ πεπλασμένων τὰ ψευδῆ καὶ πεπλασμένα παρὰ τοῦ κυνός, ᾧ μόνῳ τῆς ἐλευθερίας μέτεστιν, ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς ᾄδεσθαι συλλόγοις, ἡ συνήθεια δὲ οὕτω(142) γέγονεν ἀπὸ Διογένους ἀρξαμένη καὶ Κράτητος ἄχρι τῶν ἐφεξῆς. οὐδὲν οὐδαμοῦ παράδειγμα τοιοῦτον εὑρήσεις· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἀφίημι τέως, ὅτι τῷ Κυνικῷ τὸ νόμισμα παραχαράττοντι τῇ συνηθείᾳ προσέχειν οὐδαμῶς προσήκει, τῷ λόγῳ δὲ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, [209] καὶ τὸ ποιητέον εὑρίσκειν οἴκοθεν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μανθάνειν ἔξωθεν. εἰ δ᾽ Ἀντισθένης ὁ Σωκρατικὸς ὥσπερ ὁ Ξενοφῶν ἔνια διὰ τῶν μύθων ἀπήγελλε, μήτι(143) τοῦτό σε ἐξαπατάτω· καὶ γὰρ μικρὸν ὕστερον ὑπὲρ τούτου σοι διαλέξομαι·(144) νῦν δὲ ἐκεῖνό μοι πρὸς τῶν Μουσῶν φράσον ὑπὲρ τοῦ Κυνισμοῦ, πότερον ἀπόνοια τίς ἐστι καὶ βίος οὐκ ἀνθρώπινος, ἀλλὰ θηριώδης ψυχῆς διάθεσις οὐδὲν καλόν, οὐδὲν σπουδαῖον οὐδὲ ἀγαθὸν νομιζούσης; [B] δοίη γὰρ ἂν ὑπολαβεῖν πολλοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα Οἰνόμαος. εἴ τί σοι τοῦ ταῦτα γοῦν ἐπελθεῖν ἐμέλησεν, ἐπέγνως ἂν σαφῶς ἐν τῇ τοῦ κυνὸς αὐτοφωνίᾳ καὶ τῷ κατὰ τῶν χρηστηρίων καὶ πᾶσιν ἁπλῶς οἷς ἔγραψεν ὁ ἀνήρ. τοιούτου δὲ ὄντος τοῦ πράγματος, ὥστε ἐνῃρῆσθαι μὲν ἅπασαν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐλάβειαν, ἠτιμάσθαι δὲ πᾶσαν ἀνθρωπίνην φρόνησιν, νόμον δὲ μὴ τὸν ὁμώνυμον τῷ καλῷ καὶ δικαίῳ πεπατῆσθαι μόνον, [C] ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῶν θεῶν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ ἐγγραφέντας ταῖς ψυχαῖς, ὑφ᾽ ὧν πάντες ἀδιδάκτως εἶναι θεῖόν τι πεπείσμεθα καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀφορᾶν ἐπ᾽ αὐτό τε οἶμαι σπεύδειν οὕτω διατιθέμενοι τὰς ψυχὰς πρὸς αὐτὸ ὥσπερ, οἶμαι πρὸς τὸ φῶς τὰ βλέποντα, πρὸς τούτῳ δὲ εἰ καὶ ὁ δεύτερος ἐξελαύνοιτο νόμος ἱερὸς ὢν φύσει καὶ θεῖος, ὁ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων πάντη καὶ πάντως ἀπέχεσθαι κελεύων καὶ μήτε ἐν λόγῳ μήτε ἐν ἔργῳ μήτε [D] ἐν αὐταῖς ταῖς λανθανούσαις τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεργείαις ταῦτα ἐπιτρέπων συγχεῖν, ὅσπερ ἡμῖν καὶ τῆς τελειοτάτης ἐστὶν ἡγεμὼν δικαιοσύνης· ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι βαράθρου τὸ πρᾶγμα ἄξιον; ἆρ᾽ οὐ τοὺς ταῦτα ἐπαινοῦντας ὥσπερ τοὺς φαρμακοὺς ἐχρῆν οὐ θύσθλοις παιομένους(145) ἐλαύνεσθαι· κουφοτέρα γάρ ἐστι τῶν ἀδικημάτων ἡ ζημία· λίθοις δὲ βαλλομένους ἀπολωλέναι; διαφέρουσι γὰρ οὗτοι τί, [210] πρὸς τῶν θεῶν εἰπέ μοι, τῶν ἐπ᾽ ἐρημίας λῃστευόντων καὶ κατειληφότων τὰς ἀκτὰς ἐπὶ τῷ λυμαίνεσθαι τοῖς καταπλέουσι; καταφρονοῦντες θανάτου, φασίν· ὥσπερ οὐ κἀκείνοις συνομαρτούσης ταυτησὶ τῆς ἀπονοίας. φησὶ γοῦν ὁ καθ᾽ ὑμᾶς μὲν ποιητὴς καὶ μυθολόγος, ὡς δὲ ὁ Πύθιος λῃσταῖς χρωμένοις ἀνεῖλεν, ἥρως καὶ δαίμων, ὑπὲρ τῶν λῃζομένων τὴν θάλατταν

