Chapter 72

THAT MR COLEMAN’S AND MR HUSSEY’S OPPOSING OF CHURCH GOVERNMENT NEITHER IS NOR CAN BE RECONCILED WITH THE SOLEMN LEAGUE AND COVENANT.

Mr Coleman’s doctrine was by me charged to be a violation of the solemn league and covenant. This he acknowledged in his _Re-examination_, p. 13, 17, to be a very grievous charge, and a greater fault in him than in divers others, if made out; and he desired seriously, yea, challenged it by the right of a Christian, and by the right of a minister, that I should prosecute this charge; whereupon I did, in my _Nihil Respondes_, prosecute it so far, that, by five strong arguments, I did demonstrate the repugnancy of his doctrine to the covenant. About a month afterward comes out Mr Hussey’s book, wherein the charge itself (before desired to be prosecuted) is declined expressly by Mr Coleman in the few lines by him prefixed (which are ranked together with the errata), in which he desires that the argumentative part may be so prosecuted as that the charge of covenant-breaking may be laid aside; which, if it be taken up, he lets me know beforehand it shall be esteemed by them a _nihil respondes_. It is also declined by Mr Hussey, p. 15: “The argument of the covenant is too low to be thought on in the discourse: we are now in an higher region than the words of the covenant,” &c.:—a tenet looked upon by the reformed churches as proper to those that are inspired with the ghost of Arminius;(1355) for the remonstrants, both at and after the Synod of Dort, did cry down the obligation of all national covenants, oaths, &c., in matters of religion, under the colour of taking the Scripture only for a rule. Well, we see the charge declined as nothing. But this is not all. Almost two months after my proof of the charge, Mr Coleman comes out with his _Male Dicis_, and declines both the charge itself (which he calls an “impertinent charge,” p. 22), and my five arguments too, without so much as taking notice of them, or offering replies to them; yea, all that I said in my _Nihil Respondes_, p. 27-34, in prosecution of this argument concerning covenant-breaking, the reverend brother hath skipped over _sicco pede_ in the half of one page, p. 23; all that follows is new and other matter, wherein he did not mind his own answer to the learned viewer, p. 33, “I will keep you to the laws of disputation, and will not answer but as it is to the matter in hand.” I leave it to be judged by men of knowledge and piety, whether such an one doth not give them some ground to apprehend that he is αυτοκατάκριτος, that is, self-judged, who first calleth so eagerly for making out a charge against him, and then when it is made out, doth decline the charge, and not answer the arguments; and such as esteem the charge of covenant-breaking to be a _nihil respondes_, and the argument of the covenant too low to be thought on in a controversy about church government, “O my soul, come not thou into their secret; unto their assembly, mine honour, be not thou united.” It is in vain for them to palliate or shelter their covenant-breaking with appealing from the covenant to the Scripture, for _subordinata non pugnant_. The covenant is _norma recta_,—a right rule, though the Scripture alone be _norma recti_,—the rule of right. If they hold the covenant to be unlawful, or to have anything in it contrary to the word of God, let them speak out. But to profess the breach of the covenant to be a grievous and great fault, and worthy of a severe censure, and yet to decline the charge and proofs thereof, is a most horrible scandal; yea, be astonished, O ye heavens, at this, and give ear, O earth! how small regard is had to the oath of God by men professing the name of God.

As for that little which the reverend brother hath replied unto; first, he takes notice of a passage of his sermon at the taking of the covenant, which I had put him in mind of, but he answereth only to one particular, viz., concerning that clause, “Doubtless many materials of Prelacy must of necessity be retained, as absolutely necessary.” I asked what he understood by this clause? Now observe his answer: “I answer ingenuously, as he desires, and fully, as I conceive, These materials of Prelacy are ordination.” Remember you said, “_many_ materials of Prelacy.” I beseech you, Sir, How many is ordination? Ordination, ordination, ordination; tell on till you think you have made many materials; and, withal, tell us (if this be the meaning, that ordination should be retained without any power of ecclesiastical government in the ministry) how was it imaginable that he could hereby satisfy that scruple which then he spoke to, viz., the scruple about the purging away of the exorbitances of Prelacy, and retaining a regulated Prelacy? And after all this, I shall desire him to expound that other clause (which I desired before, but he hath not done it), “Taking away (said he) the exorbitancies, the remaining will be a new government, and no Prelacy.” Either he means this of a new church government distinct from the civil, so that the ministry should have new power of government; or he meant it of the way which now he pleads for. If the former, I have what I would. Mr Coleman himself, as well as other men, took the covenant with an intention to have an ecclesiastical government distinct from the civil. If the latter, then let him answer these two things: 1. What good sense there was in applying such an answer to such a scruple, as if the Erastian way, or the appropriating of all ecclesiastical jurisdiction wholly to the civil magistrate, could be the way to satisfy those who scrupled the total abolition of Prelacy. 2. How will he reconcile himself with himself; for here, p. 22, he saith, That his way was in practice before I was born, “and the constant practice of England always.” This, as it is a most notorious untruth (for the constant practice of England hath granted to the clergy, as he calls them, after the popish dialect, a power of deposition and excommunication, whereas his way denies all corrective power or church censures to the ministry), so, if it were a truth, it is utterly inconsistent with that which he said of the remaining part, namely, that it will be a new government. If it be his way, how will he make it the constant practice of England always, and a new government too?

