Chapter 71

grounded no argument on those places, but spake “by way of allusion,” _Male Dicis_, p. 6. Now let the reader judge. His words to the Parliament were these: “Might I measure others by myself, and I know not why I may not (God fashions men’s hearts alike; and as in water face answers face, so the heart of man to man), I ingenuously profess I have a heart that knows better how to be governed than govern; I fear an ambitious ensnarement,” &c. This argument, there largely prosecuted, hath no other ground but the parenthesis using the words (though not quoting the places) of Scripture. And now, forsooth, he hath served the Parliament well, when, being put to make good the sole confirmation of his argument, he tells it was but an allusion. But this is not all. I confuted the whole argument drawn from his own heart to the hearts of others, and gave several answers: but neither before, nor now, hath he offered to make good his argument.

3. The reverend brother cited 1 Cor. x. 33, to prove that all government is either a heathenish government, or a Jewish government, or a church government. This I denied: “Because the government of generals, admirals, mayors, sheriffs, is neither a Jewish government, nor a church government, nor a heathenish government.” What saith he to this? “I deny it; a Jewish general is a Jewish government,” &c., _Male Dicis_, p. 6. Deny it? No, Sir, you must prove (because you are the affirmer) that a Christian general, a Christian admiral, are church governments. For I deny it. You tell us, p. 7, you are persuaded it will trouble the whole world to bound civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the one from the other. You shall have them bounded and distinguished ere long, and the world not troubled neither. Meanwhile you have not made out your assertion from 1 Cor. x. 33.

4. The reverend brother had cited Rom. xiii. 4, to prove that the corrective part of church government belongs to the Christian magistrate. And now he brings in my reply thus: that I said he abuseth the place, “Because spiritual censures belong not to the civil magistrate;” which, saith he, begs the question, _Male Dicis_, p. 7. I replied no such thing upon this argument. Look at my words again. How can the brother answer it,—to shape answers of his own devising as if they were mine? My answer was, That the punitive part, Rom. xiii. 4, belongs to all magistrates, whether Christian or infidel; which he takes notice of in the second place, and bids me prove “that Scripture-commands belong to infidels;” not observing that the question is not of Scripture-commands, but whether a duty mentioned in this or that scripture may not belong to infidels. There are two sorts of duties in Scripture; some which are duties by the law of God, written in man’s heart at his creation, some principles and notions whereof remain in the hearts of all nations, even infidels by nature; other duties are such, by virtue of special commands given to the church, which are not contained in the law of nature. The first sort (of which the punishing of evil doers, mentioned Rom. xiii. 4, is one) belongs to those that are without the church as well as those within. The other only to those that are within.

5. The reverend brother had said in his sermon, “Of other governments besides magistracy I find no institution.” I cited 1 Thess. v. 12; 1 Tim. v. 17; Heb. xiii. 7, 17, to prove another government (yea, the institution of another government) besides magistracy. And, in my _Nihil Respondes_, I told he had laughed, but had not yet loosed the knot. Now hear his two answers: _Male Dicis_, p. 8, “First, for the institution; for the Commissioner affirms so much. Had he said that these texts hold out an office or officer already instituted, the words would have borne him out,” &c. “But the institution in this place I cannot see.” See the like in Mr Hussey, p. 19, 22. I thank them both. That Scripture which supposeth an institution, and holds out an office already instituted, shall to me (and, I am confident, to others also) prove an institution; for no text of Scripture can suppose or hold out that which is not true. Nay, hath Mr Coleman forgotten that himself proved an institution of magistracy from Rom. xiii. 1, 2? Yet that text doth but hold out the office of magistracy already instituted: but the institution itself is not in that place.

Secondly, Mr Coleman answereth to all these three texts. To that, 1 Thess. v. 12, “Them which are over you in the Lord,” he saith that these words prove not that it is not meant of magistracy. But he takes not the strength of the argument. My words were, “Here are some who are no civil magistrates set over the Thessalonians in the Lord.” This the reverend brother must admit to be a good proof, or otherwise say that the civil magistrates set over the Thessalonians, though they were heathens, yet were set over them in the Lord.

