Part 12

(Here however I am reminded of the report current that you are going not only to Illyria but to Thrace also, and among the Greeks who dwell on the shores of that sea.(360) Among them I was born and brought up, and hence I have a deeply rooted affection for them and for those parts and the cities there. And it may be that in their hearts also there still remains no slight affection for me: I am therefore well assured that you will, as the saying is, gladden their hearts by your coming, and there will be a fair exchange, since they will gain in proportion as I lose by your leaving me here. And I say this not because I wish you to go—for it were far better if you should return to me by the same road without delay—but the thought in my mind is that even for this loss I shall not be without comfort or consolation, since I can rejoice with them on seeing you just come from us. I say “us,” since on your account I now rank myself among the Celts,(361) seeing that you are worthy to be counted among the most distinguished Greeks for your upright administration and your other virtues; and also for your consummate skill in oratory; in philosophy too you are thoroughly versed, a field wherein the Greeks alone have attained the highest rank; for they sought after truth, as its nature requires, by the aid of reason and did not suffer us to pay heed to incredible fables or impossible miracles like most of the barbarians.)

Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ὅπως ποτὲ ἔχει, τανῦν ἀφείσθω. σὲ δέ· προπέμπειν ἤδη γὰρ ἄξιον μετ᾽ εὐφημίας· ἄγοι μὲν θεὸς εὐμενής, ὅποι ποτ᾽ ἂν δέῃ πορεύεσθαι, [C] Ξένιος δὲ ὑποδέχοιτο καὶ Φίλιος εὔνους, ἄγοι τε διὰ γῆς ἀσφαλῶς· κἂν πλεῖν δέῃ, στορεννύσθω τὰ κύματα· πᾶσι δὲ φανείης φίλος καὶ τίμιος, ἡδὺς μὲν προσιών, ἀλγεινὸς δὲ ἀπολείπων αὐτούς· στέργων δὲ ἡμᾶς ἥκιστα ποθήσειας ἀνδρὸς ἑταίρου καὶ φίλου πιστοῦ κοινωνίαν. εὐμενῆ δὲ καὶ τὸν αὐτοκράτορά σοι θεὸς ἀποφήνειε καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ νοῦν διδοίη, [D] καὶ τὴν οἴκαδε παρ᾽ ἡμᾶς πορείαν ἀσφαλῆ παρασκευάζοι καὶ ταχεῖαν.

(However, this subject also, whatever the truth about it may be, I must lay aside for the present. But as for you—for I must needs dismiss you with auspicious words—may God in His goodness be your guide wherever you may have to journey, and as the God of Strangers and the Friendly One(362) may He receive you graciously and lead you safely by land; and if you must go by sea, may He smooth the waves!(363) And may you be loved and honoured by all you meet, welcome when you arrive, regretted when you leave them! Though you retain your affection for me, may you never lack the society of a good comrade and faithful friend! And may God make the Emperor gracious to you, and grant you all else according to your desire, and make ready for you a safe and speedy journey home to us!)

Ταῦτά σοι μετὰ τῶν καλῶν κἈγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν συνεύχομαι, καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τοίτοις

(In these prayers for you I am echoed by all good and honourable men; and let me add one prayer more:)

Οὖλέ τε καὶ μέγα χαῖρε, θεοὶ δὲ τοι ὄλβια δοῖεν, Νοστῆσαι οἶκόνδε φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν.

