Chapter 24

The late augmentation of twenty thousand men, which may possibly be mentioned as a proof of their intention, shows nothing but that they pursue their own interest with their usual prudence and attention, and with such as it is to be wished that our ministers would condescend to learn from them; and that they are too wise to suffer the towns from which the Austrians have, by our persuasions, withdrawn their troops to fall into the hands of the French. They have, therefore, substituted new garrisons, but seem to have no regard to the interest of the queen of Hungary, nor any other view than that of providing for their own security, waiting the event of the war, and laying hold of any advantage that may accidentally be offered them.

It may be urged farther by those who are desirous to deceive others, or willing to be deceived themselves, that the province of Holland has passed a vote for assisting the queen of Hungary with twenty thousand men; but if it be remembered, my lords, that this must be the general act of the United States, and that every province has its own particular views to gratify, and its own interest to reconcile with the general good, it may be very reasonably suspected, that this assistance is yet rather the object of hope than expectation; it may justly be feared, that before so many various dispositions will unite, and such different schemes will be made consistent, the house of Austria may be extinguished, that our forces may be destroyed, and Germany enslaved by the French. Then, my lords, what will remain, but that we shall curse that folly that involved us in distant quarrels, and that temerity which sent us out to oppose a power which we could not withstand; and which incited us to waste that treasure in foreign countries, which we may quickly want for the defence of our own?

It must be, indeed, confessed, that if an estimate is to be made of our condition, from the conduct of our ministers, the fear of exhausting our treasure must be merely panick, and the precepts of frugality which other states have grown great by observing, are to be absolutely unnecessary. It may reasonably be imagined that we have some secret mine, or hidden repository of gold, which no degree of extravagance can drain, and which may for ever supply the most lavish expenses without diminution.

For upon what other supposition, my lords, can any man attempt a defence of the contract, by which we have obtained for one campaign the service of the troops of Hanover? What but the confidence of funds that can never be deficient, could influence them to conclude a stipulation, by which levy-money is to be paid for troops of which not a single regiment was raised for our service, or on the present occasion; which were established for the security of the electorate of Hanover, and would have been maintained, though we had not engaged in the affairs of the continent.

What were the reasons which induced our ministry to employ the forces of Hanover, it is, perhaps, not necessary to inquire. The only motive that ought to have influenced them, was the prospect of obtaining them upon cheap terms; for, my lords, if the troops of Hanover cannot be obtained, but at the same expense with those of Britain, I am not able to discover why they should be preferred. I have never heard, my lords, any uncommon instances of Hanoverian courage, that should incline us to trust the cause of Europe rather to that nation than to our own; and am inclined to believe, that Britain is able to produce men equal in all military virtues to any native of that happy country; a country which, though it was thought worthy to be secured by a neutrality, when all the neighbouring provinces were exposed to the ravages of war, I have never heard celebrated for any peculiar excellencies; and of which I cannot but observe, that it was indebted for its security rather to the precaution of its prince, than the bravery of its inhabitants.

This demand of levy-money shocks every Briton yet more strongly, on considering by whom it is required; required by that family whom we have raised from a petty dominion, for which homage was paid to a superiour power; and which was, perhaps, only suffered to retain the appearance of a separate sovereignty, because it was not worth the labour and expense of an invasion; because it would neither increase riches nor titles, nor gratify either avarice or ambition; by a family whom, from want and weakness, we have exalted to a throne, from whence, with virtue equal to their power, they may issue their mandates to the remotest parts of the earth, may prescribe the course of war in distant empires, and dictate terms of peace to half the monarchs of the globe.

I should imagine, my lords, that when a king of the house of Hanover surveys his navies, reviews his troops, or examines his revenue, beholds the splendour of his court, or contemplates the extent of his dominions, he cannot but sometimes, however unwillingly, compare his present state with that of his ancestors; and that when he gives audience to the ambassadours of princes, who, perhaps, never heard of Hanover, and directs the payment of sums, by the smallest of which all his ancient inheritance would be dearly purchased; and reflects, as surely he sometimes will, that all these honours and riches, this reverence from foreign powers, and his domestick splendour, are the gratuitous and voluntary gifts of the mighty people of Britain, he should find his heart overflowing with unlimited gratitude, and should be ready to sacrifice to the happiness of his benefactors, not only every petty interest, or accidental inclination, but even his repose, his safety, or his life; that he should be ready to ease them of every burden before they complained, and to aid them with all his power before they requested his assistance; that he should consider his little territories as only a contemptible province to his British empire, a kind of nursery for troops to be employed without harassing his more valuable subjects.

