The works of Richard Hurd, volume 6 (of 8)
Part 11
1. The FORMER of these defects we may observe in those persons who, from a too warm and enthusiastic turn of thought, are for subliming all piety into the trances of mystic contemplation; as if _morality_ and _faith_ scarce deserved their notice; and the _beatific vision_ were as well the _object_, as _end_ of the Christian life. Here the fault lies in an impatience to come at the _point_ we propose to ourselves, without observing the proper _methods_ which are to put us in possession of it; and is much the same phrenzy as we should charge on those _travellers_, who, being on their way towards a distant country, stop short in the contemplation of all the wonders they have heard reported of it, without pursuing their journey, or indeed without taking one step towards it.
2. The OTHER defect of wisdom is seen in those less sanguine, and, in truth, lukewarm Christians, who do not, indeed, altogether neglect the subservient duties of their profession, but, as not enough considering the _prize of their high calling_, grow remiss in the exercise of them: in which they too much resemble those _same travellers_; who, when taking the ordinary means of arriving at their journey’s end, fall into an idle way of loitering on the road, and use not that dispatch and diligence in their stages, which an earnest consideration of the _end_, they have in view, should naturally inspire.
II. But this duty of Christian wisdom is further violated, when, with a full respect to our final _hopes and expectations_, and a general intention to pursue them by the _means_ appointed in holy Scripture, we do not, however, observe the _due bounds and measures_ of each; that is, when, of the _two_ appointed means of salvation, _a pure faith_, and _right practice_, we chose to ourselves a favourite, and incline too much to _one_, at the expence of the _other_. For,
1. With regard to the distinct provinces of FAITH and MORALITY, we know there are those, who, provided they are but sound and orthodox in their opinions, that they give an entire assent to the several articles of their creed, and submit their faith to the entire direction of Scripture, or perhaps of the church with which they communicate, suppose the affair of _moral practice_ of much less importance; and conclude their devotion for this acceptable sacrifice of _a right faith_ will excuse their making somewhat too free with the article of _obedience_. Such persons there have been and still are in all churches; but we know _what_ sect of Christians is most deeply infected with this error.
2. On the contrary, they who have shaken off this bondage of superstition, and have observed the mischiefs which arise in abundance from this exclusive attachment to creeds and confessions, are very apt to run into the other extreme; and, because they find _morality_ to be of eternal obligation, make the less account of _faith_ and right opinion. As the former excess is the peculiar disgrace of _Popery_, this other has frequently been objected to _Protestantism_. _Both_ are manifest violations of _Christian wisdom_; which, besides that it commands an equal reverence for the two tables of the divine law, should further instruct us, _that as faith without works is vain_, so _good works_ themselves, unassisted and unsanctified by _faith_, are either not so perfect, or not so acceptable from us Christians, as otherwise they might be. Not to observe, that as the articles of our holy faith may be founded on _reasons_, which we do not know; so the belief or rejection of them may have _consequences_, which we cannot foresee.
III. And with this preparation, let us now descend to still more particular reflexions on the duty which lies upon us to approve our _wisdom_ in the _public profession_ of that faith, and the _manifestation_ of that practice. _Christian wisdom_ requires an attentive regard to the main _end_ we have in view, and to the _methods_ by which we are instructed to obtain it. But still there is great room for discretion to shew itself in the _management and pursuit_ of those methods. One _manner_ of doing the good, we are appointed to do, will be preferable to another. And it is a great part of Christian prudence to be ready and expert in discovering and acting upon that _preference_. This indeed is a large field; nor is it possible to enumerate all the cases which fall within this province of true wisdom. But to prescribe to _ourselves_ some plan, however defective, we may consider, that, if a constant regard be had to _ourselves_, to our _own character and circumstances_, our virtues will then be most GRACEFUL; if to the exigencies of the _times_ and _places_ in which we live, most SEASONABLE; and, lastly, if to the _persons_, _conditions_, and _characters_ of other men, they will thus become most ATTRACTIVE and EFFICACIOUS.
