Part 10

(And do not try to frighten me by bringing forward Diogenes as a sort of bogey. He was never initiated, they tell us, and replied to some one who once advised him to be initiated: “It is absurd of you, my young friend, to think that any tax‐gatherer, if only he be initiated, can share in the rewards of the just in the next world, while Agesilaus and Epameinondas are doomed to lie in the mire.”(286) Now this, my young friend, is a very hard saying and, I am persuaded, calls for more profound discussion. May the goddesses themselves grant us understanding thereof! Though indeed I think that has already been bestowed by them. For it is evident that Diogenes was not impious, as you aver, but resembled those philosophers whom I mentioned a moment ago. For having regard to the circumstances in which his lot was cast, and next paying heed to the commands of the Pythian god, and knowing that the candidate for initiation must first be registered as an Athenian citizen, and if he be not an Athenian by birth must first become one by law, it was this he avoided, not initiation, because he considered that he was a citizen of the world; and moreover such was the greatness of his soul that he thought he ought to associate himself with the divine nature of all the gods who in common govern the whole universe, and not only with those whose functions are limited to certain portions of it. And out of reverence for the gods he did not transgress their laws, though he trampled on all other opinions and tried to give a new stamp to the common currency. And he did not return to that servitude from which he had joyfully been released. What servitude do I mean? I mean that he would not enslave himself to the laws of a single city and submit himself to all that must needs befall one who had become an Athenian citizen. For is it likely that a man who in order to honour the gods journeyed to Olympia, and like Socrates embraced philosophy in obedience to the Pythian oracle,—for he says himself that at home and in private he received the commands of that oracle and hence came his impulse to philosophy(287)—is it likely I say that such a man would not very gladly have entered the temples of the gods but for the fact that he was trying to avoid submitting himself to any set of laws and making himself the slave of any one constitution? But why, you will say, did he not assign this reason, but on the contrary a reason that detracted not a little from the dignity of the Mysteries? Perhaps one might bring this same reproach against Pythagoras as well, but the reasoning would be incorrect. For everything ought not to be told, nay more, even of those things that we are permitted to declare, some, it seems to me, we ought to refrain from uttering to the vulgar crowd.(288) However the explanation in this case is obvious. For since he perceived that the man who exhorted him to be initiated neglected to regulate his own life aright, though he prided himself on having been initiated, Diogenes wished at the same time to reform his morals and to teach him that the gods reserve their rewards without stint for those whose lives have earned them the right to be initiated, even though they have not gone through the ceremony, whereas the wicked gain nothing by penetrating within the sacred precincts. For this is what the hierophant proclaims, when he refuses the rite of initiation to him “whose hands are not pure or who for any reason ought not!(289)”)

Τί πέρας ἡμῖν ἔσται τῶν λόγων, εἰ ταῦτα μήπω σε πείθει;

(But where would this discourse end if you are still unconvinced by what I have said?)

ORATION VIII

Introduction to Oration VIII

The Eighth Oration is a “speech of consolation” (παραμυθητικὸς λόγος), a familiar type of Sophistic composition. In consequence of the attacks on Sallust by sycophants at court, and moreover jealous of his friendship with Julian, Constantius ordered him to leave Gaul. In this discourse, which was written before the open rupture with Constantius, Julian alludes only once and respectfully to his cousin. But Asmus thinks he can detect in it a general resemblance to the Thirteenth Oration of Dio Chrysostom, where Dio tries to comfort himself for his banishment by the tyrant Domitian, and that Sallust was expected to appreciate this and the veiled attack on Constantius. Julian addresses the discourse to himself, but it was no doubt sent to Sallust.

