Part 1

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THE

WORKS

OF

RICHARD HURD, D. D.

LORD BISHOP OF WORCESTER.

VOL. V.

Printed by J. Nichols and Son, Red Lion Passage, Fleet-Street, London.

THE

WORKS

OF

RICHARD HURD, D. D.

LORD BISHOP OF WORCESTER.

IN EIGHT VOLUMES.

VOL. V.

LONDON: PRINTED FOR T. CADELL AND W. DAVIES, STRAND. 1811.

THEOLOGICAL WORKS.

VOL. I.

TWELVE SERMONS

INTRODUCTORY

TO THE STUDY OF

THE PROPHECIES.

AN

INTRODUCTION

TO THE STUDY OF THE

PROPHECIES

CONCERNING THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH;

AND, IN PARTICULAR,

CONCERNING THE CHURCH OF PAPAL ROME:

IN TWELVE SERMONS,

PREACHED IN LINCOLN’S-INN-CHAPEL,

AT THE LECTURE OF

THE RIGHT REV. WILLIAM WARBURTON,

LORD BISHOP OF GLOUCESTER.

_Ita, si potuero, stylo moderabor meo, ut nec ea, quæ supersint, dicam, nec ea, quæ satis sint, prætermittam._ Augustin. C. D. l. xvii. c. 1.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

WILLIAM, LORD MANSFIELD,

LORD CHIEF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND,

AND

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

SIR JOHN EARDLEY WILMOT, KNT.

LATE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE COMMON PLEAS,

TRUSTEES FOR THIS LECTURE,

THE FOLLOWING SERMONS

ARE MOST HUMBLY INSCRIBED

BY THE AUTHOR,

R. HURD.

LINCOLN’S-INN, MARCH 2, 1772.

EXTRACT

FROM THE

DEED OF TRUST

FOR FOUNDING THIS LECTURE.

An Indenture, bearing date July 21, 1768, sets forth, “That the right reverend WILLIAM Lord Bishop of Gloucester has transferred the sum of 500_l. Bank four per cent. annuities consolidated_, to the right honourable WILLIAM LORD MANSFIELD, Lord Chief Justice of his Majesty’s Court of King’s Bench, the right honourable SIR JOHN EARDLEY WILMOT, Lord Chief Justice of his Majesty’s Court of Common Pleas, and the honourable CHARLES YORKE[1], of Lincoln’s-Inn, in the county of Middlesex, UPON TRUST, for the purpose of founding a _Lecture_, in the form of a Sermon, _To prove the truth of Revealed Religion in general, and of the Christian in particular, from the completion of the Prophecies in the Old and New Testament, which relate to the Christian church, especially to the apostacy of Papal Rome_: That, in case of any vacancy in this trust by the decease of any one or more of the above-mentioned Trustees, _the place or places shall be filled up, from time to time and as occasion may require, by the surviving Trustees, or Trustee, or by the Executors of the survivor of them_: That the Trustees _shall appoint the Preacher of Lincoln’s-Inn for the time being, or some other able Divine of the Church of England_, to preach this Lecture: That the Lecture shall be preached every year _in the Chapel of Lincoln’s-Inn_ (_if the Society give leave_[2]) _and on the following days, viz. the first Sunday after Michaelmas Term, the Sunday next before and the Sunday next after Hilary Term_: That the Lecturer shall not preach the said Lecture longer than _for the term of_ FOUR YEARS, _and shall not again be nominated to preach the same_: And, when the term of four years is expired, that the said Lecturer shall _print and publish, or cause to be printed and published, all the Sermons or Lectures, that shall have been so preached by him_.”

CONTENTS

OF

THE FIFTH VOLUME.

SERMON I.

False ideas of Prophecy.

2 PETER i. 21.

_Prophecy came not in old time by the will of man: but holy men of God spake, as they were moved by the Spirit of God._

SERMON II.

The true idea of Prophecy.

REV. xix. 10.

_The testimony of Jesus is the Spirit of Prophecy._ 21

SERMON III.

