Part 3

(Freedom from emotion they regard as the end and aim; and this is equivalent to becoming a god. Now perhaps Diogenes observed that in the case of all other foods he himself had no particular sensations, and that only raw meat gave him indigestion and nausea, and took this for a proof that he was enslaved to vain opinion rather than reason; for flesh is none the less flesh, even though you cook it any number of times or season it with any number of sauces. This, I say, was why he thought he ought to rid and free himself altogether of this cowardice; for you may be sure that this sort of thing is cowardice. And in the name of the Law‐Giving goddess,(69) tell me why if we used cooked meats we do not eat them in their natural state also? You can give me no other answer than that this has become a custom and a habit with us. For surely we cannot say that before meat is cooked it is disgusting and that by being cooked it becomes purer than it was by nature. What then was it right for him to do who had been appointed by God like a general in command to do away with the common currency and to judge all questions by the criterion of reason and truth? Ought he to have shut his eyes and been so far fettered by this general opinion as to believe that flesh by being cooked becomes pure and fit for food, but that when it has not been acted upon by fire it is somehow abominable and loathsome? Is this the sort of memory you have? Is this your zeal for truth? For though you so severely criticised Diogenes the vain‐glorious, as you call him—though I call him the most zealous servant and vassal of the Pythian god—for eating octopus, you yourself have devoured endless pickled food,)

Ἰχθῦς ὄρνιθάς τε φίλας θ᾽ ὅτι χεῖρας ἵκοιτο,

(“Fish and birds and whatever else might come to hand.”(70))

Αἰγύπτιός γε ὤν, οὐ τῶν ἱερέων, ἀλλὰ τῶν παμφάγων, οἷς πάντα ἐσθίειν νόμος ὡς λάχανα χόρτου· γνωρίζεις οἶμαι [193] τῶν Γαλιλαίων τὰ ῥήματα. μικροῦ με παρῆλθεν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι καὶ πάντες ἄνθρωποι πλησίον οἰκοῦντες θαλάττης, ἤδη δέ τινες καὶ τῶν πόρρω, οὐδὲ θερμήναντες καταρροφοῦσιν ἐχίνους, ὄστρεα καὶ πάντα ἁπλῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα· εἶτα ἐκείνους μὲν ὑπολαμβάνεις ζηλωτούς, ἄθλιον δὲ καὶ βδελυρὸν ἡλῇ Διογένη, καὶ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὡς οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ταῦτα ἐκείνων ἐστὶ σαρκία· πλὴν ἴσως ταῦτα ἐκείνων διαφέρει τῷ τὰ μὲν εἶναι μαλθακά, τὰ δὲ σκληρότερα. ἄναιμος γοῦν ἐστι καὶ πολύπους [B] ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνα, ἔμψυχα δέ ἐστι καὶ τὰ ὀστρακόδερμα καθάπερ καὶ οὗτος· ἥδεται γοῦν καὶ λυπεῖται, ὃ τῶν ἐμψύχων μάλιστά ἐστιν ἴδιον. ἐνοχλείτω δὲ μηδὲν ἡμᾶς ἡ Πλατωνικὴ τανῦν δόξα ἔμψυχα ὑπολαμβάνουσα καὶ τὰ φυτά. ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι μὲν οὔτι ἄλογον(71) οὐδὲ παράνομον οὐδὲ ἀσύνηθες ὑμῖν ὁ γενναῖος εἰργάσατο Διογένης, εἰ μὴ τῷ σκληροτέρῳ καὶ μαλακωτέρῳ, ἡδονῇ τε λαιμοῦ καὶ ἀηδίᾳ τὰ τοιαῦτά τις ἐξετάζοι, πρόδηλον οἶμαι τοῖς ὁπωσοῦν ἕπεσθαι λόγῳ δυναμένοις. οὐκ ἄρα τὴν ὠμοφαγίαν βδελύττεσθε οἱ τὰ παραπλήσια δρῶντες, [C] οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀναίμων μόνον ζῴων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν αἷμα ἐχόντων. καὶ τούτῳ δὲ ἴσως διαφέρεσθε πρὸς ἐκεῖνον, ὅτι ὁ μὲν ἁπλῶς ταῦτα καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ᾠήθη χρῆναι προσφέρεσθαι, ἁλσὶ δὲ ὑμεῖς καὶ πολλοῖς ἄλλοις ἀρτύσαντες ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα, τὴν φύσιν ὅπως βιάσησθε. καὶ δὴ τοῦτο μὲν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀπόχρη.