After Julian’s accession Sallust was made prefect in 362 and consul in 363. He was the author of a manifesto of Neo‐Platonism, the treatise _On the Gods and the World_, and to him was dedicated Julian’s Fourth Oration.(290)

ΙΟΥΛΙΑΝΟΥ ΚΑΙΣΑΡΟΣ

(Julian, Emperor)

[240] ΕΠΙ ΤΗΙ ΕΞΟΔΩΙ ΤΟΥ ΑΓΑΘΩΤΑΤΟΥ ΣΑΛΟΥΣΤΙΟΥ ΠΑΡΑΜΥΘΗΤΙΚΟΣ ΕΙΣ ΕΑΥΤΟΝ

(A Consolation to Himself Upon The Departure of the Excellent Sallust)

Ἁλλ᾽ εἰ μὴ καὶ πρὸς σὲ διαλεχθείην ὅσα πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν διελέχθην, ἐπειδή σε βαδίζειν ἐπυθόμην χρῆναι παρ᾽ ἡμῶν, ἔλαττον ἔχειν οἰήσομαι πρὸς παραψυχήν, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν πεπορίσθαι τινὰ ῥᾳστώνην ἐμαυτῷ νομιῶ, ἧς σοί γε οὐ μεταδέδωκα. [B] κοινωνήσαντας γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἀλλήλοις πολλῶν μὲν ἀλγεινῶν, πολλῶν δὲ ἡδέων ἔργων τε καὶ λόγων, ἐν πράγμασιν ἰδίοις τε καὶ δημοσίοις, οἴκοι καὶ ἐπὶ στρατοπέδου, κοινὸν(291) εὑρίσκεσθαι χρὴ τῶν παρόντων, ὁποῖά ποτ᾽ ἂν ᾖ, παιώνιον ἄκος. ἀλλὰ τίς ἂν ἡμῖν ἢ τὴν Ὀρφέως μιμήσαιτο(292) λύραν ἢ τοῖς Σειρήνων ἀντηχήσειε(293) μέλεσιν ἢ τὸ νηπενθὲς ἐξεύροι φάρμακον; εἴτε λόγος ἦν ἐκεῖνο πλήρης Αἰγυπτίων διηγημάτων, εἴθ᾽ ὅπερ αὐτὸς ἐποίησεν, ἐν τοῖς ἑπομένοις [C] ἐνυφήνας τὰ Τρωικὰ πάθη, τοῦτο τῆς Ἑλένης παρ᾽ Αἰγυπτίων μαθούσης, οὐχ ὅσα Ἕλληνες καὶ Τρῶες ἀλλήλους ἔδρασαν, ἀλλὰ ποταποὺς εἶναι χρὴ τοὺς λόγους, οἳ τὰς μὲν ἀλγηδόνας ἀφαιρήσουσι τῶν ψυχῶν, εὐφροσύνης δὲ καὶ γαλήνης αἴτιοι καταστήσονται. καὶ γάρ πως ἔοικεν ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη τῆς αὐτῆς κορυφῆς ἐξῆφθαι καὶ παρὰ [241] μέρος ἀλλήλαις ἀντιμεθίστασθαι. τῶν προσπιπτόντων δὲ καὶ τὰ λίαν ἐργώδη φασὶν οἱ σοφοὶ τῷ νοῦν ἔχοντι φέρειν οὐκ ἀλάττονα τῆς δυσκολίας τὴν εὐπάθειαν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν μέλιτταν ἐκ τῆς δριμυτάτης πόας τῆς περὶ τὸν Ὕμηττὸν φυομένης γλυκεῖαν ἀνιμᾶσθαι δρόσον καὶ τοῦ μέλιτος εἶναι δημιουργόν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν σωμάτων ὅσα μὲν ὑγιεινὰ καὶ ῥωμαλέα καθέστηκεν, [B] ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων τρέφεται σιτίων, καὶ τὰ δυσχερῆ δοκοῦντα πολλάκις ἐκείνοις οὐκ ἀβλαβῆ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἰσχύος αἴτια γέγονεν· ὅσοις δὲ πονηρῶς ἔχει φύσει καὶ τροφῆς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσει τὸ σῶμα, τὸν πάντα βίον νοσηλευομένοις, τούτοις καὶ τὰ κουφότατα βαρυτάτας εἴωθε προστιθέναι βλάβας. οὐκοῦν καὶ τῆς διανοίας ὅσοι μὲν οὕτως ἐπεμελήθησαν, ὡς μὴ παμπονήρως ἔχειν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑγιαίνειν μετρίως, εἰ καὶ μὴ κατὰ τὴν Ἀντισθένους καὶ Σωκράτους ῥώμην μηδὲ [C] τὴν Καλλισθένους ἀνδρείαν μηδὲ τὴν Πολέμωνος ἀπάθειαν, ἀλλ᾽ ὥστε δύνασθαι τὸ μέτριον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις αἱρεῖσθαι, τυχὸν ἂν καὶ ἐν δυσκολωτέροις εὐφραίνοιντο.

