Part 3

This suggestion the Apostle obviates, by shewing the inconsequence of it. His answer is to this effect. You, says he, conclude, that the Heathens are not accountable, because they have no Law. But it no way follows, because they had no Law extraordinarily revealed to them from Heaven, that therefore the Heathens had no Law, or Rule of life, at all. For these, _having no_ such _Law_, were a _Law unto themselves_; that is, their natural reason and understanding was their Law.

And, for the real existence of such natural Law, he appeals to the virtuous ACTIONS of some Heathens, _who_ DO _by nature the things contained in the Law_; who, besides, as it follows in the next verse, _shew the work of the Law written in their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts in the mean while accusing or else excusing one another_. In which last words are contained two additional arguments in proof of the same point; the _first_, taken from their own CONSCIOUSNESS of such a Law; and the _second, from their reasonings between one another_, ACCUSING _or else_ EXCUSING: for this is the strict sense and literal construction of those words in the original, which we improperly translate—_their thoughts in the mean while accusing or else excusing one another_[13].

So that in the verses of the Text we have a PROPOSITION asserted; and THREE distinct arguments brought in proof of it. The proposition is, _that the Heathen are a Law unto themselves_, or, as it is otherwise expressed, _have a Law written in their hearts_. The arguments in proof of it are, 1. The virtuous lives of some heathen, _doing by nature the work of the Law_: 2. The force of _conscience_, testifying their knowledge of such Law: and, 3. lastly, their _private and judicial reasonings_ among themselves, referring to the confessed authority of it.

In conformity to this method of the Apostle, my business will be to open and explain the several arguments in the order, in which they lie; and to confirm, by that means, the truth of his general Proposition, _That there is a natural Law, or Rule of moral action, written in the hearts of men_.

I. The argument from the virtues of the heathen world, in proof of a Law of nature, _written in the hearts of men_, will seem strange to some, who may object, “That, if the appeal be to _action_, it may with greater reason be inferred, there was not any such law; since the crimes and vices of the heathen world, as terribly set forth by St. Paul himself in the preceding chapter, were far more notorious, than its Virtues. So that if there be any force in St. Paul’s appeal to the virtuous lives of some heathen, as evincing a Law, _written in their hearts_, because their practice was governed by it; the like appeal to the vicious lives of many more heathen, should seem with still more force to prove the non-existence of such Law, in as much as it did _not_ govern their practice.” But the answer is obvious. For a law may be in part, or even totally, violated by persons under a full conviction of its existence and obligation: whereas it is hard to imagine, that any number of men, of different times, in distant places, and under different circumstances of age, temper, and education, should exhibit in their lives the same tenour of action, without the guidance of some fixed and common Rule.

This then being observed, let us turn our eyes upon the heathen world; on that part, more especially, which is best known to us from the authentic monuments of Greek and Roman story. For _bad_ as that world was, it cannot be denied to have furnished many instances of extraordinary virtue. We find there _justice_, _temperance_, _fortitude_, and all those virtues, which their own Moralists called _Offices_, and which the sacred page has dignified with the name of _Graces_, exhibited in their fairest forms, and emulating, as it were, even Christian perfection[14].

But it will be said of _both_ these people, what was long since objected by one of them to the other, that their actions were not so illustrious, as is pretended; that we take the accounts of them from their own interested relaters, to whose vanity or genius we are rather to impute the fine portraits, they have given us, of pagan virtue, than to real fact and the undisguised truth of things[15].

Be this allowed. Still there will be ground enough to enforce the Apostle’s conclusion. For whence, if not from the source to which he points, could be derived those numerous corresponding instances, though of faint, unfinished Virtue? how, but by _nature, did the heathen_, in any degree, _the things of the Law_? and whence, the traces of that conduct in the pagan world, which the Law itself prescribed as _virtuous_?