(“Health and great joy be with thee, and may the gods give thee all things good, even to come home again to thy dear fatherland!”(364))

LETTER TO THEMISTIUS THE PHILOSOPHER

Introduction

On the strength of his Aristotelian “Paraphrases” Themistius may be called a scholar, though hardly a philosopher as he himself claimed. Technically he was a Sophist: that is to say he gave public lectures (ἐπιδείξεις), wrote exercises after the Sophistic pattern and went on embassies, which were entrusted to him solely on account of his persuasive charm. But he insisted that he was no Sophist, because he took no fees(365) and styled himself a practical philosopher.(366) He was indifferent to the Neo‐ Platonic philosophy,(367) and, since Constantius made him a Senator, he cannot have betrayed any zeal for the Pagan religion. From Julian’s Pagan restoration he seems to have held aloof, and, though Julian had been his pupil, probably at Nicomedia, he did not appoint him to any office. Under the Christian Emperor Theodosius he held a prefecture. There is no evidence for a positive coolness, such as Zeller(368) assumes, between Themistius and Julian, and we know too little of their relations to assert with some critics that the respectful tone of this letter is ironical.(369) It was probably written after Julian had become Emperor, though there is nothing in it that would not suit an earlier date; it is sometimes assigned to 355 when Julian was still Caesar. The quotations from Aristotle are appropriately addressed to Themistius as an Aristotelian commentator.

[253] ΙΟΥΛΙΑΝΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΚΡΑΤΟΡΟΣ

(Julian, Emperor)

ΘΕΜΙΣΤΙΩΙ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΩΙ

(To Themistius the Philosopher)

Ἐγώ σοι βεβαιῶσαι μέν, ὥσπερ οὖν γράφεις, τὰς ἐλπίδας καὶ σφόδρα εὔχομαι, δέδοικα δὲ μὴ διαμάρτω, μείζονος οὔσης τῆς ὑποσχέσεως, ἣν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ πρός τε τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον πρὸς σεαυτὸν ποιῇ· καί μοι πάλαι μὲν οἰομένῳ πρός τε τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ τὸν Μάρκον, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος γέγονεν ἀρετῇ διαφέρων, [B] εἶναι τὴν ἅμιλλαν φρίκη τις προσῄει καὶ δέος θαυμαστόν, μὴ τοῦ μὲν ἀπολείπεσθαι παντελῶς τῆς ἀνδρείας δόξω, τοῦ δὲ τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς οὐδὲ ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγον ἐφίκωμαι. εἰς ταῦτα ἀφορῶν ἀνεπειθόμην τὴν σχολὴν ἐπαινεῖν, καὶ τῶν Ἀττικῶν διαιτημάτων(370) αὐτός τε ἡδέως ἐμεμνήμην καὶ τοῖς φίλοις ὑμῖν προσᾴδειν ἠξίουν, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ βαρέα φορτία φέροντες ἐν ταῖς ᾠδαῖς ἐπικουφίζουσιν αὑτοῖς τὴν ταλαιπωρίαν. [C] σὺ δέ μοι νῦν μεῖζον ἐποίησας διὰ τῆς ἔναγχος ἐπιστολῆς τὸ δέος καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τῷ παντὶ χαλεπώτερον ἔδειξας, ἐν ταύτῃ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τετάχθαι με τῇ μερίδι λέγων, ἐν ᾗ πρότερον Ἡρακλῆς καὶ Διόνυσος ἐγενέσθην φιλοσοφοῦντες ὁμοῦ καὶ βασιλεύοντες καὶ πᾶσαν σχεδὸν [254] τῆς ἐπιπολαζούσης κακίας ἀνακαθαιρόμενοι γῆν τε καὶ θάλατταν. κελεύεις δὲ πᾶσαν ἀποσεισάμενον σχολῆς ἔννοιαν καὶ ῥᾳστώνης σκοπεῖν, ὅπως τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἀξίως ἀγωνιούμεθα· εἶτα ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς τῶν νομοθετῶν μέμνησαι, Σόλωνος, Πιττακοῦ, Λυκούργου, καὶ τούτων ἁπάντων μείζονα χρῆναι παρ᾽ ἡμῶν λέγεις τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν δίκῃ νῦν περιμένειν. τούτοις ἐγὼ τοῖς λόγοις ἐντυχὼν ἐξεπλάγην μικροῦ· [B] σοὶ μὲν γὰρ ὑπελάμβανον οὐδαμῶς θεμιτὸν κολακεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι, ἐμαυτῷ δὲ συνειδὼς φύσεως μὲν ἕνεκα διαφέρον οὐδὲν οὔτε ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὔτε νῦν ὑπάρξαν, φιλοσοφίας δὲ ἐρασθέντι μόνον· τὰς γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ σιγῶ τύχας, αἵ μοι τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦτον ἀτελῆ τέως ἐφύλαξαν· οὐκ εἴχον οὖν ὅ, τι χρὴ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων συμβαλεῖν, ἕως ἐπὶ νοῦν ἤγαγεν ὁ θεός, [C] μή ποτε ἄρα προτρέπειν ἐθέλεις διὰ τῶν ἐπαίνων καὶ τῶν ἀγώνων δεῖξαι τὸ μέγεθος, οἷς ἀνάγκη πᾶσα τὸν ἐν πολιτείᾳ ζῶντα παραβεβλῆσθαι τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον.