(But perhaps you will say that though reason asserts that the Cynic, who alone of men can claim to be free, ought not to invent and compose lying fictions instead of the unvarnished truth and then recite these in public assemblies, nevertheless the custom began with Diogenes and Crates, and has been maintained from that time by all Cynics. My answer is that nowhere will you find a single example of such a custom. For the moment I do not insist on the fact that it in no wise becomes a Cynic who must “give a new stamp to the common currency”(146) to pay any attention to custom, but only to pure reason, and he ought to discover within himself what is right for him to do and not learn it from without. And do not be misled by the fact that Antisthenes the disciple of Socrates, and Xenophon too, sometimes expressed themselves by means of myths; for I shall have something to say to you on this point in a moment. But now in the Muses’ name answer me this question about the Cynic philosophy. Are we to think it a sort of madness, a method of life not suitable for a human being, but rather a brutal attitude of mind which recks naught of the beautiful, the honourable, or the good? For Oenomaus(147) would make many people hold this view of it. If you had taken any trouble to study the subject, you would have learned this from that Cynic’s “Direct Inspiration of Oracles” and his work “Against the Oracles,” in short from everything that he wrote. This then is his aim, to do away with all reverence for the gods, to bring dishonour on all human wisdom, to trample on all law that can be identified with honour and justice, and more than this, to trample on those laws which have been as it were engraved on our souls by the gods, and have impelled us all to believe without teaching that the divine exists, and to direct our eyes to it and to yearn towards it: for our souls are disposed towards it as eyes towards the light. Furthermore, suppose that one should discard also that second law which is sanctified both by nature and by God, I mean the law that bids us keep our hands altogether and utterly from the property of others and permits us neither by word or deed or in the inmost and secret activities of our souls to confound such distinctions, since the law is our guide to the most perfect justice—is not this conduct worthy of pit?(148) And ought not those who applauded such views to have been driven forth, not by blows with wands, like scapegoats,(149) for that penalty is too light for such crimes, but put to death by stoning? For tell me, in Heaven’s name, how are such men less criminal than bandits who infest lonely places and haunt the coasts in order to despoil navigators? Because, as people say, they despise death; as though bandits were not inspired by the same frenzied courage! So says at any rate he(150) who with you counts as a poet and mythologist, though, as a Pythian god proclaimed to certain bandits who sought his oracle, he was a hero and divinity—I mean where, speaking of pirates of the sea, he says:)

Οἷά τε ληιστῆρες, ὑπεὶρ ἅλα τοί τ᾽ ἀλόωνται [B] Ψυχὰς παρθέμενοι.

(“Like pirates who wander over the sea, staking their lives.”(151))

τί οὖν ἔτι ἕτερον ζητεῖς ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀπονοίας τῶν λῃστῶν μάρτυρα; πλὴν εἰ μὴ καὶ ἀνδρειοτέρους ἂν εἴποι τις τῶν τοιούτων κυνῶν ἐκείνους τοὺς λῃστάς, ἰταμωτέρους δὲ τῶν λῃστῶν ἐκείνων τοὺς κύνας τουτουσί. οἱ μὲν γὰρ συνειδότες αὑτοῖς οὕτω μοχθηρὸν τὸν βίον οὐ μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ τοῦ θανάτου δέος ἢ τὴν αἰσχύνην τὰς ἐρημίας προβάλλονται, οἱ δ᾽ ἄρα περιπατοῦσιν(152) [C] ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τὰ κοινὰ νόμιμα συγχέοντες, οὐχὶ τῷ κρείττονα καὶ καθαρωτέραν, ἀλλὰ τῷ χείρονα καὶ βδελυρωτέραν ἐπεισάγειν πολιτείαν.

(What better witness can you require for the desperate courage of bandits? Except indeed that one might say that bandits are more courageous than Cynics of this sort, while the Cynics are more reckless than they. For pirates, well aware as they are how worthless is the life they lead, take cover in desert places as much from shame as from the fear of death: whereas the Cynics go up and down in our midst subverting the institutions of society, and that not by introducing a better and purer state of things but a worse and more corrupt state.)