(For you are an Egyptian, though not of the priestly caste, but of the omnivorous type whose habit it is to eat everything “even as the green herb.”(72) You recognise, I suppose, the words of the Galilaeans. I almost omitted to say that all men who live near the sea, and even some who live at a distance from it, swallow down sea‐urchins, oysters and in general everything of the kind without even heating them. And then you think they are enviable, whereas you regard Diogenes as contemptible and disgusting, and you do not perceive that those shell‐fish are flesh just as much as what he ate? Except perhaps that differ in so far as the octopus is soft and shell‐fish are harder. At any rate the octopus is bloodless, like hard‐shelled fish, but the latter too are animate things like the octopus. At least they feel pleasure and pain, which is the peculiar characteristic of animate things. And here we must not be put out by Plato’s theory(73) that plants also are animated by soul. But it is now, I think, evident to those who are in any way able to follow an argument, that what the excellent Diogenes did was not out of the way or irregular or contrary to our habits, that is if we do not in such cases apply the criterion of hardness and softness, but judge rather by the pleasure or distaste of the palate. And so it is not after all the eating of raw food that disgusts you, since you do the like, not only in the case of bloodless animals but also of those that have blood. But perhaps there is also this difference between you and Diogenes, that he thought he ought to eat such food just as it was and in the natural state, whereas you think you must first prepare it with salt and many other things to make it agreeable and so do violence to nature. I have now said enough on this subject.)

[D] Τῆς Κυνικῆς δὲ φιλοσοφίας σκοπὸς μέν ἐστι καὶ τέλος, ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ πάσης φιλοσοφίας, τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, τὸ δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐν τῷ ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς εὖ πράττειν συμβαίνει καὶ μέντοι καὶ ζῴοις πᾶσιν, ὅταν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἕκαστον ἀνεμποδίστως τυγχάνῃ τέλους· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς τοῦτό ἐστιν εὐδαιμονίας ὅρος, τὸ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς ὥσπερ πεφύκασι καὶ ἑαυτῶν εἶναι. [194] οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐχ ἑτέρωθί που τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην προσήκει πολυπραγμονεῖν· οὐδὲ ἀετὸς οὐδὲ πλάτανος οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων ζῴων ἢ φυτῶν χρυσᾶ περιεργάζεται πτερὰ καὶ φύλλα, οὐδὲ ὅπως ἀργυροῦς ἕξει τοὺς βλαστοὺς ἢ τὰ πλῆκτρα καὶ κέντρα σιδηρᾶ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀδαμάντινα, ἀλλ᾽ οἷς αὐτὰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡ φύσις ἐκόσμησε, ταῦτα εἰ ῥωμαλέα καὶ πρὸς τάχος αὐτοῖς ἢ πρὸς ἀλκὴν ὑπουργοῦντα προσγένοιτο, μάλιστα ἂν εὖ πράττειν [B] νομίζοι καὶ εὐθηνεῖσθαι. πῶς οὖν οὐ γελοῖον, εἴ τις ἄνθρωπος γεγονὼς ἔξω που τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν περιεργάσαιτο, πλοῦτον καὶ γένος καὶ φίλων δύναμιν καὶ πάντα ἁπλῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῦ παντὸς ἄξια νομίζων; εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν ἡ φύσις ὥσπερ τοῖς ζῴοις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀπέδωκε μόνον, τὸ σώματα καὶ ψυχὰς ἔχειν ἐκείνοις παραπλησίας, ὥστε μηδὲν πλέον πολυπραγμονεῖν, ἤρκει λοιπόν, [C] ὥσπερ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα, τοῖς σωματικοῖς ἀρκεῖσθαι πλεονεκτήμασιν, ἐνταῦθά που τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν πολυπραγμονοῦσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡμῖν οὐδέν τι παραπλησία ψυχὴ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐνέσπαρται ζῴοις, ἀλλ᾽ εἴτε κατ᾽ οὐσίαν διαφέρουσα εἴτε οὐσίᾳ μὲν ἀδιάφορος, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ μόνῃ κρείττων, ὥσπερ οἶμαι τὸ καθαρὸν ἤδη χρυσίον τοῦ συμπεφυρμένου τῇ ψάμμῳ· λέγεται γὰρ καὶ οὗτος ὁ λόγος περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὡς ἀληθὴς ὑπό τινων· [D] ἡμεῖς δὴ οὖν ἐπειδὴ σύνισμεν αὑτοῖς οὖσι τῶν ζῴων ξυνετωτέροις· κατὰ γὰρ τὸν Πρωταγόρου μῦθον ἐκείνοις μὲν ἡ φύσις ὥσπερ μήτηρ ἄγαν φιλοτίμως καὶ μεγαλοδώρως προσηνέχθη, ἡμῖν δὲ ἀντὶ πάντων ἐκ Διὸς ὁ νοῦς ἐδόθη· τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐνταῦθα θετέον, ἐν τῷ κρατίστῳ καὶ σπουδαιοτάτῳ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν.