(I earnestly desire to fulfil your hopes of me even as you express them in your letter, but I am afraid I shall fall short of them, since the expectations you have raised both in the minds of others, and still more in your own, are beyond my powers. There was a time when I believed that I ought to try to rival men who have been most distinguished for excellence, Alexander, for instance, or Marcus;(371) but I shivered at the thought and was seized with terror lest I should fail entirely to come up to the courage of the former, and should not make even the least approach to the latter’s perfect virtue. With this in mind I convinced myself that I preferred a life of leisure, and I both gladly recalled the Attic manner of living, and thought myself to be in sweet accord with you who are my friends, just as those who carry heavy burdens lighten their labour by singing.(372) But by your recent letter you have increased my fears, and you point to an enterprise in every way more difficult. You say that God has placed me in the same position as Heracles and Dionysus of old who, being at once philosophers and kings, purged almost the whole earth and sea of the evils that infested them. You bid me shake off all thought of leisure and inactivity that I may prove to be a good soldier worthy of so high a destiny. And besides those examples you go on to remind me of law‐ givers such as Solon, Pittacus, and Lycurgus, and you say that men have the right to expect from me now greater things than from any of these. When I read these words I was almost dumbfounded; for on the one hand I was sure that it was unlawful for you as a philosopher to flatter or deceive; on the other hand I am fully conscious that by nature there is nothing remarkable about me—there never was from the first nor has there come to be now,—but as regards philosophy I have only fallen in love with it (I say nothing of the fates that have intervened(373) to make that love so far ineffectual). I could not tell therefore how I ought to interpret such expressions, until God brought it into my mind that perhaps by your very praises you wished to exhort me, and to point out how great are those trials to which a statesman must inevitably be exposed every day of his life.)

