Part 13

Ταύτην ἐγώ σοι τὴν ῥῆσιν ἐξεπίτηδες ὅλην παρέγραφα, μή με κλέπτειν ὑπολάβῃς καὶ κακουργεῖν μύθους ἀρχαίους προφέροντα, τυχὸν μὲν ἐμφερῶς, οὐ μὴν ἀληθῶς πάντη ξυγκειμένους. ἀλλ᾽ ὅ γε ἀληθὴς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν λόγος τί φησιν; ἀκούεις ὅτι, κἂν ἄνθρωπός τις ᾖ τῇ φύσει, θεῖον εἶναι χρὴ τῇ προαιρέσει καὶ δαίμονα, πᾶν ἅπλως ἐκβαλόντα τὸ θνητὸν καὶ θηριῶδες τῆς ψυχῆς, [B] πλὴν ὅσα ἀνάγκη διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος παραμένειν σωτηρίαν; ταῦτα εἴ τις ἐννοῶν δέδοικεν ἐπὶ τηλικοῦτον ελκόμενος βίον, ἆρά σοι φαίνεται τὴν Ἐπικούρειον θαυμάζειν ἀπραγμοσύνην καὶ τοὺς κήπους καὶ τὸ προάστειον τῶν Ἀθηνῶν(395) καὶ τὰς μυρρίνας καὶ τὸ Σωκράτους δωμάτιον; ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπου γε ἐγὼ ταῦτα προτιμήσας τῶν πόνων ὤφθην. ἥδιστα ἄν σοι τοὺς ἐμαυτοῦ πόνους διεξῆλθον καὶ τὰ ἐπικρεμασθέντα παρὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ ξυγγενῶν, ὅτε τῆς παρ᾽ ὑμῖν [C] ἠρχόμην παιδείας, δείματα, εἰ μὴ σφόδρα αὐτὸς ἠπίστασο. τὰ δὲ ἐν Ἰωνίᾳ πρὸς τὸν καὶ γένει προσήκοντα καὶ φιλίᾳ μᾶλλον οἰκεῖον ὄντα μοι πραχθέντα πρότερον ὑπὲρ ἀνδρὸς ξένου μικρά παντελῶς γνωρίμου μοι γενομένου, τοῦ σοφιστοῦ φημί, λέληθεν οὐδέν σε. ἀποδημίας δὲ οὐχ ὑπέστην τῶν φίλων ἕνεκα; καίτοι Καρτερίῳ μὲν οἶσθ᾽ ὅπως [D] συνηράμην πρὸς τὸν ἑταῖρον ἡμῖν ἀφικόμενος Ἀράξιον ἄκλητος, ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ δεησόμενος. ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τῆς θαυμασίας Ἀρετῆς κτημάτων καὶ ὧν ἐπεπόνθει παρὰ τῶν γειτόνων οὐκ εἰς τὴν Φρυγίαν τὸ δεύτερον ἀφικόμην ἐν οὐδὲ ὅλοις μησὶ δύο, ἀσθενοῦς ἤδη μοι παντελὼς ὄντος τοῦ σώματος διὰ τὴν ἐπιγενομένην ὑπὸ τῆς πρότερον κακοπαθείας ἀρρωστίαν; ἀλλὰ δὴ τὸ τελευταῖον πρὸ τῆς εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα γενομένης ἡμῖν ἀφίξεως, ὅτε περὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων, ὡς ἂν εἴποιεν οἱ πολλοί, κινδυνεύων ἐγὼ τῷ στρατοπέδῳ παρέμενον, [260] ὁποίας ἔγραφον ἐπιστολὰς πρὸς σὲ νῦν ὑπομνήσθητι, μήποτε ὀδυρμῶν πλήρεις, μήτι μικρὸν ἢ ταπεινὸν ἢ λίαν ἀγεννὲς ἐχούσας. ἀπιὼν δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πάλιν, ὅτε με φεύγειν ἐνόμιζον πάντες, οὐχ ὡς ἐν ἑορτῇ τῇ μεγίστῃ τὴν τύχην ἐπαινῶν ἡδίστην ἔφην εἶναι τὴν ἀμοιβὴν ἐμοὶ [B] καὶ τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον

(I have purposely set down the whole of this speech for you lest you should think that I am cheating and defrauding by bringing forward ancient myths which may have some resemblance to the truth, but on the whole are not composed with regard to truth. But what is the true meaning of this narrative? You hear what it says, that even though a prince be by nature human, he must in his conduct be divine and a demi‐god and must completely banish from his soul all that is mortal and brutish, except what must remain to safeguard the needs of the body. Now if, reflecting on this, one is afraid to be constrained to adopt a life from which so much is expected, do you therefore conclude that one admires the inaction recommended by Epicurus, the gardens and suburbs of Athens and its myrtles, or the humble home of Socrates? But never has anyone seen me prefer these to a life of toil. That toil of mine I would willingly recount to you, and the hazards that threatened me from my friends and kinsfolk at the time when I began to study under you, if you did not yourself know them well enough. You are well aware of what I did, in the first place, in Ionia in opposition to one who was related to me by ties of blood, but even more closely by ties of friendship, and that in behalf of a foreigner with whom I was very slightly acquainted, I mean the sophist. Did I not endure to leave the country for the sake of my friends? Indeed, you know how I took the part of Carterius when I went unsolicited to our friend Araxius to plead for him. And in behalf of the property of that admirable woman Arete and the wrongs she had suffered from her neighbours, did I not journey to Phrygia for the second time within two months, though I was physically very weak from the illness that had been brought on by former fatigues?(396) Finally, before I went to Greece, while I was still with the army and running what most people would call the greatest possible risks, recall now what sort of letters I wrote to you, never filled with complaints or containing anything little or mean or servile. And when I returned to Greece, when everyone regarded me as an exile, did I not welcome my fate as though it were some high festival, and did I not say that the exchange to me was most delightful, and that, as the saying is, I had thereby gained)

χρύσεα χαλκείων, ἑκατόμβοι᾽ ἐννεαβοίων

(“gold for bronze, the price of a hundred oxen for the price of nine”?(397))

ἔφην ἀντηλλάχθαι; οὕτως ἀντὶ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ ἑστίας τὴν Ἑλλάδα λαχὼν ἐγανύμην, οὐχ ἀγρόν, οὐ κῆπον, οὐ δωμάτιον ἐκεῖ κεκτημένος.

So great was my joy at obtaining the chance to live in Greece instead of in my own home, though I possessed there no land or garden or the humblest house.

Ἁλλὰ ἴσως ἔοικα ἐγὼ τὰς μὲν δυσπραγίας οὐκ ἀγεννῶς φέρειν, πρὸς δὲ τὰς παρὰ τῆς τύχης δωρεὰς ἀγεννής τις εἶναι καὶ μικρός, ὅ γε ἀγαπῶν τὰς Ἀθήνας μᾶλλον τοῦ νῦν περὶ ἡμᾶς ὄγκου, τὴν σχολὴν δήπουθεν ἐκείνην ἐπαινῶν, διὰ δὲ τὸ [C] πλῆθος τῶν πράξεων τοῦτον αἰτιώμενος τὸν βίον; ἀλλὰ μή ποτε χρὴ περὶ ἡμῶν ἄμεινον κρίνειν, οὐκ εἰς ἀπραξίαν καὶ πρᾶξιν βλέποντας, μᾶλλον δὲ εἰς τὸ Γνῶθι σαυτὸν καὶ τὸ

(But perhaps you think that though I can bear adversity in the proper spirit, yet I show a poor and mean spirit towards the good gifts of Fortune, seeing that I prefer Athens to the pomp that now surrounds me; because, you will doubtless say, I approve the leisure of those days and disparage my present life because of the vast amount of work that the latter involves. But perhaps you ought to judge of me more accurately, and not consider the question whether I am idle or industrious, but rather the precept, “Know thyself,” and the saying,)

Ἔρδοι δ᾽ ἕκαστος ἥντιν᾽ εἰδείη τέχνην.