Conclusions from the true idea of Prophecy.

REV. xix. 10.

_The testimony of Jesus is the Spirit of Prophecy._ 44

SERMON IV.

The general argument from Prophecy.

JOHN xiii. 19.

_Now I tell you before it come, that, when it is come to pass, ye may believe, that I am He._ 74

SERMON V.

Prophecies concerning Christ’s _first coming_.

ISAIAH xlii. 9.

_Behold, the former things are come to pass, and new things do I declare: before they spring forth, I tell you of them._ 102

SERMON VI.

Prophecies concerning Christ’s _second coming_.

ISAIAH xlii. 9.

_Behold, the former things are come to pass, and new things do I declare: before they spring forth, I tell you of them._ 132

SERMON VII.

Prophecies concerning Antichrist.

1 Ep. JOHN ii. 18.

—_ye have heared that Antichrist shall come._ 171

SERMON VIII.

Prejudices against the doctrine of Antichrist.

1 Ep. JOHN ii. 18.

—_ye have heared that Antichrist shall come._ 205

SERMON IX.

The Prophetic style considered.

EZEKIEL xx. 49.

—_They say of me, Doth he not speak parables?_ 233

SERMON X.

The style and method of the Apocalypse.

EZEKIEL xx. 49.

—_They say of me, Doth he not speak parables?_ 260

SERMON XI.

Prophetic characters of Antichrist.

LUKE xii. 56.

—_How is it, that ye do not discern this time?_ 286

SERMON XII.

Uses of this Inquiry into the Prophecies—Conclusion.

REV. xxii. 7.

_Behold, I come quickly: Blessed is he that keepeth the sayings of the prophecy of this book._ 333-352

APPENDIX:

_Containing an anonymous Letter to the Author of these Sermons, with his Answer to it._ 363

SERMON I.

FALSE IDEAS OF PROPHECY.

2 PETER, i. 21.

_Prophecy came not in old time by the will of man: but holy men of God spake, as they were moved by the Spirit of God._

The argument from prophecy, in support of the Christian revelation, would be thought more conclusive, at least would be more distinctly apprehended, if men could be kept from mixing their own prejudices and preconceptions with it.

The general question may be expressed thus—“Whether the predictions in the Old and New Testament do not appear to have been so far, and in such sense, fulfilled, as to afford a reasonable conviction, that they _came not_, as the text speaks, _by the will of man, but from the Spirit of God_.”

In examining this question, the predictions themselves cannot be too diligently studied, or too cautiously applied: But, while this work is carrying on, we are still to suppose, and should not for a moment forget, that they _may_ be, what they manifestly claim to be, of divine suggestion; I mean, we are to admit, not the truth indeed, but the possibility, of such suggestion, till we can fairly make it appear that they are of human contrivance, only.

It will not be denied, that the tenour of Scripture, as well as the text, clearly asserts the divine original and direction of the prophecies. A just reasoner on the subject will, therefore, proceed on this supposition, and only try whether it be well founded. He will consider, whether the construction of the prophecies, and the application of them, be such, as may accord to those pretensions; and will not argue against them on other principles, which they do not admit, or suppose. All this is plainly nothing more than what may be expected from a fair inquirer, and what the rules of good reasoning exact from him.

The use of this conduct would be, To prevent, or set aside, all those fancies and imaginations which too frequently mislead inquirers into the evidence of prophecy; which fill their minds with needless perplexities, and disgrace their books with frivolous and impertinent disquisitions. And, because I take it to be of principal moment, that this _use_ be perfectly seen and understood, I shall, _first_, apply myself to justify and explain it.

It is true that _prophecy_, in the very idea of that term, at least in the scriptural idea of it, implies the divine agency; and that, exerted not merely in giving the faculty itself, but in directing all its operations.