In the next place, the reverend brother makes short work of my five arguments to prove the repugnancy of his doctrine to the solemn league and covenant. They were too hot for him to be much touched upon: “All is but this much (saith he), the covenant mentioneth and supposeth a distinct church government.” It is hard when arguments are neither repeated nor answered. He repeats a point which was proved (and but a part of that), but not the proofs; and so he answereth (rather to the conclusion than to the arguments) these two things: “First (saith he), the expressions in the covenant are according to the general apprehensions of the times, which took such a thing for granted, yet I believe Mr Gillespie cannot make such a supposition obligatory.” Now you yield, Sir, what before you eagerly contended against, viz., that the covenant doth suppose a church government. Remember your simile of the jury sworn to inquire into the felony of a prisoner, which oath doth not suppose the prisoner to be guilty of felony, but he is to be tried, guilty or not guilty. We are now so far agreed, that the covenant doth suppose a church government distinct from the civil government, and yet not merely doctrinal, for that was the point which I proved, and which here he yields. As for the obligation of an oath sworn upon such supposition, I answer, 1. It is more than supposed, the words and expressions of the covenant do plainly hold out the thing as I proved, and as the reverend brother here seems to yield. 2. That which an oath doth necessarily suppose, if the oath be lawful, and the thing supposed lawful, is without all controversy obligatory. Now the reverend brother doth acknowledge both the covenant itself to be a lawful oath, and that which the covenant supposeth, namely, a church government distinct from the civil government, and yet not merely doctrinal, to be a lawful thing; for he professeth to yield it (though not _jure divino_, yet) in prudence, which he cannot do, if he make the thing unlawful. 3. That which an oath doth suppose is sometimes supposed _vi materiæ_, or _consequentiæ_, that is, the words of the oath do necessarily imply such a thing, though it be not intended by the swearer; and here I will tell Mr Coleman one story of Alexander for another: When Alexander was coming against a town to destroy it, he met Anaximenes, who, as he understood, came to make intercession and supplication for sparing the town. Alexander prevented him with an oath that he would not do that thing which Anaximenes should make petition for, whereupon Anaximenes made petition that he would destroy the town. Alexander found himself bound by the plain words of his oath not to do what he intended, and so did forbear. And to add a divine story to an human, Joshua and the princes of Israel did swear to the Gibeonites upon a supposition that was not true, yet they found themselves tied by their oath. So he that sweareth to his own hurt must not change, the oath being otherwise lawful, Psal. xv. 4, yet that self-hurt which is wrapped up in the matter of his oath was not intended in swearing. Sometimes, again, that which is supposed and implied in an oath, lieth also in the thoughts and intentions of those that swear. Now, where those two are coincident, that is, where the thing supposed in an oath is both implied necessarily in the words of the oath, and is also according to the apprehensions of those that swear (which is the case here in the covenant, and is acknowledged by the reverend brother), I should think it most strange how any divine can have the least doubt concerning the obligation of such a thing, except he conceive the thing itself to be unlawful.