(Now the end and aim of the Cynic philosophy, as indeed of every philosophy, is happiness, but happiness that consists in living according to nature and not according to the opinions of the multitude. For plants too are considered to do well, and indeed all animals also, when without hindrance each attains the end designed for it by nature. Nay, even among the gods this is the definition of happiness, that their state should be according to their nature, and that they should be independent. And so too in the case of human beings we must not be busy about happiness as if it were hidden away outside ourselves. Neither the eagle nor the plane tree nor anything else that has life, whether plant or animal, vainly troubles itself about wings or leaves of gold or that its shoots may be of silver or its stings and spurs of iron, or rather of adamant; but where nature in the beginning has adorned them with such things, they consider that, if only they are strong and serviceable for speed or defence, they themselves are fortunate and well provided. Then is it not absurd when a human being tries to find happiness somewhere outside himself, and thinks that wealth and birth and the influence of friends, and generally speaking everything of that sort is of the utmost importance? If however nature had bestowed on us only what she has bestowed on other animals, I mean the possession of bodies and souls like theirs, so that we need concern ourselves with nothing beyond, then it would suffice for us, as for all other animals, to content ourselves with physical advantages, and to pursue happiness within this field. But in us has been implanted a soul that in no way resembles other animals; and whether it be different in essence, or not different in essence but superior in its activity only, just as, I suppose, pure gold is superior to gold alloyed with sand,—for some people hold this theory to be true of the soul,—at any rate we surely know that we are more intelligent than other animals. For according to the myth in the Protagoras,(74) nature dealt with them very generously and bountifully, like a mother, but to compensate for all this, mind was bestowed on us by Zeus. Therefore in our minds, in the best and noblest part of us, we must say that happiness resides.)