Τοῦτο δὲ ἀποτρέποντός ἐστι πλέον ἢ πρὸς τὸν βίον παρορμῶντος. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴ τις τὸν πορθμὸν τὸν παρ᾽ ὑμῖν πλέων καὶ οὐδὲ τοῦτον ῥᾳδίως οὐδὲ εὐκόλως ὑφιστάμενος ἀκούοι παρά του μαντικὴν ἐπαγγελλομένου τέχνην, [D] ὡς χρεὼν αὐτὸν τὸν Αἰγαῖον ἀναμετρῆσαι καὶ τὸν Ἰόνιον καὶ τῆς ἔξω θαλάσσης ἅψασθαι, καὶ “Νῦν μὲν” ὁρᾷς ὁ προφήτης λέγοι “τείχη καὶ λιμένας, ἐκεῖ δὲ γενόμενος οὐδὲ σκοπιὰν οὐδὲ πέτραν ὄψει, ἀλλ᾽ ἀγαπήσεις καὶ ναῦν πόρρωθεν κατιδὼν προσειπεῖν τοὺς ἐμπλέοντας, καὶ τῆς γῆς ὀψέ ποτε ἁψάμενος, τῷ θεῷ πολλάκις προσεύξῃ, πρὸς αὐτῷ γοῦν τῷ τέλει τοῦ βίου τυχεῖν [255] ὅρμου καὶ τήν τε ναῦν σώαν παραδοῦναι καὶ τοὺς ἐμπλέοντας ἀπαθεῖς τοῖς οἰκείοις κακῶν παραστῆσαι καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῇ μητρὶ γῇ δοῦναι, τοῦτο δὲ ἐσόμενον ἴσως ἄδηλον ἔσται σοι μέχρι τῆς τελευταίας ἐκείνης ἡμέρας·” ἆρ᾽ οἴει τούτων ἀκούσαντα τῶν λόγων ἐκεῖνον πόλιν γ᾽ ἂν(374) οἰκεῖν ἑλέσθαι πλησίον θαλάσσης, οὐχὶ δὲ χαίρειν εἰπόντα πλούτῳ καὶ τοῖς ἐξ ἐμπορίας ἀγαθοῖς περιγιγνομένοις, γνωρέμων πολλῶν, ξενικῆς φιλίας, [B] ἱστορίας ἐθνῶν καὶ πόλεων ὑπεριδόντα σοφὸν ἀποφαίνειν τὸν τοῦ Νεοκλέους, ὃς κελεύει λαθεῖν βιώσαντα; καὶ σὺ δὲ ἕοικας τοῦτο καταμαθὼν προκαταλαμβάνειν ἡμᾶς ταῖς εἰς τὸν Ἐπίκουρον λοιδορίαις καὶ προεξαιρεῖν τὴν τοιαύτην γνώμην. φὴς γάρ που σχολὴν ἐπαινεῖν ἀπράγμονα καὶ διαλέξεις ἐν περιπάτοις προσήκειν ἐκείνῳ· [C] ἐγὲ δὲ ὅτι μὲν οὐ καλῶς Ἐπικούρῳ ταῦτα ἐδόκει, πάλαι καὶ σφόδρα πείθομαι· εἰ δὲ πάνθ᾽ ὁντινοῦν ἐπὶ πολιτείαν προτρέπειν ἄξιον, καὶ τὸν ἧττον πεφυκότα καὶ τὸν οὔπω τελέως δυνάμενον, ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἴσως διαπορῆσαι χρή. λέγουσι γάρ τοι καὶ τὸν Σωκράτη πολλοὺς μὲν οὐ σφόδρα εὐφυῶς(375) ἔχοντας ἀπαγαγεῖν τοῦ βήματος, καὶ Γλαύκωνα ἐκεῖνον, Ξενοφῶν λέγει· τὸν δὲ(376) τοῦ Κλεινίου παῖδα πειραθῆναι μὲν ἐπισχεῖν, [D] οὐ δυνηθῆναι δὲ περιγενέσθαι τοῦ νεανίσκου τῆς ὁρμῆς. ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ ἄκοντας καὶ ξυνιέντας αὑτῶν προσαναγκάσομεν, θαρρεῖν ὑπὲρ τηλικούτων ἔργων κελεύοντες, ὧν οὐκ ἀρετὴ μόνον ἐστὶν οὐδὲ προαίρεσις ὀρθὴ κυρία, πολὺ δὲ πλέον ἡ τύχη κρατοῦσα πανταχοῦ καὶ βιαζομένη ῥέπειν ᾗπερ ἂν ἐθέλῃ τὰ πράγματα; Χρύσιππος δὲ δοκεῦ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα σοφὸς εἶναι καὶ νομισθῆναι δικαίως, ἀγνοήσας δὲ τὴν τύχην καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον καί τινας ἄλλας αἰτίας [256] τοιαύτας ἔξωθεν τοῖς πρακτικοῖς παρεμπιπτούσας οὐ σφόδρα ὁμολογούμενα λέγειν οἷς ὁ χρόνος ἡμᾶς διὰ μυρίων ἐναργῶς διδάσκει παραδειγμάτων. ποῦ γὰρ εὐτυχῆ καὶ μακάριον Κάτωνα φήσομεν; ποῦ δὲ Δίωνα τὸν Σικελιώτην εὐδαίμονα; οἷς τοῦ μὲν ἀποθανεῖν ἔμελεν ἴσως οὐδέν, τοῦ δὲ μὴ λείπειν ἀτελεῖς τὰς πράξεις, ἐφ᾽ ἃς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὥρμησαν, [B] καὶ σφόδρα ἔμελε, καὶ πάντα ἂν εἵλοντο παθεῖν ὑπὲρ τούτου. σφαλέντες δὲ ἐν ἐκείνοις εἰ μὲν εὐσχημόνως ἔφερον, ὥσπερ οὖν λέγεται, τὴν τύχην παραμυθίαν ἔσχον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐ μικράν, εὐδαίμονες δὲ οὐκ ἂν λέγοιντο τῶν καλλίστων πράξεων διημαρτηκότες, πλὴν ἴσως διὰ τὴν Στωικὴν ἔνστασιν· πρὸς ἣν ῥητέον, ὡς οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἐπαινεῖσθα καὶ μακαρίζεσθαι, καὶ εἰ φύσει τὸ ζῷον εὐδαιμονίας ὀρέγεται, [C] κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ κατ᾽ ἐκείνην μακαριστὸν τέλος τοῦ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἐπαινετοῦ. ἥκιστα δὲ φιλεῖ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἡ βεβαιότης τῇ τύχῃ πιστεύειν. καὶ τοὺς ἐν πολιτείᾳ ζῶντας οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἔνευ ταύτης ἀναπνεῖν τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον ...(377) ἀληθῶς θεωροῦντες εἴτε καὶ πεποιήκασι καὶ στρατηγὸν λόγῳ(378), καθάπερ οἱ τὰς ἰδέας εἴτε καὶ ψευδῶς ξυντιθέντες, ἐν τοῖς ἀσωμάτοις καὶ νοητοῖς ἱδρῦσθαί που τῶν τυχαίων ὑπεράνω πάντων, ἢ τὸν Διογένους ἐκεῖνον

