Chapter 30

THAT THE CEREMONIES TAKE AWAY OUR CHRISTIAN LIBERTY PROVED BY A SECOND REASON, NAMELY, BECAUSE CONSCIENCE ITSELF IS BOUND AND ADSTRICTED.

_Sect._ 1. Bishop Lindsey hath told us,(85) that the will of the law must be the rule of our conscience, so that conscience may not judge other ways than the law determines. Bishop Spotswood will have the sentence of superiors to direct the conscience,(86) and will have us to esteem that to be best and most seemly which seemeth so to them. Bishop Andrews, speaking of ceremonies,(87) not only will have every person inviolably to observe the rites and customs of his own church, but also will have the ordinances about those rites to be urged under pain of the anathema. I know not what the binding of the conscience is, if this be not it: _Apostolus gemendi partes relinquit, non cogendi auctoritatem tribuit ministris quibus plebs non auscultat_.(88) And shall they who call themselves the apostles’ successors, compel, constrain and enthral, the consciences of the people of God? Charles V., as popish as he was, did promise to the Protestants,(89) _Nullam vim ipsorum conscientiis illatum iri_. And shall a popish prince speak more reasonable than protestant prelates? But to make it yet more and plentifully to appear how miserably our opposites would enthral our consciences, I will here show, 1. What the binding of the conscience is. 2. How the laws of the church may be said to bind. 3. What is the judgment of formalists touching the binding-power of ecclesiastical laws.

_Sect._ 2. Concerning the first of these we will hear what Dr Field saith:(90) “To bind the conscience (saith he) is to bind the soul and spirit of man, with the fear of such punishments (to be inflicted by him that so bindeth) as the conscience feareth; that is, as men fear, though none but God and themselves be privy to their doings; now these are only such as God only inflicteth,” &c. This description is too imperfect, and deserves to be corrected. To bind the conscience is _illam auctoritatem habere, ut conscientia illi subjicere sese debeat, ita ut peccatum sit, si contra illam quidquam fiat_, saith Ames.(91) “The binder (saith Perkins(92)) is that thing whatsoever which hath power and authority over conscience to order it. To bind is to urge, cause, and constrain it in every action, either to accuse for sin, or to excuse for well-doing; or to say, this may be done, or it may not be done.” “To bind the conscience (saith Alsted(93)) _est illam urgere et adigere, ut vel excuset et accuset, vel indicet quid fieri aut non fieri possit_.” Upon these descriptions, which have more truth and reason in them, I infer that whatsoever urges, or forces conscience to assent to a thing as lawful, or a thing that ought to be done, or dissent from a thing as unlawful, or a thing which ought not to be done, that is a binder of conscience, though it did not bind the spirit of a man with the fear of such punishments as God alone inflicteth. For secluding all respect of punishment, and not considering what will follow, the very obliging of the conscience for the time, _ad assensum_, is a binding of it.(94)

_Sect._ 3. Touching the second, it is certain that human laws, as they come from men, and in respect of any force or authority which men can give them, have no power to bind the conscience. _Neque enim cum hominibus, sed cum uno Deo negotium est conscientis nostris_, saith Calvin.(95) Over our souls and consciences, _nemini quicquam juris nisi Deo_, saith Tilen.(96) From Jerome’s distinction, that a king _praeest nolentibus_ but a bishop _volentibus_, Marcus Antonius de Dominis well concludeth: _Volentibus gregi praeesso, excludit omnem jurisdictionem et potestatem imperativam ac coactivam et solam significat directivam, ubi, viz., in libertate subditi est et parere et non parere, ita ut qui praeest nihil habeat quo nolentem parere adigat ad parendum._(97) This point he proveth in that chapter at length, where he disputeth both against temporal and spiritual coactive jurisdiction in the church. If it be demanded to what purpose serveth then the enacting of ecclesiastical laws, since they have not in them any power to bind the conscience, I answer, The use and end for which ecclesiastical laws do serve is, 1. For the plain discovery of such things as the law of God or nature do require of us, so that law which of itself hath power to bind, cometh from the priests and ministers of the Lord neither ἀντοκρατορικῶς nor νομοθετικῶς, but _declarativè_, Mal. ii. 7. 2. For declaring to us what is fittest in such things as are, in their own nature, indifferent, and neither enforced by the law of God nor nature, and which part should be followed in these things as most convenient. The laws of the church, then, are appointed to let us see the necessity of the first kind of things, and what is expedient in the other kind of things, and therefore they are more properly called directions, instructions, admonitions, than laws. For I speak of ecclesiastical laws _qua tales_, that is, as they are the constitutions of men who are set over us; thus considered, they have only _vim dirigendi et monendi_.(98) It is said of the apostles, that they were constituted _doctrinae Christi testes, non novae doctrinae legist tores_.(99) And the same may be said of all the ministers of the gospel, when discipline is taken in with doctrine. He is no nonconformist who holdeth _ecclesiam in terris agere partes oratoris, seu legati obsecrantis et suadentis_.(100) And we may hitherto apply that which Gerson, the chancellor of Paris, saith:(101) “The wisest and best among the guides of God’s church had not so ill a meaning as to have all their constitutions and ordinances taken for laws properly so named, much less strictly binding the conscience, but for threatenings, admonitions, counsels, and directions only, and when there groweth a general neglect, they seem to consent to the abolishing of them again;” for seeing, _lex instituitur, cum promulgatur, vigorem habet, cum moribus utentium approbatur._