Or, were the evidence from _facts_ ever so suspicious, whence those admired portraits and pictures themselves? or, by what accountable means has it come to pass, that their historians and panegyrists have been able to feign so successfully? In truth, had the pagan world afforded no _one_ instance of a virtuous people, I had almost said, no _one_ instance of a virtuous character, yet would the projected form of such a people, by one hand[16], and the delineation of such a character, by another[17], have been a certain evidence of some Rule of life and manners, _written in the heart_, if not transcribed into practice; influencing the judgement to approve, if not the will to obey it. But this consideration, perhaps, comes more naturally under the second head of the Apostle’s reasoning, which is drawn,

II. _From the force of conscience in the heathen world._

To perceive the force of this argument, it must be remembered, That, by conscience, is only meant _a man’s judgement concerning the quality of his own actions_; which judgement, however come at, whether by use, or institution, by reason, or instinct, equally supposes some _Law_, or Rule of conduct, by which the nature of each action is tried, and by which its worth is estimated. Now it is of no moment in the present case, from which soever of these sources that judgement is _immediately_ drawn, since it cannot but be, that some fixed principle, common to human nature, and of equal extent with it, must have originally given birth to such judgement. For if _use_, or _institution_, be considered as the probable source of it, the question will recur, whence that Use, or what the original of that Institution? A question, which cannot be resolved, unless we conceive some _natural law_, as working at the root, and branching out, as it were, into _Use_, or _Institution_.

Nor is it sufficient to say, _That the manners of different people are, and have been, widely different; and that conscience, or self-judgement, according as different notions or practices prevail, condemns, or approves the very same action_. Without doubt, it does; but the consequence is not, as some sceptical writers have imagined, that there is no common principle of nature, distinguishing between right and wrong, or that moral action is of absolute indifference; but that men are, and have been, careless and corrupt; that they have either not used the light of nature, or have some way abused it. For it holds of _Sentiment_, as of _Action_, that, though the agreement of numbers in all times and places be a good argument _for_ the existence of some common rule of right, as effecting such agreement (because otherwise no tolerable account can be given of it); yet the disagreement even of greater numbers is no proof _against_ the existence of such Rule, as we can, without that supposition, give a satisfactory account _of_ that disagreement. I call it _a satisfactory account_; for it comes from St. Paul himself, who has taken care to obviate this plausible objection. If it be said then, _That the Heathen approved bad, and condemned good actions_, we own they sometimes did, but answer with the Apostle, That, in such cases, _they became vain in their imaginations_, and that _their foolish heart was darkened_; that, as they _did not search to retain God in their knowledge_, did not exert their faculties to acquire or preserve a right sense of God’s nature and will, _he gave them up to an unsearching mind_, suffered them to darken and put out the light of their understandings, and so to _do_ [and to _approve_] _things that were not convenient_[18].

This being the true account of the diversity of human judgement, such diversity only proves that the light of nature has been misused, not, that it was never given. Whereas, on the other hand, if the Heathen world can shew us, in general, a conformity of judgement in moral matters, under their state of nature, with that of the world, under the light of Revelation, what follows, but that they, _having not the Law, shew the work of the Law written in their hearts_?

But now that there was, in fact, such a conformity, we conclude from _the accounts of these times, the sense of writers, and the confessions of persons themselves_: the only means, by which a point of this nature can be established. The pagan historians and moralists are full of such lessons, as we now profit by: and even their poets, on the stage itself (where _common_ nature is drawn for the sake of _common_ instruction) represent their characters, for the most part, as _good_ or _bad_, according to the ideas we should now entertain of them. In writers of all sorts, we find abundant evidence of this truth. Numberless persons are upon record, who confess, in their own cases, and attest, this uniform power of conscience. They applaud themselves for, what _we_ should call, _a well-spent life_, and they condemn themselves for, what _we_ call, _a bad one_. To touch on a topic so known as this, is, in effect, to exhaust it. I shall then but just point to the great _Roman patriot_[19] exulting in the memory of his _Virtues_: and to the _Roman governour_[20], so famous in sacred writ, whom the preaching of Paul, in concurrence with his own heart, made tremble for his _Vices_.