Yet I know not how it is that, when men address themselves to the study of the prophetic scriptures, they are apt to let this so necessary idea slip out of their minds; and to discourse upon them just as they would or might do, on the supposition that the prophet was left at liberty to dispense this gift in all respects, as he should think proper. No wonder then, that they should misconceive of its character, and entertain very different notions about the exercise of this power from what the Scriptures give them of it. Nay it is no wonder that they should even treat the subject with some scorn, while they judge of it by the rule of human prudence, and not of divine wisdom: for, though they would readily own themselves incapable of pronouncing on the secret counsels of God, if prophecy, in its whole administration, be regarded as proceeding merely from him; yet, from their knowledge of human nature, they would think, and with some reason, they were well able to conceive how the spirit of prophecy would be administered, if man had the disposal of this spirit committed to him.

Now it happens, as I said, (by an inexcusable perverseness, or inattention, indeed, yet in fact it so happens) that, to the consideration of the argument from prophecy, as applied to the proof of the Christian religion, many inquirers bring with them this strange and fatal prejudice; and then their reasonings, or rather conjectures, on the SUBJECT, the END, and the DISPENSATION of prophecy, are only such, as this prejudice may be expected to inspire.

I. Judging for ourselves, and by the light of human investigation only, there might be some ground for supposing, that, if it should please God at any time to confer the gift of prophecy on his favoured servants, they would be solely or chiefly commissioned to unfold the future fortunes of the most conspicuous states and kingdoms in the world: that so divine a power would embrace, as its peculiar object, the counsels and enterprizes, the successes and triumphs of the most illustrious nations; those especially, which should rise to the summit of empire by generous plans of policy, and by the efforts of public virtue; of _free states_, in a word, such as we know to have flourished in the happier ages of Greece, and such as we still contemplate with admiration in the vast and awful fabric of Consular Rome. This we might think a fit object for the prophetic spirit to present to us; as corresponding in some degree to the sublime character of a prophet; and as most worthy, in our conceptions, of the divine attention and regard.

But how are we surprized to find that this astonishing power, the most signal gift of Heaven to mankind, hath, in its immediate application at least, respected, many times, obscure individuals, whose names and memory are only preserved in one barbarous chronicle, hath been chiefly employed, and, as we are ready to express it, thrown away on one single state, or rather family; inconsiderable in the extent of its power or territory; sequestered from the rest of the nations, and hardly known among them[3]; with some mention, perhaps, of greater things, but incidentally touched, as it may seem, and as they chanced to have some connexion with the interests of this sordid people!

Was this a stage, on which it might be expected that the God of heaven would condescend to display the wonders of his prescience; when He kept aloof, as it were, from more august theatres, and would scarcely vouchsafe to have the skirts of his glory seen by the nobler and more distinguished nations of the World?

Such questions as these are sometimes asked. But they are surely asked by those, who consider the prophets, as acting wholly on human views and motives; and not as over-ruled in all their predictions by _the spirit of God_. For it is natural enough for vain man, if left to himself in the exercise of the prophetic power, to turn his view towards such objects as appear to him great, in preference to others; and to estimate that greatness by the lustre of fame, in which they shine out to the observation of mankind. But a moment’s reflection may shew the probability, the possibility at least, that _God’s thoughts are not as our thoughts_; and that, if the prophet’s foresight be under the divine influence, there may be reason enough to direct it towards such scenes and objects, as we might be apt to undervalue or overlook. It is even very conceivable, that, if God be the dispenser of prophecy, and not man, all that seems great and illustrious in human affairs may to his all-judging eye appear small and contemptible[4]; and, on the other hand, what we account as nothing, may, for infinite reasons, unknown to us, but so far as he is pleased to discover them, be of that importance as to merit the attention of all his prophets from the foundation of the world.

It is evident, then, that to reason in this manner on the subject of divine prophecy, is to suffer ourselves to be misled by a poor and vulgar prejudice; and to forget, what we should ever have present to us, the claim of God’s prophets to speak, not as themselves _will_, but as they are _moved by his Spirit_.

II. The END, or ultimate purpose of prophetic illumination, is another point, on which many persons are apt to entertain strange fancies, and to frame unwarrantable conclusions, when they give themselves leave to argue on the low supposition, before mentioned.