(But your method is more likely to discourage than to make one eager for such an existence. Suppose that a man were navigating your strait,(379) and were finding even that none too easy or safe, and then suppose some professional soothsayer should tell him that he would have to traverse the Aegaean and then the Ionian Sea, and finally embark on the outer sea. “Here,” that prophet would say, “you see towns and harbours, but when you arrive there you will see not so much as a watch‐tower or a rock, but you will be thankful to descry even a ship in the distance and to hail her crew. You will often pray to God that you may, however late, touch land and reach a harbour, though that were to be the last day of your life. You will pray to be allowed to bring home your ship safe and sound and restore your crew unscathed to their friends, and then to commit your body to mother earth. And this indeed may happen, but you will not be sure of it until that final day.” Do you think that such a man after being told all this would choose even to live in a sea‐port town? Would he not bid adieu to money‐making and all the advantages of commerce, and caring little for troops of friends and acquaintances abroad, and all that he might learn about nations and cities, would he not approve the wisdom of the son of Neocles(380) who bids us “Live in obscurity”? Indeed, you apparently perceived this, and by your abuse of Epicurus you tried to forestall me and to eradicate beforehand any such purpose. For you go on to say that it was to be expected that so idle a man as he should commend leisure and conversations during walks. Now for my part I have long been firmly convinced that Epicurus was mistaken in that view of his, but whether it be proper to urge into public life any and every man, both him who lacks natural abilities and him who is not yet completely equipped, is a point that deserves the most careful consideration. We are told that Socrates dissuaded from the statesman’s profession(381) many who had no great natural talent, and Glaucon too, Xenophon(382) tells us; and that he tried to restrain the son of Cleinias(383) also, but could not curb the youth’s impetuous ambition. Then shall we try to force into that career men who are reluctant and conscious of their deficiencies, and urge them to be self‐confident about such great tasks? For in such matters not virtue alone or a wise policy is paramount, but to a far greater degree Fortune holds sway throughout and compels events to incline as she wills. Chrysippus(384) indeed, though in other respects he seems a wise man and to have been rightly so esteemed, yet in ignoring fortune and chance and all other such external causes that fall in to block the path of men of affairs, he uttered paradoxes wholly at variance with facts about which the past teaches us clearly by countless examples. For instance, shall we call Cato a fortunate and happy man? Or shall we say that Dio of Sicily had a happy lot? It is true that for death they probably cared nothing, but they did care greatly about not leaving unfinished the undertakings which they had originally set on foot, and to secure that end there is nothing that they would not have endured. In that they were disappointed, and I admit that they bore their lot with great dignity, as we learn, and derived no small consolation from their virtue; but happy one could not call them, seeing that they had failed in all those noble enterprises, unless perhaps according to the Stoic conception of happiness. And with regard to that same Stoic conception we must admit that to be applauded and to be counted happy are two very different things, and that if every living thing naturally desires happiness,(385) it is better to make it our aim to be congratulated on the score of happiness rather than to be applauded on the score of virtue. But happiness that depends on the chances of Fortune is very rarely secure. And yet men who are engaged in public life cannot, as the saying is, so much as breathe unless she is on their side ... and they have created a merely verbal idea of a leader who is established somewhere above all the chances of Fortune in the sphere of things incorporeal and intelligible, just as men define the ideas, whether envisaging them truly or falsely imagining them. Or again they give us the ideal man, according to Diogenes)