(Ah, my beloved comrade, unless I tell you all that I said to myself when I learned that you were compelled to journey far from my side, I shall think I am deprived of some comfort; or rather, I shall consider that I have not even begun to procure some assuagement for my grief unless I have first shared it with you. For we two have shared in many sorrows and also in many pleasant deeds and words, in affairs private and public, at home and in the field, and therefore for the present troubles, be they what they may, we must needs discover some cure, some remedy that both can share. But who will imitate for us the lyre of Orpheus, who will echo for us the songs of the Sirens or discover the drug nepenthe?(294) Though that was perhaps some tale full of Egyptian lore or such a tale as the poet himself invented, when in what follows he wove in the story of the sorrows of the Trojans, and Helen had learned it from the Egyptians; I do not mean a tale of all the woes that the Greeks and Trojans inflicted on one another, but rather tales such as they must be that will dispel the griefs of men’s souls and have power to restore cheerfulness and calm. For pleasure and pain, methinks, are connected at their source(295) and succeed each other in turn. And philosophers assert that in all that befalls the wise man the very greatest trials afford him as much felicity as vexation; and thus, as they say, does the bee extract sweet dew from the bitterest herb that grows on Hymettus and works it into honey.(296) Even so bodies that are naturally healthy and robust are nourished by any kind of food, and food that often seems unwholesome for others, far from injuring them, makes them strong. On the other hand, the slightest causes usually inflict very serious injuries on persons who by nature or nurture, or owing to their habits, have an unsound constitution and are lifelong invalids. Just so with regard to the mind: those who have so trained it that it is not altogether unhealthy but moderately sound, though it do not indeed exhibit the vigour of Antisthenes or Socrates, or the courage of Callisthenes, or the imperturbability of Polemon, but so that it can under the same conditions as theirs adopt the golden mean, they, I say, will probably be able to remain cheerful in more trying conditions.)

Ἐγώ τοι καὶ αὐτὸς πεῖραν ἐμαυτοῦ λαμβάνων, ὅπως πρὸς τὴν σὴν πορείαν ἔχω τε καὶ ἕξω, τοσοῦτον ὠδυνήθην, ὅσον ὅτε πρῶτον τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ καθηγεμόνα κατέλιπον οἴκοι· πάντων γὰρ ἀθρόως εἰσῄει με μνήμη, τῆς τῶν πόνων κοινωνίας, ὧν ἀλλήλοις συνδιηνέγκαμεν, τῆς ἀπλάστου καὶ καθαρᾶς ἐντεύξεως, [D] τῆς ἀδόλου καὶ δικαίας ὁμιλίας, τῆς ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς καλοῖς κοινοπραγίας, τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πονηροὺς ἰσορρόπου τε καὶ ἀμεταμελήτου προθυμίας τε καὶ ὁρμῆς, ὡς μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἔστημεν πολλάκις ἶσον θυμὸν ἔχοντες, ὁμότροποι καὶ ποθεινοὶ φίλοι. πρὸς δὲ αὖ τούτοις εἰσῄει με μνήμη τοῦ ΟἸώθη δ᾽ Ὀδυσεύς· εἰμὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ νῦν ἐκείνῳ παραπλήσιοδςσ, ἐπεὶ σὲ μὲν κατὰ τὸν Ἕκτορα θεὸς ἐξήγαγεν ἔξω βελῶν, ὧν οἱ συκοφάνται [242] πολλάκις ἀφῆκαν ἐπὶ σέ, μᾶλλον δὲ εἰς ἐμέ, διὰ σοῦ τρῶσαι βουλόμενοι, ταύτῃ με μόνον ἁλώσιμον ὑπολαμβάνοντες, εἰ τοῦ πιστοῦ φίλου καὶ προθύμου συνασπιστοῦ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους ἀπροφασίστου κοινωνοῦ τῆς συνουσίας στερήσειαν. οὐ μὴν ἔλαττον οἶμαί σε διὰ τοῦτο ἀλγεῖν ἢ ἐγὼ νῦν, ὅτι σοι τῶν πόνων καὶ τῶν κινδύνων ἔλαττον μέτεστιν, [B] ἀλλὰ καὶ πλέον ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ δεδιέναι καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς κεφαλῆς, μή τι πάθῃ. καὶ γάρ τοι καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἐν δευτέρῳ τῶν ἐμὼν ἐθέμην τὰ σά, καὶ σοῦ δὲ ὁμοίως ἔχοντος πρὸς ἡμᾶς ᾐσθόμην. ὅθεν εἰκότως καὶ μάλα δάκνομαι, ὅτι σοι, τῶν ἄλλων ἕνεκα λέγειν δυναμένῳ