1. It is then hastily surmized that the scriptural prophecies, if any such be acknowledged, could only be designed, like the Pagan oracles, to sooth the impatient mind under its anxiety about future events; to signify beforehand to states or individuals, engaged in high or hazardous undertakings, what the issue of them would be, that so they might suit their conduct to the information of the prophet, and either pursue their purpose with vigour, or expect their impending fate with resignation. For, what other or worthier end, will some say, can Heaven propose to itself by these extraordinary communications, than to prepare and qualify such events as it decrees to bring to pass; to animate desponding virtue, on the one hand, or to relieve predestined misery, on the other; to adapt itself, in short, to our necessities by a clear discovery of its will in those many intricate situations, which perplex human prudence, elude human foresight, and, but for this previous admonition, would bear too hard on the natural force, or infirmity of the human mind? Some such idea, as this, was plainly entertained by those of the Pagan philosophers who concluded, _from the existence of a divine power, that there must needs be such a thing as divination_[5]. They thought the attributes of their gods, if any such there were, concerned in giving some notice of futurity to mankind.

2. Others, again, encouraged in this conjectural ingenuity by partial views of scripture, come to persuade themselves that prophecy is an act of _special grace and favour_, not to this or that state, or individuals, indiscriminately, as either may seem to stand in need of it; but to one peculiar and chosen people, who, on some account or other, had merited this extraordinary distinction.

Self-love seems to have suggested this idea to the ancient and modern Jews; and many others, I doubt, are ready enough to suppose with them, that prophecy, under the Mosaic dispensation, had no other reasonable use, or end.

3. Lastly, there are those who erect their thoughts to nobler contemplations, and conclude that this intercourse between heaven and earth can only be carried on with the sublime view of preserving an awful sense of Providence in an impious and careless world.

Vanity, or superstition, may they say, has suggested to particular men, or to societies of men, that their personal or civil concerns are of moment enough to be the subject of divine prophecies, vouchsafed merely for their own proper relief or satisfaction. But nothing less than the maintenance of God’s supreme authority over his moral creation could be an object worthy of his interposing in the affairs of men, in so remarkable a manner. To keep alive in their minds a prevailing sense of their dependance upon him, is, then, the ultimate end of prophecy: and what more suitable (will they perhaps add, when warmed with this moral enthusiasm,) to the best ideas we can form of divine wisdom, than that this celestial light should be afforded to such ages or nations as are most in want of that great and salutary principle?

There is reason to believe, that many of the ancient speculatists reasoned thus on the subject of divination. For, as they argued _from the existence of their gods, to the necessity of divination_; so, again, they turned the argument the other way, _and from the reality of divination, inferred the existence and providence of their gods_[6]. In drawing the _former_ conclusion, they shewed themselves to be in the system of those who maintain, that the end of prophecy is _the instruction of men in their civil or personal concerns_: when they drew the _latter_, they seemed to espouse the more enlarged sentiments of such as make the end of prophecy to be, _The instruction of men in the general concerns of religion_.

I omit other instances, that might be given; and concern myself no further with these, than just to observe from them; That the foundation of all such systems is laid in the prejudices of their respective patrons; conjecturing rather what _use_ might be made of this faculty, and to what purpose men, according to their different views or capacities, would probably apply it, than regarding it, with due reverence, as directed by the spirit of God. For then they would see, that not one of those ends, nor any other of human conjecture, could be safely relied upon, as being that of prophetic inspiration. Not that all these ends need be rejected as manifestly unworthy of the divine intention; perhaps, each of them, in a certain sense, and with some proper limitation, might without impiety be conceived to enter into it. But neither could it be presumed, if none of those ends could have been pointed out, that therefore there was no reasonable end of divine prophecy; nor could it with modesty be affirmed that the noblest of these ends was certainly that, which the wisdom of God proposed chiefly and ultimately to accomplish by it, unless the information had been given by himself.

III. But this folly of commenting on prophecy by the false lights of the imagination is never more conspicuous, than when the DISPENSATION of this gift, I mean the _mode_ of its conveyance, comes to exercise the curiosity of presumptuous men.