(“Let every man practise the craft which he knows.”(398))

Μεῖζον ἔμοιγε φαίνεται τὸ βασιλεύειν ἢ κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον καὶ φύσεως δεῖσθαι δαιμονιωτέρας βασιλεύς, [D] ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ Πλάτων ἔλεγε· καὶ νῦν Ἀριστοτέλους εἰς ταῦτὸ συντείνοντα παραγράψω λόγον, οὐ γλαῦκα Ἀθηναίοις ἄγων, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι μὴ παντάπασιν ἀμελῶ τῶν ἐκείνου λόγων ἐπιδεικνύμενος. φησὶ δὲ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς συγγράμμασιν· “Εἱ δὲ δή τις ἄριστον θείη τὸ βασιλεύεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσι, τῶς ἕξει τὰ περὶ τῶν τέκνων; πότερον καὶ τὸ γένος δεῖ βασιλεύειν; ἀλλὰ γιγνομένων ὁποῖοί τινες ἔτυχον, βλαβερόν. ἀλλὰ οὐ παραδώσει [261] κύριος ὢν τοῖς τέκνοις; ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔτι ῥᾴδιον τοῦτο πιστεῦσαι· χαλεπὸν γὰρ καὶ μείζονος ἀρετῆς ἢ κατ᾽ ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν.” ἑξῆς δὲ περὶ τοῦ κατὰ νόμον λεγομένου βασιλέως διεξελθών, ὡς(399) ἐστὶν ὑπηρέτης καὶ φύλαξ τῶν νόμων, καὶ τοῦτον οὐδὲ βασιλέα καλῶν, οὐδὲ τὸν τοιοῦτον εἶδος πολιτείας(400) οἰόμενος, προστίθησι· “[B] Περὶ δὲ τῆς παμβασιλείας καλουμένης, αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶ καθ᾽ ἣν ἄρχει πάντων κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεύς, δοκεῖ τισιν οὐδὲ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τὸ κύριον ἕνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν· τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις φύσει τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι.” εἶτα μετ᾽ ὀλίγον φησίν· “Ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νοῦν κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τοὺς νόμους· ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθησι καὶ θηρία· [C] ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ὃς(401) διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρασ· διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως ὁ νοῦς νόμος ἐστίν.” ὁρᾷς, ὁ φιλόσοφος ἔοικεν ἐνταῦθα σαφῶς ἀπιστοῦντι καὶ κατεγνωκότι τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως. φησὶ γὰρ οὕτω ῥήματι τοῦτο λέγων· οὐδεμίαν ἀξιόχρεων εἶναι φύσιν ἀνθρωπίνην πρὸς τοσαύτην τύχης ὑπεροχήν· [D] οὔτε γὰρ τῶν παίδων τὸ κοινῇ τοῖς πολίταις συμφέρον προτιμᾶν ἄνθρωπόν γε ὄντα ῥᾴδιον ὑπολαμβάνει, καὶ πολλῶν ὁμοίων ἄρχειν οὐ δίκαιον εἶναί φησι, καὶ τέλος ἐπιθεὶς τὸν κολοφῶνα τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις νόμον μὲν εἶναί φησι τὸν νοῦν χωρὶς ὀρέξεως, ᾧ μόνῳ τὰς πολιτείας ἐπιτρέπειν χρῆναι, ἀνδρῶν δὲ οὐδενί. ὁ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς νοῦς, κἂν ὦσιν ἀγαθοί, συμπέπλεκται θυμῷ καὶ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, θηρίοις χαλεπωτάτοις. ταῦτα ἐμοὶ [262] δοκεῖ τοῖς τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἄκρως ὁμολογεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι κρείττονα χρὴ τῶν ἀρχομένων εἶναι τὸν ἄρχοντα, οὐκ ἐπιτηδεύσει μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσει διαφέροντα· ὅπερ εὑρεῖν ἐν ἀνθρώποις οὐ ῥᾴδιον·(402) ... καὶ τρίτον ὅτι πάσῃ μηχανῇ κατὰ δύναμιν νόμοις προσεκτέον οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα κειμένοις οὐδὲ ὡς ἔοικε νῦν τεθεῖσιν ὑπ᾽ ἀνδρῶν οὐ πάντη κατὰ νοῦν βεβιωκότων, ἀλλ᾽ ὅστις μᾶλλον τὸν νοῦν καθαρθεὶς καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ εἰς τὰ παρόντα [B] ἀφορῶν ἀδικήματα οὐδὲ εἰς τὰς παρεστώσας τύχας τίθησι τοὺς νόμους, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς πολιτείας φύσιν καταμαθὼν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οἷόν(403) ἐστι τῇ φύσει καὶ ποταπόν ἐστι τἀδίκημα τεθεαμένος τῇ φύσει, εἶθ᾽ ὅσα δυνατὸν ἐστιν ἐκεῖθεν ἐνταῦθα μεταφέρων καὶ τιθεὶς νόμους τοῖς πολίταις κοινούς, οὔτε εἰς φιλίαν οὔτε εἰς ἔχθραν ἀφορῶν [C] οὔτε εἰς γείτονα καὶ ξυγγενῆ· κρεῖσσον δέ, εἰ μηδὲ τοῖς καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὕστερον ἢ ξένοις γράψας ἀποπέμποι νόμους, ἔχων γε οὐδὲν οὐδὲ ἐλπίζων πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἕξειν ἰδιωτικὸν συνάλλαγμα. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸν Σόλωνα τὸν σοφὸν ἀκούω μετὰ τῶν φίλων συμβουλευσάμενον ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν χρεῶν ἀναιρέσεως τοῖς μὲν εὐπορίας ἀφορμήν, αὑτῷ δὲ αἰσχύνης αἰτίαν παρασχεῖν, καὶ ταῦτα τῷ πολιτεύματι τὸν δῆμον ἐλευθερώσαντα. οὕτως [D] οὐ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι τὰς τοιαύτας ἐκφυγεῖν κῆρας, κἂν τὸν αὑτοῦ νοῦν παράσχῃ τις ἀπαθῆ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν.