III. But if men did not feel the power of conscience operating within themselves, and declaring _a Law written in their hearts_, yet their daily conduct towards each other, in the civil concerns of life, would evidently proclaim it. For observe how studious men are to repel an injurious imputation, fastened on a friend; and still more, how they labour to assert their own innocence. What pains do we see taken, to overthrow a _false_ evidence, and what colours of art do we see employed to palliate or disguise a _true_ one! No man needs be told that this is the constant practice of Christians: and _did not the Heathens the same_? Here then is a fresh proof of the point in question; an argument of familiar evidence arising from the transactions of common life. For, in the altercations with each other, in reference to _right_ and _wrong_, there is manifestly supposed some prior Law of universal reason, to which the appeal on both sides is directed, and by which the decision is finally to be made. And this, as the Apostle’s argument suggests, whichever of the contending parties be in the _wrong_: For the charging another with _wrong_ conduct, equally implies a Rule, determining my judgement of moral action; as the defending myself or others from such a charge, evinces my sense of it. Thus, whether I _accuse_, or _answer for myself_, either way, I shew _a law written in my heart_; whence I estimate the _right_ or _wrong_ of the supposed question. Thus much might be inferred from the ordinary topics of _conversation_: but the case is still clearer, when they come to be debated _in courts of Justice_. More especially, therefore, the struggles and contentions of the _Bar_ (for the terms, employed in the text, being _forensic_, direct us chiefly to that interpretation), a series of civil and judiciary pleadings, such as have been preserved to us, from heathen times, in the writings of a Demosthenes, or Cicero, are a standing, unanswerable argument for the existence of a _Rule of Right_, or _Law of natural reason_. For how should these debates be carried on without a Rule, to which the advocates of either party refer? or how should these judicial differences be composed, without a common Law, to arbitrate between them? And what though the Law, referred to, be a _written institute_: it was first _written in the heart_, before legislators transcribed it on brass, or paper.

You see then, the sum of the Apostle’s reasoning stands thus. The Heathens, who had no revealed Law, DID _by nature, the things of the Law_: their JUDGEMENT, too, of their own actions, conformed to the judgement of _the Law_: and, lastly, their DEBATES with one another, whether public or private, concerning _right_ and _wrong_, evidenced their sense of some Law, which _Nature_ had prescribed to them.

And in this fine chain of argument, we may observe the peculiar art, by which it is conducted, and the advantage, resulting from such conduct to the main conclusion. For if the argument from WORKS should seem of less weight (as it possibly might, after the Apostle’s own charge upon the heathen world, and in that age of heathen corruption) yet the evidence arising from CONSCIENCE, which was an appeal to every man’s own breast, could hardly be resisted: or, if conscience could be laid asleep (as it might be by vice and ill habits) it was impossible they could deny the DEBATES among themselves, or not see the inference that must needs be drawn from them.

It may, further, seem to have been with some propriety that the sacred reasoner employed these topics of argument, in an address to ROMANS: who could not but feel the weight of them the more, as well knowing the ancient VIRTUE of their country; as knowing too, that the Roman people had been famous for their nice sense of right and wrong, or, in other words, a moral CONSCIENCE; and that, as having been a free people, they had been always accustomed to DEBATES about moral action, public and private.

Such is the force, and such the elegant disposition and address, of the Apostle’s reasoning. The conclusion follows irresistibly, _That there is a Law written in our hearts, or that, besides a Revealed Law, there is a law of natural reason_.

That this conclusion is not injurious to _revealed Law_, but indeed most friendly and propitious to it; that, in particular, it no way derogates from the honour of the _Christian Law_, nor can serve in any degree to lessen the value, or supersede the use and necessity of it; I shall attempt to shew in another discourse.