Σκόπει δή, ταύτης εἰ μὴ μάλιστα τῆς προαιρέσεως ἦν Διογένης, ὃς τὸ μὲν σῶμα τοῖς πόνοις ἀνέδην παρεῖχεν, ἵνα αὐτὸ τῆς φύσεως ῥωμαλεώτερον καταστήσῃ πράττειν [195] δὲ ἠξίου μόνον ὁπόσα ἂν φανῇ τῷ λόγῳ πρακτέα, τοὺς δὲ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἐμπίπτοντας τῇ ψυχῇ θορύβους, οἷα πολλάκις ἡμᾶς ἀναγκάζει τουτὶ τὸ περικείμενον αὐτοῦ χάριν πολυπραγμονεῖν, οὐδὲ ἐν μέρει προσίετο. ὑπὸ δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἀσκήσεως ὁ ἀνὴρ οὕτω μὲν ἔσχεν ἀνδρεῖον τὸ σῶμα ὡς οὐδεὶς οἶμαι τῶν τοὺς [B] στεφανίτας ἀγωνισαμένων, οὕτω δὲ διετέθη τὴν ψυχήν, ὥστε εὐδαιμονεῖν, ὥστε βασιλεύειν οὐδὲν ἔλαττον, εἰ μὴ καὶ πλέον, ὡς οἱ τότε εἰώθεσαν λέγειν Ἕλληνες, τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως, τὸν Πέρσην λέγοντες. ἆρά σοι μικρὰ φαίνεται ἀνὴρ

(Now consider whether Diogenes did not above all other men profess this belief, since he freely exposed his body to hardships so that he might make it stronger than it was by nature. He allowed himself to act only as the light of reason shows us that we ought to act; and the perturbations that attack the soul and are derived from the body, to which this envelope of ours often constrains us for its sake to pay too much attention, he did not take into account at all. Thus by means of this discipline the man made his body more vigorous, I believe, than that of any who have contended for the prize of a crown in the games: and his soul was so disposed that he was happy and a king no less if not even more than the Great King, as the Greeks used to call him in those days, by which they meant the king of Persia. Then does he seem to you of no importance, this man who was)

Ἄπολις, ἄοικος, πατρίδος ἐστερημένος, οὐκ ὀβολόν, οὐ δραχμήν, ἔχων(75) οὐδ᾽ οἰκέτην,

(“cityless, homeless, a man without a country, owning not an obol, not a drachma, not a single slave,”(76))

ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ μᾶζαν, ἧς Ἐπίκουρος εὐπορῶν οὐδὲ τῶν θεῶν φησιν εἰς εὐδαιμονίας λόγον ἐλαττοῦσθαι, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς θεοὺς οὐκ ἐρίζων, [C] τοῦ δοκοῦντος δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εὐδαιμονεστάτου εὐδαιμονέστερον ζῶν καὶ ἔλεγε ζῆν εὐδαιμονέστερον. εἰ δὲ ἀπιστεῖς, ἔργῳ πειραθεὶς ἐκείνου τοῦ βίου καὶ οὐ τῷ λόγῳ αἰσθήσῃ.

(nay, not even a loaf of bread—and Epicurus says that if he have bread enough and to spare he is not inferior to the gods on the score of happiness. Not that Diogenes tried to rival the gods, but he lived more happily than one who is counted the happiest of men, and he used actually to assert that he lived more happily than such a man. And if you do not believe me, try his mode of life in deed and not in word, and you will perceive the truth.)