Ἄπολιν, [D] ἄοικον, πατρίδος ἐστερημένον,

(“The man without a city, without a home, bereft of a fatherland,”(386))

οὐκ ἔχοντα μὲν εἰς ὅ,τι παρ᾽ αὐτῆς εὖ πάθῃ καὶ τοὐναντίον ἐν τίνι σφαλῇ· τοῦτον δὲ ὃν ἡ συνήθεια καλεῖν εἴωθε καὶ Ὅμηρος πρῶτος,

(that is to say, a man who can gain nothing from Fortune, and on the other hand has nothing to lose. But one whom we are in the habit of calling, as Homer did first,)

Ὧι λαοί τ᾽ ἐπιτετράφαται καὶ τόσσα μέμηλεν,

(“The man to whom the people have been entrusted and so many cares belong,”(387))

πῶς ἄν τις ἔξω τύχης ἀπαγαγὼν τὴν θέσιν φύλάσσοι; πάλιν [257] δ᾽ ὁ αὑτὸν ὑποτιθεὶς ταύτῃ πόσης αὑτῷ δεῖν οἰήσεται παρασκευῆς(388) καὶ φρονήσεως πηλίκης ὥστε τὰς ἐφ᾽ ἑκάτερα ῥοπάς, καθάπερ πνεύματος κυβερνήτην, εὐσχημόνως φέρειν;

(how I ask shall we lead him beyond the reach of Fortune and keep his position secure? Then again, if he subject himself to Fortune, how great the provision he will think he must make, how great the prudence he must display so as to sustain with equanimity her variations in either direction, as a pilot must sustain the variations of the wind!)