(To me, at any rate, it seems that the task of reigning is beyond human powers, and that a king needs a more divine character, as indeed Plato too used to say. And now I will write out a passage from Aristotle to the same effect, not “bringing owls to the Athenians,”(404) but in order to show you that I do not entirely neglect his writings. In his political treatises he says: “Now even if one maintain the principle that it is best for cities to be governed by a king, how will it be about his children? Ought his children to succeed him? And yet if they prove to be no better than anybody else, that would be a bad thing for the city. But you may say, though he has the power he will not leave the succession to his children? It is difficult indeed to believe that he will not; for that would be too hard for him, and demands a virtue greater than belongs to human nature.”(405) And later on, when he is describing a so‐called king who rules according to law, and says that he is both the servant and guardian of the laws, he does not call him a king at all, nor does he consider such a king as a distinct form of government; and he goes on to say: “Now as for what is called absolute monarchy, that is to say, when a king governs all other men according to his own will, some people think that it is not in accordance with the nature of things for one man to have absolute authority over all the citizens; since those who are by nature equal must necessarily have the same rights.”(406) Again, a little later he says: “It seems, therefore, that he who bids Reason rule is really preferring the rule of God and the laws, but he who bids man rule, adds an element of the beast. For desire is a wild beast, and passion which warps even the best men. It follows, therefore, that law is Reason exempt from desire.” You see the philosopher seems here clearly to distrust and condemn human nature. For he says so in so many words when he asserts that human nature is in no case worthy of such an excess of fortune. For he thinks that it is too hard for one who is merely human to prefer the general weal of the citizens to his own children; he says that it is not just that one man should rule over many who are his equals; and, finally, he puts the finishing stroke(407) to what he has just said when he asserts that “law is Reason exempt from desire,” and that political affairs ought to be entrusted to Reason alone, and not to any individual man whatever. For the reason that is in men, however good they may be, is entangled with passion and desire, those most ferocious monsters. These opinions, it seems to me, harmonise perfectly with Plato’s; first, that he who governs ought to be superior to his subjects and surpass them not only in his acquired habits but also in natural endowment; a thing which is not easy to find among men;... thirdly, that he ought by every means in his power to observe the laws, not those that were framed to meet some sudden emergency, or established, as now appears, by men whose lives were not wholly guided by reason; but he must observe them only in case the lawgiver, having purified his mind and soul, in enacting those laws keeps in view not merely the crimes of the moment or immediate contingencies; but rather recognises the nature of government and the essential nature of justice, and has carefully observed also the essential nature of guilt, and then applies to his task all the knowledge thus derived, and frames laws which have a general application to all the citizens without regard to friend or foe, neighbour or kinsman. And it is better that such a lawgiver should frame and promulgate his laws not for his contemporaries only but for posterity also, or for strangers with whom he neither has nor expects to have any private dealings. For instance, I hear that the wise Solon, having consulted his friends about the cancelling of debts, furnished them with an opportunity to make money, but brought on himself a disgraceful accusation.(408) So hard is it to avoid such fatalities, even when a man brings a passionless mind to the task of governing.)