For that of 1 Tim. v. 17, he saith it doth not hold out ruling elders. Whether it doth hold ruling elders or not, doth not at all belong to the present question. It is easy to answer something, so that a man will not tie himself to the point. The place was brought by me to prove “another government beside magistracy,” which he denied. Now suppose the place to be meant only of preaching elders, yet here is a rule or government: “Elders that rule well;” and these are no civil magistrates, but such as “labour in the word and doctrine.” Come on now. “But I will deal clearly (saith the brother): These officers are ministers which are instituted not here, but elsewhere,—and these are the rulers here mentioned. And so have I loosed the knot.” Now, Sir, you shall see I will not _male dicere_, but _bene dicere_. My blessing on you for it. You have at last loosed the knot so perfectly, that you are come to an agreement with me in this great point, which I thus demonstrate: He that acknowledgeth ministers to be instituted rulers, acknowledgeth another instituted government beside magistracy. But Mr Coleman acknowledgeth ministers to be instituted rulers, therefore Mr Coleman acknowledgeth another instituted government beside magistracy.

To the other texts, Heb. xiii. 7, 17, he saith nothing against my argument, only expounds the rulers to be guides, as Mr Hussey also doth, of which more elsewhere; meanwhile it is certain that ὁ ἡγουμένοις is usually taken for a name of highest authority, yea, given to emperors; for which see learned Salmasius in his _Walo Messalinus_, p. 219, 220. It is Joseph’s highest title to express his government of Egypt, Acts vii. 10. It must the rather be a name of government and authority in this place, Heb. xiii. 17, because subjection and obedience is required: “Obey them that have the rule over you, and submit yourselves.” When the word signifieth ὀδηγὸν, _seu viæ ducem_ (and it is very rarely so used by the Septuagints, but frequently, and almost in innumerable places, they use it for a name of rule and authority), obedience and subjection is not due to such an one _qua talis_; for obedience and subjection cannot be _correlata_ to the leading of the way, when it is without authority and government.

6. I having charged Mr Coleman’s doctrine with this consequence, “That there ought to be neither suspension from the sacrament, nor excommunication, nor ordination, nor deposition of ministers, nor receiving of appeals, except all these things be done by the civil magistrate,” which things, I said, “are most of them corrective, and all of them more than doctrinal,”—instead of making answer, the reverend brother expresseth the error, which I objected to him, thus: “That here are no church censures,” which is the _quæsitum_, saith he, _Male Dicis_, p. 10. Here, again, he brings an imagination of his own, both for matter and words, instead of that which I said, and doth not take the argument right. If the minister’s power be merely doctrinal, and government wholly in the magistrate’s hands, then all the particulars enumerated; for instance, suspension from the sacrament, and the receiving of appeals (which he must not bring under the _quæsitum_, except he bring the ordinance of Parliament under the _quæsitum_), shall be wholly in the magistrate’s hand; and elderships may not suspend from the sacrament; classes and synods may not receive appeals, which yet, by the ordinance, they have power to do. One of the particulars, and but one, the reverend brother hath here touched, and it is this: “For ordination of ministers, I say, it is within the commission of teaching, and so appertains to the doctrinal part.” This is the effect of his zeal to maintain that all ecclesiastical ministerial power is merely doctrinal. But mark the consequence of it: He that holds ordination of ministers to be within the commission of teaching, and to appertain to the doctrinal part, must hold, by consequence, that the power of ordination is given _uni_ as well as _unitati_; that is, that every single minister hath power to ordain, as well as the classes. But Mr Coleman holds ordination of ministers to be within the commission of teaching, &c. The reason of the proposition is clear, because the commission of teaching belongs to every single minister, so that if the power of ordination be within that commission, it must needs belong to every single minister. _Quid respondes_?

7. The reverend brother having brought an odious argument against me, which did conclude the magistrate to manage his office for and under the devil, if not for and under Christ, I show his syllogism to have four terms, and therefore worthy to be exploded. I get now two replies:

First, “This is an error (if one) in logic, not divinity. Is it an error in divinity to make a syllogism with four terms?” _Male Dicis_, p. 15. See now if he be a fit man to call others to school, who puts an _if_ in this business—_if one_. Who did ever doubt of it? And if it be an error in divinity to be fallacious, and to deceive, then it is an error in divinity to make a syllogism with four terms, yea, as foul an error as can be.