Οὐκ ἔστι θαυμαστὸν ἀντιτάξασθαι προσπολεμούσῃ μόνον αὐτῇ, πολὺ δὲ θαυμασιώτερον(389) τῶν ὑπαρξάντων παρ᾽ αὐτῆς ἀγαθῶν ἄξιον φανῆναι. τούτοις ὁ μέγιστος ἑάλω βασιλεὺς ὁ τὴν Ἀσίαν καταστρεψάμενος [B] Δαρείου καὶ Ξέρξου χαλεπώτερος καὶ μᾶλλον ἀλαζὼν φανείς, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀρχῆς κατέστη κύριος, τούτοις ἁλόντες τοῖς βέλεσιν ἄρδην ἀπώλοντο Πέρσαι, Μακεδόνες, ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δῆμος, Συρακούσιοι, τὰ Λακεδαιμωνίων τέλη, Ῥωμαίων στρατηγοὶ καὶ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς αὐτοκράτορες μυρίοι. πολὺ μῆκος ἂν γένοιτο πάντας ἀπαριθμουμένῳ τοὺς διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ νίκας καὶ τρυφὴν ἀπολομένους· ὅσοι δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν δυσπραγιῶν ἐπικλυσθέντες δοῦλοι [C] μὲν ἀντ᾽ ἐλευθέρων, ταπεινοὶ δὲ ἀντὶ γενναίων καὶ σφόδρα εὐτελεῖς ἀντὶ τῶν πρόσθεν σεμνῶν ἅπασιν ὤφθησαν, τί με χρὴ νῦν ὥσπερ ἐκ δέλτου μεταγράφοντα καταλέγειν; εἰ γὰρ ὤφελεν ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίος ἀπορεῖν παραδειγμάτων τοιούτων. ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε ἐστὶν οὔτ᾽ ἂν γένοιτό ποτε τῶν τοιούτων ἐνδεὴς παραδειγμάτων, ἕως ἂν τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαμένῃ γένος.

(Yet it is nothing wonderful to withstand Fortune when she is merely hostile, but much more wonderful is it to show oneself worthy of the favours she bestows. By her favours the greatest of kings, the conqueror(390) of Asia was ensnared, and showed himself more cruel and more insolent than Darius and Xerxes, after he had become the master of their empire. The shafts of her favours subdued and utterly destroyed the Persians, the Macedonians, the Athenian nation, Spartan magistrates, Roman generals, and countless absolute monarchs besides. It would be an endless business to enumerate all who have fallen victims to their wealth and victories and luxury. And as for those who, submerged by the tide of their misfortunes, from free men have become slaves, who have been humbled from their high estate after all their splendour and become poor and mean in the eyes of all men, what need now to go through the list of them as though I were copying it from a written record? Would that human life afforded no such instances! But it does not nor ever will lack such, so long as the race of man endures.)

