The Works of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. Volume 11. Parlimentary Debates II.
Chapter 43
Such, my lords, are the inconveniencies to be feared from rejecting this bill, or from postponing it; by which is plainly intended only a more gentle and tender manner of rejecting it, by hinting to the commons your disapprobation of it, and the necessity of sending up another, which you cannot do without hazarding the peace of the nation and the fate of the war.
The commons, who are not obliged to inquire what reception their bills find here, may perhaps not immediately prepare another, but suffer time to elapse, till necessity shall oblige us to comply with those measures which we cannot approve.
They may, likewise, by a kind of senatorial craft, elude all our precautions, and make the rejection of the bill ineffectual, as was once done, when a bill for a tax upon leather was rejected: the commons, determining not to be directed in the methods of raising money, sent up the same bill with only a small alteration of the title, to lay a duty upon tanned hides, which the lords were, for want of time, obliged to pass.
But, my lords, should the other house discover in this single instance, any uncommon degree of flexibility and complaisance, should they patiently endure the rejection of the bill, admit the validity of the reasons upon which your lordships have proceeded, and willingly engage in drawing up a new scheme for raising supplies; even upon this supposition, which is more favourable than can reasonably be formed, the business of the year will be very much perplexed, and the new bill hurried into a law without sufficient caution or deliberation.
The session is now, my lords, so far advanced, that many of the commons have retired into the country, whose advice and assistance may be necessary in the projection of a new money bill, so that the new bill must be formed in a short time, and by a thin house; and, indeed, the multiplicity of considerations necessary to another bill of this kind, is such, that I cannot think it prudent to advise or undertake it.
The committee on ways and means must strike out another scheme for a considerable impost, which, in the present state of the nation, is in itself no easy task. This scheme must be so adjusted as to be consistent with all the other taxes, which will require long consultations and accurate inquiries. It must then struggle, perhaps, through an obstinate and artful opposition, before it can pass through the forms of the other house; and, when it comes before your lordships, may be again opposed with no less zeal than the bill before us, and perhaps, likewise, with equal reason.
All these dangers and difficulties will be avoided by trying, for a single year, the experiment which is now proposed; and which, if that should fail, may be better adjusted in the time of leisure, which the beginning of the next session will undoubtedly afford; before which time I am afraid no amendment can possibly be made.
It has been proposed, indeed, by the noble lord, that three shillings should be laid upon every gallon of distilled liquors, which would undoubtedly lessen the consumption, but would at the same time destroy the trade; a trade from which large profits may be in time gained; since our distillers have now acquired such skill, that the most delicate palate cannot distinguish their liquors from those which foreigners import.
If the duty be raised to the height proposed, it must be allowed to be repaid for all that shall be exported; otherwise foreign nations will deprive us of this part of our trade; and it has been already shown, that by mock exportations the duty may be frequently evaded.
Thus, my lords, there will be difficulties on either hand; if a duty so high be paid, the manufacturer will be ruined; if it be evaded, the consumption will be lessened.
One inconvenience will easily be discovered to be the necessary consequence of any considerable advance of the price. We may be certain that an act of the senate will not moderate the passions, or alter the appetites of the people; and that they will not be less desirous of their usual gratifications, because they are denied them. The poor may, indeed, yield to necessity, unless they find themselves able to resist the law, or to evade it; but those who can afford to please their taste, or exalt their spirits at a greater expense, will still riot as before, but with this difference, that their excesses will produce no advantage to the publick.
If an additional duty of three shillings be laid upon every gallon of distilled liquors, the product of our own distillery will be dearer than those liquors which are imported from foreign parts; and, therefore, it cannot but be expected that the money which now circulates amongst us, will in a short time be clandestinely carried into other countries.
Such, my lords, will be the effect of those taxes which are so strongly recommended; and, therefore, they ought not to be imposed till all other methods of proceeding have been found ineffectual.
It is possible, indeed, that the regulation specified in this bill may not produce any beneficial effect, and that the present practice of debauchery may still continue among the people; but it is likewise possible that this tax may, by increasing the price, augment the revenue at the same time that it lessens the consumption.
This proposal has, by some lords, been treated as a paradox; but they certainly suspected it of falsehood, only for want of patience to form the calculations necessary in such disquisitions. The tax of the last year amounted to one hundred and seventy thousand pounds; this tax is now doubled, so that the same quantity will produce three hundred and forty thousand; but if one third less should be consumed, the present tax will amount to no more than two hundred and twenty thousand pounds; and when fifty thousand licenses are added, the revenue will gain an hundred thousand pounds, though one third part of the consumption should be hindered.