Secondly, He admitteth not my distinction of those words, “Under Christ, and for Christ.” I said the Christian magistrate is under Christ, and for Christ, that is, he is serviceable to Christ, but he is not under Christ nor for Christ as Christ’s vicegerent, _vice Christi_, in Christ’s stead, as Christ is Mediator. The reverend brother saith, He foresaw that this would be said (the greater fault it was to make his argument so unclear and undistinct), but he rejecteth the distinction as being _distinctio sine differentia_. “If a magistrate (saith he) be thus far a servant of Christ, as Mediator, that he is to do his work, to take part with him, to be for his glory, then he doth it _vice Christi_.” He adds the simile of a servant. Hence it follows, by the reverend brother’s principles, that the king’s cook, because he doth work and service for the king, therefore he doth it _vice regis_, and as the king’s vicegerent. Likewise, that a servant who obeyeth his master’s wife, and executeth her commands, because it is his master’s will, and for his master’s honour, doth therefore obey his master’s wife _vice domini_, as his master’s vicegerent; and, by consequence, that the duty of obedience to the wife doth originally belong to the husband; for the capacity of a vicegerent, which he hath by his vicegerentship, is primarily the capacity of him whose vicegerent he is. These, and the like absurd consequences, will unavoidably follow upon the reverend brother’s argumentation, that he who doth Christ service doth it _vice Christi_, as Christ’s vicegerent; and that to be a man’s vicegerent, and to do a man’s work or service, which I made two different things, are all one. But, further, observe his tergiversation. I had, p. 13, proved my distinction out of these words of his own: “The Commissioner saith, Magistracy is not derived from Christ. I say, magistracy is given to Christ to be serviceable in his kingdom; so that, though the Commissioner’s assertion be sound (which in due place will be discussed), yet it infringeth nothing that I said.” I asked, therefore, _qua fide_ he could confound in his argument brought against me those two things which himself had so carefully distinguished. There is no reply to this in _Male Dicis_. When the brother thought it for his advantage, he denied that the magistrate’s being serviceable to Christ doth enter the derivation of his power by a commission of vicegerentship from Christ (for that was the derivation spoken of), and yielded that the magistrate may be said to be serviceable to Christ, though his power be not derived from Christ. Now he denieth the very same distinction for substance.

8. Whereas the reverend brother had told the Parliament that he seeth not, in the whole Bible, any one act of that church government which is now in controversy, I brought some scriptural instances against his opinion, not losing either the argument from Matt. xviii. (concerning which he asketh what is become of it), or other scriptural arguments, which I intend, by God’s assistance, to prosecute elsewhere. Now hear what is replied to the instances which were given. First, To that, 1 Cor. v. 13, “Put away that wicked person from among you,” his answer is, “I say, and it is sufficient against the Commissioner, If this be a church censure, then the whole church jointly, and every particular person, hath power of church censure.” _Male Dicis_, p. 10. I hope, Sir, it is not sufficient against me that you say it, so long as you say nothing to prove it. I told you that Mr Prynne himself (who holds not that every particular person hath power of church censure) acknowledged that text to be a warrant for excommunication, and when you say “every particular person,” you say more than the Independents say, and I am sure more than the text will admit, for the text saith, “Put away from among you,” therefore this power was given not _uni_, but _unitati_, and this _unitas_ was the presbytery of Corinth. The sentence was inflicted ὑπὸ τῶν πλείονων,—_by many_, 2 Cor. ii. 6, it is not said _by all_. I might say much for this, but I will not now leave the argument in hand; for it is enough against Mr Coleman that the place prove an act of church government, flowing from a power not civil but ecclesiastical. To whom the power belonged is another question.

