Part 1

The Works of the Emperor Julian

Volume 2

With an English Translation by

Wilmer Cave Wright

Harvard University Press

Cambridge, Massachusetts

1913

CONTENTS

Oration VI Introduction to Oration VI Oration VII Introduction to Oration VII Oration VIII Introduction to Oration VIII Letter to Themistius the Philosopher Introduction Letter to the Senate and People of Athens Introduction Fragment of a Letter to a Priest Introduction The Caesars Introduction Misopogon, Or, Beard‐Hater Introduction Index Footnotes

[Cover Art]

[Transcriber’s Note: The above cover image was produced by the submitter at Distributed Proofreaders, and is being placed into the public domain.]

ORATION VI

Introduction to Oration VI

The Sixth Oration is a sermon or rather a scolding addressed to the New Cynics, and especially to one of their number who had ventured to defame the memory of Diogenes. In the fourth Christian century the Cynic mode of life was adopted by many, but the vast majority were illiterate men who imitated the Cynic shamelessness of manners but not the genuine discipline, the self‐sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια) which had ennobled the lives of Antisthenes, Diogenes and Crates. To the virtues of these great men Julian endeavours to recall the worthless Cynics of his day. In the two centuries that had elapsed since Lucian wrote, for the edification of degenerate Cynics,(1) the Life of the Cynic Demonax, the dignified and witty friend of Epictetus, the followers of that sect had still further deteriorated. The New Cynics may be compared with the worst type of mendicant friar of the Middle Ages; and Julian saw in their assumption of the outward signs of Cynicism, the coarse cloak, the staff and wallet, and long hair, the same hypocrisy and greed that characterised certain of the Christian monks of his day.(2) The resemblances between the Christians and the Cynics had already been pointed out by Aristides,(3) and while in Julian’s eyes they were equally impious, he has an additional grievance against the Cynics in that they brought discredit on philosophy. Like the Christians they were unlettered, they were disrespectful to the gods whom Julian was trying to restore, they had flattered and fawned on Constantius, and far from practising the austerities of Diogenes they were no better than parasites on society.

In this as in the Seventh Oration Julian’s aim is to reform the New Cynics, but still more to demonstrate the essential unity of philosophy. He sympathised profoundly with the tenets of Cynicism, and ranked Diogenes with Socrates as a moral teacher. He reminds the Cynics whom he satirises that the famous admonition of Diogenes to “countermark”(4) or “forge” a new coinage is not to be taken as an excuse for license and impudence, but like the Delphic precept “Know Thyself” warns all philosophers to accept no traditional authority, no convention that has not been examined and approved by the reason of the individual. His conviction that all philosophical tenets are in harmony if rightly understood, gives a peculiar earnestness to his Apologia for Diogenes. The reference in the first paragraph to the summer solstice seems to indicate that the Oration was written before Julian left Constantinople in order to prepare for the Persian campaign.

[Transcriber’s Note: The original book had pages with Greek on the left page and the corresponding English translation on the facing right page. In this e‐book, each Greek paragraph will be immediately followed by the English translation paragraph, surrounded in parentheses. The Greek text contains markings such as [3] and [B]; they are section and sub‐section markings that in the original book were in the right margin. These are different from numbers within parentheses such as (10), which are used as footnote references in some e‐book formats.]

ΙΟΥΛΙΑΝΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΚΡΑΤΟΡΟΣ

(Julian, Emperor)

ΕΙΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΠΑΙΔΕΥΤΟΥΣ ΚΥΝΑΣ

(To the Uneducated Cynics)