SERMON IV.

PREACHED MAY 24, 1767.

GAL. iii. 19.

_Wherefore then serveth the Law?_

When the Apostle Paul had proved, in his Epistle to the Romans[21], that if the _uncircumcision kept the righteousness of the Law, his uncircumcision would be accounted for circumcision_; that is, if the Gentile observed the _moral law_, which was his proper rule of life, he would be accepted of God, as well as the Jew, who observed the _Mosaic Law_; this generous reasoning gave offence, and he was presently asked, WHAT ADVANTAGE THEN HATH THE JEW[22]?

In like manner, when the same Apostle had been contending, in his Epistle to the Galatians, that _the inheritance was not of the Law, but of Promise_[23]; that is, that all men, the Gentiles as well as the Jews, were entitled to the blessings of the Christian covenant, in virtue of God’s _promise_ to Abraham—_that in his seed all the nations of the earth shall be blessed_—and not the Jews exclusively, in virtue of the _Mosaic Law_, given to them only; the same spirit discovers itself, as before, and he is again interrogated by his captious disciples, WHEREFORE THEN SERVETH THE LAW? if the Gentiles may be justified _through faith in Christ_, and so inherit the promise made to Abraham, as well as the Jews, to what purpose was the Jewish Law then given?

And to these questions, how unreasonable soever, the learned Apostle has himself condescended to give an answer.

Now, the same perverseness, which gave birth to these Jewish prejudices, seems to have operated in some Christians; who, on being told, and even by St. Paul himself, of _a Law of Nature_, by which the Heathen were required to govern their lives, and by the observance of which, without their knowledge of any revealed Law, they would be finally accepted, have been forward in their turn, to ask, WHEREFORE THEN SERVETH THE LAW? Or, if there be a _natural Law_, according to which the very Heathen will be judged, and may be rewarded, what are the boasted privileges of _Revealed Law_, and, in particular, the revealed Law _of the Gospel_?

Now to this question (having, in my last discourse, asserted the proposition, which gives occasion to it) I shall reply, in the best manner I can, by shewing,

I. That the supposition of a _natural moral Law_ is even necessary to the support of REVELATION: And

II. That this supposition no way derogates from the honour of the GOSPEL.

I. _That a natural moral Law is required to support the authority of Revelation_, I conclude, not merely, _because_ this supposition is actually made in sacred Scripture, _because_ the sacred writers argue expressly from it, and every-where refer to it, but principally and chiefly, _because_, without admitting this prior Law of nature, we cannot judge of any pretended Revelation, whether it be divine or no. For, if there be no such moral Law, previously given, which our hearts and consciences approve, and to which our common nature assents, we can never see the fitness of any means, as conducive to _a moral end_; we can entertain no just and clear notions of _moral action_, properly so called; and consequently, we can have no ideas of what are called _the moral attributes_ of God. Now, in this state of ignorance and uncertainty, how shall any man go about to prove to us the divinity of any Revelation, or through what medium can its truth or authenticity be established? We have no Rule, no principles, by which to judge of the Law, pretending to come from God: we cannot tell, whether it be worthy of him, or not: we do not so much as know, what _worth_ or _goodness_ is, either in ourselves, or in the Deity. Thus all _internal arguments_ for the excellence of any Religion are at once cut off: and yet till, from such considerations, we find that a Religion _may_ come from God, we cannot reasonably conclude, on any evidence, that it _does_ come from him. The Religion of Mahomet may, for any thing we can tell, if there be no moral Law for us to judge by, be as worthy of God, as that of Jesus. Nor will any _external arguments_, even the most unquestioned miracles, of themselves, be sufficient to confirm its pretensions. For how shall we know, that these miracles are from God, unless we understand what his attributes are, and whether the occasion, for which they are wrought, be such as is consistent with them?

