Chapter 60

WHETHER THERE BE ANYTHING INDIFFERENT IN ACTU EXERCITO.

_Sect._ 1. For our better light in this question I will premit these considerations, 1. When we measure the goodness or the badness of a human action, we must not only measure it by the object and the end, but by all the circumstances which accompany it. Fed. Morellus,(1185) upon those words of Seneca, _Refert quid, cui, quando, quare, ubi,_ &c., saith, that without those circumstances of things, persons, times, places, _facti ratio non constat_. Circumstances sometimes _constituunt rerum earum quae aguntur speciem_, say our divines,(1186) meaning that circumstances do make an action good or bad. _Humani actus_, say the schoolmen,(1187) _non solum ex objectis, verum ex circumstantiis boni vel mali esse dicuntur_. It is not every man’s part, saith one of our opposites,(1188) to judge _de circumstantia, quae reddit actionem vel bonam vel malam_. “Some circumstances, saith another of them,(1189) are intrinsical and essential to actions, and specially making up their nature.” The principal circumstances which here we speak of, are comprehended in this versicle:—

Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur quomodo, quando.

The first circumstance which maketh an action good or bad is _quis_, which designeth the person: If a magistrate put to death a malefactor, the action is good; but if a private person put him to death, it is evil.

The second is _quid_, which noteth the quality or condition of the object: If a man take _sua_, the action is good; if _aliena_, it is evil.

The third is _ubi_: If men banquet in their own houses, the action is good; if in the church, it is evil.

The fourth is _quibus auxiliis_: If men seek health by lawful means, the action is good; if by the devil, or his instruments, it is evil.

The fifth is _cur_: If I rebuke my brother for his fault, out of my love to him, and desire to reclaim him, the action is good; if out of hatred and spleen, the action is evil.

The sixth is _quomodo_: For he who doth the work of the Lord carefully doth well; but he who doth it negligently doth evil.

The seventh is _quando_: To do servile work upon the six days of labour, is good; but to do it upon the Lord’s Sabbath, is evil.

2. There is another consideration which followeth upon the former; and it is this: The goodness or badness of a human action may be considered two ways, viz., either _in actu signato_, and _quo ad speciem_; or _in actu exercito_, and _quo ad individuum_; for an action is said to be specificated by its object, and individuated by its circumstances; so that, when an action is good or evil in respect of the object of it, then it is called good or evil _quo ad speciem_: when it is good or evil in respect of the circumstances of it, then it is said to be good or evil _quo ad individuum_.

3. Human actions, whether considered _quo ad speciem_, or _quo ad individuum_, are either such as proceed from the deliberation of reason, or from bare imagination only. To this latter kind we refer such actions as are done through incogitancy, while the mind is taken up with other thoughts; for example, to scratch the head, to handle the beard, to move the foot, &c.; which sort of things proceed only from a certain stirring or fleeting of the imagination.

4. Let it be remembered, that those things we call morally good, which agree to right reason; those morally evil which disagree from right reason; and those indifferent which include nothing belonging to the order of reason, and so are neither consonant unto nor dissonant from the same.

5. When we speak of the indifferency of an individual action, it may be conceived two ways: either _absolute et sine respectu ad aliud_; or _comparate et cum respectu ad aliud_. In the free-will offerings, if so be a man offered according as God had blessed and prospered his estate, it was indifferent to offer either a bullock, or a sheep, or a goat; but if he chose to offer any of them, his action of offering could not be indifferent, but either good or evil. When we speak of the indifferency of an action _comparate_, the sense is only this, that it is neither better nor worse than another action, and that there is no reason to make us choose to do it more than another thing; but when we speak of the indifferency of an action considered absolutely and by itself, the simple meaning is, whether it be either good or evil, and whether the doing of the same must needs be either sin or evil doing.

6. Every thing which is indifferent in the nature of it, is not by and by indifferent in the use of it. But the use of a thing indifferent ought evermore to be either chosen or refused, followed or forsaken, according to these three rules delivered to us in God’s word: 1. The rule of piety; 2. The rule of charity; 3. The rule of purity.

The first of these rules we find, 1 Cor. x. 31, “Whether, therefore, ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God;” and Rom. xiv. 7, 8, “For none of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself. For whether we live, we live unto the Lord, and whether we die, we die unto the Lord:” where the Apostle, as Calvin noteth,(1190) reasoneth from the whole to the part. Our whole life, and, by consequence, all the particular actions of it, ought to be referred to God’s glory, and ordered according to his will. Again, Col. iii. 17, “And whatsoever ye do, in word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus.” In the expounding of which words Dr Davenant saith well, that _Etiam ille actiones quæ sunt sua natura adiaphoræ, debent tamen à Christianis fieri in nomine Christi, hoc est, juxta voluntatem Christi, et ad gloriam Christi_.