Φέρε δὴ πρῶτον αὐτὸν διὰ τῶν λόγων ἐλέγξωμεν. ἆρά σοι δοκεῖ τῶν πάντων ἀγαθῶν ἀνθρώποις ἡγεῖσθαι, τούτων δὴ τῶν πολυθρυλήτων, ἐλευθερίαν· [D] πῶς γὰρ οὐ φήσεις· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ χρήματα καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ γένος καὶ σώματος ἰσχὺς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πάντα ἁπλῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα δίχα τῆς ἐλευθερίας οὐ τοῦ δοκοῦντος ηὐτυχηκέναι, τοῦ κτησαμένου δὲ αὐτόν ἐστιν ἀγαθά; τίνα οὖν ὑπολαμβάνομεν τὸν δοῦλον; ἇρα μή ποτε ἐκεῖνον, ὃν ἂν πριώμεθα δραχμῶν ἀργυρίου τόσων ἢ μναῖν δυοῖν ἢ χρυσίου στατήρων δέκα; ἐρεῖς δήπουθεν τοῦτον εἶναι ἀληθῶς δοῦλον. ἆρα δι᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὅτι τὸ ἀργύριον ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τῷ πωλοῦντι καταβεβλήκαμεν; οὕτω μεντἂν [196] εἶεν οἰκέται καὶ ὁπέσους τῶν αἰχμαλώτων λυτρούμεθα. καίτοι καὶ οἱ νόμοι τούτοις ἀποδεδώκασι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν σωθεῖσιν οἴκαδε, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὺς ἀπολυτρούμεθα, οὐχ ἵνα δουλεύσωσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα ὦσιν ἐλεύθεροι. ὁρᾷς ὡς οὐχ ἱκανόν ἐστιν ἀργύριον καταβαλεῖν ἐς τὸ ἀποφῆναι τὸν λυτρωθέντα δοῦλον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὡς ἀληθῶς δοῦλος, οὗ κύριός ἐστιν ἕτερος προσαναγκάσαι πράττειν ὅ,τι ἂν κελεύῃ, καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον κόλασαι καί, τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ,

(Come, let us first test it by reasoning. You think, do you not, that for mankind freedom is the beginning of all good things,(77) I mean of course what people are always calling good? How can you deny it? For property, money, birth, physical strength, beauty and in a word everything of the sort when divorced from freedom are surely blessings that belong, not to him who merely seems to enjoy them, but to him who is that man’s master? Whom then are we to regard as a slave? Shall it be him whom we buy for so many silver drachmas, for two minae or for ten staters(78) of gold? Probably you will say that such a man is truly a slave. And why? Is it because we have paid down money for him to the seller? But in that case the prisoners of war whom we ransom would be slaves. And yet the law on the one hand grants these their freedom when they have come safe home, and we on the other hand ransom them not that they may become slaves, but that they may be free. Do you see then that in order to make a ransomed man a slave it is not enough to pay down a sum of money, but that man is truly a slave over whom another man has power to compel him to do whatever he orders, and if he refuse, to punish him and in the words of the poet)

κακαῖς ὀδύνῃσι πελάζειν;

(“to inflict grievous pains upon him”?(79))

ὅρα δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, [B] εἰ μὴ κύριοι πάντες ἡμῶν εἰσιν, οὓς ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν θεραπεύειν, ἵνα μηδὲν ἀλγῶμεν μηδὲ λυπώμεθα κολαζόμενοι παρ᾽ αὐτῶν. ἢ τοῦτο οἴει κόλασιν μόνον, εἴ τις ἐπανατεινόμενος τὴν βακτηρίαν καθίκοιτο τοῦ οἰκέτου; καίτοι γε τοιοῦτον οὐδὲ οἱ τραχύτατοι τῶν δεσποτῶν ἐπὶ πάντων ποιοῦσι τῶν οἰκετῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ λόγος ἀρκεῖ πολλάκις καὶ ἀπειλή. [C] μήποτε οὖν, ὦ φίλε, νομίσῃς εἶναι ἐλεύθερος, ἄχρις οὗ γαστὴρ ἄρχει σου καὶ τὰ ἔνερθεν γαστρὸς οἵ τε τοῦ παρασχεῖν τὰ πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ ταῦτὰ(80) ἀποκωλῦσαι κύριοι, καὶ εἰ τούυτων δὲ γένοιο κρείττων, ἕως ἂν δουλεύῃς ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν δόξαις, οὔπω τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἔθιγες οὐδὲ ἐγεύσω τοῦ νέκταρος,

(Then consider next whether we have not as many masters as there are persons whom we are obliged to conciliate in order not to suffer pain or annoyance from being punished by them? Or do you think that the only sort of punishment is when a man lifts up his stick against a slave and strikes him? Yet not even the harshest masters do this in the case of all their slaves, but a word or a threat is often enough. Then never think, my friend, that you are free while your belly rules you and the part below the belly, since you will then have masters who can either furnish you the means of pleasure or deprive you of them; and even though you should prove yourself superior to these, so long as you are a slave to the opinions of the many you have not yet approached freedom or tasted its nectar,)

Οὐ μὰ τὸν ἐν στέρνοισιν ἐμοῖς παραδόντα τετρακτύν.