“If it be true, will some say, that the Supreme Being hath at any time condescended to enlighten human ignorance by a discovery of future events, these divine notices, whatever the _end_ or _subject_ of them might be, must have been given in terms so precise, and so clearly predictive of the events to which they are applied, that no doubt could remain either about the interpretation or completion of them.

On the contrary, these pretended prophecies are expressed so ambiguously or obscurely, are so involved in metaphor and darkened by hieroglyphics, that no clear and certain sense can be affixed to them, and the sagacity of a second prophet seems wanting to explain the meaning of the first.

Then, again, when we come to verify these predictions by the light of history, the correspondence is so slight many times, and so indeterminate, that none but an easy faith can assure itself, that they have, in a proper sense, been fulfilled. At the least, there is always room for some degree of suspense and hesitation: either the accomplishment fails in some particulars, or other events might be pointed out, to which the prophecy equally corresponds: so that the result is, a want of that entire and perfect conviction, which prophecy, no doubt, was intended to give, and, when fulfilled, must supply[7].

Indeed, continue these inquirers, if our prophecies had been derived from no higher an original, than that of Pagan oracles, we might well enough have supposed them to be of this stamp. When men had nothing to trust to, in their predictions, but their own ingenuity, they did well to deal in equivocal or enigmatic expression, and might leave it to chance, or to the passions of their votaries, to find an application for their random conjectures. But when the prophet is, what he assumes to be, an interpreter of heaven, he may surely afford to speak plainly, and to deliver nothing to us but what shall appear, with the fullest evidence, to be accomplished in the event.”

The invidious comparison, here made, between Scriptural prophecies and Pagan oracles, will be considered in its place. To the general principle, assumed by these inquirers, _That divine prophecy must be delivered with the utmost clearness and perspicuity, and fulfilled with irresistible evidence_, it may be sufficient to reply, as before, That, though these inquirers use the words, _divine prophecy_, they manifestly argue on the supposition of its human original, or at least application. In this latter case, indeed, it is likely enough that the prophet, for his own credit, or for what he might fancy to be the sole end of prophecy, might chuse, if he were entrusted with the knowledge of future events, to predict them with all possible clearness, and in such sort that obstinacy itself must see and admit the completion of them: but then, on the _former_ supposition, that the prophet was only the minister and instrument of the divine counsels, in the high office committed to him, they will do well to answer, at their leisure, the following questions.

“How do they know in what manner, and with what circumstances, it was fit for divine wisdom to dispense a knowledge of futurity to mankind? How can they previously determine the degree of evidence with which a prediction must be either given or fulfilled? What assurance have they, that no reasonable ends could be served by prophecies, expressed with some obscurity, and accomplished in a sense much below what may seem necessary to unavoidable conviction? Can they even pretend, on any clear principles of reason, that very important ends, perhaps the most important, may not be answered by that mode of conveyance, which appears to them so exceptionable? Can they, in a word, determine before-hand, I do not say with certainty, but with any colour of probability; what _must_ be the character of divine prophecy, when they know not the reason, most undoubtedly not _all_ the reasons, why it is given, and have even no right to demand, that it should be given at all?”

Till these, and other questions of the like sort, be pertinently answered, it must be in vain to censure the ways of Providence, as not corresponding to our imperfect and short-sighted views.

So much for that _capital_ prejudice taken from the supposed obscurity of the scriptural prophecies. Of _smaller_ scruples and difficulties on this head, there is no end.

Men may ask, for instance, why the instruments employed in conveying these celestial notices to mankind, are frequently so mean and inconsiderable? The subject of a prediction is the downfall of some mighty state, or the fortune of its governours. Why then is this important revelation intrusted to an obscure priest, or sordid peasant, in preference to the great persons, more immediately concerned in it[8]?

Again; some momentous events have been signified in dreams: why not to persons awake, and in the full possession of their best faculties[9]?

And then, of those dreams, why are they sometimes sent to one man, and the interpretation of them reserved for another[10]?