[D] Ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἐγὼ μόνος τὴν τύχην ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐν τοῖς πρακτέοις κρατεῖν νενόμικα, λέγοιμ᾽ ἂν ἤδη σοι τὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐκ τῶν θαυμασίων Νόμων, εἰδότι μὲν καὶ διδάξαντί με, ἀπόδειξιν δὲ ὥσπερ τοῦ μὴ ῥᾳθυμεῖν ποιούμενος παραγέγραφά σοι τὴν ῥῆσιν ὧδέ πως ἔχουσαν. “Θεὸς μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ θεοῦ τύχη καὶ καιρὸς τὰ ἀνθρώπινα διακυβερνῶσι ξύμπαντα. ἡμερώτερον μὴν τούτοις συγχωρῆσαι [258] τρίτον δεῖν ἕπεσθαι τέχνην.” εἶτα ὁποῖον εἶναι χρὴ τὸν τεχνίτην καὶ δημιουργὸν τῶν καλῶν πράξεων καὶ βασιλέα θεῖον(391) ὑπογράφων· “Γινώσκων ὁ Κρόνος ἄρα, καθάπερ ἡμεῖς, φησί, διεληλύθαμεν, ὡς ἀνθρωπεία φύσις οὐδαμῇ οὐδεμία ἱκανὴ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα διοικοῦσα αὐτοκράτωρ πάντα μὴ οὐχ ὕβρεώς τε καὶ ἀδικίας μεστοῦσθαι, [B] ταῦτ᾽ οὖν διανοούμενος ἐφίστη τότε βασιλέας καὶ ἄρχοντας ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡμῶν οὐκ ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ γένους θειοτέρου καὶ ἀμείνονος, δαίμονας, οἷον νῦν ἡμεῖς δρῶμεν τοῖς ποιμνίοις καὶ ὅσων ἡμεροί εἰσιν ἀγέλαι· οὐ βοῦς βοῶν οὐδὲ αἶγας αἰγῶν ἄρχοντας ποιοῦμεν αὐτοῖς τινας, ἀλλ᾽ ἡμεῖς αὐτῶν δεσπόζομεν, ἄμεινον ἐκείνων γένος. ταὐτὸν δὴ καὶ ὁ θεὸς φιλάνθρωπος ὢν γένος ἄμεινον ἡμῶν ἐφίστη τὸ τῶν δαιμόνων, ὃ διὰ πολλῆς μὲν αὐτοῖς ῥᾳστώνης, [C] διὰ πολλῆς δ᾽ ἡμῖν, ἐπιμελόμενον ἡμῶν, εἰρήνην τε καὶ αἰδῶ καὶ δὴ ἀφθονίαν δίκης παρεχόμενον, ἀστασίαστα καὶ εὐδαίμονα τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπειργάζετο γένη. λέγει δὴ καὶ νῦν οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἀληθείᾳ χρώμενος, ὅσων πόλεων μὴ θεός, ἀλλά τις ἄρχει θνητός, οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ πόνων ἀνάψυξις· ἀλλὰ μιμεῖσθαι δεῖν ἡμᾶς οἴεται πάσῃ μηχανῇ τὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ Κρόνου λεγόμενον βίον, [D] καὶ ὅσον ἐν ἡμῖν ἀθανασίας ἔνεστι, τούτῳ πειθομένους δημοσίᾳ καὶ ἰδίᾳ τάς τε οἰκήσεις καὶ τὰς πόλεις διοικεῖν, τὴν τοῦ νοῦ διανομὴν ὀνομάζοντας νόμον. εἰ δὲ ἄνθρωπος εἷς ἢ ὀλιγαρχία τις ἢ δημοκρατία ψυχὴν ἔχουσα ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὀρεγομένην καὶ πληροῦσθαι [259] τούτων δεομένην ἄρξει δὴ πόλεώς τινος ἢ ἰδιώτου καταπατήσας τοὺς νόμους, οὐκ ἔστι σωτηρίας μηχανή.”

(And to show that I am not the only one who thinks that Fortune has the upper hand in practical affairs, I will quote to you a passage from that admirable work the Laws of Plato. You know it well and indeed taught it to me, but I have set down the speech which runs something like this, and offer it as a proof that I am not really indolent. “God governs all things and with God Fortune and Opportunity govern all human affairs: but there is a milder view that Art must needs go with them and must be their associate.”(392) He then indicates what must be the character of a man who is the craftsman and artificer of noble deeds and a divinely inspired king. Then he says: “Kronos therefore, as I have already related, knew that human nature when endowed with supreme authority is never in any case capable of managing human affairs without being filled with insolence and injustice; therefore, having regard to this he at that time set over our cities as kings and governors not men but beings of a more divine and higher race, I mean demons; thus doing as we do now for our flocks and domestic herds. We never appoint certain oxen to rule over other oxen or goats to rule over goats, but we are their masters, a race superior to theirs. In like manner then God, since he loves mankind, has set over us a race of beings superior to ourselves, the race of demons; and they with great ease both to themselves and us undertake the care of us and dispense peace, reverence, aye, and above all justice without stint, and thus they make the tribes of men harmonious and happy. And that account is a true one which declares that in our day all cities that are governed not by a god but by a mortal man have no relief from evils and hardships. And the lesson is that we ought by every means in our power to imitate that life which is said to have existed in the days of Kronos: and in so far as the principle of immortality is in us we ought to be guided by it in our management of public and private affairs, of our houses and cities, calling the distribution of mind ‘law.’(393) But whether the government be in the hands of one man or of an oligarchy or democracy, if it have a soul that hankers after pleasure and the lower appetites and demands to indulge these, and if such a one rule over a city or individual having first trampled on the laws, there is no means of salvation.”(394))