It might be at least hoped, my lords, that the princes of the house of Hanover might have the same regard to this nation as to kings from whom they never received any benefit, and whom they ought in reality always to have considered as enemies, yet even from such levy-money was not always required; or if required, was not always received.

There was once a time, my lords, before any of this race wore the crown of Britain; when the great French monarch, Lewis the fourteenth, being under a necessity of hiring auxiliary troops, applied to the duke of Hanover, as a prince whose necessities would naturally incline him to set the lives of his subjects at a cheap rate. The duke, pleased with an opportunity of trafficking with so wealthy a monarch, readily promised a supply of troops; and demanded levy-money to be paid him, that he might be enabled to raise them. But Hanoverian reputation was not then raised so high, as that the French king should trust him with his money. Lewis suspected, and made no scruple of declaring his suspicion, that the demand of levy-money was only a pretence to obtain a sum which would never afterwards be repaid, and for which no troops would be obtained; and therefore, with his usual prudence insisted, that the troops should first march, and then be paid. Thus for some time the treaty was at a stand; but the king being equally in want of men, as the duke of money, and perceiving, perhaps, that it was really impracticable for so indigent a prince to raise troops without some pecuniary assistance, offered him at length a small sum, which was gladly accepted, though much below the original demand. The troops were engaged in the service of France; and the duke of Hanover thought himself happy in being able to amuse himself at his leisure with the rattle of money.

Such, my lords, were the conditions on which the troops of Hanover were furnished in former times; and surely what could then be produced by the love of money, or the awe of a superiour power, might now be expected as the effect of gratitude and kindness.

But not to dwell any longer, my lords, upon particular circumstances of measures, of which the whole scheme is contrary to the apparent interest of this empire, I shall not inquire farther, why auxiliaries are employed on this occasion rather than Britons, rather than those whose bravery is celebrated to the most distant corners of the earth; why, if mercenaries are necessary, those of Hanover are preferred to others: or why, if they are, indeed, preferable, they are now to be hired at a higher rate than at any former time? It appears to me of far more importance to undermine the foundation, than to batter the superstructure of our present system of politicks; and of greater use to inquire, why we have engaged in a war on the continent, than why we carry it on with ridiculous profusion.

It appears to me, my lords, that there are many reasons which, with the same circumstances, would have withheld any nation but this from such a dangerous interposition. The Dutch, we see, are content to look on without action, though they are more interested in the event, and less embarrassed on any other side. We are already engaged in a war, of which no man can foresee the conclusion; but which cannot be ended unsuccessfully, without the utmost danger to our most important interests; and which yet has hitherto produced only losses and disgrace, has impoverished our merchants, and intimidated our soldiers. Whether these losses are the effects of weakness or treachery, is a question which I am not ambitious of endeavouring to decide, and of which the decision is, indeed, by no means necessary in the present debate; since if we are too weak to struggle with Spain, unassisted as she is, and embarrassed with different views, I need not say what will be our condition, when the whole house of Bourbon shall be combined against us; when that nation which stood alone for so many years against the united efforts of Europe, shall attack us, exhausted with taxes, enervated with corruption, and disunited from all allies. Whether the troops of Hanover will assist us at that time, I cannot determine. Perhaps, in the destruction of the British dominions, it may be thought expedient to secure a more valuable and important country by a timely neutrality; but if we have any auxiliaries from thence, we must then necessarily obtain them upon cheaper terms.

If our inactivity in the European seas, and our ill success in those of America be, as it is generally suspected, the consequence of perfidious counsels, and private machinations; if our fleets are sent out with orders to make no attempt against our enemies, or our admirals commanded to retreat before them; surely no higher degree of madness can be imagined, than that of provoking new enemies before we have experienced a change of counsels, and found reason to place in our ministers and statesmen that confidence which war absolutely requires.

This is the conduct, my lords, which I should think most rational, even though we were attacked in some of our real rights, and though the quarrel about which we were debating was our own; I should think the nearest danger the greatest, and should advise patience under foreign insults, till we had redressed our domestick grievances; till we had driven treachery from the court, and corruption from the senate. But much more proper do I think this conduct, when we are invited only to engage in distant war, in a dispute about the dominion of princes, in the bowels of the continent; of princes, of whom it is not certain, that we shall receive either advantage or security from their greatness, or that we should suffer any loss or injury by their fall.