Ἃ δεδιὼς ἐγὼ πολλάκις εἰκότως ἐπαινῶ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν βίον, καὶ σοὶ πειθόμενος μάλιστα ταῦτα ἐγὼ διανοοῦμαι, οὐχ ὅτι μοι τὸν ζῆλον πρὸς ἐκείνους μόνον ἔφης προκεῖσθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας, Σόλωνα καὶ Λυκοῦργον καὶ Πιττακόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι μεταβῆναί με φὴς ἐκ τῆς ὑποστέγου φιλοσοφίας πρὸς τὴν ὑπαίθριον. [263] ὥσπερ οὖν, εἰ τῷ χαλεπῶς καὶ μόλις ὑγιείας ἕνεκα τῆς αὑτοῦ γυμναζομένῳ μετρίως οἴκαδε προύλεγες, ὅτι “Νῦν ἥκεις εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν καὶ μεταβέβηκας ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ δωματίῳ παλαίστρας ἐπὶ τὸ στάδιον τοῦ Διός, οὗ θεατὰς ἕξεις τούς τε ἁπανταχόθεν Ἕλληνας καὶ πρώτους γε τοὺς σαυτοῦ πολίτας, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἀγωνίζεσθαι χρή, τινὰς δὲ καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων, οὓς ἐκπλῆξαι χρεών, φοβερωτέραν αὐτοῖς τὴν πατρίδα όο γε εἰς σὲ νῦν ἧκον ἐπιδείξαντα,” κατέβαλες ἂν εὐθέως καὶ τρέμειν ἐποίησας πρὸ τῆς ἀγωνίας· [B] οὕτω κἀμὲ νῦν νόμιζε διατεθῆναι τοῖς τοιούτοις λόγοις. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων εἴτε ὀρθῶς ἔγνωκα νῦν εἴτε ἐν μέρει σφάλλομαι τοῦ προσήκοντος εἴτε καὶ τοῦ παντὸς διαμαρτάνω, διδάξεις αὐτίκα μάλα.

(And since this sort of thing is what I dread, it is natural that I should often dwell on the advantages of my previous mode of life, and I am but obeying you when I reflect that you said not only that I must emulate those famous men Solon, Lycurgus and Pittacus, but also that I must now quit the shades of philosophy for the open air. This is as though you had announced to a man who for his health’s sake and by exerting himself to the utmost was able to take moderate exercise at home: “Now you have come to Olympia and have exchanged the gymnasium in your house for the stadium of Zeus, where you will have for spectators Greeks who have come from all parts, and foremost among them your own fellow‐citizens, on whose behalf you must enter the lists; and certain barbarians will be there also whom it is your duty to impress, showing them your fatherland in as formidable a light as lies in your power.” You would have disconcerted him at once and made him nervous before the games began. You may now suppose that I have been affected in the same manner by just such words from you. And you will very soon inform me whether my present view is correct, or whether I am in part deceived as to my proper course or whether indeed I am wholly mistaken.)