_Sect._ 4. But as we have seen in what respect the laws of the church do not bind, let us now see how they may be said to bind. That which bindeth is not the authority of the church, nor any force which the church can give to her laws. It must be then somewhat else which maketh them able to bind, when they bind at all, and that is _ratio legis_, “the reason of the law,” without which the law itself cannot bind, and which hath the chiefest and most principal power of binding. An ecclesiastical law, saith Junius,(102) διαταξις _sive depositio, non vere lex est, sed_ διατυπωσις aut canon, ac proindedirigit quidem ut canon agentem voluntarie: non autem necessitate cogit, ut lex etiam involuntarium quod si forte ante accedit coactio, ea non est de natura canonis sed altunde pervenit. An ecclesiastical canon, saith Tilen,(103) _ducit volentem, non trahit nolentem: quod si accedat coactio, ea ecclesiastici canonis natura est prorsus aliena_, Calvin’s judgment is,(104) that an ecclesiastical canon binds, when _manifestam utilitatem prae se fert_, and when either _tu prepon_ or _charitatis ratio_ doth require, that we impose a necessity on our liberty. It binds not, then, by its own authority in his mind. And what saith the canon law itself?(105) _Sed sciendum est quod ecclesiasticae prohibitiones proprias habent causas quibus cessantibus, cessant et ipsae._ Hence Junius saith,(106) that the law binds not _per se_, but only _propter ordinem charitatem, et cautionem scandali_. Hence Ames,(107) _quamvis ad justas leges humanas, justo modo observandas, obligentur homines in conscientiis suis a Deo; ipsae tamen leges humanae, qua sunt leges hominum, non obligant conscientiam._ Hence Alsted:(108) “Laws made by men of things indifferent, whether they be civil or ecclesiastical, do bind the conscience, in so far as they agree with God’s word, serve for the public good, maintain order, and finally, take not away liberty of conscience.” Hence the professors of Leyden say,(109) that laws bind not _primo et per se, sed secundario, et per accidens_; that is,(110) _quatenus in illis lex aliqua Dei violator_. Hence I may compare the constitutions of the church with _responsa juris consultorum_ among the Romans, which obliged no man, _nisi ex aequo et bono_, saith Daneus.(111) Hence it may be said, that the laws of the church do not only bind _scandali et contemptus ratione_, as Hospinian,(112) and in case _libertas fiat cum scandalo_, as Parcus;(113) for it were scandal not to give obedience to the laws of the church, when they prescribe things necessary or expedient for the eschewing of scandal, and it were contempt to refuse obedience to them, when we are not certainly persuaded of the unlawfulness or inexpediency of the things prescribed.