But, my lords, I know it will be answered, that the queen of Hungary has a right by treaty to our assistance; and that in becoming guarantees of the Pragmatick sanction, we engaged to support her in the dominions of her ancestors. This, my lords, is an answer of which I do not deny the justness, and of which I will not attempt to invalidate the strength. I allow that such a stipulation was made, and that treaties ought to be observed, at whatever hazard, with unviolated faith. It has been, indeed, objected, that many nations engaged with us in the same treaty, whom interest or cowardice have inclined to neglect it; and that we ought not to become the standing garrison of Europe, or to defend alone those territories, to the preservation of which so many states are obliged to contribute equally with ourselves. But this, my lords, appears to me an argument of which the ill consequences can never be fully discovered; an argument which dissolves all the obligations of contracts, destroys the foundation of moral justice, and lays society open to all the mischiefs of perfidy, by making the validity of oaths and contracts dependant upon chance, and regulating the duties of one man by the conduct of another. I pretend not, my lords, to long experience, and, therefore, in discussing intricate questions, may be easily mistaken. But as, in my opinion, my lords, morality is seldom difficult, but when it is clouded with an intention to deceive others or ourselves, I shall venture to declare with more confidence, that in proportion as one man neglects his duty, another is more strictly obliged to practise his own, that his example may not help forward the general corruption, and that those who are injured by the perfidy of others, may from his sincerity have a prospect of relief.

I believe all politicks that are not founded on morality will be found fallacious and destructive, if not immediately, to those who practise them; yet, consequentially, by their general tendency to disturb society, and weaken those obligations which maintain the order of the world. I shall, therefore, allow, that what justice requires from a private man, becomes, in parallel circumstances, the duty of a nation; and shall, therefore, never advise the violation of a solemn treaty. The stipulations in which we engaged, when we became guarantees of the Pragmatick sanction, are, doubtless, to be observed; and it is, therefore, one of the strongest objections against the measures which we are now pursuing, that we shall be perfidious at a greater expense than fidelity would have required, and shall exhaust the treasure of the nation without assisting the queen of Hungary.

To explain this assertion, my lords, it is necessary to take a view of the constitution of the German body, which consists of a great number of separate governments independent on each other, but subject, in some degree, to the emperour as the general head. The subjects of each state are governed by their prince, and owe no allegiance to any other sovereign; but the prince performs homage to the emperour, and having thereby acknowledged himself his feudatory, or dependant, may be punished for rebellion against him. The title of the emperour, and consequently his claim to this allegiance, and the right of issuing the ban against those who shall refuse it, is confirmed by many solemn acknowledgments of the diet, and, amongst others, by the grant of a pecuniary aid; this the present emperour has indisputably received, an aid having been already granted him in the diet, of a subsidy for eighteen months; and, therefore, none of the troops of Germany can now be employed against him, without subjecting the prince to whom they belong to the censure of the ban, a kind of civil excommunication.

To what purpose, then, my lords, are we to hire, at a rate never paid, or perhaps demanded before, troops which cannot serve us without subjecting their prince to the charge of rebellion? Or how shall we assist the queen of Hungary, by collecting forces which dare not act against the only enemy which she has now to fear? Or in what new difficulties shall we be engaged, should the inestimable dominions of Hanover be subjected to the imperial interdiction.

These, my lords, are questions to which, I hope, we shall hear a more satisfactory answer than I am able to conceive; for, indeed, I do not see what remains, but to confess, that these troops are hired only for a military show, to amuse this nation with a false appearance of zeal for the preservation of Europe, and to increase the treasures of Hanover at the expense of Britain.

These are designs, my lords, which no man will avow, and yet these are the only designs which I can yet discover; and, therefore, I shall oppose all the measures that tend to their execution. If the heat of indignation, or the asperity of resentment, or the wantonness of contempt, have betrayed me into any expressions unworthy of the dignity of this house, I hope they will be forgiven by your lordships; for any other degree of freedom I shall make no apology, having, as a peer, a right to deliver my opinion, and as a Briton, to assert the independence of my native country, when I see, or imagine myself to see, that it is ignominiously and illegally subjected to the promotion of the petty interest of the province of Hanover.

Lord CARTERET then rose, and made answer to the following effect:--My lords, as I doubt not but I shall be able to justify the measures which are now pursued, in such a manner as may entitle them to the approbation of your lordships, I proposed to hear all the objections that should be made, before I attempted a vindication, that the debate might be shortened, and that the arguments on both sides might be considered as placed in the full strength of opposition; and that it might be discerned how objections, however specious in themselves, would vanish before the light of reason and truth.