Ἄνω ποταμῶν, τοῦτο δὴ τὸ τῆς παροιμίας. ἀνὴρ Κυνικὸς Διογένη φησί κενόδοξον, καὶ ψυχρολουτεῖν οὐ βούλεται, σφόδρα ἐρρωμένος τὸ σῶμα καὶ σφριγῶν [181] καὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἀκμάζων, ὡς ἂν μή τι κακὸν λάβῃ, καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ θεοῦ ταῖς θεριναῖς τροπαῖς ἤδη προσιόντος. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐδωδὴν τοῦ πολύποδος κωμῳδεῖ καί φησι τὸν Διογένη τῆς ἀνοίας καὶ κενοδοξίας ἐκτετικέναι ἱκανὰς(5) δίκας ὥσπερ ὑπὸ κωνείου τῆς τροφῆς διαφθαρέντα. οὕτω πόρρω που σοφίας ἐλαύνει, ὥστε ἐπίσταται σαφῶς ὅτι κακὸν ὁ θάνατος. τοῦτο δὲ ἀγνοεῖν ὑπελάμβανεν ὁ σοφὸς Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετ᾽ ἐκεῖνον Διογένης. ἀρρωστοῦντι γοῦν, φασίν, ἀντισθένει μακρὰν καὶ δυσανάληπτον ἀρρωστίαν ξιφίδιον ἐπέδωκεν ὁ Διογένης εἰπών· [B] εἰ φίλου χρῄζεις ὑπουργίας. οὕτως οὐδὲν ᾤετο δεινὸν ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲ ἀλγεινὸν τὸν θάνατον. ἀλλ᾽ ἡμεῖς οἱ τὸ σκῆπτρον ἐκεῖθεν παραλαβόντες ὑπὸ μείζονος σοφίας ἴσμεν ὅτι χαλεπὸν ὁ θάνατος, καὶ τὸ νοσεῖν δεινότερον αὐτοῦ φαμεν(6) τοῦ θανάτου, τὸ ῥιγοῦν δὲ χαλεπώτερον τοῦ νοσεῖν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοσῶν μαλακῶς ἔσθ᾽ ὅτε θεραπεύεται, ὥστε γίνεσθαι τρυφὴν αὐτόχρημα τὴν ἀρρωστίαν, ἄλλως τε κἂν ᾖ πλούσιος. [C] ἐθεασάμην τοι καὶ αὐτὸς νὴ Δία τρυφώντάς τινας ἐν ταῖς νόσοις μᾶλλον ἢ τούτους αὐτοὺς ὑγιαίνοντας· καίτοι γε καὶ τότε λαμπρῶς ἐτρύφων. ὅθεν μοι καὶ παρέστη πρός τινας τῶν ἑταίρων εἰπεῖν, ὡς τούτοις ἄμεινον ἦν οἰκέταις γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεσπόταις, καὶ πένεσθαι τοῦ κρίνου γυμνοτέροις οὖσιν ἢ πλουτεῖν ὥσπερ νῦν. ἦ γὰρ ἂν ἐπαύσαντο νοσοῦντες ἅμα καὶ τρυφῶντες. [D] τὸ μὲν δὴ νοσοτυφεῖν καὶ νοσηλεύεσθαι τρυφηλῶς οὑτωσί τινες ἐν καλῷ ποιοῦνται· ἀνὴρ δὲ τοῦ κρύους ἀνεχόμενος καὶ θάλπος καρτερῶν οὐχὶ καὶ τῶν νοσούντων ἀθλιώτερον πράττει; ἀλγεῖ γοῦν ἀπαραμύθητα.

(Behold the rivers are flowing backwards,(7) as the proverb says! Here is a Cynic who says that Diogenes(8) was conceited, and who refuses to take cold baths for fear they may injure him, though he has a very strong constitution and is lusty and in the prime of life, and this too though the Sun‐god is now nearing the summer solstice. Moreover he even ridicules the eating of octopus and says that Diogenes paid a sufficient penalty for his folly and vanity in that he perished of this diet(9) as though by a draught of hemlock. So far indeed is he advanced in wisdom that he knows for certain that death is an evil. Yet this even the wise Socrates thought he did not know, yes and after him Diogenes as well. At any rate when Antisthenes(10) was suffering from a long and incurable illness Diogenes handed him a dagger with these words, “In case you need the aid of a friend.” So convinced was he that there is nothing terrible or grievous in death. But we who have inherited his staff know out of our greater wisdom that death is a calamity. And we say that sickness is even more terrible than death, and cold harder to bear than sickness. For the man who is sick is often tenderly nursed, so that his ill‐health is straightway converted into a luxury, especially if he be rich. Indeed I myself, by Zeus, have observed that certain persons are more luxurious in sickness than in health, though even in health they were conspicuous for luxury. And so it once occurred to me to say to certain of my friends that it were better for those men to be servants than masters, and to be poor and more naked than the lily of the field(11) than to be rich as they now are. For they would have ceased being at once sick and luxurious. The fact is that some people think it a fine thing to make a display of their ailments and to play the part of luxurious invalids. But, says someone, is not a man who has to endure cold and to support heat really more miserable than the sick? Well, at any rate he has no comforts to mitigate his sufferings.)