Τὰς ἀνανφερομένας δὲ εἰς τὸν Διογένη τραγῳδίας, οὔσας μὲν καὶ ὁμολογουμένως(153) Κυνικοῦ τινος συγγράμματα, ἀμφισβητουμένας δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο μόνον, [D] εἴτε τοῦ διδασκάλου, τοῦ Διογένους, εἰσίν, εἴτε τοῦ μαθητοῦ Φιλίσκου, τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐπελθὼν βδελύξαιτο καὶ νομίσειεν ὑπερβολὴν ἀρρητουργίας οὐδὲ ταῖς ἑταίραις ἀπολελεῖφθαι; ταῖς Οἰνομάου δὲ ἐντυχών· ἔγραψε γὰρ καὶ τραγῳδίας τοῖς λόγοις τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ παραπλησίας, ἀρρήτων ἀρρητότερα καὶ κακῶν πέρα, καὶ οὐκέθ᾽ ὅ,τι φῶ περὶ αὐτῶν ἀξίως ἔχω, κἂν τὰ Μαγνήτων κακὰ, κἂν τὸ Τερμέριον, κἂν πᾶσαν ἁπλῶς αὐτοῖς ἐπιφθέγξωμαι [211] τὴν τραγῳδίαν μετὰ τοῦ σατύρου καὶ τῆς κωμῳδίας καὶ τοῦ μίμου, οὕτω πᾶσα μὲν αἰσχρότης, πᾶσα δὲ ἀπόνοια πρὸς ὑπερβολὴν ἐν ἐκείναις τῷ ἀνδρὶ πεφιλοτέχνηται· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐκ τούτων τις ἀξιοῖ τὸν Κυνισμὸν ὁποῖός τις ἐστιν ἡμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι, βλασφημῶν τοὺς θεούς, ὑλακτῶν πρὸς ἅπαντας, ὅπερ ἔφην ἀρχόμενος, ἴτω, χωρείτω,(154) γῆν πρὸ γῆς, ὅποι βούλοιτο· εἰ δ᾽, ὅπερ ὁ θεὸς ἔφη Διογένει, τὸ νόμισμα παραχαράξας ἐπὶ τὴν πρὸ ταύτης εἰρημένην ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ συμβουλὴν τρέποιτο, τὸ Γνῶθι σαυτόν, ὅπερ ζηλώσαντες ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων Διογένης καὶ Κράτης φαίνονται, τοῦτο ἤδη τοῦ παντὸς ἄξιον ἔγωγε φαίην ἂν ἀνδρὶ καιὶ στρατηγεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐθέλοντι. τί δὲ εἶπεν ὁ θεός, ἆρ᾽ ἴσμεν; ὅτι τῆς τῶν πολλῶν αὐτῷ δόξης ἐπέταξεν [C] ὑπερορᾶν καὶ παραχαράττειν οὐ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ τὸ νόμισμα. τὸ δὲ Γνῶθι σαυτὸν ἐν ποτέρᾳ θησόμεθα μοίρᾳ; πότερον ἐν τῇ τοῦ νομίσματος; ἢ τοῦτό γε αὐτὸ τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι κεφάλαιον θήσομεν καὶ τρόπον εἰρῆσθαι τοῦ Παραχάραξον τὸ νόμισμα διὰ τῆς(155) Γνῶθι σαυτὸν ἀποφάσεως; ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ τὰ νομιζόμενα παντάπασιν ἀτιμάσας, ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν δὲ ἥκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν οὐδ᾽ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ τοῖς νομιζομένοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὄντως οὖσι θήσεται, [D] οὕτως οἶμαι καὶ ὁ γνοὺς ἑαυτὸν ὅπερ ἔστιν ἀκριβῶς εἴσεται καὶ οὐχ ὅπερ νομίζεται. πότερον οὖν οὐχ ὁ Πύθιος ἀληθής τέ ἐστι θεός, καὶ Διογένης τοῦτο ἐπέπειστο σαφῶς, ὅς γε αὐτῷ πεισθεὶς ἀντὶ φυγάδος ἀπεδείχθη οὐ τοῦ Περσῶν βασιλέως μείζων, ἀλλ᾽, ὡς ἡ φήμη παρέδωκεν, αὐτῷ τῷ καταλύσαντι τὸ Περσῶν κράτος καὶ ταῖς Ἡρακλέους ἁμιλλωμένῳ πράξεσιν, ὑπερβάλλεσθαι δὲ τὸν Ἀχιλλέα φιλοτιμουμένῳ ζηλωτός; οὗτος οὖν ὁ Διογένης ὁποῖός τις ἦν τά τε πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς [212] καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους μὴ διὰ τῶν Οἰνομάου λόγων μηδὲ τῶν Φιλίσκου τραγῳδιῶν, αἷς ἐπιγράψας τὸ Διογένους ὄνομα τῆς θείας πολλά ποτε κατεψεύσατο κεφαλῆς, ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ὧν ἔδρασεν ἔργων ὁποῖός τις ἦν γνωριζέσθω.