[C] Ὑπὲρ δὲ ὧν ἀπορῆσαί μοι πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστολὴν τὴν σὴν παρέστη, ὦ φίλη κεφαλὴ καὶ πάσης ἔμοιγε τιμῆς ἀξία, βούλομαι δηλῶσαι· σαφέστερον γάρ πως ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμῶ μαθεῖν. ἔφησθα ὅτι τὸν ἐν τῇ πράξει παρὰ τὸν φιλόσοφον ἐπαινεῖς βίον, καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη τὸν σοφὸν ἐκάλεις μάρτυρα, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐν τῷ πράττειν εὖ τιθέμενον, καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν σκοποῦντα τοῦ τε πολιτικοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ θεωρίᾳ ζωῆς, διαπορεῖν ἄττα περὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ τὴν μὲν θεωρίαν ἐν ἄλλοις προτιμᾶν, ἐπαινεῖν δὲ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς τῶν καλῶν πράξεων ἀρχιτέκτονας. [D] τούτους δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν εἶναι φὴς τοὺς βασιλέας, Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ εἴρηκεν οὐδαμοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπὸ σοῦ προστεθεῖσαν λέξιν, πλέον δὲ θάτερον ἐξ ὧν παραγέγραφας ἄν τις νοήσειε. τὸ γὰρ “Μάλιστα δὲ πράττειν λέγομεν κυρίως καὶ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν πράξεων τοὺς ταῖς διανοίαις ἀρχιτέκτονας” εἰς τοὺς νομοθέτας καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς φιλοσόφους καὶ πάντας ἁπλῶς τοὺς νῷ τε καὶ λόγῳ πράττοντας, οὐχὶ δὲ εἰς τοὺς αὐτουργοὺς [264] καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν πράξεων ἐργάτας εἰρῆσθαι νομιστέον· οἷς οὐκ ἀπόχρη μόνον ἐνθυμηθῆναι καὶ κατανοῆσαι καὶ τὸ πρακτέον τοῖς ἄλλοις φράσαι, προσήκει δὲ αὐτοῖς ἕκαστα μεταχειρίζεσθαι καὶ πράττειν ὧν οἱ νόμοι διαγορεύουσι καὶ πολλάκις οἱ καιροὶ προσαναγκάζουσι, πλὴν εἰ μὴ τὸν ἀρχιτέκτονα καλοῦμεν, καθάπερ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἡρακλέα καλεῖν εἴωθεν ἐν τῇ ποιήσει “μεγάλων ἐπιίστορα ἔργων,” αὐτουργότατον ἁπάντων γενόμενον.

(But I should like to make clear to you the points in your letter by which I am puzzled, my dearest friend to whom I especially am bound to pay every honour: for I am eager to be more precisely informed about them. You said that you approve a life of action rather than the philosophic life, and you called to witness the wise Aristotle who defines happiness as virtuous activity, and discussing the difference between the statesman’s life and the life of contemplation, showed a certain hesitation about those lives, and though in others of his writings he preferred the contemplative life, in this place you say he approves the architects of noble actions. But it is you who assert that these are kings, whereas Aristotle does not speak in the sense of the words that you have introduced: and from what you have quoted one would rather infer the contrary. For when he says: “We most correctly use the word ‘act’ of those who are the architects of public affairs by virtue of their intelligence,”(409) we must suppose that what he says applies to lawgivers and political philosophers and all whose activity consists in the use of intelligence and reason, but that it does not apply to those who do the work themselves and those who transact the business of politics. But in their case it is not enough that they should consider and devise and instruct others as to what must be done, but it is their duty to undertake and execute whatever the laws ordain and circumstances as well often force them; unless indeed we call that man an architect who is “well versed in mighty deeds,”(410) a phrase which Homer in his poems usually applies to Heracles, who was indeed of all men that ever lived most given to do the work himself.)