But, my lords, supposing no part of the consumption hindered, I cannot think that bill should be rejected, which, in a time of danger like the present, shall add to the publick revenue an annual income of more than two hundred thousand pounds, without lessening any manufacture, without burdening any useful or virtuous part of the nation, and without giving the least occasion to any murmurs among the people.
It is to be remembered, my lords, that whatever corruption shall prevail amongst us, it cannot be imputed to this bill, which did not make, but find the nation vitiated, and only turned their vices to publick advantage; so that if it produces any diminution of the sale of spirits, it is indisputably to be applauded as promoting virtue. If the sale of spirits still continues the same, it will deserve some degree of commendation, as it will, at least, not contribute to the increase of vice, and as it will augment the revenue without injuring the people; for how, my lords, can we be censured for only suffering the nation to continue in its former state?
Lord TALBOT then spoke in substance as follows:--My lords, if we consider the tendency of the argument used by the noble lord, the only argument on which he appears to lay any stress, it will prove, if it proves any thing, what cannot be admitted by your lordships, without bidding farewell to independency, and acknowledging that you are only the substitutes of a higher power.
It appears by the tenor of his reasoning, that he considers this house as only obliged, in questions relating to supplies, to ratify the determinations of the other; to submit implicitly to their dictates, and receive their sovereign commands, without daring either to refuse compliance, or delay it.
If we conjoin the reasoning of the noble lord who spoke last, with that of one who spoke before in favour of the bill, we shall be able to discover the full extent of our power on these occasions; the first was pleased to inform us, that though we were at liberty to examine the paragraphs of this bill, we had no right, at least no power to amend them; because in money bills, the commons left us no other choice than that of passing or rejecting them.
This, my lords, might have been thought a sufficient contraction of those privileges which your ancestors transmitted to you, and the commons needed to have desired no farther concessions from this assembly, since this was a publick confession of a subordinate state, and admitted either that part of our ancient rights had been given up, or that we were at present too much depressed to dare to assert them.
We might, however, still comfort ourselves with the peaceful and uncontested possession of the alternative; we might still believe that what we could not approve we might reject, without irritating the formidable commons. But now, my lords, a new doctrine has been vented among us; we are told not only that we must not amend a money bill, but that it will be to no purpose to reject it; for that the other house will send it again without altering any thing but the title, and force it upon us, when there is no time for any other expedient.
If this, my lords, should be done, I know not how the bill might, at its second appearance, be received by other lords; for my part, I should vote immediately for rejecting it, without any alleviating or mollifying expedients. I should reject it, my lords, even on the last day of the session, without any regard to the pretended necessity of raising supplies, and without suffering myself to be terrified into compliance by the danger of the house of Austria; for though I think the balance of power on the continent necessary to be preserved at the hazard of a fleet or an army, I cannot think it of equal importance to us with the equipoise of our own government; nor can I conceive it my duty to enslave myself to secure the freedom of another.
The danger, therefore, of disgusting the commons, at this or any other juncture, shall never influence me to a tame resignation of the privileges of our own house; nor shall I willingly allow any force to arguments which are intended only to operate upon our fear; and, therefore, unless there shall appear some better plea in favour of this bill, I shall think it my duty to oppose it.
The other plea is the difficulty, or, in the style of the noble lord who spoke last, the impossibility of raising supplies by any other method. That it is not easy to raise supplies by any new tax, in a nation where almost all the necessaries of life are loaded with imposts, must be readily allowed; but that it is impossible, the folly of the people, which is at least equal to their poverty, will not suffer me to grant.
One other expedient, at least, has been already discovered by the wonderful sagacity of our new ministers; an expedient which they cannot, indeed, claim the honour of inventing, but which appears so conformable to the rest of their conduct, and so agreeable to their principles, that I doubt not but they will very often practise it, if the continuance of their power be long enough to admit of a full display of their abilities.
Amidst their tenderness for our manufactures, and their regard for commerce, they have established a lottery for eight hundred thousand pounds, by which they not only take advantage of an inclination too predominant, an inclination to grow rich rather by a lucky hazard, than successful industry; but give up the people a prey to stockjobbers, usurers, and brokers of tickets, who will plunder them without mercy, by the encouragement of those by whom it might be hoped that they would be protected from plunderers.