1. It was a point the masters of ancient wisdom took a singular pleasure to inculcate, and we find an equal stress laid upon it by the sacred writers, that a strict _decorum_ be observed in the exercise of our virtues; or, in other words, that the _good_ we do be that which is _fit_ and _decent_, considering our _circumstances and characters_. Thus we find one set of duties more especially recommended to the _young_, another to the _aged_; some to _private_ persons, others to such as are in _place and authority_. Different _professions_ in life have also different sets of offices belonging to them; or in such as are _common_ to all, propriety demands, that they be evidenced in very different _manners_. The virtues we expect in the _poor man_, are humility, industry, and resignation. These too are virtues, from the obligation of which no _rich man_ is exempted; but it would be strangely _misbecoming_, if _he_ did not surpass the _other_ in acts of charity and beneficence. And in respect of the same _common_ virtue, suppose _charity_, what the _one_ would very commendably discharge by little acts of service and assiduity towards his distressed neighbour, might require a very considerable expence of wealth or labour in the _other_. Nay, the several humours and dispositions of men will occasion a difference, if not in the _matter_ of their duty, yet in the _way_ in which it will become them to express it. An eminent moralist, indeed, carried this point of _decorum_ very far when he would justify so bad an action, as _suicide_, and which he owns he should have condemned in any other, from the singular turn of Cato’s temper and virtue[120]. But thus much may be said with great truth: that an action, good in itself, may come with a better grace from one man than another. A lesson of good advice, for instance, might be requisite from the liveliest man to his friend; but it would have additional weight and propriety from one of a graver disposition: and certainly what the _former_ could only hint with address, the _latter_ might be allowed to enforce with much earnestness and authority.
In short, if we study _ourselves_, and reflect what our _station_, _character_, or _nature_ is, we shall best discern what the virtues are, and in what manner to be expressed, which sit most properly and _gracefully_ upon us. And to give a diligent attention to these is no mean part of _moral wisdom_. But,
2. We must look beyond ourselves; we must consider what the condition of the _times_, what the state of the _places_ in which we live, may require of us. I do not mean that religion is a matter of _policy_; or that virtue is a mere _local_ consideration. But when the question is, how we may do the _most_ good by our religious or moral conduct, a prudent accommodation of ourselves to time and place will be very necessary[121]. The primitive Christians were not _wise unto that which is good_, when they provoked the cruelty of their enemies, and offered themselves without cause to the racks and fires of persecution. Nor would _they_ be less blameable, who, in a careless, prophane age, when _silence_ would be readily taken for _assent_: when, not to profess the faith would be construed to renounce it, should, from a too scrupulous fear of giving offence, forbear to make an open confession of their religion. The exigencies of _times_, we see, are very different. A wise man would have endeavoured to moderate the excessive zeal, which prevailed in the _former_ of these periods: he would apply himself to raise and quicken it, were he to find himself in the circumstances described in the _latter_. Or, to explain myself by a case which may still more nearly affect us. There was a _time_, when the religion of our country consisted too much in a zeal for unintelligible articles and superstitious ceremonies; when Popery had enslaved both mind and body, had bent the _one_ to an implicit acquiescence in the doctrines of the Church, and burthened the _other_ with a constant unprofitable exercise of its worship. How then was the _wisdom_ of a good man to express itself in these circumstances? In dispelling, it will surely be said, the gloom of superstition; in asserting the great privileges of natural reason, and in pressing the obligation and necessity of a good life, as of more worth than all ceremonial observances.
This _was_ the service rendered by the best men of those days to true Religion; and _we_ have reason to bless and revere their memories for it. But should the liberty into which we are called, degenerate into licentiousness; should it ever be common for men, in the fear of _believing_ too much, not to believe what the Scriptures themselves plainly require of them; and from the apprehension of relapsing into their old superstitious practices, to give little or no regard to the duties of external worship: should this at any time be the case, those truly wise men, who laboured so profitably to check the _other_ extreme, would certainly, in this different state of things, apply themselves with equal earnestness to correct _this_. Not that their former practice was not good in itself, but that, by a change in the disposition of the times, it was now become less _seasonable_.
3. We are, lastly, to have a regard to the _conditions_, _characters_, and _persons_ of those with whom we converse; this attention being especially requisite to render our virtues _attractive and efficacious_.
The philosopher that took upon him to discourse on the science of war, did not enough consider his own _character_. If he chose to do this in an age which wanted no such instructions, his conduct was certainly _unseasonable_. But when he presumed to instruct the greatest general and commander in the world, he deserved the censure which has disgraced him with all posterity[122]. A decorum like this is required in our attempts to promote truth and virtue. To dictate in such matters to persons wiser than ourselves, or to persons, who by their stations and characters should, in all reason, be supposed wiser, is a manifest indiscretion, and can never be attended with any good consequences. Were _we_ ever so able to instruct, or were _they_ ever so much in want of instruction, _prudence_ would suggest a very different conduct. It would recommend to us all the honest arts of insinuation and address; it would oblige us to watch the fittest seasons and opportunities; or, perhaps, to content ourselves with the silent admonition of a good example. Or, were there nothing in the _rank and condition_ of those we would work upon, to restrain us to this caution, we might even be required to shew a condescension to their very _prejudices and humours_. The errors of men may sometimes be removed by arguing with them on their own mistaken principles; by allowing all that truth and reason will warrant to their opinions; by putting the fairest construction upon their designs; by hinting objections to their wrong tenets, instead of fiercely declaiming against them; above all, by testifying a sincere disposition to advance truth and goodness, without any indirect views to our own interest. Or, were all other considerations out of the case, we could never be excused from proceeding in the way of gentleness and civility, from treating them with due respect, and expressing the sincerest good-will to their _persons_. Be their _moral_ or _religious_ defects what they will, we should hardly be _wise_; that is, we should take very improper methods of reclaiming them from _either_, if we reproved with bitterness, advised with insolence, or condemned with passion. In all addresses to mistaken or bad men, where our purpose is to inform or amend them, the gentlest _applications_ are surely the best, because _these_ excite no passion to counteract their _virtue_.