Δεῦρο οὖν ἡμεῖς ὑπὲρ τῶν Κυνικῶν ὁπόσα διδασκάλων ἠκούσαμεν ἐν κοινῷ καταθῶμεν σκοπεῖν τοῖς ἐπὶ τὸν βίον ἰοῦσι τοῦτον· οἷς εἰ μὲν πεισθεῖεν, εὖ οἶδα, [182] οὐδὲν οἵ γε νῦν ἐπιχειροῦντες κυνίζειν ἔσονται χείρους· ἀπειθοῦντες δὲ εἰ μέν τι λαμπρὸν καὶ σεμνὸν ἐπιτηδεύσειαν, ὑπερφωνοῦντες τὸν λόγον τὸν ἡμέτερον, οὔτι τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἔργοις, οὐδὲν ἐμπόδιον ὃ γε ἡμέτερος οἴσει λόγος· εἰ δὲ ὑπὸ λιχνείας ἢ μαλακίας ἤ, τὸ κεφάλαιον ἵν᾽ εἴπω ξυνελὲν ἐν βραχεῖ, τῆς σωματικῆς ἡδονῆς δεδουλωμένοι τῶν λόγων ὀλιγωρήσειαν προσκαταγελάσαντες, [B] ὥσπερ ἐνίοτε τῶν παιδευτηρίων καὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων οἱ κύνες τοῖς προπυλαίοις προσουροῦσιν, οὐ φροντὶς Ἰπποκλείδῃ· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ τῶν κυνιδίων ἡμῖν μέλει τὰ τοιαῦτα πλημμελούντων. δεῦρο οὖν ἄνωθεν ἐν κεφαλαίοις διεξέλθωμεν ἐφεξῆς τὸν λόγον, ἵνα ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου τὸ προσῆκον ἀποδιδόντες αὐτοί τε εὐκολώτερον ἀπεργασώμεθα τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ διενοήθημεν καὶ σοὶ ποιήσωμεν εὐπαρακολούθητον. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ [C] τὸν κυνισμὸν εἶδός τι φιλοσοφίας εἶναι συμβέβηκεν, οὔτι φαυλότατον οὐδὲ ἀτιμότατον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς κρατίστοις ἀνάμιλλον, ὀλίγα πρότερον ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς ῥητέον ἡμῖν ἐστι τῆς φιλοσοφίας.

(Come now, let me set down for the benefit of the public what I learned from my teachers about the Cynics, so that all who are entering on this mode of life may consider it. And if they are convinced by what I say, those who are now aiming to be Cynics will, I am sure, be none the worse for it: and if they are unconvinced but cherish aims that are brilliant and noble, and set themselves above my argument not in words only but in deeds, then my discourse will at any rate put no hindrance in their way. But if there are others already enslaved by greed or self‐indulgence, or to sum it up briefly in a single phrase, by the pleasures of the body, and they therefore neglect my words or even laugh them down—just as dogs sometimes defile the front porticoes of schools and law‐courts,—“’Tis all one to Hippocleides,”(12) for indeed we take no notice of puppies who behave in this fashion. Come then let me pursue my argument under headings from the beginning in due order, so that by giving every question its proper treatment I may myself more conveniently achieve what I have in mind and may make it more easy for you also to follow. And since it is a fact that Cynicism is a branch of philosophy, and by no means the most insignificant or least honourable, but rivalling the noblest, I must first say a few words about philosophy itself.)