_Sect._ 5. But out of the case of scandal or contempt, divines teach that conscience is not bound by the canon of the church made about order and policy. _Extra casum scandali et destinatae rebellionis, propter commune bonum, non peccat qui contra constitutiones istas fecerit_, saith Junius.(114) “If a law (saith Perkins)(115) concerning some external right or thing indifferent, be at some time or upon some occasion omitted, no offence given, nor contempt showed to ecclesiastical authority, there is no breach made in the conscience.” Alsted’s rule is,(116) _Leges humanae non obligant quando omitti possunt sine impedimento finis ob quem feruntur sine scandalo aliorum, et sine contemptu legislatoris._ And Tilen teacheth us,(117) that when the church hath determined the mutable circumstances, in the worship of God, for public edification, _privatorum conscientiis liberum est quandoque ista omittere, modo offendicula vitentur, nihil que ex contemptu ecclesiae ac ministerii publici petulanti καινοτομια vel κειοδοξια facere videantur._

_Sect._ 6. We deny not, then, that the church’s canons about rites, which serve for public order and edification, do bind. We say only, that it is not the authority of the church framing the canon that binds, but the matter of the canon chiefly warranted by God’s word.(118) _Scimus enim quaecunque ad decorum et ordinem pertinent, non habenda esse pro humanis placitas, quia divinitus approbantur._ Therefore we think concerning such canons, “that they are necessary to be observed so far forth only, as the keeping of them maintaineth decent order, and preventeth open offence.”(119)

_Sect._ 7. If any say that I derogate much from the authority of the church when I do nothing which she prescribeth, except I see it lawful and expedient, because I should do this much for the exhortation and admonition of a brother. _Ans._ 1. I give far more reverence to the direction of the church than to the admonition of a brother, because that is ministerial, this fraternal, that comes from authority, this only from charity, that is public, this private, that is given by many, this by one. And, finally, the church hath a calling to direct me in some things wherein a brother hath not. 2. If it be still instanced that, in the point of obedience, I do no more for the church than for any brother, because I am bound to do that which is made evident to be lawful and expedient, though a private Christian do but exhort me to it, or whether I be exhorted to it or not. For answer to this I say, that I will obey the directions of the church in many things rather than the directions of a brother; for in two things which are in themselves indifferent, and none of them inexpedient, I will do that which the church requireth, though my brother should exhort me to the contrary. But always I hold me at this sure ground, that I am never bound in conscience to obey the ordinances of the church, except they be evidently lawful and expedient. This is that, _sine quo non obligant_, and also that which doth chiefly bind, though it be not the only thing which bindeth. Now, for making the matter more plain, we must consider that the constitutions of the church are either lawful or unlawful. If unlawful, they bind not at all; if lawful, they are either concerning things necessary, as Acts xv. 28, and then the necessity of the things doth bind, whether the church ordain them or not; or else concerning things indifferent, as when the church ordaineth, that in great towns there shall be sermon on such a day of the week, and public prayers every day at such an hour. Here it is not the bare authority of the church that bindeth, without respect to the lawfulness or expediency of the thing itself which is ordained (else we were bound to do every thing which the church ordains, were it never so unlawful, for _quod competit alicui qua tali, competit omni tali_: we behold the authority of the church making laws, as well in unlawful ordinances as in lawful), nor yet is it the lawfulness or expediency of the thing itself, without respect to the ordinance of the church (for possibly other times and diets were as lawful, and expedient too, for such exercises, as those ordained by the church); but it is the authority of the church prescribing a thing lawful or expedient. In such a case, then neither doth the authority of the church bind, except the thing be lawful and expedient, nor doth the lawfulness and expediency of the thing bind, except the church ordain it; but both these jointly do bind.

_Sect._ 8. I come now to examine what is the judgment of formalists touching the binding of the conscience by ecclesiastical laws. Dr Field saith, that the question should not be proposed, whether human laws do bind the conscience, but “whether binding the outward man to the performance of outward things by force and fear of outward punishment to be inflicted by men, the non-performance of such things, or the non-performance of them with such affections as were fit, be not a sin against God, of which the conscience will accuse us,”(120) &c. Unto this question thus proposed and understood of human laws, and where no more is considered as giving them power to bind, but only the authority of those who make them; some formalists do give (as I will show), and all of them (being well advised) must give an affirmative answer. And, I pray, what did Bellarmine say more,(121) when, expressing how conscience is subject to human authority, he taught that conscience belongeth _ad humanum forum, quatenus homo ex praecepto ita obligator ad opus externum faciendum, ut si non faciat, judicat ipse in conscientia sua se male facere, et hoc sufficit ad conscientiam obligandam?_ But to proceed particularly.