And now, at length, should it be asked who is that WISE CHRISTIAN whom the text designs and recommends to our imitation, we are able to furnish, at least, the outline of his character.
“HE is one who sets before him the great END and prize of his _high calling_; who, in his progress through the various stages of _this_ life, keeps in constant view the immortal happiness which his religion holds out in prospect to him in _another_: who, in humble adoration of his God and Saviour, is content to wait the appointed season which is to crown his hopes and expectations; and, for the present, is sollicitous to _work out his salvation with fear_ and reverence, by an earnest application of his time and pains to those _subservient duties_, which are to qualify him for the enjoyment of Heaven; who subjects all the towering conceits of his _understanding_, to the _doctrines_ of the Gospel, and the impetuous sallies of his _will_, to the _precepts_ of it; who makes no audacious separation of what the wisdom of God hath joined together; but, whilst he adores the mysteries of his holy FAITH, walks on in the plain and humble path of moral OBEDIENCE. He is _one_, who thinks it not enough to rest in the mere MATTER of his duty, but performs it in such a MANNER as will render it most exemplary and efficacious. He knows it to be a great precept of his religion, to see, _that his good be not evil spoken of_. He would not disgrace the _best_ cause in the world by the neglect of those decencies, which, as he observes, have sometimes the strange power to recommend the _worst_. The good he intends, therefore, is attempted in such a way, as is most BECOMING of himself; most SEASONABLE in respect of the opportunities which are offered to him; and most agreeable and PERSUASIVE to other men. In short, HE is one who, taking _Prudence_ for his guide, and _Innocence_ for his companion, thinks himself secure in these attendants; and therefore neglects no _decorum_, which the best philosophy prescribes; no _art_, which the soundest policy suggests; and no _address_, which the politest manners recommend: and so, in the high emphatic sense of the words, approves himself a WISE MAN; _wise unto that which is good_, to all purposes in _this_ world, as well as in a _better_.”
SERMON XVI.
PREACHED DECEMBER 1, 1765.
ROM. xvi. 19.
_I would have you wise unto that which is good, and simple concerning evil._
In considering the first part of this precept, I endeavoured to give some general description of Religious or CHRISTIAN WISDOM; both in respect of the END it has in view, and of the MEANS employed by it: I further exemplified some of those subordinate WAYS, in which the prudent application even of those _means_ is seen and expressed: And all this, for the sake of those sincere, but over-zealous persons, who are apt to think that _wisdom_ hath little to do in the prosecution of honest and upright purposes.
It now remains to treat that other part of the text, which requires us to be INNOCENT, as well as _wise_, to be SIMPLE CONCERNING EVIL. And this, perhaps, will be thought the more important branch of the subject. For, generally speaking, the ways of _wisdom_, when our purposes are the very best, are not only the most effectual, but the safest and most convenient. So that _prudence_ is likely to be a favourite virtue with us. But the case is different with regard to _simplicity concerning evil_; which is often found a hard and disagreeable injunction; as it may happen to cross our passions and the more immediate views of self-interest. So that this SIMPLICITY will sometimes seem, what the world is ready enough to call it, _folly_: and therefore, for the credit of our _sense_, as well as virtue, we should be well apprized of the worth and excellence of this Christian duty.
The virtue of SIMPLICITY consists, in general, in following the plain ingenuous sense of the mind; in taking our measures according to the dictates of conscience, and acting, on all occasions, without reserve, duplicity, or self-imposture, up to our notions of obligation. It is the office of WISDOM to see that our conscience be rightly informed: But our INTEGRITY is shewn in doing that which conscience, be it erroneously informed or no, requires of us. It consists, in a word, in whatever we understand by an _honesty of nature_; in observing, universally, that which we believe to be _right_, and avoiding what we know, or but suspect[123] to be _wrong_.