All lotteries, my lords, are games, which are not more honest or more useful for being legal; and the objection which has been made to all other games, and which has never yet been answered, will be found equally valid when applied to them. They engross that attention which might be employed in improving or extending our manufactures; they swallow that money which might circulate in useful trade; they give the idle and the diligent an equal prospect of riches; and by conferring unexpected wealth upon those who never deserved it, and know not how to use it, they promote extravagance and luxury, insolence and dissoluteness.
But these consequences, my lords, and a thousand others equally important, equally formidable, may be objected without effect, against any scheme by which money will be raised; money! the only end at which our ministers have aimed for almost half a century; money! by which only they have preserved the favour of the court, and the obedience of the senate; money! which has supplied the place of wisdom at one time, and of courage at another.
To gain money, my lords, they have injured trade by establishing a lottery; and they are now about to sacrifice the health and virtue of the people, to the preservation of a trade by which money may be furnished to the government. This, my lords, is their only design, however they may act, or whatever they may profess; if they endeavour to protect either the trade or lives of people, it is only because they expect a continuance of taxes from them; and when more desperate measures are necessary for the same purposes, they ruin their trade by one project, and destroy their lives by another.
Lord LONSDALE next spoke, to this effect:--My lords, it is not without the utmost grief and indignation, that I find this house considered by some who have spoken in vindication of this bill, as obliged to comply with any proposals sent up by the commons for raising money, however destructive to the publick, or however contrary to the dictates of our conscience, or convictions of our reason.
What is this, my lords, but once more to vote ourselves useless? What but to be the first that shall destroy the constitution of the government, and give up that liberty which our ancestors established?
That this is really the design of any of the noble lords, who have spoken in vindication of the bill, and have asserted the necessity of passing it, without any attempts to amend it, I am very far from affirming; but certainly, my lords, this, and this only, is the consequence of their positions, with whatever intention they may have advanced them; for how, my lords, can we call ourselves independent, if we are to receive the commands of the other house? or with what propriety can we assume the title of legislators, if we are to pass a bill like this without examination?
The bill now before us, my lords, is of the utmost importance to the happiness of that nation whose welfare we have hitherto been imagined to superintend. In this bill are involved not only the trade and riches, but the lives and morals of the British people; nor can we suffer it to pass unexamined, without betraying the nation to wickedness and destruction.
Should we, on this occasion, suffer ourselves to be degraded from legislators to messengers from the commons to the throne; should we be content only to transmit the laws which we ought to amend, and resign ourselves up implicitly to the wisdom of those whom we have formerly considered as our inferiours, I know not for what purpose we sit here. It would be my counsel that we should no longer attempt to preserve the appearance of power, when we have lost the substance, or submit to share the drudgery of government, without partaking of the authority.
The time of such desperation is, indeed, not yet arrived; but every act of servile compliance will bring it nearer; and, therefore, my lords, for the sake of ourselves, as well as of the people, I join the noble lord's motion for resuming the house, that farther information may be obtained both by ourselves, by the commons, and by the nation.
The duke of NEWCASTLE then rose, and spoke to the effect following:--My lords, I believe no lord in this assembly is more zealous for the advantage of the publick than myself, or more desirous to preserve the lives, or amend the morals of the people; but I cannot think that this character can justly imply any dislike of the bill now before us.
If I should admit what the noble lord has asserted, that the lives and morals of the people are affected by this bill, I cannot yet see that his inference is just, or that our compliance with the motion is, therefore, necessary.
That under the present regulation, the miseries of the nation are every day increased; that corruption spreads every day wider, and debauchery makes greater havock, is confessed on all sides; and, therefore, I can discover no reason for continuing the laws in their present state, nor can think that we ought to decline any experiment by which that disorder, which cannot be increased, may possibly be lessened.
It is confessed by the noble lords, who declare their approbation of the motion for postponing the consideration of this bill, that they intend nothing less than a gentle and tacit manner of dropping it, by showing the commons that though to avoid offence they do not absolutely reject it, yet they cannot approve it, and will not pass it; and that, therefore, the necessity of raising supplies, requires that another bill should be formed, not liable to the same objections.
The consequence of this procedure, my lords, can only be, that either the commons will form another bill for raising money, or that they will send up this again with a new title, and such slight alterations as not the happiness of the nation, but the forms of the senate demand.