Ἡ τῶν θεῶν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις ἅμα φανοτάτῳ πυρὶ διὰ Προμηθέως καταπεμφθεῖσα(13) ἐξ ἡλίου μετὰ τῆς Ἑρμοῦ μερίδος οὐχ ἕτερον ἐστι παρὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου καὶ νοῦ διανομήν· ὁ γάρ τοι Προμηθεύς, ἡ πάντα ἐπιτροπεύουσα τὰ θνητὰ πρόνοια, [D] πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον ὥσπερ ὄργανον ὑποβάλλουσα τῇ φύσει, ἅπασι μετέδωκεν ἀσωμάτου λόγου· μετέσχε δὲ ἕκαστον οὗπερ ἠδύνατο, τὰ μὲν ἄψυχα σώματα τῆς ἕξεως μόνον, τὰ φυτὰ δὲ ἤδη καὶ τῆς ζωῆς(14) τὰ ζῷα δὲ ψυχῆς, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος καὶ λογικῆς ψυχῆς. εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν οἳ μίαν οὄονται διὰ τούτων πάντων ἥκειν φύσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ καὶ κατ᾽ εἶδος ταῦτα διαφέρειν. ἀλλὰ μήπω τοῦτο, μᾶλλον δὲ μηδὲ ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγῳ τοῦτο ἐξεταζέσθω, πλὴν ἐκείνου χάριν, [183] ὅτι, τὴν φιλοσοφίαν εἴθ᾽, ὥσπερ τινὲς ὑπολαμβάνουσι, τέχνην τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστημῶν, εἴτε ὁμοίωσιν θεῷ(15) κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, εἴθ᾽, ὅπερ ὁ Πύθιος ἔφη, τὸ Γνῶθι σαυτὸν ὑπολάβοι τις, οὐδὲν διοίσει πρὸς τὸν λόγον· ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ μάλα οἰκείως ἔχοντα.

(The gift of the gods sent down to mankind with the glowing flame of fire(16) from the sun through the agency of Prometheus along with the blessings that we owe to Hermes(17) is no other than the bestowal of reason and mind. For Prometheus, the Forethought that guides all things mortal by infusing into nature a fiery breath to serve as an operative cause, gave to all things a share in incorporeal reason. And each thing took what share it could; lifeless bodies only a state of existence; plants received life besides, and animals soul, and man a reasoning soul. Now some think that a single substance is the basis of all these, and others that they differ essentially according to their species. But this question we must not discuss as yet, or rather not at all in the present discourse, and we need only say that whether one regards philosophy, as some people do, as the art of arts and the science of sciences or as an effort to become like God, as far as one may, or whether, as the Pythian oracle said, it means “Know thyself,” will make no difference to my argument. For all these definitions are evidently very closely related to one another.)

Ἀρξώμεθα δὲ πρῶτον ἀπὸ τοῦ Γνῶθι σαυτόν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ θεῖόν ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ παρακέλευσμα. οὐκοῦν ὁ γιγνώσκων [B] αὑτὸν εἴσεται μὲν περὶ ψυχῆς, εἴσεται δὲ καὶ περὶ σώματος. καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀρκέσει μόνον, ὡς ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος ψυχὴ χρωμένη σώματι, μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπελεύσεται τὴν οὐσίαν, ἔπειτα ἀνιχνεύσει τὰς δυνάμεις. καὶ οὐδὲ τοῦτο μόνον ἀρκέσει αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ καί, εἴ τι τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἡμῖν ἐστι κρεῖττον καὶ θειότερον, ὅπερ δὴ πάντες ἀδιδάκτως πειθόμενοι θεῖόν τι εἶναι νομίζομεν, [C] καὶ τοῦτο ἐνιδρῦσθαι πάντες οὐρανῷ κοινῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν. ἐπιὼν δὲ αὖθις τὰς ἀρχὰς τοῦ σώματος σκέψεται, εἴτε σύνθετον εἴτε ἁπλοῦν ἐστιν· εἶτα ὁδῷ προβαίνων ὑπέρ τε ἁρμονίας αὐτοῦ καὶ πάθους καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ πάντων ἁπλῶς ὧν δεῖται πρὸς διαμονήν. ἐπιβλέψει δὲ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀρχαῖς τεχνῶν ἐνίων, ὑφ᾽ ὧν βοηθεῖται πρὸς διαμονὴν τὸ σῶμα, οἷον ἰατρικῆς, [D] γεωργίας, ἑτέρων τοιούτων. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν ἀχρήστων καὶ περιττῶν τι παντάπασιν ἀγνοήσει, ἐπεὶ καὶ ταῦτα(18) πρὸς κολακείαν τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν ἐπινενόηται. προσλιπαρῆσαι μὲν γὰρ τούτοις ἀποκνήσει αἰσχρὸν οἰόμενος τὸ τοιοῦτον, τὸ δοκοῦν ἐργῶδες ἐν αὐτοῖς φεύγων· τὸ δ᾽ ὅλον ὁποῖα ἄττα δοκεῖ καὶ οἷστισιν ἁρμόττει τῆς ψυχῆς μέρεσιν, οὐκ ἀγνοήσει. σκόπει δή, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἑαυτὸν γνῶναι πάσης μὲν ἐπιστήμης, πάσης δὲ τέχνης ἡγεῖταί τε ἅμα καὶ τοὺς καθόλου λόγους συνείληφε. [184] τά τε γὰρ θεῖα διὰ τῆς ἐνούσης ἡμῖν θείας μερίδος τά τε θνητὰ διὰ τῆς θνητοειδοῦς μοίρας πρὸς τούτοις †προσήκειν ἔφη τὸ μεταξὺ τούτων ζῷον εἰδέναι, τὸν ἄνθρωπον†,(19) τῷ μὲν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον θνητόν, τῷ παντὶ δὲ ἀθάνατον, καὶ μέντοι καὶ τὸν ἕνα καὶ τὸν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον συγκεῖσθαι ἐκ θνητῆς καὶ ἀθανάτου μερίδος.