To the next instance, from 2 Cor. ii. 6, which is coincident with the former, a punishment or censure inflicted _by many_. “It is only a reprehension (saith he),—ἐπιτιμία,—which, by all the places in the New Testament, can amount no higher than to an objurgation, and so is doctrinal.” _Ans._ 1. He made it even now an act of the whole church jointly, and of every particular person. Why did he not clear himself in this,—how the whole church, men, women, children and all, did doctrinally reprehend him? 2. If the objurgation must be restricted, To whom? Not to a single minister (yet every single minister hath power of doctrinal objurgation), but to the presbytery. It was an act of those πλειόνες I spake of; and this is a ground for that distinction between ministerial and presbyterial admonition, which Mr Coleman, p. 22, doth not admit. 3. If it were granted that ἐπιτιμία in this text amounteth to no more but an objurgation, yet our argument stands good; for the Apostle having, in his first epistle, required the Corinthians to put away from among them that wicked person, which they did accordingly resolve to do (which makes the Apostle commend their obedience, 2 Cor. ii. 9), no doubt either the offender was at this time actually excommunicated and cast out of the church, or (as others think) they were about to excommunicate him, if the Apostle had not, by his second epistle, prevented them, and taken them off with this _sufficit_: Such a degree of censure is enough, the party is penitent, go no higher. 4. When the reverend brother appealeth to all the places in the New Testament, he may take notice that the word ἐπιτιμία is nowhere found in the New Testament, except in this very text. And if his meaning be concerning the verb ἐπιτιράω he may find it used to express a coercive power, as in Christ’s rebuking of the winds and waves, Matt. viii. 26; Mark iv. 39; his rebuking of the fever, Luke iv. 39; his rebuking of the devil (which was not a doctrinal, but a coercive rebuke), Mark i. 25; ix. 25; Luke iv. 35; ix. 42. Sometimes it is put for an authoritative charge, laying a restraint upon a man, and binding him from liberty in this or that particular, as Matt. xii. 16; Mark iii. 12; viii. 30; Luke ix. 21. The word ἐπιτιμία I find in the apocryphal book of Wisdom, chap. iii. 10. It is said of the wicked, ἓξουσιν ἐπιτιμίαν, they shall have _correction_ or _punishment_. The whole chapter maketh an opposition between the godly and the wicked, in reference to punishments and judgments. The Hebrew געד (which, if the observation hold which is made by Arias Montanus, and divers others, following Kimchi, when it is construed with ב signifieth _objurgavit_, _duriter reprehendit_; when without ב, it signifieth _corrupit_, _perdidit_, or _maledixit_), the Septuagint do most usually turn it ἐπιτιμάω and that in some places where it is without ב, as Psal. cxix. 21, “Thou hast rebuked the proud that are cursed;” ἐπιτίμησας,—Pagnin, _disperdidisti_,—thou hast destroyed, so the sense is; it is rebuke, with a judgment or a curse upon them. The second part of the verse, in the Greek, is exegetical to the first part, “Thou hast rebuked the proud, ἐπικατάρατοι, cursed are they,” &c.; so Zech. iii. 2, “The Lord rebuke (ἐπιτιμήσαι) thee, O Satan.” The same phrase is used in Jude, ver. 9, which must needs be meant of a coercive, efficacious, divine power, restraining Satan. The same original word they render by ἀφορίζω, which signifieth to separate and to excommunicate, Mal. ii. 3, “Behold I will corrupt your seed,” &c. In the preceding words, God told them that he would curse them. The same word they render by ἀποσκορανίζω, _extermino_, Isa. xvii. 13, a place which speaks of a judgment to be inflicted, not of a doctrinal reproof. Yet Aquila readeth there ἐπιτιμήσει; likewise the word which the Septuagint render ἀπώλεια, _perdition_, Prov. xiii. 6, and θυμὸς, _wrath_, Isa. li. 20, in other places they render it ἐπιτίμησις: Psal. lxxvi. 6, “At thy rebuke, O God of Jacob, both the chariot and horse are cast into a dead sleep;” lxxx. 16, “They perish at the rebuke of thy countenance.” These are _real_ rebukes, that is, judgments and punishments.

4. What saith Mr Coleman to Pasor, who expounds ἐπιτιμία to be the same with ἐπιτίμιον, _mulcta_, and that, 2 Cor. ii. 6. it is meant of excommunication; which he proves by this reason, Because, in the same place, the Apostle exhorteth the Corinthians to forgive him. Add hereunto Erasmus’s observation upon the word κυρῶσαι(1348) (ver. 8, to “confirm your love toward him”); that it implies an authoritative ratification of a thing by judicial suffrage and sentence. Which well agreeth to the πλειόνες, ver. 6; that is, that they who had judicially censured him, should also judicially loose him and make him free. Now, therefore, the circumstances and context being observed, and the practice, 2 Cor. ii. 6, compared with the precept, 1 Cor. v. 13, I conclude, that, whether this ἐπιτιμία was excommunication already inflicted, or whether it was a lesser degree of censure, tending to excommunication,—a censure it was, and more than ministerial objurgation. And it is rightly rendered by the English translators _punishment_ or _censure;_ which well agreeth with the signification of the verb ἐπιτιμάω given us by Hesychius,(1349) and by Julius Pollux;(1350) who makes ἐπιτιμᾶν, to _punish_ or _chastise_, and ἐπιτίμημα, _punishment_ or _chastisement_. Clemens Alexandrinus(1351) useth ἐπιτιμία as well as ἐπιτιμιον, _pro poena vel supplicio_. So Stephanus, in _Thes. Ling. Gr._ From all which it may appear that the text in hand holds forth a corrective church government in the hands of church officers; the thing which Mr Coleman denieth.