If, in return for our endeavours to reform a bill, of which they think themselves the only constitutional judges, they should send it again with only another title; what, my lords, shall we procure by the delay, but a new occasion of murmurs and discontent, a new confirmation of the power of the commons, and an establishment of senatorial chicanery, at once pernicious to the publick, and ignominious to ourselves.
That the commons, in sending back a bill that has been rejected in this house, with only a change in the title, act contrary to the end of senatorial consultations, though consistently with their external forms, cannot be denied: but as each house is without any dependence on the other, such deviations from the principles of our constitution, however injurious to our authority, or however detrimental to the nation, cannot be punished, nor otherwise prevented, than by caution and prudence.
If, therefore, the commons, as they have formerly done, should return the bill without alteration, we shall only have impaired our own authority, and shaken the foundations of our government by a fruitless opposition. Nor shall we gain any advantage, though they should comply with our expectations, and employ the little time that remains in contriving a new tax; for corruption must then proceed without opposition, the people must grow every day more vitious, and debauchery will, in a short time, grow too general to be suppressed.
With regard to the bill before us, the only question that is necessary or proper, is, whether it will promote or hinder the consumption of distilled liquors? for as to the effects of those liquors, those that vindicate, and that oppose this bill, are of the same opinion; and all will readily allow, that if the law now proposed shall be found to increase the consumption which it was intended to diminish, it ought immediately to be repealed, as destructive to the people, and contrary to the end for which it was designed; but if the additional duties shall produce any degree of restraint, if they shall hinder the consumption even of a very small part, I think it must be allowed that the provisions are just and useful; since it has already appeared, that this vice is too deeply rooted to be torn up at once; and that, therefore, it is to be pruned away by imperceptible diminution.
Whether the provisions now offered in the bill might not admit of improvements; whether some other more efficacious expedients might not be discovered; and whether the duties might not be raised yet higher, with more advantage to the publick, may undoubtedly admit of long disputes and deep inquiries; but for these inquiries and disputes, my lords, there is at present no time: the affairs of the continent require our immediate interposition, the general oppressors of the western world are now endeavouring to extend their dominions, and exalt their power beyond the possibility of future opposition; and our allies, who were straggling against them, can no longer continue their efforts without assistance.
At a time like this, my lords, it is not proper to delay the supplies by needless controversies; or, indeed, by any disputes which may, without great inconvenience, be delayed to a time of tranquillity, a time when all our inquiries may be prosecuted at leisure, when every argument may be considered in its full extent, and when the improvement of our laws ought, indeed, to be our principal care. At present it appears to me, that every method of raising money, without manifest injury to the morals of the people, deserves our approbation; and, therefore, that we ought to pass this bill, though it should not much hinder the consumption of spirituous liquors, if it shall barely appear that it will not increase it.
It is at least proper, that, at this pressing exigence, those that oppose the bills by which supplies are to be raised, should, by offering other expedients, show that their opposition proceeds not from any private malevolence to the ministry, or any prepossession against the publick measures, but from a steady adherence to just principles, and an impartial regard for the publick good; for it may be suspected, that he who only busies himself in pulling down, without any attempts to repair the breaches that he has made, with more fit or durable materials, has no real design of strengthening the fortification.
It has been proposed, indeed, by one of the noble lords, that a tax of three shillings a gallon should be laid upon all distilled spirits, and collected by the laws of excise at the still-head, which would doubtless secure a great part of the people from the temptations to which they are at present exposed, but would at the same time produce another effect not equally to be desired.
I have been informed, my lords, upon mentioning this proposal in conversation, that such duties will raise the price of the liquors distilled among us above that of foreign countries; and that, therefore, not only all our foreign trade of this kind would be immediately destroyed, but that many of those who now drink our own spirits, only because they are cheaper, will then purchase those of foreign countries, which are generally allowed to be more pleasant.
That this is really the state of the affair, I do not affirm; for I now relate only what I have heard from others; but surely the imposition of so heavy a duty requires a long consideration; nor can it be improper to mention any objections, the discussion of which may contribute to our information.
But any other regulations than those now offered, will require so many inquiries, and so long consultation, that the senate will expect to be dismissed from their attendance, before any resolutions are formed; and when once the supplies are provided, we shall find ourselves obliged to leave the law relating to spirituous liquors in its present state.
Then, my lords, will the enemies of the government imagine that they have a new opportunity of gratifying their malignity, by censuring us as wholly negligent of the publick happiness, and charge us with looking without concern upon the debauchery, the diseases, and the poverty of the people, without any compassion of their wants, or care of their reformation.