(For my part, when I put myself to the proof to find out how I am and shall be affected by your departure, I felt the same anguish as when at home I first left my preceptor.(297) For everything flashed across my mind at once; the labours that we shared and endured together; our unfeigned and candid conversation; our innocent and upright intercourse; our co‐ operation in all that was good; our equally‐matched and never‐repented zeal and eagerness in opposing evildoers. How often we supported each other with one equal temper!(298) How alike were our ways! How precious our friendship! Then too there came into my mind the words, “Then was Odysseus left alone.”(299) For now I am indeed like him, since the god has removed you, like Hector,(300) beyond the range of the shafts which have so often been aimed at you by sycophants, or rather at me, since they desired to wound me through you; for they thought that only thus should I be vulnerable if they should deprive me of the society of a faithful friend and devoted brother‐in‐arms—one who never on any pretext failed to share the dangers that threatened me. Moreover the fact that you now have a smaller share than I in such labours and dangers does not, I think, make your grief less than mine; but you feel all the more anxiety for me and any harm that may befall my person.(301) For even as I never set your interests second to mine, so have I ever found you equally well disposed towards me. I am therefore naturally much chagrined that to you who with regard to all others can say,)

Οὐδὲν μέλει μοι· τἀμὰ γὰρ καλῶς ἔχει, Μόνος εἰμὶ [C] λύπης αἴτιος καὶ φροντίδος.(302)

(“I heed them not, for my affairs are prosperous,”(303) I alone occasion sorrow and anxiety.)

ἀλλὰ τούτου μὲν ἐξ ἴσης, ὡς ἔοικε, κοινωνοῦμεν, σὺ μὲν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀλγῶν μόνον, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀεὶ ποθῶν τὴν σὴν συνουσίαν καὶ τῆς φιλίας μεμνημένος, ἣν ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς μὲν μάλιστα καὶ προηγουμένως, ἔπειτα καὶ διὰ τὴν χρείαν, ἣν ἐγὼ μὲν σοί, σὺ δὲ ἐμοὶ συνεχῶς παρέσχες, ἀνακραθέντες ἀλλήλοις ὡμολογήσαμεν, οὐχ ὅρκοις οὐδὲ τοιαύταις ἀνάγκαις ταῦτα πιστούμενοι, [D] ὥσπερ ὁ Θησεὺς καὶ ὁ Πειρίθους, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ὧν ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ νοοῦντες καὶ προαιρούμενοι κακὸν μὲν δοῦναι τῶν πολιτῶν τινι τοσοῦτον δέω λέγειν ἀπέσχομεν, ὥστε οὐδὲ ἐβουλευσάμεθά ποτε μετὰ ἀλλήλων· χρηστὸν δὲ εἴ τι γέγονεν ἢ βεβούλευται κοινῇ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν, τοῦτο ἄλλοις εἰπεῖν μελήσει.

(However this sorrow it seems we share equally, though you grieve only on my account, while I constantly feel the lack of your society and call to mind the friendship that we pledged to one another—that friendship which we ever cemented afresh, based as it was, first and foremost, on virtue, and secondly on the obligations which you continually conferred on me and I on you. Not by oaths or by any such ties did we ratify it, like Theseus and Peirithous, but by being of the same mind and purpose, in that so far from forbearing to inflict injury on any citizen, we never even debated any such thing with one another. But whether anything useful was done or planned by us in common, I will leave to others to say.)