(“I swear by him who set in my breast the mystery of the Four!”(81))

καὶ οὐ τοῦτό φημι, [D] ὡς ἀπερυθριᾶσαι χρὴ πρὸς πάντας καὶ πράττειν. τὰ μὴ πρακτέα· ἀλλ᾽ ὧν ἀπεχόμεθα καὶ ὅσα πράττομεν, μὴ διὰ τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖν σπουδαῖα πως(82) ἢ φαῦλα, διὰ τοῦτο πράττωμεν καὶ ἀπεχώμεθα, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῷ, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τῷ νῷ, ταῦτά ἐστιν ἀπόρρητα. τοὺς μὲν οὖν πολλοὺς οὐδὲν κωλύει ταῖς κοιναῖς ἕπεσθαι δόξαις· ἄμεινον γὰρ τοῦτο τοῦ παντάπασιν ἀπερυθριᾶν· [197] ἔχουσι γὰρ ἅνθρωποι φύσει πρὸς ἀλήθειαν οἰκείως· ἀνδρὶ δὲ ἤδη κατὰ νοῦν ζῶντι καὶ τοὺς ὀρθοὺς εὑρεῖν τε δυναμένῳ καὶ κρῖναι λόγους προσήκει τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲν ἕπεσθαι τοῖς νομιζομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν εὗ τε καὶ χεῖρον πράττεσθαι.

(But I do not mean by this that we ought to be shameless before all men and to do what we ought not; but all that we refrain from and all that we do let us not do or refrain from, merely because it seems to the multitude somehow honourable or base, but because it is forbidden by reason and the god within us, that is, the mind.(83) As for the multitude there is no reason why they should not follow common opinions, for that is better than that they should be altogether shameless, and indeed mankind is predisposed to the truth by nature. But a man who has attained to a life in accordance with intelligence and is able to discover and estimate right reasons, ought on no account whatever to follow the views held by the many about good and bad conduct.)

Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ τὸ μέν ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν θειότερον, ὃ δὴ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησίν φαμεν καὶ λόγον τὸν σιγώμενον, οὗ κήρυξ ἐστὶν ὁ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς οὑτοσὶ λόγος προïὼν ἐξ ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων, ἕτερον δέ τι τούτῳ συνέζευκται ποικίλον καὶ παντοδαπόν, [B] ὀργῇ καὶ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ξυμμιγές τι καὶ πολυκέφαλον θηρίον, οὐ πρότερον χρὴ πρὸς τὰς δόξας τῶν πολλῶν ἀτενῶς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀδιατρέπτως, πρὶν ἂν τοῦτο δαμάσωμεν τὸ θηρίον καὶ πείσωμεν ὑπακοῦσαι τῷ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν θεῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ θείῳ. τοῦτο γὰρ πολλοὶ τοῦ Διογένους ζηλωταὶ ἐάσαντες(84) ἐγένοντο παντορέκται καὶ μιαροὶ καὶ τῶν θηρίων οὐδὲ ἑνὸς κρείττους, ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἐμὸς ὁ λόγος ἐστί, [C] πρῶτον ἔργον ἐρῶ σοι Διογένους, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ γελάσονται μὲν οἱ πολλοί, ἐμοὶ δὲ εἶναι δοκεῖ σεμνότατον. ἐπειδὴ γάρ τις τῶν νέων ἐν ὄχλῳ, παρόντος καὶ τοῦ Διογόνους, ἀπέπαρδεν, ἐπάταξεν ἐκεῖνος τῇ βακτηρίᾳ φάς· εἶτα, ὦ κάθαρμα, μηδὲν ἄξιον τοῦ δημοσίᾳ τὰ τοιταῦτα θαρσεῖν πράξας ἐντεῦθεν ἡμῖν ἄρχῃ δόξης καταφρονεῖν; οὕτως ᾤετο χρῆναι πρότερον ἡδονῆς καὶ θυμοῦ κρείττονα γενέσθαι, πρὶν(85) ἐπὶ τὸ τελειότατον ἐλθεῖν τῶν παλαισμάτων, [D] ἀποδυσάμενον πρὸς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας αἳ μυρίων κακῶν αἴτιαι γίνονται τοῖς πολλοῖς.