But the noble lord has made it necessary for me to alter my design, by a speech which I will not applaud, because it has, in my opinion, an ill tendency; nor censure, because it wanted neither the splendour of eloquence, nor the arts of reasoning; and had no other defect than that which must always be produced by a bad cause, fallacy in the arguments, and errours in the assertions.

This speech I am obliged to answer, because his lordship has been pleased to call out for any lord who will assert, that the Dutch have agreed to concur with us in assisting the queen of Hungary. That all the provinces of that republick have agreed to assist us, is indeed not true; nor do I know, my lords, by whom or upon what authority it was asserted; but the concurrence of the province of Holland, the most important of all, and whose example the rest seldom delay to follow, has been obtained, which is sufficient to encourage us to vigorous resolutions, by which the rest may be animated to a speedy compliance.

The concurrence of this province has been already the consequence of the measures which have been lately pursued; measures from which, though just and successful, the ministry cannot claim much applause; because all choice was denied, and they were obliged either to remain passive spectators of the ruin of Europe, and, by consequence, of Britain, or to do what they have done. And surely, my lords, that necessity which deprives them of all claim to panegyrick, will be, likewise, a sufficient security from censure. There is, indeed, no reason to fear censure from judges so candid and experienced as your lordships, to whom it may without difficulty be proved, that the balance of Europe has already changed its position, and the house of Bourbon is now not able to preponderate against the other powers.

By entering into an alliance with Sardinia, we have taken from the crown of Spain all the weight of the territories of Italy, of which the Austrian forces are now in possession, without fear or danger of being interrupted; while the passes of the ocean are shut by the fleets of Britain, and those of the mountains by the troops of Sardinia.

Those unhappy forces which were transported by the Spanish fleet, are not only lost to their native country, but exposed without provision, without ammunition, without retreat, and without hope: nor can any human prospect discover how they can escape destruction, either by the fatigue of marches, or the want of necessaries, or the superiour force of an army well supplied and elated with success.

This, my lords, is an embarrassment from which the Spaniards would gladly be freed at any expense, from which they would bribe us to relieve them, by permitting the demolition of new fortresses, or restoring the army which we lost at Carthagena.

Of this alliance the queen of Hungary already finds the advantage, as it preserves countries in her possession, which, if once lost, it might be impossible to recover; and sets her free from the necessity of dividing her army for the protection of distant territories.

Thus, my lords, the Spaniards are obstructed and distrusted; of their armies, one is condemned to waste away at the feet of impassable mountains, only to hear of the destruction of their countrymen whom they are endeavouring to relieve, and the establishment of peace in these regions of which they had projected the conquest; and the other, yet more unfortunate, has been successfully transported, only to see that fleet which permitted their passage preclude their supplies, and hinder their retreat.

Nor do we, my lords, after having thus efficaciously opposed one of the princes of the house of Bourbon, fear or shun the resentment of the other; we doubt not to show, that Britain is still able to retard the arms of the haughty French, and to drive them back from the invasion of other kingdoms to the defence of their own. The time is at hand, my lords, in which it will appear, that however the power of France has been exaggerated, with whatever servility her protection has been courted, and with whatever meanness her insolence has been borne, this nation has not yet lost its influence or its strength, that it is yet able to fill the continent with armies, to afford protection to its allies, and strike terrour into those who have hitherto trampled under foot the faith of treaties and rights of sovereigns, and ranged over the dominions of the neighbouring princes, with the security of lawful possessors, and the pride of conquerors.

It has been objected by the noble lord, that this change is not to be expected from an army composed of auxiliary troops from any of the provinces of the German empire, because they cannot act against the general head. I can easily, my lords, solve this difficulty, from my long acquaintance with the constitution of the empire, which I understood before the noble lord, who has entertained you with a discourse upon it, was in being; but I will not engross your time, or retard your determination by a superfluous disquisition, which may be now safely omitted; since I am allowed by his majesty to assure your lordships, that the Hessian and Hanoverian troops shall be employed in assisting the queen of Hungary, and that they have already received orders to make the preparations necessary for marching into the empire.

After this declaration, my lords, the most formidable objection against the present measures will, I hope, be no more heard in this debate; for it will be by no means proper for any lord to renew it by inquiring, whether his majesty's resolution is not a breach of the imperial constitution, or whether it will not expose his electoral dominions to danger. For it is not our province to judge of the laws of other nations, to examine when they are violated, or to enforce the observation of them; nor is it necessary, since the interests of Britain and Hanover are irreconcilably opposite, to endeavour the preservation of dominions which their own sovereign is inclined to hazard.