His second answer is this: “In my way (saith he) the governments, civil and ecclesiastical, are in the subject matter clearly distinct. When the Parliament handles matters of war, it is a military court; when business of state, it is a civil court; when matters of religion, it is an ecclesiastical court.” If this hold good, then it will follow, 1. That the Parliament, when they deliberate about matters of war or matters of religion, are not, at least formally and properly, a civil court, else how makes he these so clearly distinct? 2. That ministers may be called civil officers, for consider his words in his _Re-examination_, p. 11: “I do not exclude ministers, neither from ecclesiastical nor civil government, in a ministerial way, doctrinally and declaratively.” Compare this with his present answer, it will amount to thus much: That different denominations being taken from the different subject matter, ministers, when they handle doctrinally matters of religion, are ecclesiastical ministers; and when they handle doctrinally matters of civil government, which himself alloweth them to do, they are civil ministers. But now to apply his answer to the argument, How doth all this solve the repugnancy of his doctrine to the covenant? If he had examined my arguments, he had found that most of them prove from the covenant a church government distinct from civil government, subjective as well as objective; that is, another government besides magistracy; different agents as well as different acts; different hands as well as handling of different matters. I know the Christian magistrate may and ought to have a great influence in matters of religion; and whatsoever is due to him by the word of God, or by the doctrine either of the ancient or reformed churches, I do not infringe, but do maintain and strengthen it. But the point in hand is, that the covenant doth undeniably suppose, and clearly hold forth a government in the church distinct from magistracy, which is proved by these arguments (which, as they are not yet answered, so I will briefly apply them to the proof of that point which now Mr Coleman sticks at): 1. The church covenant mentioned in the covenant is as distinct from the privileges of parliament, as the first article of the covenant is distinct from the third article. 2. The church government in the first article of the covenant, the reformation whereof we are to endeavour, differeth from church government by archbishops, bishops, &c., mentioned in the second article, as much as a thing to be reformed differeth from a thing to be extirpated; so that the church government formerly used in the church of England is looked upon two ways in the covenant, either _qua_ church government, and so we swear to endeavour the reformation of it (which I hope was not meant of reforming that part of the privileges of Parliament whereby they meddle with religion in a parliamentary way), or _qua_ church government, by archbishops, bishops, &c., and so we swear to endeavour the extirpation of it. This difference between the first and second articles, between reformation and extirpation, proveth that the covenant doth suppose that the church government formerly used in the church of England, in so far as it was a church government, is not _eatenus_ to be abolished, but in so far as it was a corrupt church government, that is, prelatical. 3. Church government, in the covenant, is matched with doctrine, worship, and catechising. Now these are subjectively different from civil government, for the civil magistrate doth not act doctrinally nor catechetically, neither can he dispense the word and sacraments, as Mr Coleman acknowledgeth. 4. In the first part of the first article of the covenant, concerning “the preservation of the reformed religion in the church of Scotland, in doctrine, worship, discipline, and government,” it is uncontroverted, that discipline and government are ecclesiastical, and subjectively different from civil government, that is, though divers who have a hand in the civil government are ruling elders, yet it is as true that divers members of Parliament and inferior civil courts are not church officers; and of the ministry none are civil governors which makes the two governments clearly distinct subjectively. Now the second part of that article concerning “the reformation of religion in the kingdoms of England and Ireland, in doctrine, worship, discipline, and government,” cannot so far differ from the first part of that article in the sense of the words, “discipline and government,” as that the same words, in the same article of the same covenant, should signify things differing _toto genere_, which will follow, unless “discipline and government” in the second branch, and “form of church government” in the third branch, be understood of the power of church officers, and not of the magistrate. 6. We did swear to “endeavour the reformation of religion in the kingdoms of England and Ireland, in doctrine, worship, discipline and government, according to the word of God and the example of the best reformed churches.” Now the word of God holds forth another government besides magistracy; for Mr Coleman himself hath acknowledged, that he finds in the New Testament ministers to be rulers, yea, instituted rulers; and the example of the best reformed churches, without all doubt, leadeth us to an ecclesiastical government different from magistracy. Neither hath the reverend brother so much as once adventured to allege the contrary, except of the church of Israel, which, as it is heterogeneous, being none of the reformed churches mentioned in the covenant, so it shall be discussed in due place; from all which reasons I conclude, that the wit of man cannot reconcile Mr Coleman’s doctrine with the covenant. 6. I add a confutation of him out of himself, thus: No such church government as Mr Coleman casts upon an uncertainty, whether the word hold out any such thing, can be, by his principles, the power of magistracy in things ecclesiastical, but another government beside magistracy. But the church government, mentioned in the first article of the covenant, is such a church government as Mr Coleman casts upon an uncertainty, whether the word hold out any such thing; therefore the church government mentioned in the first article of the covenant cannot be, by his principles, the power of magistracy, but another government beside magistracy. The proposition he will easily admit, unless he alter his assertions; the assumption is clear from his _Re-examination,_ p. 15.