(Since therefore one part of our souls is more divine, which we call mind and intelligence and silent reason, whose herald is this speech of ours made up of words and phrases and uttered through the voice; and since there is yoked therewith another part of the soul which is changeful and multiform, something composite of anger and appetite, a many‐headed monster, we ought not to look steadily and unswervingly at the opinions of the multitude until we have tamed this wild beast and persuaded it to obey the god within us, or rather the divine part. For this it is that many disciples of Diogenes have ignored, and hence have become rapacious and depraved and no better than any one of the brute beasts. And to prove that this is not my own theory,(86) first I will relate to you something that Diogenes did, which the many will ridicule but to me it seems most dignified. Once when, in a crowd of people among whom was Diogenes, a certain youth made an unseemly noise, Diogenes struck him with his staff and said “And so, vile wretch, though you have done nothing that would give you the right to take such liberties in public, you are beginning here and before us to show your scorn of opinion?” So convinced was he that a man ought to subdue pleasure and passion before he proceeds to the final encounter of all(87) and strips to wrestle with those opinions which to the multitude are the cause of evils innumerable.)

Οὐκ οἶσθα ὅπως τοὺς μὲν νέους τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀπάγουσιν, ἄλλα ἐπ᾽ ἄλλοις τῶν φιλοσόφων θρυλοῦντες; οἱ Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πλάτωνος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους χορευταὶ γνήσιοι γόητες εἶναι λέγονται καὶ σοφισταὶ καὶ τετυφωμένοι καὶ φαρμακεῖς. [198] τῶν Κυνικῶν εἴ που τις γέγονε σπουδαῖος, ἐλεεινὸς δοκεῖ· μέμνημαι γοῦν ἐγώ ποτε τροφέως εἰπόντος πρός με, ἐπειδὴ τὸν ἑταῖρον εἶδεν Ἰφικλέα αὐχμηρὰν ἔχοντα τὴν κόμην καὶ κατερρωγότα τὰ στέρνα ἱμάτιόν τε παντάπασι φαῦλον ἐν δεινῷ χειμῶνι· τίς ἄρα δαίμων τοῦτον εἰς ταύτην περιέτρεψε τὴν συμφοράν, ὑφ᾽ ἧς αὐτὸς μὲν ἐλεεινός, ἐλεεινότεροι δὲ οἱ πατέρες αὐτοῦ, θρέψαντες σὺν ἐπιμελείᾳ καὶ παιδεύσαντες ὡς ἐνεδέχετο σπουδαίως, [B] ὁ δὲ οὕτω νῦν περιέρχεται, πάντα ἀφείς, οὐδὲν τῶν προσαιτούντων κρείττων; ἐκείνου μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅπως τότε κατειρωνευσάμην· εὖ μέντοι γε ἴσθι ταῦτα καὶ(88) ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀληθῶς κυνῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς διανοουμένους. καὶ οὐ τοῦτο δεινόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὁρᾷς ὅτι καὶ πλοῦτον ἀγαπᾶν πείθουσι καὶ πενίαν μισεῖν καὶ τὴν γαστέρα θεραπεύειν καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἕνεκα πάντα ὑπομένειν πόνον καὶ πιαίνειν τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς δεσμὸν καὶ τράπεζαν παρατίθεσθαι πολυτελῆ [C] καὶ μηδέποτε νύκτωρ καθεύδειν μόνον, ἀλλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα δρᾶν ἐν τῷ σκότῳ λανθάνοντα; τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ Ταρτάρου χεῖρον; οὐ βέλτιόν ἐστιν ὑπὸ τὴν Χάρυβδιν καὶ τὸν Κωκυτὸν καὶ μυρίας ὀργυιὰς κατὰ γῆς δῦναι, ἢ πεσεῖν εἰς τοιοῦτον βίον αἰδοίοις καὶ γαστρὶ δουλεύοντα, καὶ οὐδὲ τούτοις ἁπλῶς ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία, πράγματα δὲ ἔχειν, ὡς ἂν καὶ λάθοιμεν ὑπὸ τῷ σκότῳ ταῦτα ἐξεργαζόμενοι; καίτοι πόσῳ [D] κρεῖττον ἀπέχεσθαι παντάπασιν αὐτῶν; εἰ δὲ μὴ ῥᾴδιον, οἱ Διογένους νόμοι καὶ Κράτητος ὑπὲρ τούτων οὐκ ἀτιμαστέοι· ἔρωτα λύει λιμός, ἂν δὲ τούτῳ χρῆσθαι μὴ δύνῃ,(89) βρόχος. οὐκ οἶσθα, ὅτι ταῦτα ἔπραξαν ἐκεῖνοι τῷ βίῳ διδόντες ὁδὸν εὐτελείας; οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν μαζοφάγων, φησὶν ὁ Διογένης, [199] οἱ τύραννοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τῶν δειπνούντων πολυτελῶς. καὶ ὁ Κράτης μέντοι πεποίηκεν ὕμνον εἰς τὴν Εὐτέλειαν·