So that those zealous persons, who think they do honour to the revealed will of God, by denying him to have given prior natural Law, do, indeed, defeat their own purpose, and put it out of their power to judge of any Revelation whatsoever. There is, then, a Law of Reason, _written in the heart_, by which _every_ Religion, claiming to be divine, must be tried; or we have no ground to stand upon in our endeavours to support the credit and divinity of _any_ Religion.

What is, then, so necessary to the support of _Revelation_, in general, cannot, we may be sure,

II. _Any way derogate from the honour of the Christian Revelation_, in particular.

But, to put this matter out of all doubt, I shall distinctly shew, that the supposition of a _natural moral Law_ neither discredits the USE; nor tends, in the least, to supersede the NECESSITY, of the Gospel.

And, 1. IT DOES NOT DISCREDIT ITS USE.

For, what, if all men be endowed with those faculties, which, if properly employed, may instruct us in the knowledge of God and ourselves, and of the duties we, respectively, owe to him and to each other? Is it nothing that this knowledge is rendered more easy and familiar to us by the lights of the Gospel? Is it nothing, that those laws, which men of thought and reflexion may deduce for themselves from principles of natural reason, are openly declared to all: that they are confirmed, illustrated, and enforced by express revelation? Is it of no moment, that the plainest and busiest men are as fully instructed in their duty, as men of science and leisure, the simplest as well as the wisest, the mechanic and the sage, the rustic and philosopher? Is it of no use, that men are kept steady in their knowledge and observance of the law of nature, by this pole-star of revelation? that they are secured from error and mistake, from the effects of their own haste, or negligence, or infirmity, from the illusions of custom or ill example, from the false lights of fanaticism or superstition, and from the perverseness of their own reasonings? Look into the history of mankind, and see what horrid idolatries have overspread the world, in spite of what _Nature_ teaches concerning God; and what portentous immoralities have prevailed in the wisest nations, in defiance, nay, _what is worse_, under the countenance and sanction, of what was deemed _natural Reason_.

Add to all this, that the moral duties, we thus easily and certainly know, and without any danger of mistake or corruption, by means of the evangelical Law, are enjoined by the highest authority; are set off by the brightest examples; are recommended to us by new arguments and considerations; are pressed upon us by the most engaging motives, higher and more important than nature could suggest to us; and, lastly, are sublimed and perfected by the most consummate reason.

Still we are not got to the end of our account. Consider, further, our natural weakness, strengthened and assisted by the influences of divine Grace; the doubts and misgivings of Nature, in the momentous points of repentance and forgiveness of sin, cleared; the true end and destination of moral agents, discovered; a future judgement, ascertained; and the hopes of endless unspeakable glory, which nature could at most but desire, and had no reason (unless that desire be, itself, a reason) to expect, unveiled and fully confirmed to us.

This, and still more, is but a faint sketch of the advantages, which, even in point of morals, we derive from revealed Law. Go now, then, and say, that the light of nature, set up in your own hearts, obscures the glory, or _discredits the use_, of the everlasting Gospel!

2. But it is a low, degrading, and unjust idea of the _Gospel_, to regard it only, as a new code of morals, though more complete in itself, more solemnly enacted, and more efficaciously enforced, than the prior one of _nature_. Were the _use_ of each the same, the honour of the Christian revelation would not be impaired, because its NECESSITY IS NOT SUPERSEDED.

For Christianity, rightly understood, is something, vastly above what Reason could discover or procure for us. It confirms, incidentally, the law of nature, and appeals to it; it harmonizes, throughout, with that and every other prior revelation of God’s will as it could not but do, if it were indeed derived from the same eternal source of light and truth. But, for all that, it is no more a simple _re-publication_ of the natural, than of any other divine Law. It is a new and distinct revelation, that perfects and completes all the rest. It is the consummation of one great providential scheme, planned before the ages, and fully executed in due time, for the redemption of mankind from sin and death, through the mercies of God in Christ Jesus.