Ὡς μὲν οὖν εἰκότως ἀλγῶ τοῖς παροῦσιν, οὐ φίλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνεργοῦ πιστοῦ, [243] δοίη δὲ ὁ δαίμων, καὶ πρὸς ὀλίγον ἀπαλλαττόμενος, οἶμαι καὶ Σωκράτη τὸν μέγαν τῆς ἀρετῆς κήρυκα καὶ διδάσκαλον ἔμοιγε συνομολογήσειν ἐξ ὧν ἐκεῖνον γνωρίζομεν, λέγω δὲ τῶν Πλάτωνος λόγων, τεκμαιρόμενος ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ. φησὶ γοῦν ὅτι Χαλεπώτερον ἐφαίνετό μοι ὀρθῶς τὰ πολιτικὰ διοικεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ ἄνευ φίλων ἀνδρῶν καὶ ἑταίρων πιστῶν οἷόν τε εἶναι πράττειν, οὔτ᾽ εὐπορεῖν τούτων ξὺν πολλῇ ῥᾳστώνῃ. καίτοι τοῦτό γε εἰ Πλάτωνι μεῖζον ἐφαίνετο τοῦ διορύττειν [B] τὸν Ἄθω, τί χρὴ προσδοκᾶν ἡμᾶς ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τοὺς πλέον ἀπολειπομένους τῆς ἐκείνου συνέσεώς τε καὶ γνώμης ἢ ἐκεῖνος τοῦ θεοῦ; ἐμοὶ δὲ οὐδὲ τῆς χρείας μόνον ἕνεκα, ἣν ἀντιδιδόντες ἀλλήλοις ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ῥᾷον εἴχομεν πρὸς τὰ παρὰ γνώμην ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης καὶ τῶν ἀντιταττομένων ἡμῖν πραττόμενα, ἀλλὰ(304) καὶ τῆς μόνης ἀεί μοι θαλπωρῆς τε καὶ τέρψεως [C] ἐνδεὴς οὐκ εἰς μακρὰν ἔσεσθαι μέλλων, εἰκότως δάκνομαί τε καὶ δέδηγμαι τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ καρδίαν. ἐς τίνα γὰρ οὕτως ἔσται μοι λοιπὸν εὔνουν ἀποβλέψαι φίλον; τίνος δὲ ἀνασχέσθαι τῆς ἀδόλου καὶ καθαρᾶς παρρησίας; τίς δὲ ἡμῖν συμβουλεύσει μὲν ἐμφρόνως, ἐπιτιμήσει δὲ μετ᾽ εὐνοίας, ἐπιρρώσει δὲ πρὸς τὰ καλὰ χωρὶς αὐθαδείας καὶ τύφου, παρρησιάσεται δὲ τὸ πικρὸν ἀφελὼν τῶν λόγων, [D] ὥσπερ οἱ τῶν φαρμάκων ἀφαιροῦντες μὲν τὸ λίαν δυσχερές, ἀπολείποντες δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ χρήσιμον; ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἐκ τῆς σῆς φιλίας ὄφελος ἐκαρπωσάμην. τοσούτων δὲ ὁμοῦ ἐστερημένος, τίνων ἂν εὐπορήσαιμι λόγων, οἵ με, διὰ τὸν σὸν πόθον σά τε μήδεα σήν τε ἀγανοφροσύνην αὐτὴν προέσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν κινδυνεύοντα, πείσουσιν ἀτρεμεῖν καὶ φέρειν ὅσα δέδωκεν ὁ θεὸς γενναίως; [244] εἰς ταὐτὸ γὰρ ἔοικεν αὐτῷ νοῶν ὁ μέγας αὐτοκράτωρ ταῦθ᾽ οὕτω νυνὶ βουλεύσασθαι. τί ποτε οὖν ἄρα χρὴ διανοηθέντα καὶ τίνας ἐπῳδὰς εὑρόντα πεῖσαι πρᾴως ἔχειν ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους θορυβουμένην τὴν ψυχήν; ἆρα ἡμῖν οἱ Ζαμόλξιδός εἰσι μιμητέοι λόγοι, λέγω δὲ τὰς ἐκ Θρᾴκης ἐπῳδάς, ἃς Ἀθήναζε φέρων ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸ τοῦ τὴν ὀδύνην ἰᾶσθαι τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐπᾴδειν ἠξίου τῷ καλῷ Χαρμίδῃ; ἢ τούτους μὲν ἅτε δὴ μείζονας καὶ περὶ μειζόνων οὐ κινητέον, ὥσπερ ἐν θεάτρῳ μικρῷ μηχανὰς μεγάλας, [B] ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἔργων, ὧν ἐπυθόμεθα τὰ κλέα, φησὶν ὁ ποιητῆς, ὥσπερ ἐκ λειμῶνος δρεψάμενοι ποικίλου καὶ πολυειδοῦς(305) ἄνθη τὰ κάλλιστα ψυχαγωγήσομεν αὑτοὺς τοῖς διηγήμασι, μικρὰ τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας αὐτοῖς προστιθέντες; ὥσπερ γὰρ οἶμαι τοῖς λίαν γλυκέσιν οἱ παρεγχέοντες οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὁποῖ ἄττα φάρμακα τὸ προσκορὲς αὐτῶν ἀφαιροῦσιν, οὕτω τοῖς διηγήμασιν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἔνια προστιθέμενα τὸ δοκεῖν ἐξ [C] ἱστορίας ἀρχαίας ὄχλον ἐπεισάγειν, οὐδὲν δέον, καὶ περιττὴν ἀδολεσχίαν ἀφαιρεῖται.