(However, let us begin with “Know thyself,” since this precept is divinely inspired.(20) It follows that he who knows himself will know not only about his soul but his body also. And it will not be enough to know that a man is a soul employing a body, but he will also investigate the essential nature of the soul, and then trace out its faculties. And not even this alone will be enough for him, but in addition he will investigate whatever exists in us nobler and more divine than the soul, that something which we all believe in without being taught and regard as divine, and all in common suppose to be established in the heavens. Then again, as he investigates the first principles of the body he will observe whether it is composite or simple; then proceeding systematically he will observe its harmony and the influences that affect it and its capacity and, in a word, all that it needs to ensure its permanence. And in the next place he will also observe the first principles of certain arts by which the body is assisted to that permanence, for instance, medicine, husbandry and the like. And of such arts as are useless and superfluous he will not be wholly ignorant, since these too have been devised to humour the emotional part of our souls. For though he will avoid the persistent study of these last, because he thinks such persistent study disgraceful, and will avoid what seems to involve hard work in those subjects; nevertheless he will not, generally speaking, remain in ignorance of their apparent nature and what parts of the soul they suit. Reflect therefore, whether self‐ knowledge does not control every science and every art, and moreover whether it does not include the knowledge of universals. For to know things divine through the divine part in us, and mortal things too through the part of us that is mortal—this the oracle declared to be the duty of the living organism that is midway between these, namely man; because individually he is mortal, but regarded as a whole he is immortal, and moreover, singly and individually, is compounded of a mortal and an immortal part.)

Ὅτι μέντοι καὶ τὸ τῷ θεῲ κατὰ δύναμιν ὁμοιοῦσθαι οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ τὸ τὴν ἐφικτὴν ἀνθρώποις γνῶσιν τῶν ὄντων περιποιήσασθαι, πρόδηλον ἐντεῦθεν. [B] οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλούτῳ χρημάτων τὸ θεῖον μακαρίζομεν οὐδὲ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τῶν νομιζομένων ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ Ὅμηρός φησι

(Further, that to make oneself like God as far as possible is nothing else than to acquire such knowledge of the essential nature of things as is attainable by mankind, is evident from the following. It is not on the score of abundance of possessions that we count the divine nature happy, nor on the score of any other of those things that are commonly believed to be advantages, but it is because, as Homer says,)

θεοὶ δέ τε πάντα ἴσασι,

(“The gods know all things”;(21))

καὶ μέντοι καὶ περὶ Διὸς

(and indeed he says also of Zeus,)

ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς πρότερος γεγόνει καὶ πλείονα ᾔδει·

(“But Zeus was older and wiser.”(22))