_Sect._ 9. I begin with Field himself, whose resolution of the question proposed is,(122) that we are bound only to give obedience to such human laws as prescribe things profitable, not for that human laws have power to bind the conscience, but because the things they command are of that nature, that not to perform them is contrary to justice or charity. Whereupon he concludeth out of Stapleton, that we are bound to the performance of things prescribed by human laws, in such sort, that the non-performance of them is sin, not _ex sola legislatoris voluntate, sed ex ipsa legum utilitate_. Let all such as be of this man’s mind not blame us for denying of obedience to the constitutions about the ceremonies, since we find (for certain) no utility, but, by the contrary, much inconveniency in them. If they say that we must think those laws to be profitable or convenient, which they, who are set over us, think to be so, then they know not what they say. For, exempting conscience from being bound by human laws in one thing, they would have it bound by them in another thing. If conscience must needs judge that to be profitable, which seemeth so to those that are set over us, then, sure, is power given to them for binding the conscience so straitly, that it may not judge otherwise than they judge, and force is placed in their bare authority for necessitating and constraining the assenting judgment of conscience.

_Sect._ 10. Some man perhaps will say that we are bound to obey the laws made about the ceremonies, though not for the sole will of the law-makers, nor yet for any utility of the laws themselves, yet for this reason, that scandal and contempt would follow in case we do otherwise. _Ans._ We know that human laws do bind in the case of scandal or contempt. But that nonconformity is neither scandal nor contempt, Parker hath made it most evident.(123) For, as touching contempt, he showeth out of fathers, councils, canon law, schoolmen, and modern divines, that _non obedire_ is not contempt, but _nolle obedire_, or _superbiendo repugnare_. Yea, out of Formalists themselves, he showeth the difference betwixt subjection and obedience. Thereafter he pleadeth thus, and we with him: “What signs see men in us of pride and contempt? What be our _cetera opera_ that bewray such an humour? Let it be named wherein we go not two miles, when we are commanded to go but one, yea, wherein we go not as many miles as any shoe of the preparation of the gospel will bear us. What payment, what pain, what labour, what taxation made us ever to murmur? Survey our charges where we have laboured, if they be not found to be of the faithfulest subjects that be in the Lord, we deserve no favour. Nay, there is wherein we stretch our consciences to the utmost to conform and to obey in divers matters. Are we refractory in other things, as Balaam’s ass said to his master? Have I used to serve thee so at other times?” And as touching scandal, he showeth first, that by our not conforming, we do not scandalise superiors, but edify them, although it may be we displease them, of which we are sorry, even as Joab displeased David when he contested against the numbering of the people, yet did he not scandalise David, but edify him. And, secondly, whereas it might be alleged, that nonconformity doth scandalise the people, before whom it soundeth as it were an alarm of disobedience, we reply with him, “Daniel will not omit the ceremony of looking out at the window towards Jerusalem. Mordecai omitteth the ceremony of bowing the knee to Haman; Christ will not use the ceremony of washing hands, though a tradition of the elders and governors of the church then being. The authority of the magistrate was violated by these, and an incitement to disobedience was in their ceremonial breach, as much as there is now in ours.”