(Now that it is natural for me to be grieved by the present event, on being parted for ever so short a time—and God grant that it may be short!—from one who is not only my friend but my loyal fellow‐worker, I think even Socrates, that great herald and teacher of virtue, will agree; so far at least as I may judge from the evidence on which we rely for our knowledge of him, I mean the words of Plato. At my rate, what he says is: “Ever more difficult did it seem to me to govern a state rightly. For neither is it possible to achieve anything without good friends and loyal fellow‐workers, nor is it very easy to obtain enough of these.”(306) And if Plato thought this more difficult than digging a canal through Mount Athos,(307) what must we expect to find it, we who in wisdom and knowledge are more inferior to him than he was to God? But it is not only when I think of the help in the administration that we gave one another in turn, and which enabled us to bear more easily all that fate or our opponents brought to pass contrary to our purpose; but also because I am destined soon to be bereft also of what has ever been my only solace and delight, it is natural that I am and have been cut to the very heart.(308) For in the future to what friend can I turn as loyal as yourself? With whose guileless and pure frankness shall I now brace myself? Who now will give me prudent counsel, reprove me with affection, give me strength for good deeds without arrogance and conceit, and use frankness after extracting the bitterness from the words, like those who from medicines extract what is nauseating but leave in what is really beneficial?(309) These are the advantages that I reaped from your friendship! And now that I have been deprived of all these all at once, with what arguments shall I supply myself, so that when I am in danger of flinging away my life out of regret for you and your counsels and loving kindness,(310) they may persuade me to be calm and to bear nobly whatever God has sent?(311) For in accordance with the will of God our mighty Emperor has surely planned this as all else. Then what now must be my thoughts, what spells must I find to persuade my soul to bear tranquilly the trouble with which it is now dismayed? Shall I imitate the discourses of Zamolxis(312)—I mean those Thracian spells which Socrates brought to Athens and declared that he must utter them over the fair Charmides before he could cure him of his headache?(313) Or must we leave these alone as being, like large machinery in a small theatre, too lofty for our purpose and suited to greater troubles; and rather from the deeds of old whose fame we have heard told, as the poet says,(314) shall we gather the fairest flowers as though from a variegated and many‐coloured meadow, and thus console ourselves with such narratives and add thereto some of the teachings of philosophy? For just as, for instance, certain drugs are infused into things that have too sweet a taste, and thus their cloying sweetness is tempered, so when tales like these are seasoned by the maxims of philosophy, we avoid seeming to drag in a tedious profusion of ancient history and a superfluous and uncalled‐for flow of words.)