[C] ἐπιστήμῃ γὰρ ἡμῶν οἱ θεοὶ διαφέρουσιν. ἡγεῖται γὰρ ἴσως καὶ αὐτοῖς τῶν καλῶν τὸ αὑτοὺς γινώσκειν· ὄσῳ δὴ κρείττονες ἡμῶν εἰσι τὴν οὐσίαν, τοσούτῳ γνόντες ἑαυτοὺς ἴσχουσι βελτιόνων γνώσιν. μηδεὶς οὖν ἡμῖν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν εἰς πολλὰ διαιρείτω μηδὲ εἰς πολλὰ τεμνέτω, μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ πολλὰς ἐκ μιᾶς ποιείτω. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀλήθεια μία, οὕτω δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφία μία· θαυμαστὸν δὲ οὐδέν, εἰ κατ᾽ ἄλλας καὶ ἄλλας ὁδοὺς ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν πορευόμεθα. ἐπεὶ κἄν, [D] εἴ τις θέλοι τὼν ξένων ἢ ναὶ μὰ Δία τῶν πάλαι πολιτῶν ἐπανελθεῖν εἰς Ἀθήνας, δύναιτο μὲν καὶ πλεῖν καὶ βαδίζειν, ὁδεύων δὲ οἶμαι διὰ γῆς ἢ ταῖς πλατείαις χρῆσθαι λεωφόροις ἢ ταῖς ἀτραποῖς καὶ συντόμοις ὁδοῖς· καὶ πλεῖν μέντοι δυνατὸν παρὰ τοὺς αἰγιαλούς, καὶ δὴ καὶ κατὰ τὸν Πύλιον γέροντα τέμνοντα πέλαγος μέσον. μὴ δὲ τοῦτό τις ἡμῖν προφερέτω, εἴ τινες τῶν κατ᾽ αὐτὰς ἰόντων τὰς ὁδοὺς ἀπεπλανήθησαν καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ που γενόμενοι, [185] καθάπερ ὑπὸ τῆς Κίρκης ἢ τῶν Λωτοφάγων ἡδονῆς ἢ δόξης ᾿ἤ τινος ἄλλου δελεασθέντες, ἀπελείφθησαν τοῦ πρόσω βαδίζειν καὶ ἐφικνεῖσθαι τοῦ τέλους, τοὺς πρωτεύσαντας δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῃ τῶν αἱρέσεων σκοπείτω, καὶ πάντα εὑρήσει σύμφωνα.

(For it is in knowledge that the gods surpass ourselves. And it may well be that with them also what ranks as noblest is self‐knowledge. In proportion then as they are nobler than we in their essential nature, that self‐knowledge of theirs is a knowledge of higher things. Therefore, I say, let no one divide philosophy into many kinds or cut it up into many parts, or rather let no one make it out to be plural instead of one. For even as truth is one, so too philosophy is one. But it is not surprising that we travel to it now by one road, now by another. For if any stranger, or, by Zeus, any one of her oldest inhabitants wished to go up to Athens, he could either sail or go by road, and if he travelled by land he could, I suppose, take either the broad highways or the paths and roads that are short cuts. And moreover he could either sail along the coasts or, like the old man of Pylos,(23) “cleave the open sea.” And let no one try to refute me by pointing out that some philosophers in travelling by those very roads have been known to lose their way, and arriving in some other place have been captivated, as though by Circe or the Lotus‐Eaters, that is to say by pleasure or opinion or some other bait, and so have failed to go straight forward and attain their goal. Rather he must consider those who in every one of the philosophic sects did attain the highest rank, and he will find that all their doctrines agree.)

Οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν ἐν Δελφοῖς θεὸς τὸ Γνῶθι σαυτὸν προαγορεύει, Ἡράκλειτος δὲ “ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν,” ἀλλὰ καὶ Πυθαγόρας οἵ τε ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου μέχρι Θεοφράστου τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ φασι, καὶ γὰρ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης. ὃ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ποτέ, τοῦτο ὁ θεὸς ἀεί. γελοῖον οὖν ἂν εἴη τὸν θεὸν ἑαυτὸν μὴ εἰδέναι· κομιδῇ γὰρ οὐδὲν εἴσεται τῶν ἄλλων, εἴπερ ἑαυτὸν ἀγνοοίη· πάντα γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ παρ᾽ ἑαυτῷ ἔχει τῶν ὁπωσοῦν ὄντων τὰς αἰτίας, εἴτε ἀθανάτων ἀθανάτους, εἴτε ἐπικήρων οὐ θνητὰς οὐδὲ ἐπικήρους, ἀιδίους δὲ καὶ μενούσας ἀεὶ καὶ αἳ τούτοις εἰσὶν αἰτίαι τῆς ἀειγενεσίας. [C] ἀλλ᾽ οὗτος μὲν ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ μείζων.