_Sect._ 11. But some of our opposites go about to derive the obligatory power of the church’s laws, not so much from the utility of the laws themselves, or from any scandal which should follow upon the not obeying of them, as from the church’s own authority which maketh them. Camero speaketh of two sorts of ecclesiastical laws:(124) 1. Such as prescribe things frivolous or unjust, meaning such things as (though they neither detract anything from the glory of God, nor cause any damage to our neighbour, yet) bring some detriment to ourselves. 2. Such as prescribe things belonging to order and shunning of scandal. Touching the former, he teacheth rightly, that conscience is never bound to the obedience of such laws, except only in the case of scandal and contempt, and that if at any time such laws may be neglected and not observed, without scandal given, or contempt shown, no man’s conscience is holden with them. But touching the other sort of the church’s laws, he saith, that they bind the conscience indirectly, not only _respectu materiæ præcepti_ (which doth not at all oblige, except in respect of the end whereunto it is referred, namely, the conserving of order, and the not giving of scandal), but also _respectu præcipientis_, because God will not have those who are set over us in the church to be contemned. He foresaw (belike), that whereas it is pretended in behalf of those ecclesiastical laws which enjoin the controverted ceremonies, that the things which they prescribe pertain to order and to the shunning of scandal, and so bind the conscience indirectly in respect of the end, one might answer, I am persuaded upon evident grounds that those prescribed ceremonies pertain not to order, and to the shunning of scandal, but to misorder, and to the giving of scandal; therefore he laboured to bind such an one’s conscience with another tie, which is the authority of the law-makers. And this authority he would have one to take as ground enough to believe, that that which the church prescribeth doth belong to order and the shunning of scandal, and in that persuasion to do it. But, 1. How doth this doctrine differ from that which himself setteth down as the opinion of Papists,(125) _Posse los qui præsunt ecclesiæ, cogere fideles ut id credant vel faciant, quod ipsi judicaverint?_ 2. It is well observed by our writers,(126) that the apostles never made things indifferent to be necessary, except only in respect of scandal, and that out of the case of scandal they still left the consciences of men free, which observation they gather from Acts XV. and 1 Cor. x. Camero himself noteth,(127) that though the church prescribed abstinence from things sacrificed to idols, yet the Apostle would not have the faithful to abstain for conscience’ sake: why then holdeth he, that beside the end of shunning scandal and keeping order, conscience is bound even by the church’s own authority? 3. As for the reason whereby he would prove that the church’s laws do bind, even _respectu præcipientis_, his form of speaking is very bad. _Deus_ (saith he) _non vult contemni præpositos ecclesiæ, nisi justa et necessaria de causa._ Where falsely he supposeth, not only that there may occur a just and necessary cause of contemning those whom God hath set over us in the church, but, also, that the not obeying of them inferreth the contemning of them. Now, the not obeying of their laws inferreth not the contemning of themselves (which were not allowable), but only the contemning of their laws. And as Jerome,(128) speaketh of Daniel, _Et nunc Daniel regis jussa contemnens_, &c.; so we say of all superiors in general, that we may sometimes have just reasons for contemning their commandments, yet are we not to contemn, but to honour themselves. But, 4. Let us take Camero’s meaning to be, that God will not have us to refuse obedience unto those who are set over us in the church: none of our opposites dare say, that God will have us to obey those who are set over us in the church in any other things than such as may be done both lawfully and conveniently for the shunning of scandal; and if so, then the church’s precept cannot bind, except as it is grounded upon such or such reasons.

_Sect._ 12. Bishop Spotswood and Bishop Lindsey, in those words which I have heretofore alleged out of them, are likewise of opinion, that the sole will and authority of the church doth bind the conscience to obedience. Spotswood will have us, without more ado, to esteem that to be best and most seemly, which seemeth so in the eye of public authority. Is not this to bind the conscience by the church’s bare will and authority, when I must needs constrain the judgment of my conscience to be conformed to the church’s judgment, having no other reason to move me hereunto but the sole will and authority of the church? Further, he will have us to obey even such things as authority prescribeth not rightly (that is, such rites as do not set forward godliness), and that because they have the force of a constitution. He saith that we should be directed by the sentence of superiors, and take it as a sufficient ground to our consciences for obeying. Bellarmine speaketh more reasonably:(129) _Legesæ human non obligant sub pœna mortis æternæ, nisi quatenus violatione legis humanæ offenditur Deus._ Lindsey thinketh that the will of the law must be the rule of our consciences; he saith not the _reason_ of the law, but the _will_ of the law. And when we talk with the chief of our opposites, they would bind us by sole authority, because they cannot do it by any reason. But we answer out of Pareus,(130) that the particular laws of the church bind not _per se_, or _propter ipsum speciale mandatum ecclesiæ. Ratio: quia ecclesia res adiaphoras non jubet facere vel omittere propter suum mandatum, sed tantum propter justas mandandi causas, ut sunt conservatio ordinis, vitatio scandali: quæ quamdiu non violantur, conscientias liberas relinquit._

_Sect._ 13. Thus we have found what power they give to their canons about the ceremonies for binding of our consciences, and that a necessity not of practice only upon the outward man, but of opinion also upon the conscience is imposed by the sole will of the law-makers. Wherefore, we pray God to open their eyes, that they may see their ceremonial laws to be substantial tyrannies over the consciences of God’s people. And for ourselves, we stand to the judgment of sounder divines, and we hold with Luther,(131) that _unum Dominum habemus qui animas nostras gubernat._ With Hemmingius,(132) that we are free _ab omnibus humanis ritibus, quantum quidem ad conscientiam attinet._ With the Professors of Leyden,(133) that this is a part of the liberty of all the faithful, that in things pertaining to God’s worship, _ab omni traditionum humanarum jugo liberas habeant conscientias, cum solius Dei sit, res ad religionem pertinentes praescribere_.