(Do you not know how people lure away the young from philosophy by continually uttering now one slander and then another against all the philosophers in turn? The genuine disciples of Pythagoras and Plato and Aristotle are called sorcerers and sophists and conceited and quacks. If here and there among the Cynics one is really virtuous he is regarded with pity. For instance I remember that once my tutor said to me when he saw my fellow‐pupil Iphicles with his hair unkempt and his clothes in tatters on his chest and wearing a wretched cloak in severe winter weather: “What evil genius can have plunged him into this sad state which makes not only him pitiable but even more so his parents who reared him with care and gave him the best education they could! And now he goes about in this condition, neglecting everything and no better than a beggar!” At the time I answered him with some pleasantry or other. But I assure you that the multitude hold these views about genuine Cynics also. And that is not so dreadful, but do you see that they persuade them to love wealth, to hate poverty, to minister to the belly, to endure any toil for the body’s sake, to fatten that prison of the soul, to keep up an expensive table, never to sleep alone at night,(90) provided only that they do all this in the dark and are not found out? Is not this worse than Tartarus? Is it not better to sink beneath Charybdis and Cocytus or ten thousand fathoms deep in the earth(91) than to fall into a life like this, enslaved to lust and appetite, and not even to these simply and openly, like the beasts, but to take pains so that when we act thus we may be hidden under cover of darkness? And yet much better is it to refrain altogether from all this! And if that be difficult the rules of Diogenes and Crates on these matters are not to be despised: “Fasting quenches desire, and if you cannot fast, hang yourself.”(92) Do you not know that those great men lived as they did in order to introduce among men the way of plain living? "For," says Diogenes, “it is not among men who live on bread that you will find tyrants, but among those who eat costly dinners.” Moreover Crates wrote a hymn to Plain Living:)

Χαῖρε, θεὰ δέσποινα, σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγάπημα, Εὐτελίη, κλεινῆς ἔγγονε Σωφροσύνης.

(“Hail, goddess and Queen, darling of wise men, Plain Living, child of glorious Temperance.”(93))