(Therefore the god at Delphi proclaims, “Know Thyself,” and Heracleitus says, “I searched myself”;(24) and Pythagoras also and his school and his followers down to Theophrastus, bid us become like God as far as possible, yes and Aristotle too. For what we are sometimes, God is always.(25) It would therefore be absurd that God should not know himself. For he will know nothing at all about other things if he be ignorant of himself. For he is himself everything, seeing that in himself and near himself he keeps the causes of all things that in any way whatever have existence, whether they be immortal causes of things immortal, or causes of perishable things, though themselves not mortal or perishable; for imperishable and ever‐abiding are the causes of perpetual generation for the perishable world. But this line of argument is too lofty for the occasion.)

Ὅτι δὲ μία τέ ἐστιν ἀλήθεια καὶ φιλοσοφία μία καὶ ταύτης εἰσὶν ἐρασταὶ ξύμπαντες ὧν τε ὑπεμνήσθην μικρῷ πρότερον ὧν τε ἐν δίκῃ νῦν εἴποιμι ἂν τοὔνομα, τοὺς τοῦ Κιτιέως ὁμιλητὰς λέγω, οἳ τὰς πόλεις ἰδόντες ἀποδιδρασκούσας τὸ λίαν ἀκραιφνὲς καὶ καθαρὸν τῆς ἐλευθερίας τοῦ κυνὸς ἐσκέπασαν αὐτὸν [D] ὥσπερ οἶμαι παραπετάσμασιν οἰκονομίᾳ καὶ τῇ χρηματιστικῇ καὶ τῇ πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα συνόδῳ καὶ παιδοτροφίᾳ, ἴν᾽ οἶμαι ταῖς πόλεσιν αὐτὸν ἐγγύθεν ἐπιστήσωσι φύλακα· ὅτι δὲ τὸ Γνῶθι σαυτὸν κεφάλαιον τίθενται φιλοσοφίας, οὐ μόνον ἐξ ὧν κατεβάλλοντο ξυγγραμμάτων ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τοῦτου πεισθείης ἄν, εἴπερ ἐθέλοις, ἀλλὰ πολὺ πλέον ἀπὸ τοῦ τῆς φιλοσοφίας τέλους· τὸ γὰρ ὁμολογουμένως [186] ζῆν τῇ φύσει τέλος ἐποιήσαντο, οὗπερ οὐχ οἷόv τε τυχεῖν τὸν ἀγνοοῦντα, τίς καὶ ὁποῖος πέφυκεν· ὁ γὰρ ἀγνοῶν ὅστις ἐστίν, οὐκ εἴσεται δήπουθεν ὅ, τι πράττειν ἑαυτῷ προσήκει, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ ὁ(26) τὸν σίδηρον ἀγνοῶν εἴσεται, εἴτε αὐτῷ τέμνειν εἴτε μὴ προσήκει, καὶ ὅτου δεῖ τῷ σιδήρῳ πρὸς τὸ δύνασθαι τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν· ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι μὲν ἡ φιλοσοφία μία τέ ἐστι καὶ πάντες ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἑνός τινος ἐφιέμενοι ὁδοῖς ἐπὶ τοῦτο διαφόροις ἦλθον, [B] ἀπόχρη τοσαῦτα νῦν εἰπεῖν. ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ Κυνισμοῦ σκεπτέον ἔτι.(27)

(Now truth is one and philosophy is one, and they whom I just now spoke of are its lovers one and all; and also they whom I ought in fairness to mention now by name, I mean the disciples of the man of Citium.(28) For when they saw that the cities of Greece were averse to the excessive plainness and simplicity of the Cynic’s freedom of manners, they hedged him about with screens as it were, I mean with maxims on the management of the household and business and intercourse with one’s wife and the rearing of children, to the end, I believe, that they might make him the intimate guardian of the public welfare.(29) And that they too held the maxim “Know Thyself” to be the first principle of their philosophy you may believe, if you will, not only from the works that they composed on this very subject, but even more from what they made the end and aim of their philosophic teaching. For this end of theirs was life in harmony with nature, and this it is impossible for any man to attain who does not know who and of what nature he is. For a man who does not know himself will certainly not know what it is becoming for him to do; just as he who does not know the nature of iron will not know whether it is suitable to cut with or not, and how iron must be treated so that it may be put to its proper use. For the moment however I have said enough to show that philosophy is one, and that, to speak generally, all philosophers have a single aim though they arrive at that aim by different roads. And now let us consider the Cynic philosophy.)