This _simplicity of mind_ may be almost said to be born with us. It is the bias of nature on our young minds; and our earliest instructions, as well as the first efforts of reason, strengthen and confirm it. But the impression lasts not long. We are scarcely entered into life, when we begin to treat it as one of _those childish things_, which it is beneath the dignity of our riper age to be amused with. The passions put forth and grow luxuriant; and why, we say to ourselves, should this tender apprehension of evil check their growth, and restrain their activity? We are now in the season of _pleasure_; and can there be any hurt in taking a little of it, out of that narrow path, which our early prejudices have prescribed to us?
Still, as we advance in years, fresh objects arise, and other passions engage us in the pursuit of them. Wealth and honour, or what we improperly call our _interests_, have now an ascendant over us; and the passion for each is rarely gratified but at the expence of some virtue. And thus it comes to pass, that, though we set out in the world with a warm sense of truth and honour, experience by degrees refines us out of these principles; and our hearts, instead of retaining that _infant_ purity, the grace and ornament of our nature, and which Christ so especially requires[124] in the professors of his religion, are all over stained with fraud, dissimulation, and disingenuity. We are even proud of the acquisition, and call it a _knowledge of life_: so dextrous are we in giving a good name to our worst qualities!
But effects follow their causes; and the vice we are now considering is not the less operative, nor the less hurtful, for the specious terms in which we dress it up, and present it to each other.
Of its malignity I shall give two or three instances; and, to fit them the better for use, they shall be taken from very different quarters; from the _cabinets of the wise, and the schools of the learned_, as well as from the _vulgar haunts of careless and licentious men_. We shall learn, perhaps, to reverence the Apostle’s advice, when we find that the neglect of it has DEGRADED RELIGION; RELAXED MORALITY, and POLLUTED COMMON LIFE.
To begin with an instance which shews how dangerous it is to depart from this _simplicity concerning evil_, in the great concerns of RELIGION.
I. When the priest, the sage, and the politician joined together in the days of heathenism to propagate among the people a superstition, which themselves condemned and detested; when they did their utmost to support a senseless, an immoral, an irreligious worship; when they strove, by every seducing artifice, to keep up that strong delusion, which God, in his just indignation, had sent among them, to believe a _lye_, (for such in its whole fabric and constitution was the old Pagan idolatry) when these men, who _knew the truth_, were yet contented _to hold it in unrighteousness_; they believed, no doubt, nay, they made no scruple to boast, that they had acted with consummate prudence; and that, in sacrificing the interests of religious truth (a small matter in their estimation) they had most effectually provided for the public interest. But what sentence does the Scripture pass on these men of ancient and renowned wisdom? Why this severe and mortifying one, That _professing themselves wise, they became fools_. And how well they deserved this censure, we understand from their own history; where we read, That Pagan idolatry, thus countenanced and supported, teemed with all the vices, of which our depraved nature is capable; and that the several contrivances of its wise advocates to keep an impious and barefaced falshood in credit, served only to produce, _first_, a SUSPICION, and in the _end_, an open and avowed CONTEMPT, of all Religion.
However, the ends of _divine wisdom_ were greatly promoted by this sad experience of _human folly_. For Christianity, which made its appearance at this juncture, found it an easier task to establish itself on the ruins of a fallen, or falling superstition. _Truth_, which had for so long a time been anxiously kept out of sight, was now the more welcome to those, who wished her appearance. And the detection of those prophane arts, which had been so manifestly employed in that service, disposed the most perverse or careless the more easily to reconcile themselves to her.
And it would have been happy if the sense of this advantage, which the _simplicity of truth_ obtained, in the first pages of the Gospel, over all the frauds of imposture, had prevented Christians from copying afterwards what they had so successfully contended against and exposed. Then had a great dishonour of the Christian name been avoided. But that _truth_, whose virtues are here magnified, must not be dissembled. The practice of _lying_ for the cause of God, too soon revived, and became too frequent in the Christian world. It is in vain to think of diverting your minds, more especially, from that great part of it, which has long since forgotten to be _simple concerning evil_. But true _wisdom will ever be justified of her children_. These dishonest arts, which could not support a bad cause, have been injurious and disgraceful to the _best_. They have corrupted the ingenuous spirit of the Gospel, they have adulterated the sincere word of God; and, in both ways, have produced innumerable mischiefs, in civil and religious life. They have helped to bring into discredit or disuse a true _Christian temper_; and have unhappily created in the minds of many an undeserved prejudice against the _Christian faith_.
II. But if these men have dishonoured _Religion_, others have defiled MORALITY; yet both assume to themselves the title of _wise_ men; and for that very reason, because they have departed as far as possible from the virtue of _simplicity_.