The second rule is the rule of charity; which teacheth us not to use anything indifferent when scandal riseth out of it: Rom. xiv. 21, “It is good neither to eat flesh, nor to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak;” yea, though it do not weaken, if it be not expedient for edifying our brother, be it never so lawful or indifferent in its own nature, the law of charity bindeth us to abstain from it: Rom. xiv. 19, “Let us therefore follow after the things which make for peace, and the things wherewith one may edify another;” Rom. xv. 2, “Let every one of us please his neighbour for his good to edification;” 1 Cor. x. 23, “All things are lawful for me, but all things are not expedient: all things are lawful for me, but all things edify not:” where the Apostle teacheth, that _in cibo_, &c.,(1191) “In meat, drink, and the whole kind of things indifferent, it is not enough to look whether they be lawful, but that, farther, we are to look whether to do or omit the same be expedient, and may edify.” The Bishop of Winchester, preaching upon John xvi. 7, “I tell you the truth: it is expedient for you that I go away,” &c., marketh, that Christ would not go away without acquainting his disciples with the reason of it; and that reason was, because it was for their good: whereupon he inferreth, 1. That we should avoid Hophni’s _non vult enim_, and make our _vult_ our _enim_, 1 Sam. ii. 15; that is, that we should not give our will for a reason, but a reason for our will; 2. That we should not, with the Corinthians, stand upon _licet_,—it is lawful, but frame our rule by _expedit_,—it is expedient, 1 Cor. vi. 13; x. 23; 3. That our rule should not be Caiaphas’ _expedit nobis_, but Christ’s _expedit vobis_,—for you it is good, you, the disciples, John xi. 50; and make that the rule of our going out and our coming in. The heathens themselves could say that we are born, partly for God, partly for our country, partly for our friends, &c. How much more ought Christians to understand that we are not born for ourselves, but for Christ and his church. And as in the whole course of our life, so especially in the policy of the church, we may do nothing (be it never so indifferent in itself) which is not profitable for edification: 1 Cor. xiii. 26, “Let all things be done to edifying.” From which precept Pareus inferreth, that nothing ought to be done in the church which doth not manifestly make for the utility of all and every one; and that therefore not only unknown tongues, but cold ceremonies and idle gestures should be exploded out of the church.

The third rule is the rule of purity, which respecteth our peace and plerophory of conscience, without which anything is unclean to us, though it be clean and lawful in its own nature: Rom xiv. 14, “To him that esteemeth anything to be unclean, to him it is unclean,” therefore _si quis aliquam in cibo immunditiem imagineter, eo libere uti non potest_.(1192) Whatsoever indifferent thing a man in his conscience judgeth to be unlawful, he may not lawfully do it: Rom xiv. 5, “Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind;” and verse 23, “He that doubteth is damned if he eat, because he eateth not of faith; for whatsoever is not of faith is sin.” _Nefas est omnino_, saith Calvin,(1193) _quippiam aggredi quod putes illi (domino) displicere, imo quod non persuasus sis illi placere_. Now if a thing indifferent be used according to these three rules, the use of it is not only lawful but expedient also; but if it be not used according to these rules, the use of it is altogether unlawful.

_Sect._ 3. And since a thing indifferent in the nature of it can never be lawfully used, except according to these rules, hence it followeth, that the use of a thing indifferent is never lawful to us when we have no other warrant for using the same beside our own will and arbitrement.

Dr Forbesse speaks unadvisedly whilst he saith,(1194) _Evenit nonnunquam_, &c.: “It falleth out sometimes that that which was expedient for thee to do yesterday, and to omit this day, thou mayest, notwithstanding, afterward either do it, or not do it, according to thy arbitrement:” As if, forsooth, our using of things indifferent should not evermore be determined by the rule of expediency which God’s word giveth us, but sometimes by our own will. Dr Davenant(1195) could not dream that any, except the ignorant common people, could be of this opinion which Dr Forbesse holdeth _Fallitur vulgus_, saith he, _dum judicat licere __ sibi, uti victu, vestitu, sermone, aut quacunque re adiaphora pro arbitrio suo; nam haec omnia ad regulam adhibenda sunt_.

Moreover, as we may not use any indifferent thing at our own pleasure; so neither may the church, at her will and pleasure, command the use of it: but as our practice, so the church’s injunction must be determined and squared according to the former rules. And if any man think that, in the using of things indifferent, he may be led and ruled by the church’s determination, without examining any further, let him understand that the church’s determination is but a subordinate rule, or a rule ruled by higher rules.

Dr Forbesse, perceiving how these rules of Scripture may subvert his cause, desireth to subject them to the church’s determination, and to make it our highest rule. _Jam autem_, saith he,(1196) _in talium rerum usu, id edificat, quod pacificum; illud est pacificum quod est ordinatum; is autem decens ordo est in ecclesia ab ipso Christo constitutus, ut in talibus non suo quisque se gerat arbitratu, sed audiatur ecclesia, et exhibeatur praepositis obedientia._

He hath been speaking of the rules which God’s word giveth us concerning the use of things indifferent; and all of them he comprehendeth under this rule, that we should hear the church, and obey them who are set over us, as if God’s rules were subordinate to men’s rules, and not theirs to his. We say not that every man may use things indifferent _sua arbitratu_, but we say withal, that neither may the church command the use of things indifferent _suo arbitratu_. Both she in commanding and we in obeying must be guided by the rules of Scripture.

They who are set over us in the church have no power given them of Christ which is not for edifying, Eph. iv. 12. The counsel of the apostles and elders at Jerusalem (which is a lively pattern of a lawful synod to the world’s end) professed they would lay no other burden upon the disciples except such things as the law of charity made necessary for shunning of scandal, Acts xv. 28; and so that which they decreed had force and strength to bind _a charitate propter scandalum_, saith Sanctius;(1197) but _suo arbitratu_ they enjoined nothing. Cartwright saith, “It appeareth by this place that there may be no abridgement of liberty simply decreed, but in regard of circumstance, according to the rule of edification.”(1198) And if the church’s decrees and canons be not according to the rules of the word; yet, forasmuch as every one of us shall give account of himself and his own deeds, we must look that whatsoever the church decree, yet our practice, in the use or omission of a thing indifferent, be according to the foresaid rules.

We may not, for the commandment of men, transgress the rule of piety, by doing anything which is not for God’s glory, and ordered according to his will; neither ought any of us to obey men, except “for the Lord’s sake,” 1 Pet. ii. 13, and “as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God,” Eph.