Τί πρῶτον; τί δ᾽ ἔπειτα; τί δ᾽ ὑστάτιον καταλέξω;

(“What first, what next, what last shall I relate?”(315))

πότερον ὡς ὁ Σκηπίων ἐκεῖνος, ὁ τὸν Λαίλιον ἀγαπήσας καὶ φιληθεὶς τὸ λεγόμενον ἴσῳ ζυγῷ παρ᾽ ἐκείνου πάλιν, ἡδέως μὲν αὐτῷ συνῆν, ἔπραττε δὲ οὐδέν, ὧν μὴ πρότερον ἐκεῖνος πύθοιτο καὶ φήσειεν εἶναι πρακτέον; ὅθεν οἶμαι καὶ λόγον παρέσχε [D] τοῖς ὑπὸ φθόνου τὸν Σκηπίωνα λοιδοροῦσιν, ὡς ποιητὴς μὲν ὁ Λαίλιος εἴη τῶν ἔργων, Ἁφρικανὸς δὲ ὁ τούτων ὑποκριτής. αὕτη τοι καὶ ἡμῖν ἡ φήμη πρόσκειται, καὶ οὐ μόνον οὐ δυχεραίνω(316) χαίρω δὲ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῇ πλέον. τὸ γὰρ τοῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου γνωσθεῖσι πεισθῆναι μείζονος ἀρετῆς(317) ὁ Ζήνων ποιεῖται γνώρισμα [245] τοῦ γνῶναί τινα αὐτὸν ἐξ αὑτοῦ τὰ δέοντα, τὴν Ἡσιόδου μεθαρμόττων ῥῆσιν,

(Shall I tell how the famous Scipio, who loved Laelius and was loved by him in return with equal yoke of friendship,(318) as the saying is, not only took pleasure in his society, but undertook no task without first consulting with him and obtaining his advice as to how he should proceed? It was this, I understand, that furnished those who from envy slandered Scipio with the saying that Laelius was the real author of his enterprises, and Africanus merely the actor. The same remark is made about ourselves, and, far from resenting this, I rather rejoice at it. For to accept another’s good advice Zeno held to be a sign of greater virtue than independently to decide oneself what one ought to do; and so he altered the saying of Hesiod; for Zeno says:)

Οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος, ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται

(“That man is best who follows good advice” instead of “decides all things for himself.”(319))

λέγων ἀντὶ τοῦ νοήσῃ πάνθ᾽ ἑαυτῷ. ἐμοὶ δὲ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο χαρίεν εἶναι δοκεῖ· πείθομαι γὰρ ἀληθέστερον μὲν Ἡσίοδον λέγειν, ἀμφοῖν δὲ ἄμεινον Πυθαγόραν, ὃς καὶ τῇ παροιμίᾳ παρέσχε τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ λέγεσθαι κοινὰ τὰ φίλων ἔδωκε τῷ βίῳ, οὐ δήπου τὰ χρήματα λέγων μόνον, [B] ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς φρονήσεως κοινωνίαν, ὥσθ᾽ ὅσα μὲν εὗρες αὐτός, οὐδὲν ἔλαττον ταῦτα τοῦ πεισθέντος ἐστίν, ὅσα δὲ τῶν σῶν ὑπεκρινάμην, τούτων αὐτῶν εἰκότως τὸ ἴσον μετέχεις. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὁποτέρου μᾶλλον ἂν φαίνηται, καὶ(320) θατέρῳ προσήκει, καὶ τοῖς βασκάνοις οὐδὲν ἔσται πλέον ἐκ τῶν λόγων.

(Not that the alteration is to my liking. For I am convinced that what Hesiod says is truer, that Pythagoras was wiser than either of them when he originated the proverb and gave to mankind the maxim, “Friends have all things in common.”(321) And by this he certainly did not mean money only, but also a partnership in intelligence and wisdom. So all that you suggested belongs just as much to me who adopted it, and whenever I was the actor who carried out your plans you naturally have an equal share in the performance. In fact, to whichever of us the credit may seem to belong, it belongs equally to the other, and malicious persons will gain nothing from their gossip.)