[B] Εἰ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἀληθὲς ὑπολαμβάνομεν ἢ καὶ μόνον ἐν τῇ πράττειν τὰ κοινά φαμεν εὐδαίμονας τοὺς κυρίους(411) ὄντας καὶ βασιλεύοντας πολλῶν, τί ποτε περὶ Σωκράτους ἐροῦμεν; Πυθαγόραν δὲ καὶ Δημόκριτον καὶ τὸν Κλαζομένιον Ἀναξαγόραν ἴσως διὰ τὴν θεωρίαν κατ᾽ ἄλλο φήσεις εὐδαίμονας· Σωκράτης δὲ τὴν θεωρίαν παραιτησάμενος καὶ τὸν πρακτικὸν ἀγαπήσας βίον οὐδὲ τῆς γαμετῆς ἦν τῆς αὑτοῦ κύριος οὐδὲ τοῦ παιδός· [C] ἦπού γε δυοῖν ἢ τριῶν πολιτῶν ἐκείνῳ κρατεῖν ὑπῆρχεν; ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐκ ἦν ἐκεῖνος πρακτικός, ἐπεὶ μηδενὸς ἦν κύριος; ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν Ἀλεξάνδρου φημὶ μείζονα τὸν Σωφρονίσκου κατεργάσασθαι, τὴν Πλάτωνος αὐτῷ σοφίαν ἀνατιθείς, τὴν Ξενοφῶντος στρατηγίαν, τὴν Ἀντισθένους ἀνδρείαν, τὴν Ἐρετρικὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὴν Μεγαρικήν, τὸν Κέβητα, τὸν Σιμμίαν, [D] τὸν Φαίδωνα, μυρίους ἄλλους· καὶ οὔπω φημὶ τὰς γενομένας ἡμῖν ἐνθένδ᾽ ἀποικίας, τὸ Λύκειον, τὴν Στοάν, τὰς Ἀκαδημείας. τίς οὖν ἐσώθη διὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου νίκην; τίς πόλις ἄμεινον ᾠκήθη; τίς αὑτοῦ γέγονε βελτίων ἰδιώτης ἀνήρ; πλουσιωτέρους μὲν γὰρ πολλοὺς ἂν εὕροις, σοφώτερον δὲ οὐδένα οὐδὲ σωφρονέστερον αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ, εἰ μὴ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀλαζόνα καὶ ὑπερόπτην. ὅσοι δὲ σώζονται νῦν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, διὰ τὸν Σωκράτη σώζονται. καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐγὼ μόνος, [265] Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ πρότερος(412) ἔοικεν ἐννοήσας εἰπεῖν, ὅτι μὴ μεῖον αὐτῷ προσήκει φρονεῖν ἐπὶ τῆς θεολογικῇ συγγραφῇ τοῦ καθελόντος τὴν Περσῶν δύναμιν. καί μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο ἐκεῖνος ὀρθῶς ξυννοῆσαι· νικᾶν μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρείας ἐστὶ μάλιστα καὶ τῆς τύχης, κείσθω δέ, εἰ βούλει, καὶ τῆς ἐντρεχοῦς ταύτης φρονήσεως, ἀληθεῖς δὲ ὑπὲρ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξας ἀναλαβεῖν οὐκ ἀρετῆς μόνον τῆς τελείας ἔργον ἐστίν, [B] ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιστήσειεν ἄν τις εἰκότως, πότερον χρὴ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἢ θεὸν καλεῖν. εἰ γὰρ ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὸ λεγόμενον, ὅτι πέφυκεν ἕκαστον ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων γνωρίζεσθαι, τὴν θείαν οὐσίαν ὁ γνωρίσας θεῖός τις ἂν εἰκότως νομίζοιτο.

(But if we conceive this to be true, or that only those are happy who administer public affairs and who are in authority and rule over many, what then are we to say about Socrates? As for Pythagoras and Democritus and Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, you will perhaps say that they were happy in another sense of the word, because of their philosophic speculations. But as for Socrates who, having rejected the speculative life and embraced a life of action, had no authority over his own wife or his son, can we say of him that he governed even two or three of his fellow‐citizens? Then will you assert that since he had no authority over any one he accomplished nothing? On the contrary I maintain that the son of Sophroniscus(413) performed greater tasks than Alexander, for to him I ascribe the wisdom of Plato, the generalship of Xenophon, the fortitude of Antisthenes, the Eretrian(414) and Megarian(415) philosophies, Cebes, Simmias,(416) Phaedo and a host of others; not to mention the offshoots derived from the same source, the Lyceum, the Stoa and the Academies. Who, I ask, ever found salvation through the conquests of Alexander? What city was ever more wisely governed because of them, what individual improved? Many indeed you might find whom those conquests enriched, but not one whom they made wiser or more temperate than he was by nature, if indeed they have not made him more insolent and arrogant. Whereas all who now find their salvation in philosophy owe it to Socrates. And I am not the only person to perceive this fact and to express it, for Aristotle it seems did so before me, when he said that he had just as much right to be proud of his treatise on the gods as the conqueror(417) of the Persian empire. And I think he was perfectly correct in that conclusion. For military success is due to courage and good fortune more than anything else or, let us say, if you wish, to intelligence as well, though of the common everyday sort. But to conceive true opinions about God is an achievement that not only requires perfect virtue, but one might well hesitate whether it be proper to call one who attains to this a man or a god. For if the saying is true that it is the nature of everything to become known to those who have an affinity with it, then he who comes to know the essential nature of God would naturally be considered divine.)