To the next instance, from 1 Tim. v. 19, “Against an elder receive not an accusation, but before two or three witnesses,” the reverend brother answereth, “It is either in relation to the judgment of charity, or ministerial conviction, as the verses following.” _Ans._ 1. That of two or three witnesses is taken from the law of Moses, where it is referred only to a forensical proceeding. But in relation either to the judgment of charity, or ministerial conviction, it is not necessary that there be two or three witnesses. If a scandalous sin be certainly known to a minister, though the thing be not certified by two or three witnesses, yet a minister, upon certain knowledge had of the fact, may both believe it and ministerially convince the offender. But there may not be a consistorial proceeding without two or three witnesses. 2. Since he appealeth to the following verses, let ver. 22 decide it: “Lay hands suddenly on no man.” To whom the laying on of hands or ordination did belong, to them also it did belong to receive an accusation against an elder: but to the presbytery did belong the laying on of hands, or ordination, 1 Tim. iv. 14; therefore to the presbytery did belong the receiving of an accusation against an elder. And so it was not the act of a single minister, as ministerial conviction is.

To the last instance, from Rev. ii. 14, 15, 20, the reverend brother answers, That he had striven to find out how church censures might be there grounded, but was constrained to let it alone. But what is it, in his opinion, which is there blamed in the angels of those churches? Doth he imagine that those who are so much commended by Christ himself for their holding fast of his name, and of the true faith, did not so much as doctrinally or ministerially oppose the foul errors of the Balaamites and of Jezebel? No doubt but this was done: but Christ reproves them, because such scandalous persons were yet suffered to be in the church, and were not cast out. “I have a few things against thee, because thou hast there them that hold the doctrine of Balaam;” and, ver. 20, “Thou sufferest that woman Jezebel.” And why was the very having or suffering them in the church a fault, if it had not been a duty to cast them out of the church? which casting out could not be by banishment, but by excommunication. It did not belong to the angel to cast out the Balaamites out of Pergamos, but he might, and ought to have cast them out of the church in Pergamos.

9. Mr Coleman hath another passage against the distinction of church censures and civil punishments. “But what are ecclesiastical censures (saith he)? Let us take a taste. Is deposition from the ministry? This kings have done,” &c., _Male Dicis_, p. 7. Now _similia labra lactucis_. But for all that, the taste is vitiated, and doth not put a difference between things that are different. Deposition is sometimes taken, improperly, for expulsion; as Balsamon, in _Conc. Nicoen._, can. 19, doth observe. And so the Christian magistrate may remove or put away ministers when they deserve to be put away, that is, by a coercive power to restrain them, imprison or banish them, and, in case of capital crimes, punish them with capital punishments. King James, having once heard a dispute in St. Andrews about the deposition of ministers, was convinced that it doth not belong to the civil magistrate, “yet (said he) I can depose a minister’s head from his shoulders.” Which was better divinity than this of Mr Coleman. If we take deposition properly, as it is more than the expelling, sequestering or removing of a minister from this or that place, and comprehendeth that which the Council of Ancyra, can. 18, calls Ἀφαιρεισθαι την τιμὴι τον πρεσβυτεριον, _the honour of presbytership to be taken away_, or a privation of that _presbyteratus_, the order of a presbyter, and that ἐξουσία, the authority and power of dispensing the word, sacraments, and discipline, which was given in ordination, so none have power to depose who have not power to ordain. It belongeth not to the magistrate either to make or unmake ministers. Therefore, in the ancient church, the bishops had power of the deposition as well as of the ordination of presbyters, yet they were bound up that they might not depose either presbyter or deacon without the concurrence of a presbytery or synod in the business.(1352) Mark, of the _synod_, not of the magistrate. As for the testimonies brought by Mr Coleman, he doth, both here and in divers other places, name his authors, without quoting the places. It seems he hath either found the words cited by others, but durst not trust the quotations, or else hath found somewhat in those places which might make against him. However, all that he can cite of that kind concerning deposition of ministers by emperors, is meant of a coercive expulsion, not of that which we call properly deposition. And to this purpose let him take the observation of a great antiquary.(1353)

And, withal, he may take notice that Protestant writers(1354) do disclaim the magistrate’s power of deposing ministers, and hold that deposition is a part of ecclesiastical jurisdiction: ministers being always punishable (as other members of the commonwealth), according to the law of the land, for any offence committed against law.