(Now as for the tragedies ascribed to Diogenes, which are and are admitted to be, the composition of some Cynic—the only point in dispute being whether they are by the master himself, Diogenes, or by his disciple Philiscus,—what reader of these would not abhor them, and find in them an excess of infamy not to be surpassed even by courtesans? However, let him go on to read the tragedies of Oenomaus—for he too wrote tragedies to match his discourses—and he will find that they are more inconceivably infamous, that they transgress the very limits of evil; in fact I have no words to describe them adequately, and in vain should I cite in comparison the horrors of Magnesia,(156) the wickedness of Termerus(157) or the whole of tragedy put together, along with satiric drama, comedy and the mime: with such art has their author displayed in those works every conceivable vileness and folly in their most extreme form. Now if from such works any man chooses to demonstrate to us the character of the Cynic philosophy, and to blaspheme the gods and bark at all men, as I said when I began, let him go, let him depart to the uttermost parts of the earth whithersoever he pleases. But if he do as the god enjoined on Diogenes, and first “give a new stamp to the common currency,” then devote himself to the advice uttered earlier by the god, the precept “Know Thyself,” which Diogenes and Crates evidently followed in their actual practice, then I say that this is wholly worthy of one who desires to be a leader and a philosopher. For surely we know what the god meant? He enjoined on Diogenes to despise the opinion of the crowd and to give a new stamp, not to truth, but to the common currency. Now to which of these categories shall we assign self‐ knowledge? Can we call it common currency? Shall we not rather say that it is the very summary of truth, and by the injunction “Know Thyself” we are told the way in which we must “give a new stamp to the common currency”? For just as one who pays no regard whatever to conventional opinions but goes straight for the truth will not decide his own conduct by those opinions but by actual facts, so I think he who knows himself will know accurately, not the opinion of others about him, but what he is in reality. It follows then, does it not? that the Pythian god speaks the truth, and moreover that Diogenes was clearly convinced of this since he obeyed the god and so became, instead of an exile, I will not say greater than the King of Persia, but according to the tradition handed down actually an object of envy to the man(158) who had broken the power of Persia and was rivalling the exploits of Heracles and ambitious to surpass Achilles. Then let us judge of the attitude of Diogenes towards gods and men, not from the discourses of Oenomaus or the tragedies of Philiscus—who by ascribing their authorship to Diogenes grossly slandered that sacred personage—but let us, I say, judge him by his deeds.)

Ἦλθεν εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν ἐπὶ τί πρὸς Διός; ἵνα τοὺς ἀγωνιστὰς θεάσηται; τί δέ; οὐχὶ καὶ Ἰσθμίοις τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ Παναθηναίοις θεάσασθαι δίχα πραγμάτων οἷόν τε ἦν; ἀλλὰ ἐθέλων ἐκεῖ τοῖς κρατίστοις συγγενέσθαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων; [B] οὐ γὰρ Ἰσθμόνδε ἐφοίτων; οὐκ ἂν οὖν εὕροις ἄλλην αἰτίαν ἢ τὴν εἰς τὸν θεὸν θεραπείαν. εἰ δ᾽ οὐκ ἐξεπλάγη τὸν κεραυνὸν· οὐδὲ ἐγὼ μὰ τοὺς θεοὺς πολλῶν πολλάκις πειραθεὶς διοσημιῶν ἐξεπλάγην. ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως οὕτω δή τι τοὺς θεοὺς πέφρικα καὶ φιλῶ καὶ σέβω καὶ ἅζομαι καὶ πάνθ᾽ ἁπλῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς αὐτοὺς πάσχω, ὅσαπερ ἄν τις καὶ οἷα πρὸς ἀγαθοὺς δεσπότας, πρὸς διδασκάλους, πρὸς πατέρας, πρὸς κηδεμόνας, πρὸς πάντα ἁπλῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα, [C] ὥστε ὀλίγου δεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν σῶν ῥημάτων πρῴην ἐξανέστην. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅντινα τρόπον ἐπελθὸν ἴσως σιωπᾶσθαι δέον ἐρρέθη.